Findings Of Fact The following findings are based on the uncontested facts alleged in Petitioner's Motion For Summary Recommended Order and from the Final Orders issued in Bayshore Homeowners Association v. Department of Environmental Regulation and Grove Isle, Inc., Case Nos. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354. On December 29, 1980 DER entered a Final Order on the application of Petitioner for a 90 slip marina in Biscayne Bay, Florida. The Order denied the permit because Grove Isle had not demonstrated that the project is "affirmatively in the public interest" and because the applicant had not demonstrated that it "can meet ambient water quality standards within the project area itself." In the Recommended Order on Remand the Hearing Officer had defined "existing ambient waters" to be the area in the cove between Grove Isle and the Miami mainland. The Final Order rejected that concept and held if any waters others than those contained within the immediate project site were to be considered as ambient, Petitioner must request a mixing zone as part of its application. See Section 17-4.242, (1)(a)2.b. and Section 17-4.244, Florida Administrative Code. By a letter received at the Department of Environmental Regulation on May 20, 1981, Grove Isle reapplied for the boat dock permit which was the subject of the foregoing proceedings. Petitioner's application, which was in the form of a letter from counsel, stated: May 18, 1981 Mr. Larry O'Donnell Department of Environmental Regulation Post Office Box 3858 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 RE: GROVE ISLE - Application for Boat Dock Dear Mr. O'Donnell: On behalf of Grove Isle, LTD, I am reapplying for the boat dock permit previously applied for by Grove Isle, LTD. Please consider this a short-form application. Your office designated a previous file number, DF 13-7956, to this matter. In conjunction with that application I am applying for a mixing zone, pursuant to Rule 17-4.244, for both the construction and operation of this marina. Please refer to your file on the previous application and incorporate said documents into this reapplication. I am submitting with this application: A scale drawing (one inch = 100') of the proposed facility. (which you have) A certified survey of the proposed mixing zone. (one inch = 100') An application fee of $20.00 A copy of the Final Order issued by Jacob D. Varn, former secretary of DER, on the previous application. A copy of the Notice of Intent previously issued for this project, dated 9/23/79. (which you have) As you will note from reading Mr. Varn's Final Order, he concluded that issuance of this permit was not appropriate inasmuch as the applicant had not applied for nor received a designated mixing zone. We do not necessarily agree with this order and have, in fact, appealed this decision to the First District Court of Appeal. However, in an attempt to keep this matter from becoming any more complicated, we have decided to reapply for the permit and to apply for a mixing zone. We do not concede that a mixing zone should be required for this project or that the facility will result in the release of any pollutants so as to significantly degrade ambient water quality. However, should this project, through its construction or operation, result in the release of any pollutants, I believe they would be limited to: Bottom sediments placed in suspension by the installation of the concrete piles used to support the docking facility during construction; Minimal amounts of oil and grease which may escape from the various vessels moored to the docks; The constituants of anti-fouling paint which may be applied to the hulls of the various vessels moored at the docks. Turbidity will be controlled by the use of curtains during construction. If lowered water quality occurs at all in this project it would only occur within the designated mixing zone, as per Rule 17-4.242 (2)(b) F.A.C. Please advise me should additional information be needed to process this re-application. Yours truly, /s/ KENNETH G. OERTEL On June 19, 1981, DER sent a "completeness summary letter" to Petitioner which requested the following information: Your project is in Outstanding Florida Waters. Please provide the following items demonstrating compliance with Section 17-4.242, Florida Administrative Code. Please demonstrate that this project is clearly in the public interest and that this project will not result in the degradation of ambient water quality beyond the 30 day construction period. Petitioner responded by letter dated June 22, 1981 and which was received at DER on June 25, 1981. Petitioner said in pertinent part: Dear Mr. Duke: If you would check your previous file no. DF-13-7956, I believe you will find all the information you have requested has previously been provided to your office either in that permit file or through the administrative hearings held in pursuit of this application. I think it would be more fruitful if you would communicate with Al Clark, Attorney for DER, with regard to the status of this application. As I do not wish to speak on behalf of Mr. Clark, I believe you should confirm the status of this application with him, particularly in view of our attempt to comply with Secretary Varn's Final Order which suggests the application for this mixing zone. The record reflects no further correspondence between the parties until September 23, 1981 when the Department entered a Final Order Denying Application for Permit. The Order provided that: This project was reviewed previously (DF 13-7956) and was determined not to be clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. No further evidence upon resubmittal, has been provided to clearly demonstrate that this project is in the public interest. Furthermore, the requested mixing zone exceeds that allowable pursuant to Section 17-4.244, F.A.C. and can be applied only during the construction period, pursuant to Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. During the operation of this facility ambient water quality is expected to be degraded in violation of Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. This order was entered ninety-one days after DER received Petitioner's June 22, 1981 letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue the permit applied for by Petitioner, Grove Isle, Ltd. on May 20, 1981 subject to the conditions contained in the Notice of Intent To Issue Permit dated October 23, 1979 which is a part of the record in Bayshore Homeowners Association et al., v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and Grove Isle, Inc., Case Nos. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 12th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1982.
The Issue The issues presented for consideration by the hearing officer were as follows: Whether the project would adversely the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project would adversely affect navigation; Whether the project would adversely affect the fishing or recreational values in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project would be of a temporary or permanent nature; and Whether the project would adversely affect the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
Findings Of Fact On February 21, 1985, the Respondent, John Spang, applied to the Department of Environmental Regulations, Department of natural Resources and the Army Corp. of Engineers for permits necessary to construct two docking facilities, one on each side of the east end of Coronado Bridge, commonly known as the "North Bridge" on the Indian River, north in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Sections 55 and 9, Township 17 South, Range 34 East. The proposed docks include a total of 24 boat slips. The proposed docks are within 25 feet of the right-of-way of the Coronado Bridge on both the north and south sides. The proposed docks consist of four piers. The piers, from south to north, are 101 feet, 102 feet, 122 feet and 122 feet in length respectively. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. The piers south of the bridge are 75 to 80 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The piers north of the bridge are 60 to 65 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The proposed docking facilities shall service commercially zoned properties `to which they shall be attached and, in particular, the Riverview Hotel and Charlie's Blue Crab Restaurant, at the Riverview. The Petitioners, Grover Ryan and Margaret Ryan, own the commercially zoned property adjacent to the subject property to the south, located at 100 West Columbus Avenue, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Ryans operate a commercial business. On March 17, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. Panet E. and Jerrie L. Peterson of 200 Canova Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida own the real property located on the river adjacent to the Ryans but not adjoining the proposed docking area or the property of the applicant. On April 15, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. On February 14, 1986, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit Number 64-099806-4, to construct the proposed docking facilities, subject to specific modifications and conditions to those applications. Issuance of the permit was based upon the following: The Army Corp. of Engineers assessed the proposed docking facilities and determined that the project will not impede navigation or otherwise cause danger to the health, safety or welfare of vessels and persons traveling in the Intracoastal Waterway. On April 18, 1986, the Army Corp. of Engineers issued Permit No. 85IPL-20644 for construction of piers pursuant to the applicant's proposal for docking facilities. The harbor and dockmaster for the City of New Smyrna Beach determined that the proposed docking facilities would not impede or endanger navigation of the river and Intracoastal Waterway, if pilots entering and leaving the docking area carefully follow the rules of road. Actual testing of the proposed site by the Department of Environmental Regulation revealed no seagrasses or rooted macrophytes which might be destroyed by the proposed docks. Flushing in the river was found to be excellent and would alleviate any short-term turbidity problems and would further mitigate against any pollutants from the docking areas to the extent that no water quality violations were anticipated. The United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the area of the proposed docking facility would not have an adverse affect on the manatee otherwise endanger them. Although the dock will restrict fishing from the bridge between the shore and channel, it will not significantly affect adversely the recreational uses. Generally, bridge fishing is being restricted in Florida due to the hazards to fishermen from traffic. The fishing from boats will be unaffected. There is no marine production in the area. The boat traffic in the vicinity of the proposed docking facility is considered heavy, and there are no restrictions on boating speed. The bridge is raised frequently, but heavy traffic requires boats to wait on weekends. The bridge fenders and concrete abutments of the bridge block the lateral view of boaters as they approach, pass under and leave the Coronado Bridge, and likewise obscures the boats in the bridge area from boaters in the proposed dock area. The closest dock to the south of the proposed docks is owned by the Ryans. Mr. Ryan has used his dock for forty-seven (47) years and uses it to dock his large commercial shrimp boat. Mr. Ryan operates a wholesale/retail seafood store on the property which he owns adjoining the Spang's property. As originally proposed, the southernmost dock sought by the Spang's would interfere with Ryan docking his boat at Ryan's dock. The next dock to the south of the proposed docks and Mr. Ryan's dock is owned by the Petersons. This a forty (40) foot dock which is used for noncommercial purposes. Because it does not protrude as far into the water as Ryan's dock, there is no hazard created by the proposed docks. A conditioned modification to the application was the reduction in size of the southernmost docking facility by 15 feet and the construction of handrails on the outer edges of each dock to prevent mooring of boats along the outer edges. The reduction of the southernmost dock by 15 feet, together with handrails and prevention of mooring of boats on the outside of the docks provided reasonable assurance that there was no impediment to navigation, to include Ryan docking his boat. However, the design of the exits to the two proposed docking areas promotes direct entry at right angles into the Intracoastal Waterway. This is potentially hazardous. Petitioner Ryan has an easement over the Spang property to permit public access to Ryan's property from the right-of-way of the bridge and highway. Spang's restaurant, which has already been built at the site, actually traverses the easement, not the proposed docking facility. The proposed facility does not interfere with the easement the Ryans hold landward of the mean high waterline from the highway right-of-way south to the Ryan's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue Permit No. 64-099806-4 with the size limitation and requirements for handrails established by the agency and that the layout of the docks be modified as drawn in Appendix B to discourage exiting the docking areas at right angles to the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 86-0992 The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of John Spang: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 2. Rejected. Paragraph 5 of Ryan's proposed findings of fact adopted as more complete and accurate. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 6. 5,6. Adopted and combined as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted substantially as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 8. 10,11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (b). Irrelevant. Effect on the persons named is not a basis for review. The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of the Ryans and Petersons: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Rejected because the applicants' finding cited 24 which was adopted thereby binding the applicant to the lower number. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 3. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 4. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 5. Adopted in part and included in Recommended Order paragraph 12. 7,8. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 11. 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. 10,12. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 13. 11,13. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 12. Rejected as a list of actors without any conclusion stated. 18,19. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 10 which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding fishing. 20,21,22. Rejected in favor of paragraph 9(d) which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding danger to manatees. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The following action was taken with regard to the Agency's proposed findings of facts. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16 and in part in Recommended Order paragraph 10. 1st sentence: Rejected as irrelevant in light of the Agency's subsequent issuance. Remainder: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(c). Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 16. 5,6. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 15. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(b). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hathaway, Esquire Post Office Drawer H New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1586 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hal Spence, Esquire 221 N. Causeway Post Office Box 1266 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1266
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether the Respondent, Roy Palmer, is entitled to a Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit, under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 62-341, and a Consent of Use under Florida Administrative Code Chapter 18-21.
Findings Of Fact Procedural History On or about February 13, 1995, the Respondent, Roy Palmer (Palmer), applied for a wetland resource permit to construct a 395-foot boat dock for use at his single-family residence at property he owned on Sarasota Bay, an Outstanding Florida Water. As proposed, this dock was to originate from the northern part of Palmer's property and have a terminal platform with two boat moorings and two boat lifts. On September 1, 1995, the Department of Environmental Protection (the Department or DEP) gave notice of intent to issue a permit for a shorter (370-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging the intended action. DEP referred the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 95-5311. On or about December 11, 1995, Palmer applied for a noticed general environmental resource permit (ERP) permit for his dock under new DEP rules went into effect on October 3, 1995. This proposal was for the 370-foot dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property. On or about January 10, 1996, DEP acknowledged receipt of the noticed general ERP (No. 582819483) and informed Palmer that it appeared to meet the requirements of the new rule. DEP also gave notice of intent to grant Palmer's application for consent of use of sovereign submerged lands necessary to construct the dock. (The record is not clear when the application for consent of use was filed.) The Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging agency action regarding both the noticed general ERP and the consent of use. DEP also referred this petition to DOAH, where it was assigned DOAH Case No. 96-0736. Palmer withdrew the original permit application and moved to dismiss DOAH Case No. 95-5311. In July, 1996, Palmer applied for a noticed general ERP to build a still shorter (232-foot) dock originating from the southern part of the Palmer property (Permit No. 292583). Apparently, no notice of the application was published or required to be published. It is not clear whether the Petitioners "filed a written request for notification of any pending applications affecting the particular area in which the proposed activity is to occur." Palmer's second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) was amended on or about August 19, 1996, to eliminate one boat mooring and one boat lift. DEP took no action on Palmer's second application for a noticed general ERP No. 292583. On September 23, 1996, Palmer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Administrative Proceeding in DOAH Case No. 96-0736 because he had withdrawn the previous application for a noticed general ERP for a 370-foot dock (No. 582819483) and was proceeding only on the second noticed general ERP (No. 292583) for the 232foot dock. Palmer's intent was to dismiss only the portion of his prior application regarding the noticed general permit, but not the consent of use. On October 28, 1996, the Petitioners filed a petition for administrative hearing challenging noticed general ERP No. 292583 for the 232-foot dock. This petition alleged that the Petitioners filed a written objection to noticed general ERP No. on September 16, 1996, which requested a written response, and that no response of any kind was received until the Petitioners inquired and were told that DEP did not intend to respond to either the noticed general ERP (No. 292583) or the Petitioners' objection. Proposed Dock at Issue The proposal at issue is for a 227-foot access pier and 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform with only one boat mooring and one boat lift. The length, location, and design of Palmer's proposed dock was changed in an attempt to satisfy the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP or the Department) and Palmer's neighbors. Palmer's task in this regard was difficult in part because a longer dock with a terminus in deeper water could have less impact on seagrasses (the major environmental concern) but would have a greater impact on the neighbors' views of Sarasota Bay (the major infringement of riparian rights concern.) In the final version, Palmer tried to balance these conflicting concerns. As proposed, neither the terminal platform, boat lift, nor mooring location occurs over submerged grassbeds, coral communities or wetlands. Starting at the mean high water line, the first 75 feet of the access pier for the proposed dock will traverse essentially no sea grasses. In the next 75 feet to 150 feet of the access pier, there will be approximately 80% vegetative cover consisting primarily of the seagrass halodule wrightii. Between 150 feet and 200 feet, there will be approximately 20% vegetative cover consisting of the seagrasses halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. Between 200 feet and 232 feet, seagrasses consisted primarily of thalassia testudinum, except that the terminal platform is located in an area of essentially bare sand. Starting at 80 feet from the mean high water line, the access pier for the proposed dock will ramp up to 5 feet above mean high water for the next 20 linear feet and continue at that elevation for the next 112 feet to reduce shading of the seagrasses. Then it will descend stairs for the next 5 linear feet, until it is 3.5 feet above mean high water, and will continue at that elevation for 10 more feet to where it joins the 20 foot by 5 foot terminal platform. In this way, wherever it traverses seagrasses, the access walkway portion of the pier will be elevated 5 feet above mean high water. The access walkway will be only 4 feet wide and will have half-inch wide gaps between its deck boards to allow sunlight through and further reduce shading of the seagrasses. The access walkway also will have handrails that are maintained in such a manner as to prevent use of the access walkways for boat mooring or access. As proposed, the terminal platform and boat lift occurs in a location with minimum depth of 2.2 feet below the mean low water level. There is some water 1.7 feet deep in the vicinity of the terminal platform, but the structure can be used without traversing the shallow water. The structure is designed so that boat mooring and navigational access will be in water at least 2 feet deep. Including access pier and terminal platform, the total area of Palmer's proposed dock over sovereign, submerged land would be 1,008 square feet. There will be no wet bars or living quarters over wetlands or surface waters or on the pier, and there will be no structures enclosed by walls or doors. There will be no fish cleaning facilities, boat repair facilities or equipment, or fueling facilities on the proposed dock. No overboard discharges of trash, human, or animal waste, or fuel will occur from the dock. The only dredging or filling associated with construction of Palmer's proposed dock will be the minimum dredge and fill required for installation of the actual pilings for the pier, terminal platform, and boat lift. Altogether, less than 30 square feet of bay bottom will be disturbed during construction and displaced to accommodate the pilings. Palmer's noticed general ERP is subject to the general conditions set out in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 341.427. Among those conditions is the requirement that Palmer implement best management practices for erosion, turbidity, and other pollution control to prevent violation of state water quality standards. The pilings will be jetted, not driven, into place to minimize disturbance of the bay bottom and temporary increases in turbidity. Turbidity barriers will be installed and maintained in a functional condition at each piling until construction is completed and soils are stabilized and vegetation has been established. Used properly, turbidity barriers have proved effective in containing temporary turbidity from dock construction. Based on the expert testimony, it is found that the construction of Palmer's proposed dock will not significantly impact seagrasses. The Petitioners presented expert testimony on seagrasses, but their expert testified only generally based on studies showing that shading negatively impacts seagrasses. He had no prior knowledge of the Palmer dock design, seagrass coverage, or the depth of the water. When apprised of some information concerning Palmer's proposed dock, he admitted that the studies involved far more severe shading conditions than would be caused by the proposed dock. He could not testify that the Palmer dock design would harm seagrasses, with the exception of those actually removed by the installation of the pilings. Accidental boat propeller dredging in using a dock can be a secondary impact on seagrasses from dock construction. But while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of damage to seagrasses from accidental prop dredging. Petitioners Dr. Franklin Pfeiffenberger, James Castoro, and Winifred Castoro jointly own a dock to the south of the Palmer property. This dock, which was built in the 1930's, projects 190 feet into Sarasota Bay and traverses seagrasses. Unlike the proposed Palmer dock, the Pfeiffenberger dock is not elevated, and it terminates in seagrasses. The seagrasses under the Pfeiffenberger dock are the same types as those located in the Palmer dock alignment--a combination of halodule wrightii and thalassia testudinum. The dock has been rebuilt a number of times over the years. Upon physical inspection, apparently healthy and growing seagrasses were found underneath the Pfeiffenberger dock. The proposed dock will not harm wildlife, including manatees (the only endangered species in the area, animal or plant). Manatees use Sarasota Bay in general, but the east side of the bay, where the Palmer property is located, is not a high use area. It is shallow and would not be considered "select" habitat for manatees. The proposed dock would not have any detrimental effect on manatee travel patterns; they could easily swim around the dock. Manatees eat seagrasses and other aquatic vegetation, but the proposed dock will not have significant adverse impact on those resources. Finally, while a dock could perhaps attract a few boats, the dock's presence also might cause boaters to steer clear of the dock or reduce speed in the vicinity of the dock, which could result in a net reduction in the risk of injury to manatees in the area from boat collisions and prop scarring. Except for temporary turbidity during construction, no other water quality parameters will be violated as a result of the construction of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock and its use will not significantly impede navigability in Sarasota Bay. The bay is approximately 18,000 feet wide at that point, and it is approximately 4,800 feet from Palmer's property to the Intracoastal Waterway. Since the water is shallow near shore in the vicinity of the Palmer property, relatively few boats frequent the area. Those that do are generally smaller boats. These boats easily could navigate so as to avoid the dock; very small boats, such as canoes and kayaks, might even be able to carefully pass under the elevated portion of the dock. Palmer's proposed dock also would not be a serious impediment to other recreational uses of Sarasota Bay in the area. The water is too shallow for swimming. Fishing could improve because the dock could attract baitfish. People could continue to wade-fish by walking around or even under the proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock is aesthetically consistent with the area in which it is located. All the Petitioners have some sort of man-made structure projecting out into Sarasota Bay from their property. As already mentioned, Dr. Pfeiffenberger and the Castoros have a 190-foot dock projecting straight out into Sarasota Bay. Within the past five years, Dr. Pfeiffenberger has installed a bench to sit on at the end of the dock. To the north of the Palmer property, property owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cabaniss has a yacht basin formed by a sea wall that projects roughly perpendicular to the shoreline out into the bay. Immediately north of the Cabaniss property, there is a boat house on the Goldman property where it abuts the yacht basin. The Goldmans' boat house is approximately 20 feet in length and 10 feet in height from ground level. Immediately south of the Palmer property, Ms. Stenhouse has a small dock (which appears to be located over seagrasses.) As a result, the viewsheds of Palmer and the Petitioners already contain many docks and man- made structures. In addition, the Ringling Causeway and bridge can be seen from all of these properties. Palmer's proposed dock will appear in some views from the Petitioners' properties. Generally, the closer the neighbor, the more will be seen of Palmer's proposed dock. Some of the Petitioners will only be able to see the proposed dock if they go out to the westerly edge of their properties on the bay. While the proposed dock will appear in and alter these views, it will not eliminate any Petitioner's view of Sarasota Bay. Even the closest neighbors will have some unobstructed views around the proposed dock. It also will be possible to see over and under the proposed dock, similar to the way in which many of the Petitioners now enjoy their views. There are tall pine and palm trees on the Cabaniss property between their house and their view of the bay. Most of the other properties in the vicinity appear to have similar viewsheds. Ms. Stenhouse has a large stand of mangroves of the western edge of her property; they cover approximately 60 percent of the panorama from her house, but they are trimmed up so she can see through them. While some people would prefer not to have the Palmer dock there, other people might view the availability of single- family residential docks to be an asset to the properties in the neighborhood. Based on expert testimony, it cannot be found that property values in the area would go down as a result of Palmer's proposed dock. Palmer's proposed dock does little if anything to further the idealistic goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan to restore and expand seagrasses in Sarasota Bay in that the proposed dock will eliminate some seagrasses. However, only approximately 30 square feet of seagrasses will be lost. Otherwise, the proposed dock is consistent with other goals and objectives of the City of Sarasota Comprehensive Plan and the Sarasota Bay Management Plan in that the dock has been aligned and planned so as to minimize impacts on seagrasses while balancing the neighbors' desire to minimize the impact on their views of Sarasota Bay. Palmer's Riparian Rights Palmer and his wife received a Warranty Deed, dated August 27, 1993, from James Kirk, II, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Marie Ferguson. The deed describes Lots 27 and 28 of the Indian Beach subdivision in Sarasota, Florida, with a western boundary "along the shores of Sarasota Bay." Palmer attached this deed to his applications. Since at least November 1992, the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay has been west of a seawall on the Palmer property. The evidence was clear that the seawall has been there since at least 1944 and that Palmer has not filled the area to the west of the seawall or built any structure that influences its existence. The evidence was not clear as to the creation and history of upland to the west of the seawall. From aerial photographs, it appears that at least some upland has existed to the west of the seawall at least from time to time for at least the last 30 years. For reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers also received a Warranty Deed from Kirk, dated September 3, 1993, purporting to convey title only up to the seawall on the Palmer property. Likewise for reasons no witness could explain, a land surveyor named Lawrence R. Weber prepared a boundary survey based on the description in the September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed. Also for reasons no witness could explain, the Palmers received a Quit Claim Deed from Kirk, dated October 20, 1993. This instrument quitclaimed to the Palmers "all of the Grantor's property to the mean high water line of Sarasota Bay, including riparian rights." Except for the mysterious September 3, 1993, Warranty Deed from Kirk, all deeds in the chain of title back to at least 1944 reflect an intention to convey riparian rights. A deed given by Helen and Frederick Delaute to Cecilia and Harold Wilkins, dated April 19, 1944, described the westerly boundary of the property as running northerly along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced riparian rights. (This deed attached a survey showing the still-existing seawall.) The next deed in the chain of title was from the widowed Cecilia S. Wilkins to Edward and Laura Williams dated December 27, 1954. The metes and bounds description again referenced the westerly boundary as running along the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Edward and Laura Williams to Aidan and Wilma E. Dewey dated June 30, 1958. This deed again defined the westerly boundaries of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights. The next deed in the chain of title was from Aidan and Wilma Dewey to Edward and Marie Ferguson dated August 23, 1967. This deed again defined the westerly boundary of the property as the shores of Sarasota Bay and specifically referenced foreshore accretions and riparian rights.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order issuing Noticed General Environmental Resource Permit (No. 292583) and Consent of Use (No. 582819483) to Roy Palmer. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Filson, Esquire Filson and Penge, P.A. 2727 South Tamiami Trail, Suite 2 Sarasota, Florida 34239 Thomas I. Mayton, Esquire T. Andrew Zodrow, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David M. Levin, Esquire Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg Post Office Box 4195 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Alexandra St. Paul, Esquire The Riverview Center 1111 3rd Avenue, West Suite 350 Bradenton, Florida 34205 Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Pine Island Properties, Ltd., (Petitioner) owns a residential development project identified as "Pelican Inlet" located on Pine Island, Lee County, Florida. The Petitioner seeks a permit to fill 0.78 acres of wetlands to construct the project. The Department of Environmental Protection (Department) is responsible for reviewing permit applications under Chapter 403, Florida Statutes and related administrative rules. The Department file number for this application is 362004755. The Pelican Inlet project is located in Lee County, Florida, Sections 4 and 9, Township 45 South, Range 25 East. The project impact site is immediately adjacent to "Forty Acre Bay/Bay 36" (bay) which is a Class II Outstanding Florida Water and part of the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. There are no other developments on the bay. Access from Pelican Inlet to Pine Island Sound is via the bay. Pine Island Sound is a popularly used water body, with substantial fishing and recreational use. The Pelican Inlet development fronts a man-made canal which runs generally east-west. The canal is between two to ten feet deep. The Petitioner did not construct the canal. It appears that during the dredging of the canal, spoil was deposited along the canal banks, resulting in an upland area in the midst of the wetlands. The spoil is vegetated by Australian pine. The elevation of the property drops approximately 1.5 feet where the higher spoil abuts the wetlands. The Petitioner owns only the north half of the canal. Other parties not involved in this application own the south half of the canal. According to the Petitioner, the south half owners are not interested in assisting in the Petitioner's project. Extensive mangrove growth exists immediately north and south of the project impact area. Immediately along the banks of the canal are red, black, and white mangroves. At the east end of the canal is a dense growth of mature black mangroves. Further to the east lie undeveloped uplands vegetated with slash pine and saw palmetto. Although there has been some trash dumping in the area, the mangroves to be impacted by the proposed development are part of a high quality, functioning, healthy, and productive wetlands system. The area currently provides broad water quality benefits and wildlife habitat. The north part of the impacted wetlands area contained a dirt road. Exotic vegetation, including Brazilian pepper Australian pine and Melaleuca, has invaded the trail area. Away from the road, the wetlands are dominated by buttonwood, seashore dropseed, beach carpet, salt grass, needlerush, and leather fern. The Western end of the canal connects to the bay. Water depths in the bay average approximately 1.5 feet deep, but vary significantly. The bay bottom is composed of fine organic mud. There is evidence of damage caused by boat propellers in some parts of the bay. The bay is used by species of fish, snails, mollusks, crabs and birds and is regarded as a productive marine habitat. Within the development, the Petitioner seeks to locate a total of 23 single family homes. Fourteen of the 23 homes will be located directly along the canal. Of these 14, eight will require placement of fill in the adjacent mangroves; two others are entirely within the mature mangrove wetlands. The remaining nine houses would be placed in the area east of the canal. Within the wetlands and uplands portion of the property, the development will include the 23 houses, driveways, access roads, sewer treatment plant, spreader swale and retention area. Subsequent to the filing of the application, the parties engaged in an extensive dialogue in an attempt to reach a resolution of the matter. The issues raised by the Department essentially centered on two general issues, minimization and mitigation of the wetlands lost through fill and resolution of the anticipated secondary impacts of the project. The parties appear to have resolved concerns related to the mitigation of the wetlands lost and impacted by the fill. At the hearing, there was minimal evidence and testimony related to the wetlands mitigation issues. Based on the apparent lack of conflict related to the wetlands loss mitigation, this Recommended Order is directed towards the cumulative and secondary impacts of the project. On August 21, 1991, the Petitioner filed an application for permit/water quality certification with the agency. On October 28, 1991, the Department conducted a field appraisal of the project. Based on the appraisal, the Department determined that the project was unpermittable as proposed in the application. On December 24, 1991, the Department forwarded to the Petitioner a copy of the site inspection report. In the report, the Department identifies a number of concerns related to the expected environmental impact of the project. Thereafter, the parties began an extensive dialogue regarding the project. On March 12, 1992, the Department issued a Notice of Permit Denial. The parties continued to discuss mitigation, and several extensions to the deadline for filing an administrative hearing request were granted by the Department. There is no dispute regarding timeliness of the request for hearing. The Notice of Permit Denial indicates that the Department's concerns center on the potential for turbidity-related water quality violations which could result from unstabilized fill, the adverse floristic impact caused by fill washout into adjacent wetlands, the loss of the filtering benefits provided via the filled wetlands and the adverse impact on wildlife habitat. The Notice of Permit Denial further identifies concerns related to the cumulative and secondary impacts of the project. Such impacts include boat docks in the canal resulting in an increase in the intensity of boating activity in the Bay. The Notice also addresses the precedential impact of permitting this project as it relates to other properties similarly situated, specifically, the property on the south side of the Canal. The expected increases in boat traffic will result in turbidity and damage to the bay bottom through prop dredging, in turn causing injury to the marine habitat's sea grasses and benthic organisms. During the ongoing dialogue with the Department, the Petitioner submitted a mitigation plan. In the Department's letter of June 26, 1992, related to its review of the plan, the Department notes that the proposal failed to address the anticipated impact of boat users on the shallow bay adjacent to the canal. Paragraph #23 of the letter states as follows: Please be advised that the submitted proposal does not adequately address the secondary impacts of the proposed development. There is still a high potential for boat use within the adjacent shallow bay which will significantly degrade this portion of the aquatic preserve, additional boating pressure could also result in requests for dredging a channel within this bay....Before a permit can be issued all of these impacts need to be addressed. One possible way to address these would be to provide easements over adjacent wetlands and the canal that specifically prohibit dock construction...and/or to fill in a portion of the canal to prevent large boats from utilizing the area. In a letter of July 29, 1992 in response to the Department's earlier transmittal, the Petitioner stated: Boat access to coastal waters of Lee is a very important aspect of this project, however only two of the twenty-four lots have direct private property access to the canal and these are lots 1 and 18. Only lot 1 has both canal and natural water frontage. The potential for secondary wetland impacts related to permitting of this project are real and are also a concern of the applicant. As to the issue of boat docks, the Petitioner stated: Pine Island Properties, Limited, the owner of the project, is not proposing to permit or construct any boat docks within the project boundary. Each lot owner must, if they wish to, make application through appropriate state and federal agencies for a boat dock. As to the matter of the shallow adjacent bay, the Petitioner stated: The existing water depths in the adjacent bay system already by itself mandates and places limits on access by large boats, ones with a deeper draft. Local knowledge of both bottom topography as well as tidal conditions and times is necessary for one to travel through these back bay areas. The applicant agrees to place reasonable size, i.e., draft, restrictions on boats allowed into and out of the project. The draft limit restriction for boats would be 24 inches. In additional all boats with engines larger than 35 horsepower would be required to have hydraulic motor/outdrive lifts capable of allowing adjustments in the depth of the operation of the propeller. The applicant also accepts responsibility of placing appropriate depth markers from the western end (exist) (sic) of the unnamed canal to the "between island" passage approximately 750 feet directly to the west. Placement of markers would identify the preferred travel route and inform boaters, through placement of signs, that they are in an aquatic preserve and caution them about damage to bottom of the bay if propellers are set to (sic) deep. By Department letter of September 21, 1992, the Department noted continuing concerns with the impacts of the project. In relevant part, the letter states, "[T]he Department still lacks reasonable assurance that the project's impacts will be offset. Also, you have not yet demonstrated to the Department's satisfaction that the project will be clearly in the public interest." The Department's September 21 letter addresses remaining questions about the wetlands fill area, as well as canal use restrictions. Specifically as to the canal issue, the letter states: Your proposal to place a draft restriction of 24" on boats using the canal to protect adjacent waters which are 18" deep is not acceptable. A deed restriction prohibiting property owners from using or mooring motorized vessels in the canal would be more acceptable....A conservation easement could also prohibit the construction of docks and/or the mooring of motorized vessels on the shoreline by the present owners or by potential future owners such as a homeowners association. Based on the Department's assertion that the shallow bay could not accommodate boat traffic related to the development, the Petitioner conducted a survey of existing water depths in the vicinity of the canal. In its October 28, 1992 letter in response to the Department, the Petitioner responded as follows: In general there is sufficient water for shallow draft motor driven vessels, however local knowledge, proper tidal conditions and informed operators would be essential to a safe and non-habitat damaging passage from the canal mouth to the deeper waters of Pine Island Sound. Evidence of prop scars...provides a longlasting record of past damage to the turtle grass beds by (sic) without proper boat handling skills and knowledge. Sizing of boat draft and the requirement that all boats possess hydraulically adjustable outboards units or if inboard drive units then the outdrives must be adjustable is a must. During lower tidal phases, e.g., mean low water, water levels can be expected to drop another foot which would result in water depth ranges of about 17 to 30 inches, definitly (sic) a problem for boats with a hull draft of 18 inches regardless of what angle the drive unit is positioned. Placement of informational signs as well as placement of channel marks would reduce hull and drive unit impacts to the adjacent bay bottom. In concluding the October 28 letter, the Petitioner makes the following recommendations: Recommendations for consideration: Boats limited to hull drafts of 20 inches. All boats required to have adjustable power units. Channel markers required from the Pelican Inlet canal mouth through to a point midway between the islands and Cork Island. This is approximately 2,800 feet west of the canal mouth. These markers would be spaced, approximately 150 feet apart, on-center,. (sic) Thus under southflorida's (sic) winter foggy conditions or after dark ease of marker detection/direction would be a useful aid to navigation. Informational signs should be installed at "entry points" such as the canal mouth, the between-island pass and between the island headlands. These should inform the boater of the environmental sensitivity, the shallow water conditions, the existence of grass beds and requirement of a slow speed, "no wake" zones. Monitoring of bentic (sic) habitats over the first five years would also determine if the above conditions are effective at protecting the coastal habitats. By Department letter of December 17, 1992, the Department again addressed continuing concern with the impact of the project. Paragraph 14 of the letter states: Thank you for the water depth report. As the report states,"...local knowledge, proper tidal conditions and informed operators would be essential to a safe and non-habitat damaging passage from the canal mouth to the deeper waters of Pine Island Sound." Since it would be extremely difficult to provide the Department with reasonable assurance that all three of these conditions will be present during motorized vehicle operations originating on-site, other assurance that impacts will not occur and degrade the Outstanding Florida waterbody must be provided. As previously stated, legally binding agreements regarding draft and other restrictions may be difficult to enforce. Monitoring of an activity's impacts is only useful if there is some recourse to eliminate or reduce any impacts revealed by monitoring. The submitted report reinforces the Department's position that reasonable assurance, beyond that already proposed, must be provided that boat traffic originating from the project's canal will not adversely impact the adjacent shallow waters. Such assurance could include, but would not be limited to, a mnechanical or physical draft restrictor in the canal, an agreement not to seek permits to expand the existing canal, and authorization from the Department of Natural Resources for the proposed channel markers and informational signs. Please note that additional assurance beyond these may also be required. Paragraph 15 of the Department's December 17, letter states: Although not proposed as part of this application, construction of boat docks in the canal is a secondary impact which could be reasonably expected to occur as a result of issuing a permit for the proposed activities. Please provide reasonable assurance that construction of docks in the canal and subsequent mooring of boats will not contribute to a degradation of water quality below State water quality standards in the canal and in the adjacent waters. By letter of February 1, 1993, the Petitioner responded to paragraph 14 of the Department's December 17 letter as follows: The applicant does agree not to seek permits to expand the existing channel and will seek authorization from the Department of Natural Resources for the proposed channel markers and informational signs. In a twenty page letter, dated July 29, 1992, also answering questions of the FDER, Kathleen Parker Greenwood, the applicant stated that he was in agreement as to the placement of restrictions on the draft of boats allowed into and out of the project. This draft limit was set at 24 inches. In addition boats having engines larger that 35 horsepower, would have to have a hydraulic motor/outdrive lift, this to allow adjustments in the depth of propeller operation when operating in or during low water conditions. The applicant may accept the proposal of placement of a draft restrictor at the mouth of the unnamed canal, however would like additional information regarding available designs. Are there any floating types, ones that could be moored permanently at the mouth of the project canal, and rise and fall with the tide, similar in concept to the method used to moor floating docks, i.e., a collar/ring freely moving up and down on a stationary piling? This would allow the setting of a uniform depth regardless of tidal or wind induced depth of water conditions. The Petitioner responded to paragraph 15 of the Department's December 17 letter as follows: The applicant also does not want to degrade existing water quality and agrees to implement both design determined as well as behavioral directing programs to insure that this does not happen. The central issues are: a.) Oil and gas leaks and spills. b.) Leakage of the active chemicals found in anti-fouling bottom paints. c.) "Wolmerized" substances placed in marine piling which, over time, leak into the water column. d.) Shading of shoreline bottom communities due to the installation of docks with associated floating boats. and e.) Physical, one-time, impacts occurring during the installation of pilings and dolphines. The applicant, wishing to minimize potential onetime (sic) as well as cumulative impacts proposes the following: The applicant will attach to documents/lot sales contract a notice that clearly informs the prospective land owner of his/her responsibilities regarding the use and storage, handing and disposal of hazardous wastes, especially boat fuel and oil. This document will warn residents against the discharge overboard of bilge water known to contain fuel/oil mixtures. Each dock will display, in a prominent mannor (sic), a sign with essentially the same warning. The Pelican Inlet property owner(s) will also develop, and have in place and operational, prior to any authorization for the construction of boad (sic) docks, an emergency response program designed to handle in-project fuel spells (sic). This program will include the storage of equipment suitable for emergency containment until, and if necessary, a local response can be made by the appropriate Lee County and/or state officials. Boats will be lifted, when not actively in use, via davits or elevating hoist platforms completely out of the water. This will minimize water/hull contact in the case of anti-fouling paints and bottom coatings. Dock pilings and dolphines will utilize non-toxic structural components, wolmerized and other petroleum based substances will not be allowed to come in contact with the water column. Such Structural members as concrete or PVC or other known non-toxic items will be utilized for all vertical supports. Dock access platforms/boardwalks will be minimized, this in order to reduce potential shading. Consideration will be given to the use of translucent "boards" now on the construction market, this again to further minimize shading. By Department letter of February 15, 1993, the Department addressed continuing and additional concerns related to project impact. Paragraph 9 of the letter states: Regarding the issue of boat access from the canal out to Pine Island Sound, it should be noted that [the Petitioner agent's] access study was done at a time when the water elevation was provided as +1.91' NGVD. The mean high water elevation, as provided, is +1.47' NGVD. Thus is appears that at mean high water, there will be a little more than 5 inches less water that what was present during that study. The mean low water elevation provided is -1.2' NGVD which seems low. However, using this figure, at mean low water there will be 3' less water between the canal and the sound. Using a more reasonable tidal range of approximately 1', there would still be a difference of almost 1.5' between the observed and the low water levels, yielding lowest depths of approximately 3" in segment 1, the unvegetated areas, 10" in segment 2, where turtle grass and shoal grass...exist within the "channel", and 24" or greater out in the sound (along the sampled channel). The Department's own informal depth survey, taken during a full moon low tide, showed water depths of approximately 3" to 6" in segment 1 and 10" to 36" (in the remnant channel) along segment 2. Most importantly, many of the shallow areas in segment 2 showed dense seagrass growth, especially out by the "island headlands", where no channel exists and where prop scarring of the grassbeds already appears to be a major problem. Also, the shallowest area, segment 1, where turbidity would be expected to occur almost every time a boat went through until the channel was prop dredged, was observed to be a highly productive and diverse area, despite the fact that it is unvegetated. Other concerns which this site visit brought up include the potential for increased erosion of shorelines adjacent to the proposed channel, and disturbance of wading bird rookeries or roosting areas along the channel's path. Reasonable assurance that boats crossing the areas between the canal and the sound will not cause violations of water quality, including turbidity and loss of diversity, and loss of non-mitigable wetland resources, seagrass beds, has not been provided. Without this, a permit may still not be issued for this project. By response dated April 11, 1993, the Petitioner responded to the Department's December 17 letter. As to the conflicting high water calculations, the Petitioner offered a further refinement of the figures and noted: Both of the above are relatively minor corrections and any reasonable person would still agree that water depths along the recommended boating channel corridor are, at best, minimal. Only one with local knowledge and possessing common boating skills and sense would be able to navigate the passage without disruption or damage to the bottom habitat. As to the application of a 1' "tidal range," the Petitioner suggests that the Department meant to identify the figure as the range below mean sea level. Citing to 1993 tidal tables, the Petitioner recalculated the water depths and opined that the lowest depth in segment 1 would be 6.7", in segment 2 would be 21.1" and in segment 3 would be over 30". The Petitioner noted that the calculations did not account for neap or spring tides, periods of even lower water conditions. As to the Department's informal depth survey showing water depths of approximately 3" to 6" in segment 1 and 10" to 36" (in the remnant channel) along segment 2, the response states "[t]hese value ranges and conclusion seem reasonable to the applicant. Only after a series of repeated depth measurements have been taken over a variety of tidal and weather conditions (e.g. wind speed and direction) would a more detailed analysis be available. " As to the Department's statement concern for potential increased erosion of shorelines adjacent to the proposed channel, and disturbance of wading bird rookeries or roosting areas along the channel's path, the Petitioner responded as follows: The applicant previously agreed to a mandatory "no wake, slow speed" zone condition within segments I, II, and III out past the western most headlands to a position due north of Cork Island. Signs along the proposed boat corridor would notify boaters of this and other environmentally related restrictions. Disturbances to in place bird rookeries during the nesting season are of concern in southwest Florida. Parents frightened off active nests do greatly decrease the success for fledging of subadult birds. Generally rookeries occur on islands rather than headlands, thus the applicant would committ (sic) to a vigerous (sic) environmental sensitivity education program directed towards project initiated boaters in order to gain citizen appreciation, support and consideration for island areas of nesting wading birds. Part of the on-going monitoring that the applicant commits to would also track near-shore rookeries in the vacinity (sic) of the proposed boat traffic corridor. As to the Department's statement that reasonable assurance that boats crossing the areas between the canal and the sound would not cause violations of water quality had not been provided, the Petitioner responded as follows: The issue and standard, reasonable assurance, is very difficult to meet, however the applicants proposed residential project design is sensitive to on-site and near shore environmental conditions in the following mannor (sic): The applicant is aware that without full cooperation,, support, appreciation and participation by the future project resident boat operators there will defintly (sic) be negative impacts to the tidally related natural resource base. The natural resource setting is the major selling point for prospective owners and its continued health and sustainability is a good business practice Toward these ends the applicant clearly committs (sic) to: The marking and maintaining of a path along which all boat traffic must follow when exiting or entering the near-shore boat corridor lane. Placement and maintaining of a series of informational "No Wake, Slow Speed" signs along the required boat corridor out to just north of Cork Island. A mandatory requirement stating that all resident owned boats, proposed to enter and exit the site will: Be restricted to a maximum hull draft of 20 inches. Will possess adjustable hydraulic motor/shaft outdrive lifts. Predevelopment base-line and post development monitoring of the conditions and any changes, of the benthic habitats along and adjacent (250' on either side of the centerline) to the proposed boat corridor. This monitoring, with quarterly reports, will continue for five consecutive years. By letter dated May 19, 1993, the Department replied in relevant part to the Petitioner's response as follows: ...The second issue is that of navigable access from the canal to Pine Island Sound. The one specific point to be made here is that a proposed draft restriction of 20" to cross an area as shallow as 6.7" (using your figures) at mean low water is not acceptable as this would cause scarring even when a motor was not in use. More general concerns, as previously discussed, involve whether or not placement of no wake signs, deed restrictions requiring outboard lift units and maximum keel drafts, and monitoring to document boating impacts on adjacent resources provide reasonable assurance that impacts will not occur, and if they do occur, they can be offset. Currently, the Department's view is that only by strict legal (e.g., conservation easement) and physical (e.g., pilings at the end of the canal) measures can impacts to the adjacent OFW resources be avoided or minimized. If there is new information concerning this aspect of this project which demonstrates to the Department's satisfaction that there will not be impacts associated with boat traffic or that these impacts can be offset, then please submit such, since this is not considered a closed issue. " By letter dated June 2, 1993, the Petitioner responded to the Department's May 19 letter. Paragraph 2 of the response states: Our client has agreed to put his half of the canal in a conservation easement without limiting the future construction of boat docks and the ability to obtain a permit for dredging maintenance of the canal. Also, he agreed to drive draft restricting pilings at the west end of the canal. In order to do this, our client is trying to get in touch with the owner of the south half of the existing canal. The construction of these pilings will depend on the adjacent lot owner's response. If required the "No Wake" sign will be installed. Deed restrictions requiring outboard lift units and maximum keel drafts will be provided." The adjacent lot owner is not cooperative with the Petitioner. The evidence establishes that permitting of this project will lead to increased boat traffic in the shallow bay, resulting in prop scarring of the bay bottom, erosion of adjacent shoreline, and damage to the wildlife habitat provided therein. The use of a draft restrictor appears to be integral to the Department and to the Petitioner's ability to protect the shallow bay from damage. Although discussed frequently, the Petitioner provided no detailed draft restrictor design until immediately prior to the hearing. The draft restrictor would limit boat passage in or out of the canal mouth unless the water depth was sufficient to prevent harm to the bay bottom. The greater evidence fails to establish that a draft restrictor placed at the opening to the canal into the shallow bay is sufficient to prevent damage to the bay habitat. Placement of a restrictor only at the mouth of the canal provides no protection to the marine resource once boaters exit the canal and are in the bay. The proposed marking of a "channel" which is marginally sufficient to permit access to deeper waters, fails to protect the resource. A draft restrictor at the canal mouth further provides no protection against damage caused by boaters returning from deeper waters who will be able to travel through the shallow bay before perhaps discovering at the canal mouth that the water is too shallow to permit passage over the restrictor. It is reasonable to assume at that point, the bay will have been damaged by the excessive draft. It is also reasonable to assume that the damage would be exacerbated by the boater who, unable to enter the canal, either exits the too shallow bay, or remains until the water rises sufficiently to permit passage over the restrictor. The evidence fails to establish that it is possible to police the users of the bay to provide that due care is used to prevent bay damage. The Petitioner asserts that the bay is already being used and damaged by other boaters. Even if correct, this project must meet the applicable criteria to be permitted. As set forth herein, the criteria are not met. Based on the evidence and on consideration and balancing of the following criteria, the project is not clearly in and is contrary to the public interest: WHETHER THE PROJECT WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, OR WELFARE OR THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS-- The Department does not assert that the project will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others. WHETHER THE PROJECT WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE CONSERVATION OF FISH AND WILDLIFE, INCLUDING ENDANGERED OR THREATENED SPECIES, OR THEIR HABITATS-- The evidence establishes that the project will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. Pine Island Sound provides habitat for endangered species including manatees, roseate spoonbills, and wood storks. Additionally, bald eagles have been seen in the project site and Pine Island Sound. The direct loss of wetland habitat resulting from this project will adversely affect the conservation of such species. The Petitioner presented no credible evidence to the contrary. The increased boat traffic which may reasonably be expected to result from award of the permit sought will cause damage to the shallow bay waters and result in harm to the health and function of the bay habitat. WHETHER THE PROJECT WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT NAVIGATION OR THE FLOW OF WATER OR CAUSE HARMFUL EROSION OR SHOALING-- The Notice of Permit Denial suggests a likelihood of turbidity-related water quality violations which could result from unstabilized fill, the adverse floristic impact caused by fill washout into adjacent wetlands, the loss of the filtering benefits provided via the filled wetlands and the adverse impact on wildlife habitat. The evidence establishes that the parties have resolved concerns related to the mitigation of the wetlands lost and impacted by the fill. The Department does not currently assert that the project will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the project will increase travel through the shallow bay to adjacent waters by boaters residing in the project. The prop dredging which will occur in the shallow water will result in harmful erosion of the bay bottom. WHETHER THE PROJECT WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FISHING OR RECREATIONAL VALUES OR MARINE PRODUCTIVITY IN THE VICINITY OF THE PROJECT-- The project will likely result in an increase in the number of boaters utilizing the bay and adjacent waters. The turbidity caused by prop dredging in the bay will degrade the water quality and adversely affect the productivity of the impacted marine resource, in turn reducing the fishing values in the vicinity of the project. The Petitioner presented no credible evidence to the contrary. WHETHER THE PROJECT WILL BE OF A TEMPORARY OR PERMANENT NATURE-- The project will cause a permanent alteration to the existing condition of the property and will cause a continuing adverse impact to the affected area. WHETHER THE PROJECT WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT OR WILL ENHANCE SIGNIFICANT HISTORICAL AND ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF S. 267.061-- The Department does not assert that this project will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources. THE CURRENT CONDITION AND RELATIVE VALUE OF FUNCTIONS BEING PERFORMED BY AREAS AFFECTED BY THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY-- The current condition and relative values of the functions being performed in the affected areas will be adversely affected by the granting of this application. The project will result in an adverse impact to and degradation of an Outstanding Florida Water. The Petitioner presented no credible evidence to the contrary. The evidence establishes that adverse secondary and cumulative impacts will result from permitting this project. Aside from the adverse affect of increased boating related to residents of the development, it is reasonable to expect that similarly-situated applicants could seek permits under these circumstances, resulting in additional boating activity and related damage to an Outstanding Florida Waterbody.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order denying the application of Pine Island Properties, Ltd., for a water quality certification permit in DEP File No. 362004755. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of March, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-2713 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 1. Rejected, unnecessary. 12. Rejected. Evidence is insufficient to determine whether use of bay by public is "regular." Rejected. The map attached to the application identifies 23 homesites. The Notice of Permit Denial references 23 homesites. Petitioner's exhibit 92 is a set of drawings which indicate 24 homesites, however it is unclear as to why the lots were replatted. Rejected as to reference to South Florida Water Management District, irrelevant. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the project is contrary to public interest. Rejected, argumentative, subordinate. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that this was the first detailed drawing of the draft restrictor. 32-33. Rejected, irrelevant as to whether project meets permitting criteria. 37-38. Rejected, unnecessary. 39-40. Rejected. The evidence fails to establish that filling in the canal is the "only solution" suggested by the Department. 42. Rejected as to assertion that the Department did not question the conclusion or accuracy of the Petitioner's water depth study, contrary to evidence including the Department's site visit. The conclusion to which the Department agreed is that "local knowledge, proper tidal conditions and informed operators would be essential to a safe and non-habitat damaging passage from the canal mouth to the deeper waters of Pine Island Sound." Rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. The Department noted in correspondence that monitoring would not protect the resource. 46-48. Rejected The easement has not been executed or recorded. Rejected. Contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Nothing in the correspondence indicates that all other issues have been resolved. Rejected, immaterial. 56. Rejected, irrelevant. The easement has not been executed or recorded. 57-58. Rejected, immaterial. 60-61. Rejected. Contrary to the greater weight of the credible and persuasive evidence. The testimony of the cited witness is not credited. 62. Rejected, immaterial. Respondent The proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 15. Rejected, contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. There is no citation to record to support the recalculation. 23. Rejected, contrary to evidence which establishes that the Notice of Permit Denial was issued on March 12, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Harry Blair, Esquire BLAIR & BLAIR, P.A. 2138-40 Hoople Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 John L. Chaves, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9730
The Issue Whether petitioners have timely availed themselves of a clear point of entry into administrative proceedings on Mr. and Mrs. Rankin's application for a permit to build a dock and, if so, whether the permit application should be granted?
Findings Of Fact On April 12, 1982, Frederick W. Rankin applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock six feet wide and 300 feet long in the waters of Bayou Chico in Escambia County, Florida. Paralleling the dock on either side of the outboard end, two rows of mooring pilings 19.5 feet distance from the dock were proposed in the application. On April 20, 1983, Mark N. Snowdon, an employee of the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) inspected the site, and, in an official DER permit application appraisal dated April 23, 1982, reported: Two large support vessels (crew boats) are moored at a small pier immediately east of the site. A commercial marina facility i[s] located directly across the bayou (north) from the project site. Bayou Chico is approximately 0.25 mile wide at this point. DER Exhibit No. 4. Between the crew boats' dock (Gulfwater Marine) and the site proposed for the Rankins' dock is the mouth of a small embayment (the bayouette). The Holzbauers own a house and lot, separated from the Rankins' lot by a parcel less than 75 feet wide, that fronts on the bayouette. PERMIT ISSUES DER issued a permit on June 9, 1982, and work began on the Rankins' dock on June 12, 1982. On the same day, Mr. Holzbauer inquired of the men putting in pilings whether DER had issued a permit for the work, then telephoned DER and asked DER's Mr. Fancher the same question. Mr. Fancher told Mr. Holzbauer that a permit had been issued, which was the first Mr. Holzbauer was told of issuance of the permit. As far as the evidence revealed, no notice of intent to issue preceded issuance of the permit. On June 26, 1982, the Holzbauers received a letter from W. Richard Fancher on behalf of DER, dated June 24, 1982, in which he stated: It is my understanding that, until recently, you had no knowledge of this private dock project. If this is correct, you may consider this formal notice of the activity. Should you object to this permit, including any and all of the conditions contained therein, you may file an appropriate petition for administrative hearing. This petition must be filed within 14 days of the receipt of this letter. Further, the petition must conform to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 17-1 and Section 28-5.201, Florida Administrative Code (copies enclosed). The petition must be filed with the Office of General Counsel, Department of Environmental Regulation, Twin Towers Office Building, 2600 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. If no petition is filed within the prescribed time, you will be deemed to have waived your right to request an administrative hearing on this matter. DER Exhibit No. 1. A copy of Mr. Fancher's letter to the Holzbauers was also sent to Mr. Rankin. On July 8, 1982, a letter from the Holzbauers to Ms. Tschinkel reached DER's Office of the Secretary, protesting issuance of the permit and alleging that the dock did not conform to permit conditions. 1/ This letter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, whose Director entered an order, sua sponte, on July 28, 1982, that "[t]his matter is dismissed without prejudice." No. 82-1947. An amended petition dated August 4, 1982, reached DER's Office of the Secretary on August 9, 1982, and the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 20, 1982. No. 82-2314. NO PERMIT RELIANCE The dock has been continued to completion, at a cost of $11,000.00. As built, the dock veers out from shore at a more easterly angle than the permit purported to allow. Whereas the permit contemplated construction at an angle several degrees west of north, the dock has in fact been built at an angle about 15 degrees east of north. One result is that the end is some 90 feet east of the point contemplated by the permit. Although a DER employee testified that this deviation was "within reason," it is clearly a significant departure from what the permit putatively allowed. The Rankins only own 86 feet of bayou frontage. The mouth of the bayouette is no more than 110 feet across. The mooring pilings, moreover, have been set in two rows parallel to the dock not 19.5 feet on either side, but 40 feet from the west side of the dock and 30 feet from the east side. If any of the landowners on the bayouette (with one exception) tried to build a pier perpendicular to their shore line extending even half the length of the Rankins' dock, it would intersect the Rankins' dock. NAVIGATION While the dock does not seal off the bayouette, it makes access considerably more difficult, especially for Mr. Holzbauer who sails in and out in his 14 foot boat. The dock juts out from the point at the western edge of the entrance into the bayouette at such an angle that it comes within 70 feet of the eastern edge of the entrance into the bayouette. Petitioner's Exhibit No. The crew boats moored to the east of the Rankins' dock have overall lengths ranging from 65 to 85 feet and there were three of them moored at Gulfwater Marine last summer. When the crew boats are docked, the distance between the westernmost one and the most inboard mooring piling next to the Rankins' dock is 81.5 to 103 feet. Where traffic from Bayou Chico to Pensacola Bay passes under a bridge, the channel is only 80 feet wide and the crew boats sometimes hit the bridge. The greatest problem the Rankins' dock has caused the crew boats is making docking more difficult. It is not always easy to turn an 85 foot boat around in the wind. The root of the problem, according to Mr. Kingry, who owns the crew boats, is that a patch of slightly deeper water in this generally shoaled area has been cut or blocked by the Rankins' dock. Sooner or later, Mr. Kingry predicted, a crew boat will "wipe out" the Rankins' mooring pilings.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation deny the application for a dredge and fill permit for a dock located and aligned as this dock is. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 1983.
The Issue The issue is whether petitioners' development is entitled to a favorable determination by respondent under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes (1989), and thus is exempt from development of regional impact review.
Findings Of Fact PETITIONERS' EXCEPTIONS In its Exception No. 1., Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's determination that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that Lee County Sheriff's Office, or any other local law enforcement officials strictly enforce Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51. Petitioners' exception is not supported by the record. Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51, requires that a vessel must proceed at idle speed, no wake, within five hundred feet of a water oriented structure, such as a seawall or dock. If enforced, the ordinance would require that boaters on the channel who venture closer than five hundred feet to the seawall which fronts a part of the island's shoreline or a dock located several hundred yards south of the collector canal, which is the site of Petitioners' proposed project, be obliged to travel no faster than idle speed, no wake in those areas. The Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced was based on the testimony of Lt. Graylish of the Florida Marine Patrol. Lt. Graylish appeared as a witness for Respondent and testified as to his opinion as a law enforcement officer on the impact of Lee County Vessel Control Ordinance No. 90-51 on vessel speeds in Estero Bay. During Lt. Graylish's direct examination when asked whether the Marine Patrol enforced the ordinance he replied: Well, we have the power to do it. The hardest problem for us is what in fact is that 500 foot distance. It's really hard on the water to come up with that, and then we've got a lot of transient traffic that goes through that area from out of state during season and part-time residents, and it's very difficult to enforce that when you don't have an actual sign placement indicating what in fact the condition is. [Tr. p. 118, Ins. 15-24] The lieutenant's testimony was uncontroverted. Petitioners produced no competent substantial evidence to refute Lt. Graylish's testimony. Likewise in its exceptions, Petitioners have failed to present competent substantial evidence to demonstrate why the Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced should be rejected. Accordingly, Petitioners' Exception No. 1. is therefore rejected as being contrary to the evidence presented. In its Exception No. 2, Petitioners object to the Hearing Officer's determination that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel (i.e., Coon Key Pass). Petitioners state that the parties only stipulated that "Estero Bay is an area that is, at least, frequented by manatees" and cites to the Transcript in support of its position. [See Petitioners' Exceptions] However, a review of the statement in the record which Petitioners rely on and which was made by Petitioners' own attorney at the hearing demonstrates that the Hearing Officer was correct in finding that the parties stipulated that manatees frequent the channel. In pertinent part the passage states: At this time I would like to stipulate to one thing that was omitted in here [i e., prehearing stipulation], is that we do stipulate that the areas are Outstanding Florida Waters and Class II waters, Estero Bay, and they are waters that are at least frequented by manatees . . . (emphasis added)[Tr. p. 8, Ins. 18-24] The Hearing Officer's finding that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel, which is part of Estero Bay, is consistent with the parties' stipulation. The exception is therefore rejected as unnecessary. In its Exception No. 3, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that since there was no evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced, DNR could not reasonably determine that Petitioners' project would not have an adverse impact on manatees. The issue in this case was whether Petitioners were entitled to a favorable determination under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, that their proposed project was located so that it would not adversely impact Outstanding Florida Waters or Class II waters an would not contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. It was Petitioners' burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were entitled to a favorable determination. It was therefore incumbent upon Petitioners to present competent evidence regarding the enforcement of Ordinance No. 90-51. This Petitioners did not do. Therefore, Petitioners' Exception No. 3 is rejected as either irrelevant or not being based on competent substantial evidence. In its Exception No. 4, Petitioners allege that Respondent's committed two discovery violations. These allegations are beyond the scope of what is permitted under the rules which deal with exceptions to recommended orders; however they will be addressed. Petitioners claim they were prejudiced by improper testimony from the Respondent's expert witnesses, Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. Petitioners state that these witnesses "allegedly re-examine Petitioners' project area on the afternoon prior to the hearing and alleged the discovery of new observations and conclusions at the hearings." [See Petitioners' Exceptions] Petitioners claim that this alleged re-examination precluded any opportunity for discovery and that therefore, "no testimony relating to this site visit should have been admitted into the record." However, Petitioners raised no such objection at the hearing and by not doing so have waived any right to do so now. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure that would preclude an expert witness from engaging in a review of information to be relied on at the hearing prior to the hearing. Additionally, for clarification only, it should be noted that there is no evidence in the record which would have led Petitioner to believe that Pat Rose visited the site prior to the hearing. In Exception No. 4, Petitioner further alleged that the Hearing Officer should have disallowed the testimony of Lt. Graylish, because his name "first appeared on the prehearing stipulation (not signed by Petitioners) approximately 48 hours before the hearing . . . ." However, Petitioners' did not object at the hearing to the testimony of Lt. Graylish and furthermore, stated on the record in reference to signing the prehearing stipulation: due to our, I guess you would say our geographic differences, the prehearing stipulation was submitted . . . without my signature; and at this time I would like to on the record confirm that I stipulate to that prehearinq stipulation that was jointly prepared and finally submitted by the Department. (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 4, Ins. 21- 25] In addition to having stipulated to Respondent's witnesses, which included Lt. Graylish, Petitioners had raised this very objection prior to the hearing and the Hearing Officer had conducted a telephonic hearing on the matter. The Hearing Officer ruled that the witness would be allowed to testify at the hearing subject to Petitioners' objections at that time. A review of the record of the hearing indicates that Petitioners made no further objections to the lieutenant's testimony. Exceptions as to alleged discovery violations are improper pursuant to the rules and in this case there is no competent substantial evidence to demonstrate the existence of any discovery violations. Exception No. 4 is therefore rejected as being improper. Finally, at Exception No. 5, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's application of law to the findings of fact to support a determination that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that their proposed project would riot "contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees." Petitioners allegation that this conclusion be rejected is based upon Petitioners' argument, discussed above, that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced. As stated in Paragraphs Nos. 1. and 3., any such rejection of the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Petitioners allege that the Hearing Officer's "sole conclusion of possible manatee impacts from this project was based on what he determined to be a lack of evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced. Petitioners have narrowly construed the Hearing Officer's ruling. There is ample evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Petitioners had not met their burden. In fact, the Recommended Order demonstrates that the ruling was also based on competent substantial evidence presented by Respondent that this proposed project demonstrated a potential for harm to manatees. In that regard, the Hearing Officer's conclusion was based on testimony from both Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. It was their testimony which led the Hearing Officer to conclude that a "favorable determination for Petitioners would not lie." The record is replete with evidence the Hearing Officer could have reasonably relied upon to conclude that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof. [See Tr. p. 118, Ins. 6-9; p. 156 p. 1; p. 158, Ins. 4-6; p. 158. In. 9; p. 159, In.18; p. 176, Ins. 20-23; ; p. 218, Ins. 20-24; p. 219, In. 40p. 316, Ins. 22-23; DNR Exh. 17J Accordingly, Petitioners' exceptions to Conclusion of Law No. 5., is rejected as being contrary to Florida law and the evidence presented. RESPONDENT' S EXCEPTIONS Respondent alleges that Finding of Fact No. 15., should be rejected in its entirety inasmuch as it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. At finding of fact No. 15, the Hearing Officer implies that the Petitioners were "somehow surprised" on June 7, 1991, while the parties were preparing the Prehearing Stipulation to be filed at hearing on June Il, 1991, to learn that DNR intended to take the position at hearing that the proposed project would likely contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area frequented by manatees. In support of this finding the Hearing Officer refers to a comment made by DNR employee David Trimble at his June 5, 1990, deposition, during which he advised Petitioners that based upon the October 17, 1990 memorandum from the Division of Marine Resources he assumed that the manatee issue was "resolved" in Petitioners' favor. However, a review of the record reveals that at no time subsequent to November 8, 1990 or the date on which the unfavorable letter of determination was issued, could Petitioners reasonably claim they believed the issue regarding manatees was resolved. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is not based on competent substantial evidence and is rejected. At his deposition Mr. Trimble was asked who was responsible for making the final determination decision, to which he replied: I evaluate them and make a staff recommendation to my superiors. (emphasis added) [Tr. 22, Ins. 24-25] Q. So you go with your feeling - from what the letters say and - A. Not from my feeling, I go with what the letters say. [Tr. p. 23, Ins. 8-11] Furthermore, Trimble's statement at the deposition that he believed the manatee issue was resolved was given only after Petitioners specifically asked Mr. Trimble his opinion on the matter. Furthermore, Trimble was qualified to give only his opinion as to whether the manatee issue was resolved, not the agency's position which was memorialized in the November 8, 1991, letter of determination. Petitioners' claim that they believed the manatee issue was resolved and the Hearing Officer's subsequent finding that Petitioners' claim was meritious can not be supported on the basis of Trimble's answer to the following question: Q. Was, in your opinion - - and this is your opinion as the reviewer of the request - - was the manatee issue resolved . . . (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 26, Ins. 8-10] Further, the letter that was issued under the Executive Director's signature did not indicate that the manatee issue was resolved, quite the contrary. In fact, the Prehearing Stipulation at page 17, stipulated to by both parties after, the deposition of Trimble listed the following disputed issue for determination at the hearing: 2. Whether the DNR correctly determined that the proposed 132 wetslips in conjunction with the existing 161 slips, will contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. In order to find that Petitioners were somehow surprised by this "newly discovered revelation" (i.e., that manatees were going to be an issue at hearing) the Hearing Officer improperly attributed more weight to the deposition testimony of Trimble thanit was due. Trimble was merely the conduit through which information on the manatee issue from the Division of Marine Resources passed. As he himself stated, he was the reviewer of the information - - he was not the final decisionmaker. Once having reviewed the material sent to him from the other divisions, he merely drafted the unfavorable letter of determination for the Executive Director's consideration. The Executive Director then reviewed the material and issued the letter of determination under his signature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order confirming its earlier determination of November 8, 1990, under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of August 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the arguments of counsel and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Harriet Stokes purchased the Largo Motel during August of 1967. The motel consisted of six (6) units with a boat basin and dock which adjoined the site. When the property was purchased, the boat basin was navigable from the motel to the open waters of Tarpon Bay. Tarpon Bay is a Class III water body. A representative number of Ms. Stokes' residents and patrons bring in trailered boats ranging in size, approximately fourteen (14) to eighteen (18) feet. Since approximately 1974, silting has occurred in the basin in the immediate area approaching the dock area. The silting has rendered the dock virtually unnavigable except in cases where boat owners are able to access the open waters by poling". Evidence reveals that a number of boat owners have broken their propellers attempting to gain access to the open waters of Tarpon Bay. Based thereon, residents are cautioned against attempting to launch boats from the dock area, which has resulted in a decline of Respondent's fish and pleasure boating guests (Testimony of Harriet Stokes). Johnny DeBrule, the Heavy Construction Superintendent for the Upper Keys Marine Construction Company, Key Largo, Florida, was consulted by Respondent Stokes for completion of the dredging work called for in the subject application. Mr. DeBrule gave his opinion that the subject project could be excavated with a backhoe equipped with a material handling bucket with minimal interruption to the adjacent waters. Richard Dumas, an Environmental Specialist employed by the Department since approximately November, 1977, conducted the initial field site inspection which resulted in the Department's first report recommending issuance of the permit application (Respondent's Exhibit 1). Mr. Dumas testified that he failed to consider the proper standards when he initially issued his first site inspection report which recommended approval of the project as applied for. Dumas was part of the inspection team which included Messrs. Michael Nowicki, Curtis Kruer, and Attorney Ray Allen. After the second field inspection survey was made during December, 1979, the team unanimously concurred that the project as applied for did not entail maintenance dredging and, further, that based upon an in-depth inspection during the second visit, the project, as applied for, was not permittable. Mr. Dumas's earlier recommendation which favored the approval of the subject project was prompted in large part by the policy consideration of the economic viability of Mrs. Stokes' motel enterprise. Michael Nowicki (Nowicki), a Dredge and Fill Supervisor employed by the Department in its Punta Gorda office, is in charge of processing short form dredge and fill applications. As part of his employment duties, Nowicki makes recommendations to the District Manager on short form applications and as part of this review process has reviewed and appraised approximately three thousand (3,000) dredge and fill applications. Nowicki was involved with the formulation and review process of the subject application. During the inspection on this project on December 10, 1979, the dredging was determined not to be "maintenance dredging" since the dredging "would occur in an area of exposed caprock bottoms situated approximately six (6) to nine (9) inches below the surface waters and would result in the destruction and elimination of the thriving benthic community" (Testimony of Kruer, Nowicki and Dumas). In this regard, during May of 1979, Dumas conducted water samplings in the immediate areas of the proposed project and noted that there was a very diverse and productive benthic algal community which was surviving on the nursery and feeding grounds supplied by the grass flats and natural shorelines (Testimony of Dumas and DER Exhibits 10 and 11). Subsequent inspections by Curtis Kruer corroborate this fact. Curtis Kruer, an Environmental Specialist received as a marine biology expert in this proceeding, performed an on-site inspection of the proposed project on December 6, 1979. Kruer made several probings in the area and found that natural caprock was present in the very shallow areas of the bay bottoms. He found that approximately 70 percent of the area was very diverse and highly vegetated. For example he found that the bay bottom is composed of approximately 30 percent benthic algae, 30 percent silt and organic detritus, and approximately 40 percent sea grasses. The most abundant seagrasses were turtle grass with a small amount of Cuban shoalgrass near the boat ramp. Kruer noted that the vegetated bottoms serve as nursery grounds for the area's marine community which consisted of several varieties of juvenile commercial and recreational fish and shellfish (DER Exhibit 11). Kruer noted that adjoining dredged areas immediately adjoining the proposed project have not revegetated and that there are thick layers of silt and organic materials on this site. He further noted that the project would conflict with the natural shoreline and that there were reasonable alternatives which would provide favorable and less destructive uses for the Petitioner's boat basin. Among the alternatives suggested by Kruer was a boat dock with piers supported by pilings of adequate depth in the project's bay bottoms (DER Exhibit 11). Finally, Kruer noted that the proposed dredged area contains productive vegetated benthic communities which will only revegetate, if at all, over extended periods of time (DER Exhibit II).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its final order denying the application for a permit to dredge approximately 5,400 square feet of silt from the boat basin at Largo Lodge, Key Largo, Monroe County, Florida. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Lucile Keely 5797 La Luneta Avenue Miami Florida 33155 Michael Egan, Esquire ROBERTS & EGAN, P.A. Post Office 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Ray Allen, Esquire William W. Deane, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jacob R. Varn, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner should be assessed for use taxes, interest and penalties related to the purchase of certain fuel-pumping equipment, on which sales tax was allegedly unpaid to the supplier. It must also be determined whether the placement of storage tanks, pumps, and appurtenant fueling equipment at the Destin Marina constituted a license or lease of the real property upon which that equipment was placed and, therefore, whether the $.15 per gallon fee paid to the marina owner for pumping and selling the Petitioner's fuel should have been the subject of sales tax or, conversely, whether the placement of the pumping equipment and fuel at the marina site was a bailment, for purposes of the rule cited below and, therefore, a non-taxable transaction.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, V.T. Leasing, at times pertinent hereto, was a partnership with partners, Mr. C. S. Valmus and George Threadgill. It was created at the request of Mr. William Ming, who was the owner of Destin Marina at times pertinent hereto. Mr. Ming had agreed to purchase marine fuels from the wholesale fuel dealership maintained by Mr. Valmus and Mr. Threadgill, but needed another entity to purchase and have installed the necessary tanks, pumps and appurtenances at his marina. Consequently, in order to effect their arrangement, a contract was drafted and executed between Mr. Valmus and Mr. Threadgill on behalf of the Petitioner herein, and Mr. Ming on behalf of the Destin Marina. That contract provided by its term that the Petitioner, the "supplier", and Destin Marina, the "buyer", would engage in a business relationship whereby the supplier agreed to furnish and install the equipment necessary for the buyer to be able to operate a marina fueling facility, including gasoline and diesel (fuel). The Petitioner agreed to furnish dispensers, hoses, tanks, piping, and related equipment and appurtenances necessary for self-service sales and to keep an adequate supply of fuel and inventory at the marina for sale to marina customers. Destin Marina agreed to use its best efforts to sell the fuel for which it would be paid a commission of $.15 per gallon for each gallon of fuel sold. The Petitioner agreed to check the tanks periodically and see that the tanks were kept filled and to determine the amount of gallons of fuel sold, whereupon the Petitioner would collect from Destin Marina all monies and valid credit card vouchers for the retail sales, less the $.15 commission due to the marina. The Petitioner was to retain ownership of the fuel, the money and credit card vouchers for fuel sold and would set the retail selling price for the fuel. The contract was to extend for five years from the date of its execution with extensions being provided for thereafter. The Petitioner, in the contract, was granted a right of ingress and egress to the marina property to deliver fuel, collect for fuel, and to remove any equipment not paid for under the terms of the contract. Destin Marina agreed not to encumber the equipment or consigned fuel inventory owned by the Petitioner. The Petitioner was responsible for reporting and paying all taxes on fuel sold. There is no dispute concerning any fuel taxes due in this proceeding. The agreement further provided that, should the marina be closed for 90 consecutive days, except due to an act of God, Destin Marina agreed to pay for the equipment at a schedule set forth in the agreement, if so demanded by the Petitioner. The amount due under that contingency for the first year would be $47,000.00 and declined every year thereafter to a valuation of $27,000.00 in the fifth year of the agreement's operation. At the end of the agreement's term, the equipment would become the property of Destin Marina, the Petitioner taking the position that due to exposure to the elements and salt water, at the end of five years, the equipment would be worth little to it. The Panhandle Pump Transaction In order to fulfill its responsibilities under the above-discussed agreement, the Petitioner purchased the pumps, tanks, piping, and other related equipment necessary to install the fueling station at the marina from the Panhandle Pump Company (Panhandle). The Petitioner produced at hearing various invoices showing gross dollar amounts paid to Panhandle for the equipment involved in this proceeding. Those invoices do not indicate whether any sales tax was paid to Panhandle on the purchase of the equipment. Prior to this hearing, the Respondent attempted to ascertain whether sales tax had been paid, and in what amounts, from the Petitioner and apparently made at least one inquiry of Panhandle in an effort to find out if sales tax had been paid to Panhandle, as well as the total amount paid for the equipment by the Petitioner. Witness Henderson, the auditor for the Respondent in this matter, established that he was unable to determine the original cost of the equipment paid to Panhandle by the Petitioner. In that event, the Respondent used the provision of Section 212.12(6)(d), Florida Statutes, as the basis for its audit, which provides that if the taxpayer cannot or does not supply original cost and tax information concerning a transaction, then the "best information available" may be used. During an audit, the Respondent is not required to inquire of third parties with respect to the tax liability of an audited taxpayer. This is because the auditor for the Respondent is not free to initiate an audit of a third party in order to confirm or deny information provided by the taxpayer. Any inquiry into another taxpayer's tax records can only be done under strict compliance with the confidentiality requirements in Section 213.053, Florida Statutes. The Respondent was unable to determine the price which the Petitioner paid for the equipment. The Respondent requested the information pertaining to the equipment price of the Petitioner and even requested a copy of the sales invoice for the pumps from Panhandle itself, but neither the Petitioner nor Panhandle ever supplied that information prior to hearing. During the hearing, the Petitioner's evidence in the form of the invoices only shows the gross amount paid for the equipment and does not depict what, if any portion of that, might have been sales tax. It does not show that sales tax was paid on the equipment. Only the Petitioner's testimony, through Mr. Valmus, asserts that the sales tax on the equipment was paid to Panhandle. Mr. Valmus states that he is certain that the prices shown on the invoice included sales tax, but he presented no substantiating evidence for that statement. Because the sales tax has not been shown to have been paid on the purchase of the tanks, pumps and other equipment from Panhandle, the Petitioner, the purchaser of the equipment, was assessed use tax. The Respondent, however, because the exact price could not be determined, used the valuation placed on the equipment in the first year "buy out" figure depicted in the agreement between the Petitioner and Destin Marina (Mr. Ming). That value of $47,000.00 is thus based upon the valuation of the equipment set by the parties to that agreement themselves. This valuation was the only readily identifiable figure by which to value the transaction between Panhandle and the Petitioner. It would be unreasonable to require the Respondent to supply the missing parts of the taxpayer's records, in order to arrive at a valuation figure for purposes of calculating tax due. This would encourage fraud and tax evasion if taxpayers were allowed to benefit from inadequate records. If in doubt, a taxpayer could simply lose or misplace records and propose a more advantageous number to the Respondent, and the Respondent would be forced to attempt to disprove that contention. The only records of this transaction, the receipts for the partial payments to Panhandle, support the conclusion that the tax was not paid. Section 212.01(2), Florida Statutes, requires that receipts for purchased items separately state the sales tax paid. Since this was not done, the Respondent concluded justifiably, in the absence of other records, that no sales tax was paid on the transaction. Consequently, it has assessed use tax on the Petitioner, the purchaser of the equipment from Panhandle. The Destin Marina Transaction Pursuant to the terms of the exclusive supply and purchase contract, referenced in the above findings of fact, the Petitioner agreed to furnish, install and maintain the fuel-pumping equipment to be located at the Destin Marina on property owned by the Destin Marina or Mr. Ming. The Petitioner also agreed to insure an adequate supply of fuel inventory at the marina for sale to boating customers. The Petitioner agreed to gauge the tanks every two weeks, determine the amount of gallons sold, and collect all monies and credit card vouchers, less the $.15 commission to be paid to the Destin Marina operator, Mr. Ming. The Destin Marina, Mr. Ming or his agents, were responsible for actually dispensing the fuel from customers and collecting monies or credit card vouchers from customers in payment for the fuel. The agreement further provided that at the end of the five-year period, the depreciated equipment would become the property of Mr. Ming and/or the Destin Marina. The Petitioner owned and depreciated the equipment on its books and records during the term of the agreement. Due to salt water corrosion, the equipment would be of little value after the five-year period. The Petitioner serviced and maintained the equipment subject to the agreement between it and Destin Marina. It never relinquished exclusive control of the equipment to the Destin Marina. The agreement between Destin Marina and the Petitioner specifically states that the "supplier" (the Petitioner) should at all times have the right of ingress and egress to the marina property to deliver fuel, collect for the fuel, or to remove any equipment not paid for under the conditions of the contract. The overall terms of the agreement show that the right of access, or "ingress and egress", for those purposes, also included the right for the Petitioner to come on the premises to service the equipment. The marina, however, operated the equipment during dispensing of fuel, on a day-to-day basis. Thus, the evidence shows that the two parties to the agreement had joint control over the equipment. The Respondent showed, through the testimony of its auditor, Mr. Henderson, that the amounts assessed against the Petitioner, at the time of hearing, were for use tax on the equipment of $2,820.00, and tax on the fuel commissions of $2,638.07, for a total of $5,458.07. A penalty was assessed in the amount of $1,364.52, and interest accrued through April 15, 1994 amounted to $3,174.48, for a grand total of $9,997.07, with interest accruing from April 15, 1994 at $1.79 per day. The use tax on the equipment referenced herein concerned the transaction involving the equipment purchase from Panhandle. The Respondent determined that the agreement between the Petitioner and Destin Marina, whereby the Petitioner would pay a $.15 commission per gallon to the marina, constituted a "license to use real property", pursuant to Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, and Rule 12A-1.007, Florida Administrative Code. Although the parties were not shown to have intended that this arrangement amount to a lease agreement, the Respondent interpreted the agreement in that fashion and assessed sales tax due on the $.15 per gallon commission amounts paid to Destin Marina, as if they were lease rental. This is related to the Respondent's position that the arrangement could not constitute a bailment because the Petitioner maintained control over the property for the life of the agreement, never gave up title to it, performed all maintenance and depreciated the equipment on its books and records during the five-year period of the agreement. Moreover, at the end of the agreement, the property would not revert back to the possession of the Petitioner but, rather, to the ownership and possession of the Destin Marina. Although it is not found that exclusive control of the equipment remained in the Petitioner, the parties did at least have joint control over the equipment, rather than exclusive control being delivered to the Destin Marina, the putative bailee.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue upholding the assessment of V.T. Leasing for sales and use tax, as well as applicable interest and penalties, as set forth in the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Petitioner submitted no Proposed Recommended Order. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-27. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Constantine S. Valmus 12346 Ailanthus Drive Pensacola, FL 32506 Mark T. Aliff, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
