The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not the Respondent's (Division of Retirement) denial of Petitioner's claim to buy for retirement credit purposes, service while she was a student nurse during the period August, 1941 through December, 1944 was proper.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. The facts herein are virtually undisputed. From August, 1941, through December, 1944, Petitioner was a student nurse at Florida State Hospital (Hospital) at Chattahoochee, Florida. As a student nurse, Petitioner worked twelve (12) hours a day, six and one-half (6-1/2) days per week with one full day off each month. During the weekdays, Petitioner spent time in class, with the remainder of time spent in the wards at the Hospital. Petitioner averaged between thirty-nine (39) and forty-seven (47) hours of work per week at the Hospital. As a student nurse, Petitioner received a salary of $15.00 per month in addition to her room, board, uniform and various fringe benefits such as medical care and leave, much like other Hospital employees. Personnel problems were resolved through the personnel office as with other employees. Petitioner returned to work at the Hospital as a Registered Nurse in October, 1954, and has worked almost continually to the present time. During the period 1970 through early 1972, employees of Florida State Hospital were given the opportunity to participate in the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner participated in that retirement system. During the period 1970 through 1972, various state retirement systems, including SCOERS, merged and formed the present Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner was given the option to transfer to FRS and in fact exercised that option by designating that election on a ballot provided by the personnel office at Florida State Hospital (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). The effective date of that transfer to FRS is December 1, 1970. During the period 1970 through early 1972, Respondent permitted transferees of the SCOERS retirement system to transfer student nurse credits as part of the retirement credits in the same manner as "full-time work" for retirement credit purposes. In early 1972, Respondent changed its policy of allowing work as a student nurse to be credited toward retirement benefits. C. J. Brock has been the personnel manager at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee since approximately 1968. He was initially hired at the Hospital in 1955. As personnel manager, Mr. Brock is in charge of submitting employee claims for retirement credits for various types of employment service to FRS for retirement benefits.' Mr. Brock recalled Petitioner visiting his office pan various occasions between the periods 1963 through 1972 inquiring as to the manner for purchasing student time for retirement credit purposes. Mr. Brock advised Petitioner that he would research the wage statements to determine the exact amount of student time she had earned and would refer the matter to FRS for a decision, Mr. Brock is not authorized to act for or on behalf of Respondent. The interaction between the Hospital's personnel officer and Respondent is limited to the referral of claims and certification of wage and employment statements. As such, there is no agency relationship between the Hospital and Respondent. This referral was made by Mr. Brock on Petitioner's behalf on December 20, 1972, and the request was denied. Former student nurses who were members of SCOERS and transferred to FRS during the periods 1970 through early 1972 had been allowed to purchase retirement credit for their student nurse service. This practice ended in early 1972. In this regard, Mr. Brock has certified the payroll records for student nurses who purchased retirement credit for their student nurse time, Ruth Sampson, Assistant Bureau Chief for the Division of Retireent, has primarily been involved in reviewing retirement benefit calculations since approximately 1969. Mrs. Sampson is familiar with the merger of SCOERS and FRS. Mrs. Sampson affirmed that Respondent had a policy which allowed members of SCOERS who transferred to FRS to purchase retirement credit for student employment time and that such policy was followed from December 1, 1970 (the inception of FRS) to early 1972. This policy was also followed by the SCOERS administrator prior to December 1, 1970. This unwritten policy was changed, according to Mrs. Sampson for two primary reasons. First, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, did not permit the purchase of student time. Secondly, with the combination of SCOERS and the Teacher Retirement System (TRS) into the combined FRS system, an inequity existed since TRS members, unlike student nurses, were not allowed to purchase student time. As stated, the letter from Mr. Brock certifying Petitioner's employment and wage statements for the period in question was dated December 20, 1972. Mrs. Sampson, by letter dated March 30, 1973, requested additional information respecting the salary paid Petitioner and the amount of time she actually spent working at the Hospital during the period in question. Mr. Brock replied by letter dated April 4, 1973, advising that during the period in question, Petitioner was a student nurse at the Hospital which paid a full-time salary of $15.00 per month. By letter dated May 14, 1973, Mrs. Sampson denied Petitioner's claim since Petitioner was primarily a student during the period that the prior service claim was submitted (Joint Exhibit No. 1). Mr. Robert L. Kennedy, Jr. , the former Director of FRS, appeared and related that the policy decision was made to discontinue the practice of allowing student time to be credited for retirement purposes since that practice was not contemplated by pertinent statutes. Former Director Kennedy disagreed with the Comptroller's policy decision which had previously allowed this practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner's appeal of the State Retirement Director's decision denying her request to purchase prior service credit for her service as a student nurse be DENIED. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the decision of the State Retirement Director be SUSTAINED. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Stafman, Esquire Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire PATTERSON and TRAYNHAN Division of Retirement 1215 Thomasville Road Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32302 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box .81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what amount?
Findings Of Fact The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat.; and Order and Mandate in Case No. 1D04-4167, First District Court of Appeal. Section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes, reads as follows: (5) In administrative proceedings under chapter 120, an administrative law judge shall award a reasonable attorney's fee and damages to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and a losing party's attorney or qualified representative in the same manner and upon the same basis as provided in subsections (1)-(4). Such award shall be a final order subject to judicial review pursuant to s. 120.68. If the losing party is an agency as defined in s. 120.52(1), the award to the prevailing party shall be against and paid by the agency. A voluntary dismissal by a nonprevailing party does not divest the administrative law judge of jurisdiction to make the award described in this subsection. Subsection (5) of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, directs the undersigned to the preceding subsections which set forth standards to be applied in the analysis of entitlement to attorney’s fees. Subsection (1) provides that reasonable attorney’s fees shall be awarded to the prevailing party to be paid by the losing party where the losing party or the losing party’s attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense, when initially presented to the administrative tribunal or at any time before the administrative hearing, “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense or [w]ould not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” The standards set forth in Subsection (1) and incorporated by reference in Subsection (5) were the result of an amendment to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, in 1999. s. 4, Ch. 99-225, Laws of Florida. Prior to that amendment, the statute provided for the award of attorney’s fees when “there was a complete absence of justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the complaint or defense of the losing party.” These new standards became applicable to administrative hearings in 2003 by s. 9, Ch. 2003-94, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of June 4, 2003. Petitioner filed his Petition for Administrative Hearing in September 2003. Accordingly, the newer standards of Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, apply to this case. In the case of Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), the court discussed the legislative changes to Section 57.105: [T]his statute was amended in 1999 as part of the 1999 Tort Reform Act in an effort to reduce frivolous litigation and thereby to decrease the cost imposed on the civil justice system by broadening the remedies that were previously available. See Ch. 99- 225, s. 4, Laws of Florida. Unlike its predecessor, the 1999 version of the statute no longer requires a party to show a complete absence of a justiciable issue of fact or law, but instead allows recovery of fees for any claims or defenses that are unsupported. (Citations omitted) However, this Court cautioned that section 57.105 must be applied carefully to ensure that it serves the purpose for which it was intended, which was to deter frivolous pleadings. (Citations omitted) In determining whether a party is entitled to statutory attorney's fees under section 57.105, Florida Statutes, frivolousness is determined when the claim or defense was initially filed; if the claim or defense is not initially frivolous, the court must then determine whether the claim or defense became frivolous after the suit was filed. (Citation omitted) In so doing, the court determines if the party or its counsel knew or should have known that the claim or defense asserted was not supported by the facts or an application of existing law.(Citation omitted) An award of fees is not always appropriate under section 57.105, even when the party seeking fees was successful in obtaining the dismissal of the action or summary judgment in an action. (Citation omitted) Wendy's v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 523. The court in Wendy’s recognized that the new standard is difficult to define and must be applied on a case-by-case basis: While the revised statute incorporates the ‘not supported by the material facts or would not be supported by application of then-existing law to those material facts’ standard instead of the ‘frivolous’ standard of the earlier statute, an all encompassing definition of the new standard defies us. It is clear that the bar for imposition of sanctions has been lowered, but just how far it has been lowered is an open question requiring a case by case analysis. Wendy’s v. Vandergriff, 865 So. 2d 520, 524 citing Mullins v. Kennelly, 847 So. 2d at 1155, n.4. (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). More recently, the First District Court of Appeal further described the legislative change: The 1999 version lowered the bar a party must overcome before becoming entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 57.105, Florida Statutes . . . Significantly, the 1999 version of 57.105 ‘applies to any claim or defense, and does not require that the entire action be frivolous.’ Albritton v. Ferrera, 913 So. 2d 5, 6 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), quoting Mullins v. Kennelly, supra. The Florida Supreme Court has noted that the 1999 amendments to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes, “greatly expand the statute’s potential use.” Boca Burger, Inc. v. Richard Forum, 912 So. 2d 561, 570, (Fla. 2005). The phrase “supported by the material facts” found in Section 57.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, was defined by the court in Albritton to mean that the “party possesses admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the finder of fact.” Albritton, 913 So. 2d 5, at 7, n.1. Therefore, the first question is whether FAMU or its attorneys knew or should have known that its defense of Dr. Jain’s claim was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the defense when the case was initially filed or at any time before trial. That is, did FAMU possess admissible evidence sufficient to establish its defense. The parties filed a Pretrial Stipulation the day before the hearing. The Pretrial Stipulation characterized FAMU’s position as follows: It is the position of the University that Dr. Babu Jain retired at the close of business on May 30, 2003, pursuant to the provision of the DROP retirement program. Dr. Jain did not have the right, nor the authority, to unilaterally rescind his resignation and retirement date. In a letter dated May 5, 2003, the Division of Retirement informed Dr. Jain that it was providing him with the “DROP VOID” form that had to be signed by himself and the University, for his participation in DROP to be rescinded. No University official signed that form nor agreed to rescind his retirement. On May 30, 2003, Dr. Babu Jain knew that his retirement through DROP had not been voided and that he had in-fact retired. The University included the position that Dr. Jain occupied in its vacancy announcement in the ‘Chronicle of Higher Education.’ The University, through Dr. Larry Robinson notified Dr. Jain that his retirement rescission was not accepted. Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003. Finally, there was never a ‘meeting of the minds’, nor any other agreement between the University and Dr. Jain to void his retirement commitment. It [is] the University’s position that Dr. Babu Jain retired from Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University effective at the close of business on May 30, 2003. Pretrial Stipulation at 14-15. (emphasis in original) The material facts known by FAMU necessary to establish its defense against Petitioner's claim at the time the case was filed included: Petitioner’s initial Notice of Election to Participate in DROP and Resignation of Employment in which Dr. Jain resigned effective the date he terminated from DROP (designated as May 30, 2003); Dr. Robinson’s letter dated May 27, 2003, which asserted that the University was not in agreement with Dr. Jain's decision and that the decision to terminate from DROP is a mutual one; Dr. Robinson's letter of May 30, 2003, which informed Dr. Jain that the two summer semester employment contracts were issued to him in error and informing Dr. Jain that he would be paid through May 30, 2003, his designated DROP date; the refusal of anyone from FAMU to sign the DROP-VOID form provided to Dr. Jain by the Division of Retirement; the reassignment of another instructor to take over Dr. Jain’s classes the first Monday following the designated DROP termination date; and the Refund of Overpayment of Salary Form and resulting salary deduction from Dr. Jain’s sick leave payout. It is difficult to determine what, if any, additional facts FAMU learned through discovery. That is, whether deposition testimony of FAMU officials enlightened FAMU or its attorneys as to material facts not known at the time the case was filed by Dr. Jain, is not readily apparent. However, a review of the pre-trial depositions reveals material facts which supported FAMU’s defense that the summer contracts were issued in error and that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties regarding voiding Dr. Jain’s DROP participation. In particular, Dr. Robinson, Provost and Vice- President for Academic Affairs, testified in deposition that when he signed Dr. Jain’s summer employment contracts on May 20, 2003, he had no knowledge of Dr. Jain’s participation in the DROP program; that he first became aware that Dr. Jain was in DROP with a DROP termination date of May 30, 2003, upon receiving a May 21, 2003, memorandum from Nellie Woodruff, Director of the FAMU Personnel Office; and that Dean Larry Rivers did not have the authority to issue work assignments for any of his faculty beyond their DROP dates. Additionally, Dr. Henry Williams, Assistant Dean for Science and Technology, testified in deposition that when he signed the Recommendation for Summer Employment on May 5, 2003, which recommended Dr. Jain for teaching summer courses beginning May 12, 2003, he was unaware that there was a 30-day window during which a DROP participant could not be employed. Obviously, when the undersigned weighed all of the evidence, including evidence presented at hearing which is not part of this analysis, it was determined that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of Dr. Jain’s position. However, that is not the standard to be applied here. The undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU possessed admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact that it did not give written agreement to his decision to abandon DROP and resume employment if accepted by the finder of fact. While the finder of fact ultimately did not agree with FAMU, FAMU possessed the material facts necessary to establish the defense, i.e., admissible evidence sufficient to establish the fact if accepted by the trier of fact, when the case was filed and prior to the final hearing. The second question is whether FAMU’s defense would not be supported by the application of then existing law to those material facts, when the case was initially filed or at any time before the final hearing. In the Pretrial Stipulation, the parties referenced Sections 121.091(13) and 121.021(39), Florida Statutes, as provisions of law relevant to the determination of the issues in the case.2/ These statutory provisions were also referenced by the undersigned in the Recommended Order as “two competing statutory provisions.” Recommended Order at 15. Subsection 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, establishing the DROP program, was created by s. 8, Ch. 97-180, Laws of Florida, with an effective date of January 1, 1999.3/ Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: DEFERRED RETIREMENT OPTION PROGRAM.--In general, and subject to the provisions of this section, the Deferred Retirement Option Program, hereinafter referred to as the DROP, is a program under which an eligible member of the Florida Retirement System may elect to participate, deferring receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with his or her Florida Retirement System employer. The deferred monthly benefits shall accrue in the System Trust Fund on behalf of the participant, plus interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of the DROP participation, as provided in paragraph (c). Upon termination of employment, the participant shall receive the total DROP benefits and begin to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Participation in the DROP does not guarantee employment for the specified period of DROP. Participation in the DROP by an eligible member beyond the initial 60-month period as authorized in this subsection shall be on an annual contractual basis for all participants. Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), read as follows: 'Termination' for a member electing to participate under the Deferred Retirement Option Program occurs when the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant ceases all employment relationships with employers under this system in accordance with s. 121.091(13), but in the event the Deferred Retirement Option Program participant should be employed by any such employer within the next calendar month, termination will be deemed not to have occurred, except as provided in s. 121.091(13)(b)4.c. A leave of absence shall constitute a continuation of the employment relationship. Unlike the situation in Albritton, supra, the DROP program was relatively new and the statutes creating the same were not well established provisions of law. Dr. Jain was in the first “class” of DROP for FAMU. FAMU and its lawyers did not have the benefit of established case law that discussed DROP and its provisions when this case was filed or at any time before the hearing. While general contract law also came into play, it had to be considered in the context of the DROP program, which had no precedent of case law. FAMU argues in its Response to the Motion for Attorney's Fees that it interpreted the provision in Section 121.091(13), Florida Statutes, that requires written approval of the employer to be either the DROP VOID form provided by the Division of Retirement or a written document, executed by the designated University official, specifically approving Petitioner's decision. "The University did not believe the employment contracts that were issued to Petitioner in error, would constitute written approval." FAMU's Response at 5. This argument is consistent with the position FAMU took in the Pretrial Statement quoted above, that there was never a meeting of the minds "or any other agreement" that Dr. Jain's retirement rescission was accepted. A critical conclusion in the Recommended Order is found in paragraph 38: "Moreover, while the FAMU administration did not sign the DROP-VOID form, the contracts issued to Dr. Jain constitute written approval of Dr. Jain's employer regarding modification of his termination date." FAMU also took the position in the Pretrial Stipulation that Dr. Jain did not work past May 30, 2003, based upon the material facts recited above. Under that reading of the facts, Dr. Jain did not work during the next calendar month after DROP, and, therefore terminated employment consistent with the definition of "termination" in Section 121.021(39)(b), Florida Statutes. Again, while the undersigned did not agree with FAMU's application of the material facts to the then-existing law, FAMU's interpretation was not completely without merit. See Mullins v. Kennerly, 847 So. 2d 1151, 1155. (Case completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by reasonable argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law is a guideline for determining if an action is frivolous.) Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that at the time the case was filed and prior to the commencement of the hearing, FAMU did not know and could not be expected to know that its defense would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to the material facts necessary to establish the defense. Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is ORDERED: Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2006.
The Issue The basic issue in this case is whether the Petitioner, Mr. Joseph M. Lesko, violated the provisions of Section 238.181(2)(a), Florida Statutes, by being reemployed within twelve (12) months of retirement by an agency participating in the Florida Retirement System, and, if so, whether his retirement benefits were overpaid and need to be refunded to the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Joseph M. Lesko was employed as an instructor with the Palm Beach Community College (hereinafter "the College") and retired under the provisions of the Teachers' Retirement System (hereinafter "TRS"), Chapter 238, Florida Statutes, on July 1, 1986. In October of 1986 a science instructor at the College suffered a stroke and was unable to continue working. Dr. Paul Dasher, then the Chairman of the College's Science Department, called Mr. Lesko and asked him to be a substitute instructor for some of the classes of the instructor who had suffered the stroke. Mr. Lesko, a former Senior instructor in Chemistry, was the only qualified candidate who was known to be available on short notice. Although Mr. Lesko had not intended to teach at that point in his retirement, he agreed to teach for the balance of the semester to help the College during the incapacity of the stricken instructor. When the stricken instructor was unable to return during the next semester, Mr. Lesko also agreed to substitute in Chemistry for the following semester. The incapacitated instructor died in March of 1987, and Mr. Lesko finished substitute teaching for the balance of the semester. At the time Mr. Lesko was reemployed as described above, the College's Director of Human Resources, Mr. Schneider, was not aware that Mr. Lesko had retired under the TRS, because the vast majority of the College's instructors retire under the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Schneider believed that Mr. Lesko was covered by certain amendments to the Florida Retirement System that became effective in July of 1986. Those amendments allowed retired instructors who retired under the Florida Retirement System to be reemployed by community colleges on a noncontractual and part time basis after one month of retirement without loss of retirement benefits. Mr. Schneider was under the erroneous impression that those amendments applied to all retired instructors, because he did not recall receiving any information from the Division of Retirement indicating that retirees under TRS were to be treated differently from retirees under the Florida Retirement System for purposes of eligibility for reemployment. Three other instructors who retired at the same time as Mr. Lesko, and who were rehired during the same time period as Mr. Lesko, have not been required to repay any retirement benefits because they all retired under the Florida Retirement System. Neither Mr. Schneider nor Mr. Lesko were aware that Mr. Lesko's retirement benefit would be jeopardized by his returning to work for the College in October of 1986. Both believe that the information regarding TRS retirees provided by the Division of Retirement is at least unclear, if not misleading. Mr. Lesko would not have returned to teach at the College during the first year of his retirement if he had been aware that doing so would require him to lose his retirement benefits during that period. During the period from October 1986 through May 1987, Mr. Lesko earned $4,460.60 for the services he provided to the College. During that same period he received retirement benefits of $6,506.72.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be issued in this case requiring Mr. Lesko to repay retirement benefits to the Division of Retirement in the amount of $6,506.72. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2 day of April, 1990. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 2 day of April, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-5717 The following are my specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Findings submitted by Petitioner: First page, First unnumbered paragraph: All covered in the Preliminary statement portion of this Recommended Order. First Page, Second unnumbered paragraph: Accepted in substance. Second Page, Paragraph No. 1: Accepted in substance. Second Page, Paragraph No. 2: Accepted in substance. Second Page, Paragraph No. 3: Accepted in part and rejected in part; rejected portion is portion following the comma. The rejected portion is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second Page, paragraph No. 4: Accepted in substance. Third Page, Paragraph No. 5: Rejected as irrelevant to the disposition of this case. Third Page, Paragraph No. 6: Rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details. Third Page, Paragraph No. 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as constituting argument, rather than findings of fact. Third Page, Last paragraph of Findings: Rejected as constituting commentary about the proceedings, rather than proposed findings of fact. Findings proposed by Respondent: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance, with certain unnecessary details omitted. Paragraphs 3 and 4: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary procedural details. Paragraphs 5 and 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Joseph M. Lesko 184 Meadows Drive Boynton Beach, Florida 33462 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ida L. Salz, began her employment as a classroom teacher in 1942 with the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri. The Central Institute for the Deaf is a private, non-profit agency and has been such ever since its beginning in 1914. Mrs. Salz worked for the institute as a classroom teacher for eight (8) years. She moved to Florida in 1954 and began employment with the public schools in January, 1955, at which time she also became a member of the Teachers' Retirement System. When she started her employment with the Dade County School System, she completed an enrollment application form which is required of all teachers in the public school systems of Florida. The purpose of the enrollment form was to identify the member, to provide beneficiary designation, to establish the beginning date of employment and the beginning date of membership in the Teachers' Retirement System. In 1966, she inquired of the (then) Teachers' Retirement System regarding her right to purchase credit for the eight (8) years of out-of-state teaching service from Missouri. She was informed shortly thereafter by the Teachers' Retirement System (Mr. B. M. Kelley) that she would be allowed to purchase eight (8) years of credit for hem Missouri teaching time. The Petitioner received a letter from Mr. B. M. Kelley employed by the Respondent, in September 2, 1966, stating that she could make periodic personal remittances to the Teachers' Retirement System in any amount she desired. She made periodic payments to the Teachers' Retirement System and on November 28, 1977, made the final payment of the amount due to the Teachers' Retirement System representing the eight (8) years prior service credit which she was purchasing. The Petitioner retired on June 15, 1981. She thereupon made application to the Respondent for retirement benefits. The Petitioner is sixty- four (64) years of age and has been a classroom teacher since 1942. The Petitioner's husband had previously retired on April 1, 1979,and is now sixty- seven (67) years old. The Petitioner's and her husband's retirement plans were based upon their belief that her retirement benefits would be computed based upon credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state Missouri service. The Petitioner would not have retired in July of 1981 had she not been in the belief, since 1966, that she would receive credit for her eight (8) years of out-of-state service. She relied on the Division of Retirement's representation in 1966 that she would have credit for those eight (8) years out-of-state service and had computed her expected retirement benefits and personal budget based on this information. Had the Petitioner known that after her retirement benefits resulting from the eight (8) years out-of-state service would be denied, she would not have retired, since the income so generated is insufficient to adequately support her and her husband. Upon receipt of the Petitioner's retirement application by the Division, the Bureau of Retirement Calculation reviewed the Petitioner's file for compliance with the statute and appropriate rules and regulations. It determined that the eight (8) years out-of-state service was not creditable because it was in a private school. The Respondent took the position that the so-called approval given the Petitioner in 1966 to purchase the service time related to her private school teaching was a "clerical error or a oversight" by the division. In a letter of August 3, 1981, Mr. A. J. McMullian, III, Director of the division, advised the Petitioner that the out-of-state service had been erroneously allowed to her, that the contribution she had paid for it would be returned, and that she would not get retirement credit for those eight (8) years. The personnel of the Teachers' Retirement System (later the Division of Retirement) are unilaterally responsible for the investigation in 1966, which led to their determination at that time that the Petitioner was entitled to the eight (8) years out- of-state service. The Petitioner had no influence in making this determination, but has relied on it in making her retirement plans during the years from 1966 through 1981. Sometime after the Petitioner started employment in the Dade County School System, the Division of Retirements' sent a form. to the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis and, either personnel of that institute or of `a state agency of Missouri, completed the form and returned it to the Division of Retirement. The form certifies that the Petitioner was employed in the school, Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, from September 1, 1940 to June, 1948. The word in the form, "public", which appears before "schools" on the form was crossed out by either the Central Institute personnel or an employee of the Missouri State Government who completed the form. Thus, the Respondent's official who read the form and made the decision that the Petitioner was entitled to eight (8) years of out-of-state service was on notice that the out-of-state service was performed at a private institution rather than a public school. The parties stipulated that the Central Institute for the Deaf in St. Louis, Missouri, is a private, non-profit school and not a public school and that their interpretation of the statute quoted below is that out-of-state service in private schools is not creditable. The Petitioner contends, however, that inasmuch as the Petitioner relied, from 1966 through 1981, upon the representation made to her in 1966 that she would be allowed credit for the eight (8) years out-of-state service and planned her retirement and budgeted her retirement income accordingly, that the State Division of Retirement is now estopped to deny her benefits based upon those eight (8) years out-of-state service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence in the record, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, the Division of Retirement, issue a Final Order finding that the Petitioner be allowed credit for her out-of-state teaching service, and recompute her retirement benefits from the date of her retirement, allowing her such credit. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1982 at Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: William DuFresne, Esquire Suite 1782, One Biscayne Tower Two South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Andrew J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Building C Cedars Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration The Carl ton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT IDA L. SALZ, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-2487 DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of retirement contributions for the period from February 1, 1960, through January 1975.
Findings Of Fact Until January 1975, the Florida Retirement System and its predecessor, the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS), were contributory retirement plans, in which state employees contributed a portion of their wages toward their retirement benefits. In January 1975, FRS became a non-contributory retirement plan, in which the employer paid all contributions to the plan. On February 1, 1960, Petitioner, who was then known as Rebecca Jamis or James Lee, began her state employment at Florida State Hospital (FSH), located in Chattahoochee, Florida. During her employment, Petitioner was enrolled in the state’s retirement plan and contributed $2,188.01 to that plan. In 1980, Petitioner was convicted of a felony offense and was sentenced to prison. She began serving her sentence in state prison in June 1980. Due to her imprisonment, Petitioner’s employment at FSH terminated on July 29, 1980. At some unknown date, Respondent received form FRS-M81 requesting a refund of Petitioner's contributions to the state’s retirement plan. Pursuant to the state's document retention policy, the original form was destroyed many years ago with a microfilmed copy of the front of the form retained by DMS. The microfilmed copy of this form does not reflect the date the form was signed. Additionally, except for the agency number and various signatures, information contained in the refund request form was typed in. The date of termination of Petitioner’s employment was also typed on the form, indicating the form was completed after Petitioner was imprisoned. More importantly, the form was purportedly signed by Petitioner with the name she used at the time. However, the address on the request was not Petitioner’s residence but was the 1980 address of Florida State Hospital Credit Union. At the time, Petitioner had a loan at the credit union, although she denies having an account there. Petitioner also did not hear any more from the Credit Union about her loan and does not know what happened to it. The regularly kept records of the Division indicate that on November 4, 1980, pursuant to this request for refund, Respondent issued Warrant No. 264829 in the amount due Petitioner for a refund of her retirement contributions. The warrant was issued to Petitioner and mailed as instructed to the address of the credit union. Again due to the passage of time, a copy of this warrant is no longer available. Moreover, the credit union records are not available. However, Charlene Fansler performed a search of un- cashed state warrants for Warrant No. 264829. The warrant was not on the list of warrants that remained outstanding. Further, the warrant had not escheated to the State as abandoned property. As such, the evidence demonstrated that the warrant was paid by the State. In 1990, at the age of 60 and several years after her release from prison, Petitioner requested a refund of her retirement contributions. On May 24, 1990, Respondent denied Petitioner’s request based on the 1980 refund of those contributions. At the time, Respondent did not advise Petitioner of her chapter 120 hearing rights; and therefore, did not provide Petitioner with a clear point of entry for an administrative hearing. However, Petitioner was clearly aware that DMS claimed that she had been issued a refund of her contributions and was, therefore, not entitled to a further refund. Petitioner took no action in 1990 even though she did not personally receive the 1980 refund because and claimed to not have signed the refund request form. In 2012, 32 years after the 1980 warrant was issued and 22 years after the 1990 denial of her request for refund, Petitioner, at the age of 82, again requested a refund of her retirement contributions based on her claim that she did not sign the 1980 refund request form and the fact that she did not personally receive the refund warrant. Respondent submitted the microfilmed copy of the signed refund request form and known handwriting exemplars of Petitioner's signature to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) laboratory for analysis. Kesha White, a handwriting analyst with FDLE, analyzed the documents and concluded that they were more likely than not signed by the same person. Her finding was not conclusive due to the limits of analyzing signed documents preserved on microfilm. Indeed, the signatures on the refund form and the known handwriting samples of Petitioner's signature are very similar and appear to be by the same person. In this case, the better evidence demonstrates that Petitioner signed the 1980 refund request form and, due to the passage of time, has simply forgotten that she did so. By signing that form, Petitioner instructed Respondent to issue and mail the warrant to the address for the credit union listed on the form. Respondent complied with that request. Given these facts, Petitioner is not entitled to another refund of her retirement contributions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner was issued a refund of retirement contributions for the period from February 1960, through January 1975, and dismissing Petitioner's request for hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Rebecca Thomas 1929 Hamilton Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Jason Dimitris, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement Suite 160 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the Deferred Retirement Option Program.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is now, and has been since 1976, a firefighter employed by Miami-Dade County and, as such, a Special Risk member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner's date of birth is September 19, 1937. Accordingly, on July 1, 1998, the effective date of DROP, Petitioner was 61 years of age and had approximately 22 years of creditable service as a Special Risk member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner was aware that he needed to file an application to join DROP within 12 months of July 1, 1998, but he opted not to file such an application because he believed that the retirement benefits he would receive if he joined DROP within this 12-month period would not be enough for him to "live on" after he stopped working.2 Petitioner thought that it would be in his best interest, instead, to wait until 2003 to retire (and enjoy higher retirement benefits). On June 7, 2001, Petitioner sent an e-mail to Governor Bush, which read, in pertinent part, as follows: Yesterday I met with the head spokesman of FL. State Retirement concerning my participation in the D.R.O.P. [and] he advised me to send this note. As you know it started in 1998 at which time I was offered a small window because of my age (unlawful discrimination) for which I was not able to get into because of the insignificant amount offered as permanent retirement. Since then, as anticipated, my retirement has increased from the high 30's to the low 60's due thanks to you . . . Now, I am asking, by special request, to be allowed to enter into the D.R.O.P. either to finish these two years or to be given an opportunity to go for the whole 5 years, which I doubt I would complete. . . . Petitioner's e-mail correspondence was referred to the State Retirement Director who, by letter dated June 8, 2001, advised Petitioner that Petitioner's "request to join DROP at this late date must be denied."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a final order finding that Respondent is not eligible to participate in DROP because he did not elect to do so within the time frame prescribed by Subsection (13)(a)2. of Section 121.091, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of December, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner enrolled in "Plan A" of the Teachers Retirement System on August 13, 1954 as a teacher in the Orange County Florida school System. Petitioner transferred to Jacksonville, Florida and began teaching in Duval County on August 18, 1959 and continued hem membership in the Teachers' Retirement System "Plan A". Petitioner requested a change from the Teachers' Retirement System "Plan A" to Teachers' Retirement System "Plan E" by letter dated April 5, 1965. Petitioner was approved on March 26, 1966 for Teachers' Retirement System benefits and received disability retirement benefits for a period of time until she re-entered the teaching profession on November 27, 1970 in Duval County, Florida. She subsequently repaid an overpayment of these disability benefits which been paid for a period of time when she had returned to work in Duval County without notice to the Division of Retirement. Petitioner transferred from the Teachers Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System on October 15, 1970 when she signed a ballot entitled "Social Security Referendum and Application for Florida Retirement System Membership". Petitioner complains that she did not know when she signed the ballot that she was in fact changing her retirement from the Teachers' Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System contending that the statements of the person conducting the meeting at which the ballots were distributed informed the group the ballots were for an election for social security coverage. The ballot, however, clearly reflects that if social security benefits are desired, a change in the retirement system is necessary. Petitioner applied for Florida Retirement System disability benefits on October 20, 1971 and was approved. This benefit is $26.07 per month greater than the benefits she would have received had she remained in the Teachers' Retirement System. On October 3, 1975, Petitioner was supplied with the various documents concerning her actions in regard to her retirement benefits and was informed that her election to transfer into the Florida Retirement System was irrevocable and there was no method by which she could be transferred back into the Teachers' Retirement System. She requested a hearing on the transfer.
Recommendation Dismiss the Petition of Petitioner Martha A. Crosson. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of November, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Martha A. Crosson 801 West Myrtle Independence, Kansas 67301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT MARTHA A. CARSON, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1456 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the joint stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner was elected to the office of tax assessor, Bay County, for successive regular terms in 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972. He was commissioned for that office on January 6, 1953, January 8, 1957, January 3, 1961, January 5, 1965, January 7, 1969, and January 2, 1973. As tax assessor, petitioner was a member of the retirement system now known as the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System, Chapter 122, Florida Statutes. By two written ballots, petitioner rejected membership in the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, to be effective December 1, 1970, and January 1, 1975. The constitutional office of tax assessor was abolished and the constitutional office of property appraiser was created in its stead by amendment to Article 8, Section (1)(d) in 1974. The petitioner was elected to the office of property appraiser in 1976, and commissioned on January 4, 1977. The petitioner's duties as property appraiser were and are the same as they were when he was the tax assessor. Petitioner has been in office continually since January 6, 1953, either as tax assessor or property appraiser. He has not terminated his employment and received a refund of contributions; has not had a non-creditable leave of absence; nor was he off the payroll for at least one calendar month.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that petitioner's demand for admittance into the Florida Retirement System as of January 4, 1977, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 20th of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Cooper, Jr., Esquire Davenport, Johnston, Harris, Gerde and Harrison 406 Magnolia Avenue Robert L. Kennedy, Jr. Panama City, Florida 32401 State Retirement Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207-C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact Based on the record in this proceeding, including the evidence presented at the formal hearing and the joint pre- hearing stipulation1 of the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Respondent or Division), is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. Petitioner, Mr. Johnson Holsberry, Jr. (Petitioner or Mr. Holsberry), was formerly employed as a teacher at the West Area School of Choice by the Palm Beach County School Board (PBCSB). By reason of his employment with the PBCSB, Mr. Holsberry became a member of the FRS. As a teacher, Mr. Holsberry was subject to the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida found in Rule 6B- 1.001, Florida Administrative Code. As a teacher, Mr. Holsberry was subject to the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006. On or about December 5, 2000, Mr. Holsberry resigned his teaching position with PBCSB. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry was charged, by amended information, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, with one count of child abuse, a third degree felony, in violation of Section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes. The same amended information is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. The victim of the alleged crime, R.D., was a female student at the Area School of Choice. In Palm Beach County, Florida, between the dates of January 1, 1999, and December 31, 1999, Petitioner, while teaching in a position of parental responsibility, was alleged to have had contact with R.D. and to have acted in such a manner as to cause mental injury to said child. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry entered an agreement with the State Attorney's Office wherein he agreed to plead guilty as charged in the amended information. The same plea agreement is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF- 001185. Mr. Holsberry's guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily. Mr. Holsberry pled guilty because he was in fact guilty. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry was adjudicated guilty. The same judgment is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. On or about January 8, 2001, Mr. Holsberry applied to the Division for early service retirement from the FRS and began receiving retirement benefits. The Division suspended payment of Mr. Holsberry's monthly retirement benefits in June 2008. By certified letter dated June 13, 2008, Mr. Holsberry was notified of the Division's intended action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of his guilty plea in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. At the hearing, Mr. Holsberry testified that R.D. was in his classroom a few times, but that he was not sure of the year, frequency, or why she was there. He testified that he does not remember taking a picture of R. D. sitting at his desk, but that might have taken place. Mr. Holsberry also testified that he does not recall permitting R. D. to access her email from his classroom, or inviting her to join him on trips, to come to his home, or otherwise to meet him any place outside of the school. Mr. Holsberry testified that he does not recall giving R. D. his home telephone number. He recalls having an email screen name of Sameagle1, but does not recall whether he emailed R. D. from that email address or whether he had another screen name, Gutster. He testified that he does not recall referring to himself as H-Man (although he said some students called him "Mr. H.") or referring to R.D. as "Dukey Dufus." In general, Mr. Holsberry's testimony that he does not recall his actions that ultimately ended his career as a teacher is not credible. Mr. Holsberry noted that R.D. was not officially assigned to any of his classes, so that he was not responsible for her education, nor was he involved with her in any after school program that would have made him responsible for her welfare. Mr. Holsberry testified that he probably would not have met R.D. but for his position as a teacher at her school. He also recalled having being interviewed by an investigator named Green. Angelette Green, an employee of the Palm Beach County School District for 15 years, was the investigator assigned to Mr. Holsberry's case. Detective Green testified that Mr. Holsberry admitted that he helped R. D. set up an email account, communicated with her by email, including having sent by internet a picture of her taken in his classroom. She also testified that she remembers emails inviting R. D. to go somewhere. She said Mr. Holsberry called R. D. "Dukey Dufus" after he sent her an email and she questioned who it was from. On July 30, 2002, an Administrative Complaint was filed by the Commissioner of Education seeking disciplinary sanctions against Mr. Holsberry's license based on allegations of professional misconduct. Mr. Holsberry did not contest the disciplinary matter, having already agreed to surrender permanently his teaching certificate as a part of his plea agreement. The Education Practices Commission entered a final order permanently revoking his teaching certificate. On October 24, 2001, a plea conference was held on the following charge: Amended Information For: CHILD ABUSE In the Name and by the Authority of the State of Florida: BARRY E. KRISCHER, State Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, by and through his undersigned Assistant State Attorney, charges that JOHNSON LEO HOLSBERRY JR. on or between January 01, 1999 and December 31, 1999, in the County of Palm Beach and State of Florida, did knowingly or willfully, intentionally inflict physical or mental injury upon R.D., a child, {or} did an intentional act or actively encourage another to do an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to R.D., a child, contrary to Florida Statute 827.03(1). (3 DEG FEL) At the plea conference, the following exchange occurred: [By Mr. Jaegers, Assistant State Attorney:] The defendant will be adjudicated guilty of the offense; he will be placed on five years probation. There will be no early termination contemplated. The defendant will be required to pay Court costs in the amount of $261.00, $50.00 to the Drug Trust Fund, $50.00 cost of prosecution. The defendant must undergo a psychological evaluation and successfully complete any recommended treatment. * * * The defendant is to surrender all and not seek at any time in the future any teaching certificates in any jurisdiction in the world. There will be no contact with children under 18 unless they're in the presence of an adult who is aware of these charges. And those are the terms of the negotiated settlement. The facts in this case, Judge, are that the defendant, Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., did in Palm Beach County, Florida, on, between the dates of January 1, 1999 and December 31st, 1999, while teaching in a position of parental responsibility, in that capacity had contact with a juvenile female by the name of, or by the initials of SRD, I think it's on the plea sheet. MR. WILINSKEY [Counsel for Mr. Holsberry] That's right. MR. JAEGERS: -- RD, and did act in a manner such as to cause mental injury to said child. The -- those are the facts that occurred in Palm Beach County. THE COURT: Sir, raise your right hand, please. JOHNSON LEO HOLSBERRY, JR. BEING FIRST DULY SWORN BY THE COURT, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: THE COURT: Your name? THE DEFENDANT: Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr. THE COURT: How old are you? THE DEFENDANT: 62 * * * THE COURT: Do you understand what the things are you have to do? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you agree with the facts the State Attorney gave me as the basis for your plea of guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner was convicted of a specified offense pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his FRS rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2009.
