The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of deviating from the applicable standard of care, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, and failing to keep adequate medical records, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is what penalty the Board of Medicine should impose.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed physician, holding license number ME 0066606. Respondent has been board certified in plastic surgery since 1983 and is also board certified in hand surgery. Respondent has previously practiced in Kentucky. He relocated to Florida in 1994 to join a former physician colleague, Dr. Bolt, who had developed cancer and later died in early 1995. Respondent joined the Center for Cosmetic Surgery (Center), which Dr. Bolt had sold to two persons, including Jeff Davis. The record does not disclose whether Mr. Davis is a physician, but Respondent described him and the other principal/owner as felons. The Center held out Respondent as the medical director. This representation was obviously with Respondent’s knowledge and at least tacit consent. After Dr. Bolt’s death, Respondent recruited three more physicians for the Center, but none of them was board certified in plastic surgery. Mr. Davis served as the patient coordinator at the Center. The position of patient coordinator had significant marketing responsibilities. Typically, a prospective patient would contact the Center and schedule a free consultation. At the appointed time, the prospective patient would visit the Center and speak with a physician, such as Respondent. No physical examination would take place. During the discussion, the physician would make notes on a Physician’s Report, which the prospective patient would take to Mr. Davis, whose job was to sell the surgery. Using incentives such as free nose jobs, Mr. Davis was responsible for pricing surgical procedures and scheduling surgery, once the prospective patient agreed to have a Center physician perform the agreed-upon surgery. Mr. Davis was also responsible for collecting money from patients in payment for their surgery. Typically, one of Respondent’s patients would schedule surgery two to three months from the date of making the appointment. Before surgery, Respondent would see the patient before surgery for a physical examination and preoperative testing. Respondent determined what preoperative testing was necessary on a patient-by-patient basis. Following this visit, Respondent would dictate the findings from the physical examination and the treatment plan. A transcribing service was responsible for transcribing the dictation and filing it in the patient’s chart. In May or June of 1996, Respondent provided notice to the principals of the Center that he would be terminating his employment. He terminated his employment on November 1, 1996. After his departure, Respondent learned that Center employees had misinformed his patients as to Respondent’s nonavailability due to illness or surgery. It is unclear whether this situation existed before Respondent’s announced departure. Tensions developed between Respondent and the principals of the Center. Respondent determined that he could lawfully contact those patients still needing care, so he sent those patients an announcement that he was associating himself with the American Institute of Plastic Surgery. Litigation between Respondent and the Center principals followed, including a legal action by Respondent to obtain patient records. The litigation over the records concluded with the agreement by the Center to provide records as needed, but they have provided Respondent with incomplete records. A. S. first contacted the Center in June 1995 after seeing an advertisement on television. She chose the Center and two other facilities for plastic surgery that she was considering. At the time, A. S. was 48 years old. Wanting to improve her appearance, A. S. wanted a face lift and work on her lower eyelids. She had had her lower eyelids done in 1978 or 1979 and had had a “mini-lift” in 1984. A. S. met Respondent during her first visit to the Center. A. S. and Respondent spoke for 15-20 minutes. Respondent asked her what procedures she wanted done, and she said that she wanted a face lift and work on her lower eyelids. He showed her a copy of his resume and marked a picture of a face, as they discussed procedures. A. S. did not fill out any forms or questionnaires. Respondent did not explain much concerning the procedures that A. S. was contemplating. He mentioned that she would have a thin line, which would not be noticeable, under her eyes and told how long the stitches would remain in place. He did not discuss the possibility of scarring or other risks associated with the surgery. Following her visit with Respondent, A. S. saw Mr. Davis. They discussed costs and financing. Mr. Davis gave her an estimate of the cost of the surgery that she was considering. A. S. had already checked another plastic surgery center and, later on the same day that she visited the Center, she visited the third, and last, plastic surgery facility that she was considering. The next day, Mr. Davis called A. S. and asked if she had made a decision. Mr. Davis said that Respondent had told him that Respondent wanted to do A. S.’s nose, evidently for aesthetic reasons. Mr. Davis offered the nose work at no additional charge. Although Respondent had not offered to do A. S.’s nose for free or for a charge, he was aware that Mr. Davis would offer free additional work of this kind as an incentive to the patient to select the Center for the work that she was already considering. A. S. talked the matter over with her daughter. A. S. decided to have the surgery at the Center. She then informed Mr. Davis of her decision. Three to five days later, A. S. visited the Center to discuss payments with Mr. Davis because she did not have all of the money necessary for the surgery. During this visit, Mr. Davis suggested a brow lift. He said that Respondent was good at this procedure and would be working in this area anyway. At the end of this visit, a nurse gave A. S. some paperwork prohibiting her from smoking for two weeks before the surgery due to the anticipated bleeding. A. S. had smoked one pack of cigarettes a day since she had been a teenager. A. S. discussed the effect of smoking on the surgery with the nurse, but not with Respondent. As directed, she stopped smoking and never resumed smoking again. A. S. next visited the Center on June 26, 1995, for the surgery. No one performed a physical examination of A. S. On this date, Respondent performed a browlift, rhinoplasty, and facelift. After A. S. awoke from the general anesthesia, she did not receive any instructions from Respondent or staff regarding the care of her bandages, which extended across a large part of her face and top of her head. She was scheduled to return to the Center two days later. A. S.’s daughter drove her home. Once they got there, she noticed that her mother’s face seemed grey. A. S. told her to call Respondent. The daughter informed his answering service of her mother’s condition. She then waited one-half hour for Respondent or his staff to contact her. After hearing nothing, the daughter called the answering service again and waited another half-hour. After a third call and another half-hour wait, Respondent called A. S. and told her to cut the bandage under her neck. By cutting the bandages, A. S. revealed an open cut on her neck. When she returned for her followup visit two days later, A. S. asked Respondent about the cut, which extended along the right side of the neck below the ear. Respondent assured her that it would close up, which it did. When Respondent expressed concerns about her eyes and a dent in her nose, Respondent assured her that they would discuss these matters after the swelling went down. About one week later, Respondent returned to the Center for a second followup visit. During the second followup visit, Respondent removed the stitches. Now that some of the swelling had gone down, A. S. discovered that Respondent had not performed the surgery on her lower eyes. A. S. could not recall Respondent’s explanation for not performing this surgery. A. S. complained to Respondent that, since the surgery, her right eye had become smaller than her left eye, the right eyebrow had become lower than the left eyebrow, and the right side of her face from the eye down had become looser. Also, she complained about the extensive marks, scarring, loose skin, redness, and a dent under her chin; the dent in her nose and a misshapen right nostril; a swollen bump on her left cheek; a big chunk of skin gone from her hairline; and a gully on the left side of her face. Respondent assured her that he would fix these problems with revisions to the eyes and nose and the area under the neck. He did not offer any revisions to hair line, whose appearance worsened as the swelling reduced. Respondent later performed some relatively minor revisions to the right side of A. S.’s face at no cost to A. S. He reset the remaining revisions for a date in mid-December, 1995. Despite A. S.’s persistence at trying to obtain the additional revisions, Respondent failed to perform them. Repeatedly, Center employees canceled scheduled surgery dates, claiming that Respondent was ill or busy with unscheduled surgery. They rescheduled the December surgery to a date in mid- February, 1996. When she reported on this date, a Center employee took her to Mr. Davis, who informed her that the Center had lost money on her surgery and would not perform revision surgery until she paid additional money. They rescheduled her surgery for a date in late March. When A. S. reported on the date for her surgery in March, Mr. Davis told her that they would not do the revision surgery until she paid another $300. A. S. charged this sum on her credit card, so they would do the surgery. Mr. Davis told her that Respondent was too busy, and he rescheduled the surgery for April 8. On April 8, when A. S. reported for surgery, a Center employee sedated A. S., but, after A. S. waited a couple of hours, another Center employee informing her that the surgery could not take place either because Respondent was not coming into work that day or he was in emergency surgery. When A. S. called from home later that day to reschedule the surgery, a Center employee told her that Respondent was in surgery. The employee advised A. S. to call the Center each morning to see if Respondent had any cancellations. A. S. did as advised, but the Center was never able to accommodate her. Subsequently, A. S. sent Respondent two or three letters and left telephone messages for him to contact her on at least ten occasions. Realizing that Respondent and the Center would not perform the revision surgery, A. S. went to another plastic surgery facility in 1998 for work on her right nostril and under her neck. A surgeon repaired the nostril, but, due to financial constraints, could not do all of the work required to repair the damage under A. S.’s neck, which would require about $4000 in surgery. In the meantime, Respondent sent A. S. a card announcing the relocation of his practice to the American Institute for Cosmetic Surgery. A. S. wrote Respondent a letter at his new address, but Respondent never responded. A. S. never sued Respondent. All she wanted was that he perform the revisions that she could not afford to purchase elsewhere so as to reduce or, if possible, eliminate the deformities that Respondent caused surgically. Respondent violated the applicable standard of care in several ways. First, preoperatively, his evaluation of A. S. was scanty. He did not take an ample history, and he did not adequately evaluate her medical status. He did not prepare a surgical plan with a description of all risks and a discussion of these details with the patient. Perhaps most importantly, Respondent never performed a physical examination of A. S. before surgery. Respondent violated the applicable standard of care operatively. The results in this case are so substandard in number and degree as to preclude assigning the outcomes to bad luck, as opposed to a hurried, careless surgery. Respondent violated the applicable standard of care postoperatively. He did not adequately the many problems that he caused. Perhaps most obviously, he failed to adequately treat the open wound in the neck, and he failed to form a plan to address the many revisions necessitated by his careless surgery. The Board of Medicine has previously disciplined Respondent for, among other things, his deviation from the applicable standard of care in treating three plastic surgery patients whose surgery he performed in 1995-96 and 1998.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, in his treatment of A. S. and revoking his license. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health Bin C03 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health Bin A02 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health Bin A02 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Kim M. Kluck Carol Gregg Senior Attorneys Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Jerry C. Lingle 1419 Northeast 16th Terrace Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304
The Issue Should Respondent Patricia Dee G. Stehpenson's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida be revoked, suspended or otherwise disciplined based on the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed herein?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 0051453. The patient, a 73 year old female, presented to Respondent on July 11, 1991, with complaints of flashes of light over the past ten years which had increased over the past two years. The patient also complained of seeing halos around street lights at night. During this visit, Respondent diagnosed the patient as having 20/30 corrected vision in her right eye and 20/40 plus 2 corrected vision in her left eye, and that the patient had cataracts. However, Respondent did not recommend cataract surgery at this time. In January, 1992, the patient took the State of Florida driver's license test, including the eye test, and received her driver's license. However, the examiner notice that the patient was having trouble with the eye test and, although the examiner gave the patient her driver's license, the examiner suggested that the patient see an opthalmologist. At the time the patient received her driver's license in January, 1992, the patient was enjoying golf, bowling and driving. Although the patient did not immediately follow the driver's license examiner's advice concerning her eyes, the patient did visit with Respondent on May 8, 1992. At this visit, the patient advised the Respondent that the flashes and floaters had improved but that her vision was interfering with her golfing and driving. Again, Respondent did not recommend removal of the cataract. The patient's vision continued to interfere with her golfing and driving, notwithstanding the patient's testimony to the contrary which I do not find to be credible. The patient's next visit with Respondent was on October 16, 1992. At this visit, the patient advised Respondent that her vision had "lessened a lot" in the left eye. Visual acuity testing indicated corrected vision of 20/30 in the right eye and 20/40 plus 2 in the left eye. However, while the level of vision at which the patient was able to perceive letters (20/40 plus 2) did not change, the refraction (stronger glasses) required to achieve that level indicated more myopia, indicating that the cataract had progressed which supports the patient's complaint that her vision had "lessened a lot". Also at the October 16, 1992, visit, Respondent tested the patient's vision using brightness acuity testing (glare test) and measured the patient's vision as 20/70, with glare in the left eye. The glare test is a method whereby the doctor shines a light in the person's eye to determine the effect of glare on the person's vision. Although some ophthalmologists consider the glare test of no value, other ophthalmologists consider the glare test as another tool to assist the surgeon in making a decision concerning the necessity for cataract surgery. During the October 16, 1992, office visit, Respondent discussed with the patient: (a) the effect the cataract was having on the patient's activities (life-style); (b) the patient's complaint that her vision had lessened; (c) the results of the glare test showing the patient's vision as 20/70 with glare and; (d) other visual acuity testing; and (e)advised the patient that cataract surgery was indicated. Also, Respondent explained the cataract surgery procedures and discussed with the patient the risks and the benefits of the surgery. The patient had no reservations or objections to the surgery and consented to the surgery in hopes of improving her eyesight as well as her life- style. For a person with cataracts, a corrected vision of 20/40 or worse is the vision level where some cataract surgeons will recommend cataract surgery, while other cataract surgeons consider a corrected vision of 20/50 or worse, with or without glare, as the vision level where cataract surgery should be recommended. However, because the vision as determined by visual acuity testing (the ability of the person to perceive letters) does not always accurately reflect the person's quality of vision (the quality of perception on a day to day basis), neither vision level referred to above when considered alone can be used as a hard and fast rule to form a basis for cataract surgery. Since the quality of vision can only be described by the person with the cataract(s), the cataract surgeon must also determine, after consultation with the person, that the cataract(s) are interfering with the person's life-style. Therefore, a person with corrected vision of somewhat better than 20/40 or 20/70 with or without glare, may be a candidate for cataract surgery, provided the cataract is causing a reduction in the person's quality of vision beyond what is indicated by visual acuity testing and thereby interfering with the person's life-style. Furthermore, there are no written standards or guidelines which set a particular vision level for the cataract surgeon to follow when making a decision to recommend cataract surgery. The surgeon must take into consideration all factors and make a decision based on the surgeon's judgment as to what is best for that person. The patient's vision level and the interference the patient was experiencing with her life-style because of the cataracts in her left eye justified Respondent's decision to recommend and perform the cataract surgery on the patient, notwithstanding any of the testimony of Dr. Leslie Monroe to the contrary. On November 3, 1992, Respondent performed phacoemulsification (removal of cataract) with posterior chamber intracular lens implant (implantation of lens) on the patient's left eye. While the patient was in the holding area being prepared for surgery there were complications with the anesthesia. The anesthesiologist, Robert Dienes, M. D., first gave the patient a retrobulbar block which was repeated apparently due to Dr. Dienes' conclusion that the first retrobulbar block was ineffective. Apparently, Dr. Dienes also concluded that the second retrobulbar block was ineffective and gave the patient a superior lid peribulbar block. After giving the peribulbar block, Dr. Dienes noticed a dissecting subconjunctival hemorrhage and notified Respondent. Upon examining the patient's eye, Respondent found the globe (whole eye) to be soft with no active bleeding, indicating the eye was not full of blood and that there was no retina tear or rupture of the globe. Respondent also noticed that "the conjunctiva was real chemotic or it had blood behind it". Respondent also measured the patient's eye pressure with a Schiotz tonameter because there was no slit-lamp in the holding area. The patient's eye pressure was 5, with a 5.5 gram weight, which was normal. The patient's medical records do not reflect an indirect ophthalmoscopy being performed by Respondent on the patient's left eye between Respondent being advised of the dissecting subjunctival hemorrhage by Dr. Diemes and the Respondent performing surgery on the patient's left eye to remove the cataract and implant the lens. Furthermore, Respondent has no independent recollection of performing an indirect ophthalmoscopy during the above period of time before surgery. Respondent's normal practice under conditions and circumstances similar to those in this case has been to perform an indirect ophthalmoscopy during the above period of time before surgery. Therefore, it is assumed that Respondent performed an indirect ophthalmoscopy on the patient after being advised of the subconjunctival hemorrhage but before surgery, notwithstanding the fact that patient's medical records do not reflect such procedure being performed or the fact that Respondent has no independent recollection of performing such procedure during the above period of time. However, assuming arguendo that Respondent did not perform the indirect ophthalmoscopy before surgery, the Agency has failed to establish facts to show that under the conditions and circumstances of this case that such failure amounted to the failure of Respondent to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. After considering the conditions and circumstances surrounding the complication that arose while the patient was being anesthetized, Respondent made a decision that it was in the best interest of the patient to go forward with the removal of the cataract and implantation of the lens. The operation was completed without any further incident and there was a successful removal of the cataract and lens transplant. Respondent's decision to go forward with the surgery had no adverse effect on the subsequent treatment of the complication that arose while the patient was being anesthetized. In fact, the result of the treatment subsequent to the cataract surgery would have been the same even if Respondent had not gone forward with the surgery. Respondent, using a ophthalmoscope, was able to see the inside of the eye more clearly and assess the complication that arose while the patient was being anesthetized. While performing this indirect ophthalmoscopy, Respondent noted undulation of the vitreous with pigmented blood cells present and that the anesthesia needle had penetrated the globe. The patient was seen the next morning, November 3, 1992, by Respondent. After assessing the condition of the patient's left eye, Respondent referred the patient to Keye Wong, M. D., a retina specialist. Upon examining the patient's left eye on November 4, 1992, Dr. Wong noted vitreous hemorrhaging and retinal detachment. Dr. Wong performed an operation on the patient's left eye in an attempt to correct the damage and attach the retina. The patient's vision is not as good as it was before the operation, and still effects the patient's life-style. The patient has difficulty tolerating sunlight, which may or may not be a result of the complication experienced while the patient was being anesthetize. Respondent's action of going forward with the surgery after becoming aware of the complication that arose while the patient was being anesthetized did not cause, complicate, aggravate or result in any of the problems the patient has suffered postoperatively. Respondent did not fail to recognize, identify or treat properly the complications that arose before, during or after the surgery. The Agency has failed to establish facts to show that Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances at anytime while Respondent was treating the patient, including both preoperative and postoperative treatment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed herein against Respondent Patricia Dee G. Stephenson, M. D. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1560 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner and the Department in this case. Agency's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1-2 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. The first sentence of proposed finding of fact 3 is adopted in Finding of Fact 3. The second and third sentence are not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 4 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 5, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 5 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 7, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 6 is adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 12, 13, and 14, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed findings of fact 7 and 8 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 21 and 22, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Proposed finding of fact 9 is a restatement of Dr. Monroe's testimony and is not a finding of fact. However, see Findings of Fact 16 and 17. 8, Proposed findings of fact 10, 16, 17 and 19 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 15, 16, 10, 8 and 9. Proposed finding of fact 11 is adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 16, otherwise not supported by evidence in the record. Although proposed findings of fact 12, 13 and 15 are findings of fact, they are neither material nor relevant to this proceeding. See Finding of Fact 9. Proposed finding of fact 14 is a restatement of Dr. Grabow's testimony and is not stated as a finding of fact, but see Finding of Fact 10. Dr. Grabow's testimony was 20/50 vision with or without glare which is different than just 20/50 vision. 11. Proposed findings of Fact 18 and 20 are not supported by evidence in the record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 27 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 25. COPIES FURNISHED: Marm Harris, M. D., Executive Director Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Jerome W. Hoffman, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building Number Three 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Steve Rothenburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 9325 Bay Plaza Boulevard, Suite 210 Tampa, Florida 33619 William E. Partridge, Esquire Lutz, Webb, Partridge, BoBo, and Baitty One Sarasota Tower 2 North Tamiami Trail, Suite 500 Sarasota, Florida 34236
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown, is a graduate of the University of Queensland Medical School in Brisbane, Australia. He holds the degrees of Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery. Doctorates of Medicine, under the British system, are reserved for specialists. Nonetheless, the medical training Petitioner received equates to that leading up to the award of the degree of Doctor of Medicine in the United States, and he is a physician and licensed as such in several states. He has completed residencies in general and thoracic surgery in Australia and the United States and has taken advanced training in cardiovascular and thoracic surgery at Emory University. Immediately before coming to the University of South Florida, (USF), Dr. McKeown was an Assistant Professor of Surgery at the University of Washington. In mid to late 1988, Dr. McKeown responded to an advertisement USF had placed in the Journal of the American Medical Association seeking applicants qualified for appointment at the Associate Professor level "... to join the Department of Surgery at the University of South Florida College of Medicine as the Chief of Cardiothoracic Surgery." He was selected for the position and joined the faculty effective May 1, 1989. All the correspondence leading up to Petitioner's joining the University faculty referred not only to his appointment as Associate Professor but also his assignment as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Only the actual state employment contract described his employment exclusively as Associate Professor and made no mention of the Chief position. Under these circumstances, Petitioner did not gain any proprietory interest in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. Dr. McKeown held the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division until April, 1994, when, as a result of a decision made by the Chairman of the school's Department of Surgery, he was replaced as Chief and that position was filled, on a temporary basis, by the Department Chair. Petitioner claims that when he arrived at USF to assume the directorship, an administrative position, he saw an opportunity to develop the position into something significant. He contends he would not have come to USF unless he was to be the Chief of the Division as there was no appeal to him in a position as a general faculty member. He wanted an opportunity to budget, hire people, and develop plans and programs, and in order to advance in academic medicine, one must, at some point, hold an administrative position. Apparently the Department of Surgery had experienced a rapid turnover in faculty. It is not clear whether this caused or was the result of a dispute with administrators and medical staff at Tampa General Hospital, (TGH), where much of the clinical medical school activity is carried on. However, the program was recognized as being weak in cardiothoracic surgery, and this condition offered Petitioner the challenge he wanted. In his five years as Chief, Petitioner increased both the number and quality of personnel and revenues considerably. He developed affiliations with several foreign universities and recruited qualified people, built up the laboratory, secured more grants, developed a program of continuing medical education and raised the examination scores of the school's graduates. He opened new clinical programs and built up both billings and collections to the point where the program revenues were increased at least 2 to 5 times. By 1992- 1993, the Division was making money and generating a surplus and still used clinic funds to support research. During his tenure as Chief of the Division, Petitioner served under two Department of Surgery chairmen. The first was Dr. Connar, the individual who recruited him; and the incumbent is Dr. Carey, the individual who removed him. Petitioner asserts that at no time during his tenure in the position of Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division was he ever told, by either Department Chairman, that his performance was unsatisfactory. All Division heads within the Department were, from time to time, counseled about personnel costs, and Petitioner admits he had some differences with Dr. Carey about that subject and some other financial aspects of the job, but nothing different than anywhere else in academia. Petitioner was removed by Dr. Carey based in part upon his alleged inability to get along with people. Though he claims this is not true, he admits to three areas of conflict. The first related to his objection to transplants being accomplished by unqualified surgeons which, he alleges, Dr. Carey permitted to further his own ends. The second related to the pediatric heart transplant program for which Petitioner supported one candidate as chair and Dr. Carey supported another. The third related to Petitioner's reluctance to hire a physician whom Dr. Carey wanted to hire but to whom Petitioner purportedly objected. Of the three areas of dispute, only the first two came before his removal, but he contends at no time was he advised his position was a problem for the Department. By the same token, none of Petitioner's annual performance ratings reflected any University dissatisfaction with his performance. At no time was he ever rated unsatisfactory in any performance area; and prior to his removal, he had no indication his position as Chief of the Division was in jeopardy. Dr. Carey indicates he did counsel with Petitioner often regarding his attitude but did not rate him down because he hoped the situation would improve. Dr. McKeown was called to meet with Dr. Carey in his office on April 12, 1994. At that meeting, Dr. Carey was very agitated. He brought up the "Norman" incident and indicated he was going to remove Petitioner as Chief of the Division. Dr. McKeown admits to having made an inappropriate comment regarding Dr. Norman, another physician, to a resident in the operating room while performing an operation. He also admits that it was wrong to do this and apologized to Dr. Norman both orally and in writing shortly thereafter. Dr. Norman accepted his apology and Petitioner asserts that after his removal, Dr. Norman called him and assured him he, Norman, had not prompted the removal action. Dr. Norman did not testify at the hearing. Dr. Carey removed Petitioner from his position as Chief because of the comments he had made regarding Dr. Norman. Almost immediately after the meeting was concluded, Dr. Carey announced in writing his assumption of the Chief's position, in which position he remained until he hired Dr. Robinson as Chief in April, 1995. Petitioner found out that Carey's threat to remove him had been carried out the following day when his nurse told him his removal had been announced at the Moffett Cancer Center. He thereafter heard other reports of his removal from other sources, and based on what had happened, concluded his removal was intended to be and constituted a disciplinary action for his comment regarding Dr. Norman. He was not advised in advance of Carey's intention to impose discipline nor given an opportunity to defend himself before the action was taken. He claims he was not given any reason for his removal before or at the time of his dismissal. It is found, however, that the removal was not disciplinary action but an administrative change in Division leadership. Dr. McKeown at first did nothing about his removal, believing it would blow over. However, after he heard his removal had been publicized, he called several University officials, including a Vice-President, the General Counsel and the Provost, to see how the matter could be handled. He claims he either got no response to his inquiries or was told it was a Medical College problem. He then met with the Dean of the College of Medicine who indicated he could do nothing. After he was removed as Division Chief, Petitioner's salary remained the same as did his supplement from his practice. He claims, however, his removal has had an adverse effect on his reputation in the medical and academic communities. It is his belief that people now feel something is wrong with him. Dr. Carey's blunt announcement of his assumption of the Chief's position, without any reasons being given for that move or credit being given to Petitioner for his past accomplishments has had an impact on his ability to work effectively. After his removal, he received calls from all over the world from people wanting to know what had happened. The removal has, he claims, also made it more difficult for him to get grants and has, thereby, adversely impacted his ability to do productive research. In addition, his removal made it difficult for him to carry out his academic duties. His specialty is still presented in student rotations, only in a different place in the medical curriculum. Dr. McKeown has sought reinstatement to the administrative position of Chief of the Division. He is of the opinion that Dr. Carey's action in removing him from his position as Division Chief was capricious and damaging to the University as well as to his career. Petitioner admits he could have been less confrontational in the performance of his duties as Division Chief, but he knows of no complaints about him from TGH, All Children's Hospital or the VA Hospital. There are, however, letters in the files of the Department Chairman which indicate some dissatisfaction with Petitioner's relationships in some quarters and, as seen below, there were signs of dissatisfaction from both TGH and All Children's Hospitals. Petitioner admits he may have been somewhat overbearing or abrasive, but neither his alleged inability to properly steward finances nor his alleged inability to get along with people were mentioned to him at the time of dismissal or before. After Dr. Carey assumed the Chairmanship of the Department of Surgery in July, 1990, he saw Dr. McKeown frequently on an official basis at first. A Chief, as Petitioner was, has many and varied functions such as administration, teaching, fiscal, research, clinic administration and the like. People skills are important because of the necessary interface with colleagues, faculty, administrators and the public. When Dr. Carey came to USF, Dr. McKeown had not been in place very long, and the Division of Cardiothoracic Surgery was not doing well financially. There were contract negotiations going on with the VA Hospital which were not going well, at least partly because, Dr. Carey asserts, Dr. McKeown had made some major unacceptable demands. As a result, Dr. Carey stepped in, along with Dr. Benke, who was very effective in dealing with the VA, and as a result, an agreement was reached which resulted in somewhere between $275,000 and $300,000 per year coming in which put the Division in the black. Dr. Carey recalls other instances indicating Dr. McKeown's inability to get along with others. One related to the relationship with TGH previously mentioned. TGH had made a decision to use a particular physician as head of its transplant program because, allegedly, Dr. McKeown had so angered private heart patients they would not let him be appointed even though Dr. McKeown was Dr. Carey's choice. As it turned out, Dr. Carey convinced the TGH Director and another physician to agree to a plan whereby Dr. McKeown would be head of the program 50 percent of the time. This would have been good for the University, but Dr. McKeown refused indicating that if he could not be in charge all of the time, he would not be in charge at all. Another incident relates to All Children's Hospital. That institution wanted to initiate a pediatric heart transplant program and a meeting was set up to which Dr. McKeown was invited. Petitioner so infuriated the community surgeons attending that meeting they would not work with him, and without his, Carey's, efforts, Dr. Carey claims the program was doomed to failure. As a result, Carey asked Dr. Nevitsky to help get the program started. This gave the USF an opportunity to participate in the program, but when Nevitsky left, they lost it. Still another example, according to Dr. Carey, is the fact that some surgeons on staff have called to complain about Dr. McKeown's attitude and unwillingness to compromise and negotiate and about his demands for service and staff, all of which creates friction among the hospital staff. A few days before Dr. Carey removed Petitioner as Chief, he spoke with the Dean of the College of Medicine, a Vice-president of the University, and others who would be impacted, about his concern regarding the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division and, in fact, he had had discussions with other officials even before that time. Long before making his decision to remove Petitioner, Carey spoke of his consideration of possibly shifting the emphasis within the Division to non-cardiac thoracic surgery in place of the cardiac program which Dr. Carey felt was not very successful. He believed the program did not do enough procedures to support the medical school affiliation. Dr. Carey chose to dismiss Dr. McKeown as Chief of the Division on April 12, 1994, after learning of McKeown's destructive attack on another surgeon before a junior physician in a public place, an operating room, (the Norman incident). He notes that over the years there was a building concern regarding Dr. McKeown's abilities as an administrator, and this incident with Dr. Norman was the last straw. Dr. Carey had received complaints about Petitioner from other physicians, all of which he discussed with Dr. McKeown. Finally, with the Norman incident, it became abundantly clear that Dr. McKeown's capabilities as a leader had diminished to the point where a change was necessary. Before he dismissed Petitioner, and during the investigation which led up to the dismissal, Dr. Carey admits, he did not give Dr. McKeown any opportunity to give any input to the decision. By the time Carey met with McKeown on April 12, 1994, his mind was made up. The Norman incident was demonstrative of what Carey perceived as McKeown's lack of supervisory ability, and it was that factor which led Carey to the ultimate decision to remove McKeown. He felt it necessary to act then and not leave Dr. McKeown in place during the search for a replacement. Petitioner cites alleged comments made by Carey to others that he would have relieved anyone for doing what Petitioner did in the Norman incident. Dr. Carey cannot recall having made such a statement. He claims he considered disciplinary action against Petitioner for the Norman comments but decided against it. However, it was the last in a series of incidents which caused him to question the propriety of McKeown's placement in the Chief's position, and which ultimately cemented his decision to replace him. Dr. Carey met with Dr. McKeown several times before the dismissal and counseled him about administrative deficiencies in his performance, but he never told Dr. McKeown that unless he improved, he would be dismissed. This is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that he was not warned of his shortcomings or of the administration's dissatisfaction with his performance. Disagreements in conversations between superior and subordinate, meant by the former to be corrective in nature, are not always taken as such by the latter. Dr. Carey did not document any of this in Dr. McKeown's personnel files but put some of the information he received by way of communications from others in the files. These are the letters submitted by the University, pursuant to agreement of the parties, subsequent to the hearing. They contributed to Carey's increasing concern about Dr. McKeown's ability to lead the Division. At no time, however, though he questioned Dr. McKeown's leadership, did Dr. Carey ever question his good faith and sincerity, nor does he do so now. When he finally decided action was necessary, on April 12, 1994, Dr. Carey wrote a memorandum to the Medical College faculty concerning his assumption of the position as Chief of the Cardiothoracic Surgery Division. He also advised Dr. McKeown of his removal. Dr. Carey remained in the Chief's position, holding that title in an administrative capacity and not from a clinical standpoint, for approximately one year, intending to stay in the position only until he could find a fully qualified thoracic surgeon to take the job. After Carey removed Petitioner, he was contacted by the Medical College Dean who asked that he get with McKeown and try to work something out. He thereafter offered Dr. McKeown the position of Chief of the cardiac section of the Division but McKeown declined. Dr. Carey also, on April 26, 1994, wrote to TGH recommending that Dr. McKeown be allowed to have more impact on the hospital's transplant program, pointing out that the change in McKeown's position at the University was occasioned by a need for a change in leadership. According to Dr. Tennyson J. Wright, Associate Provost of the University, disciplinary action against nonunion faculty members is governed by Rule 6C4-10.009, F.A.C., and requires notice of proposed action be given before such disciplinary action is taken. The contract which Dr. McKeown holds and has held since the inception of his tenure at the University, is a standard USF/State University System contract. It reflects Petitioner was hired as an Associate Professor, which is one of the three types of personnel classifications used within the system. These are faculty, administration and support. Petitioner's contract does not refer to his holding the Division Chief position and it is not supposed to. Such a position is an administrative appointment within a Department and a working title used to define the holder's duties, and service in such a position is at the pleasure of the Department Chair. Appointment to or removal from a Chief position is an administrative assignment. The position of Department Chairperson, on the other hand is a separate position and subclassification within the University classification system and is different.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Peter P. McKeown's, grievance against the University of South Florida School of Medicine arising from his removal as Chief, Cardiothoracic Surgery Division in the Department of Surgery be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1832 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Though the documents in question refer to appointment, in actuality the personnel action was an appointment to the faculty with an administrative assignment to the position of Director of the Division. & 10. Accepted. 11. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporate herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. & 27. Accepted. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. 32. - 34. First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inconsistent with the better evidence of record. 35. - 37. Accepted. 38. Rejected as argument. 39. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Benjamin H. Hill, III, Esquire William C. Guerrant, Jr., Esquire Danelle Dykes, Esquire Hill, Ward & Henderson, P.A. Post Office Box 2231 Tampa, Florida 33601 Thomas M. Gonzalez, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez 109 North Brush Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601 Olga J. Joanow, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620 Noreen Segrest, Esquire General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
The Issue Whether Proposed Rules 10N-6.002, 10N-6.003, 10N-6.004, 10N-6.005 and 10N- 6.006, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, Medivision, Inc., and Tampa Surgi-Center, d/b/a Ambulatory Surgery Center, have standing to challenge the proposed rules at issue in these cases. See the affidavits of Larry Cyment and Donna McMillan. Intervenor, Florida Hospital Association, Inc., has standing to participate in these cases. See the affidavit of Pat Haines. The following Intervenors have established their standing to participate as intervenors in these cases through testimony or affidavit: Cataract Surgery Center, Cortez Foot Surgery Center, Ambulatory Surgery Center of Bradenton, Tampa Outpatient Surgical Facility, Naples Day Surgery, Ambulatory Surgical Center, Specialty Surgical Center and Tallahassee Single Day Surgery. Eye Surgery Center, The Eye Associates, FW Associates and Cordova Ambulatory Surgical Center have failed to prove their standing to participate in these cases. The Proposed Rules; Purpose and Adoption. The Health Care Cost Containment Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), published Rules 10N-6.002, 10N-6.003, 10N-6.004, 10N-6.005 and 10N- 6.006 (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rules"), in Volume 16, Number 12, of the Florida Administrative Weekly (March 23, 1990). The purpose of the Proposed Rules is to collect data concerning the provision of ambulatory surgery services in the State of Florida. Data collected by the Board will allow a comparison of patient charges and will create an additional bases for the analysis of trends in the health care field. In particular, data collection will promote the analysis of shifts in the provision of health care from inpatient to outpatient settings. Data concerning patient identity, geographic location, diagnosis, procedures performed and charges for services is required to be collected and submitted to the Board pursuant to the Proposed Rules. In June of 1989, the staff of the Board presented a study to the Board concerning the growth of ambulatory health care services. Staff recommended that the Board direct that steps be taken to explore the possibility of collecting ambulatory surgery data. The Board accepted the recommendation and appointed a Technical Advisory Panel. The Technical Advisory Panel appointed by the Board consisted of nine representatives of various interested groups. Two members were from freestanding ambulatory surgery centers and two members were from hospitals providing ambulatory surgery services. At meetings of the Technical Advisory Panel in July, August, September and October, 1989, the collection of ambulatory surgery services data was considered. The Technical Advisory Panel discussed collection costs, the type of data to be collected, implementation dates, legislative authority, methods of submitting data and the scope of data collection. The Board was made aware of the Technical Advisory Panel's efforts through minutes of the Panel's meetings and other materials provided to the Board. The collection of ambulatory surgery services data was considered by the Board at its October, November and December, 1989, meetings. The Proposed Rules were approved by the Board at its December, 1989, meeting. There is no statutory authority which specifically provides that data may be collected by the Board from "freestanding ambulatory surgical centers." The Board cited Section 407.03, Florida Statutes (1989), as the specific authority for the Proposed Rules. The Board cited Sections 407.003, 407.03 and 407.08, Florida Statutes (1989), as the laws implemented by the Proposed Rules. Scope of the Proposed Rules. Ambulatory surgery services are provided in a variety of settings: hospitals (e.g., acute care, psychiatric and rehabilitation), licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers, physician offices and other unlicensed health care facilities. The Proposed Rules provide that all licensed hospitals included in Groups 1 through 10 and Group 14 of the HCCCB Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual which provide outpatient surgery services and all licensed ambulatory surgery centers in Florida are required to collect and submit 45 data elements to the Board. Psychiatric hospitals and rehabilitation hospitals are not subject to the Proposed Rules. Physicians' offices and other unlicensed health care providers are also not subject to the Proposed Rules. The Proposed Rules are limited to licensed providers of ambulatory surgery services so that the Board's staff can insure that all members of the groups selected data actually collect and report data. The Board cannot insure that all unlicensed providers of ambulatory surgery services, such as physicians' offices, comply with the Proposed Rules. Therefore, if data was required to be collected and submitted by unlicensed providers, the data would be less reliable. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that only hospitals included in Groups 1 and 10 and Group 14 of the HCCCB Florida Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual and licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers collect and submit data constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Specific Data vs. Aggregate Data. The Proposed Rules require the collection and reporting of 45 specific data elements. Aggregate data concerning ambulatory surgery services could be obtained from insurance companies and used by the Board as an alternative to the more specific data required to be collected pursuant to the Proposed Rules. Aggregate data is a compilation of specific data. Aggregate data can be used to comply with the Board's statutorily required functions. If aggregate data is used, however, it is likely that reporting will be incomplete. Not all information is reported to insurance companies concerning outpatient activity. Therefore, aggregate data obtained from insurance companies would not cover 100% of ambulatory surgery services provided by reporting entities, resulting in the potential for presenting an incomplete or inaccurate picture of ambulatory surgery services. The recommendations and conclusions which can be reached from aggregate data are limited. Specific data allows more flexibility for research purposes. Specific data will assure greater accuracy and comparability of data. Recommendations and conclusions reached from specific data should be more accurate. In order to insure comparability of data, specific data concerning patients, geographic location, diagnoses, procedures and charges must be collected. The Board collected aggregate data concerning ambulatory surgery services through a special study. The Board collected the data from hospitals and, on a voluntary basis, from licensed ambulatory surgery centers. "Typical" charges for specified ambulatory surgery procedures was collected. This collection effort was flawed by the lack of specific data. The accuracy of the reports based upon the aggregate data was criticized publicly. The reports were even criticized by one of the witnesses called to testify by Intervenors, Cataract Surgery Center, et. al. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that specific data be collected and submitted instead of aggregate data constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority. Confidential Patient Data. Some of the data elements to be reported pursuant to the Proposed Rules constitute confidential patient information. Disclosure of confidential patient information is prohibited by Florida law. The Proposed Rules do not require or authorize disclosure of confidential patient information. The manner in which the data collected will be distributed has not yet been decided upon by the Board. The evidence failed to prove that the Board will not comply with prohibitions against disclosure of confidential patient information. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the requirement of the Proposed Rules that confidential patient information be reported to the Board constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority. Computer Use. The Proposed Rules require that data be submitted by computer tape or computer diskette. Therefore, data will have to be input into a computer system. The Proposed Rules specify the format data must be in when submitted. Most of the language of the Proposed Rules is computer terminology. The terminology of the Proposed Rules will require some knowledge of computers to carry out the requirements of the Proposed Rules. The language of the Proposed Rules is intentionally designed to convey technical information. The general purpose and requirements of the Proposed Rules does not take any special knowledge to understand. Requiring the submission of data by electronic means is designed to assure the accuracy and confidentiality of the data. The requirement of the Proposed Rules that data be reported in computer form and the use of computer terminology does not constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Errors in the Proposed Rules. Proposed Rule 10N-6.002(2) defines "Ambulatory Surgery Services" as procedures "provided in a hospital in its dedicated ASC ..." [Emphasis added]. Instead of "ASC" the Board intended to use the terms "operating room." Proposed Rule 10N-6.005 contains a list of the data elements to be collected and reported to the Board. This Proposed Rule contains the following errors or unclear language: Item 20 is "Facility Fee - Pri. Proc." "Pri. Proc." is an abbreviation for primary procedure. Items 21-24, similar to Item 20, contains the abbreviation "Sec. Proc." instead of secondary procedure. Items 25-27 contain a reference to "Page 3". As published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, there is no page 3. Item 35, which deals with expected methods of payment, refers to "Comm. Ins. (incl. BCBS)." This reference is an abbreviation for commercial insurance (Blue Cross Blue Shield). Item 44, patient birth date, uses the abbreviation "MMYYYY." This abbreviation should be "MMDDYY." Proposed Rule 10N-6.006 refers to "Primary Diagnosis Code" and "Secondary Diagnosis Code." The Rule should refer to Primary and Secondary "Procedure" Code. The mistakes identified in findings of fact 38-40 are not significant enough to characterize the rule as vague. Nor are these mistakes sufficient enough to otherwise conclude that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Economic Impact. The Economic Impact Statement (hereinafter referred to as the "EIS"), issued with the Proposed Rules provided the following concerning the economic impact of the Proposed Rules on the Board: ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF IMPLEMENTATION: The agency will be affected by the costs of rule promulgation and by the demands placed upon staff time to assure compliance with the rules and to analyze the data collected. Costs for these activities are estimated to be approximately $85,000 per year. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this portion of the Board's EIS is unreasonable. The EIS provided the following concerning the economic impact of the Proposed Rules on persons affected by the Proposed Rules: ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF IMPLEMENTATION: Implementation by affected facilities will cost approximately $2.9 to $3.1 million. These funds will be used to develop the programs necessary to collect and submit the data required. On-going compliance will have a much less significant impact. . . . . ESTIMATE OF COST TO ALL PERSONS DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE RULE: The initial cost to Florida hospitals and freestanding ambulatory surgery centers (ASC) would be from approximately $2.9 to $3.1 million to develop the reporting system necessary to generate the necessary data elements. On-going annual cost to the hospitals and free standing ASCs would be substantially less after the first year's start-up procedures are adopted. . . . . The EIS is insufficient because it does not adequately discuss the costs (implementation and ongoing costs) to affected persons or the impact of the Proposed Rules on small business. The weight of the evidence proved that the Proposed Rules will have an economic impact on affected persons. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of the implementation cost affected persons can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. As indicated in the EIS, the Board's determination of the estimate of the economic impact on affected persons was based upon surveys the Board distributed to licensed ambulatory surgery centers, an estimate of costs that hospitals incurred in implementing the Board's detailed patient data collection rule, the Board staff's experience with computer costs (including the collection and entry of data) and consultation with a computer expert familiar with the Proposed Rules. The surveys relied upon by the Board were distributed to all licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers. A total of 91 surveys were distributed. The Board requested that the surveys be returned within one week. Forty-one responses to the surveys were received by the Board from licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers. The responses constitute hearsay. Findings of fact concerning whether the information contained in the responses is correct, therefore, have not been made. The responses to the surveys have, however, been relied upon to make findings of fact concerning what information the Board based its EIS on. The Board received the following pertinent responses to the surveys from licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers: (1) 26 of the responders use computers, 12 have no computer capacity and 3 have some computer capacity; 17 or 18 different software programs are in use; and, (3) the costs to implement the proposed collection of data ranged from $0 to $50,000.00. Twenty- six responders indicated that they did not know how long it would take for them to implement the proposed collection of data. The Board determined that the average implementation cost for licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers reported in the responses to its survey was $18,975.00 and that the average implementation time was 13 weeks. The Board rounded up the average cost reported to it in the surveys and estimated that the cost of implementing the Proposed Rules at licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers would be $20,000.00. Based upon the existence of 85 licensed facilities, the Board estimated the total implementation cost for licensed freestanding ambulatory surgery centers to be $1,700,000.00 ($20,000.00 x 85). The Board estimated that the maximum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules at affected hospitals would be $2.00 per patient record. This estimate was based upon the Board's estimate of the cost of hospital compliance with the Board's detailed patient discharge data rule. Based upon an estimate of 600,000 patient records a year which will have to processed as a result of the Proposed Rules, the Board estimated the total cost of implementation in affected hospitals to be $1,200,000.00. The Board concluded that the total minimum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules will be $2,900,000.00 ($1,700,000.00 cost for freestanding ambulatory surgery centers plus $1,200,000.00 cost for affected hospitals). The Board discussed the cost of implementing the Proposed Rules with J. Thomas Solano, an expert in computers. Mr. Solano estimated that the cost of modifying an existing computer system (small to mid-range computer) to comply with the Proposed Rules would be $4,000.00 to $10,000.00. The Board used the highest estimate, $10,000.00, and multiplied this cost by the number of affected persons (85 freestanding ambulatory surgery centers and 220 hospitals x $10,000.00). This resulted in a rounded-up estimated implementation cost of $3,100,000.00. The Board concluded that the total maximum cost of implementing the Proposed Rules will be $3,100,000.00. Some of the data to be collected and reported pursuant to the Proposed Rules is already being collected by affected persons. Therefore, the primary cost of complying with the Proposed Rules will be associated with modifying existing computer software and/or hardware. The cost of modifying an existing computer system can fluctuate widely. As a general rule, computer users with existing software must rely upon their existing software provider to make modifications. The cost of modifying software can, therefore, be much higher than Mr. Solano estimated. As an alternative to modifying existing systems, affected persons can acquire a freestanding personal computer and software which can be used to comply with the Proposed Rules. The cost of such an acquisition should be approximately $2,500.00 to $5,600.00. Intervenor, T.S.D.S., Inc., d/b/a Tallahassee Single Day Surgery Center, estimated that it will have to spend approximately $14,000.00 to $20,000.00 to implement the Proposed Rules. This estimate is based upon a letter purportedly from the Intervenor's computer company. The information contained in the letter is hearsay. The estimated implementation costs are, therefore, not supported by admissible evidence. The estimate, even if supported by competent substantial evidence, is within the Board's estimated implementation costs and, therefore, fail to prove that the Board's EIS is unreasonable or that the Board failed to fully consider the economic factors or impact. Intervenor, Cataract Surgery Center, estimated implementation costs of $1,900.00. This amount is limited to additional maintenance fees, supplies and personnel costs. Cataract Surgery Center believes there will no charge from its computer vendor to modify its software. Cataract's estimated costs are reasonable and within the Board's estimates. Ambulatory Surgical Center of Lake County (hereinafter referred to as "Lake"), does not own a computer. It uses the computer system of its physician owners. Lake considered more than one method of complying with the Proposed Rules. It considered buying a personal computer and estimated it would cost $5,000.00. This cost is consistent with the estimates of the Board. Lake also considered purchasing an integrated hardware and software package. It estimated that such a system would cost $40,000.00 to $50,000.00. The estimate is based upon hearsay. Even if the evidence concerning the cost of an integrated system is accepted as correct, the evidence fails to prove that such costs are necessary to comply with the Proposed Rules. The estimate for this system is based upon Lake's decision that it would perform other functions with the computer system, including storing management information and performing billing functions. These functions are not required in order to comply with the Proposed Rules. Lake currently treats approximately only 300 patients annually. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority because of the implementation cost which will be incurred by affected persons. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the inadequate treatment of implementation costs in the EIS was fully considered by the Board. Therefore, the treatment of implementation costs in the EIS constitutes harmless error. Although the primary costs to affected persons caused by the Proposed Rules will be associated with implementation of the Proposed Rules, there will also be certain costs associated with ongoing compliance with the Proposed Rules. There will be ongoing costs for the collection of data, entry of the data into a computer and reporting data to the Board. Ongoing costs caused by the Proposed Rules will be greater if an affected person with an existing computer system acquires a freestanding computer system instead of using the existing system. The Board's statement in the EIS concerning ongoing costs was not based upon information from affected persons. The statement concerning ongoing costs does not indicate what the ongoing costs of compliance with the Proposed Rules will be. It only indicates that it will be less than the initial implementation costs associated with the Proposed Rules. Although the weight of the evidence did not prove the estimated total amount of ongoing costs to affected persons from the Proposed Rules, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that ongoing costs will be greater than the estimated total amount of implementation costs. T.S.D.S., Inc., d/b/a Tallahassee Single Day Surgery Center, estimated that it would incur ongoing costs of approximately $6,000.00. This estimate is reasonable. Cataract Surgery Center estimated that it would incur ongoing costs of $41,600.00, or $20.00 per case, to comply with the Proposed Rules. Cataract Surgery Center's estimated costs include the following costs: reel purchase; handling; reel preparation; collection of billing data; process of sending information to the Board; clarification of errors; additional record production; and response to public inquiries. Cataract Surgery Center's estimated costs are not reasonable. The estimated time to comply with the Proposed Rules is excessive and some of the tasks, i.e., collection of billing data, are not required by the Proposed Rules. Cataract Surgery Center's conclusion that it may have an increase in maintenance fees is reasonable. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of the ongoing costs affected persons can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. Therefore, the treatment of ongoing costs in the EIS was harmless error. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority because of the ongoing cost which will be incurred by affected persons. The EIS contains a statement that the Proposed Rules should have no economic impact on small business. In reaching this conclusion the Board failed to take into account the legal definition of "small business" contained in Florida Statutes. The Board did, however, actually consider the impact the Proposed Rules would likely have on small ambulatory surgery centers subject to the Proposed Rules. The Board attempted to reduce the economic impact on small ambulatory surgery centers by allowing affected persons to file data on computer tape or on diskette. By allowing the use of diskettes for reporting data, the Board made it possible for affected persons to use personal computers to comply with the Proposed Rules. Delayed submission of some data elements was also allowed in order to reduce the impact on small facilities. It is unlikely that the Board would have made further modifications of the Proposed Rules had the legal definition of "small business" been considered. The weight of the evidence failed to prove what, if any, reasonable modifications should have been taken by the Board to accommodate any economic impact on small business. The weight of the evidence failed to prove whether any of the entities that participated in the proceeding were small businesses. Those entities, although meeting the definition of small business with regard to the number of employees they have and their net worth, failed to prove whether they are "independently owned and operated." See Section 288.703(1), Florida Statutes (1989). The weight of the evidence failed to prove if any person affected by the Proposed Rules is a small business. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Board did not fully consider the asserted economic factors and impact of small business which can be expected to incur as a result of the Proposed Rules. Therefore, the treatment of the impact on small business in the EIS was harmless error. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that the Proposed Rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because of the impact on small business. The Petitioners and Intervenors presented evidence concerning a number of actions which the Board did not take during its consideration of the economic impact and factors of the Proposed Rules and its preparation of the EIS. This evidence proved only that there were other steps which the Board could have taken during its preparation of the EIS. The Petitioners and Intervenors failed to prove, however, that the steps which the Board did take were not sufficient. The Petitioners and Intervenors therefore failed to prove that the steps which the Board did not take were required or necessary.
