The Issue Whether the Respondent by erecting the two subject signs violated the state and federal regulation and laws by erecting one sign on the right of way of U.S. 319, a Federal Aid Primary Road, and erecting one sign within five (5) feet of said highway. Whether subject signs should be removed for lack of permits.
Findings Of Fact Claimant contended and Respondent admitted that the two subject signs were in violation of set-back requirements of Chapter 479 and the Federal Beautification Act as charged.
The Issue The issue is whether Franklin County (County) has given reasonable assurance that it satisfies all requirements for an after-the-fact permit authorizing the construction of a rock revetment seaward of the coastal construction control line (CCCL) on Alligator Drive, also known as County Road 370.
Findings Of Fact The Nature of the Dispute The origins of this dispute date back a number of years. In short, the County currently has two adjoining revetments seaward of the CCCL on County Road 370 (Alligator Drive) located on Alligator Point in the southeastern corner of the County.1 County Road 370, situated immediately adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico, is a vulnerable structure and eligible for armoring. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.002(64). The old revetment is permitted; the new revetment is not. Pursuant to a Department enforcement action directed at both revetments, the County applied for an after-the-fact permit to authorize the construction of the new revetment. See Case No. 12-3276EF. The two revetments, totaling around 2,800 feet in length, abut County Road 370 and join near the intersection of Alligator Drive and Tom Roberts Road. The road itself is around 50 or 60 feet from the edge of the revetments. The old revetment extends around 2,000 feet west of the intersection while the new revetment extends 800 feet east of the intersection. There is a curve in the road at the intersection, and at that point the road elevation drops two or three feet for an undisclosed distance. The revetments, however, run in a straight line. There is no beach and dune system in front of the old revetment, while a small amount of exposed sand is located on the far eastern end of the new revetment. Due to storm events over the years, unauthorized debris has been placed on top of the old revetment by the County. Under the terms of the enforcement action, the County is required to remove the debris. This will reduce the height of the old revetment by several feet below its original height of nine feet National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD).2 Where the two revetments join, however, the height differs by only around a foot. The Bank owns property across the street from the old revetment and alleges that, for several reasons, the site and design of the new revetment, coupled with the reduction in height of the old revetment, will cause erosion of the shoreline around the old revetment and expose County Road 370 and the adjacent upland Bank property to erosion. Although the current design and location of the old revetment have been finalized through prior agency action, the Bank has asked that the permit be denied unless the County relocates rock boulders from the new to the old revetment and raises its height back to nine feet NGVD. The County asserts that the Bank's real aim here is to require the County, at taxpayer expense, to reconstruct the old revetment to its original height. Otherwise, the Department will not waive the 30-year erosion control line restriction and allow the Bank to fully develop its property that is seaward of the CCCL. See § 161.053(5)(b), Fla. Stat. The Old Revetment Since the late 1970s, the County has owned and maintained that portion of County Road 370 that is the subject of this dispute. In May 1986, the Department of Natural Resources, which was later merged with the Department, issued to the County CCCL Permit No. FR-204 for the construction of the old revetment, then 1,500 feet long. The revetment was located approximately 350 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-211 to approximately 150 feet west of the Department Reference Monument R-213. In November 1994, the Department issued to the County CCCL Permit No. FR-446 for the re-construction of the old revetment, as well as a 500-foot extension of the eastern limits of the structure with granite boulders. The revetment, as extended, is located approximately 540 feet west of Department Reference Monument R-212 to approximately 140 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-213. The permit did not authorize placement of any construction debris within the revetment. With the extension, the total length of the old revetment is now approximately 2,000 feet. After an application for a joint coastal permit to conduct a beach and dune restoration project was filed by the County in September 2006, a Department site inspection revealed the presence of concrete debris and other debris material stacked on top of the old revetment. A debris removal plan was formulated by the Department, which was intended to be incorporated as a special condition in the joint coastal permit. In May 2011, the joint coastal permit was approved and included a debris removal plan. Because of financial constraints, however, the County did not undertake and complete the work relating to the beach and dune restoration plan or the debris removal plan. In January 2012, another inspection was conducted by the Department to document how much debris was in the old revetment and where it was located. The inspection revealed the presence of a significant amount of concrete debris and other debris material scattered throughout the revetment and continuing eastward. That same month, largely at the urging of the Bank, the Department issued a one-count Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that after a storm event in July 2005, the County placed unauthorized construction debris and other debris material in the old revetment seaward of the CCCL, and that the debris still remained within the footprint of the revetment. See Case No. 12- 3276EF. (The Bank unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in the enforcement action.) As corrective action, the County was required to remove all debris, seaward of the CCCL, from and adjacent to the footprint of the old revetment no later than 60 days after the end of the hurricane season. That work has not yet been performed, probably because the work on both revetments will take place at the same time. After the debris is removed, the height of the old revetment will vary from between five and eight feet NGVD rather than the original nine-foot height. This was not the relief that the non-party Bank desired in the enforcement action. Instead, the Bank has always wanted the old revetment to be reconstructed to the nine-foot NGVD standard authorized in the original construction permit. Even so, the enforcement action is now final, as no appeal was taken by the County. Except for the unauthorized debris, the old revetment meets all Department standards. The New Revetment Under emergency circumstances, between September 2000 and July 2005 the County placed material, including granite rock boulders and debris material, in a location east of the old revetment, seaward of the CCCL. The construction activity is located approximately 140 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-213 to approximately 80 feet east of Department Reference Monument R-214 and is around 800 feet in length. However, the County did not obtain a permit for the temporary structure within 60 days after its construction, as required by section 161.085(3), Florida Statutes. In July 2005, Hurricane Dennis made landfall in the Florida Panhandle causing damage to the shoreline along Alligator Drive. As an emergency measure after the storm event, the County placed rock boulders that had been displaced back into the new revetment seaward of the CCCL. The County also placed other unauthorized concrete debris and debris material within the footprint of the rock revetment seaward of the CCCL. Again, no timely authorization for this work was obtained by the County. In August 2012, the Department issued an Amended NOV in Case No. 12-3276EF adding a second count, which alleged that the County had failed to obtain a permit for the placement of the rock boulders and unauthorized debris. On April 18, 2013, the Department issued a Final Order in Case No. 12-3276EF. As to Count II, it gave the County two options for corrective action: (a) that the County submit "a complete permit application for a rigid coastal armoring structure located between Department reference monuments R-213 and R-214 that complies with all applicable Department permitting rules and statutes"; or (b) that "the County remove all material placed seaward of the CCCL pursuant to a Department approved debris removal plan[,]" leaving that portion of County Road 370 without a revetment. 2013 Fla. ENV LEXIS 16 at *16. Desiring to protect its infrastructure, the County opted to apply for an after-the-fact permit. The Permit Application In March 2013, the County filed an application for an after-the-fact permit for the construction of the new revetment. As directed by the Department, the County proposes to construct a new revetment located between Department Reference Monuments R- 213 and R-214. The height of the new revetment will be around nine feet NGVD, while its slope will be one vertical to three horizontal. The old revetment is not quite as steep, having a slope of one vertical to two horizontal. The application includes a debris removal plan for the removal of construction debris as well as other debris scattered through the new revetment. Construction debris occupies a large portion of the new revetment and largely appears to be associated with storm damaged concrete sidewalk. All derelict concrete and asphalt material that is located water ward of Alligator Drive and landward of the mean high water line is to be removed. Both the County and its engineering consultant will monitor the work at the project. After reviewing the application, the Department proposed to issue after-the-fact CCCL Permit FR-897. The Bank then filed its Petition, as later amended. Petitioner's Objections As summarized in its PRO, the Bank alleges that the County did not give reasonable assurance that the following statutory and rule provisions have been satisfied: section 161.053(1)(a), which provides that special siting and design considerations shall be necessary seaward of the CCCL "to ensure protection of . . . adjacent properties"; rule 62B-33.005(2), which requires that the applicant provide the Department with sufficient information to show that adverse impacts associated with the construction have been minimized and that construction will not result in a significant adverse impact"; rule 62B-33.005(3)(a), which requires that the Department "[d]eny any application for an activity which either individually or cumulatively would result in a significant adverse impact including potential cumulative effects"; rule 62B-33.0051(2), which provides that armoring "shall be sited and designed to minimize adverse impacts to the beach and dune system, marine turtles, native salt-tolerant vegetation, and existing upland and adjacent structures"; and rule 62B-33.0051(2)(a), which requires armoring to "be sited as far landward as practicable to minimize adverse impacts . . . on existing upland and adjacent structures." See PRO, pp. 16-17. A common thread in these regulatory citations is that a revetment should be constructed in a manner that does not cause adverse impacts on "adjacent property." Except for the above cited provisions, no other permit requirements are contested, and the County's prima facie case satisfied those other requirements. The Bank's odd-shaped property, acquired in a foreclosure proceeding, abuts that portion of Alligator Drive immediately adjacent to the old revetment. The eastern boundary of the Bank's property is at least 300 feet west of the new revetment and extends westward along County Road 370 until it intersects with Harbor Circle. The entire tract is separated from the old revetment by County Road 370, a two-lane paved road. The property was once used as a KOA campground; however, the predecessor owner acquired development rights for a Planned Unit Development, which apparently cannot be fully developed unless the old revetment is raised back to its original height by the County or some other acceptable form of erosion protection is provided by the Bank at its own expense. The essence of the Bank's complaint is that the new revetment, as now sited and designed, will expose the old revetment to a higher rate of erosion, and ultimately accelerate the erosion of its property across the street. The Bank asserts that this will occur for three reasons. First, the removal of construction debris from the old revetment will lower its height, weaken the structure, and create a "discontinuity in height and composition between the revetments," resulting in increased exposure to erosion. Second, the toe of the new revetment (at the western end of the structure) will extend ten feet further seaward than the old revetment, creating a discontinuity and placing the old revetment at higher exposure to erosion. Finally, the Bank contends a discontinuity already exists between the two revetments due to the curved shape of the road at the intersection, causing the western end of the new revetment to extend further seaward than the old revetment. The Bank argues that the discontinuity will amplify the wave action on the shoreline during a severe storm event and eventually cause a breach of the old revetment. In sum, the Bank is essentially arguing that unless the two revetments mirror each other in height and slope, and consist of the same construction materials, the after-the-fact permit must be denied. The Bank's expert, Mr. Chou, a coastal engineer, was employed shortly before the final hearing and made one visit to the site. Regarding the removal of unauthorized construction debris from the old revetment, Mr. Chou was concerned that, while not ideal, the debris offers a degree of shoreline protection. He recommended that if removed, the debris be replaced with boulders comparable to the design standard of the new revetment. However, the record shows that when the loose and uneven debris is removed from the old revetment, the existing rocks will be moved to an interlocking or "chinking" configuration that actually enhances the stability and integrity of the structure.3 The Bank is also concerned that the height and slope of the two revetments differ. Mr. Chou testified that there exists the increased potential for erosion as a result of what he described as a discontinuity, or a difference of characteristics, between the two revetments. He opined that the protective function of the old revetment will be compromised by the removal of the granite boulders, which will lower the overall height of the revetment between two and four feet. According to Mr. Chou, if the new revetment suffers a direct hit by a major storm, i.e., one capable of dislodging the armor, he would "expect damage, significant damage, right next to it." Mr. Chou conceded, however, that if a permit is not approved, and the County elects to remove the new revetment, it could result in a significant adverse impact to property located along Alligator Drive. Mr. Chou further acknowledged that there will be no significant adverse effect on the old revetment during "everyday" winds, waves, and currents. Finally, he agreed that if the toes of the new and old revetments are essentially the same, as the certified engineering plans demonstrate they are, it will "minimize" the discontinuity that he describes. Notably, in 2005, Hurricane Dennis actually caused accretion (an increase in sand) on the Bank property, rather than erosion. While there are some differences in height and slope between the two revetments, no meaningful differences from an engineering perspective were shown. Through the County's coastal engineer, Mr. Dombrowski, who over the years has visited the site dozens of times and worked on a number of major projects in the area, it was credibly demonstrated that the old and new revetments will, in effect, form one continuous armoring structure that will provide shoreline protection along Alligator Drive. In terms of toe, slope, height, and construction material, there will be one continuous and straight revetment along the road, with a "fairly consistent elevation and slope going from one end to the other." If a major storm event occurs, the impacts to both revetments will likely be the same. In any event, there is no requirement that the County construct a revetment that is storm proof or prevents severe storm damage. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the new revetment is consistent with the siting and design criteria in rule 62B-33.0051(2). The design of the new revetment is consistent with generally accepted engineering practice. The new revetment is sited and designed so that there will be no significant adverse impacts, individually or cumulatively, to the adjacent shoreline. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.005(3). The County has provided the Department with sufficient information to show that adverse and other impacts associated with the construction are minimized, and the new revetment will not result in a significant adverse impact to the Bank's property. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 62B-33.005(2). The new revetment should toll erosion – which now occurs on Alligator Point at the rate of five feet per year -- and provide shoreline protection. Finally, the construction of the new revetment will not cause an adverse impact to the old revetment. For all practical purposes, the two revetments have existed side-by-side since 2005. The Bank failed to offer any credible evidence that the new revetment has had a significant adverse impact on the old revetment over the last nine years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order approving the County's application for after- the-fact permit number FR-897. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether proposals by Richard and Mildred Olson to widen an existing bridge (designated Bridge 1) and construct two new pedestrian bridges (designated Bridges 2 and 4) across Bessey Creek in Martin County, Florida, qualify for the Noticed General Permit established by Rule 62-341.475; and (2) whether Petitioner participated in this proceeding for an improper purpose under Section 120.595(1). (Citations to sections are to the 2000 codification of Florida Statutes. Rule citations are to the current Florida Administrative Code.)
Findings Of Fact Richard and Mildred Olson own property in Rustic Hills Phase III in Martin County, Florida. The Olsons own lots 191, 192, 195, 212, 213, and 214. Each lot is approximately two acres in size. The Olson home is on lot 213, and a rental home is on lot 195. On their property, the Olsons raise miniature goats, guinea hens, and peacocks; they also have ducks, geese, chickens, and dogs. Bessey Creek winds through Rustic Hills and the Olsons' lots. The Olsons propose to use DEP's NGP for Minor Activities established by adoption of Rule 62-341.475 to widen one existing bridge and construct two others for access to their property across Bessey Creek. Bessey Creek is a tributary of the St. Lucie River, through man-made Canal 23. Navigating upstream on Bessey Creek, a boat would have to pass under the Murphy Road Bridge, which is 9 feet, one inch above mean high water (MHW), just before reaching the first of the four bridges involved in this case, Bridge 1. Bridge 1 is a steel span bridge (with no pilings in the water) that connects two portions of lot 191, which is split by the creek. The Olsons propose to widen existing Bridge 1. It is not clear from the evidence whether pilings will be required to widen Bridge 1. But it seems clear that a centerline stream clearance (horizontal width) of 16 feet and a bridge height above mean high water (MHW) (vertical clearance) of 9 feet will be maintained. Proposed pedestrian Bridge 2 is the next bridge upstream, at a point where the creek is only approximately 24 feet wide from MHW to MHW. It is designed to be a 192 square foot piling-supported bridge, with an 8-foot wide by 24-foot long walkway. To support Bridge 2, sets of pilings will placed in the creek bed so as to maintain a centerline stream clearance of 16 feet. The proposed vertical clearance for Bridge 2 is 8 feet above MHW. Existing Bridge 3, the next upstream, is at a point where the creek is approximately 35 feet wide from MHW to MHW. Bridge 3 is a wooden bridge approximately 25 years old. It connects lots 192 and 193 to lot 191. The Olsons use existing Bridge 3 on a daily basis. Bridge 3 was built to span the creek; later, two sets of wooden piles were added. There is a centerline stream clearance of 13 feet between the piles. Vertical clearance is 8 feet above MHW. Proposed pedestrian Bridge 4, the farthest upstream, is designed in the same manner as proposed pedestrian Bridge 2. It is located at a point where the creek is approximately 35 feet wide from MHW to MHW. Bridge 4 will connect lots 195 and 212. Navigability Proposed pedestrian Bridges 2 and 4 are designed to have the same 8-foot vertical clearance as existing Bridge 3; they are designed to have three feet more horizontal clearance than existing Bridge 3. Neither they nor widened Bridge 1 will restrict navigation as much as existing structures, natural conditions (including numerous fallen trees, underwater snags and low, overhanging vegetation), and docked boats. The United States Coast Guard and the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FFWC) concur that the bridges would not have any deleterious effect on the navigation in this area of Bessey Creek. While not specifically alleging impedance of navigation, Petitioner alleged that existing Bridges 1 and 3 are lower than measured by the Olsons' environmental consultant. But there was no evidence to support such a finding. Meanwhile, the Olsons' consultant explained how he determined the vertical clearance of those bridges above MHW by measurements adjusted for MHW using NOAA tide charts. Even if existing Bridges 1 and 3 had less vertical clearance than determined by the Olsons' consultant, Bridges 2 and 4 are designed to have the same vertical clearance as the consultant determined Bridge 3 to have. For that reason, even if the consultant's determinations were incorrect, the vertical clearances of Bridges 2 and 4 are designed to be the same as the vertical clearance of Bridge 3, and the vertical clearance of Bridges 2 and 4 will not impede navigation any more than Bridge 3. Flooding Bessey Creek is a typical tidal creek. It has low volume and low velocity. Being influenced by tidal ebb and flow, its flow is not continuously downstream except during and just after times of high precipitation, such as hurricanes. Under these conditions, build-up of debris around pilings of these bridges would not be expected, and none was observed around at the existing bridges. The chances of vegetation or organic matter building up over time in the area of these bridges to create a beaver dam effect and cause flooding are small. The proposed new pedestrian bridges have four pilings, which is typically less than a single-family dock. The pilings of a single-family dock are closer to the shoreline and, particularly with a boat alongside, would have more potential to trap debris and cause flooding than the proposed bridges. The same can be said of the fallen trees and low, overhanging vegetation existing under natural conditions in Bessey Creek. The proposed bridges are not expected to have an adverse impact of a significant nature with respect to off-site flooding. Petitioner did not present any expert testimony regarding allegations of off-site flooding potential. Dan White testified as a lay person that flooding occurs in the area during times of high precipitation and that Petitioner was concerned that the proposed bridges would exacerbate those conditions. But, while the evidence was clear that flooding is a condition to be expected under certain conditions in low-lying areas like Rustic Hills Phase III, White failed to make any causal connection between existing periodic flooding and the bridges, existing or proposed. Improper Purpose Petitioner's request for hearing, by letter dated November 16, 2000, thanked DEP for "this opportunity to contest the granting of a Noticed General Permit to the Olson's [sic]" and also requested "an Administrative Review to ensure your department has all the information needed to make a fair decision regarding this matter." It also requested: "Since we are a small community, I hope the Department will review this petition in light of the author's lack of familiarity with the specific form and format used by the environmental consultants and those who work with you on a regular basis." Petitioner "respectfully submit[ted] the following information which is required to dispute the Department's actions and to request an Administrative hearing if necessary." In response to Petitioner's letter, DEP referred the matter to DOAH. Apparently, Petitioner (and the other parties) did not receive a copy of the Initial Order. Petitioner, which was not represented by counsel at the time, failed to comply with the Amended Initial Order entered on March 23, 2001. But apparently neither did the Olsons, who also were not represented by counsel at the time, or DEP, which was. The Olsons complained by letter filed April 26, 2001, that Petitioner had not contacted them. But there was no indication or evidence that, up to that point in time, the Olsons attempted to contact Petitioner or DEP, or that DEP attempted to contact Petitioner or the Olsons, in response to the Amended Initial Order. The Joint Response to Initial Order filed by the Olsons and DEP on May 1, 2001, recited that Petitioner's contact person-of-record, Treasurer Jim Fyfe, "no longer was associated with Rustic Hills" and that Petitioner's President, Dan White, was "out of town and could not be reached." Based on the Joint Response to Initial Order filed by DEP and the Olson's, final hearing was scheduled for May 24, 2001. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions entered along with the Notice of Hearing on May 3, 2001, required that the parties exchange witness lists and copies of exhibits and file their witness lists by May 14, 2001. Petitioner complied with the requirement to file a witness list and also included a list of exhibits. There was no indication or evidence that Petitioner did not exchange exhibits as well. The Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions also required: "No later than May 18, 2001, the parties shall confer with each other to determine whether this cause can be amicably resolved." When the Olsons' environmental consultant, Bruce Jerner, went to Dan White's home on May 14, 2001, to provide him a copy of the Olsons' exhibits, he invited White to discuss settlement in accordance with the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. White responded to the effect that, even if Petitioner did not have a strong case, Petitioner preferred to go to hearing, and White did not want to mediate or discuss settlement with Jerner. At that point, Jerner indicated that he would be sending White a letter confirming the Olsons' attempt to comply with the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions. The letter dated the next day requested "an informal conference to determine whether the above referenced case can be amicably resolved and avoid hearing proceedings." Significantly, there was no indication or evidence that DEP complied with the Order of Pre-Hearing Instructions in any respect. It appears that DEP distanced itself from the dispute between Petitioner and the Olsons, preferring to allow them to settle or litigate as they saw fit. In view of DEP's noncompliance, DEP at least certainly may not rely on Petitioner's noncompliance as a ground for an award of attorney fees and costs. In addition, while DEP's noncompliance does not excuse Petitioner from complying, it helps put Petitioner's actions in context and is relevant on the question whether Petitioner's noncompliance was evidence of improper purpose. In this regard, White testified to his belief that he had complied with all ALJ orders but did not "know why I would be obligated to respond to the consultant for Mr. Olson with regard to hearing or any other matters." While DEP and the Olsons in part cite Petitioner's failure to follow prehearing procedures, they primarily rely on the weakness of Petitioner's presentation at final hearing and posthearing efforts as evidence of improper purpose. But this evidence must be evaluated along with other factors resulting in the weakness of Petitioner's case. Not only did White misinterpret the Order of Pre- Hearing Instructions, the evidence indicated that he was unfamiliar with the administrative process in general and also was confused about the difference between the administrative hearing scheduled for May 24, 2001, and the County permitting proceedings on the bridges which also were on-going. White indicated repeatedly during final hearing that he and Petitioner had just recently learned more about distinctions between the administrative and County permit proceedings. As a result, White was beginning to recognize that several issues Petitioner had attempted to raise in this administrative proceeding may be relevant to on-going County permit proceedings but not this administrative proceeding. When it was established and explained at final hearing that DEP had no jurisdiction to require demolition or repair of existing bridges in this proceeding, White agreed to withdraw that part of Petitioner's request for relief. When it was established and explained that issues Petitioner raised relating to the "public interest" test under Rules Chapter 21-18 were premature, White did not object to those issues being dropped. Later, when Petitioner attempted to raise water quality issues relating to excrement from Olson livestock crossing these bridges, and it was ruled that no such issue was raised in Petitioner's request for hearing, White accepted the ruling. Final hearing proceeded on the only remaining issue specifically raised by Petitioner (alleged off-site flooding) (together with navigability--an issue addressed in the Olsons' presentation but not raised in Petitioner's request for hearing). To use White's words, Petitioner did not "have a very sophisticated presentation." Petitioner had no expert testimony, and White's lay testimony did not make a causal connection between flooding and the bridges. After the presentation of evidence, Petitioner did not withdraw its request for hearing in view of the evidence presented; but, in fairness, neither was Petitioner asked to do so. Petitioner did not order a Transcript, or a copy after the Olsons ordered a Transcript, and did not file a PRO. It is fairly clear from the evidence that Petitioner did not participate in this proceeding primarily to cause unnecessary delay. Even if Petitioner had never requested a hearing, the Olsons did not have all of the authorizations required of DEP for their proposals. In addition, County permits apparently also are required. It seems reasonably clear that, had Petitioner retained a competent expert to evaluate its case, the expert probably would have advised Petitioner that it would not be able to make a causal connection between flooding and the bridges. Had Petitioner retained counsel prior to final hearing, counsel probably would have advised Petitioner not to proceed with its request for hearing because, without a causal connection between flooding and the bridges, Petitioner would not be able to prevail. But there was no indication or evidence that Petitioner had and disregarded the benefit of professional advice. Under the totality of these circumstances, it was not proven that Petitioner's participation in this proceeding was for an improper purpose--i.e., primarily to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for frivolous purpose or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or securing the approval of the Olsons' applications.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DEP enter a final order: denying Petitioner's challenge to the propriety of the Olsons' use of the NGP for minor activities for their proposals; authorizing the Olsons to use the NGP for their proposals (DEP File Nos. 43- 0137548-002 and 43-0158123-002) subject to the design criteria limitations and other conditions in the applicable general permit rules; and denying the Motion for Attorney's Fees from Petitioner under Section 120.595(1). Jurisdiction is reserved to enter a final order on the part of the Motion for Attorney's Fees seeking sanctions under Section 120.569(2)(e). DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Francine M. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Dan White, President Rustic Phase III Property Owners Association 3337 Southwest Bessey Creek Trail Palm City, Florida 34990 Tim Morell, Esquire 1933 Tom-a-Toe Road Lantana, Florida 33426 Elizabeth P. Bonan, Esquire Cornett, Googe, Ross & Earle, P.A. 401 East Osceola Street Stuart, Florida 32991 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Office of General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 David B. Struhs, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue At issue is whether an order recommending denial of the subject permits and variance should be rendered.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing statement of the case and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order reversing Monroe County's decision to issue the subject permits and variance. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29 day of January 1992. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29 day of January 1992.
Findings Of Fact Six signs were described in a violation notice to Respondent Dandy Signs from Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation dated July 7, 1977. The notice stated the signs were alleged to be in violation of Chapter 479 and rules 14-10.04; rule 14-10.03. By stipulation of the parties the charges on the signs listed were dropped except for the following two signs: a sign located one mile west of U.S. 1, State Road 44, Mile Post 28.25 with copy "Bob's Sandpiper Restaurant" and a sign located at Junction 17-92 Deland, U.S. Highway 17 (Section 35 Mile Post .02) with copy "Buddy Sheats". The foregoing signs have no permit and evidence was presented to show that each sign is nearer to a permitted sign than 500 feet. The Respondent admits that neither sign has been permitted and that both signs violate the spacing requirements. Respondent was given time to submit evidence that the signs had at one time been permitted, but no evidence was submitted to this hearing officer although the hearing was held in excess of three months before this order is being entered.
Recommendation Remove the subject signs and invoke penalty under Section 479.18, Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of March, 1978. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dan Richardson, Owner Dandy Signs 324 Flagler Street New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32069
Findings Of Fact Leamington (Petitioner herein), is a road maintenance and construction contractor doing business since approximately 1985. John Hummell is Petitioner's President and is responsible for all bids submitted for contract awards. Petitioner contracts primarily with the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent herein). Since 1985, Petitioner has entered into approximately forty-one (41) contracts with Respondent. Petitioner was one of seven bidders on State Job #17030-3536, Contract E-1706, let by Respondent in District I. Respondent notified Petitioner of its decision to award the bid to the second lowest bidder, Simco, by notice posted on April 19, 1993 stating that Leamington's bid was rejected because it was considered not to be responsible and was not in the best interest of the Department (to contract with Leamington). The work in question involves the repairs of the bridge located at SR- 789 at Little Ringling Causeway west of Sarasota in Sarasota County. The work entails removal and replacement of silicone sealant on the bridge deck and replacement and rejacketing of piling with grout epoxy. The bid tabulations revealed that Petitioner's bid was approximately $500.00 less than that of the second lowest bidder, Simco, Inc., of Sarasota. The Department has a procedure called the "district contracts procedure". Part of the procedure calls for the awards committee to review bids and determine who the bid should be awarded to. The awards committee, which was chaired by Glenn Ivey, the District Director of Operations, reviewed the bid submitted for project E-1706. The awards committee voted unanimously to reject Leamington's bid on Contract E-1706. The decision to reject Petitioner's bid, by the awards committee, was based on Petitioner's performance on its more recent Department contracts. Specifically, the awards committee considered projects E-1649, for sidewalk repair in several counties; contract E-1545, a concrete repair job in Lakeland; and contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair job. Leamington's contract on the concrete repair job (E-1545) was rated as being poor when Leamington was, in effect, asked to leave the job. Based on Leamington's poor workmanship and difficulties encountered on that contract, Respondent terminated work on the contract after approximately sixty percent (60 percent) of the work was completed. The remainder of that project was completed by another contractor. Specifically, Job No. E-1545 called for Petitioner to remove and replace portland concrete slabs on Memorial Boulevard in Lakeland. Petitioner failed to restore the concrete slabs to a smooth surface, making it necessary for Respondent to have the slabs ground such that motorists had a smooth driving surface. After several warnings, Respondent cancelled the project and, as noted, approximately forty percent (40 percent) of the work was completed by another contractor. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Contract E-1652, a roadway shoulder repair contract. On that project, Petitioner was advised that the shoulder had to be graded at a certain angle and was shown, by several of Respondent's engineers, the proper manner in which to accomplish the task. Petitioner failed to grade the shoulder at the correct angle as requested. Petitioner also routinely failed to provide proper traffic control during the performance of Contract E-1652 and frequently disputed Respondent's employees advice as to work instructions and ways to eradicate the poor workmanship on that project. Additionally, Petitioner failed to use skilled workers and did not have ample equipment on the job to perform the work on Contract E-1652. Initially, Petitioner had limited equipment at the beginning of the work on Contract E-1652. After Petitioner received a letter from Respondent advising that there wasn't adequate equipment to complete the project, Petitioner obtained additional equipment. The Department terminated Petitioner's work under Contract E-1652 because Petitioner had approached the contract deadline for completion and due to of the numerous problems the Department experienced with Petitioner in getting the work completed acceptably. Bobby Cranford, the Assistant Maintenance Engineer for the Petitioner's Sarasota Maintenance Unit, recommended that Petitioner not be awarded any more roadway shoulder repair contracts based on the difficulties experienced by Petitioner's "poor" workmanship on contract E-1652. Another project reviewed by the awards committee was Petitioner's work performance on Contract E-1649, a sidewalk repair job which encompassed several counties. Petitioner did not have the required personnel and expertise to perform the sidewalk job correctly. Petitioner was kept informed of deficiencies and necessary corrections to correctly perform the sidewalk repair job, however, the proper repairs have not been made. The Respondent introduced a composite of twenty-three (23) photos showing the extent of the problems Petitioner needed to correct the sidewalk repairs with notes as to the corrective action that was needed. Specifically, Petitioner used little expansion joint materials and no edging tools were utilized on the project. Similar problems were found throughout the four county area in which Petitioner was engaged on the sidewalk project. By letter dated May 13, 1993, Respondent advised Petitioner of the numerous problems on contract E-1649. Specifically, Petitioner's President was told of visual inspections which showed substandard work on the original work as well as the work wherein Petitioner attempted to correct deficiencies which were discovered by Respondent. For example, Petitioner was advised that at 506 First and Main Streets in Wachula, there were sections of concrete sidewalk removed and scheduled for replacement with adjacent sections now damaged. Petitioner was further advised that workers had driven trucks on the sidewalk damaging several slabs not marked for replacement. Finally, Petitioner was asked to correct broken sprinklers at the work site and to resolve a claim filed by a Mrs. Campbell, which was registered with Respondent. The awards committee also relied upon an independent inspection report prepared by Bobby Cranford. That report is a forty (40) page report citing numerous deficiencies on the sidewalk repair project. Respondent requires that contractors employ english speaking superintendents at each work site to assist in communicating with its inspectors. Petitioner utilized superintendents who did not speak english and thereby created a language barrier making communication difficult with Respondent's personnel. Respondent had to monitor Petitioner's projects extensively and at a cost which increased the Department's overhead disproportionately when compared to other projects let to other district contractors. Based on a review of Respondent's work on Petitioner's recent contracts, no other contractors performing contracts in District I had a performance record as poor as Petitioner. When the awards committee made its decision to reject Petitioner's bid on the subject contract, it also relied on a memorandum from , Wally Clark, a District I attorney. In the memorandum it was concluded that Petitioner had subcontracted work to Hummell, Inc., a separate entity and that the required prior written approval of the subcontracting had not been obtained from Respondent. The investigation also revealed that the subcontractor, Hummell, Inc., had not been paid for its services (by Petitioner). An internal audit also prepared by Wall revealed that Hummell, Inc. was an unpaid subcontractor of Petitioner. The awards committee also considered allegations from Phillip Spears, a subcontractor of Petitioner, who had not been paid for work performed on Respondent's contracts. The committee also considers a newspaper article which stated that Petitioner was under investigation by local law enforcement officials for failure to pay subcontractors on the Interstate 75 project. Dennis Hall is the District Investigator for District I. Hall accompanied Wall, the author of the internal audit report, on investigations and interviews in compiling the audit report. One of the persons interviewed by Wall and Hall was Larry Zavitz. Zavitz was an inspector employed by Petitioner in excess of twenty- eight (28) years and had performed the inspection on Petitioner's sidewalk repair project under Contract E-1649. During the interview of Zavitz, he admitted to receiving a loan of $1,000.00 from John Hummell which Zavitz had not fully repaid at the time of the interview. Upon Zavitz admission of accepting the loan, he was asked and later resigned from the Department.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner's protest of the rejection of its bid on Contract E-1706 be rejected and the Department enter its award of the subject contract to the second lowest responsible bidder, Simco, Inc. of Sarasota. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 8th day of September, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Haydon Burns Building 562 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 William H. Roberts, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Michael E. Riley, Esquire 106 East College Avenue Post Office Box 10507 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's operation of an overweight truck over the low-limit bridge involved herein is a violation and if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department of Transportation was the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutes involving commercial carrier and truck vehicle weights on covered vehicles operated on the streets and highways of this state. It does so through its Office of Motor Carrier Compliance staffed with uniformed certified law enforcement officers who have the authority to conduct random safety and compliance inspections of commercial vehicles being operated in this state. The parties agree that on August 8, 1991, Respondent, P.J. Constructors, Inc. was prime contractor to the Petitioner, Department of Transportation for the removal and replacement of a highway bridge over the Florida Turnpike where it intersects with Hood Road in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. At the time in issue, Respondent was operating a 1981 MAC tractor trailer low boy on which it was transporting a piece of heavy construction equipment. At the time in issue, Officer Neff stopped the vehicle for crossing over this bridge which was clearly posted as having a maximum weight limit for tractor trailers of 15 tons, (30,000 pounds). Following standard Department weighing procedures measuring weight at each axle and combining those weights to arrive at a total, and using portable Department scales which are calibrated every 6 months for accuracy, Officer Neff determined the vehicle weight at 54,800 pounds. This was 24,800 pounds over the legal weight and resulted in a penalty assessment of $1,240.00 at 5 per pound of overweight. The approaches to this bridge were clearly marked at several locations with signs indicating the maximum weight permitted for this type vehicle was 15 tons. These signs were located at sites which were far enough away from the bridge to give a driver ample notice of the restrictions and ample opportunity to turn around or to take an alternate route over roads situated between the signs and the bridge. In addition to the signs, however, earlier the same day, as warnings were issued to users of the bridge who were going to a construction site on the other side, Respondent's driver was specifically told of the bridge's low limits and advised of an alternate route to avoid it. Admittedly, the alternate routes would be longer than the route over the bridge, but no evidence as presented by either party as to how much the difference was. Respondent's General Manager, Mr. McAllester, claims the signs were not in position on the two occasions he visited the site during the bid process in February or March, 1991. He cannot say that he knew where the signs might have been located (away from the site), but avers only that he did not see any. However, officer Neff specifically checked to see that the signs were in place before issuing the citation on August 8, 1991 and it is, therefore, found that the signs were properly in place on that date. Mr. McAllester also urges in the alternative, however, that even if the signs were in place, as contractor on the bridge replacement project, the terms of the bid specifications, which directs contractors from operating equipment in excess of the maximum weights set out by law, exempts the contractor where the existing road or bridge is to be removed as a part of the work included in the project. The bridge in issue here was removed and replaced as a part of the project on which Respondent was contractor and the current bridge has no limit. Mr. McAllester admits that when the instant citation was issued, Respondent had no special permit to cross the bridge with an excess load. Once the citation was issued, however, Respondent quickly retained an engineer to do a structural analysis of the bridge in issue. Based on that analysis, Respondent thereafter sought and obtained permission to cross the bridge with an overload provided all other traffic was stopped on Hood Road while the excessively laden vehicle was on the bridge so it would be the only vehicle thereon at the time, and provided that vehicle kept to the center of the road while on the bridge. Subsequent to the citation and before the permit was issued, Respondent did not operate any excessively laden vehicles on the bridge. Respondent admits that at the time the citation was issued, there was traffic operating both on the Turnpike and on Hood Road. Therefore, a potential danger to the public existed. Nonetheless, traffic was maintained on both roadways throughout the entire project without incident. None of the weight limits or a need to maintain weight standards was discussed at the pre-bid conference, however.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assessing a civil fine in the amount of $1,240.00 against the Respondent. P.J. Constructors, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1992. Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Foster McAllester Vice President and General Manager P.J. Constructors, Inc. 4100 S.W. 70th Court Miami, Florida 33155 Ben G.Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel ]Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue The issues to be decided in this case are those associated with the question of whether the Respondent is required to have a permit for the connection of his business property to State Road 206 or is exempt from that requirement. See Section 335.187, Florida Statutes. If he is required to have a permit the issue becomes the acceptability of his current drive, i.e., does it comply with the commercial use design criteria contemplated by Chapter 335, Florida Statutes, and further described in the Florida Department of Transportation "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System," February, 1985, which was recognized and incorporated by reference through Rule 14- 15.013, Florida Administrative Code. These issues are raised through an alleged violation of the Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code set out in the Notice to Show Cause which was forwarded to Respondent from Petitioner leading to the formal hearing. The date of that Notice to Show Cause was July 18, 1989. Within the statement of violations there were also allegations concerning irregular signs as alleged under Section 479.11(8), Florida Statutes, associated with the commercial activities by Respondent and the unauthorized parking on the right-of-way at State Road 206 in violation of Section 337.406, Florida Statutes. These latter allegations were conceded by the Respondent at hearing and are resolved through those concessions.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing Respondent operated a roadside fruit and vegetable stand at property adjacent to State Road 206 in St. Johns County, Florida. In addition to fruits and vegetables, by local ordinance of St. Johns County, Florida, he is allowed to sell poultry and fish. There is no indication that he has taken advantage of that opportunity other than to sell fresh shrimp from a cooler during 1989. In addition to these products he sells honeys, jellies, and jams. He also sells soft drinks from a dispensing machine. A mainstay in his business is peanuts which he sells fresh. Another product sold is pork skins. The drink machine that is described was added in March, 1989. Before that time he sold fountain drinks and cold drinks that were dispensed from a cooler. He has always had soft drinks available from the inception of his operation of the roadside stand. That began in March, 1985. At the time the Respondent purchased the property there was an operation ongoing whereby fruit was being sold on two tables. Respondent replaced those structures with a portable trailer which was anchored to the lot, and display and sell of fruit on a 16-foot table and use of an 8-foot table upon which tomatoes were displayed and sold. The trailer was used to store his products over night. The trailer described was a pop-up camper trailer. The principal products being dispensed at that time were peanuts, vegetables, and tomatoes. Through Ordinance No. 86-68, passed by St. Johns County, a copy of which may be seen as Respondent's exhibit No. 1, the property was recognized as C1, commercial intensive, with the conditions that the property would be limited to outdoor sale of produce, vegetables, fruit, poultry, and fish. It was also stated that there would be no access/egress to United States Highway 1, which is also known as State Road 5. This property is located at the intersection of State Road 5 and State Road 206. Present access/egress to the property is from State Road 206 and that has been the situation since Respondent purchased the property. The ordinance described dates from August 12, 1986. Over time Respondent has taken a number of steps to improve his business. In March, 1988, Respondent obtained permission from St. Johns County to place a storage shed on his property. In August of that year he obtained permission to install a metal awning or carport of dimension 18 feet by 45 feet which is anchored to the ground. At that same time he placed the body from an old milk truck on the property for purposes of cold storage. In March, 1988, he had received an electrical permit from St. Johns County. Prior to that time he did not have electricity. In the spring of 1989, a well was drilled to provide running water. Prior to that time Respondent used bottled water. Respondent's composite exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence describes various permits obtained from St. Johns County. If Respondent was required to remove the structures on his property it could be done in three days. This goes to identify the nature of the structures and to demonstrate that they are not permanent fixtures to the realty. According to Respondent, whose testimony is accepted, the business that he is experiencing at present has remained fairly constant in dollar amounts. He does not sell as many peanuts as he did before. Concerning traffic, Respondent indicates, and his testimony is accepted, that the number of cars that are located at his business would be a maximum of 12 on a busy Sunday afternoon and that at most times there are one or two cars. The hours of the business are from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. in the winter time and somewhat longer in the summer time. The business is open seven days a week. A rough description of the nature of the property by design may be found in the documents contained in Respondent's exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. The property is approximately 280 front feet and 280 feet at the rear with 41 feet on each side. The frontage runs approximately east-west on State Road 206 and one of the sides abuts State Road 5. The basic design of the driveway entrance from State Road 206 is also set out in those drawings. As Marshall W. Sander, engineer in the permit department for Petitioner in its St. Augustine, Florida, maintenance office, explains the driveway is an unimproved dirt shell connection. This is the same driveway that was there at the time that Respondent purchased the property and has remained in that state since that time. Notwithstanding Mr. Sanders' concern that the driveway is not up to current commercial business criteria for access/egress, there have been no accidents as a result of access/egress from the business. There are two turnouts or turn- ins into the property. Mr. Sander believes that at least one paved driveway is needed leading into the property. The dimensions of that drive would be 24-foot wide which allows a 12-foot wide lane in and a 12-foot wide lane out. This impression of Mr. Sander is drawn in the face of the Respondent's presenting himself at the office of Petitioner in St. Augustine, Florida, with an application and plan showing the intention to improve the property to include restrooms, a beer and wine cooler with parking on site. Under those circumstances Mr. Sander felt it necessary to improve the drive connection. At hearing there was no suggestion that restrooms are available on the premises or will be in the near future, nor was there any indication that a beer and wine cooler would be installed. Therefore it cannot be said that the basic nature of the business has changed from its inception to the present. Mr. Sander concedes that within the records of the Petitioner there are no indications that the business has increased by way of records concerning traffic flow or otherwise. His remarks about increased traffic at Dupont Center is not specific enough to gain a useful impression of that circumstance. Mr. Sander relies upon the observations of the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the St. Johns County Public Health Unit as were testified to by George L. Sigman, Environmental Health Director II for that organization. He also spoke to certain records of the health unit which may be found as Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. Nothing about his testimony or that exhibit identifies a noteworthy change in the basic nature of the business from Respondent's establishment of the roadside stand in March, 1985 until the present. Throughout the existence of his business Respondent has operated without the benefit of a driveway permit issued by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and in view of the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: By way of disposition of the Notice to Show Cause, that a Final Order be entered which recognizes the concessions made by the Respondent concerning the sign in question, calling for its removal if still in existence and his acknowledgment of the problem of parking on the right-of-way and which absolves the Respondent of any necessity to obtain a driveway permit. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning proposed facts. Petitioner' s Facts Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence in Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is contrary to facts found. The third sentence is subordinate to facts found. Sentences 4 and 5 depict testimony as opposed to suggesting fact finding. However, the last sentence in that paragraph is one upon which facts were found in the Recommended Order. Respondent' s Facts Paragraphs one and two pertain to withdrawal of the request for hearing concerning signs and parking and are not part of fact finding. The first sentence in paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The remaining sentence is legal argument, as are paragraphs 4 and 5. Paragraphs 6-11 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 12 is not relevant. Paragraphs 13 and 14 are subordinate to facts found. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Leo O. Myers, Esquire Post Office Box 1621 Jacksonville, FL 32201 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue This proceeding concerns an Intent to Issue a dredge and fill permit given by the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") to Respondent, Edmund Burke ("Burke"), for construction of a retaining wall and wooden pile-supported bridge crossing a portion of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The ultimate issues for determination are whether Petitioner has standing to challenge the proposed DER action, and if so, whether the proposed agency action complies with the requirements of Sections 403.91 through 403.938, Florida Statutes, and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Edmund Burke, on January 15, 1988, filed with the Department of Environmental Regulation ("DER") application number 431441608 for a permit to construct a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge approximately 80 feet long and 10 feet wide connecting the mainland with an island in the South Fork of the St. Lucie River in Martin County, Florida. The bridge was to span a 50 foot canal or creek ("channel") in the River. One of two retaining walls was to be located on the mainland peninsula. The other retaining wall was to be located on the island (the "initial project"). Between January 15, 1988, and April 28, 1989, the initial project was modified by Respondent, Burke, to satisfy DER concerns over potential impacts, including secondary impacts, relevant to the application. The width of the bridge was reduced from 10 feet to 6 feet. The retaining wall initially planned at the point where the bridge intersects the island was eliminated. The retaining wall on the mainland side of the bridge was relocated above mean high water. Sixty feet of the proposed bridge runs from mean high water to mean high water. An additional 10 feet on each end of the bridge is located above mean high water. The project remained a permanent, pile supported, wooden bridge (the "modified project"). The Intent to Issue, dated April 28, 1989, indicated that the modifications required by DER had been made, that the modifications satisfied DER concerns relevant to the initial project, and that DER intended to issue a permit for construction of the modified project. The elimination of the retaining wall obviated any necessity for backfill on the island. The reduction in the width of the bridge virtually eliminated the secondary impacts on the surrounding habitat, resulted in less shading of the water, and precluded vehicular traffic over the bridge. The final modification that was "necessary in order for [DER] to approve this application" was the reduction in the width of the bridge from 10 feet to 6 feet. Petitioner's Exhibit 17. DER's requirement for this final modification was communicated to Mr. Cangianelli in a telephone conversation on April 6, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 18), and memorialized in a letter to Respondent, Burke, on April 14, 1989 (Petitioner's Exhibit 17). The final modification was made, and the Intent to Issue was written on April 28, 1989. Petitioner's Case. Property commonly known as Harbor Estates is adjacent to the site of the modified project. A constructed harbor and contiguous park are located within the boundaries of Harbor Estates. Both are used by residents of Harbor Estates and both are proximate to the site of the modified project. The harbor entrance and site of the modified project are located on opposite sides of a peninsula approximately 40 feet wide and approximately 125 feet long. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that can navigate under the modified project need only travel the length of the peninsula, a distance of approximately 125 feet through the channel, in order to reach the harbor entrance. Boats operated by residents of Harbor Estates that cannot navigate under the proposed bridge must travel around the island, a distance of approximately 1800 feet in the main body of the St. Lucie River, in order to reach the harbor entrance. However, Petitioner presented no evidence that prior to the construction of the bridge the channel was navigable by boats not capable of passing under the bridge after the bridge was completed. Petitioner, Harbor Estates Associates, Inc., submitted no evidence to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of modifications required by DER. Of Petitioner's 26 exhibits, Exhibits 1-19, 24 and 25 were relevant to the initial project but were not material to claims in the Petition concerning the inadequacy of the modifications required by DER. Petitioner's Exhibit 20 was cumulative of DER's Exhibit 6B. Petitioner's Exhibits 22 and 26, respectively, concern a 1980 bridge permit and a Proposed Comprehensive Growth Management Plan for Martin County, Florida. Petitioner offered no expert testimony in support of the pleadings in the Petition including assertions that: the modified project will have a direct adverse impact upon water quality and the welfare or property of others; the channel is navigable by deep-draft motor vessels; the modified project will result in shoaling that will have to be corrected at the expense of Harbor Estates; the modified project will result in prohibited destruction of mangroves; or that the modified project will cause any of the other specific adverse effects described in the Petition. The testimony of fact witnesses called by Petitioner was not material to Petitioner's claims that modifications required by DER were inadequate. The testimony of Bob Nicholas was relevant to allegations of prior violations but was not dispositive of any issue concerning the adequacy of modifications required by DER. The testimony of William Burr was admitted as rebuttal testimony relevant to precedents in the general area of the modified project but failed to address the adequacy of modifications required by DER. Petitioner consistently demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the applicable law, the proper scope of the formal hearing, and the distinction between argument and evidence. Petitioner repeatedly attempted to establish violations of laws not relevant to the proceeding including local laws and other environmental laws. Petitioner attempted to establish issues by arguing with witnesses during direct and cross examination, and by repeatedly making unsworn ore tenus representations of fact. There was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact in this proceeding because Petitioner failed to show facts necessary to sustain the pleadings. Petitioner presented no evidence refuting Respondent, Burke's, showing that the modifications required by DER were adequate to assure water quality and the public health, safety, or welfare, or the property of others. Evidence presented by Petitioner was not material to the issue of whether the modifications required by DER were adequate for the purposes of the law applicable to this proceeding. Therefore, Petitioner participated in this proceeding for a frivolous purpose, primarily to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of licensing or approval of the proposed activity. Respondents' Case. The island to be accessed by the modified project is approximately 2.5 acres in area and contains mostly wetland. The island is approximately 900 feet long. The portion of the island that is beyond DER permit jurisdiction is less than 200 feet long and less than 50 feet wide. The site of the modified project is located in Class III waters. Respondent, Burke, provided adequate assurances that portions of the modified project not extending over open water will be constructed upon property owned by him. The single retaining wall to be constructed at the southeastern terminus of the modified project will be constructed landward of DER jurisdiction. The modified project permits neither the installation of water or electrical conduits to the island nor any excavation, filling, or construction on the island. Respondent, Burke, must provide notification to DER before any such activity is begun. The bridge will accommodate no vehicular traffic larger or heavier than a golf cart. Golf cart access is necessary in order to accommodate a physical disability of Respondent, Burke. The modified project employs adequate methods to control turbidity, limit mangrove alteration on the island, and limit potential collisions with manatees. Vegetation, including mangroves, will not be removed. Incidental, selective trimming of vegetation will be allowed to create access to the island. The single retaining wall to be constructed on the mainland will be located landward of mangroves. Turbidity curtains will be used during construction to minimize short term water quality impacts. The modified project requires turbidity screens to be installed if there is any indication of sedimentation. No mechanical equipment will be located on the island during construction. No boats will be moored at the site of the modified project. The modified project will cause no significant downstream shoaling or silting. The site of the modified project is located approximately 15 feet from an existing fishing platform. No significant shoaling has been associated with that platform. The impacts associated with the modified project are similar to the impacts associated with single family docks in the area. No significant shoaling has been associated with such docks. The modified project is not a navigational hazard. The elevation is sufficient to accommodate small boats, canoes, and row boats. Reflective devices are required to alert night boat traffic of its presence. There is adequate clearance under the bridge to prevent obstruction. DER reviewed all applicable rules and criteria in considering the modified project. The modified project will have no adverse effect upon public health, safety or welfare, or the property of others. The modified project will not adversely impact the conservation of fish, wildlife, or their habitats. The modified project will not adversely affect navigation, the flow of water, or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The modified project will not adversely impact fishing value or marine productivity in the area. The modified project will have no adverse impact upon recreational values in the vicinity. The modified project was reviewed in a manner that is customary for similar projects reviewed by DER. It is common practice for DER employees, as they did in this case, to rely upon opinions of other DER professionals in formulating an intent to issue. Other projects within DER jurisdiction in the general geographic area of the modified project and within the same region were considered in DER's review process. Other docks and marinas have been constructed and are proposed for construction within the South Fork of the St. Lucie River. Bridges including pedestrian bridges have been and are proposed to be constructed in Martin County. DER did not require a hydrographic study because the modified project was considered a minor project. DER review took into account the intended future use of the island property and DER's past experience with Respondent, Burke. As part of its review, DER reviewed a conceptual bridge to a single family residence on the island which would not require any fill or construction of retaining walls. In addition, DER considered previous violations on the island under Florida Administrative Code Rules 17-4.070, 17-4.160, and 17-4.530 in connection with an earlier permit that expired before the initial project was begun. Respondent, Burke, provided reasonable assurances that he is the owner of the site of the proposed project. Respondent, Burke, signed DER's property ownership affidavit and submitted a survey. DER's Intent to Issue does not authorize any construction in any area within the jurisdiction of DER other than the modified project. The Intent to Issue constitutes compliance with state water quality standards. DER has not received any requests for a jurisdictional determination in the general geographic area of the modified project. No enforcement action has been initiated by DER or at the request of a third party against Respondent, Burke, for alleged violations of DER rules.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order on the merits issuing the requested permit and awarding reasonable attorney's fees and costs in accordance with this Recommended Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April, 1990. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Although most of Petitioner's proposed findings were cast in the form of "fact", they were in substance argument and rejected accordingly. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Included in part in Finding 1 Findings as to ownership are rejected as beyond the jurisdiction of the undersigned. Finding as to the late filed exhibit is rejected as irrelevant. 2-4, 10-12, Rejected as either irrelevant 16, or not supported by the record. 5 and 6, 37, 40 Rejected as unsupported by 42 the record. 7, 8, 15 Rejected as irrelevant 17, 21-29 and immaterial 9, 13, 14, 18-20 Rejected as immaterial 30-33, 35 and 36 37(a), 38, 39, 41, 48 20(A) Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial except the last sentence is included in Finding 13 34 Included in Finding 12 Rejected as not supported by the record, hypothetical and immaterial. Rejected as not established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondent, Burke, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Respondent. Burke's, Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 15 and 16 Included in Finding 1 17, 26, 27 Included in Finding 2 18, 48 Included in Findings 15 and 16 19, 30, 31, 42 Included in Finding 13 20, 21, 44 Included in Findings 4 and 14 22, 23, 25, 32 Included in Finding 17 24 Included in Finding 16 25, 36-38 Included in Finding 17 Included in Finding 18 Included in Finding 3 Included in Finding 10 Included in Finding 19 35, 39, 43 Included in Finding 20 40, 41 Included in Finding 11 45-47 and 49 Included in Finding 16 51 and 52 Included in Findings 6-8 54 Included in Finding 5 and 8 50 and 53 Rejected as irrelevant and immaterial Respondent, DER, has submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 and 2 Included in Findings 1 and 2 3 Included in Finding 10 4 and 5 Included in Finding 16 6, 9 Included in Finding 2 7 and 8 Included in Findings 9 and 11 10 Included in Finding 13 11 Included in Finding 15 Included in Finding 17 and 14 Included in Finding 16 COPIES FURNISHED: Dale H. Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia E. Comer Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Patricia V. Bartell Qualified Representative 615 S.W. St. Lucie Street Stuart, FL 34997 J. A. Jurgens Jones, Foster, Johnson & Stubbs, P.A. 505 South Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, FL 33402
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent's intended decision to award a contract, challenged by Petitioner, is contrary to Respondent's governing statutes, rules, policies, or the proposal specifications.
Findings Of Fact Admitted Facts Per Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation The Department advertised for proposals and bids for the Project under procurement contract number E5R63. Commercial was a bidder on the Department's contract E5R63 for the Project. Commercial reviewed the Department's advertisement for proposals and bids for the Project. The Project consists of replacing the existing Daytona Avenue Bridge (Bridge No.: 795502). The Project was advertised as a low bid design-build Project. Commercial did not file a challenge to the specifications for the Project. The advertisement for the Project included pre- qualification requirements for design professionals and pre- qualification work class requirements for the contractor. The advertisement for the Project included requirements for design professional services 8.1 and 8.2, Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 14-75.5/ The bids and technical proposals for the Project were due at the Department's District 5 offices by no later than 2:30 p.m., on June 18, 2012. Commercial submitted a technical proposal for the Project in response to the advertisement for procurement E5R63. Commercial submitted a bid price for procurement E5R63. The technical proposal submitted by Commercial for procurement E5R63 did not contain a firm or individual pre-qualified by the Department to perform work types 8.1 and 8.2. District 5 representatives contacted Commercial and sought to clarify who had been identified in Commercial's technical proposal to meet the pre-qualification requirements for work types 8.1 and 8.2. Andrus Gaudet was identified in response to the inquiry regarding who would satisfy work type 8.1 and 8.2 pre- qualification requirements. As of June 18, 2012, Andrus Gaudet had not been pre- qualified by the Department in work types 8.1 and 8.2 under rule chapter 14-75. The Department determined that Commercial was non- responsive based on its failure to include a firm or an individual possessing the pre-qualification requirements in work types 8.1 and 8.2 as advertised in the procurement solicitation. The advertisement states on page one that "all qualification requirements must be met prior to the Response Deadline." The Department sent a letter to Commercial that informs all responding firms that in order to be considered for the award, the team must be pre-qualified in the areas in the advertisement. Commercial could not be considered for award of this contract since it did not comply with the pre-qualification requirements. Additional Findings of Fact The Department's advertisement summarized the key terms for the Project, which included the following: NOT TO EXCEED BUDGET AMOUNT OR MAXIMUM BUDGET AMOUNT OR BUDGET AMOUNT*: $798,000 * Actual commitment and final execution of this contract is contingent upon an approved legislative budget and availability of funds ESTIMATED CONTRACT TIME: 300 Contract Days SELECTION PROCEDURE: Low Bid Design-Build RESPONSE REQUESTED: Fax Order Form STIPEND AMOUNT: No Stipend PREQUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: CONTRACTOR-WORK CLASS REQUIREMENTS Minor Bridges DESIGN-PROFESSIONAL SERVICES WORK TYPE REQUIREMENTS Major: 4.1.2-Minor Bridge Design Minor: 3.1--Minor Highway Design 4.1.1--Miscellaneous Structure 7.1--Signing, Pavement Marking and Channelization 8.1--Control Surveying 8.2--Design, Right of Way, and Construction Surveying 9.1--Soil Exploration 9.2--Geotechnical Classification Lab Testing 9.3--Highway Materials Testing 9.4.1--Standard Foundation Studies TECHNICAL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO: http://www2.dot.state.fl.us/construction/bid questionmain.asp. The selection procedure for a low bid design-build project is that the Department's technical review committee starts with the lowest price bidder and reviews that bidder's technical proposal to determine if it meets the technical requirements or if it is non-responsive. If the lowest bidder's technical proposal is deemed non-responsive, the technical review committee proceeds to review the technical proposal of the next lowest bidder. The technical proposals of other bidders are not reviewed at all for responsiveness unless and until the committee deems the lowest bidder's proposal non-responsive. The technical review committee prepares its recommendations as to the responsiveness of the proposals reviewed and identifies which bidder, if any, should be deemed the lowest responsive bidder. The technical review committee recommendations are then submitted to the selection committee, which makes the final decision that is posted as the Department's intended decision. Commercial submitted the lowest bid for the Project in the amount of $780,000. Therefore, the technical review committee began with a review of Commercial's technical proposal. After that review, the technical review committee made the following recommendation: The Technical submitted by [Commercial] was reviewed and is recommended as non- responsive. [Commercial] did not identify how the advertised prequalification requirement on 8.1--Control Surveying and 8.2--Design, Right of Way, and Construction Surveying would be met within their Technical. The technical review committee proceeded to the next lowest bidder, Gregori, with a bid price of $817,500. Gregori's technical proposal was reviewed and found to meet the technical requirements for the Project. The technical review committee recommended that Gregori be deemed the lowest responsive bidder. The decision to award the contract to Gregori was made by the selection committee, which agreed with the technical review committee's recommendations. Before making that decision, the selection committee considered whether Gregori's bid price was reasonable. The selection committee made the judgment that Gregori's bid price, which exceeded the engineer's estimate used to establish the budget amount by a relatively small percentage, was reasonable. Funds for contracts must be provided for in the Work Program. When an RFP is issued, the Department sets aside funds in the Work Program in the estimated budget amount. Therefore, in order for the selection committee to award a contract for a bid price that exceeds the estimated budget amount, the selection committee must get approval to fund the excess amount in the Work Program. In this case, the selection committee obtained approval to add $20,500--the amount by which Gregori's bid price exceeded the advertised budget amount--to the Work Program. Commercial did not contend or attempt to prove that Gregori's bid price was unreasonable. Instead, Commercial's challenge to the intended contract award was that the Department was required to reject the bid as non-responsive, because the bid price exceeded what Commercial referred to as the "advertised not to exceed budget amount." Thus, Commercial's challenge hinges on its characterization of the advertisement as specifying a "not to exceed budget amount." However, the actual language in the advertisement was: "NOT TO EXCEED BUDGET AMOUNT OR MAXIMUM AMOUNT OR BUDGET AMOUNT*: $798,000." Commercial was unable to point to any statute, rule, or RFP specification that narrowed the quoted language or that required the Department to deem a proposal non-responsive solely because the bid price is higher than the advertised budget amount. Without more, the dollar amount identified in the advertisement cannot be considered a "not to exceed budget amount." Instead, the amount was either a "not to exceed budget amount," or a "maximum amount," or simply a "budget amount." Commercial unsuccessfully attempted to prove that the Department's prior practice was to declare non-responsive any bids over the advertised budget amounts. To support its position, Commercial relied on the Department's prior practice in connection with an earlier solicitation for the same bridge replacement project, designated contract no. E5R48 (project E5R48), which resulted in a Department decision to reject all bids and re-advertise. The evidence established that the advertisement for project E5R48 set forth a "NOT TO EXCEED BUDGET AMOUNT OR MAXIMUM BUDGET AMOUNT OR BUDGET AMOUNT" of $650,000. The advertisement specified the same "PREQUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS" in the same work type categories as did the advertisement for the Project at issue here. Potential bidders were given the opportunity to review the RFP and submit questions to the Department. The questions and answers were posted. One question/answer provided as follows: [Question:] The advertisement makes mention of a Maximum Budget for the project. The RFP is silent as to a Maximum Allowable Bid for the project. Is the budget estimate provided in the Advertisement a maximum bid price and will our bid be non-responsive if it is over that amount? [Answer:] No. Technical proposals and bids were submitted by two bidders in response to the solicitation for project E5R48. Following the same selection procedure as for the Project at issue in this case, the technical review committee first reviewed the technical proposal of the bidder with the lower bid, which was in the amount of $798,000. The technical review committee recommended as follows regarding the lower bidder: The Technical submitted by United Infrastructure Group was reviewed and is recommended as non-responsive. United Infrastructure Group did not identify how the advertised prequalification requirement on 9.3--Highway Materials Testing would be met within their Technical. The technical review committee for project E5R48 did not also recommend that the United Infrastructure Group's proposal be declared non-responsive for the additional reason that its bid of $798,000 exceeded the advertised budget amount of $650,000. The technical review committee for project E5R48 then considered the other bidder's proposal, with a bid price of $1,100,000. However, it did not proceed to review that bidder's technical proposal for compliance with technical requirements, for the following reason: The Technical submitted by Superior Construction Company has not been reviewed. The bid submitted by Superior Construction Company is 69% over the Department's advertised Budget Amount. The Technical Review Committee recommends rejecting all bids and readvertising this project. The selection committee for project E5R48 agreed with the technical review committee's recommendations and made the decision to reject all bids and re-advertise. The Department's representative at the final hearing, who served on the selection committees for both bid solicitation rounds for the Daytona Avenue bridge replacement project, confirmed that the selection committee's decision to reject all bids for project E5R48 was not based on a determination that the two bids were "non- responsive" because the bid prices were higher than the advertised budget amount. Instead, the lower bidder for project E5R48 was deemed non-responsive for the same reason that Commercial was deemed non-responsive in this case (non- compliance with all pre-qualification requirements as of the response due date); and the only other bidder proposed a price that was found to be unreasonably high. The Department has the discretion to award contracts when the amounts bid are higher than the advertised budget amounts, absent an RFP specification to the contrary. In deciding whether to exercise that discretion, one factor the Department considers is the magnitude by which the bid price exceeds the advertised budget amount. For project E5R48, after the low bidder was found non-responsive, the only other bid was so much higher than the advertised budget that the Department reasonably exercised its discretion to reject all bids and re-advertise. When bids come in much higher than estimated for a project, the Department will go back to review the engineer's estimate from which the budgeted amount was derived to determine if something needs to be changed in a re-advertisement, such as clarification of the project terms, increase in the budget amount, or both. In this case, the Department clarified the Project terms and increased its budget amount in the re-advertisement of the Project (but not nearly to the level of the very high bid that the Department refused to consider). The Department's exercise of discretion in the prior solicitation round to not consider a bid exceeding the budgeted amount by 69 percent does not dictate that the Department reject Gregori's bid as non-responsive. Instead, the Department's prior practice was shown to be entirely consistent with the Department's exercise of discretion in this case to consider Gregori's bid that was only three percent higher than the advertised budget amount. Petitioner failed to prove any Department's prior practice of rejecting bids as non-responsive when they exceed the advertised budget amount. The evidence showed otherwise. The evidence regarding project E5R48 also demonstrated that the Department's prior practice has been to reject proposals as non-responsive for failure to meet the advertised pre-qualification requirements as of the response submission deadline. That prior practice is consistent with the Department's decision to deem Commercial's proposal non- responsive because the proposal failed to satisfy all of the advertised pre-qualification requirements as of the response submission deadline of June 18, 2012.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Transportation, dismissing the formal protest of Petitioner, Commercial Industrial Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2012.
