The Issue The issues are whether the Department of Education’s (Department) decision to deny Petitioner’s application for capital outlay funding for the 2017-2018 school year is in conflict with Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-2.0020(4)(b), as amended effective August 13, 2017, and is, therefore, based on an unadopted rule; and whether the Department’s decision to deny the application should be determined under the prior version of the rule.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a not-for-profit public charter school located in Ocoee, Florida, serving approximately 260 students in kindergarten through grade five. The school opened in the 2012-2013 school year, but did not receive a school grade until 2014-2015. That year, it received a grade of “B.” It received a grade of “D” in 2015-2016 and a “D” in 2016-2017. Since school year 2015-2016, Petitioner has been operating under a School Improvement Plan, approved and reviewed by its sponsoring school district, the Orange County School District. A School Improvement Plan is a plan designed to improve academic performance and is required when a charter school receives a grade of “D” or “F.” See § 1002.33(9)(n)1., Fla. Stat. (2016). The Department is the agency charged with the responsibility of administering capital outlay funds for charter schools pursuant to section 1013.62, Florida Statutes.1/ Charter school capital outlay funding is a source of funds for charter schools, which must meet eligibility criteria set forth in section 1013.62. The funds can be used only for specific purposes set forth in the statute, such as the purchase of real property, construction of school facilities, purchase of vehicles, computer equipment and software, insurance for school facilities, and renovation and repair of school facilities. See § 1011.71(2), Fla. Stat. Petitioner has used the funding “for subsidizing or supplementing [its] rent.” If funds are appropriated by the Legislature, each year the Department is required to allocate capital outlay funds to eligible charter schools. The allocation is based on the number of students in the school. In school year 2017-2018, charter school capital outlay consisted of a combination of state and local funds, which included both a state appropriation and revenue resulting from the discretionary millage level levied by local school districts under section 1011.71(2). The state appropriation for charter school capital outlay for that year was $50 million. In order to receive capital outlay funds, a charter school must satisfy a number of criteria, one of which is that the school must have “satisfactory student achievement based on state accountability standards applicable to the charter school.” § 1013.62(1)(a)3., Fla. Stat. A school’s budgetary concerns are not a consideration in the approval process. Rule 6A-2.0020 governs eligibility for charter school capital outlay funds and implements the statutory requirement for satisfactory student achievement. The previous version of the rule, effective December 15, 2009, stated, in part: (2) The eligibility requirement for satisfactory student achievement under Section 1013.62, F.S., shall be determined in accordance with the language in the charter contract and the charter school’s current school improvement plan if the school has a current school improvement plan. A charter school receiving an “F” grade designation through the state accountability system, as defined in Section 1008.34, F.S., shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding for the school year immediately following the designation. Under this version of the rule, a charter school that received an “F” grade was automatically ineligible for capital outlay funding. A school that received any grade other than an “F” was evaluated based upon satisfaction of performance metrics in the charter school contract and the School Improvement Plan, if there was one. Therefore, capital outlay funding was not guaranteed to any charter school under the former version of the rule. The 2016 Legislature amended section 1013.62 to change eligibility criteria for charter school capital outlay funding, although the section of the statute relating to satisfactory student achievement was not amended. The goal of the Legislature was to raise academic standards required of charter schools in order to qualify for capital outlay funding. In order to comply with these statutory changes, the Department proposed revisions to rule 6A-2.0020. These proposed revisions also included changes to the criteria for determining satisfactory student achievement that would be required in order to be eligible for capital outlay funds. Rule development began in May 2016, and the Department anticipated that the amended rule would go into effect before school year 2016-2017. The Department determined that revisions to the satisfactory student achievement portion of the rule were necessary in order to be consistent with the Department’s overall approach to school quality and accountability, which included the adoption of new standards and assessments. Based on a review of the school grading statute, and the definition of a “D” school as one that is making less than satisfactory progress, the Department determined that a school earning an “F” or two consecutive grades below a “C” was not consistent with the requirement for satisfactory student achievement. The proposed rule was approved by the State Board of Education at the September 2016 board meeting, but was later withdrawn for further revision. On February 28, 2017, the Department published a Notice of Proposed Rule, proposing that, beginning in school year 2017- 2018, a charter school with two consecutive grades below a “C,” as well as a single “F” grade, would be ineligible for capital outlay funds. The amended portion of the rule that addresses satisfactory student achievement and which is at the heart of this dispute, states as follows: Satisfactory student achievement under Section 1013.62(1)(a)3., F.S., shall be determined by the school’s most recent grade designation or school improvement rating from the state accountability system as defined in Sections 1008.34 and 1008.341, F.S. Satisfactory student achievement for a school that does not receive a school grade or a school improvement rating, including a school that has not been in operation for at least one school year, shall be based on the student performance metrics in the charter school’s charter agreement. Allocations shall not be distributed until such time as school grade designations are known. For the school year 2016-17, a charter school that receives a grade designation of “F” shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding. Beginning in the school year 2017-18, a charter school that receives a grade designation of “F” or two (2) consecutive grades lower than a “C” shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding. Beginning in the school year 2017-18, a charter school that receives a school improvement rating of “Unsatisfactory” shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding. The words, “Beginning in the school year 2017-18,” were included in the rule to make it clear that the new criteria for satisfactory student achievement would not apply to schools in school year 2016-2017, but instead would apply to schools applying for funding for the school year 2017-2018. These changes were approved by the State Board of Education on March 22, 2017, or before charter schools began submitting applications for funding for the following school year. Due to a third-party challenge of the new rule, however, it did not become effective until August 13, 2017. Fla. Ass’n of Indep. Charter Sch. v. Fla. Dep’t of Educ., Case No. 17-1986RP (Fla. DOAH July 21, 2017), aff’d, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 8802 (Fla. 1st DCA June 21, 2018)(per curiam). The Department requires charter schools to submit an application for capital outlay funding each year and requires the sponsoring school district to review the application and make a recommendation regarding eligibility. The applications are filed with the Department using a web-based system known as the Charter School Portal. The Commissioner of Education then makes the final decision as to whether the school has satisfied all eligibility requirements. For the school year 2017-2018, applications for charter school capital outlay funding were due by July 7, 2017, and each sponsoring school district was required to review and recommend its charter schools’ capital outlay plans by July 28, 2017. For school year 2017-2018, 582 applications were submitted for review by the Department. Petitioner began receiving capital outlay funding in school year 2015-2016. It also received funding for school year 2016-2017. Funding in those two years was based on the old rule. Because Petitioner expected, but was not guaranteed, to get capital outlay funding again in 2017-2018, it planned its budget for the upcoming school year with those funds included. Had its application been approved, Petitioner would have received approximately $68,000.00 in capital outlay funding. On June 27, 2017, or three months after the rule was adopted by the State Board of Education, Petitioner submitted its application for charter school capital outlay funding. The Department did not inform Petitioner by separate written notice that the new rule would apply to all capital outlay applications for school year 2017-2018.2/ On July 13, 2017, the Orange County School District recommended that Petitioner be eligible for capital funding. Based on the amended rule, which became effective on August 13, 2017, Petitioner was determined ineligible for capital outlay funding for the 2017-2018 school year, as its two most recent school grades from 2015-2016 and 2016-2017 were lower than a “C.” This determination was consistent with the language in the revised rule, which stated clearly that the rule would apply “Beginning in the school year 2017-18.” In making this determination, the Department applied the rule in a prospective manner, beginning with the 2017-2018 school year, but it used the two most recent school grades (2015-2016 and 2016-2017) to determine eligibility for capital outlay funds. Petitioner was one of approximately a dozen schools that were impacted adversely by the change in the rule. On August 29, 2017, the Department sent an automated email to Petitioner stating that the school was ineligible for capital outlay funds. The email informed Petitioner that the basis for the denial could be accessed on the web-based system that the school used for filing its application. Petitioner also was notified of the denial of capital outlay funds by letter dated October 30, 2017, and yet a third time in an amended letter dated February 2, 2018. The last paragraph in the amended letter reads as follows: After review of your Charter School Capital Outlay Plan, submitted for 2017-18 school year, it has been determined that your school is ineligible to receive charter school capital outlay fund. According to Rule 6A- 2.0020(4), Florida Administrative Code, beginning in the 2017-18 school year, a charter school that receives a grade designation of “F” or two (2) consecutive grades lower than a “C” shall not be eligible for capital outlay funding. Therefore, Kids Community College Charter does not meet the requirements for charter capital outlay funding for the 2017-18 school year, as the school received two consecutive grades lower than a “C” [in school years 2015-2016 and 2016-2017]. Petitioner contends that because the letter conflicts with the terms of the amended rule, it constitutes an unadopted rule and cannot be used as the basis for denying its application. In the same vein, Petitioner argues that the most reasonable interpretation of the rule is that only school grades earned beginning in 2017-2018 and beyond can be used to satisfy eligibility for capital outlay funds. This interpretation of the rule, however, would mean that charter schools with any grade designation, including “Fs,” could receive funding in school years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. Also, it would effectively delay implementation of the new academic standards for two years. In short, if Petitioner’s interpretation is accepted, the new eligibility criteria could not take effect until school year 2019-2020. This is contrary to the Department’s interpretation of the rule, which determines eligibility for capital outlay funds based on the new criteria beginning in school year 2017- 2018. The Department’s interpretation of the rule is as or more reasonable than the interpretation offered by Petitioner. On February 23, 2018, Petitioner filed its request for an administrative hearing to contest the Department’s decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for capital outlay funding for the school year 2017-2018. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2018.
The Issue The issue for determination in this consolidated bid protest proceeding is whether the Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“FHFC”) intended award of tax credits for the preservation of existing affordable housing developments was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact FHFC and Affordable Housing Tax Credits FHFC is a public corporation that finances affordable housing in Florida by allocating and distributing low income housing tax credits. See § 420.504(1), Fla. Stat. (providing that FHFC is “an entrepreneurial public corporation organized to provide and promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing or refinancing housing and related facilities in this state.”); § 420.5099(2), Fla. Stat. (providing that “[t]he corporation shall adopt allocation procedures that will ensure the maximum use of available tax credits in order to encourage development of low-income housing in the state, taking into consideration the timeliness of the application, the location of the proposed housing project, the relative need in the area for low-income housing and the availability of such housing, the economic feasibility of the project, and the ability of the applicant to proceed to completion of the project in the calendar year for which the credit is sought.”). The tax credits allocated by FHFC encourage investment in affordable housing and are awarded through competitive solicitations to developers of qualifying rental housing. Tax credits are not tax deductions. For example, a $1,000 deduction in a 15-percent tax bracket reduces taxable income by $1,000 and reduces tax liability by $150. In contrast, a $1,000 tax credit reduces tax liability by $1,000. Not surprisingly, the demand for tax credits provided by the federal government exceeds the supply. A successful applicant/developer normally sells the tax credits in order to raise capital for a housing development. That results in the developer being less reliant on debt financing. In exchange for the tax credits, a successful applicant/developer must offer affordable rents and covenant to keep those rents at affordable levels for 30 to 50 years. The Selection Process FHFC awards tax credits through competitive solicitations, and that process is commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications (“RFA”). Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-60.009(2) provides that unsuccessful applicants for tax credits “may only protest the results of the competitive solicitation process pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 120.57(3), F.S., and Chapter 28-110, F.A.C.” For purposes of section 120.57(3), an RFA is equivalent to a “request for proposal.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67.60.009(4), F.A.C. FHFC issued RFA 2015-111 on October 23, 2015, and responses from applicants were due on December 4, 2015. Through RFA 2015-111, FHFC seeks to award up to $5,901,631 of tax credits to qualified applicants that commit to preserve existing affordable multifamily housing developments for the demographic categories of “Families,” “the Elderly,” and “Persons with a Disability.” FHFC only considered an application eligible for funding from RFA 2015-111, if that particular application complied with certain content requirements. FHFC ranked all eligible applications pursuant to an “Application Sorting Order” set forth in RFA 2015-111. The first consideration was the applicants’ scores. Each application could potentially receive up to 23 points based on the developer’s experience and the proximity to services needed by the development’s tenants. Applicants demonstrating that their developments received funding from a U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) Rural Development program known as RD 515 were entitled to a 3.0 point proximity score “boost.” That proximity score boost was important because RFA 2015-111 characterized counties as small, medium, or large. Applications associated with small counties had to achieve at least four proximity points to be considered eligible for funding. Applications associated with medium-sized counties and those associated with large counties had to achieve at least seven and 10.25 proximity points respectively in order to be considered eligible for funding. Because it is very common for several tax credit applicants in a particular RFA to receive identical scores, FHFC incorporated a series of “tie-breakers” into RFA 2015-111. The tie-breakers for RFA 2015-111, in order of applicability, were: First, by Age of Development, with developments built in 1985 or earlier receiving a preference over relatively newer developments. Second, if necessary, by a Rental Assistance (“RA”) preference. Applicants were to be assigned an RA level based on the percentage of units receiving rental assistance through either a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or USDA Rural Development program. Applicants with an RA level of 1, 2, or 3 (meaning at least 75 percent of the units received rental assistance) were to receive a preference. Third, by a Concrete Construction Funding Preference, with developments incorporating certain specified concrete or masonry structural elements receiving the preference. Fourth, by a Per Unit Construction Funding Preference, with applicants proposing at least $32,500 in Actual Construction Costs per unit receiving the preference. Fifth, by a Leveraging Classification favoring applicants requiring a lower amount in housing credits per unit than other applicants. Generally, the least expensive 80 percent of eligible applicants were to receive a preference over the most expensive 20 percent. Sixth, by an Applicant’s specific RA level, with Level 1 applicants receiving the most preference and Level 6 the least. Seventh, by a Florida Job Creation Preference, which estimated the number of jobs created per $1 million of housing credit equity investment the developments were to receive based on formulas contained in the RFA. Applicants achieving a Job Creation score of at least 4.0 were to receive the preference. Eighth, by lottery number, with the lowest (smallest) lottery number receiving the preference. Rental assistance from the USDA or HUD is provided to existing developments in order to make up for shortfalls in monthly rent paid by tenants. For example, if an apartment’s base rent is $500 per month and the tenant’s income limits him or her to paying only $250 towards rent, then the USDA or HUD rental assistance pays the other $250 so that the total rent received by the development is $500. As evident from the tie-breakers incorporated into RFA 2015-111, the amount of rental assistance, or “RA Level,” played a prominent role in distinguishing between RFA 2015-111 applicants having identical scores. RFA 2015-111 required that applicants demonstrate RA Levels by providing a letter containing the following information: (a) the development’s name; (b) the development’s address; (c) the year the development was built; (d) the total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC;/3 (e) the total number of units that would receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed development were to be funded; (f) all HUD or RD financing program(s) originally and/or currently associated with the existing development; and (g) confirmation that the development had not received financing from HUD or RD after 1995 when the rehabilitation was at least $10,000 per unit in any year. In order to determine an applicant’s RA Level Classification, RFA 2015-111 further stated that Part of the criteria for a proposed Development that qualifies as a Limited Development Area (LDA) Development to be eligible for funding is based on meeting a minimum RA Level, as outlined in Section Four A.7.c of the RFA. The total number of units that will receive rental assistance (i.e., PBRA and/or ACC), as stated in the Development Category qualification letter provided as Attachment 7, will be considered to be the proposed Development’s RA units and will be the basis of the Applicant’s RA Level Classification. The Corporation will divide the RA units by the total units stated by the Applicant at question 5.e. of Exhibit A, resulting in a Percentage of Total Units that are RA units. Using the Rental Assistance Level Classification Chart below, the Corporation will determine the RA Level associated with both the Percentage of Total Units and the RA units. The best rating of these two (2) levels will be assigned as the Application’s RA Level Classification. RFA 2015-111 then outlined a Rental Assistance Level Classification Chart to delineate between the RA Levels. That chart described six possible RA Levels, with one being developments that have the most units receiving rental assistance and six pertaining to developments with the fewest units receiving rental assistance. A development with at least 100 rental assistance units and greater than 50 percent of the total units receiving rental assistance was to receive an RA Level of 1. FHFC also utilized a “Funding Test” to assist in the selection of applications for funding. The Funding Test required that the amount of unawarded housing credits be enough to satisfy any remaining applicant’s funding request. In other words, FHFC prohibited partial funding. In addition, RFA 2015-111 applied a “County Award Tally” designed to prevent a disproportionate concentration of funded developments in any one county. As a result, all other applicants from other counties had to receive an award before a second application from a particular county could be funded. After ranking of the eligible applicants, RFA 2015-111 set forth an order of funding selection based on county size, demographic category, and the receipt of RD 515 financing. The Order was: One RD 515 Development (in any demographic category) in a medium or small county; One Non-RD 515 Development in the Family Demographic Category (in any size county); The highest ranked Non-RD 515 application or applications with the demographic of Elderly or Persons with a Disability; and If funding remains after all eligible Non- RD 515 applicants are funded, then the highest ranked RD 515 applicant in the Elderly demographic (or, if none, then the highest ranked RD 515 applicant in the Family demographic). Draft versions of every RFA are posted on-line in order for stakeholders to provide FHFC with their comments. In addition, every RFA goes through at least one workshop prior to being finalized. FHFC often makes changes to RFAs based on stakeholder comments. No challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of RFA 2015-111. A review committee consisting of FHFC staff members reviewed and scored all 24 applications associated with RFA 2015-111. During this process, FHFC staff determined that none of the RD-515 applicants satisfied all of the threshold eligibility requirements. On June 24, 2016, FHFC’s Board of Directors announced its intention to award funding to five applicants, subject to those applicants successfully completing the credit underwriting process. Pineda Village in Brevard County was the only successful applicant in the Non-RD 515 Family Demographic. The four remaining successful applicants were in the Non-RD 515 Elderly or Persons with Disability Demographic: Three Round Tower in Miami-Dade County; Cathedral Towers in Duval County; Isles of Pahokee in Palm Beach County; and Lummus Park in Miami- Dade County. The randomly-assigned lottery number tie-breaker played a role for the successful Non-RD 515 applicants with Three Round Tower having lottery number one, Cathedral Towers having lottery number nine, and Isles of Pahokee having lottery number 18. While Lummus Park had a lottery number of 12, the County Award Tally prevented it from being selected earlier because Three Round Tower had already been selected for funding in Miami-Dade County. However, after the first four applicants were funded, only $526,880 of credits remained, and Lummus Park was the only eligible applicant with a request small enough to be fully funded. All Petitioners timely filed Notices of Protest and petitions for administrative proceedings. The Challenge by Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns Woodcliff is seeking an award of tax credits in order to acquire and preserve a 34-unit development for elderly residents in Lake County.4/ Colonial is seeking an award of tax credits in order to acquire and preserve a 30-unit development for low-income families in Lake County.5/ St. Johns is seeking an award of tax credits to acquire and preserve a 48-unit development for elderly residents in Putnam County.6/ FHFC deemed Woodcliff, Colonial and St. Johns to be ineligible because of a failure to demonstrate the existence or availability of a particular source of financing relied upon in their applications. Specifically, FHFC determined that the availability of USDA RD 515 financial assistance was not properly documented. For applicants claiming the existence of RD 515 financing, RFA 2015-111 stated: If the proposed Development will be assisted with funding under the United States Department of Agriculture RD 515 Program and/or RD 538 Program, the following information must be provided: Indicate the applicable RD Program(s) at question 11.b.(2) of Exhibit A. For a proposed Development that is assisted with funding from RD 515 and to qualify for the RD 515 Proximity Point Boost (outlined in Section Four A.6.b.(1)(b) of the RFA), the Applicant must: Include the funding amount at the USDA RD Financing line item on the Development Funding Pro Forma (Construction/Rehab Analysis and/or Permanent Analysis); and Provide a letter from RD, dated within six (6) months of the Application Deadline, as Attachment 17 to Exhibit A, which includes the following information for the proposed Preservation Development: Name of existing development; Name of proposed Development; Current RD 515 Loan balance; Acknowledgment that the property is applying for Housing Credits; and Acknowledgment that the property will remain in the USDA RD 515 loan portfolio. (emphasis added). FHFC was counting on the letter mentioned directly above to function as proof that: (a) there was RD 515 financing in place when the letter was issued; and that (b) the RD 515 financing would still be in place as of the application deadline for RFA 2015-111. FHFC deemed Woodcliff, Colonial and St. Johns ineligible because their RD letters were not dated within six months of the December 4, 2015, deadline for RFA 2015-111 applications. The Woodcliff letter was dated May 15, 2015, the Colonial letter was dated May 15, 2015, and the St. Johns letter was dated May 5, 2015. FHCA had previously issued RFA 2015-104, which also proposed to award Housing Credit Financing for the Preservation of Existing Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments. The deadline for RFA 2015-104 was June 23, 2015, and Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns applied using the same USDA letter that they used in their RFA 2015-111 applications. Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns argued during the final hearing that FHFC should have accepted their letters because: (a) they gained no competitive advantage by using letters that were more than six months old; (b) waiving the six- month “shelf life” requirement would enable FHFC to satisfy one of its stated goals for RFA 2015-111, i.e., funding of an RD 515 development; and (c) other forms of financing (such as equity investment) have no “freshness” or “shelf life” requirement. However, it is undisputed that no party (including Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns) challenged any of the terms, conditions, or requirements of RFA 2015-111. In addition, Kenneth Reecy (FHFC’s Director of Multifamily Programs) testified that there must be a point at which FHFC must ensure the viability of the information submitted by applicants. If the information is “too old,” then it may no longer be relevant to the current application process. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for FHFC to utilize a six-month shelf life for USDA letters.7/ Furthermore, Mr. Reecy testified that excusing Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns’ noncompliance could lead to FHFC excusing all deviations from all other date requirements in future RFAs. In other words, applicants could essentially rewrite those portions of the RFA, and that would be an unreasonable result. Excusing the noncompliance of Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns could lead to a “slippery slope” in which any shelf- life requirement has no meaning. The letters utilized by Woodcliff, Colonial, and St. Johns were slightly more than six months old. But, exactly when would a letter become too old to satisfy the “shelf life” requirement? If three weeks can be excused today, will four weeks be excused next year? St. Elizabeth’s and Marian Towers’ Challenge St. Elizabeth is seeking low-income housing tax credit financing in order to acquire and preserve a 151-unit development for elderly residents in Broward County, Florida. Marian Towers is an applicant for RFA 2015-111 funding seeking low-income housing tax credits to acquire and preserve a 220-unit development for elderly residents in Miami-Dade County, Florida. The same developer is associated with the St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers projects. In its scoring and ranking process, FHFC assigned St. Elizabeth an RA Level of two. RFA 2015-111 requires that Applicants demonstrate RA Levels by providing a letter from HUD or the USDA with specific information. That information is then used to establish an RA Level for the proposed development. As noted above, the RFA requires the letter to contain several pieces of information, including: (a) the total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC; and (b) the total number of units that will receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed development is funded. RFA 2015-111 provided that a development with at least 100 rental units would receive an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth included with its application a letter from HUD’s Miami field office stating in pertinent part that: Total number of units that currently receive PBRA and/or ACC: 99 units. Total number of units that will receive PBRA and/or ACC if the proposed Development is funded: 100 units*. The asterisk in the preceding paragraph directed readers of St. Elizabeth’s HUD letter to a paragraph stating that: HUD is currently processing a request from the owner to increase the number of units subsidized under a HAP Contract to 100 by transferring budget authority for the one additional unit from another Catholic Housing Services Section 8 project under Section 8(bb) in accordance with Notice H-2015-03. Because of the foregoing statement from HUD, FHFC concluded that St. Elizabeth did not have 100 units receiving rental assistance as of the application deadline. Accordingly, FHFC used 99 units as the total number of units that would receive rental assistance when calculating St. Elizabeth’s RA Level, and that led to FHFC assigning an RA Level of two to St. Elizabeth’s application.8/ If St. Elizabeth had been deemed eligible and if FHFC had used 100 units as the total number of units that would receive rental assistance, then St. Elizabeth would have received an RA Level of one. Given the application sorting order and the selection process outlined in RFA 2015-111, St. Elizabeth (with a lottery number of six) would have been recommended for funding by FHFC, and that outcome would have resulted in Intervenors Isles of Pahokee and Lummus Park losing their funding. St. Elizabeth asserted during the final hearing that the 100th unit had obtained rental assistance financing since the application deadline on December 4, 2015. However, FHFC could only review, score, and calculate St. Elizabeth’s RA Level based on the information available as of the application deadline. While St. Elizabeth argues that the asterisk paragraph sets forth a “condition,” Kenneth Reecy (FHFC’s Director of Multifamily Housing) agreed during the final hearing that the asterisk paragraph was more akin to information that was not explicitly required by RFA 2015-111. FHFC did not use that additional information to declare St. Elizabeth’s application ineligible for funding. Despite being assigned an RA Level of two, St. Elizabeth’s application still could have been selected for funding because RFA 2015-111 merely established RA Level as a basis for breaking ties among competing applications. However, too many applicants for RFA 2015-111 had identical scores, and RFA 2015-111’s use of RA Level as a tiebreaker forced St. Elizabeth’s application out of the running. Under the circumstances, FHFC’s treatment of St. Elizabeth’s application was not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. As noted above, tie- breakers are very important, because there is often very little to distinguish one application for tax credits from another. Given that there was a degree of uncertainty about whether St. Elizabeth’s would have 100 qualifying units, FHFC acted reasonably by assigning St. Elizabeth’s application an RA Level of two for this tie-breaker rather than an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers argue that other applications contained language that indicated a degree of uncertainty. Nevertheless, those other applications received an RA Level of one. For example, FHFC assigned an RA Level of one to Three Round and Haley Sofge even though their HUD letters stated that both developments would be “subject to a Subsidy Layering Review to be conducted by HUD.” Marian Towers argued that if FHFC does not accept HUD or RD letters containing conditional language about the number of units that will be subsidized, then FHFC should have assigned an RA Level of six to Three Round and Haley Sofge. If Three Round and Haley Sofge had been assigned an RA Level of six, then Marian Towers (with a lottery number of five) would have been recommended for funding. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers cited another instance in which an application received an RA Level of one, even though its application contained a letter from the RD program stating that “USDA Rural Development will consent to the transfer if all regulatory requirements are met.” (emphasis added). However, St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers failed to demonstrate that the language cited above applied only to those particular applications rather than to all applications for tax credits. For example, if all applications are subject to a subsidy layering review and compliance with all regulatory requirements, then inclusion of such language in a HUD letter (in and of itself) should not prevent an applicant from being assigned an RA Level of one. St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers also cited a HUD Letter used in another recent RFA by an applicant that received an RA Level of one. The HUD letter in question contained an asterisk followed by the following statement: “It is HUD’s understanding that two separate applications are being submitted – one for each tower comprising St. Andrew Towers. If funded, HUD will consider a request from the owner to bifurcate the St. Andrew Towers HAP contract in order to facilitate the separate financing of each tower.” However, St. Elizabeth and Marian Towers failed to demonstrate why the language quoted directly above should have resulted in the applicant in question being awarded an RA Level less than one. There is no indication that the total number of units receiving rental assistance would change.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order awarding funding to Three Round Tower A, LLC; Cathedral Towers, Ltd; Isles of Pahokee Phase II, LLC; SP Manor, LLC; and Pineda Village. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G.W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether the School Board has the authority to include a provision in a charter that limits a charter school's annual capacity to the number of applications received as of a date certain (March 1) and whether that proposed enrollment cap is legal under Florida law.
Findings Of Fact RCA is a Florida not-for-profit corporation organized for the purpose of governing and operating charter schools. The School Board is a public body corporate, organized and existing under the Florida Constitution and Florida Statutes to govern the provision of public education to students in Leon County. On August 1, 2011, RCA submitted an application to replicate a high-performing charter school to the School Board, requesting approval of a start-up or new charter school in Leon County based upon a high-performing charter school already in existence. On September 20, 2011, School Board staff sent written correspondence to the charter school informing them of several issues with its application, and that approval of their application would be contingent upon the fulfillment of stipulations set forth in the correspondence. In paragraph 11 of the correspondence, the School Board informed the charter school that it would be required to "provide documentation to Leon County Schools by March 1, 2012, regarding the number of students who have completed official applications at the school, and this number will be utilized to set enrollment for the 2012-2013 school year." RCS responded to the September 11 letter through email on September 23, 2011, stating that most of the issues outlined therein would be worked out during contract negotiations. School Board staff responded by reiterating that, for those items to be handled through the charter, the application would not be approved "as is." The charter application was considered at its September 27, 2011, regular board meeting, and was unanimously approved, "contingent upon amendments to the application and compliance with deadlines as outlined in the [September 20] letter to [RCA]. RCS believed that, under the charter school statutes set out at sections 1002.33 and 1002.3311, Florida Statutes, and related regulations, the School Board was not legally empowered to conditionally approve a high-performing charter application, but instead could only legally approve or deny the application under limited circumstances. RCS communicated this position to the School Board during the charter negotiation process at the parties' meeting to negotiate the charter in January 2012. In late November 2011, the parties began negotiating the terms of the charter and were ultimately able to reach agreement on all issues except the March 1 enrollment cap issue that is the subject of this proceeding. On December 19, 2011, the School Board received a response from RCS to the correspondence of September 20 which stated "[t]he school's board will either have documentation that 862 students have enrolled in the school and in Genesis by August 1, 2012, or will provide documentation of available funding and an approved budget that will fully support the program described in the school's application at the number of students enrolled in the school and in Genesis by August 1, 2012. The school will provide documentation to Leon County Schools by March 1, 2012, regarding the number of students who have completed official applications to the school, and this number will be utilized to set enrollment for the 2012-2013 school year." However, at no time did RCS agree to cap the enrollment for the proposed school as of the number of applications received by March 1 of any given year. In January 2012, representatives for the parties met to work through specific terms in the proposed charter. The parties were unable to reach agreement on the March 1 enrollment deadline language. The language in the proposed charter relating to the disputed issue states in pertinent part, "[t]otal annual enrollment for each year shall be determined by the total number of applications received by March 1 of each year." RCS submitted a request for mediation in accordance with section 1002.33(6)(h). The parties participated in two days of mediation, assisted by Thomas Bateman, Supreme Court Certified Circuit Court Mediator, and were able to resolve all outstanding issues except for the issue relating to the March 1 enrollment deadline. Mr. Bateman submitted a mediation report to the Florida Department of Education declaring impasse as to this one issue. On March 12, 2012, RCS filed a Notice/Request for Initiation of Proceedings with the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). RCS has broken ground on, and is currently in the process of constructing, a multi-million-dollar school facility in Leon County to house the school. Construction is currently scheduled to be completed as of late summer 2012. RCS operates a number of other charter schools throughout the state and no other school district in which it owns and operates charter schools is enrollment limited to a March 1 deadline. The School Board has granted charters to a number of other charter schools in Leon County. Currently, there are five charter schools operating in Leon County. All current charters contain the enrollment deadline provision at issue in this matter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Leon County School Board issue a final order finding that the School Board's proposed contractual provision proposing a March 1 enrollment deadline does not violate the charter school law and does not constitute an unadopted rule. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2012.
Findings Of Fact On February 7, 14 and 21, 1989, respondent, School Board of Pinellas County (Board), published a legal advertisement in an area newspaper inviting prospective bidders to submit proposals for certain construction work to be performed on two elementary schools, Walsingham and Cross Bayou, located in Largo and Pinellas Park, Florida, respectively. The bidders were advised that their bids must be "prepared and submitted in accordance with the drawings and specifications" and that such drawings and specifications could be obtained from the Board. Such bids were to be filed with the Board no later than 2:00 p.m. on March 6, 1989. The notice also provided that the bids would be opened the same day. Bids were timely filed by at least five contracting firms, including petitioner, Prelude Construction Company, Inc. (Prelude), and intervenors, Lincoln Construction Company (Lincoln) and Bandes Construction Company (Bandes). In filing these proposals, each bidder represented he had "thoroughly examined all of the contract documents." After the bids were opened and reviewed by Board personnel, Lincoln, Prelude and Bandes were ranked first, second and fourth, respectively, based upon the dollar amount of their proposals. 2/ Thereafter, the Board issued its notice of intended action on March 7, 1989, wherein it advised all parties of its intention to award the contract to Lincoln. In doing so, the Board concluded that, although a bid bond accompanying Lincoln's proposal was not dated March 5 or 6 as required by the specifications, the deviation was minor and could be waived. That action prompted Prelude to file its protest. Through testimony of Lincoln's vice-president, it was established that the Board staff intended to change its initial position and to recommend to the Board that Lincoln's bid proposal be rejected and the contract awarded to Bandes. This change was prompted by the Board staff's discovery on the day of hearing (April 3) that, with the exception of Bandes, all bidders had failed to list the, roofing subcontractor on their bid proposals. The Board staff accordingly concluded that all bidders except Bandes should be disqualified. The bid specification upon which the Board relies to award the contract to Bandes is found in Part One, paragraph 1.1 of section 07511 of the bid specifications. The requirement is a relatively new one and imposes the following requirement upon bidders: NOTE: The contractor is required to list the name of the roofing subcontractor on the form of proposal, Section 1C. Section 1C is entitled "Form of Proposal" and includes the following section on page 1C-3 to be filled in by the bidder: The following subcontractors will be contracted with on this project. Type of Subcontractor Name of Subcontractor (Trade Specialty) (Company/Firm) The column on the left side is intended to identify the subcontractor by specialty, such as plumbing or roofing, while the blank spaces in the right hand column are to be filled in by the bidders with the name of the subcontractor who will perform the specialty. The Board has not been consistent in requiring bidders to list the name of subcontractors on the bid documents. According to the uncontroverted testimony of Lincoln, the Board requires the listing of subcontractors on some projects but not on others. For example, on the specifications for the recently let contract for the prototype new media center at four elementary schools, the left hand column on the above form was filled in by the Board with five types of subcontractors who were required on the project, including roofing. This meant that the bidder was to fill in the blanks in the right hand column with the name of the subcontractor who he intended to use on each specialty. However, on other contracts, including the one under challenge, both columns in the Form for Proposal have been left blank, and Lincoln construed this to mean that the name of the subcontractor was not required. Indeed, Lincoln pointed out, without contradiction, that on a recent contract which left both columns blank, as was true in this case, it was awarded the contract even though it did not identify the roofing subcontractor on its proposal. Because of this prior agency practice, Lincoln assumed the same policy would be used again. However, Lincoln conceded it had failed to read the requirement in paragraph 1.1 of section 07511 before preparing its proposal. There was no evidence that Lincoln gained any substantial advantage over other bidders by this omission. Also relevant to this controversy is Paragraph 10A of the General Requirements. This item is found on page 1B-11 and reads as follows: Each bidder shall indicate the names of specific major Subcontractors if called for on the form of proposal. If listing of Subcontractors is required and the Bidder fails to list them, the bid may, at Owner's option, be disqualified. (Emphasis added) This authority to waive the requirement is reinforced by language in Paragraph 21 of the General Requirements which provides in part that "(t)he owner reserves the right to waive minor technicalities." According to the Board's outside architectural consultant, who was the author of a portion of the contract specifications including section 07511, the omission of the name of the roofing subcontractor is a "minor" technicality that can be waived. However, the consultant had no personal knowledge as to whether the provision had actually been waived by the Board on prior contracts.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered awarding the contract in question to Bandes Construction Company. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1989.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Michael E. Langton, violated Sections 112.313(6) and 112.3141(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Section 8(e), Article II, Constitution of the State of Florida, by his activities and contacts with staff of the Department of Community Affairs on matters dealing with the Community Development Block Grant Program?
Findings Of Fact The Respondent. The Respondent, Michael E. Langton, took office as a member of the Florida House of Representatives, on October 22, 1985. The Respondent has continuously served as a Florida state representative since October 22, 1985. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent served as a public officer subject to Sections 112.313(6) and 112.3141(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Section 8(e), Article II, of the Constitution of the State of Florida. Since October, 1981, the Respondent has been a grants consultant. The Respondent formed, owned and was employed by Langton Associates, Incorporated. Upon taking office as a Florida state representative in 1985, the Respondent requested an opinion of the Commission concerning his continued work for Langton Associates, Incorporated. The opinion of the Commission indicated that the Respondent could continue to work as a grants consultant but that he should not personally appear before state agencies. Langton Associates, Incorporated. The Respondent has been the sole stockholder of Langton Associates, Incorporated (hereinafter referred to as "Langton Associates"), since it was formed in October, 1981. The corporation is a for-profit-corporation. Among its functions, Langton Associates provides consulting services to governments eligible to apply for grants under the Community Development Block Grant Program and assists governments in preparing and submitting applications for grants under the program. During the period of time at issue in this proceeding, the Respondent was paid a salary from Langton Associates for his services to, and on behalf of, the corporation. The salary paid to the Respondent has been determined by the Respondent. Although the salary varies from year-to-year, it averages approximately $50,000.00 a year, including 1988, 1989 and 1990. The City of Macclenny, Florida, was among the clients of Langton Associates. Macclenny paid Langton Associates $12,000.00 a year for five to six years, including 1988. Income paid to Langton Associates by its clients was deposited in a business account from which the Respondent's salary was paid. During the five to six years prior to July, 1990, Langton Associates made approximately $350,000.00 for services to its clients. During the period of time at issue in this proceeding, the Respondent, through Langton Associates, provided services to a number of local governments. Several of these local governments paid Langton Associates an annual fee. The average fee was approximately $30,000.00 a year. Other clients of Langton Associates paid on a per grant application basis approximately $3,000.00 per grant application. The Community Development Block Grant Program. The Community Development Block Grant Program (hereinafter referred to as the "CDBGP"), is a Federal government program whereby funds are provided to States to use to improve small local communities. Funds received for the CDBGP in Florida are administered by the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), through the Department's Division of Housing and Community Development. Funds for the CDBGP are received and are distributed for four categories of grant projects: (1) housing; (2) neighborhood revitalization; (3) economic development; and (4) commercial revitalization. CDBGP funds are intended to be used in part to assist small local governments to revitalize homes and neighborhoods. Each year the Department adopts administrative rules governing the CDBGP and the manner in which annual funds are to be distributed in Florida. The Department's revised administrative rules provide the steps to be followed in each annual funding cycle. The procedures for determining which small governments receive CDBGP funds generally include the following steps: An applicant workshop is held at the beginning or the middle of the funding cycle; An opening date is established for when Applications are to be submitted; A closing date is established for when Applications are scored and awards of funds are made; Applications are initially ranked according to their scores; Site visits are conducted by the Department; Applications are ranked again. These rankings can be challenged; and Funds are awarded. The Secretary of the Department makes the final decision as to how CDBGP funds are awarded. All applications for CDBGP funds are "self-scored" prior to filing. Each applicant determines, based upon objective standards, the score of its application and informs the Department of the score on the application. When applications are filed they are initially ranked by the Department based upon the self-score determined by the applicant. Applications may be filed on behalf of small cities of less than 50,000 population or small counties of less than 200,000 population. Applications for CDBGP funds are technically filed by eligible applicants--a county or city. Private individuals and businesses are not eligible to apply for grants from the Department under the CDBGP. Applications are prepared 90 to 95% of the time by consultants, including Langton and Associates. The following question is included on applications from which it may be determined if an application was prepared by a consultant: "Who was the agency or firm responsible for preparing the application?" The eligible county or city for which an application is submitted is considered the "applicant." If a consultant prepared and filed an application on behalf of an applicant, however, it was common for Department staff associated with the CDBGP to refer to the consultant and/or the government entity as the "applicant." Although the number of consultants in Florida who prepared applications for CDBGP awards varied from year to year, there have been approximately six to ten consultants in Florida preparing applications for CDBGP awards. During 1988, there were a total of approximately 276 local governments which were eligible for awards under the CDBGP. Only a small number of these entities, however, actually filed applications for awards. The Department does not consider the identity of any consultant involved in filing a CDBGP application in determining which applicants should be awarded CDBGP grants. Following the filing of applications for CDBGP grants, additional information is not to be provided to the Department unless requested. Nor are arguments to be presented to the Department in support of any application. Target Area Maps and Gerrymandering. Applications filed during the 1988 (as well as prior years) annual funding cycle for CDBGP funds for the housing category were required to include a "target area map". A "target area map" was an area map of the local community of the applicant depicting the specific area that the proposed grant activities were to be conducted in. Therefore, a target area map for a housing grant would identify on the area map the specific houses for which the funds were being requested. Prior to the 1988 annual funding cycle many target area maps had been submitted which included oddly shaped target areas. These oddly shaped target areas were not square or rectangular; instead, the target area was drawn in such a way that houses that qualified for CDBGP funds were included and those that did not qualify, even if located right next door to a qualified house on the same block, were excluded. "[A]pplicants would draw their target area boundaries in such a way to exclude housing units that would adversely affect their score." Lines 24-25, page 73, and line 1, page 74, Transcript of September 30, 1991-October 1, 1991, Formal Hearing (hereinafter referred to as the "Transcript"). This practice was referred to as "gerrymandering." There had been concern and debate in and outside the Department concerning whether gerrymandering should be allowed. There were some who were not concerned about, or bothered by, gerrymandering because the use of gerrymandering to identify a target area did not cause persons who were not in need to be directly benefited from CDBGP funds. For example, in the housing grant area, only the houses of persons with low enough income levels could directly benefit from the CDBGP. Those that did not qualify for assistance could not be directly benefited even if an impacted area was gerrymandered. There were others, however, who were concerned about and bothered by gerrymandering because the use of gerrymandering allowed applicants to achieve higher scores for their applications by drawing the targeted area in such a way to insure that it included mainly or totally houses that were qualified for funding while excluding unqualified houses in the same neighborhood which would reduce their scores. Persons concerned with, and bothered by, gerrymandering, including the Respondent, believed that the CDBGP intended that only relatively box-shaped geographic neighborhoods should be allowed as the target area. At various times, the Department tried to devise a method of preventing gerrymandering, but could find no reasonable solution. The difficulty with preventing gerrymandering was explained by Lewis O. Burnside, the Director (beginning in January, 1989) of the Department's Division of Housing and Community Development: Every time I talked about target areas when we looked at it -- we tried to deal with target areas to see what shape should they be. Should they be square or circular and should they -- we couldn't find any rhyme or reason for that. Also, our program applies to urban and rural areas. And in rural areas it is quite normal to have a large property value farm across from what used to be tenant lands, where you have very low income people directly across the street from a multi-million-dollar piece of farmland. And so, we could not write anything, one that would give you a non-gerrymandered target area unless it was just arbitrary. We would just have to say it has got to be square, or it has got to be rectangular, and it can be no larger than a certain size. . . . Lines 8-20, page 141, Transcript. Most people associated with the CDBGP, other than the Respondent, did not consider the issue of gerrymandering to be a burning issue or a particularly improper practice. This lack of concern was caused by the fact that the general purpose of the CDBGP was to benefit low and moderate income people and gerrymandering did not circumvent this general purpose. Ultimately, individuals in the houses included in a target area, even in a gerrymandered target area, benefited only if they were in need of assistance as established under the CDBGP. There were members of the Florida Legislature, including the Respondent, who believed that gerrymandering in the CDBGP was inconsistent with the goals of the CDBGP. Through at least the 1988 annual funding cycle, gerrymandering of target area maps was not prohibited by federal or Florida law. The 1988 Funding Cycle. The general procedures for determining how CDBGP funds were to be awarded each funding cycle which are described in finding of fact 18, supra, were followed for the 1988 funding cycle. Legislation concerning the CDBGP was adopted during the 1988 legislative session and was codified as Chapter 88-201, Laws of Florida. As a result of the adoption of Chapter 88-201, Laws of Florida, and as was the practice of the Department prior to each funding cycle, the Department undertook to amend its administrative rules governing the CDBGP, Chapter 9B-43, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 9B-43.003(33), Florida Administrative Code, was renumbered as subparagraph (35) and was amended by the Department by adding the following underlined language: "Target area" means a distinct, locally designated slum or blighted area under Section 163.340, F.S.; or a designated Enterprise Zone under Section 290.065, F.S.; or a distinct locally designated area, totally contained and contiguous in nature, that is characterized by concentrations of low and moderate income persons, wherein low and moderate income persons comprise at least 51 percent or more of the target area population. It was believed in the Department when the Department amended the definition of "target area" in its Rules that gerrymandering had been eliminated or substantially reduced. Although no formal opinion was given, an attorney on the Department's legal staff indicated during a CDBGP application workshop conducted by the Department for the 1988 funding cycle that gerrymandering would no longer be allowed. A representative of the Department instructed potential CDBGP grant applicants during a CDBGP application workshop held sometime after October 11, 1988, the effective date of Rule 9B-43.003(35), Florida Administrative Code, that gerrymandered target area maps would not be permitted. The Respondent and Langton Associates were aware of this representation. At some time subsequent to the workshop at which it was announced that gerrymandering would not be allowed, applications for CDBGP housing grants for the 1988 funding cycle were submitted to the Department. There were a total of thirty-four applications received for CDBGP housing grants for the 1988 funding cycle. Langton Associates submitted applications for housing grants for the 1988 funding cycle for three applicants: (1) Macclenny; (2) Fellsmere, Florida; and (3) St. Johns County, Florida. The target areas proposed with the applications prepared and submitted by Langton Associates for Macclenny, Fellsmere and St. Johns County were not gerrymandered. Langton Associates did not submit gerrymandered target areas because the Respondent did not believe that gerrymandering was proper and because the Department had announced that it would not accept gerrymandered maps. Despite the Department employee's statement during the workshop that gerrymandered maps would not be allowed for the 1988 funding cycle, most of the target area maps submitted with applications for the 1988 funding cycle were gerrymandered. Only five applications received by the Department did not include gerrymandered target areas: (1) the three applications submitted by Langton Associates; (2) the application of Apalachicola, Florida; and (3) the application of Century, Florida. On December 1, 1988, a memorandum was sent from Earl H. Parmer, Jr., then Director of the Department's Division of Housing and Community Development, to the Department's General Counsel. Mr. Parmer informed the General Counsel of the target area maps which had been filed for the 1988 funding cycle and stated, in part, the following: As you know, the department has been attempting to reduce the grantsmanship in the CDBG program by substantially reducing the gerrymandering of CDBG target areas; however, we question whether our current rule language supports our position. Advocate's Exhibit 7. On December 2, 1988, the following response was given by the Department's legal staff to Mr. Parmer: "Maps appear to be in compliance with Rule." Advocate's Exhibit 7. The Department, therefore, determined that it could not, despite the previous instructions from a Department representative that gerrymandered target areas would not be accepted, prevent the use of gerrymandered target area maps for the 1988 funding cycle. On December 14, 1988, the applications for CDBGP housing grants were initially ranked by the Department based upon the scores determined by the applicants through self-scoring and reported to the Department. Applications were listed by highest score to lowest score. The total 1988 funding cycle housing grant funds available were sufficient to meet the requests for funds of only the top fifteen-ranked applications. There were not sufficient funds to fund those applicants who ranked below fifteenth. The applications filed by Langton Associates ranked as follows, based upon their self determined scores, on the initial ranking: (1) Macclenny was seventeenth; (2) St. Johns was thirtieth; and (3) Fellsmere was thirty-second. The scores for these applicants determined through self-scoring were not high enough to entitle any of the applicants to an award of a housing grant for the 1988 funding cycle. The Respondent's Contacts with Linda Frohock. During December, 1988, the Respondent was informed that most applications for CDBGP housing grants for the 1988 funding cycle included gerrymandered target area maps and that the Department intended to accept those maps. After learning of the Department's acceptance of gerrymandered target area maps, the Respondent telephoned Thomas Yeatman, an employee of the Department. The Respondent left a message requesting that his telephone call be returned. Between December 20 and 31, 1988, Linda Frohock, then Chief of the Bureau of Housing and Community Assistance, in the Department's Division of Housing and Community Development, returned the telephone call the Respondent had made to Mr. Yeatman. This telephone call probably took place on or about December 20, 1988. The Respondent's initial telephone call to Mr. Yeatman and his conversation with Ms. Frohock were the result of his frustration over the fact that the Department was going to allow gerrymandering of target areas. The Respondent had expressed concern over the Department's administration of the CDBGP prior to 1988. The Respondent described his frustration: I called Mr. [Yeatman] and Linda, and I wanted to speak to the secretary as Representative Langton. I made it very clear, I said, I don't care what this is going to cost me politically or financially; you guys have got to stop this craziness. You are disadvantaging tons of cities, cities that are doing this right, they are doing this fair. They have no shot at ever competing for these grants, if you are going to continue this abuse of a program. . . . . Lines 16-24, Page 35, September 12, 1991, Deposition of the Respondent. The Respondent admitted that when he called the Department he intended to put pressure on the Department through his position as a legislator and that he attempted to use his power as a public official to force the Department to take action. The Respondent let it be known to Ms. Frohock that he was calling in his capacity as a legislator. Ms. Frohock informed the Respondent that she was returning his telephone call at the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the Department and that she would report their conversation back to the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of the Department. During Ms. Frohock's telephone conversation with the Respondent, she took notes of the nature of the conversation. During the telephone conversation with Ms. Frohock, the Respondent was very upset and angry. The Respondent was excited, and he talked loudly and rapidly. The Respondent was angry that his competitors were benefiting by being allowed to submit gerrymandered target area maps while the applications prepared for, and submitted on behalf of, Langton Associates' clients had not included gerrymandered target area maps. The Respondent believed that Langton Associates had lost money in the past because it had not gerrymandered target areas while the Respondent's competitor's had. During the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock, the Respondent indicated the following: He had met with Mr. Parmer in the summer of 1988 and discussed gerrymandering. Mr. Parmer had promised him that gerrymandering would not be allowed. A Department employee had stated at a workshop that gerrymandering would not be allowed for the 1988 funding cycle. He wanted to be allowed to gerrymander the target area maps Langton Associates had submitted on behalf of its clients or he wanted the Department to require that those applicants that had gerrymandered their target area maps be punished. He indicated that he did not care what it cost him politically or financially to fight the Department's actions. He intended to shut down the CDBGP and see that all of the employees involved in the CDBGP were fired if the matter was not resolved to his satisfaction; "Heads would roll." He indicated that Florida Senator Carrie Meek and Florida Representative C. Fred Jones had asked him to play a major role in the Legislature in revising the CDBGP. He stated that the matter would end up in a court of law. He would get Fred Baggett and Jack Skelding, both of whom are attorneys, to assist him to fight the Department. He indicated that he would stop the 1988 funding cycle by suing the Department. He stated that he would probably only get two grants funded during the 1988 funding cycle. He stated that he would return to his office on January 2, 1989, and would have a legislative committee meeting on January 9, 1989; if he had not heard back from the Department about the problem, he wanted to talk to the Secretary of the Department after his return. If he was not satisfied after talking to the Secretary of the Department, he indicated he intended to speak to the then Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker of the House Designate. The Respondent asked Ms. Frohock to pass his concerns on to the Department's Secretary. The Respondent requested that Ms. Frohock provide him with copies of all target area maps submitted in the housing category and the neighborhood revitalization category for the 1988 funding cycle. These documents were public records. The Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock made her nervous, in part because he was a legislator. During the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock, he did not specifically say that he was calling on behalf of himself, Langton Associates or any local government for which the Respondent or Langton Associates was working. Nor did the Respondent specifically mention being compensated for the call. Despite the foregoing finding of fact, it is obvious that the Department's actions which the Respondent complained of during his conversation with Ms. Frohock had directly affected applicants which had paid Langton Associates to prepare and file applications on their behalf during the 1988 funding cycle. It is also obvious that the alternative resolutions of the problem suggested by the Respondent had the potential to benefit those same applicants. In light of the fact that the Langton Associates' three applications were among only five applications out of thirty-four applications filed that were not gerrymandered, it was in the interest of Langton Associates and the Respondent that the Department take the actions the Respondent suggested or some other action to correct the Department's decision to accept gerrymandered target areas. It is also true that the Respondent did not specifically request any change in the scores of the applicants represented by Langton Associates; and that the specific actions recommended by the Respondent were suggested for the "entire set of eligible applicants." But the Respondent's suggestions included the applicants represented by Langton Associates and those applicants stood to gain more from the Respondent's suggestions than those applicants that had filed gerrymandered target area maps; especially if the applicants that had filed gerrymandered target area maps were penalized as suggested by the Respondent. While it is true that the concerns which the Respondent expressed to Ms. Frohock were to some degree concerns which the Respondent or any other legislator could have raised in their capacity as a legislator, the Respondent's actions also could have beneficially impacted clients of Langton Associates that had paid Langton Associates to prepare and file applications on their behalf in the funding cycle at issue. The fact that issues may have been raised by the Respondent in his capacity as a legislator does not negate the fact that the raising of those issues before the Department could also have benefitted the clients of his company, Langton Associates. The Respondent's actions in telephoning Mr. Parmer and talking to Ms. Frohock were also considered necessary by the Respondent because of the possible harm to the reputation of Langton Associates caused by the Department's actions. Langton Associates was one of the only consultants that heeded the Department's instructions concerning the use of gerrymandered target areas for the CDBGP 1988 funding cycle. When the Department reversed its position and accepted the gerrymandered target areas proposed by most of the applicants in the 1988 funding cycle for housing, the Respondent had to be concerned about those who would question why Langton Associates had not filed gerrymandered maps. In light of these concerns, the Respondent had to have felt compelled to take some action to force the Department to admit that it had been in error and not Langton Associates, even if the clients of Langton Associates were not directly benefited. Finally, some of the comments and requests made by the Respondent to Ms. Frohock may have been reasonable in light of the events which precipitated the conversation. If the Respondent had not been a member of the legislature who was prohibited from representing others for compensation before a state agency, some of his actions were actions which might be expected of, and considered reasonable if taken by, any consultant in light of some of the Department's actions. Some of the Respondent's actions were taken and some of his comments were made because he believed that the Department's actions had improperly misled Langton Associates. Some of his actions were taken and some of his comments were made, however, solely because of his position and power as a legislator. Following her telephone conversation with the Respondent, Ms. Frohock gave a copy of her notes to, and briefed, the Department's Assistant Secretary. She also gave a copy of her notes to Mr. Burnside. Ms. Frohock also subsequently wrote a memorandum memorializing her telephone conversation with the Respondent. The January 10, 1989, Meeting. Subsequent to the Respondent's telephone conversation with Ms. Frohock, the Respondent requested that a meeting be held with the Secretary of the Department in Representative C. Fred Jones' office. In January, 1989, Representative Jones was the Chairman of the House Committee on Community Affairs, the committee of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over the Department's programs. The Respondent asked Mario Taylor, Staff Director of the House Committee on Community Affairs, to arrange the meeting with the Secretary of the Department. Mr. Taylor obtained approval for the meeting requested by the Respondent from Representative Jones, and Mr. Taylor informed Michael Richardson, the Department's legislative liaison, of the meeting. The meeting requested by the Respondent was scheduled for January 10, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "Meeting"). Mr. Richardson informed the then Secretary of the Department, Thomas Pelham, of the Meeting. Mr. Richardson told Mr. Pelham that the meeting was being held to discuss target area maps and gerrymandering. Mr. Pelham met with Mr. Burnside prior to the meeting to be briefed on the issue and requested that Mr. Burnside attend the Meeting with him. Prior to the Meeting, Ms. Frohock and Mr. Burnside met with Department staff to discuss the gerrymandering issues raised by the Respondent during his telephone conversation with Ms. Frohock. A "discussion paper" was drafted by Ms. Frohock as a result of this Department staff meeting and was dated January 10, 1989. It was agreed by Department staff that the Department had presented faulty instructions concerning gerrymandering during the workshop which took place before applications for the 1988 funding cycle were filed. There were some in the Department that wanted to take this incident into account in any recommended solution to the problem. There were others, including the Department's legal staff, who believed that the Department had done nothing illegal and, therefore, wanted to take no action. The following possible solutions to the gerrymandering issue were discussed and agreed upon by the Department's staff and were discussed in the discussion paper: Allow all applicants to resubmit target area maps (this would benefit the five applicants, including the three Langton Associates' applicants, that had submitted maps that had not been gerrymandered); Give the maximum score for the target area for all the proposals (this would also benefit the five applicants, including the three Langton Associates' applicants, that had submitted maps that were not gerrymandered); and Do nothing and allow any disappointed applicant to follow the Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, process to challenge the Department's actions. This is the option that was ultimately recommended in the discussion paper. The Meeting was attended by Representative Jones, the Respondent, Mr. Pelham, Mr. Burnside, Mr. Taylor and Mr. Richardson. The Meeting was held in Representative Jones' office. Representative Jones agreed to the meeting because he had a number of concerns about the manner in which the Department was administering the CDBGP. Representative Jones was not aware that the Respondent's company, Langton Associates, had filed applications on behalf of its clients which had been affected adversely by the Department's actions in accepting gerrymandered maps. Therefore, Representative Jones was not aware that the Respondent had not requested the Meeting solely in his legislative capacity. During the Meeting the Respondent was hostile, agitated, upset and "seemed about to explode". His manner was threatening. Mr. Pelham described the Respondent's actions as a "tirade". The Respondent did most of the talking during the Meeting: He expressed his displeasure with the Department's administration of the CDBGP and, in particular, the Department's actions in accepting the gerrymandered target area maps. Representative Jones also expressed concern about the Department's administration of the CDBGP. He indicated that he and others, in preparing applications on behalf of local governments for the 1988 funding cycle, had been misled by information presented at a workshop to the effect that gerrymandering would not be allowed for the 1988 funding cycle. The Respondent stated that "he and others had relied upon that misinformation, and now he feared that they were going to be penalized in the way those applications were scored." Lines 4-6, page 194, Transcript. He stated that he did not believe the Department was administering or interpreting the law correctly, especially with regard to gerrymandering. He stated that the law did not allow gerrymandering. He indicated his displeasure with staff of the Department and indicated that they should all, with one exception, be fired. He demanded that all applications be thrown out; that they should not be scored or acted upon. He suggested that the Department should do nothing until the Legislature could take a look at the problem. He threatened to take legal action to stop the Department if it did not stop the funding cycle. Later during the Meeting, he suggested that the Department accept redrawn target area maps that were not gerrymandered or at least require all the applicants to "play by the same set of rules." The Respondent wanted the Department to halt the 1988 funding cycle process so that legislation prohibiting gerrymandering could be adopted. As of the date of the Meeting, if the Department had halted the 1988 funding cycle process it would not have harmed the applicants represented by Langton Associates. All three applicants had scores at that time which were below the funding ranking cut off score. Without some action by the Department, those applicants did not appear destined to receive a grant for the 1988 funding cycle. While it is true that the suggestions made by the Respondent during the Meeting would apply in general to all applicants, it is also true that if all applicants were required to submit maps that were not gerrymandered, the applicants that had submitted gerrymandered maps would in all probability end up with reduced scores, depending on how their target areas were drawn. The applicants for which applications had been prepared by Langton Associates and two other applicants, on the other hand, would not suffer such a reduction in scores because they had already submitted target areas which were not gerrymandered. Those applicants which had the top fourteen scores for the 1988 funding cycle for housing at the time of the Meeting would have suffered disproportionately if the funding cycle were suspended: their status would have changed from prospective award winner to non-award winner. During the Meeting, although the Respondent did not specifically indicate that the Meeting had been called, or that he was voicing his displeasure, on behalf of himself, Langton Associates or its clients, the Respondent made reference to the fact that he was a consultant and that Langton Associates had prepared applications for local governments that had been filed in the 1988 funding cycle being discussed. This was apparent to the Department employees present at the Meeting. The Respondent, although expressing his concerns in terms of all applicants generally, was nonetheless also concerned about the impact on the Langton Associates' applicants and Langton Associates. The Department employees present at the Meeting were aware of this fact also. The Respondent indicated that unless the Department took the actions he had suggested, Langton Associates and the two other applicants that had not gerrymandered their target areas would be prejudiced. The Respondent, through Langton Associates, could have benefited if any of its 1988 funding cycle grants were approved for funding. For example, applicants which are approved will more often than not hire the consultant that prepared a successful application to administer the awarded funds. Fees for such services can be more profitable than the fees for preparing an application. Therefore, if the Respondent's actions during the Meeting could ultimately result in the awarding of a grant to one of the Langton Associates' clients, the Respondent would have benefited. The Respondent's actions in calling and participating in the Meeting were also considered necessary by the Respondent for the same reasons described in finding of fact 71, supra. As was true of the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock, it is true that the concerns which the Respondent expressed during the Meeting were to some degree concerns which the Respondent or any other legislator could have raised in their capacity as a legislator. It is also true that the Respondent's actions also could have beneficially impacted clients of Langton Associates that had paid Langton Associates to prepare and file applications on their behalf in the funding cycle at issue. The fact that issues may have been raised by the Respondent in his capacity as a legislator does not negate the fact that the raising of those issues before Department employees could also have benefited the clients of his company, Langton Associates. It is also true that some of the comments and requests made by the Respondent during the Meeting may have been reasonable in light of the events which precipitated the conversation. If the Respondent had not been a member of the legislature who was prohibited from representing others for compensation before a state agency, some of his actions during the Meeting were actions which might be expected of, and considered reasonable if taken by, any consultant in light of some of the Department's actions. Some of the Respondent's actions were taken and some of his comments were made because he believed that the Department's actions had improperly misled Langton Associates. Some of his actions were taken and some of his comments were made, however, solely because of his position and power as a legislator. The 1988 Funding Cycle Awards in the Housing Category. Following the Meeting, Mr. Burnside met with Ms. Frohock and discussed the meeting. Following this discussion, Ms. Frohock, at Mr. Burnside's direction, prepared a revised discussion paper in the form of a memorandum from Mr. Burnside to Mr. Pelham. In the memorandum from Mr. Burnside to Mr. Pelham a fourth option was added: to cancel the funding cycle and start over. Mr. Burnside ultimately decided, after discussion with Ms. Frohock, to recommend that the Department adopt the option included in the original discussion paper described in finding of fact 83b: give the maximum score for the target area for all the proposals. This option was recommended, in part, because Mr. Burnside and Ms. Frohock had determined that awarding all applicants maximum scores for their target areas would not have any real impact on which applicants were ultimately awarded funds for the 1988 funding cycle for the housing category and the option recognized that the Department had made a mistake at the workshop. The option recommended was also chosen, in part, because the Department had taken a similar action in the past and because the Respondent was a legislator. Mr. Pelham ultimately approved Mr. Burnside's recommendation. The decision of the Department as to how to resolve the issues raised by the Respondent concerning the gerrymandered maps received during the 1988 funding cycle for housing was the direct result of the actions of the Respondent described, supra. After approval by Mr. Pelham of the recommended action, Mr. Burnside telephoned the Respondent to inform him of the Department's decision. This conversation took place sometime in February, 1989. After Mr. Burnside explained the decision to the Respondent, the Respondent went over the scores of the applicants and asked how the decision would affect those scores. Mr. Burnside, in response to the Respondent's question, indicated how the decision would impact the score for the application of Macclenny, one of Langton Associates' clients. This conversation took place after site visits had taken place and after an applicant previously ranked above Macclenny had been moved down in the rankings as a result of the site visits. Therefore, Mr. Burnside was able to inform the Respondent that Macclenny was within the fundable range of applicants. The Department's solution to the dispute was based in part on the fact that Macclenny was going to receive an award. The Respondent told Mr. Burnside that the result of the Department's solution, as explained by Mr. Burnside, might be acceptable to him. The Respondent was satisfied even though the solution did not resolve the ultimate problem of gerrymandering. , which the Respondent has suggested was the reason he was so upset about the Department's actions. The Respondent also asked Mr. Burnside whether the Department's decision could withstand a legal challenge. Mr. Burnside informed the Respondent that the Department's legal staff had opined that the decision was defendable. If the problem raised by the Respondent had been raised by any person who was not a member of the Florida Legislature, Mr. Burnside would have recommended to Mr. Pelham that the Department take no action and allow the complaining individual to take legal action. The Respondent, therefore, clearly affected the manner in which the Department administered the CDBGP. The Respondent's Contact with Department Staff Concerning the Monitoring of CDBGP Grants. During October, 1989, Terri Ganson was employed as a Community Assistant Consultant for the Department. Ms. Ganson's duties included, among other things, monitoring CDBGP grants. During late 1989, Ms. Ganson was responsible for monitoring three CDBGP grants that had been awarded to Marion County (hereinafter referred to as the "Marion Grants"). Ms. Ganson was required to write periodic monitoring reports concerning the Marion Grants. The Marion Grants were being administered on behalf of Marion County by a grant consultant and competitor of the Respondent, Fred Fox Enterprises. Prior to October 30, 1989, Marion County was awarded a fourth grant (hereinafter referred to as the "Fourth Marion Grant"), in the CDBGP. Marion County was seeking bids for the administration of the Fourth Marion Grant. Langton Associates and Fred Fox Enterprises had submitted proposals to administer the Fourth Marion Grant. As of October 30, 1989, Marion County had not yet decided who would administer the Fourth Marion Grant. On October 30, 1989, the Respondent telephoned Ms. Ganson. During this telephone call, the Respondent yelled at her and was very angry and upset. The Respondent believed that Ms. Ganson was cooperating with Fred Fox, his competitor, and he wanted her to stop. The Respondent feared that Ms. Ganson's monitoring reports for the Marion Grants would cause the administration of the Fourth Marion Grant to be awarded to Fred Fox Enterprises. The Respondent did not believe the monitoring reports were critical enough of Fred Fox Enterprises. The evidence failed to prove that Ms. Ganson in fact had favored Fred Fox Enterprises. During his telephone conversation with Ms. Ganson on October 30, 1989, the Respondent indicated the following to Ms. Ganson: He was concerned that Marion County would select Fred Fox Enterprises to administer the Fourth Marion Grant because of the monitoring reports Ms. Ganson had written concerning the Marion Grants. He accused Ms. Ganson of siding with Fred Fox. He told Ms. Ganson that she had "probably cost him a $96,000 administration grant because of the way [her] reports were written" Lines 2-4, page 181, Transcript. He demanded that a mistake in Ms. Ganson's monitoring reports for one of the Marion Grants be corrected. He requested that Ms. Ganson send him a copy of the current contracts and milestones, all of the monitoring reports and all requests for modifications pertaining to the Marion Grants. Ms. Ganson told the Respondent that she would check her reports to determine if she had made a mistake and, if so, would correct it. She ultimately determined that she had made a mistake and corrected it. She did not, however, totally modify her reports in the manner that the Respondent had demanded. Ms. Ganson reported the October 30, 1989, telephone conversation with the Respondent in a memorandum to her immediate supervisor. The Respondent's actions in telephoning Ms. Ganson on October 30, 1989, and his comments to Ms. Ganson were intended to avoid the loss by Langton Associates of the administration fees for the Fourth Marion Grant, which the Respondent believed could be $96,000.00. Although the decision as to who administered the Fourth Marion Grant was a local decision, the Respondent attempted to influence that decision by demanding that Ms. Ganson, an employee of the Department, modify her monitoring reports. The Respondent's conversation with Ms. Ganson was intended to benefit Langton Associates and, thus, benefit himself. The evidence failed to prove that the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Ganson was on behalf of any person or entity (other than Langton Associates) that he had received compensation from. Although the evidence proved that the Respondent was paid a salary by Langton Associates during the year in which his conversation with Ms. Ganson took place, the evidence failed to prove that Langton Associates had any clients at that time that were paying for Langton Associates' services. Although general testimony was elicited concerning Langton Associates' business and clients, testimony concerning clients that paid Langton Associates during any specific period of time was limited to the period of time preceding approximately July, 1989. The Respondent's Contact with Department Staff Concerning Awards of Multiple Service Grant Contracts. A copy of a letter dated September 22, 1989, was received by the Department. The letter was from Patricia Teems, the business manager of Langton Associates, to the Mayor of the City of Bunnell, Florida. The letter was on the letterhead of Langton Associates. In the September 22, 1989, letter Ms. Teems claimed that the City of Bunnell had awarded an administrative contract in violation of Florida law. In the last paragraph of the contract, Ms. Teems stated the following: Also, by this letter I am requesting DCA make a formal investigation into the procurement practices of the City of Bunnell. The complaint made by Ms. Teems in the September 22, 1989, letter, concerned the award of multi-service contracts. A "multi-service" contract includes the awarding of a contract to administer a grant to the same consultant that prepared the application for which the CDBGP grant was awarded. Under Florida law in effect during 1989, multi-service contracts were prohibited unless the local government awarding such a contract indicted in writing that the multi-service contract was in the best interest of the local government. Mr. Burnside was aware of the September 22, 1989, letter and the request of Langton Associates that the Department investigate its complaint against the City of Bunnell. The Department was investigating the complaint in October, 1989. During October, 1989, Mr. Pelham was walking through a hall in the House of Representatives' office building. The Respondent approached Secretary Pelham and indicated that he wanted to speak to him. During the Respondent's October, 1989, conversation with Mr. Pelham, the Respondent indicated the following: He indicated that the Department was not enforcing one of the laws governing the CDBGP. The Respondent indicated that the problem involved the services that could be performed by someone who contracted with a local government to administer a CDBGP grant. He indicated that he "was being hurt by . . . " the Department's failure to properly enforce the law. He threatened to sue the Department unless the Department enforced the law properly. The Respondent, who spoke in a low-key voice, was firm in expressing his position to Mr. Pelham that the law concerning multi-service contracts should be enforced as the Respondent interpreted the law. Shortly after the conversation with the Respondent concerning multi- service contracts, Mr. Pelham spoke to Mr. Burnside about the conversation. Mr. Burnside explained to Mr. Pelham that Langton Associates had filed a copy of the September 22, 1989, letter to the Mayor of the City of Bunnell and that the Department had been requested to investigate the matter. After Mr. Pelham and Mr. Burnside discussed the Secretary's encounter with the Respondent, they realized that the Respondent had been talking about the City of Bunnell incident when he spoke to Mr. Pelham. Mr. Pelham realized that the Respondent had been suggesting that the City of Bunnell had not followed the correct procedures in awarding the administration contract and the consultant that was awarded the administration contract should not have been the same consultant that had obtained the grant. Mr. Burnside responded on behalf of the Department to the request that the Department investigate the City of Bunnell incident by a letter to Ms. Teems dated January 22, 1990. Based upon information reviewed by the Department, including review by the Department's legal staff, the Department informed the Mayor of Bunnell and Ms. Teems that it had been concluded that the City had not violated the law. Although the Respondent admitted that he was aware that he should not directly request that the Department investigate the City of Bunnell, he approached Mr. Pelham to discuss the matter with him. The Respondent's conversation with Mr. Pelham was intended to benefit Langton Associates because Langton Associates was interested in obtaining the grant administration contract the City of Bunnell had awarded to another consultant and, thus, benefit himself. If the Department had agreed with Ms. Teems' and the Respondent's argument that the City of Bunnell had acted illegally, the City of Bunnell could have been forced to select a different administrator for its grant. The Respondent hoped Langton Associates would be the newly selected administrator. The evidence failed to prove that the Respondent's conversation with Mr. Pelham was on behalf of any person or entity (other than Langton Associates) that he had received compensation from. Although the evidence proved that the Respondent was paid a salary by Langton Associates during the year in which his conversation with Mr. Pelham took place, the evidence failed to prove that Langton Associates had any clients at that time that were paying for Langton Associates' services. Although general testimony was elicited concerning Langton Associates' business and clients, testimony concerning clients that paid Langton Associates during any specific period of time was limited to the period of time preceding approximately July, 1989. The Respondent's Contact with Department Staff Concerning Certain Department Policies. In January, 1990, Wanda A. Jones, worked in the Department's Bureau of Housing, Division of Housing and Community Development. On January 23, 1990, Ms. Jones attended a CDBGP workshop in Jacksonville, Florida, sponsored by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The Respondent was introduced to Ms. Jones during the January 23, 1990, workshop by an employee of Langton Associates. The Respondent began questioning Ms. Jones about the Department's policy that allowed Noma, Florida, to continue to be awarded funds under the CDBGP year after year. Noma is a very small community that had received a number of grants and the Respondent was challenging the Department policy that allowed such a small community such as Noma to continue to receive grants. Ms. Jones attempted to explain the Department's policy to the Respondent. At the time of the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Jones, the Department was in the middle of a funding cycle. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that any application had been filed by Langton Associates on behalf of any client during that funding cycle. The Respondent became upset with Ms. Jones' responses and raised his voice. The Respondent was aggressive, confrontational and he badgered Ms. Jones. Ms. Jones felt very uncomfortable. Her discomfort was caused in part by the fact that the Respondent was a legislator and he was holding her accountable for Department actions. The Respondent told Ms. Jones that the Department's policy was impacting on his business. By eliminating the situation that allowed governments like Noma to continue to obtain grants, other governments would become eligible to receive CDBGP funds. Some of those governments might include Langton Associates' clients or prospective clients. After Ms. Jones left the Respondent, he again approached her, apologized and then started to berate her again. During this conversation, the Respondent asked if Ms. Jones would speak to him "off the record" and express her personal opinions about Department actions. The Respondent's conversation with Ms. Jones was intended to benefit Langton Associates and, thus, benefit himself. The evidence failed to prove that the Respondent's conversation with Ms. Jones was on behalf of any person or entity (other than Langton Associates) that he had received compensation from. Although the evidence proved that the Respondent was paid a salary by Langton Associates during the year in which his conversation with Ms. Jones took place, the evidence failed to prove that Langton Associates had any clients at that time that were paying for Langton Associates' services. Although general testimony was elicited concerning Langton Associates' business and clients, testimony concerning clients that paid Langton Associates during any specific period of time was limited to the period of time preceding approximately July, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics enter a Final Order and Public Report finding that the Respondent, Michael E. Langton, violated Sections 112.313(6) and 112.3141(1)(c), Florida Statutes, and Section 8(e), Article II, of the Constitution of the State of Florida, as alleged in Complaint No. 90-86. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be subjected to public censure and reprimand and be required to pay a civil penalty of $5,000.00 ($2,500.00 for each statutory violation). DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection A. 1 1-3. 2 6-7. 3 8. 4 See 10. The weight of the evidence failed to prove what years the percentages apply. 5 11. 6 Hereby accepted. 7 5. B. 1 13-14 and 21-23. 2 See 25. 3 24. "Gerrymandering" 1 29-30, 38 and 41. 2 32-34. 3 31-33. 4 32-33 and 35. 5 35. 6 See 35. 7 37. The 1988-1989 Funding Cycle 1 18 and 38. 2 18. 3 44 and 51. 4 82 and hereby accepted. 5 46-47. 6 48-49. 7 19, 38 and 52. 8 52-53. 9 The first sentence is not relevant. 54-55. 10 55-56. 11 59. 12 56. 13 57 and 61-63. 14 58 and 61. 15 63. 16 58. 17 62-63. 18 59, 66 and 73. Hereby accepted. See 75 and 80. 21 76-77 and 80. 22 34. 23 81-83. 24 81. 83 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 27 80. 28 84. 29 87. 30 86-87. 31 87. The testimony supporting these proposed findings was too speculative. 52 and hereby accepted. 34 89-90. 35 87 and 89-90. 36 90. 37 Not relevant. 38 92. 39 95, 97 and 101. 40 97. 41 101. 42 104. 43 100-101. 44-45 102. 46-47 Although these findings of fact are true, there could have been a number of reasonable explanations for why the Respondent did not proposed legislation concerning gerrymandering. 48 There proposed findings of fact are generally true. The fact that there are inconsistencies in testimony alone is not why some of the Respondent's testimony was not credible, however. The Respondent's explanation has been rejected based upon the weight of all of the evidence in this proceeding. C. 1 105. 2 Hereby accepted. 3 Not relevant. 4 106. 5 112-113. 6 114. 7 113. 8 114. 9 109-111. 10 113-114. 11 See 113. The evidence did not prove whether Ms. Ganson did or did not intend to favor Mr. Fox. 12 116. 13 118. D. 1-2 112. 3 120-121. 4 Hereby accepted. 5 124-125. 6 126. 7 127. 8 Not supported by the weight of the evidence or not relevant. 9 128. 10 129 and see 130. E. 1 131. 2 132. The meeting took place on January 23, 1990. 3 133 and 135. 4 133-134. 5 134 and 139. 6 See 136. 7 134. 8 138. 9-10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. No weight has been given to the sworn statement of Ms. Jones. 11 Hereby accepted. 12 141. 13 Hereby accepted. 14 139. 15 Hereby accepted. 16 140. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1-2. 2 4, 6 and 8. 3 7. 4 13-14 and 16. 5 21-22. 6 22. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The interrogatories were not offered into evidence. See 26. 9 5. 10 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The interrogatories were not offered into evidence. 11 27. 12 28. 13 52. 14 57. 15-16 Hereby accepted. 31-32. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Respondent's exhibit 14 was offered and accepted into evidence only for impeachment purposes. Not relevant. 19 14. Hereby accepted. See 32 and 35. Hereby accepted. 23 39-42. 24 Although generally true, the intent of one legislator does not support a finding concerning the intent of the entire Legislature in enacting any law. 25 41. 26 40-42. 27 See 43. 28 44. 29 51. 30 56. 31 See 58. The Respondent's conversation with Ms. Frohock was not to raise "numerous complaints regarding the DCA's administration of the CDBG program." 32-36 See 67-72. 37 See 75 and 77-78. The evidence failed to prove that the Meeting was requested by the Respondent to discuss the general administration of the CDBGP. 38 76. 39 85. 40 78. 41 81. 42 79 and 84. 43 87. See 87. Not relevant. See 91. 47 See 87 and 89-90. See 91. Not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence except as found in 101. See 100-104. 50-51 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Ms. Frohock's sworn statement was hearsay. 52-54 Not relevant. 55 84. 56 Not relevant. 57 See 67-72 and 90-94. 58 124. 59 125. 60 See 120-121. The third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 61 See 130-131. 62 112-114. 63 114-115. 64 115. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 118. Not relevant. 67 See 118-119. 68 132. 69 133-134. 70 134. 71 137. 72 137 and 143. 73 See 142. 74 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 51 COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss Bonnie J. Williams Craig B. Willis Executive Director Assistant Attorneys General Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Room 2105 The Capitol, Suite 1601 Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Tallahassee, FL 32302-0006 Mark Herron, Esquire Jeffrey H. Barker, Esquire Akerman, Senterfitt, Eidson & Moffit 216 South Monroe Street Suite 300 Post Office Box 10555 Tallahassee, FL 32302-2555
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether Respondent took "agency action" when it certified the Okaloosa-Walton College Foundation, Inc. as its direct support organization and endorsed the Foundation's decision to sell the Mattie Kelly property; and whether Petitioners have standing to request an administrative hearing on those issues.
Findings Of Fact The Foundation was incorporated and first certified as a direct support organization in 1988. The Mattie Kelly property is approximately 13 acres of waterfront property on Choctawhatchee Bay in Destin, Okaloosa County, Florida. It includes the former residence of Mattie Kelly and the real property surrounding the residence. Destin, Okaloosa County, Florida, is a municipality, bounded on the north and west by Choctawhatchee Bay, on the south by the Gulf of Mexico, and on the east by Walton County, Florida. On August 17, 1992, Mattie Kelly executed her Last Will and Testament (will). Article VIII of the will states as follows: I give, devise and bequeath my personal residence located a 1200 Indian Trail Road, Destin, Florida 32541, including all real property surrounding the residence and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000,000) to Okaloosa-Walton Community College for the establishment of the "Mattie Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute of Okaloosa-Walton Community College." The purpose of the "Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute of Okaloosa-Walton Community College" shall be: To provide a meeting place for literary societies, fine arts groups, and small performing groups. To provide a location for conferences and seminars offered through Okaloosa-Walton Community College. To provide a location for biology studies and marine science studies associated with Choctawhatchee Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. To provide a location for displaying the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida. The Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000,000) endowment which forms part of this gift shall be used only for maintenance and operating costs in furtherance of the above purposes, including the perpetual care, maintenance and upkeep of my mausoleum. A Personal Representative's Warranty Deed dated March 6, 1997, conveyed the property to the Foundation. At some point in time, the Foundation decided to sell the property to a real estate developer and entered into a contract to do so. On March 15, 2004, Petitioner Hammet filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing with the Board. The petition questioned whether the Board should support, endorse, and/or not oppose the sale of the property for private real estate development purposes, accept the college president's recommendation about the sale, and certify the Foundation to be operating in the best interest of the state. The Board's March 16, 2004, minutes state as follows in relevant part: ACTION AGENDA DSO Certification/IRS 990 The District Board of Trustees certified that requirements of Direct Support Organization under FS 1004.70 have been met and that the OWCC Foundation is in compliance with the procedures as herein described and accepts Form IRS 990 as submitted. Further, the District Board of Trustees supports and endorses the Foundation Board of Directors in its endeavor to sell the Mattie Kelly Property (Motion: Henderson; Second Rainer. Vote: 6 yes; 2 no (Smith, Wells). Motion carried. On April 22, 2004, the Board referred Petitioner Hammet's petition to DOAH, together with the Board's Motion to Dismiss. DOAH assigned this case DOAH Case No. 04-2049. On June 15, 2004, the Board referred the following to DOAH: (a) Petitioner Coastkeepers' Petition for Administrative Hearing; (b) Petitioner's Motion and Suggestion for Disqualification of Joseph Henderson and James R. Richburg; and the Board's Motion to Dismiss Petition for Administrative Hearing. DOAH assigned the case DOAH Case No. 04-2141. On July 8, 2004, some of Ms. Kelly's relatives filed a suit against the Foundation in Circuit Court. In Count I of the complaint, the relatives sought a declaratory judgment that the Foundation's proposed sale violates Ms. Kelly's will and that the relatives had reversionary rights to the property. In Count II of the complaint, the relatives sought injunctive relief to restrain the Foundation from selling the property to a third party in accordance with a written contract of sale. On April 20, 2005, the Florida Attorney General issued an Advisory Legal Opinion, stating that the Foundation is subject to Florida's Sunshine Law. On May 5, 2005, the Foundation voted to ratify the contract to sell the property and to confirm the prior decision to sell the property. On June 3, 2005, the First Circuit Court entered a "Final Judgment for Defendant" in L. Bernarr Kelly, Carol Kelly and Lowell B. Kelly v. The Okaloosa-Walton Community College Foundation, Inc., No. 2004-CA-405 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. June 3, 2005), which states as follows in pertinent part: . . . The Court is convinced by the nature of the Will, and the testimony and evidence that Mattie Kelly had legal advice in her estate planning, that if Mattie Kelly intended for the subject property to be placed in a trust, and if she desired to put restrictions on the subject property to prevent Defendant Foundation from selling it, that she knew how to accomplish this, and that she chose not to do so. The Court finds . . . that Mattie Kelly did not intend to limit or restrict the sale of the subject property in the future to fulfill her desires for the creation of a cultural and environmental institute. . . . The Court finds that the deed dated March 6, 1997, . . . does not contain a reverter clause or language creating any right of reversion. . . . The Court finds that the deed conveyed a fee simple title to the OWCC Foundation with no right of reversion. The Court further finds that this deed was in accordance with the intent of Mattie Kelly at the time she executed her will. The Court finds that Article VIII of the Will which devised the subject property contains no language of trust and no language of reverter, and did not create a charitable trust . . . . The Court further finds that Defendant's proposed sale of the subject property does not include the "mausoleum property." . . . Since the mausoleum property is not being conveyed, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs no longer have standing as to the remaining property, and would deny Plaintiffs relief on this basis, in addition to the foregoing reasons. Therefore, the Court finds for the Defendant, The Okaloosa-Walton Community College Foundation, Inc. and against the Plaintiffs, and ORDERS and ADJUDGES as follows: Defendant Foundation's proposed sale of the subject property is not in derogation of Article VIII of the Last Will and Testament of Mattie Kelly, or the deed which conveyed the subject property to Defendant Foundation. Therefore, Defendant Foundation is not prohibited from selling the subject property, excluding the mausoleum property as described in Addendum #4 to the Contract for Sale and Purchase, in order to fulfill the intent of Mattie Kelly in creating the "Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute;" however, all monies received from the sale of the subject property, including any matching funds, are to be used in the establishment and operation of the Mattie M. Kelly Cultural and Environmental Institute. [Emphasis added.] On June 8, 2005, Petitioners filed a Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing, stating as follows regarding standing: Petitioner Hammet's substantial interests will be affected by Respondent's determination because she and her family live within close proximity to the Mattie Kelly property and have often used and enjoyed the property for viewing the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida, and she wishes to continue to use and enjoy the property in the future. The Mattie Kelly property is a special place for Hammet and her family, where they have many pleasant memories and regularly have benefited from this public property being in their neighborhood. Hammet and her family will no longer be able to use and enjoy this accessible public resource if it is sold for private development. Petitioner Coastkeepers' substantial interest will be affected by Respondent's determination because it is a Florida non-profit corporation dedicated to protection of the environment in an area of the Gulf of Mexico Coast that includes Okaloosa and Walton Counties and Choctawhatchee Bay. Preservation of environmentally sensitive lands such as the Mattie Kelly property, and having the Mattie Kelly property as a location for biological studies, marine science studies, and studies of the coastal heritage of Northwest Florida, are vitally important to protecting Choctawhatchee Bay and the interest of Petitioner and its members, who include a substantial number of members who reside in Okaloosa and Walton Counties and have the present intention to use, visit, enjoy, and study biological, marine science and cultural heritage issues associated with Choctawhatchee Bay, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Mattie Kelly property at the Mattie Kelly property. The Mattie Kelly property is ideally suited to provide waterfront environmental education in an otherwise highly urbanized environment, including education of local residents, which is vital to controlling urban runoff, and for highlighting, encouraging, and educating the public of the need to protect Choctawhatchee Bay and the Gulf of Mexico. The Mattie Kelly property would no longer be available for such intended pursuits were the proposed sale of the Mattie Kelly property to private development interest go forward. Moreover, the proposed development of the very property set aside by Mattie Kelly would itself directly contribute to the urban runoff known to be causing problems in Choctawhatchee Bay. Choctawhatchee Bay has many examples of waterfront subdivision development and very little opportunity for environmental protection education in a local setting near where waterfront residential owners already live. These purposes will not be as well-served by educational efforts at OWC's main campus in Niceville, which is not waterfront and miles away from Choctawhatchee Bay. If properly managed, the Mattie Kelly property should be the field trip every school-age child in Okaloosa and Walton County takes, which would be a lasting legacy to Mattie Kelly that would truly be consistent with her express purposes. This opportunity will be forever destroyed if the property is developed as proposed. On June 24, 2005, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing. On July 5, 2005, Petitioners filed a Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Joint First Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing. Neither of the Petitioners holds any title interest in the property.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a final order dismissing the Petitions for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Richburg, President Okaloosa-Walton Community College 100 College Boulevard Niceville, Florida 32578-1295 Joseph D. Lorenz, Esquire 1270 North Elgin Parkway, Suite C-12 Shalimar, Florida 32579 Steven A. Medina, Esquire Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Echsner & Proctor, P.A. 316 South Baylen Street Post Office Box 12308 Pensacola, Florida 32581
Findings Of Fact The Department administers the CDCSAP Act (the "act"). The Florida legislature makes annual appropriations to fund the CDCSAP. These funds are used to finance activities of qualified CDCs. CDCs are community-based organizations which, in concert with state and local governments and private enterprise, facilitate or financially support revenue-generating business for the purpose of community economic development, redevelopment, preservation, restoration and revitalization. To this end, the Department's line staff person for the CDC program, James Fox, who is a planner employed by the Department, reviews applications, gives technical assistance workshops on rules and gives statewide speeches to CDC programs and at their annual meetings. Fox is familiar with the community development corporations statewide and the activities of each CDC program. He has been instrumental in assisting local entities prepare applications to become CDCs to include filing their non-profit corporate status with the Secretary of State. He has authored a pamphlet for the Department which has been distributed to entities desirous of achieving CDC status entitled "How to become a CDC". (Respondent's Exhibit 1). This pamphlet is widely utilized by entities seeking CDC status and provides all of the basic information needed to become a CDC. The act empowers the Department to administer the CDCSAP and authorizes issuance of one and three year administrative grants, planning grants and loans to fund the activities of eligible CDCs. The act requires the Department to monitor expenditures of CDC funds and to provide technical assistance to CDCs. In addition to CDCSAP grants and loans, CDC has also received funding from private foundations and local governments. The Department has adopted Chapter 9B-14, Florida Administrative Code. That chapter implements the act and establishes regulations and procedures governing the CDCSAP. CDCs fiercely compete annually for administrative grants when filing their applications with the Department. These grant applications are reviewed by Fox. There are approximately fifty CDCs statewide and they annually submit applications for grants. Once these applications are received, Fox reviews and scores them pursuant to Rule 9B-14, Florida Administrative Code. In so doing, the Department uses three reviewers and the reviews are individually conducted. In reviewing the grant applications, a funding matrix is used. Using the matrix, a score and rank is made for each application. Next, the division director goes over each application and the matter is discussed with the Department's Secretary. Later a letter of intent is given (to either grant or deny the application). The score lists the rank and order and is not an entitlement to funding. After the applications are reviewed, the Department's senior management lists a "pre-appeal" score and ranking for each applicant. Once the CDCs are notified in writing of the score and ranking in the pre-appeal scoring matrix, they are also advised that the number and amount of administrative grants awarded will be contingent upon passage of a state budget and appropriation for the fiscal year. Applicants are also advised of rights to pursue an appeal regarding the correctness of the scores pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. (Respondent's Exhibit 3). If an appeal is initiated, an administrative proceeding is conducted usually under the informal provisions of Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes. A hearing officer assigned by the Department conducts a hearing and issues a recommended order. A final order is then entered by the Department's Secretary. Thereafter, each applicant is assigned a final score and ranking in the matrix which determines funding order priority. The final scores are usually determined prior to adoption of an appropriations act by the legislature. As noted, the final score does not establish whether a particular CDC will be funded. Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes and Rule 9B-14.007(3) and 9B- 14.009(11)(a)-(c) provide the parameters within which the Department determines the number, type and amount of administrative grants it will award. When grant applications are submitted and evaluated, the Department is, at the time, unaware of the amount of money available for upcoming grants because the legislature has not passed an appropriations bill for the fiscal year. Final decision with respect to the number and amount of administrative grants is made after the final appropriation bills and summary statement of intent is transmitted to the Department. "Proviso language" is passed by the legislature as part of the appropriations bill. It is signed by the governor, has the force of law and is binding on the Department. Legislative statement of intent language is transmitted to the governor at a date after passage of the appropriations act by chairpersons of the House and Senate committees on appropriations. The intent language is the statement of how the legislature, in its considered opinion, thinks the appropriated funds should be spent. It guides the Department regarding use of appropriated funds. The Department considers and relies on applicable legislative proviso or intent language in deciding its final determination as to number and amount of administrative grants. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the Department follows the statement of intent language in reaching its final funding decision. Over the years, a pattern has emerged which evidences that the Department carefully considers applicable proviso or statement of intent language. Specifically, from a historical perspective, for the 1983-84 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,175,000 for the CDCSAP but did not include either proviso or legislative statement of intent language. The governor vetoed $200,000.00 of that sum leaving $975,000 to fund the program. The Department awarded administrative grants in varying amounts to 23 CDCs. Subsequently, the legislature amended the statute to allow the Department to fund no more than 18 CDCs. (Respondent's Exhibit 7 and Chapter 84-240, Laws of Florida). For the 1984-85 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,600,000 for the CDCSAP and included proviso language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be funded. In accordance with that proviso language, the Department awarded administrative grants of $100,000 each to 16 CDCs. For the 1985-86 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,600,000 for the CDCSAP but included neither proviso nor statement of intent language. The Department awarded grants of $100,000 to 16 CDCs. For the 1986-87 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,600,000 for the CDCSAP and included proviso language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be awarded administrative grants and that a specific CDC be awarded a training grant. Pursuant to that proviso language, the Department awarded administrative grants of $85,000 each to 16 CDCs, and a $40,000 training grant to the specified CDC. For the 1987-88 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,337,156 for the CDCSAP and included proviso language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be funded. Pursuant to that proviso language, the Department awarded grants of $83,338 each to 15 CDCs. Another $83,338 was divided to provide grants of $41,669 each to two eligible CDCs which received identical scores for the last funding slot. For the 1988-89 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,337,156 for the CDCSAP and included proviso language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be funded. Pursuant to that proviso language, the Department awarded grants of $72,380 each to 16 CDCs. For the 1989-90 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,337,156 for the CDCSAP and included statement of intent language directing that no more than 16 CDCs be funded. The Department awarded grants of $83,572 each to 16 CDCs. For the 1990-91 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,699,600 for the CDCSAP and included statement of intent language directing that no more than 18 CDCs be funded. The Department followed the statement of intent and awarded grants of $90,564 each to 17 CDCs which scored above the minimum point threshold as set forth in the matrix. For the 1991-92 funding cycle, the legislature appropriated $1,600,000 for the CDCSAP but included neither proviso nor statement of intent language. The Department awarded grants of $88,888 each to 18 CDCs. Final scores and ranking does not establish entitlement to funding under the program. The final score establishes whether a CDC is eligible to receive either a one or three year administrative grant depending on the total number of points received. The score also results in ranking of each CDC so that depending upon legislative appropriations and expressions of intent regarding funding, a funding priority is established. Prior to 1991, the act provided only for the award of one year administrative grants. In 1991, the Florida legislature amended the act to permit the award of multi-year administrative grants and planning grants. (Chapter 91-263, Laws of Florida). The provisions of the act relative to funding provides: The amount of any administrative grant to a community development corporation in one year shall be any amount up to $100,000. The Department may fund up to 18 Community Development Corporations this year as provided for in the general appropriations act. The Department shall develop a diminishing scale of funding each year based on the annual appropriation to ensure compliance with this section and Section 290.0365. See Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes (1991). To incorporate the 1991 statutory changes into Rule 9B-14, Florida Administrative Code, the Department initiated rulemaking pursuant to Section 120.54 in September 1991. Several workshops were held to gain input from CDCs regarding proposed changes to the rule. In addition, a public hearing was held in January 1992 at which the Department received oral and written comments from CDCs regarding the proposed rule challenges. Amendments were adopted and took effect on March 22, 1992. During the rulemaking process, no comment was submitted regarding the proposed changes to Rule 9B-14.009(11). No party initiated a rule challenge to the proposed amendments pursuant to Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes. Rule 9B-14.007(3), which was not affected by the 1992 amendments, states in relevant part that "[n]o grant will be awarded for funds exceeding $100.000." Respondent's Exhibit 2 at Rule 9B-14.007(3). Rule 9B-14.009(11), as amended in 1992, now authorizes the award of two types of administrative grants of one and three years duration in addition to planning grants. The pertinent portion of this rule provides: A maximum of 18 administrative grants may be awarded in any fiscal year pursuant to Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes. Applicants which receive a score of 150 or more points will be awarded a three year administrative grant. Applicants which receive a score of at least 100 points but less than 150 points will be awarded a one year administrative grant. For the 1992-93 funding cycle, prior to the application deadline and after the amendments to Rule 9B-14 were adopted, public application workshops were held in Tallahassee and Miami. At the workshops, representatives of the Department discussed the recent statutory and rule changes to the CDCSAP as well as the proper way to complete applications. The application deadline for administrative grants for the 1992-93 grant cycle was April 1, 1992. The Department received 29 timely applications. When the 1992-93 grant applications were received, evaluated and given tentative scores and rankings, the Department was unaware of the amount of legislative appropriations for the CDCSAP and whether any proviso or statement of intent language would accompany the appropriation. After the applications were evaluated, the preappeal scores and rankings derived and the applicants were notified of the results, several CDCs including Petitioners appealed their scores. Informal hearings were held during late May 1992. The hearing officer's recommended orders were issued June 25, 1992 followed by the Department's final orders on July 8, 1992. Thereafter, each applicant was assigned a final score and ranking. For the 1992-93 funding cycle, 21 CDCs scored above the 100 point minimum threshold. Of these 21, 12 CDCs scored above 150 points and 9 CDCs scored above 100 points but less than 150 points. Each of the Petitioners scored above 100 points but less than 150 points. In late June 1992, the legislature passed an appropriations act which was signed into law on July 2, 1992. On July 14, the Department received a copy of the appropriations act and the accompanying statement of intent regarding the disbursements of appropriated funds of the CDCSAP. The Department requested funding of $1,800,000 for the CDCSAP grant and loan program for fiscal year 1992-93. However, the legislature reduced that funding request to $800,000 for the CDCSAP grants and included a statement of intent language directing that those CDCs which received sufficient point scores under Rule 9B-14 to qualify for a three year administrative grant be funded. The intent language states: It is the intent of the legislature that funds provided in specific appropriation 293A shall be used to award administrative grants in accordance with the provisions of Section 290.036, Florida Statutes, of equal amounts, to those Community Development Corporations that receive a sufficient point score under the Department of Community Affairs evaluation of FY 1992-93 grant applicants to qualify for a three year administrative grant pursuant to criteria established in Chapter 9B-14.009(11) (b), F.A.C. In reaching its decision respecting funding, the Department considered whether to follow the statement of intent language and award 12 grants of $66,666 each, or instead to award 18 grants at $44,444 each. The Department's Secretary ultimately decided to follow the statement of intent language and award grants of $66,666 each to the 12 CDCs which qualified for three year grants under Rule 9B-14. The action of the Secretary was within the discretion accorded by Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes and Rule 9B-14.009(11)(a) to award "up to" 18 grants. The Department has not issued any type of statement which indicates that, in future funding cycles, it will award only three year administrative grants. The Secretary's decision relates only to the 1992-93 fiscal year. Section 290.036(3), Florida Statutes and Rules 9B-14.007(3) and 9B- 14.009(11)(a), Florida Administrative Code commands the Department to award between 0 and 18 administrative grants each year, provided no single award exceeds $100,000. Flexibility is given to the Department based on the uncertainties each year surrounding the legislative appropriations process. Due to the vagaries of the appropriations process, it is not practical or feasible for the Department to adopt a rule which requires it to award a specific number of administrative grants annually. Nor is it feasible or practicable for the Department to wait for the appropriations bill to be passed before initiating an order on the number of grants it will award. The Department strives to get the administrative funds to the CDCs expeditiously. At a minimum, rulemaking takes several months and would accordingly substantially delay transferring grant monies to the CDCs.
