Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs TEDDY AND KATHLEEN ARIAS, 16-000072 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port St. Lucie, Florida Jan. 08, 2016 Number: 16-000072 Latest Update: Jul. 28, 2016

The Issue Whether Respondents’ renewal foster home license application should be denied based upon allegations that Respondents violated a foster child’s safety plan, refused to sign a corrective action plan, and refused to work in partnership with Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact The Parties DCF is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes pursuant to section 409.175, Florida Statutes. DCF administers foster care programs by contracting with third-party private entities. In Circuit 19, which is the geographic area encompassing Port St. Lucie, DCF has contracted with Devereux Community Based Care (“Devereux”) to be the “lead agency” to provide the majority of child services. Devereux, in turn, has subcontracted with Camelot Community Care (“Camelot”), which is licensed as a child placement agency. Respondents, who are husband and wife, are foster care parents in a foster care home licensed by DCF. At all times material hereto, Mr. and Mrs. Arias have fostered children at their home in Port St. Lucie. Respondent, Kathleen Arias (“Mrs. Arias”), does not work outside the foster home. She is a “stay-at-home” foster mom. Over the past 16 years, Mrs. Arias has fostered many children. Mrs. Arias is very loving to the foster children in her care, and she has provided a great benefit to the foster children in her care.2/ Kenneth Strout’s Prior History of Sexually Inappropriate Behaviors Kenneth Strout (“Kenneth”), who recently turned 18 years old, was placed into Respondents’ foster home in 2013. Prior to his placement in Respondents’ home, Kenneth engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors. As a therapeutic foster child in Respondents’ home, Kenneth received therapeutic services, including therapy, psychiatric services, support, and therapeutic parenting by a trained therapeutic foster parent, Mrs. Arias. Despite receiving therapeutic services, Kenneth continued to engage in inappropriate sexual behaviors while living in Respondents’ home. During the time in which Kenneth lived in the home, he had a history of sexually touching others, exposing himself, and masturbating in close proximity to others. On one particular occasion on September 17, 2014, Kenneth was sitting on the couch watching television, and Mrs. Arias’ sister walked in the room. While she had her back to Kenneth, he dropped his pants, exposed himself to her, and pressed his penis against her buttocks. The Applicable Safety Plan Requirements As a result of this incident, an updated safety plan was developed.3/ The safety plan was signed by Mrs. Arias on October 8, 2014. Mrs. Arias reviewed the safety plan and is aware of the requirements of the safety plan. Specifically, the safety plan requires, in pertinent part: “Client needs to be within eyesight and earshot of a responsible adult, who is aware of and will enforce the safety plan at all times.” The May 28, 2015, Incident at LA Fitness and its Aftermath Against this backdrop, on May 28, 2015, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Mrs. Arias took Kenneth, who was 17 years old at the time, to LA Fitness, a gym facility in Port St. Lucie. Mrs. Arias had a membership at LA Fitness and frequented the facility on a regular basis. Despite Ms. Arias’ knowledge of Kenneth’s inappropriate sexual propensities, Kenneth often accompanied Mrs. Arias to the facility, where he would play basketball on an indoor basketball court, while Mrs. Arias exercised in another area at the facility. During the evening of May 28, 2015, Kenneth had been playing basketball on the indoor basketball court. He left the basketball court and approached Mrs. Arias and told her that he needed to use the bathroom. Mrs. Arias gave Kenneth permission to go to the bathroom. The men’s restroom is located inside the men’s locker room. At this point, Kenneth walked toward the men’s locker room, and entered the men’s locker room through the door leading from a hallway into the men’s locker room. Mrs. Arias did not go into the men’s locker room with Kenneth, nor was Kenneth accompanied by an adult when he entered the men’s locker room. Once Kenneth entered the men’s locker room, he walked to the other end of the locker room to another door, which led to the Jacuzzi area. Kenneth then opened the door from the men’s locker room leading to the Jacuzzi area. At this point, Kenneth observed a female, Concepcion Alvarado, sitting alone in the Jacuzzi. Ms. Alvarado was in her swimsuit. At this point, Ms. Alvarado was relaxing in the Jacuzzi with her eyes closed. After observing Ms. Alvarado for a moment, Kenneth stripped down to his boxer shorts, entered the Jacuzzi, and inappropriately touched Ms. Alvarado on her leg. Upon realizing that somebody touched her leg, Ms. Alvarado opened her eyes, saw Kenneth in front of her, and said to him: “What are you doing, little boy?” “Just get out of my way, or do your own stuff.” Kenneth then touched Ms. Alvarado on her shoulder. At this point, Ms. Alvarado became very angry and said to Kenneth: “Why are you touching me? You’re not supposed to do that.” “Just get out.” Kenneth smiled at Ms. Alvarado as Ms. Alvarado exited the Jacuzzi. Ms. Alvarado then entered the nearby pool. Kenneth followed Ms. Alvarado and jumped in the pool as well. Ms. Alvarado recognized Kenneth because he had engaged in similar inappropriate sexual behavior a week earlier. On the prior occasion, Kenneth and Ms. Alvarado were in the Jacuzzi when Kenneth tried to kiss her and touched her leg. Ms. Alvarado did not report the prior incident. However, Ms. Alvarado reported the May 28, 2015, incident to an LA Fitness employee. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officers arrived at the facility and arrested Kenneth. Kenneth was taken to a juvenile detention facility where he spent the night. Kenneth was not within eyeshot or earshot of Mrs. Arias or another responsible adult once he entered the men’s locker room on May 28, 2015. Kenneth was not within eyeshot or earshot of Mrs. Arias or another responsible adult when the inappropriate physical contact perpetrated by Kenneth against Ms. Alvarado in the Jacuzzi on May 28, 2015, occurred. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing establishes that Respondents violated the October 2014 safety plan by failing to ensure that Kenneth was within earshot and eyeshot of a responsible adult at all times when he was at LA Fitness. Had Kenneth been within eyeshot and earshot of a responsible adult at all times on May 28, 2015, while he was at LA Fitness, the incident in the Jacuzzi with Ms. Alvarado would not have occurred.4/ Notably, given Kenneth’s history of sexually inappropriate behaviors, Mrs. Arias knew that she was taking a risk to the public in bringing Kenneth to LA fitness because it was an environment that could be problematic for him. At hearing, Ms. Linda Green, a licensed clinical social worker formerly employed by Camelot, persuasively and credibly explained the difficulties she and Mrs. Arias faced in their efforts to deal with Kenneth’s sexually inappropriate behaviors. According to Ms. Green, a true bond developed between Mrs. Arias and Kenneth. Kenneth referred to Mrs. Arias as “mom,” and he felt like she was his mother. In an attempt to keep the family unit intact, Ms. Green wanted significant “client-directed therapy” and “advocation because the client should have the right to control their life.” On the other hand, Ms. Green was concerned about keeping society safe from Kenneth. In hindsight, Ms. Green candidly admitted at hearing that Kenneth “probably needed institutionalization sooner.” Mrs. Arias recognized her inability to control Kenneth’s sexually inappropriate behaviors and the danger he posed to society prior to the May 28, 2015, incident. Prior to the May 28, 2015, incident, Mrs. Arias requested that Kenneth be placed on a “30-Day Notice.” Kenneth was on a “30-Day Notice” when the incident at the gym on May 28, 2015, occurred. Nevertheless, Kenneth remained in the Respondents’ home as of the May 28, 2015, incident at the gym because Devereux was having difficulty finding a new placement, and Mrs. Arias agreed to keep Kenneth in the home until after the end of the school year. The school year ended the first week of June. Kenneth never returned to Respondents’ home after the May 28, 2015, incident at LA Fitness. Instead, Kenneth was discharged from the foster care program, and placed in a group facility where he has resided ever since. It is anticipated that Kenneth will remain in the group facility until he is 23 years old. Following the incident at the LA Fitness gym on May 28, 2015, DCF undertook an investigation. As a result of its investigation, DCF concluded that the safety plan was violated because Kenneth was not within earshot or eyeshot of a responsible adult when the incident at the gym on May 28, 2015, occurred. DCF’s investigation resulted in a verified finding of abuse against Respondents based on inadequate supervision. Based on DCF’s verified finding of abuse based on inadequate supervision, a corrective action plan was required by administrative rule and prepared for Respondents to execute. A corrective action plan is a document which identifies issues of concern to DCF and how DCF, as an agency, can work together with the foster parent to improve the foster parent’s performance. A corrective action plan serves as a supportive intervention and is not punitive in nature. Respondents refused to execute the corrective action plan because they were concerned that, in doing so, they would admit DCF’s investigative finding of abuse based on inadequate supervision. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing establishes that Respondents refused to execute the corrective action plan. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing fails to establish that Respondents failed to work in partnership with DCF.5/ Respondents’ foster care license was due to expire on October 18, 2015. After the May 28, 2015, incident occurred, DCF placed another child under Respondents’ care. Regardless of the incident at LA Fitness on May 28, 2015, DCF intended to re-license Respondents. DCF intended to renew Respondents’ foster care license after the May 28, 2015, incident despite the verified finding of inadequate supervision. DCF was unable to re-license Respondents because they failed to execute the corrective action plan required by rule. Had Respondents executed the corrective action plan required by DCF, Respondents’ foster care license would have been renewed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Department of Children and Families placing Respondents’ foster care license in provisional status for six months, during which time Respondents shall execute the corrective action plan. If Respondents decline to execute the corrective action plan within six months, the provisional license will not be replaced with a regular license or renewed.7/ DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2016.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57120.60120.68409.175 Florida Administrative Code (1) 65C-13.034
# 1
HANCEL AND IRMA FELTON vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 96-004348 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 16, 1996 Number: 96-004348 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 1997

The Issue Whether the application of Hancel and Irma Felton for foster home licensure should be granted or denied.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Children and Family Services is the state agency responsible for granting or denying applications for foster home licensure. Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. Hancel and Irma Felton have been married 10 years, and both consider their marriage to be a happy one. Mr. and Mrs. Felton are raising Mrs. Felton's two children from a previous marriage; her daughter is a junior in high school and her son is in middle school. Mr. Felton treats these children as though they were his own; neither of these children has even had behavior problems. Mr. Felton is currently employed by the City of Coral Gables driving a garbage truck. Mrs. Felton works as a bus attendant for Dade County, although she worked in a child care center until 1989. Mr. and Mrs. Felton profess to have a Christian home, and they both testified that they are very active in the church. Although he has no formal theological training, Mr. Felton is an ordained minister of a church called Our Temple of God for All Ages. Mrs. and Mrs. Felton engage in missionary work, which involves working with young people in prison and with people who live on the street, including prostitutes and drug addicts. They often invite these people to stay in their home so they can counsel them and show them a better way to live. In the summer of 1996, Hancel and Irma Felton indicated to a representative of the Department that they were interested in becoming foster parents. According to Mrs. Felton, she and her husband want to become foster parents because she is an only child and wants more children but cannot have more of her own. Mr. and Mrs. Felton passed the initial "screening" and were enrolled in the MAPP/GPS class, which is a 10-week course which must be taken by all prospective foster and adoptive parents as part of the application process. Mr. and Mrs. Felton regularly attended the MAPP/GPS classes from July to September, 1996, and the Department issued certificates dated September 19, 1996, indicating that they had successfully completed the program. During the first meeting of the MAPP class, Personal Profile forms were distributed to the participants. Mr. Felton filled out this form, detailing his family history, and turned it in to the MAPP instructor. Question 14 in the profile requested: "Please list any children you have, from previous marriages or relationships, who do not currently live with you." Mr. Felton wrote "none" in the blank space provided for the response. Question 17 in the profile asked: "If you have remarried, or entered into a new relationship with someone other than your children's mother, how did your children adjust to the new person?" Mr. Felton responded by stating that the question was "not applicable," that there were "no other children." On July 11, 1996, Mr. and Mrs. Felton signed a Release of Information, in which they authorized the Department to obtain information from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to determine if they had any criminal history and to obtain information from the "central abuse registry and tracking system" maintained by the Department to determine if they were named in any confirmed reports of child abuse.1 The Department's check of records kept regarding reports and investigations of child abuse revealed that a report was made to the central abuse registry on February 21, 1989, in which it was alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Felton had abused a child named C. A., who was identified as Mr. Felton's daughter. C. A. is Mr. Felton's daughter by a woman with whom he had a relationship before he met Mrs. Felton. In February, 1989, C. A. was 8 years old. She had been raised by her mother in Detroit, Michigan, but the mother had died approximately a year earlier, and C. A. was placed in foster care in Detroit. In the summer of 1988, Mr. Felton requested that the Detroit authorities place C. A. with him, and she came to live with him and Mrs. Felton in December, 1988. C. A. had behavior problems during the few months she lived with Mr. and Mrs. Felton. Mrs. Felton was apparently unable to cope with her behavior, and Mr. Felton testified that things were getting very difficult with his wife as a result of C. A.'s living in their home.2 As a result of the problems Mrs. Felton had with C. A., Mr. Felton took C. A. out of the home he shared with Mrs. Felton and her children in February, 1989, and moved her into the home of his step-grandmother. In late February, a protective investigator with the Department went to C. A.'s school in response to a report that she had been abused. The investigator talked to C. A. in the presence of the school principal. During the interview, C. A. removed some of her clothing, and the investigator observed raised and discolored welts on the girl's back and legs. C. A. told the investigator that she had been beaten with a folded electrical extension cord. The investigator had observed welts with similar configurations on other children, and she determined, based on her experience, that the welts on C. A. had been inflicted with an extension cord. The protective investigator went to the Felton home and examined Mrs. Felton's two children for signs of abuse; she found no signs of abuse on these children. She interviewed Mr. and Mrs. Felton and noted in her report that they "admitted that they had beat C[]. A[]. with a belt and extension cord." Because they were not related by blood, the Department removed C. A. from the home of Mr. Felton's step-grandmother, even though she was a loving person and provided good care for C. A. C. A. was placed in a shelter and returned to Detroit shortly thereafter. Mr. Felton did not challenge the classification of the abuse report, and it became final as to him. Mrs. Felton hired an attorney, who negotiated a settlement with the Department whereby the abuse report became final as to her, but she was granted an exemption from the disqualification from working with children which resulted from the abuse report. At the hearing, both Mr. and Mrs. Felton denied ever "beating" C. A. They admitted, however, that they "spanked" her. During the time they participated in the MAPP classes and selection process, neither Mr. Felton nor Mrs. Felton disclosed to the Department that they had been named in an abuse report in 1989. Both testified that, since they had signed the Release of Information form, they assumed the Department would find out about it. Mr. and Mrs. Felton both testified that they had benefited greatly from the MAPP program. They have learned that it is inappropriate to spank a child for misbehavior and that it is better to talk with the child and make the child feel loved and wanted. C. A., who is now 16 years old, calls her father occasionally, and Mr. Felton is in contact with his mother, who apparently lives in Detroit and can provide some information about C. A. Mr. Felton testified that his daughter lives mostly on the street and has essentially raised herself since her mother died. Mr. Felton related that C. A. had recently called him and asked if she could come stay with him for the summer. He refused her request because he "needed to get his name straight." He wants C. A. to come live with him eventually. Mr. Felton provides support for C. A. though the $101.50 the City of Coral Gables currently deducts from Mr. Felton's biweekly paycheck. The evidence presented by Mr. and Mrs. Felton is not sufficient to establish their fitness for licensure as foster parents. Rather, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that Mr. and Mrs. Felton currently do not possess the good moral character necessary for those entrusted with a foster home license, which is recognized as a public trust and a privilege. Mr. Felton made intentional misstatements on the Personal Profile form which he completed as part of the foster home licensure application process when he twice stated that he had no children from relationships or marriages other than that with Mrs. Felton. In addition, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Felton disclosed to the Department the existence of the 1989 abuse report involving C. A., apparently feeling no obligation to do so and assuming that the Department would find out about it when they did the screening required for foster home license applicants. Finally, Mr. and Mrs. Felton are currently unable or unwilling to provide shelter and care to Mr. Felton's own child, C. A., who, in Mr. Felton's words, has "raised herself" and is currently living "on the street" in Detroit, Michigan. These three factors, taken together with their treatment of C. A in 1989,3 establish that the Feltons do not have the good moral character required of foster parents.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the application of Irma and Hancel Felton for foster home licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1997.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569409.175
# 2
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs STANLEY THIBODEAU, 00-004347 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Largo, Florida Oct. 24, 2000 Number: 00-004347 Latest Update: Aug. 08, 2001

The Issue The issue is this case is whether revocation of Respondent's Foster Care license privilege for his past and present conduct, determined by the Department of Children and Family Services (hereinafter Agency) to be inappropriate, was proper under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Under Section 409.175, Florida Statutes, the Department of Children and Family Services is the State Agency responsible for evaluating, qualifying, licensing, and regulating family foster care homes. On or about November 5, 1999, the Agency, after Mr. Thibodeau's successful completion of the Agency's evaluation and qualifying procedures, determined Mr. Thibodeau to be of good moral character. At all times material to the application process, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained on each standard application form and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the foster care home application process. Based upon its determination, the Agency granted Provisional Certificate of License, No. 1999-110-002, for Substitute Family Home care privilege to Mr. Thibodeau. Thereafter, the Agency placed three minor children in Mr. Thibodeau's home: two teenaged brothers, David M. and Daniel M., and seven-year-old Steve. After an unspecified period of time together, bonding began to develop between the brothers, Daniel and David, and Mr. Thibodeau. As a result of a mutual agreement, Mr. Thibodeau submitted an adoption application to the Agency to become the adoptive parent of the brothers David M. and Daniel M. At all times pertinent hereto, Mr. Thibodeau answered completely and truthfully each question contained in the standard application forms and other documents presented to him by the Agency during the adoption application process. Ms. Georgia Alezras, trainer for the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) classes and Mr. Kelvin Birdsell, family therapist and continuity specialist, made a home-study visit to the Thibodeau residence at some time between early July and August 15, 2000. Mr. Birdsell testified that he confined his conversations to the brothers, David M. and Daniel M. during the visit. Mr. Birdsell further testified that his conversations with the brothers were separate and away from the presence and hearing of Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau, who conversed privately. On July 26, 2000, after Mr. Thibodeau submitted his adoption application, and after the home study visit by Ms. Alezras, the Agency received a confidential telephonic abuse report, Petitioner's exhibit number one.1 The abuse report contains an interpolation of the private conversation between Ms. Alezras and Mr. Thibodeau during the earlier home-study visit. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Family Counselor Supervisor, testified that Ms. Georgia Alezras reported her private conversation with Mr. Thibodeau to her Agency supervisors. The Agency's interpolation of the Alezras-Thibodeau conversation formed the factual allegations contained in the Agency's August 18, 2000, revocation letter. Sergeant Hagerty, Pasco County Sheriff's Office, testified that she and Sergeant O'Conner investigated the abuse allegations, consisting solely of the Agency's interpolation of Ms. Alezras' earlier and prior conversation with Mr. Thibodeau, by checking with authorities in Washington and checking with the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) with negative results. The removal of the children from Mr. Thibodeau's home was based upon a joint decision to be safe and take a preventative approach in this matter. Petitioner's exhibit number two, a composite of eight letters, contained a "Closing of Foster Home For Children" report form, with a "foster home closing date" of August 18, 2000, and the caseworker and supervisor's signature on the date of August 22, 2000. The report, under "reason for closing" heading, contains the following comments: [H]is license was revoked because he recently divulged information about his past, that, had we known these facts prior to licensing, would have disqualified him to act as a foster parent---namely, he stated that some years ago he left the state of Washington with an unrelated male child without parental or state permission and lived with him for years under false identification. Ms. Georgia Alezras did not testify. Mr. Thibodeau's testimony is the only evidence of the private conversation with Ms. Alezras. Mr. Thibodeau's recollection of his responses to Ms. Alezras' questions was: [I]n 1975 he moved to the State of Washington; in 1976-77 he met Daniel L.; in 1976-77 he left the State of Washington and moved with Daniel to Pennsylvania where Daniel enrolled in school using his Washington school records; Daniel's mother visited them in Pennsylvania and maintained contact by telephone; Daniel, at age nineteen returned to Washington. He used a friend's birth certificate to secure his Pennsylvania driver's license. His video business2 considerations were subsequently dismissed and he advised the Agency of his decision by letter to his caseworker. Ms. Carolyn Olsen, Agency Representative, testified that one member of every MAPP team always asks a general, catchall question of every [foster care parent] applicant: "Is there anything else we need to know [about you], please tell us, [because] we will probably find out?" Ms. Olsen's candor and purpose comes into question on this point. She was not present during the Alezras-Thibodeau private conversation. Ms. Olsen does not know the identity of the team member who would have asked her catchall question nor does she know of a rule, guideline, or checklist requiring that specific question to be asked of every foster care license applicant, and there was no corroboration of her testimony. The Agency presented no evidence in support of its allegation that during the application process, its failure to inquire and Mr. Thibodeau's failure to disclose activities 20 years earlier in his life resulted from negligence or from the malicious intent of Mr. Thibodeau, and materially affect the health and safety of the minor children in his foster care. The Agency has failed to establish that Mr. Thibodeau left Washington with an unrelated minor child without parental consent and obtained false identification for the child. While it is true that Mr. Thibodeau "left Washington with an unrelated minor child," the Agency produced no evidence that his leaving was "without [minor child's] parental consent." Agency's investigators were unable to make contact with either the child or his mother. No investigation was made of the State of Washington's Motor Vehicle Department. No contact was made with the Pennsylvania authorities. Assuming argunendo, the Agency intended upon establishing this element by "an admission by Mr. Thibodeau"; they presented no evidence Mr. Thibodeau, in fact, uttered words to the effect of or acknowledged the comment "without parental consent." The undisputed evidence is Mr. Thibodeau's testimony that the minor child's mother not only approved of the child leaving Washington with him, but she also visited them in Pennsylvania and had telephone conversations with her child during his stay there. On this issue the Agency failed to carry its burden by clear and convincing evidence. Mr. Thibodeau admitted his use of another's birth certificate to secure a Pennsylvania driver's license more than 20 years ago. Since that time, Mr. Thibodeau's conduct, foster care parenting skills, helping problem young boys, and good moral conduct has been, as testified by the several witnesses, exemplary.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order reinstating to Stanley Thibodeau his foster care home license privilege. DONE AND ENTERED 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001.

Florida Laws (3) 120.52120.57409.175
# 3
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs LOIS KELLY, 98-001609 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sanford, Florida Apr. 03, 1998 Number: 98-001609 Latest Update: Feb. 25, 1999

The Issue In a letter dated February 17, 1998, the Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS) notified Lois Kelly that DCFS intended to revoke her foster home license for five specified reasons. Later, during the course of pre-hearing discovery, DCFS narrowed the issues to three violations: A substitute care parent must not use corporal punishment of any kind. 65C-13.010(l)(b)5f, Florida Administrative Code (FAC). You have used corporal punishment to discipline the children in your care. More specifically, the children report that you routinely slapped them and hit them with a "switch." . . . The home and premises must be free from objects, materials, and conditions which constitute a danger to children. 65C-13.011(12)(b), FAC. The yard area was full of trash, the boys' room smelled of urine and there were roaches crawling around at the time the licensing representative visited the home. . . . A substitute care parent must not punish children for bed-wetting for errors during the toilet training process. 65C-13.010(l)(b)5i, FAC. Children in your care were punished by corporal punishment for bed-wetting. The issues in this proceeding are whether those violations occurred and if so, whether they constitute bases for license revocation.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Lois Kelly, was licensed as a foster home by the Department of Health and Rehabilitation Services (HRS) on September 29, 1995. She was a working, single woman who had raised one child, now an adult son, who lives on his own. HRS was the predecessor to the agency now known as the Department of Children and Family Services, the Petitioner in this proceeding. Ms. Kelly's foster home license was for three children; the maximum number of children under any foster home license was five. However, at various times during the two years that she was licensed, Ms. Kelly cared for four, six, and (for one weekend) eight children placed with her by HRS foster care workers. Juanita Warren White was assigned to be Ms. Kelly's foster home licensing representative in 1996. Ms. White visited the Kelly home three times: July 11, 1996; August 1, 1996; and September 24, 1996. On her first visit Ms. White noted wet carpet and a strong smell of urine. There was wet carpet hanging outside. The toilet in the children's bathroom had overflowed after one of the boys hid a toy in the commode. In addition, there was an appearance of general disarray, including garbage in the garage where the children played. By the September visit, Ms. Kelly had corrected the series of items noted as problems by Ms. White. Ms. Kelly was relicensed for another year. Karen Norton was assigned as Ms. Kelly's licensing representative in 1997. After one unsuccessful attempt when Ms. Kelly was not home, Ms. Norton's first home visit was April 11, 1997. On this date, there were four foster children residing with Ms. Kelly: J. and B., pre-school toddlers; K., 8 years old; and H.J., 9 years old. The bedroom shared by the two young boys was cluttered with toys and clothes; a roach was crawling up the wall. In the bedroom shared by the older boys, there was a strong odor of urine. One of the boys was a bed-wetter. Ms. Norton also observed a bleach bottle stored on the kitchen floor within reach of the children. She found the garage had a seating area with a sofa and TV set that was turned on. The garage included tools and yard equipment. She observed trash and an old grill/smoker in the backyard and a discarded refrigerator turned to the wall with a make-shift basketball hoop set up in the refrigerator coils. After completing her inspection, Ms. Norton advised Ms. Kelly that the trash would have to be picked up, the bleach stored properly, the refrigerator and cooker disposed of, the urine cleaned up, and a bug extermination scheduled. Ms. Norton returned on May 6, 1997, for an unscheduled visit. The trash was gone, but the refrigerator remained and Ms. Kelly said it would be removed within a week. There was no urine odor in the boys' bedroom and Ms. Kelly told her that she required the bed-wetting child to clean his bed with bleach water. Ms. Norton explained that it was inappropriate and dangerous to have a child use bleach for cleaning. Ms. Norton was concerned about hazardous conditions in the Kelly home, including the obvious use of the garage as a play-room. Some time between May and September 1997, HRS learned that Ms. Kelly was using corporal punishment on her foster children. The children were removed from her home and after being told that she would be charged with child abuse, Ms. Kelly agreed to give up her license; no children have been placed in her home since September 1997. At hearing, Ms. Kelly confirmed that she would not have relinquished her license without the threat and that she still wants to be a foster home parent. The agency has proceeded with a license revocation and provided notice and opportunity for a hearing in its letter dated February 17, 1998. Two children, former foster child residents in Ms. Kelly's home, testified at hearing: L.D.-age 11; and C.W.-age The testimony of both children was credible regarding discipline used by Ms. Kelly. Ms. Kelly disciplined two pre-school aged boys by switching them on their legs or hands with a switch from the yard. The 3 year-old cried; the 5-year old did not cry. Punishment occurred when the boys broke something belonging to Ms. Kelly. On another occasion Ms. Kelly came home and found that L.D. had been tussling with a 5-year old boy and had ripped the boy's underwear, which L.D. claimed was his. Ms. Kelly took L.D. into the hall outside the bedroom and swatted him on his arms, legs and waist with her open hand. She continued hitting him when he was on the floor. He was afraid and cried. Ms. Kelly also spanked K.H. on at least two occasions for wetting his bed. She used her hand to hit him. She also continued to require him to clean up the urine with a rag and bleach. Ms. Kelly was trained and given hand-outs regarding appropriate discipline prior to her licensure as a foster home. She understood that she was never permitted to strike the children or use any form of corporal punishment. Corporal punishment is harmful to foster children even when it is not excessive, as many foster children have come from abusive environments.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: that the agency issue its final order revoking the foster home license of Lois Kelly. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Timothy Straus, Esquire Moyer and Straus 2627 West State Road 434 Longwood, Florida 32779 Carmen Muniz Sierra, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57409.175 Florida Administrative Code (2) 65C-13.01065C-13.011
# 4
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES vs CHERYL SMITH, 01-002837 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lake City, Florida Jul. 18, 2001 Number: 01-002837 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 2001

The Issue May the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) revoke Respondent's foster home license for violating Section 409.175 (8)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, in that Respondent intentionally or negligently committed acts that materially affected the health and safety of children, to-wit: inadequate supervision of a minor child entrusted to her care?

Findings Of Fact R.G. is the biological mother of the infant female, A.G., born out of wedlock. R.G. gave birth to a male child before A.G. That son was taken away from R.G. by DCF. Both A.G. and R.G., while R.G. was yet a minor under the age of 18 years, were adjudicated dependent children, subject to placement by DCF, pending DNA testing of A.G. and two putative fathers. R.G. had been placed with a licensed foster home other than Respondent's licensed foster home. That home requested R.G.'s removal because R.G. would not follow its rules. R.G. with A.G., was then placed in the licensed foster care home of Respondent. Although the placement of A.G. with Respondent raised Respondent's home population to one more live foster child than Respondent's licensed capacity, a situation to which Respondent objected, DCF personnel informed Respondent that the infant A.G. would be counted as part of R.G.'s placement. Therefore, despite A.G. and R.G. being two separate persons, DCF would not consider Respondent to have exceeded her license's capacity. It was not explained on the record how DCF intended to pay board to Respondent for care of A.G., if A.G. were not considered a whole person, but it is clear that DCF personnel resented Respondent's asking how she would be compensated for A.G.'s care. At all times material, R.G. and A.G. were subject to a Circuit Court Order which permitted only "unsupervised day visitation" by R.G. with A.G. (Emphasis in the original). By implication of the Circuit Court Order, and by her own understanding from instructions by DCF personnel, Respondent knew that R.G., the minor mother, was not permitted to have unsupervised night visitation with the dependent infant, A.G. DCF's and Respondent's understanding of the Circuit Court Order was that Respondent, R.G., and A.G. were required to be in Respondent's home after dark, but Respondent was not required to "eyeball" R.G. and A.G. all night, every night, while they were present in Respondent's foster home. Gracie Rager, DCF foster care worker, authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out of Respondent's foster home during the day for unsupervised visitation. Ms. Rager also authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. to R.G.'s older natural sister's home to spend some nights, including weekends. R.G.'s older natural sister was married and licensed for foster care. Accordingly, DCF personnel, including Ms. Rager, presumed that the older sister was sufficiently responsible and qualified to provide supervision of R.G. and A.G. at night. DCF reasonably concluded that R.G.'s presence with A.G. in her sister's home at night would constitute supervised night visitation and comply with the Court's Order. Ms. Rager never authorized Respondent to allow R.G. to take A.G. out at night by herself, but Ms. Rager reasonably saw no impediment, including the Circuit Court Order, to R.G. taking A.G. with her anywhere she wanted to take the baby during the day. R.G. openly resented being placed with Respondent because Respondent is Black. R.G. wanted to return, with A.G., to a white foster home placement. As a result, R.G. was never cooperative with Respondent. When R.G. turned 18 years of age, she became openly defiant of Respondent. R.G. insisted that she alone, would do everything for A.G., who was still under two years old. R.G. refused all assistance from Respondent concerning A.G. Respondent asked DCF to remove R.G. and A.G. or at least A.G., from her foster home. DCF had no other placement for them and asked Respondent to keep them until another placement was found. R.G. had a part-time day job. To get there, she would "catch a ride" with others. She would not accept a ride from Respondent. Sometimes, R.G. would take A.G. with her to work and go directly from work, with A.G., to her older, licensed sister's home. On these occasions, R.G. and A.G. might be gone for a night or a weekend. When R.G. did not return to Respondent's foster home, Respondent sometimes called R.G.'s older, licensed sister's home to be sure that R.G. and A.G. had arrived there safely. Sometimes, Respondent asked this sister to call her when R.G. and A.G. arrived. However, Respondent did not always contact R.G.'s older, licensed sister or otherwise check-up on R.G.'s and A.G.'s whereabouts overnight or over a weekend. When R.G. and A.G. returned after a night or weekend away, Respondent did not always check up on where they had been. Respondent was under the impression that a different, adult sister of R.G.'s was also a suitable adult supervisor for after dark, even though that sister was not licensed for foster care. Indeed, there is nothing in the Circuit Court Order requiring that supervised night-time visitation of R.G. with A.G. could not be undertaken by any other adult, regardless of whether that person were licensed for foster care. Respondent never checked to see if R.G. and A.G. were with R.G.'s unlicensed sister. At no time did Respondent report to law enforcement or DCF that R.G. had gone off and failed to return or that R.G. was taking A.G. away on weekends. At some point, R.G.'s authorized and licensed older sister called Ms. Rager and said R.G. had taken A.G. out all night with R.G.'s boyfriend and had not returned. It is unclear from Ms. Rager's testimony whether R.G.'s and A.G.'s departure point for their night or weekend of unsupervised visitation was Respondent's home or R.G.'s licensed sister's home. On February 9, 2001, Ms. Page, a DCF protective investigator, responded to an abuse hotline call and met with Respondent in the lobby of a DCF facility. During her interview of Respondent, Ms. Page knew nothing of where either R.G. or A.G. had been picked up, or how long they had been unsupervised at night, but Ms. Page "understood" from Ms. Rager that R.G. and A.G. had been removed from Respondent's home and that Respondent had come to the DCF facility voluntarily. Ms. Page was particularly concerned because of a comment Respondent made in the course of this interview, to the effect that Respondent guessed she had "handled it all wrong" because she had only asked to have the baby, A.G., removed from her care instead of reporting R.G.'s rebelliousness. DCF Investigator Page testified that she "verified" in an abuse report that Respondent was guilty of neglect by failure to notify authorities of R.G.'s unsupervised night visitation with A.G. There is insufficient evidence to determine of Respondent ever had a chance to challenge the abuse report or if the report was ever "confirmed." There is no evidence R.G. or A.G. suffered harm as a result of this incident.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order dismissing charges against Respondent and restoring her foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: David West, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 390, Mail Stop 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Dr. James Brant, Qualified Representative 1140 Durkee Drive, North Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Cheryl Smith Post Office Box 1053 Lake City, Florida 32056 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (3) 120.57409.175475.175
# 5
LORRAINE ARNOLD vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 01-001536 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Apr. 25, 2001 Number: 01-001536 Latest Update: Aug. 23, 2002

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for re-licensure as a family foster home should be approved or denied.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lorraine Arnold, has operated a foster home since 1995 at her current place of residence. Petitioner applied for and was granted a family foster home license in January 1995. Petitioner was approved for placement of up to two children between the ages of 5 and 10 years. Foster home licenses are valid for one year and must be renewed annually. Petitioner's license was renewed annually thereafter. On December 15, 2000, Petitioner applied to renew her foster home license. Respondent denied Petitioner's application for renewal on March 9, 2001. During the relevant time-period in 2000, Petitioner was entrusted with responsibility for several children, including two teenage foster children, L. C. and J. B. In late August 2000, Respondent's case worker approached Petitioner with the request to accept into her home L. C., a 17-year-old female. Petitioner was told that L. C. was severely emotionally disturbed (SED), had violent behavior problems and was taking psychotropic medication. Because of L. C.'s history of behavioral problems, including incidents of violence, Respondent offered to contract with a private company to provide Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA) services to supplement the care given to L. C. Contract CNAs were to be present with L. C. around the clock, in order to provide Petitioner and her family some semblance of protection in the event of a violent outburst by L. C. This case worker assured her that under the watchful eye of the CNAs, L. C. would do fine. Petitioner was provided with additional monetary inducements by Respondent in order to persuade Petitioner to take in L. C. Upon placement, L. C.'s "Blue Book" was not provided to Petitioner. The "Blue Book" contained critical medical and social information about L. C. In addition, L. C. was not under the care of any local healthcare professional at the time of placement. Although Petitioner is a licensed pharmacist in Florida, she has received no special training in dealing with SED children. No specialized training of any kind was provided by Respondent during the two months that L. C. lived in Petitioner's home. Respondent was aware that L. C.'s needs required that she be placed in a living situation where she could receive proper therapy for her special needs, but none was provided. Respondent's conduct in the placement of L. C. in Petitioner's home violated its own guidelines and demonstrated very poor judgment on its part. The presence of contract CNAs was not intended to, nor did it in fact, relieve Petitioner of her responsibility to supervise foster children in her care. However, Petitioner was not instructed by Respondent that the teenage children in her care were not permitted to be alone or leave with the CNA, if the CNA offered to take them out for a supervised activity. In August of 2000, Petitioner gave L. C. and J. B., both minor girls, permission to go with the CNA, then on duty, to the home of L. C.'s aunt. While at the home of L. C.'s aunt, J. B., then fourteen years old, slipped out of the house and smoked marijuana. When J. B.'s case worker learned of the incident, she had J. B. tested for drug usage; J. B. tested positive for marijuana. Petitioner had L. C. tested and her test results were negative. Carla Washington, case worker for both L. C. and J. B., had previously informed Petitioner that L. C. was not to have contact with family members that was not supervised by Respondent. Petitioner misunderstood the instructions, and believed that L. C. was only restricted from having contact with her mother. Petitioner was not negligent in this incident, and J. B.'s misconduct could not have reasonably been foreseen. Less than a month before the incident in which J. B. smoked marijuana at L. C.'s aunt's house, there were two other incidents involving J. B. and L. C., with results detrimental to the foster children. On one occasion, Petitioner gave permission for the CNA on duty to take L. C. and another foster child out to the movies. Because of a family emergency, Petitioner left Orlando and drove to Tallahassee, leaving her adult daughter in charge of the household. The CNA took the two foster children to her residence, changed into "hoochie" clothes, went to a bar during which L. C. visited with her mother and witnessed a shooting. After the incident, the case worker spoke to Petitioner and reminded her that L. C. was not to have unsupervised contact with her mother. Petitioner complied with these instructions. No evidence was presented concerning the disposition of the CNA that perpetrated this outrageous conduct. Petitioner was not negligent in giving permission for the girls to go to the movies, and the CNA's conduct could not have been foreseen. On September 14, 2000, Petitioner was placed in a position of duress in regard to L. C. She had not received L. C.'s Blue Book, which contained all of her medical records and her Medicaid number, and L. C. was out of all of her psychotropic medications. Petitioner tried several times to find a psychiatrist who would treat L. C. She spent 2 days looking through the telephone book and calling every psychiatrist until she found one who would accept Medicaid. She also went to the Nemours Children's Clinic and spent most of the day waiting at the Sanford Health Department, where Petitioner finally discovered that L. C. could only be seen by a doctor in the Oviedo area. When the doctor in Oviedo was contacted an appointment was made for the following day at 2:00 p.m. Petitioner contacted the caseworker for assistance in getting L. C. to the doctor's appointment because Petitioner was unable to remain out of work for a third day. The case worker informed Petitioner that she was unable to assist, and if Petitioner did not see that the child got to the doctor any repercussions would be Petitioner's responsibility. Petitioner was given no choice but to rely on a family member to assist in making sure that L. C. received the required medical attention. Petitioner asked a family member to take L. C. and J. B. to the doctor's appointment. He left them in the reception area for 20 minutes to run an errand while L. C. waited to see the doctor. Before he returned, L. C. and J. B. misbehaved at the doctor's office. The adult family member did not have reason to believe that these two teenagers could not be left alone at a doctor's office for 20 minutes. He expected that the teenagers would behave themselves for such a short period of time. During the course of her testimony in this matter, J. B. testified that she had sexual relations in the house while living with Petitioner. This testimony is neither credible nor relevant to this proceeding. Petitioner has not committed an intentional or negligent act which materially affected the health or safety of L. C. or J. B. while in her care. Several years in the past, Petitioner used corporal punishment on a much younger, uncontrollable foster child on more than one occasion. Upon receiving counseling from her case worker, Petitioner agreed to corrective action to address her improper use of corporal punishment of foster children entrusted to her care. Over time, Petitioner has displayed extreme care and concern for the children placed in her care. She has taken the issues of supervision seriously. Petitioner has demonstrated that as a foster mother she has given the children placed in her care an abundance of love. She has taught them how to care for and love themselves. She has been there to listen to their needs and their desires, and she cares about them. She has taught them that self- control, self-discipline and hard work will lead to success in life.

Recommendation Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary grant Petitioner's application for renewal of her family foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Lorraine Arnold 3997 Biscayne Drive Winter Springs, Florida 32708 Craig A. McCarthy, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 400 West Robinson Street Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.569120.57120.60409.175
# 6
ROBERT DEROO vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 01-004881 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Largo, Florida Dec. 21, 2001 Number: 01-004881 Latest Update: Sep. 04, 2002

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license because “skinny dipping” with a foster child at the foster home violates Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 65C-13. (All section references are to Florida Statutes (2001). All references to rules are to rules promulgated in the Florida Administrative Code in effect on the date of this Recommended Order.)

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating foster homes in Florida. A foster home license is valid for a period of one year and must be renewed annually. Various privatized entities supervise licensed foster homes, review applications for foster home licenses, and make recommendations to Petitioner regarding the applications. However, the recommendations are not binding on Petitioner. Petitioner, rather than the private entity, is the licensing agency. For example, Petitioner rejected the recommendation from the private entity with responsibility for reviewing the application at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner first issued a foster home license to Respondent on January 28, 2000. Petitioner licensed Respondent to operate a therapeutic foster home. A therapeutic license authorized Respondent to operate a foster home for children with psychological or emotional disorders and for children without such disorders. Therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Personal Enrichment through Mental Health, Inc. (PEMHS). PEMHS recommended that Petitioner issue the original foster home license on January 28, 2000, and a renewal license that Petitioner issued on January 28, 2001, for the second year. The second therapeutic foster home license expired on January 27, 2002. Petitioner never took action to discipline or revoke Respondent’s therapeutic foster home license. In July 2001, Respondent applied for a non- therapeutic foster home license. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorizes a licensee to operate a foster home only for children without psychological or emotional disorders. Non-therapeutic foster homes operate under the auspices of a private entity known as Family Continuity Programs (Family Continuity). Family Continuity recommended that Petitioner approve the application for a non-therapeutic foster home license. However, Petitioner did not follow the recommendation of Family Continuity and denied the application. Petitioner's denial of Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is the proposed agency action that is at issue in this proceeding. Respondent's application for a non-therapeutic foster home license is not an application for a new license. Rather, it is an application for renewal of an existing license. Both the therapeutic license that Respondent held at the time of the application and the non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks authorize the licensee to operate a foster home for children without psychological or emotional disorders. By applying for a non-therapeutic foster home license before the expiration of his therapeutic foster home license, Respondent sought to renew his license to operate a foster home for children without psychological and emotional disorders. The non-therapeutic license that Respondent seeks does not impose any requirements in addition to those that Respondent had already satisfied when Petitioner granted the therapeutic license to Respondent. The requirements for the therapeutic license are more stringent than those that must be met to qualify for a non-therapeutic license. The requirements for a therapeutic license are more comprehensive, and Petitioner requires an applicant for a therapeutic license to have more training than an applicant for a non-therapeutic license. A non-therapeutic license does not impose requirements in addition to those imposed for a therapeutic license. Petitioner proposes to deny the application for renewal of Respondent's foster home license on the sole ground that Respondent went "skinny dipping" with two minor males. One of those males was a foster child assigned to Respondent. The foster child is a victim of past sexual abuse and has psychological and emotional disorders. The child suffers from oppositional defiance disorder and mood disorder. The symptoms of the disorders include self-injury, such as head banging, aggression, anger, and low self-esteem. However, many of the behavioral problems diminished during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. The "skinny-dipping" events occurred between six and nine times during the 15 months that the foster child was in Respondent's care. During that time, the foster child was between 12 and 14 years old. The foster child swam nude in the swimming pool at Respondent's residence and bathed nude in the hot tub adjacent to the pool. On some of those occasions, Respondent was nude in the hot tub and swimming pool with the foster child and at other times the two were in the swimming pool and hot tub independently of each other while both were nude. The local sheriff's office investigated the foster home and found no indicators of abuse. Once PEMHS learned of the "skinny dipping" events, neither PEMHS nor Petitioner sought to revoke Respondent's therapeutic foster home license or to provide Respondent with remedial training. Rather, PEMHS removed the foster child from the foster home and refused to assign any more foster children to Respondent's foster home. At the administrative hearing, Petitioner sought the post-hearing deposition testimony of Dr. Cotter for several purposes. One of those purposes was to show the impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events. Another purpose was to show that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. The ALJ sustained Respondent's objection to the admissibility of the expert deposition testimony for the purpose of showing the impact on the foster child and for the purpose of showing that the "skinny dipping" was "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter could not render an opinion concerning the actual impact on the foster child from the "skinny dipping" events or whether those events were actually intended by Respondent as "grooming behavior" for future pedophilia. Dr. Cotter did not intend to evaluate either the foster child or Respondent before rendering his opinions and, in fact, never evaluated either individual. Any expert opinion by Dr. Cotter concerning "grooming behavior" for pedophilia was not relevant to the grounds stated in the Notice of Denial. That expert opinion was relevant only to grounds not stated in the Notice of Denial. Nudity in a swimming pool and hot tub are not synonymous with "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Nudity and "grooming behavior" for pedophilia are separate grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license to operate a foster home. Petitioner failed to provide adequate notice prior to the administrative hearing that Petitioner sought to deny the renewal of Respondent's license on the separate ground that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. Fundamental principles of due process prohibit a state agency from notifying a regulated party of the allegations against the party and then, at the hearing, proving-up other allegations. One of the primary functions of an ALJ is to assure that an administrative hearing is a fair hearing. Respondent was not prepared at the administrative hearing to submit evidence, including expert testimony, to refute any allegation not stated in the Notice of Denial. The admission of evidence relevant to allegations not stated in the Notice of Denial would have required a continuance of the administrative hearing to provide Respondent with an opportunity to refute the allegation. A continuance would have denied Respondent a remedy during the period of continuance, increased the economic burden on Respondent, and frustrated judicial economy. Nothing prevents Petitioner from bringing a separate proceeding against the licensee based on the allegation that Respondent engaged in "grooming behavior" for pedophilia. The ALJ limited the testimony of Dr. Cotter to those grounds for denial that Petitioner stated in the Notice of Denial. In relevant part, the Notice of Denial states: After careful review and consideration, your application has been denied. Our decision is based on the following: Your admission that you and two minor boys, one of which was a foster child under your supervision, participated in several "skinny dipping" incidents during your recent licensure as a foster parent for Pinellas Enrichment Through Mental Health Services (PEMHS). As you are aware, the nature of a boy's early experiences may affect the development of his sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Therefore, foster parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities appropriate to the child's age. "Skinny dipping" in a hot tub with two minor boys violates the intent of this rule. These incidents reflect poor judgment for a person who is a licensed foster parent. Respondent's Exhibit 1. The Notice of Denial essentially states four grounds for denying the application for renewal of Respondent's license. One ground is the impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Another ground is nudity between a foster parent and a foster child. A third ground is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. The remaining ground is that Respondent provided recreational activities that were not appropriate to the foster child's age. No evidence shows that the "skinny dipping" events had any adverse impact on the development of the foster child's sexual attitudes and subsequent behavior. Dr. Cotter did not evaluate the foster child to determine the actual impact of the events on the foster child. Contrary to the statements in the Notice of Denial, Petitioner's representative testified at the hearing that Petitioner did not consider the impact on the child that resulted from skinny dipping with Respondent. The preponderance of evidence shows that the actual impact of the foster care provided by Respondent during the 15 months in which the "skinny dipping" events occurred was positive. Many of the foster child's behavioral problems greatly diminished. The foster child made remarkable progress in his behavior both at home and at school. The foster child bonded with Respondent, and Respondent was an exemplary foster parent. The placement of the child with Respondent was so successful that Family Continuity published an article in their magazine about the successful match between the foster child and Respondent. Family Continuity considers Respondent to be an exemplary foster parent and wishes to have Respondent in its foster care program. If Petitioner grants the application for renewal, Family Continuity intends to return the foster child to Respondent for adoption. The second ground stated in the Notice of Denial is nudity between the foster parent and foster child. Without considering the impact on the foster child, Petitioner determined that being naked in the presence of a foster child, without more, was sufficient to close a foster home, remove a child, and revoke a foster home license. Petitioner cited no written statute or rule that prohibits nudity between a foster parent and foster child; or that establishes intelligible standards for regulating such nudity. Petitioner failed to submit competent and substantial evidence to explicate an unwritten policy that prohibits or regulates nudity. Rather, some evidence shows that nudity between foster parents and foster children is generally unavoidable and common. The third ground stated in the Notice of Denial is that Respondent exercised poor judgment. Several witnesses at the hearing and Dr. Cotter opined that Respondent exercised poor judgment. It is unnecessary to determine whether Petitioner exercised poor judgment because Petitioner cited no written rule or policy that defines or prohibits "poor judgment." For reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, Petitioner must base a denial of a license application on a finding that the applicant violated a specific statute or rule. Petitioner cannot use the Notice of Denial to invent requirements that are not authorized by statute or rule. Petitioner cited no statute or rule that defines "poor judgment" or that establishes intelligible standards to guide the discretionary determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment. In the absence of intelligible standards, the determination of whether an applicant has exercised poor judgment is necessarily an exercise of unbridled agency discretion. The use of unbridled agency discretion to make findings of fact violates fundamental principles of due process. Unbridled agency discretion creates the potential that agency decision-makers may define poor judgment by relying on their personal predilections rather than on those standards authorized by the legislature. Even if it were determined that poor judgment is a standard authorized by the legislature and that Respondent violated that standard, the determination is not dispositive of whether Petitioner should renew Respondent's license to operate a foster home. For example, representatives for Family Continuity and PEMHS agreed in their testimony that Respondent exercised poor judgment. However, Family Continuity recommends that Petitioner issue the non- therapeutic foster home license while PEMHS recommends against renewal of the license. The remaining allegation in the Notice of Denial is that "skinny dipping" is not an age-appropriate recreational activity. Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8a. states: 8. Recreation and community. a. The substitute parents are expected to provide opportunities for recreational activities for children. The activities must be appropriate to the child's age and abilities. Swimming in a swimming pool and bathing in a hot tub are recreational activities within the meaning of Rule 65C- 13.010(1)(a)8a. Swimming nude and bathing nude in a hot tub with a nude adult are not appropriate for a child who is between 12 and 14 years old and whose psychological and emotional abilities are diminished by past sexual abuse.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Rule 65C-13.010(1)(b)8 and granting Respondent’s application for a therapeutic foster home license. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Nagatani, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 11351 Ulmerton Road, Suite 314 Largo, Florida 33778-1630 Gary A. Urso, Esquire 7702 Massachusetts Avenue New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.175
# 7
JOEY TOLBERT AND DONNA TOLBERT vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, 01-004218 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Shalimar, Florida Oct. 29, 2001 Number: 01-004218 Latest Update: Feb. 10, 2003

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Children and Family Services should revoke the foster care license of Joey and Donna Tolbert.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, the home of Joey and Donna Tolbert was licensed by the Department as a foster home. They were initially licensed provisionally in December of 1998 for one year. They received a regular license in 1999 and retained a regular license until December 1, 2000, when they were issued license number 1200-008-2, a child specific license with a capacity of two children. The Relicensure Process Prior to issuing the child specific license, two Department employees of the Department, Mary Martin, a relicensing counselor for foster homes, and Ann Brock, a family services counselor, conducted a relicensing visit to the Tolbert's home on October 12, 2000. Donna Tolbert was present but Joey Tolbert was out of town. During the home visit, a Bilateral Service Agreement (Agreement) was signed by Mrs. Tolbert and Ms. Martin. The Agreement was signed and dated by Mr. Tolbert and again by Ms. Martin on October 17, 2000. The relicensing visit resulted in a Foster Home Relicensing Summary written by Mary Martin. The Summary recommended that the Tolberts be issued a regular license effective December 1, 2000 through December 1, 2001, for the capacity of two children. The Summary was signed by Mary Martin on October 26, 2000, and read in pertinent part as follows: The Tolbert family is an invaluable asset to this Department. They have made themselves available on a regular basis for the placement of children when needed. Both Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert are experienced in childcare and they have three (3) children with special needs whom they adopted prior. They should not be asked to take numerous children with severe behavioral problems or teenagers. It appears Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert have satisfied the Florida Administrative Code, Chapter 65C-15, requirements. It is respectfully recommended that the Tolbert family be issued a REGULAR license, effective December 1, 2000, through December 1, 2001, for the a capacity of two (2) children, ages birth (0) through twelve (12) years of either gender. Children with severe behavioral problems and teenagers are not to be placed in the Tolbert home. However, Ms. Martin later wrote an addendum to the licensing summary. According to Ms. Martin, she was asked by her supervisor, Jill Green, to write the addendum. The addendum is undated but references the October 12, 2000, home relicensing visit that resulted in her original recommendation. There is also an entry dated October 16, 2000, which is a date prior in time to her signature to the original relicensure summary, and an entry dated November 17, 2000. The addendum relates to matters concerning the Tolberts and their adopted son, Mi.1/ Richard Messerly has worked for the Department for approximately 22 years and works in protective investigations in Pensacola. From June 1999 through September 2001, he was the program operations administrator for the central licensing unit of the Department. In that position, he had authority over foster care licensure. He supervised Mary Martin and her supervisor, Jill Green. Mr. Messerly signed Ms. Martin's relicensure summary on December 4, 2000, and initialed both pages of her addendum. He also created a written history of the Tolbert foster home which concluded with a recommendation that the Tolberts' foster home license be revoked: SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATIONS The Tolbert family has a positive licensing history of capably caring for many of our foster children. However, a serious change has occurred in the family's willingness to work with our staff, including rebuffing our attempts to offer them assistance with the disruption of an adoptive placement. The Tolberts have attempted to convince others that they had been requesting assistance for M for a very long period of time and that this is flatly not borne out in licensing records. The matter was never brought to our attention until the visit in October 2000, at which time the matter was promptly referred to the adoptions unit, who responded promptly. Since that time the family has not cooperated with any attempts to assist them in that matter, and they seem to be insensitive to M's plight, and are completely focused on regaining their prior licensed status, as if nothing had happened. Contacts with Pat Franklin, Kathi Guy, Sally Townsend and others reflect the absence of any prompt attempts to get help dealing with M's behaviors, yet many requests were made regarding foster children in their care with similar problems during the same time frame. It appears the family was more focused on attending the needs of foster children to the exclusion of sensitivity to their own (adopted) child's cries for help. Even when the needs were identified, the family was unwilling to become involved in attempts to remedy the problems and appeared to have given up on the child. I am very uncomfortable with the inappropriate position this family has taken in regard to our family safety staff, as well as licensing staff, and do not see how we can hope to interact positively with them given their recent radical behaviors and threats. I feel that they have violated the Bilateral Service Agreement and have failed to "Treat all members of the foster care team with respect and courtesy." I recommend that we revoke the license using the violation of the agreement in conjunction with their other oppositional behaviors, omissions, and misrepresentations reflected in family safety foster care and adoptions records. On December 1, 2000, Mr. Messerly signed a letter on behalf of Charles Bates addressed to the Tolberts which read: Dear Mr. And Mrs. Tolbert: Your home has been relicensed for the continuance placement of D and M.R. only. No other placements or overcapacity requests will be authorized at this time. A regular license is issued for twelve months pending the outcome of matters presently before the Circuit Court. If you have questions or wish to discuss this further, please contact Jill Greene, Foster Care Licensing Supervisor at (850)- 595-8451. On June 4, 2001, Mrs. Tolbert met with Charles Bates, District Administrator for District 1 of the Department. This meeting was at Mrs. Tolbert's request regarding her foster care licensure status. During that meeting, Mrs. Tolbert complained to Mr. Bates about certain adoption case workers. On August 24, 2001, Charles Bates sent a letter to the Tolberts notifying them of the revocation of their license. The letter reads in pertinent part as follows: RE: Revocation of Foster Home License. Dear Mr. and Mrs. Tolbert: This letter is to inform you that the Department of Children and Families has made a decision to revoke your foster home license. The basis for this decision is your failure to comply with Florida Administrative Code 65C-13 and the Bilateral Service Agreement (form CF-FSP 5226) which you executed. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.009(1)(e)5. states: Work in a partnership. Develop partnerships with children and youth, birth families, the department, and the community to develop and carry out plans for permanency. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.010(1)(c)1. states: Substitute care parents are expected to work cooperatively with the counselor as a member of a treatment team in seeking counseling, participating in consultation, and preparing and implementing the performance agreement or permanent placement plan for each child. Florida Administrative Code 65C-13.010(4)(i) states: The substitute care parents must be able to accept supervision by department staff and participate in and support case plans for children in their homes. Specifically, substitute care parents must be included in the development of performance agreements or permanent placement plans, and in the carrying out of these plans. As part of your foster care licensing, you executed a bilateral Service Agreement. The Bilateral Service Agreement that you signed enumerated the Administrative Code responsibilities and detailed responsibilities of foster parents. The paragraphs violated are listed below in pertinent part: h. To notify the department immediately of a potential change in a family composition, significant health changes or any other condition that may affect the child's well- being. Obtain authorization from the department prior to spending money for which repayment is expected. To accept the direction and supervision given by department to assist in caring for the foster child. To work cooperatively with the department to attend scheduled meetings to discuss the child and his family and to meet the needs of the child. To treat all members of the foster care team (i.e., the department, child's family, and GALS) with respect and courtesy. As stated in the service agreement, non-compliance with any of the above provisions can result in termination of the service agreement and may also result in the department revoking the home's license. You have failed to comply with the above code citations and service agreement provisions in that you have accused departmental staff of failing to disclose complete information to you and of misrepresenting statements that you have made. You have not worked cooperatively with the department employees who offered to assist you and your child; and have not worked in partnership with the department. Specifically, you have previously stated you were obtaining therapy for a child, didn't agree with the therapist's recommendation, and were obtaining a psychiatric evaluation and assessment for the child, when in fact you did not do any of those things. A review of the department records reflected concerns you mentioned to the department in October 2000, regarding your child's disruptive behavior. However you would accept no assistance even though the department offered extensive assistance. You surrendered your adopted child later that same month. Further, you have stated to a department employee that Ms. Peggy Custred and Ms. Sally Townsend should not work for the department, have accused them of wrongdoing, and have stated that you "will have their jobs." You have failed to treat members of the department with respect and courtesy. Given the above problems, I find that it would not be in the children's best interests to continue licensing your foster home and am permanently revoking your license. The Tolberts as foster parents The overwhelming evidence shows that the Tolberts were excellent foster parents. Jane Crittenden, licensing supervisor for the Department, who was a foster care supervisor at the times material to this proceeding, acknowledged that the Tolberts received the award of Foster Parents of the Year in May of 2000 for the year 1999. She also acknowledged that as far as she knew, the Tolberts excelled as far as their work as foster parents; the foster children in their care did quite well; the Tolberts always seemed to provide a loving, nurturing home to foster children placed there; the Tolberts were called on by the Department to take extra children beyond their cap, which they agreed to do; and the Tolberts cooperated with her and her case workers during the period of time she worked with them. Arlene Johnson, a former guardian ad litem for a foster child in the Tolberts' home from December 1998 until July 1999, visited the Tolbert home about twice a week during that time. She has been in a lot of foster homes and described the Tolberts' home as "the best one I've been in." Gerald Reese, a family service counselor for the Department, worked with the Tolberts over a period of 6 to 7 months in 1999 and 2000 while he was a case worker. During that time, Mr. Reese did not have problems dealing with the Tolberts, did not observe any instance in which the children were not adequately provided for, and observed that the foster children in the Tolberts' home were happy. Richard Messerly acknowledged that the Tolberts were exemplary foster parents as far as the care they provided to the foster children in their care. Mr. Messerly also acknowledged that the only staff the Tolberts had problems with were particular members of the adoption staff, not the Department's foster care staff. The wallpaper expense Carlita Bennett was employed by the Department from 1986 until March of 2002. When she was working for the Department in the capacity of a foster parent recruiter in May of 2001, she sent an e-mail message to Mary Martin regarding the Tolberts which contained the following: 11/04/99 A restitution claim form was submitted by Mrs. T for damage to wallpaper caused by 2 yr. Old. The bill total was $1,151.04 to replace wallpaper in living room, dining room, kitchen and hall. PS Counselors were not made aware of the damage until repairs were made. According to Ms. Bennett, it is regular procedure for someone from the department to go out to a foster home and look at damage before repairs are made. The Bilateral Services Agreement requires the foster parents to obtain authorization from the Department prior to spending money for which repayment is expected. According to Ms. Bennett, this policy was not followed in this instance. Ms. Bennett did not explain why she sent the e-mail message on May 30, 2001, to Mary Martin referencing an incident that took place two and one-half years earlier. According to Mrs. Tolbert, a former two-year-old foster child in her care ripped the wallpaper in the dining room and the living room. Her dining room, kitchen, and hallway are all one color. According to Mrs. Tolbert, she gave an estimate of the repair work to Shiela Campbell, an employee of the Department. Richard Messerly acknowledged that this matter of the expense for wallpaper would not in and of itself have resulted in the Department revoking the Tolberts' foster care license. At most, the Department would have only talked to the Tolberts had there not been other issues about which the Department was concerned. Notification to Department of change of condition The August 24, 2001, revocation letter from Mr. Bates alleged that the Tolberts failed to notify the Department of a potential change in conditions in the home that might affect the well-being of foster care children in the home. This allegation relates to behavior problems of the Tolberts' adopted son, Mi. The Tolberts adopted Mi. in September of 1998. They signed surrenders of Mi. in November of 2000. The Tolberts' surrender of Mi. was central to the Department's decision to revoke the Tolbert's foster care license.2/ Mi. began having serious behavior problems in 1999. Mrs. Tolbert recalls telling Gerald Reese, the foster care worker assigned to the Tolberts at that time, about problems with Mi. Mr. Reese acknowledged that Mrs. Tolbert mentioned to him problems she was having with Mi. to which he responded that she should bring it to the attention of the adoption case worker. The Tolberts' adoption case worker was Sally Townsend. Mrs. Townsend recalls that Mrs. Tolbert stopped by her office three times when Mrs. Tolbert was in the Ft. Walton Beach Service Center to see other department employees. Mrs. Townsend acknowledged that Mrs. Tolbert told her of behavior problems with Mi. the first time she stopped by Mrs. Townsend's office. The second time Mrs. Townsend recalls that Mrs. Tolbert told her Mi.'s behavior problems were better. The third time, however, Mrs. Tolbert informed Mrs. Townsend that Mi.'s behavior was much worse. Mrs. Tolbert remembers these encounters with Mrs. Townsend differently. According to Mrs. Tolbert, she met with Mrs. Townsend approximately 10 times during which she spoke to her about Mi.'s behavior problems. According to Mrs. Townsend's case notes, Mrs. Tolbert told her on October 24, 2000, that Mi. was urinating all over the house, had gotten a butcher knife out of a drawer in the kitchen, and shoved a puppy's head under a piece of furniture. Evidence was presented at hearing regarding whether or when the Tolberts received notice that Mi. had significant problems before he was adopted by the Tolberts. However, what is important for purposes of this proceeding is when was the Department notified of Mi.'s problems. The Department knew of Mi.'s previous problems prior in time to the Tolberts adopting Mi. and were told as early as 1999 that the Tolberts were experiencing behavior problems with Mi. Kathi Guy is an adoption program specialist for the department. She met with the Tolberts immediately after Mrs. Tolbert met with Mr. Bates on June 4, 2001. On June 21, 2001, she wrote a memorandum to Charles Bates concerning the issues relating to the Tolberts. Regarding the issue of the Tolberts' responsibility of notifying the Department of Mi.'s behavior in relation to the foster children in the home, Ms. Guy wrote, "It is unclear what responsibility the Tolberts had to inform Central Licensing of M's behaviors that may have had injurious effects on foster children in their care." Working in partnership The June 24, 2001, revocation letter alleges that the Tolberts failed to work in partnership with the Department and did not obtain certain services for Mi. although they were offered. It is important to remember that the provisions to which Mr. Bates' revocation letter references are part of the Bilateral Services Agreement that pertained to the Tolberts' role as foster parents. However, Mi. was their adopted son, he was not a foster child at that time. Further, there is ample evidence in the record that the Tolberts sought and received services for Mi. over time, although they were in disagreement with the Department regarding certain services during the time immediately preceding the surrender of Mi. Marianne Vance is a first grade teacher. Mi. was in her class for two years. According to Ms. Vance, Mi. received testing in school for learning disabilities and for "everything possible." When Mi.'s behavior problems became worse during his second year in Ms. Vance's class, Mrs. Tolbert sought assistance from the school. The school counselor worked with Mi. and Mrs. Tolbert. According to Ms. Vance, the Tolberts did everything possible in seeking help or assistance.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order rescinding its revocation of the Tolberts' foster care license. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2002.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.175
# 8
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES vs JOSEPH ITURRIAGA AND CHERIE ITURRIAGA, 15-004169 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Micanopy, Florida Jul. 22, 2015 Number: 15-004169 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 2016

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should revoke Respondents' foster home license based on violations of section 409.175(9), Florida Statutes (2014), and provisions of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 65C-13 alleged in the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License dated April 16, 2015.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for licensing foster care parents and foster homes pursuant to section 409.175.2/ Respondents are foster care parents in a foster care home licensed as Provider FSFN ID #100032652, the therapeutic foster home at issue in this proceeding.3/ A.A., an eight-year-old child, was placed into Respondent's foster home in April 2014.4/ On the afternoon of September 4, 2014, Respondent Cherie Iturriaga took A.A. and her two grandchildren to a shopping center. When they were ready to leave, A.A. refused to get into the family van. Mrs. Iturriaga testified that she tried, for approximately ten to 15 minutes, to persuade A.A. to get into the vehicle, but he refused. She became very frustrated, yelled at A.A. to get into the van, and began to back the van out of the parking space while A.A. was standing next to the van's open door.5/ A passerby called 911 to report that Mrs. Iturriaga—— who the passerby characterized as A.A.'s "grandmother"——was attempting to make A.A. get into the vehicle against his will. The passerby told A.A. "you don't have to get in the van if you don't want to." Mrs. Iturriaga also called 911 to report that A.A. would not get into her vehicle. She told the 911 dispatcher that she was not staying for him, and that she was "going home." The dispatcher told her that because the child was supposed to be in her care, she had to stay with him, and that officers already were on the way to that location. Nonetheless, Mrs. Iturriaga drove away and left A.A. in the parking lot with the passerby, who Mrs. Iturriaga characterized, in testimony at the hearing, as a "random person." The evidence does not clearly establish whether Mrs. Iturriaga left A.A. in the parking lot for "five to ten minutes," as she claimed, or for as much as 20 to 30 minutes, as indicated by other evidence in the record. Regardless, it is undisputed that she drove away from the parking lot and left A.A. in the company of a stranger. At some point, Mrs. Iturriaga returned to the parking lot to pick up A.A., but he was not there. She called 911, and the dispatcher confirmed that A.A. had been taken to the Pembroke Pines Police Department. Mrs. Iturriaga went to the police department to pick up A.A. There, she was arrested and charged with child neglect without great bodily harm, a third-degree felony; this charge ultimately was dropped. A.A. was not physically harmed as a result of being left in the parking lot. The evidence establishes that approximately 45 days before the September 4, 2014, incident, Mrs. Iturriaga requested that Citrus remove A.A. from Respondents' foster home within 30 days; however, he was not timely removed. When the incident giving rise to this proceeding occurred, A.A. was immediately removed from Respondents' foster home. Another child, J.O., who was approximately 14 years old at the time of the incident, was placed in Respondents' foster home approximately two and one-half years before the incident. Since then, J.O. has formed very close bonds with both Respondents, particularly Mr. Iturriaga. At the time of the hearing, J.O. had not been removed from Respondents' home and continued to reside with them. J.O. does not wish to be removed from Respondents' home. Eric Sami serves as the guardian ad litem for J.O., and has done so for the past three and one-half years. Mr. Sami testified, persuasively, that when he was assigned to J.O.'s case, J.O. was a very withdrawn, depressed, socially unstable child who had been moved through several different foster homes, and who was academically struggling. Since being placed in Respondents' home, J.O. has flourished. He has made friends, his academic performance has dramatically improved, and he is no longer depressed and socially unstable. According to Mr. Sami, Respondents have treated J.O. as if he were their own child, including taking him on family vacations and involving him in all holiday celebrations. Mr. Iturriaga participates in parent- teacher conferences for J.O. and has taken an interest in J.O.'s school work and in helping him improve his academic performance. Sami also testified, credibly, that in the short amount of time in which A.A. lived in Respondents' home, he was an extremely disruptive force, bullying J.O. and Respondents' grandchildren and killing ducks in front of Respondents' granddaughter——an event that was extremely traumatic for her to witness. Sami observed, and the undersigned agrees, that it is fundamentally unfair for J.O. to suffer the consequences of Respondents' license revocation due to an event that was precipitated by A.A.'s extreme, ongoing misbehavior before he was removed from the home. Because Sami and J.O.'s therapist, Fred Leon, believed so strongly that removing J.O. from Respondents' home would have very substantial negative consequences for J.O., they advocated to Petitioner and Citrus to allow Respondents to keep their foster home license and to keep J.O. in their home. However, that did not dissuade Citrus from recommending that Petitioner revoke Respondents' license. In October 2014, J.O.'s placement was changed from foster care in Respondents' home to non-relative placement in Respondents' home. Because revocation of Respondents' license would require J.O. to be removed from Respondents' foster home, this placement change was necessary in order for J.O. to remain in the home. However, this placement change is not without negative consequences. J.O. remains in Respondents' home but they do not receive any monetary allowance for his care,6/ so they are placed in the position of supporting him without receiving any financial assistance through the foster care system. Thus, the consequence of revoking Respondents' license is that if J.O. remained in the foster care system, he would have to be moved to a licensed foster home. If he were to stay in Respondents' home in a non-relative placement, Respondents would not receive any monetary assistance through the foster care system to help with his support. Respondents' fervently wish to keep J.O. in their home, even without financial assistance through the foster care system, due to the strong emotional bond they have with him and because of the remarkable social and academic strides he has made while in their care. However, Mr. Iturriaga testified, persuasively, that this situation imposes a financial hardship on them, which, in turn, penalizes J.O. That Respondents wish to continue to provide a nurturing home for J.O., despite the financial hardship, is strong evidence that they have J.O.'s best interests at heart and that they would continue to provide the same stable, nurturing environment for him that they have provided for more than two and one-half years. As noted above, the criminal charges against Mrs. Iturriaga were dropped. Nonetheless, employees of Citrus testified that because there was an open child abuse investigation with verified findings, they could not recommend that Respondents' foster home continue to be licensed. Petitioner presented the testimony of Sonia De Escobar, licensing manager of Petitioner's Circuit II foster care program. Ms. De Escobar testified that Petitioner is seeking to revoke Respondents' license in part due to concern for the safety of children who may be placed in Respondents' foster home in the future. De Escobar noted that it is not uncommon for children in the dependency system to "misbehave,"7/ and Petitioner is concerned about Respondents' ability to deal with child misbehavior in the future. However, the evidence establishes that Respondents successfully cared for eight foster children over a six-year period and never had any problems dealing with child misbehavior until the incident involving A.A. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that A.A. was extremely aggressive and engaged in behavior that seriously disrupted Respondents' home environment. Because of A.A.'s extreme behavior, Respondents previously had given Citrus the required 30-day notice. However, Citrus did not timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home and the incident giving rise to this proceeding thereafter ensued. As noted above, there is no dispute that Mrs. Iturriaga intentionally left A.A. with a complete stranger for some period of time. In doing so, she endangered his health and safety, in violation of section 409.175(9)(a)1. However, the undersigned finds that mitigating circumstances in this case militate against revoking Respondents' foster home license. Specifically, Respondents enjoyed a spotless record as foster parents before the incident involving A.A. Further——and very importantly——they have fostered a very successful, nurturing, long-term parental relationship with J.O. that will be jeopardized if their foster home license is revoked. Finally, it is undisputed that A.A.'s behavior was extremely aggressive, disrespectful, and disruptive throughout the time he was placed in Respondents' home. On September 4, 2014, his behavior finally caused Mrs. Iturriaga to "snap."8/ Although her actions unquestionably were inappropriate and affected A.A.'s health and safety, the evidence indisputably shows that this was a one-time incident that occurred while Mrs. Iturriaga was under significant duress, and that, under any circumstances, A.A. was not injured. The undersigned further notes Citrus' role in this incident. As the child placing agency, Citrus is charged with placing foster children in foster homes, and with removing them when circumstances warrant. As discussed above, in July 2014, Respondents gave Citrus the required 30-day notice for transitioning A.A. out of their home. However, Citrus failed to timely meet its obligation to remove A.A. from Respondents' home and this incident subsequently occurred. Had Citrus met its obligation to timely remove A.A. from Respondents' home, this incident would not have occurred. Thus, Citrus is not without blame in this matter. The undersigned further notes that if Respondents were allowed to keep their license, Citrus, as the child placing agency, is obligated under the Bilateral Agreement to consult with Respondent before placing children in their home. This consultation process presumably would help ensure that children having extreme behavioral problems are not placed in Respondents' home in the future. For these reasons, the undersigned finds that allowing Respondents to keep their foster home license would enable them to continue their close, nurturing relationship with J.O., and, further, likely would not result in any danger or other adverse effect on the health and safety of foster children who may be placed in their home in the future.9/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order dismissing the Notice of Intent to Revoke Foster Home License issued on April 16, 2015, and imposing a corrective action plan on Respondents' foster home license to the extent deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2016.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.5739.5085409.175435.04 Florida Administrative Code (3) 65C-15.02265C-28.00865C-30.001
# 9
SHAKINAH GLORY vs DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 12-003270 (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 04, 2012 Number: 12-003270 Latest Update: Jul. 19, 2013

The Issue Whether Petitioner’s application for licensure as a family foster home should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Sometime around 2004, Petitioner held a license as a foster home in Florida. During the licensure period, Petitioner fostered X. B. and T. T. in her home where she resided with her three biological children. X. B. stayed in Petitioner's home for approximately three weeks to a month. Throughout X. B.'s stay, Petitioner failed to provide breakfast to X. B. prior to school. Petitioner's failure necessitated the case manager providing such breakfast to X. B. when she drove X. B. to school. Additionally, on several occasions the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in the home. In particular, upon X. B.'s return to Petitioner's home from visiting X. B.'s siblings, the case manager found him in a roach-infested environment, with no running water in the home since the service had been turned off by the service provider for non-payment of the bill. The toilet bowl was filled with feces and urine and had feces on the lid. It was unsanitary and unusable. X. B. asked the case manager to take him to the local gas station so that X. B. could use the bathroom. Soon after, X. B. was removed from Petitioner's care due to unsanitary conditions and/or unsafe conditions in Petitioner's home. T. T. was a one-year-old child who was also placed in Petitioner's foster home during her earlier licensure period. Again, the case manager saw evidence of roach infestation in Petitioner's home. At first, the case manager only saw a couple of roaches in the home. However, the roach problem progressively grew to the point that during one of the case manager's visits the wall behind the baby's crib looked like it was moving because there were so many roaches on it. Soon after, the case manager removed T. T. to another foster home. When they arrived at the new home, a roach crawled out of T. T.'s diaper bag. Upon inspection of the bag, the case manager discovered many dead roaches in the bag. More importantly, half of a dead roach was discovered in the baby bottle of milk that T. T. was drinking while being moved to T. T.'s new foster home. Clearly, the condition of Petitioner's foster home was neither sanitary nor safe. Petitioner's care of both these children resulted in verified abuse reports in Florida's abuse registry for conditions hazardous to the health of children. Petitioner's initial foster home license either lapsed or was not renewed. Since 2004, Petitioner has not been financially stable. In fact, she often asked her neighbors for money to pay her utility bills or buy gas for her car. Additionally, Petitioner lost different homes to foreclosure in 2006 and 2007. Since 2009, she and her children have moved to a different home an average of once a year. To her credit, Petitioner attended college and obtained her doctorate in Theology and Philosophy. However, her history has not demonstrated either household stability or financial ability in her life. In 2011, Petitioner applied for licensure as a family foster home. She successfully completed the Model Approach to Partnership in Parenting (MAPP) training program on September 20, 2011. In June 2012, Trauma Therapist for Children’s Homes Society, Katie Klutz, began the required home study of Petitioner. During the home study, Petitioner and her three biological children were living in a three bedroom home. Petitioner moved her bedroom furniture into the living room in order to make room for potential foster children. The bedroom space was separated from the living room by "curtains" that afforded no significant privacy for those living in the home. Clearly, Petitioner's home did not provide sufficient space to foster an additional child in the home. Petitioner has since moved to a larger home that was not the subject of the home study for this license. However, given Petitioner's past household instability, the very limited evidence regarding this new home does not support a finding that Petitioner's current home offers sufficient space to provide for the privacy and well-being of a foster child. More importantly, Petitioner has not worked since having an accident on the job in May 2010. A neighbor also provided a written reference in which she praised Petitioner’s spirit but stated that it is “a real struggle” for Petitioner to maintain her home and that “she will definitely need additional support in this area.” Notably, it was unclear how Petitioner was currently supporting her household. She has no employment. Petitioner claimed that she received money from a church or charitable organization that she founded. However, there was no evidence that such limited income, if any, was sufficient to support her family and/or provide financially stable conditions to Petitioner and her family. Moreover, Petitioner's bank records reflect that in June 2012, she made deposits of $167.53 and debited the account $266.07. Her ending balance in June was $18.81. At hearing, other than child support and food stamps, Petitioner offered no evidence of additional finances or income that is attributable to her. Given these facts, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate home safety, household stability or financial ability sufficient to entitle her to be licensed as a foster home. Therefore, Petitioner's application for such licensure should be denied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's application for licensure as a foster home should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul A. Rowell, Esquire Department of Children and Families 2383 Phillips Road Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shakinah Glory 4768 Woodville Highway Apartment 428 Tallahassee, Florida 32305 M. Burnette Coats, Esquire Department of Children and Families 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Gregory Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Marion Drew Parker, General Counsel Department of Children and Families Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 David Wilkins, Secretary Department of Children and Families Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.175
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer