The Issue The issue is whether a text amendment to the general description of the Commercial land use designations of the Comprehensive Plan (Plan) of Respondent, City of Jacksonville (City), adopted by Ordinance No. 2010-401-E on June 22, 2010, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties The City is a municipal entity and is responsible for enacting and amending its Plan. Since 2007, the City has participated in the Pilot Program for adoption of comprehensive plan amendments. Except for amendments based on the Evaluation and Appraisal Report or amendments based on new statutory requirements that specifically require that they be adopted under the "traditional" procedure described in section 163.3184, and small-scale amendments, all other amendments must be adopted under that process. Under the Pilot Program, municipalities have "reduced state oversight of local comprehensive planning," and plan amendments may be enacted in "an alternative, expedited plan amendment adoption and review process." § 163.32465, Fla. Stat. Although the City must send a transmittal package to the Department of Community Affairs (Department) and other designated agencies for their preliminary review, the Department does not issue an Objections, Recommendations, and Comments Report or a notice of intent. Instead, the Department "may provide comments regarding the amendment or amendments to the local government." Id. It may also initiate an administrative proceeding to challenge whether an amendment is in compliance. Id. In this case, the Department did not file adverse comments or initiate a challenge to the City's amendment. Clifton Curtis Horton owns real property located at 7175 Blanding Boulevard, Jacksonville, Florida. Horton Enterprises, Inc., is a Florida corporation that owns and operates a "strip club" known as "New Solid Gold" located on Mr. Horton's property. The club is an "adult entertainment establishment" as defined by the Jacksonville Municipal Code (JMC). See §§ 150.103(c) and 656.1101, JMC. History Preceding the Amendment In order to operate an adult entertainment facility within the City, the facility must have both a correct land use and zoning classification. The location must also satisfy certain distance limitations from schools (2,500 feet), other adult entertainment businesses (1,000 feet), churches (1,000 feet), residences (500 feet), and businesses selling alcohol (500 feet). See § 656.1103(a)(1)-(4), JMC; § 847.0134, Fla. Stat. Prior to 2005, adult entertainment facilities were an authorized use in the Heavy Industrial (HI) land use category. In 2005, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2005-1240-E, which approved a text amendment to the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) of the City's 2010 Plan adding the following language to the Community/General Commercial (C/GC) land use category: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right only in Zoning District CCG-2." See Respondent's Exhibit D. That classification is the primary zoning district within the C/GC land use category. The Ordinance also deleted the following language from the HI land use category: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right." Id. The purpose of the amendment was to change the permissible land use designation for adult entertainment facilities from HI to C/GC with a further condition that the property must also have a CCG-2 zoning classification. At the same time, the City enacted Ordinance No. 2005-743-E, which adopted a new zoning requirement that any adult entertainment facility whose location was not in conformity with the revised land use/zoning scheme must close or relocate within five years, or no later than November 10, 2010. See § 656.725(k), JMC. Because New Solid Gold did not conform to these new requirements, it would have to close or relocate within the five-year timeframe. On an undisclosed date, Horton Enterprises, Inc., and two other plaintiffs (one who operated another adult entertainment facility in the City and one who wished to open a new facility) filed suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of the City's adult zoning scheme and seeking to enjoin the five-year amortization requirement, as applied to them. See Jacksonville Property Rights Ass'n v. City of Jacksonville, Case No. 3:05-cv-1267-J-34JRK (U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Fla.). On September 30, 2009, the United States District Court entered a 33-page Order generally determining that, with one exception not relevant here, the City's zoning and land use scheme was permissible. See Petitioners' Exhibit V. On November 3, 2009, that Order was appealed by Petitioners to the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit where the case remains pending at this time. The parties' Stipulation indicates that oral argument before that Court was scheduled during the week of December 13, 2010. An Order of the lower court memorialized an agreement by the parties that the five- year time period for complying with the new requirements are stayed until the federal litigation is concluded. See Petitioners' Exhibit JJ. The Court's Order also noted that an "ambiguity" in the Plan arose because the City failed to "remove the language in the general description of the Commercial land use designations acknowledging its intention to locate adult entertainment facilities in the HI category." Id. at 19. This occurred because when adopting the new amendments, the City overlooked conflicting language in the general description of the Commercial land use designations in the FLUE. However, the Court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the City on the theory that the conflicting language was contrary to the City's overall legislative intent in adopting the new land use/zoning scheme and could be disregarded. Id. Thereafter, a new amendment process was begun by the City to delete the conflicting language. This culminated in the present dispute. The Transmittal Amendment - 2010-35-E To eliminate the ambiguity, the City proposed to amend the FLUE by deleting the following language from the general description of the Commercial land use designations: "Adult entertainment facilities are allowed by right in the heavy industrial land use category, but not in commercial." This amendment was numbered as Ordinance No. 2010-35-E. A public workshop was conducted by the City's Planning and Development Department on December 14, 2009. Thereafter, public hearings were conducted by the City Planning Commission on February 11, 2010; by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on February 17, 2010; and by the full City Council on February 9 and 23, 2010. It became effective upon the Mayor signing the Ordinance on February 26, 2010. Although the Ordinance inadvertently referenced section 163.3184 as the statutory authority for its adoption, it also stated that the amendment was being transmitted for review "through the State's Pilot Program." See Petitioners' Exhibit E. As required by the Pilot Program, copies of the amendment were then transmitted to the Department and seven other agencies. No adverse comments were received from any agency. It is undisputed that Petitioners did not attend the the workshop or any hearing, and they did not submit written or oral comments concerning the proposed amendment. When the process for adopting Ordinance No. 2010-35-E began, the City's 2030 Plan was still being reviewed by the Department and had not yet become effective. Consequently, at the Department's direction, the Ordinance referenced the City's then-effective 2010 Plan as the Plan being amended. On February 3, 2010, the City's 2030 Comprehensive Plan became effective, replacing the 2010 Plan. However, the 2030 Plan contained the same conflicting language. Notice of the public hearings for Ordinance No. 2010- 35-E (and other plan amendments adopted at the same time) was published in the Daily Record on January 29, 2010, a local newspaper that the City has used for advertising plan amendments since at least 2003. The parties agree that the legal advertisements complied with the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. Besides the above notice, an additional notice regarding Ordinance No. 2010-35-E was published in the Florida Times Union on January 31, 2010. The parties agree that this advertisement did not meet the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. but was published by the City for the purpose of providing additional public notice and to broaden the coverage of the plan amendment. The Adoption Amendment - 2010-401-E Because the 2030 Plan contained the same conflicting language in the Commercial land use descriptions, on May 25, 2010, a draft of Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was introduced at City Council for the purpose of deleting this language. Except for referencing the latest Plan, the language in Ordinance Nos. 2010-35-E and 2010-401-E was identical. While somewhat unusual, this procedure was authorized by the Department because the 2030 Plan became effective during the middle of the amendment process. A copy of the draft Ordinance and schedule for the upcoming hearings on that Ordinance was emailed by the City's counsel to Petitioners' counsel on June 4, 2010. See Petitioners' Exhibit FF. Public hearings on Ordinance No. 2010-401-E were conducted by the Planning Commission on June 10, 2010; by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on June 15, 2010; and by the full City Council on June 8 and 22, 2010. All of the meetings occurred after Petitioners' counsel was given a schedule of the hearings. The amendment became effective upon the Mayor signing the Ordinance on June 24, 2010. Notice of the public hearings for Ordinance No. 2010- 401-E was published in the Daily Record on May 28, 2010. The parties agree that the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. were met. An additional notice of the public hearings was published in the Florida Times Union on May 30, 2010. The parties agree that this legal advertisement did not meet the size, font, and appearance requirements of section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., but was published by the City for the purpose of providing additional public notice and to broaden the coverage of the plan amendment. Ordinance No. 2010-401-E, as originally proposed, incorrectly referenced section 163.3184, rather than the Pilot Program, as the statutory authority for adopting the amendment. During the hearing conducted by the City Council Land Use and Zoning Committee on June 15, 2010, an amendment to Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was proposed changing the statutory authority to section 163.32465. The City proposed the same amendment for 19 other plan amendments being considered at the same hearing. The amendment was minor in nature and had no effect on the substance of the Ordinance. It is undisputed that Petitioners did not appear or submit written or oral comments at any public hearing regarding Ordinance No. 2010-401-E. On July 21, 2010, Petitioners timely filed their Petition with DOAH challenging Ordinance No. 2010-401-E. Their objections, as later refined in the Stipulation, are both procedural and substantive in nature and are discussed separately below. Petitioners' Objections Substantive Objections As stated in the Stipulation, Petitioners contend that the amendment is not in compliance because it "is inconsistent with the balance of the 2030 Comprehensive Plan, and underlying municipal policies, since it forces adult uses into zones which permit residential and educational uses." To support this claim, Petitioners point out that the C/GC land use category permits a wide range of uses, including commercial uses in close proximity to sensitive uses, such as schools, churches, and residential areas. Petitioners characterize the current range of uses in C/GC as "an excellent planning approach to downtown Jacksonville" and one that promotes a well-reasoned, mixed-use development in the urban area. Because Ordinance No. 2010-401-E "forces" adult uses into the C/GC category where, despite the distance limitations, they will have to co-exist with sensitive uses, Petitioners contend the amendment is inconsistent with Policy (15)(b)3. and Goal (16) of the State Comprehensive Plan, which generally encourage orderly, efficient, and functional development in the urban areas of the City. Further, they assert it would contradict the City's "policy" of separating adult uses from residences, businesses, and schools. Petitioners' primary fear is that if they are required to relocate from HI to C/GC where sensitive uses are allowed, this will generate more complaints from schools, churches, and residents, and result in further zoning changes by the City and more forced relocations. As explained by Mr. Killingsworth, Director of the City's Planning and Development Department, Ordinance No. 2010- 401-E does not change the permitted uses in the Commercial or HI land use categories. Those changes in permitted uses were made by Ordinance No. 2005-1240-E in 2005 and are now being litigated in federal court. The purpose of the new amendment is simply "to clear up an inconsistency [noted by the federal court but told that it could be disregarded] that existed in the comprehensive plan." Mr. Killingsworth added that even if the language remained in the Plan, it would have no regulatory weight since the actual language in the C/GC and HI categories, and not the "header" or general description that precedes the category, governs the uses allowed in those designations. Assuming arguendo that the new amendment constitutes a change in permitted uses, the City established that from a use standpoint, adult entertainment facilities (like businesses selling alcohol) are more consistent with the C/GC land use category with the appropriate distance limitations from schools, churches, and residential areas. Further, the placement of adult entertainment facilities on property with a C/GC designation will not necessarily result in their being closer to residential property, as the City currently has a "great deal" of HI land directly adjacent to residential properties, as well as grandfathered enclaves of residential areas within the HI category. The City also established that the HI category is set aside for uses that generate physical or environmental impacts, which are significantly different from the "impacts" of a strip club. Finally, while a plan amendment compliance determination does not turn on zoning issues, it is noteworthy that the CCG-2 zoning district is the City's most intensive commercial district, and that very few schools (all grandfathered) remain within that zoning classification. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the amendment is consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan and internally consistent with the "balance of the 2030 Comprehensive Plan." Procedural Objections Petitioners' principal argument is that the City did not publish a notice for either Ordinance in a newspaper of general circulation, as described in section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., or in the proper location of the newspaper; that these deficiencies violate both state law and a Department rule regarding notice for the adoption of this type of plan amendment; and that these procedural errors require a determination that the amendment is not in compliance. They also contend that because the legal notice did not strictly comply with sections 163.3184(15)(e) and 166.041(3)(c)2.b., both Ordinances are void ab initio.2 As noted above, the City has published legal notices for plan amendments in the Daily Record since at least 2003. The newspaper is published daily Monday through Friday; it has been published continuously for 98 years; it is published wholly in English; it is mailed to 37 zip codes throughout the City and around 20 zip codes outside the City; most of its revenue is derived from classified and legal advertisements; it is considered by the United States Postal Service to be a general circulation newspaper; it is available in newsstands throughout the City; and although much of the newspaper is directed to the business, legal, and financial communities, the newspaper also routinely contains articles and editorial content regarding special events, sporting news, political news, educational programs, and other matters of general interest pertaining to the City that would be of interest to the general public and not just one professional or occupational group. Its publisher acknowledges that the newspaper is a "Chapter 50 periodical," referring to chapter 50 and specifically section 50.031, which describes the minimum standards for newspapers that can be utilized for publishing certain legal notices. Also, its website states that it covers political, business, and legal news and developments in the greater Jacksonville area with an emphasis on downtown. Although Petitioners contend that the legal notice was published in a portion of the Daily Record where other legal notices and classified advertisements appear, as proscribed by section 166.041(3)(c)2.b., and is thus defective, this allegation was not raised in the Petition or specifically in the parties' Stipulation. Therefore, the issue has been waived. Both proposed recommended orders are largely devoted to the issue of whether the Daily Record is a newspaper of general paid circulation as defined in section 166.041(3)(c)2.b. For the reasons expressed in the Conclusions of Law, it is unnecessary to decide that question in order to resolve the notice issue. Petitioners received written notice that the City intended to adopt Ordinance No. 2010-401-E prior to the public hearings, along with a copy of the draft Ordinance and "everything" in the City's file. They also received a copy of all scheduled hearings during the adoption process. See Petitioners' Exhibits EE and FF. Therefore, notwithstanding any alleged deficiency in the published legal notice, they were on notice that the City intended to adopt the plan amendment; they were aware of the dates on which public hearings would be conducted; and they had an opportunity to submit oral or written comments in opposition to the amendment and to otherwise participate in the adoption process. Given these facts, even assuming arguendo that the publication of the legal notice in the Daily Record constitutes a procedural error, there is no evidence that Petitioners were substantially prejudiced in any way. Petitioners also contend that reference by the City to section 163.3184, rather than the Pilot Program, in the draft ordinance during the preliminary stages of the amendment process is a procedural error that rises to the level of requiring a determination that the amendment is not in compliance. This argument is rejected as the error was minor in nature, it was corrected shortly after Ordinance No. 2010-401-E was introduced, it did not affect the substance of the amendment, and it would not confuse a member of the public who was tracking the amendment as to the timing and forum in which to file a challenge. In Petitioners' case, they cannot claim to be confused since they timely filed a Petition with DOAH, as required by section 163.32465(6)(a). Finally, intertwined with the procedural arguments is the issue of whether Petitioners are affected persons and thus have standing to challenge the plan amendment. The parties have stipulated that Petitioners (or their representative) did not attend any meeting regarding the adoption of either Ordinance. Petitioners argue, however, that emails between the parties in May and June 2010, and a telephone conference call on June 3, 2010, involving Petitioners' counsel and the City's then Deputy General Counsel, equate to the submission of written and oral comments regarding the amendment. The parties have stipulated that the following written communications between Petitioners and the City occurred in May and June 2010: Petitioners made a public records request regarding the amendment on May 21, 2010, to Cheryl Brown, Council Secretary/Director, seeking various public documents relating to Ordinance No. 2010-35-E, transmitted by electronic mail and facsimile. On May 27, 2010, counsel for Petitioners exchanged emails with Assistant General Counsel Dylan Reingold regarding pending document requests relating to Ordinance No. 2010-35-E, and Mr. Reingold provided a number of responsive documents. On June 3, 2010, Cindy A. Laquidara, then Deputy General Counsel (but now General Counsel), sent an email to Petitioners' counsel stating: "Below please find the schedule for the passage of the comp plan changes. Call me with questions or to discuss. Take care." On June 4, 2010, counsel for Petitioners exchanged a series of emails with Assistant General Counsel Reingold regarding the status of Ordinance Nos. 2010-35-E and 2010-401-E, as well as the review of the proposed plan amendment by the Department of Community Affairs. On June 4, 2010, Jessica Aponte, a legal assistant with counsel for Petitioners' office, exchanged emails with Jessica Stephens, legislative assistant, regarding the proofs of publication for the legal advertisements relating to Ordinance No. 2010- 35-E. The affidavits of Petitioners' counsel (Petitioners' Exhibits KK and LL) regarding a conversation with the City's then Deputy General Counsel would normally be treated as hearsay and could not, by themselves, be used as a basis for a finding of fact. See § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. However, the parties have stipulated that they may be used in lieu of live testimony by Petitioners' counsel. See Stipulation, p. 17. The affidavits indicate that the reason for the conference call was "that [Petitioners] were trying to reach a mutually acceptable approach with the City by which enforcement of the City of Jacksonville's amortization ordinance against [them] . . . would be deferred pending the outcome of the appeal to the Eleventh Circuit." Petitioners' Exhibits KK and LL. During that call, counsel also advised the City's counsel that "there were [procedural] problems with the enactment of the subject Comprehensive Plan Amendment and that they would likely be filing challenges to its enactment." Id.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2010-401-E is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2011.
The Issue The issue is whether to approve Petitioners' application for a beneficial use determination (BUD) on their property in Key Largo, Florida, and if approved, to determine the type of relief that is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners purchased their property in September 2006 for $60,000.00 (or at the peak of the Florida housing boom). The parcel is located at the corner of Meridian Avenue and Lycaloma Avenue, mile marker 94.5, on the Gulf of Mexico side of U.S. Highway 1 in Key Largo. It is also identified as Block 9, Lot 1, Section 3 of the Bay Haven Subdivision, an older, partially-developed subdivision comprised of four sections and several hundred lots. Since September 15, 1986, the subdivision, including Petitioners' lot, has been zoned Suburban Residential (SR), which allows only one residential unit per two acres. No challenge to that action was taken by any person, and no contention has been made that the County failed to follow the established procedure for adopting its LDRs. A challenge to the validity of the LDRs is now barred by the statute of limitations.1 See § 95.11(3)(p), Fla. Stat. The Bay Haven Subdivision is located in South Key Largo and was first platted after World War II. Building permits for all existing homes in the subdivision were applied for before the zoning change became effective in September 1986. Due to the SR restrictions, around 250 lots remain vacant at this time, including 99 in Section 3 where Petitioners' lot is located. Many of these vacant lots have been deeded by their owners to the County for conservation purposes in exchange for points that can be used with a Rate of Growth Ordinance (ROGO)2 allocation to develop other property in the County. Petitioners' corner lot lies at the intersection of two streets and has an irregular shape with a large radius at the intersection. It is bordered on two sides by single-family homes, measures 8,276 square feet, or around 0.19 acres, and is somewhat larger than the typical subdivision lot size of 5,000 square feet. Mr. Beauchamp, who resides in Wisconsin, testified that he purchased the property with the expectation of building a home when he retired as an air traffic controller. Before purchasing the property, he assumed that it was zoned Improved Subdivision (IS) because this was the zoning incorrectly shown on the multiple listing service sheet provided by his realtor. Neither Mr. Beauchamp nor his realtor was familiar with County zoning classifications or permissible uses for the parcel.3 Sometime in 2006 they visited a County office to secure further information. Mr. Beauchamp says they spoke with two unidentified "planners," who told them that a single-family home could be built on the property. However, nothing was confirmed in writing, and there is no record of the meeting. Other than this meeting, neither Mr. Beauchamp nor his realtor took any other steps to verify the zoning on the property and/or any development restrictions that might apply. Based solely on the oral advice given by these two unnamed County employees, the Beauchamps purchased the lot. According to Petitioners' expert, Robert Smith, before purchasing a vacant lot in the Keys, normal due diligence would require a prospective purchaser to arrange a pre-application conference with Planning Department staff and secure a written Letter of Understanding confirming the rights of the property owner. See § 110-3, M.C.C. However, Petitioners (and their realtor) did not complete appropriate due diligence; they simply checked with an unidentified County employee and without any other assurance purchased the property.4 In May 2012, Petitioners' agent, Randy Wall, a builder and former Planning Commissioner but not an attorney, met with a representative of the County Building Department to begin the process of securing approval to build a single-family residence on the property. Mr. Wall was advised that the zoning on the property was SR, which allows only one dwelling unit per two acres. This was confirmed in an email dated July 13, 2012, from the Assistant Director of Planning, which stated as follows: The parcel has a zoning designation of SR which requires Two (2) acres per residential unit. As noted by planning staff, this parcel does not have sufficient land area for the zoning and associated density. At the meeting, Mr. Wall also inquired about the possibility of changing the zoning on the property from SR to IS (which would allow construction of a single-family home), but decided not to pursue that option because he recognized the poor prospects of securing a zoning change for a single lot in a large subdivision, when scores of other lots were subject to the same restriction. He assumed, probably correctly, that this might invite a spot zoning challenge. Other than having a discussion with County representatives, Mr. Wall did nothing more. He did not file an application for a residential dwelling unit allocation under the County's ROGO process, or any other formal application for relief, such as a change in the zoning district or land use designation, a variance, or an exception. Believing that the County staff would "fix the problem" because the County had made "a mistake" in reclassifying the entire subdivision as SR, Mr. Wall prepared and filed a BUD application, which was eventually deemed to be complete on September 27, 2013. The BUD process is intended "to provide a means to resolve a landowner's claim that a [LDR] or comprehensive plan policy has had an unconstitutional effect on property in a nonjudicial forum." § 102-103(a), M.C.C. An applicant for a BUD must include a statement "describing the [LDR], comprehensive plan policy, or other final action of the county, which the applicant believes necessitates relief under this division." § 102-105(b)(5), M.C.C. The application at issue simply stated that "the adoption of the land use designation of SR for the subdivision of Bay Haven constituted a compensable taking." The application did not refer to any comprehensive plan policy or final action taken by the County. As relief, the application requested that the County take one of the two following actions: (a) change the Future Land Use Map and zoning designations to allow a residence to be built on the lot; or (b) notwithstanding the SR zoning, issue a permit for development. The BUD process requires applicants to state whether they are alleging a facial or as-applied regulatory taking as the basis for administrative relief. See § 102-104, M.C.C. Unless a landowner asserts that a LDR or comprehensive plan provision, on its face, has caused a taking of his property, relief is permitted only after "the landowner has received a final decision on development approval applications from the county, including building permit allocation system allocations, appeals, administrative relief pursuant to section 138-54, and other available relief, exceptions, or variances." Id. Mr. Wall did not formally apply for any type of development approval and received no final decision, as contemplated by the Code. However, Mr. Wall testified that he "understood" the County was waiving that requirement in this instance. He also stated in the application that "Joe Haberman contracted [sic] the Beauchamps and informed them that staff had deemed this phase unnecessary and to move directly to submitting a [BUD] application." Other than this assertion, there is no evidence to confirm this understanding, and the County's Principal Planner testified that a waiver had not been granted. She also confirmed that no development approval application had been filed, and no final decision had been made, both required by the Code in order to seek relief under an "as applied" theory. Therefore, rightly or wrongly, as plainly stated in the application, Petitioners' basis for relief is that the LDR on its face constitutes a taking of their property.5 Besides a single-family home, which is impermissible here due to size limitations of the lot, two other uses are permitted as of right in the SR district: community parks and beekeeping. See § 130-94, M.C.C. Also, a property owner may apply for a minor conditional use, subject to approval by the Planning Director. Permissible minor conditional uses include public or private community tennis courts and swimming pools; public buildings and uses; parks and community uses; institutional uses; and churches, synagogues, and houses of worship. Id. However, Mr. Beauchamp testified that he is not interested in any of these uses since he believes most, if not all, would be offensive to a residential neighborhood or simply impractical due to the size of his lot. The property can also be sold to the owners of adjacent Lot 11 to be used as a side yard, its use before being purchased by Petitioners. Finally, the Principal Planner testified that there are transferable development rights (TDRs) on the property, whose value at this time is unknown. See § 130-160, M.C.C. Therefore, the Beauchamps are not deprived of all economically beneficial use of their property. Cf. § 102-110(c), M.C.C. ("[t]he highest, common, or expected use, is not intended as an appropriate remedy, unless expressly required by applicable statute or case law"). There was no evidence from a property appraiser on the fair market value of the parcel, as encumbered by the regulation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of County Commissioners deny Petitioners' application for relief under the BUD Ordinance. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether the plan amendment adopted by Escambia County (County) by Ordinance No. 2017-53 on September 7, 2017, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner owns real property and resides in the County. She submitted written comments to the County during the adoption phase of the amendment. She is an affected person within the meaning of section 163.3184(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The County is a local government that is subject to the requirements of chapter 163, Florida Statutes. A sector plan is the process in which the local government engages in long-term planning for an area of at least 5,000 acres. §§ 163.3164(42) and 163.3245(1), Fla. Stat. It involves two levels of planning: a) a long-term master plan, and b) a Detailed Specific Area Plan (DSAP), which implements the master plan. A DSAP is created for an area that is at least 1,000 acres and identifies the distribution, extent, and location of future uses and public facilities. § 163.3245(3), Fla. Stat. While the DSAP is created by a local development order that is not subject to state compliance review, an amendment to an adopted sector plan is a plan amendment reviewed under the State Coordinated Review process. § 163.3184(2)(c), Fla. Stat. The development standards in the DSAP are separate and distinct from the development standards in non-sector plan properties. On June 3, 2010, the County approved Ordinance No. 2010-16, which adopted Evaluation and Appraisal Report-based amendments to the Plan, including a new Optional Sector Plan (OSP). The Ordinance was challenged by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) and assigned DOAH Case No. 10-6857GM. In response to the DCA challenge, on February 3, 2011, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2011-3 as a stipulated remedial amendment. The Ordinance establishes a long-term master plan for central Escambia County known as the Mid-West Escambia County Sector Plan (Sector Plan). The Sector Plan is comprised of approximately 15,000 acres, north of Interstate 10, west of Highway 29, and south of Highway 196. The area is depicted on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) as the OSP. The DCA determined the Ordinance to be in compliance. To implement the long-term master plan, on September 9, 2011, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2011-29, which establishes two DSAPs: Muskogee DSAP and Jacks Branch DSAP. Petitioner's residence and the subject property are located within the Jacks Branch DSAP. State compliance review of that action under section 163.3184(3) or (4) was not required. In 2011, the Legislature created the right to opt out or withdraw from a sector plan. See § 163.3245(8), Fla. Stat. This can be accomplished "only with the approval of the local government by plan amendment adopted and reviewed pursuant to s. 163.3184." Id. In response to the statutory amendment, the County adopted a plan amendment which provides that any additions to, or deletions from, a DSAP must follow the established procedures in the Plan. See Ex. 40, p. 14. In order to consolidate the County zoning districts, on April 16, 2015, the County adopted Ordinance No. 2015-12, which repealed the entire Land Development Code (LDC) and replaced it with a new LDC, which has a county-wide rezoning plan. After the first (and only) application to opt out of the Sector Plan was filed by a property owner, on March 16, 2017, the County amended the LDC through Ordinance No. 2017-14, which establishes seven criteria for evaluating this type of request. See LDC, § 2-7.4. The Ordinance was not challenged. According to the County, the criteria were actually drafted by the Department of Economic Opportunity (DEO) and require it to consider the following: All standard Comprehensive Plan map criteria; Comprehensive Plan requirement for changes to an existing DSAP; The size of the subject parcel in relation to the individual DSAP land use category and in relation to the overall Sector Plan, to specifically include the aggregate acreage of any previously granted opt-outs; The existing transportation infrastructure and any impact the proposed opt-out may have on the capacity of the infrastructure; The underlying existing zoning category and its compatibility with surrounding DSAP land use designations; The consistency of the requested future land use designation with the underlying zoning; and The previous future land use designation. Besides the foregoing criteria, subsection 2-7.4(b) provides that when the County reviews an opt-out application: [t]o the extent possible, the staff analysis and the reviewing bodies shall consider whether the applicant lost development rights or was effectively downzoned as part of the Sector Plan adoption. The Board may take into consideration any other relevant factors in making its determination related to the request. Once a parcel is removed from the County's Sector Plan, the underlying zoning that was in effect when the Sector Plan was created remains the same, but a new future land use (FLU) category must be assigned to the property by a plan amendment. § 163.3245(8), Fla. Stat. Withdrawing from a DSAP does not modify the DSAP because the DSAP is the development standard itself. The Property The parcel lies on the eastern edge of the DSAP about ten miles north of Interstate 10 on the northwest corner of Highway 29 and Neal Road. Highway 29 is a major four-lane arterial road running in a north-south direction with a median in the middle. The road is maintained by the state. Neal Road is a small, two-lane County road that intersects with Highway 29 from the west and provides access to a residential area where Petitioner resides. Existing commercial development is located on the east side of Highway 29. Most recently, a Family Dollar Store was developed directly across the street from the property. Currently, the parcel is vacant and lies in the Conservation Neighborhood District, which permits a maximum density of three dwelling units per gross acre and is the lowest density of residential development allowed in the Sector Plan. Only residential uses are allowed in the district, which is intended to treat stormwater and preserve open space and wildlife. Based on maps of the area, Petitioner's property appears to be no more than one-half mile west of the subject property. The character of the area in Petitioner's neighborhood is low-density residential development. Before the Sector Plan was adopted, the assigned land use on the parcel was MU-S. This use is intended for "a mix of residential and non-residential uses while promoting compatible infill development and the separation of urban and suburban land uses." Its express purpose is to serve as a mixed-use area. As described by a County witness, "the mixed-use aspect of it allows a non-residential component first, but, again, it's predominately residential, low-density residential." The range of allowable uses includes residential, retail services, professional office, recreational facilities, and public and civic, with a maximum intensity of a 1.0 floor area ratio. Until the Sector Plan was created, the parcel was zoned as Gateway Business District (GBD). Under the new rezoning plan established in 2015, all parcels outside the Sector Plan which were zoned GBD were consolidated with similar zoning categories into the new district of Heavy Commercial/ Light Industrial (HC/LI). Permitted uses under this district are residential, retail sales, retail services, public and civic, recreation and entertainment, industrial and related, agricultural and related, and "other uses," such as billboards, outdoor sales, trade shops, warehouses, and the like. Once a parcel is withdrawn from the Sector Plan, it retains the underlying zoning in effect when the DSAP was established. Because the new zoning scheme consolidates GBD into HC/LI, the parcel will revert to HC/LI. Therefore, the zoning and land use will be the same as they were before the Sector Plan was created. This combination is not unusual, as there are "multiple parcels" outside the DSAP that have this zoning/land use pairing. The Challenged Amendment In June 2016, the property owner filed an application with the County requesting that his parcel be removed from the Mid-West Sector Plan. At that time, neither the County nor the applicant realized that a new land use must be assigned. Consequently, no request for a new land use was made. Because this was the first time an opt-out application had been filed with any local government, the County had a series of meetings with DEO seeking guidance on how to proceed. It was told by DEO that the opt-out application and a FLU change should be processed in the same manner as a FLUM amendment and then reviewed under the State Coordinated Review process. DEO also provided suggested criteria that should be considered when processing such an application. These criteria were adopted as new LDC section 2-7.4. The County followed all steps suggested by DEO. DEO instructed the County to require a second application from the property owner, which included a request for a new land use category. After the second application was filed, the County began the process of determining whether the application satisfied the opt-out criteria in section 2-7.4 and relevant Plan requirements. The second application addressed the FLU requirement and contained the analysis required for each component of the Plan. A future land use of Mixed-Use Urban (MU-U) was initially requested by the owner. This category is consistent with HC/LI zoning, but is a much more intense land use category than MU-S. Because of concerns that the MU-U land use would not be compatible with the surrounding neighborhood in the DSAP, the County changed the proposed new land use to MU-S, the use assigned to the property before the Sector Plan was adopted. MU-S is the same land use assigned to other non-Sector Plan parcels surrounding the subject property, and there are non- industrial uses within the HC/LI zoning district that are consistent with MU-S. If the application is approved, only 25 potential residential units will be removed from the total Sector Plan, and the reduction in total developable area will be de minimis. Except for a change to the DSAP map and the acreage table, no changes to the text of the DSAP are made. During the application process, the County addressed natural resources, wetlands, historically significant sites, and impacts on the environment. The County also evaluated the application in light of the criteria found in section 2-7.4 and determined that, as a whole, it satisfied those requirements. See Cnty. Ex. 34, pp. 28-39. Because a proposed use of the property was not submitted with the application, an analysis of a specific use was not made. When a site plan to develop the property is filed, the proposed use will be evaluated by the Development Review Committee, and then by the Board of County Commissioners. That review will ensure that the intended development will not be inconsistent with the zoning district and land use assigned to the parcel. The opt-out request was debated extensively during a series of ten public hearings that began in September 2016. Members of the public were allowed to speak for or against the proposal. On September 7, 2017, the County voted to amend the Plan by (a) allowing the parcel to withdraw from the OSP, removing the Sector Plan overlay on the parcel, and amending the FLUM by assigning the property a MU-S land use designation. No other changes were made. The amendment does not create a remnant area or fragmented DSAP. The amendment was transmitted to DEO for review under the State Coordinated Review process. DEO determined it met the requirements of chapter 163 for compliance purposes. The State Coordinated Review is more comprehensive than the Expedited Review process under section 163.3184(3). On November 8, 2017, a Notice of Intent to find the amendment in compliance was issued by DEO. See Cnty. Ex. 39. Petitioner filed her Petition within 30 days after the Ordinance was adopted, but before DEO issued its Notice of Intent. Therefore, it was timely. Besides DEO's review, the Department of Transportation and Department of Education reviewed the proposal for impacts on transportation and school concurrency, respectively. No further information was requested from the County by any agency. Petitioner's Objections In the parties' Pre-hearing Stipulation, Petitioner raises a procedural objection to the manner in which the withdrawal application was adopted. She also alleges generally that the amendment creates inconsistent and incompatible zoning and future land use pairing in violation of sections 163.3177(2) and 163.3194(1); is inconsistent with the FLU Element; conflicts with statutory provisions regarding compatibility of adjacent land uses; and lacks sufficient data and analysis required by section 163.3177(1)(f). These contentions, and others not directly related to a compliance challenge, are addressed below. Petitioner first contends an opt-out application must be adopted by a local development order, rather than by a plan amendment. She argues the County erred by not providing her the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at the adoption hearing and failing to subject the proposal to more "intense review and analysis." The quasi-judicial process requires strict scrutiny of a local government's action, rather than a fairly debatable standard of review, and provides third parties the right to challenge the local government's decision in circuit court, rather than in a section 163.3184 proceeding. This contention has been rejected and is addressed in the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner contends approval of the application will lead to further requests by other property owners to opt out of the Sector Plan. Currently, there are over 1,000 property owners in the Sector Plan. During the County hearings, staff identified 24 or 25 other properties that might choose to file an opt-out application in the future. Whether those owners will do so is no more than speculation at this point. The County responds that it will evaluate each application on a case-by- case basis. A case-by-case analysis is necessary because an application involving a large parcel of property would clearly have a different analysis than one which involves only 8.67 acres. More importantly, because the opt-out process is a statutory right created by the Legislature, the County is obligated to consider every opt-out application filed, and if it satisfies the applicable criteria, it must be approved. In any event, there is nothing in sections 163.3184 or 163.3245 which requires the local government to deny an application merely because another property owner might file a similar application at some point in the future. Petitioner contends the County acted "unreasonably" because it did not establish opt-out criteria until after the application was filed. The County's action was reasonable under the circumstances because it had no standards or precedent for reviewing this type of application; at the direction of DEO, the criteria were adopted before final action on the application was taken; and the criteria were considered by the County. Petitioner contends the criteria in section 2-7.4 are vague and lack specific, objective evaluation standards. However, Ordinance No. 2017-14 was never challenged and is presumed to be valid. Petitioner contends HC/LI zoning is inconsistent with the MU-S land use and violates sections 163.3177(2) and 163.3194(1)(b).1/ Those provisions require generally that zoning regulations and land uses be consistent with one another and the elements of the Plan. The zoning and land use will be the same as existed before the Sector Plan was adopted. They correlate with the zoning and land use on numerous other non-Sector Plan parcels in the immediate area and throughout the County. MU-S contemplates a mixed-use area, while HC/LI contains a variety of residential, commercial, and industrial uses. Although industrial uses are inconsistent with the land use, see Endnote 1, there are many other uses within the zoning district that are compatible with MU-S. It is fairly debatable that the zoning and land use designation are compatible. FLU Objective 1.3 provides that future land use designations should "discourage urban sprawl, promote mixed use, compact development in urban areas, and support development compatible with the protection and preservation of rural areas." By allowing more intensive development next to the Conservation Neighborhood District, Petitioner contends the plan amendment is inconsistent with this directive because it encourages urban sprawl. "Sprawl" is defined in chapter 3 of the Plan as [h]aphazard growth of dispersed, leap- frog and strip development in suburbs and rural areas and along highways; typically, sprawl is automobile-dependent, single use, resource-consuming, and low-density development in previously rural areas and disconnected from existing development and infrastructure. The parcels on the east side of Highway 29 have similar zoning and land uses as the subject property and are interspersed with commercial development. Therefore, future development on the subject property would not be "disconnected from existing development and infrastructure," and it would not leap-frog into non-developed areas. It is fairly debatable that the plan amendment does not encourage urban sprawl. Petitioner contends the underlying zoning on the parcel is incompatible with the land use in her neighborhood. Although the County considered this issue, it points out that the Sector Plan and Comprehensive Plan have different development standards, and therefore there is no requirement that it consider the compatibility of non-Sector Plan property with property in the DSAP. Moreover, to restore the property rights that an owner once had, when the withdrawal application is approved, the property should revert to the underlying zoning in existence when the Sector Plan was established. Notwithstanding the foregoing, LDC section 2-7.4(a)5. requires that when reviewing an opt-out application, the County must consider "[t]he underlying existing zoning category and its compatibility with surrounding DSAP land use designations." To this end, the County addressed this factor by assigning a less intense MU-S land use to the parcel so that more intense uses allowed by HC/LI would be prohibited or minimized. It is fairly datable that the underlying zoning will be compatible with the neighboring area. Petitioner contends the amendment is not supported by data and analysis, as required by section 163.3177(1)(f). Prior to adopting the amendment, the County staff made a qualitative and quantitative analysis of impacts on natural resources, wetlands, historically significant sites, the environment, and adjacent lands. Because Highway 29 is a state road, the County has limited planning responsibilities for traffic impacts. Even so, a limited analysis of traffic impacts is found in County Exhibit 17. In addition, the Department of Transportation performed a more complete analysis of traffic impacts attributable to the amendment. Because the parcel is currently vacant, traffic impacts on Neal Road cannot be fully analyzed until a site plan is filed. A review of school concurrency issues was performed by the Department of Education and no adverse comments were submitted. The County verified that Emerald Coast Utility Authority had available water, sewer, and garbage capacity to serve the parcel. Finally, the County took into account the fact that removal of such a small parcel from the edge of the eastern side of the Sector Plan would have minimal, if any, effect on the Sector Plan goals and objectives. It is fairly debatable that the amendment is supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis. All other contentions not specifically discussed have been considered and rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that the plan amendment adopted by Ordinance No. 2017-53 is in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2018.
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether the amendments to the Palm Beach County Comprehensive Plan (“the Comp Plan”) adopted by the Board of County Commissioners of Palm Beach County by Ordinance No. 14-030 (“Proposed Amendments”) are “in compliance,” as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2014).
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Alerts of PBC, Inc. (“Alerts”), is a Florida not-for-profit corporation doing business in Palm Beach County. Alerts made timely objections and comments to the County on the Proposed Amendments. Petitioner Patricia Curry is a resident and landowner in Palm Beach County. Ms. Curry made timely objections and comments to the County on the Proposed Amendments. Petitioner Robert Schutzer is a resident and landowner in Palm Beach County. Mr. Schutzer made timely objections and comments to the County on the Proposed Amendments. Petitioner Karen Schutzer is a resident and landowner in Palm Beach County. Ms. Schutzer made timely objections and comments to the County on the Proposed Amendments. Respondent Palm Beach County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida and has adopted the Comp Plan, which it amends from time to time pursuant to section 163.3184. Intervenor Minto is a Florida limited liability company doing business in Palm Beach County. Minto is the owner of all of the 3,788.6 acres (“the Property”) which are the subject of the Proposed Amendments, with the exception of two parcels totaling 40.04 acres, which are owned by the Seminole Improvement District. Minto appointed the board of supervisors of the Seminole Improvement District pursuant to state law. Background FLUE Objective 1.1 establishes a unique Managed Growth Tier System “to protect viable existing neighborhoods and communities and direct the location and timing of future development.” The Property is located in the County’s Rural Tier and is bounded by Exurban Tier to the north and east. North of the Property is a large subdivision known as the Acreage, which was described by Respondents as “antiquated” because it was developed in a manner that was common decades ago before modern community planning concepts and growth management laws. The Acreage is dominated by 1.25-acre residential lots, laid out in a grid pattern with few other uses. Although the residents of the Acreage have a strong sense of community, it is apparently a matter of aesthetics, familiarity, and social intercourse, because the Acreage is not a community in the modern planning sense of providing a mix of uses where residents can live, shop, work, and play. It is a development pattern that is now discouraged by state law and the Comp Plan, because it is inefficient with respect to the provision and use of public services. The Property and the Acreage are within a 57,000-acre area known as the Central Western Communities (“CWC"). The CWC has been the subject of extensive planning efforts by the County for many years to address land use imbalances in the area. There are many residential lots, but few non-residential uses to serve the residents. In 2008, the previous owner of the Property, Callery- Judge Groves (“Callery”), obtained an Agricultural Enclave (AGE) future land use designation for essentially the same area as the Property. The Comp Plan was amended to establish an AGE future land use designation, AGE policies, a conceptual plan of development, and implementing principles (“the 2008 Amendments”). Under the 2008 Amendments, the site was limited to 2,996 residential units and 235,000 square feet of retail and office uses. No development has been undertaken pursuant to the 2008 Amendments. In 2013, the site was sold to Minto, which submitted a Comp Plan amendment application in November 2013, and a revised application in July 2014. On October 29, 2014, the County adopted the Proposed Amendments. The Proposed Amendments change the future land use designation of 53.17 acres (“the outparcels”) from RR-10 to AGE, and increase residential density to 4,546 units and increase intensity to two million square feet of non-residential uses, 200,000 square feet of civic uses, a 150-room hotel and a 3,000- student college, and revise the Conceptual Plan and Implementing Principles. The Proposed Amendments would also revise text in the Introduction and Administration, Future Land Use, and Transportation Elements. The Map Series would be amended to add 53.17 acres to the Limited Urban Service Area on Map LU 1.1 and Map LU 2.1, and to identify new Rural Parkways on Map TE 14.1. Petitioners’ Challenge Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are not “in compliance” because they fail to establish meaningful and predictable standards; do not comply with the agricultural enclave provisions of section 163.3164(4); are not based upon relevant and appropriate data and analysis; promote urban sprawl; are incompatible with adjacent communities and land uses; and create inconsistencies within the Comp Plan. Many of the issues raised and the arguments made by Petitioners fail to acknowledge or distinguish the 2008 Amendments that address future development of the Property. In several respects, as discussed below, the 2008 Amendments already authorize future development of the Property in a manner which Petitioners object to. In several respects, the types of impacts that Petitioners are concerned about are actually diminished by the Proposed Amendments from what is currently allowed under the 2008 Amendments. Meaningful and Predictable Standards Petitioners contend that proposed FLUE Policies 2.2.5-d, 2.2.5-e, and 2.2.5-f, and Maps LU 1.1 and 2.1 fail to establish meaningful and predictable standards for the use and development of land and fail to provide meaningful guidelines for the content of more detailed land development and use regulations, in violation of section 163.3177(1). The Proposed Amendments add more detail to the standards that were adopted in the 2008 Amendments. The Proposed Amendments establish substantially more direction for the future development of the Property than simply a land use designation and listing of allowed uses, which is typical in comprehensive plans. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments lack adequate standards because they refer to the use of “appropriate new urbanism concepts,” which Petitioners say is vague. New urbanism refers to land use planning concepts such as clustering, mixed-use development, rural villages, and city centers. See § 163.3162(4), Fla. Stat. (2014). In land use planning parlance, new urbanism creates more “livable” and “sustainable” communities. The term “appropriate new urbanism concepts” used in the Proposed Amendments is the same term used in section 163.3162(4), dealing with the development of agricultural enclaves. There are many concepts that are part of new urbanism, which can be used in combination. Which concepts are “appropriate” depends on the unique opportunities and constraints presented by the area to be developed. Use of the term “appropriate new urbanism concepts” in the Proposed Amendments adds detail to the future development standards applicable to the Property. It does not create vagueness. Petitioners contend the proposed amendments of Maps LU 1.1 and 2.1 do not provide meaningful and predictable standards and guidelines. However, the maps are only being amended to show that 53.17 acres of outparcels within the Property are being added to the existing Limited Urban Service Area. The map amendments do not diminish the meaningfulness or predictability of any standards in the Comp Plan. The preponderance of the evidence shows the Proposed Amendments establish meaningful and predictable standards. Agricultural Enclave Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments fail to meet the requirements for an agricultural enclave in section 163.3164. As explained in the Conclusions of Law, consistency with section 163.3164 is not a component of an “in compliance” determination. Furthermore, the Property is already designated Agricultural Enclave in the Comp Plan. Data and Analysis Petitioners contend the amendment of the Limited Urban Service Area is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis as required by section 163.3177(1)(f). The inclusion of the outparcels is logical and reasonable. It is consistent with the Comp Plan policies applicable to Limited Urban Service Areas. It is supported by data and analysis. Petitioners contend the increases in density and intensity allowed by the Proposed Amendments are not supported by data and analysis showing a need for the increases. However, the increases are supported by relevant and appropriate data and analysis, including population projections and extensive analysis of the need for non-residential uses in the CWC. Population projections establish the minimum amount of land to be designated for particular uses; not the maximum amount of land. See § 163.3177(1)(f)3., Fla. Stat (2014). Petitioners make several claims related to the availability of public utilities and other services to the Property. The data and analysis show sufficient capacity for roads, transportation, schools, water supply, wastewater treatment, fire, emergency and police either already exists or is contemplated in the Comp Plan to accommodate the development authorized by the Proposed Amendments. The preponderance of the evidence shows the Proposed Amendments are supported by relevant data and analysis. Urban Sprawl Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments do not discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Urban sprawl is defined in section 163.3164(51) as “a development pattern characterized by low density, automobile-dependent development with either a single use or multiple uses that are not functionally related, requiring the extension of public facilities and services in an inefficient manner, and failing to provide a clear separation between urban and rural uses.” Petitioners contend the Property does not qualify for the presumption against urban sprawl under the criteria in section 163.3162(4), but Minto did not rely on that statutory presumption. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments create five of the 13 primary indicators of urban sprawl set forth in section 163.3177(6)(a)9.: Promotes, allows, or designates for development substantial areas of the jurisdiction to develop as low-intensity, low-density, or single-use development or uses. Promotes, allows, or designates significant amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while not using undeveloped lands that are available and suitable for development. Fails to maximize use of existing public facilities and services. Allows for land use patterns or timing which disproportionately increase the cost in time, money, and energy of providing and maintaining facilities and services, including roads, potable water, sanitary sewer, stormwater management, law enforcement, education, health care, fire and emergency response, and general government. Fails to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. The evidence presented on this issue by Petitioners was inconsistent with generally accepted land use planning concepts and principles. The Proposed Amendments do not promote urban sprawl. They go far to rectify existing sprawl conditions in the CWC. Findings relevant to the five indicators have already been made above. Compatibility with adjacent uses is discussed below. There are ample data and analysis which show the Proposed Amendments discourage urban sprawl. Respondents’ characterization of the Proposed Amendments as the opposite of urban sprawl is not unreasonable. The preponderance of the evidence shows the Proposed Amendments discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. Compatibility Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are “incompatible with the lifestyle of the existing and surrounding communities and adjacent agricultural and other land uses.” Protection of Petitioners’ lifestyle cannot mean that surrounding areas must remain undeveloped or must be developed in a similar suburban sprawl pattern. Land use imbalances in the CWC are rectified by the Proposed Amendments while providing large buffers and a transition of land uses on the Property to protect adjacent land uses. The Acreage is more accurately characterized as suburban rather than rural. Moreover, the Proposed Amendments include a conceptual plan and development guidelines designed to create a clear separation between urban uses on the Property and less dense and intense external uses. Residential densities near the perimeter of the Property would correspond to the density in the Acreage. The proposed distribution of land uses and large open space buffers would not establish merely an adequate transition. They would provide substantial protection to adjacent neighborhoods. A person at the periphery of the Property would likely see only open space, parks, and low-density residential uses. The distribution of land uses and natural buffers in the Proposed Amendments provide more protection for external land uses than the 2008 Amendments. The more persuasive evidence presented indicates that Petitioners and other persons living near the Property would be beneficiaries of the Proposed Amendments because they could use and be served by the office, commercial, government, and recreational uses that will be available nearby. The preponderance of the evidence shows the Proposed Amendments are compatible with adjacent land uses. Internal Consistency The Comp Plan’s Introduction and Administration Element and FLUE contain statements of intent. They are not objectives or policies. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with some of the statements. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with the Introduction and Administration Element statements discouraging growth to the west where services are not adequate, do not provide for orderly growth or the provision of facilities and services to maintain the existing quality of life in an economical manner, and do not recognize countywide growth management strategies or maintain the diversity of lifestyles. Findings that refute this contention have been made above. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with several general statements in FLUE Sections I A, I B, and I C. regarding respect for the character of the area, protection of quality of life and integrity of neighborhoods, prevention of “piecemeal” development, and efficient provision of public services. Findings that refute this contention have been made above. Petitioners contend FLUE Policy 2.2.5-d allows land uses which are inconsistent with the policies applicable to the Rural Tier in which the Property is located. In the proposed policy, the County exempts the Project from any conflicting Rural Tier policies that would otherwise apply. Under the County’s Managed Growth Tier System, the tiers are the “first level” land use consideration in the FLUE. Therefore, it would have been helpful to amend the Rural Tier section of the FLUE to indicate the exceptions to Rural Tier policies for agricultural enclaves, in general, or for the Property, in particular. Instead, the Proposed Amendments place the new wording about exceptions in the section of the FLUE dealing with agricultural land uses. However, as stated in the Conclusions of Law, where the exception is located in the comprehensive plan is not a consistency issue. The County has shown there are unique considerations involved with the CWC that justify the exceptions. It also demonstrated that the Proposed Amendments would accomplish numerous objectives and policies of the Comp Plan that could not be accomplished without creating exceptions to some Rural Tier policies. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Objective 1.1-3 because they encourage the proliferation of urban sprawl. That contention has been rejected above. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Objective 1.1-6 because they do not protect agricultural land and equestrian uses. The evidence shows that agricultural and equestrian uses are enhanced by the Proposed Amendments over the existing provisions of the Comp Plan. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.1-b, which addresses criteria re- designating a tier. This policy is not applicable because the Proposed Amendments do not re-designate a tier. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.1-c, which requires the review of the tier system as part of each Evaluation and Appraisal review. Evaluation and Appraisal Reviews are no longer required by state law. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.1-d, which states a tier shall not be re-designated if it would cause urban sprawl. This policy is not applicable because the Proposed Amendments do not re- designate a tier. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.4-a, which requires the County to protect and maintain the rural residential, equestrian, and agricultural areas within the Rural Tier. The Proposed Amendments and Conceptual Plan increase the level of protection for these uses over what is currently in the Comp Plan. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.4-d, which generally prohibits subdividing parcels of land within the Rural Tier unless certain conditions are met. The Proposed Amendments do not subdivide any parcels. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.4-k, which addresses the designation of “sending areas” for Transfer of Development Rights (“TDR”). This policy only applies to parcels with a RR20 future land use designation and there are no such parcels existing or that would be created by the Proposed Amendments. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Policy 1.4-l, which requires the County to provide rural zoning regulations for areas designated Rural Residential. The Property does not have any Rural Residential designations. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Policy 2.4-b, which provides that the TDR program is the required method for increasing density within the County. The County applies this policy only to density increases in urban areas, because they are the only areas authorized to receive TDRs. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Objective 2.1 and some related policies, which promote balanced growth. The preponderance of the evidence shows the Proposed Amendments will further this objective and its policies because they correct the current imbalance of land uses in the CWC and provide for a balanced mix of residential, agricultural, commercial, light industrial, office, recreation, and civic uses. Petitioners presented no evidence to support their claim that Proposed Amendments would exceed the natural or manmade constraints of the area. Petitioners presented no credible evidence that transportation infrastructure and other public services could not be efficiently provided to the Property. The data and analysis and other evidence presented show otherwise. Petitioners contend there is no justification for the increased density and intensity authorized by the Proposed Amendments. There was ample justification presented to show the increases were needed to create a sustainable community where people can live, work, shop, and play. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Objective 2.2 and some related policies, which require development to be consistent with land use designations in the Comp Plan. Petitioners’ evidence failed to show any inconsistencies. The Proposed Amendments are compatible with and benefit adjacent land uses, as found above. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments fail to include “new urbanism” concepts as required by section 163.3164(4) and Policy 2.2.5-i. The evidence presented by Respondents proved otherwise. Petitioners contend the Proposed Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Objective 3 and some related policies, which address the provision of utilities and other public services. Petitioners presented no credible evidence to support this claim. The data and analysis and other evidence presented show that public services are available or planned and can be efficiently provided to the Property. Petitioners argued the Proposed Amendments were inconsistent with several other FLUE policies generally related to compatibility with adjacent land uses and the provision of public services, all of which Petitioners failed to prove as explained above. The preponderance of the evidence shows the Proposed Amendments would not create internal inconsistency in the Comp Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity issue a final order determining the Proposed Amendments adopted by Palm Beach County Ordinance No. 2014-030 are in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralf G. Brookes, Esquire 1217 East Coral Parkway, Suite 107 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 (eServed) Gary K. Hunter, Jr., Esquire Hopping, Green and Sams, P.A. Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 (eServed) Tara W. Duhy, Esquire Lewis Longman and Walker, P.A. 515 North Flagler Drive, Suite 1500 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Amy Taylor Petrick, Esquire Palm Beach County Attorney's Office 301 North Olive Avenue, Suite 601 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 (eServed) Jesse Panuccio, Executive Director Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building, MSC 110 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed) Katie Zimmer, Agency Clerk Department of Economic Opportunity Caldwell Building 107 East Madison Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4128 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether the Land Development Code (LDC) adopted by Ordinance No. 2007-12 on August 22, 2007, as amended on February 27, 2008, is inconsistent with the effective comprehensive plan for the City of Doral (City), which is the Miami-Dade Comprehensive Development Master Plan (County Plan).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties Section 64 is a Florida corporation. The Grand is a Florida limited partnership. Both entities are owned by the same individual. On September 25, 2001, Section 7 acquired ownership of an approximate ten-acre tract of property in the County (now the City) located along the southern boundary of Northwest 82nd Street, between 109th and 112th Avenues. See Petitioners' Exhibit 416. On December 16, 2005, title in one- half of the property was conveyed to The Grand in order to divide the property into two different ownerships. Id. It was Petitioners' intent at that time to build two hotels on separate five-acre tracts, one owned by Section 7 and the other by The Grand. The City is located in the northwestern part of Dade County and was incorporated as a municipality in June 2003. At the time of incorporation, the County's Plan and Land Use Code were the legally effective comprehensive plan and land development regulations (LDRs), respectively. On April 26, 2006, the City adopted its first comprehensive plan. After the Department determined that the Plan was not in compliance, remedial amendments were adopted on January 10, 2007, pursuant to a Stipulated Settlement Agreement. Although the Department found the Plan, as remediated, to be in compliance, it was challenged by a third party, and the litigation is still pending. See DOAH Case No. 06-2417. Therefore, the County Plan is still the legally effective Plan. See § 163.3167(4), Fla. Stat. The Department is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing LDRs whenever the appeal process described in Section 163.3213, Florida Statutes, is invoked by a substantially affected person. History of the Controversy When Petitioners' property was purchased in 2001, the County zoning on the property was Light Industrial (IU-1), having been rezoned by the County to that designation on October 9, 1984. See Petitioners' Exhibit 5. One of the uses permitted under an IU-1 zoning classification is a hotel with up to 75 units per acre. See Petitioners' Exhibit 6. The land use designation on the County's LUP map for the property is Low- Density Residential (LDR), with One Density Bonus, which allows 2.5 to 6 residential units per acre with the ability for a "bump-up" in density to 5 to 13 units per acre if the development includes specific urban design characteristics according to the County urban design guide book. Language found on pages I-62 and I-63 of the Future Land Use Element (FLUE) in effect at the time of the incorporation of the City (now found on pages I-73 and I-74 of the current version of the FLUE) provides in relevant part as follows: Uses and Zoning Not Specifically Depicted on the LUP Map. Within each map category numerous land uses, zoning classifications and housing types may occur. Many existing uses and zoning classifications are not specifically depicted on the Plan map. . . . All existing lawful uses and zoning are deemed to be consistent with the [Plan] unless such a use or zoning (a) is found through a subsequent planning study, as provided in Land Use Policy 4E, to be inconsistent with the criteria set forth below; and (b) the implementation of such a finding will not result in a temporary or permanent taking or in the abrogation of vested rights as determined by the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida. As noted above, if there is a concern that zoning might be inconsistent with land use, using the criteria described in the provision, the County may initiate a planning study to analyze consistency and down-zone the property to a less intense use if an inconsistency is found. Although the County initiated a number of planning studies after it adopted its Plan in 1993, and ultimately down-zoned many properties, none was ever initiated by the County for Petitioners' property. Essentially, when existing uses and zoning are not depicted on the County LUP map, the language in the FLUE operates to deem lawfully existing zoning consistent with the land use designation on the property. In this case, the parties agree that the zoning of Petitioners' property is not depicted on the County LUP map. Therefore, absent a planning study indicating an inconsistency, the zoning is deemed to be consistent with the land use category. On August 22, 2007, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2007-12, which enacted a new LDC, effective September 1, 2007, to replace the then-controlling County Land Use Code. Although the LDC was adopted for the purpose of implementing the new City Plan, until the new Plan becomes effective, the LDC implements the County Plan. Amendments to the LDC were adopted by Ordinance No. 2008-1 on February 27, 2008. The LDC does not change the zoning on Petitioners' property. However, it contains a provision in Chapter 1, Section 5, known as the Zoning Compatibility Table (Table), which sets forth the new land use categories in the City Plan (which are generally similar but not identical to the County land use categories) and the zoning districts for each category. Pertinent to this dispute is an asterisk note to the Table which reads in relevant part as follows: Under no circumstances shall the density, intensity, or uses permitted be inconsistent with that allowed on the city's future land use plan. . . . Zoning districts that are inconsistent with the land use map and categories shall rezone prior to development. See Petitioners' Exhibit 27 at p. I-3. Under the Table, only residential zoning districts (with up to ten dwelling units per acre and no density bonus) are allowed in the City's proposed LDR land use category. Therefore, if or when the City Plan becomes effective, before Petitioners can develop their property, they must rezone it to a district that is consistent with the land use designation shown on the Table. There is no specific requirement in the LDC that the City conduct a planning study when it has a concern that the zoning is inconsistent with the relevant land use category in the new City Plan. Petitioners construed the asterisk note as being inconsistent with the text language on pages I-62 and I-63 of the County Plan. See Finding of Fact 5, supra. Accordingly, on August 21, 2008, Petitioners submitted a Petition to the City pursuant to Section 163.3213(3), Florida Statutes, alleging generally that they were substantially affected persons; that the LDC was inconsistent with the County Plan; that the LDC changes the regulations regarding character, density, and intensity of use permitted by the County Plan; and that the LDC was not compatible with the County Plan, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.023.2 See Petitioners' Exhibit 103. The City issued its Response to the Petition on November 20, 2008. See Petitioners' Exhibit 104. The Response generally indicated that Petitioners did not have standing to challenge the LDC; that the Petition lacked the requisite factual specificity and reasons for the challenge; that the LDC did not change the character, density, or intensity of the permitted uses under the County Plan; and the allegation concerning compatibility lacked factual support or allegations to support that claim. On December 22, 2008, Petitioners filed a Petition with the Department pursuant to Section 163.3213(3), Florida Statutes, alleging that the LDC implements a City Plan not yet effective; that the LDC changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the existing County Plan; and that the LDC changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the not yet effective City Plan. See Petitioners' Exhibit 105. After conducting an informal hearing on April 7, 2009, as authorized by Section 163.3213(4), Florida Statutes, on July 23, 2009, the Department issued a Determination of Consistency of a Land Development Regulation (Determination). See Petitioners' Exhibit 102. See also Section 7 Tract 64 Property, Inc., et al. v. The City of Doral, Fla., Case No. DCA09-LDR-270, 2009 Fla. ENV LEXIS 119 (DCA July 23, 2009). In the Determination, the Department concluded that Petitioners were substantially affected persons and had standing to file their challenge; that the provision on pages I-62 and I-63 of the County FLUE did not apply to Petitioners' property because the uses and zoning of the property are specifically designated on the LUP map; that the law does not prohibit the Department from reviewing the LDC for consistency with the not yet effective City Plan; and that because the LDC will require Petitioners to rezone their property to be consistent with the City Plan, the challenge is actually a challenge to a rezoning action and not subject to review under this administrative process. See § 163.3213(2)(b), Fla. Stat. On August 13, 2009, Petitioners filed their Petition for Formal Proceedings with DOAH raising three broad grounds: that the LDC unlawfully implements a comprehensive plan not yet effective; that it changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the County Plan and is therefore inconsistent with the County Plan; and that it changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the not yet effective City Plan and is inconsistent with that Plan. See Petitioners' Exhibit 39. These issues are repeated in the parties' Stipulation. As to other issues raised by Petitioners, and evidence submitted on those matters over the objection of opposing counsel, they were tried without consent of the parties, and they are deemed to be beyond the scope of this appeal. The Objections Petitioners first contend that the LDC unlawfully implements a comprehensive plan not yet in effect, in that it was specifically intended to be compatible with, further the goals or policies of, and implement the policies and objectives of, the City Plan. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.023. But Petitioners cited no statute or rule that prohibits a local government from adopting LDRs before a local plan is effective, or that implement another local government's plan (in this case the County Plan). While the LDC was adopted for the purpose of implementing a City Plan that the City believed would be in effect when the LDC was adopted, the City agrees that until the new City Plan becomes effective, the LDC implements the County Plan. Even though the two Plans are not identical, and may even be inconsistent with each other in certain respects, this does automatically create an inconsistency between the LDC and County Plan. Rather, it is necessary to determine consistency between those two documents, and not the City Plan. Except for testimony regarding one provision in the LDC and its alleged inconsistency with language in the County FLUE, no evidence was presented, nor was a ground raised, alleging that other inconsistencies exist. The Table note and the County Plan do not conflict. The LDC is not "inconsistent" merely because it was initially intended to implement a local plan that has not yet become effective. Petitioners next contend that the LDC changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the County Plan and is therefore inconsistent with that Plan. Specifically, they contend that the note following the Zoning Compatibility Table in Chapter 1, Section 5 of the LDC is inconsistent with the language on pages I-62 and 63 (now renumbered as pages I-73 and I-74) of the County Plan. In other words, they assert that an inconsistency arises because the note requires them to down- zone their property before development, while the County Plan deems their zoning to be consistent with the County LUP map unless a special planning study is undertaken. The evidence establishes that if there is a conflict between zoning and land use on property within the City, it is necessary to defer to the language on pages I-62 and I-63 of the County FLUE for direction. This is because the County Plan is the effective plan for the City. Under that language, if no planning study has been conducted, the zoning would be deemed to be consistent with the land use. On the other hand, if a planning study is undertaken, and an inconsistency is found, the property can be rezoned in a manner that would make it consistent with the land use. Therefore, the LDC does not change the use, density, or intensity on Petitioners' property that is permitted under the County Plan. It is at least fairly debatable that there is no conflict between the Table note and the County Plan. Finally, Petitioners contend that the LDC changes the uses, densities, and intensities permitted by the not yet effective City Plan because the current industrial zoning designation will be inconsistent with the LDR land use designation. Petitioners argue that once the new City Plan becomes effective, the LDC requires them to down-zone their property before development. However, this concern will materialize only if or when the new City Plan, as now written, becomes effective; therefore, it is premature. Further, the definition of "land development regulation" specifically excludes "an action which results in zoning or rezoning of land." See § 163.3213(2)(b), Fla. Stat. Because the challenged regulation (the note to the Table) is "an action which results in zoning or rezoning of land," the issue cannot be raised in an administrative review of land development regulations. Id. The other contentions raised by Petitioner are either new issues that go beyond the scope of the Petition filed in this case or are without merit.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Environmental Coalition of Broward County, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the "Coalition"), is a Florida corporation. The Coalition has offices located in Broward County. The Coalition has approximately 500 members, most of whom reside in Broward County. A substantial number of the Coalition's members own property in Broward County and/or operate businesses within Broward County. The Coalition is a not-for-profit corporation, chartered for educational and scientific purposes. The primary purpose of the Coalition is to present objections and recommendations to local governments concerning planning issues on behalf of its membership. The Coalition is authorized to participate in actions of this type and to represent its membership in administrative proceedings. The Coalition presented oral and written objections to Broward County during the review and adoption process concerning the plan amendment at issue in this proceeding. Respondent, the Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of implementing the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Among other things, the Department is required to review local government comprehensive plans and amendments thereto for compliance with the Act. Respondent, Broward County (hereinafter referred to as the "County"), is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The County is the local government with the authority pursuant to the Act and the Broward County Charter to adopt and amend a comprehensive plan. The County has adopted the 1989 Broward County Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"). The Broward County Board of County Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as the "County Commission"), is the local planning agency for the County. The County Commission is advised on land use planning issues by the Broward County Planning Council (hereinafter referred to as the "Planning Council"). The Planning Council was created by the County Charter. Intervenors, Miramar Lakes, Inc., d/b/a Miramar Rock, Robert A. Whitcombe, Trustee, and the South Broward Trust own or have under contract virtually all of the property affected by the Plan amendment which is the subject of this proceeding. These Intervenors have entered into a joint venture agreement with Intervenor Atlantic Gulf Communities Corporation to develop the subject property. Intervenors applied for the amendment that is the subject of this proceeding and presented oral or written comments, recommendations and objections during the period of time between the transmittal hearing and adoption of the subject Plan amendment. The County's Plan. The County adopted a comprehensive plan as required by the Act in 1989. The planning horizon of the plan is 2010. The Plan includes two volumes of text, two volumes of support documents and associated maps. See Petitioner's exhibit 8. Volume One is text and is effective countywide. Volume Three contains support documents for the Plan. The Plan also includes the 1989 Broward County Future Land Use Plan Map (Series) (hereinafter referred to as the "FLUM"). The FLUM depicts the proposed distribution, extent and location of categories of land uses allowed under the Plan. Among others, those land uses include "residential" at various densities and "agricultural". Pursuant to the Plan, the eastern approximately one-third of the County may be developed. The developable area consists of approximately 400 square miles of land area. The western approximately two-thirds of the County are designated as water conservation areas and are separated by a levee from the developable one- third. Future land use elements of municipal comprehensive plans in the County must be in substantial conformity to the Plan. The Subject Property. The property which is the subject of the Plan amendment at issue in this case consists of 1,280 acres of a total of 1,965 acres (hereinafter referred to as the "Property"). The Property is located in the City of Miramar, in southwest Broward County, Florida, Sections 25, 26, 27 and 36, Township 51 South, Range 39 East. The Property is located in the southwestern portion of the developable one-third of the County. See Map 1 of Broward County exhibit 1. The Property is bounded on the east by S.W. 184th Avenue and on the north by Honey Hill Road. It is east of U.S. Highway 27. Part of the Property is vacant. Part of the Property is being used as cattle pasture and for a rock mining, batching, mixing and crushing operation. Existing land uses in the vicinity of the Property include vacant land, rock mining and some development to the north, single-family residential development to the east, rock mining and vacant land to the south, in Dade County, Florida. Residential development immediately to the east in a development known as "Silverlakes" is being developed at a density of three dwelling units per acre. Further to the west of the Property is the eastern boundary of the water conservation areas of the Everglades. These areas are separated from the rest of Broward County by a levee. The land use designation of the Property and other property in the surrounding area is "agricultural". Under the Plan, the land use designation allows agricultural uses and residential development of one dwelling per 2.5 acres. Under its current land use designation, a total of 786 dwelling units may be developed on the Property. The First Amendment Requested by the Intervenors. In early 1994 Intervenors filed an application with the County seeking an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Low (2) Residential". "Low (2) Residential" allows the development of two dwelling units per acre. The Planning Council conducted a review of the proposed amendment. The Broward County Department of Natural Resource Protection raised objections to the proposed amendment because the Property is located in an area of water recharge and wetlands. The area is identified as within a general wetlands area on the "Southwestern Generalized Wetlands Map" of the Plan. 30 Based upon the objections of the County Department of Natural Resource Protection, the staff of the Planning Council recommended denial of the proposed amendment. The South Florida Water Management District (hereinafter referred to as the "SFWMD"), an agency with broad regional responsibility for water management in southeast Florida, raised objections with the Planning Council concerning the location of the property in an area which was being considered for use as part of a project to restore the Everglades. The SFWMD was concerned that the Property is located within an area which has come to be known as the "East Coast Buffer". In early 1994, at the time of the initial review of the proposed amendment, the East Coast Buffer was a study area abutting the eastern water conservation areas of southeast Florida. The SFWMD was studying the East Coast Buffer for use in water conservation efforts in southeast Florida. At the time of the first review of the proposed amendment, the portion of the East Coast Buffer in which the Property is located was being considered for preservation as a reservoir site. The Planning Council transmitted the proposed amendment to the County Commission without recommendation. The County Commission decided not to transmit the proposed amendment to the Department for its review, ending review of the initial application. The Initial Review of the Subject Amendment. A second application on the Property was resubmitted by the Intervenors in March of 1994. The application was designated Application PC 94- 15. Application PC 94-15 sought an amendment of the FLUM to modify the future land use designation of all 1,965 acres of the Property to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". "Irregular 1.5 Residential" allows 1.5 dwelling units per acre. The amendment sought by Intervenors would have allowed an increase from 786 dwelling units to 2,947 dwelling units on the Property. An increase of 2,161 units. Application PC 94-15 was again reviewed. The same comments about, and objections to, the proposed amendment were raised concerning groundwater and aquifer recharge. The staff of the Planning Council again recommended denial of the proposed amendment. 41 The Planning Council recommended transmittal of the application, subject to the Intervenors satisfying the concerns raised by the SFWMD. On August 17, 1994, the County Commission transmitted Application PC 94-15 to the Department, conditioned upon the Intervenors satisfying the concerns of the SFWMD. The SFWMD objected to Application PC 94-15 because of its conclusion that the proposed future land use designation was not compatible with the East Coast Buffer then under evaluation by the SFWMD. SFWMD had developed data and conducted computer modeling concerning the utilization of a buffer for a variety of purposes, including reducing seepage of water from the Everglades, increasing groundwater recharge into aquifers and creating a natural buffer to protect the Everglades from the impacts of development. The SFWMD had commissioned a worldwide engineering firm, CH2M Hill to prepare a report on the East Coast Buffer. The SFWMD recommended that Application PC 94-15 not be approved until it had completed its study of the East Coast Buffer because the land use designation being sought might be incompatible with the conclusions reached from the SFWMD's and CH2M Hill's evaluation. The Department reviewed Application PC 94-15 and, based upon comments from the SFWMD similar to those raised before the County Commission, issued an Objections, Recommendations and Comments report concerning Application PC 94-15. The Department raised objections consistent with the adverse comments from the SFWMD. Modification of the Proposed Amendment. Parts of southwestern Broward County and northwestern Dade County were designated "Management Unit 5" by the SFWMD. Management Unit 5 was being considered, as recommended by CH2M Hill, as a reservoir area. Development of the Property was, therefore, not considered to be a use comparable with the concept of the East Coast Buffer being considered by the SFWMD at the time of the County's and Department's decision to reject Application PC 94-15. Intervenors worked with the SFWMD in an effort to find a way of modifying Application PC 94-15 to satisfy the SFWMD's concerns. SFWMD utilized computer modeling to simulate groundwater and surface water flows in Management Unit 5 to determine the impact of allowing development of the Property. The SFWMD concluded that Management Unit 5 was more suitable as a recharge area rather than as a reservoir. This conclusion was based, in part, of the transmissibility of the soil and other site conditions which were not conducive to storing water above ground for long periods of time. Use of Management Unit 5 as a recharge area and not a reservoir requires less surface area. Therefore, it was concluded that development in the area might be compatible with the SFWMD's East Coast Buffer concept. The SFWMD modeled four development alternatives for Management Unit 5 and analyzed the impact of each alternative on the efforts to retard seepage, provide groundwater recharge and enhance wetland benefits: (a) retaining the Property as a recharge area and allowing no development; (b) retaining the entire western two-thirds as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern one-third; (c) retaining the western one-third as a recharge area and allowing development of the eastern two-thirds; and (d) allowing development of the entire management unit. Alternatives (b) and (c) assumed that a berm would be constructed between the recharge area and the developed area. After meeting with Intervenors and discussing the results of the modeling, Intervenors indicated willingness to remove the western portion of the Property from the proposed development. The SFWMD then conducted a more detailed, computer analysis of the following alternatives: (a) continuing existing conditions; (b) constructing a berm around Management Unit 5 and utilizing the entire area as a recharge area; (c) constructing a berm between the eastern and western sections of the Management Unit 5 and utilizing the western section for recharge with no development in the eastern section; and (d) alternative "(c)" with development of the eastern section. As a result of computer modeling of the alternatives, it was concluded that alternatives (b), (c) and (d) could significantly reduce seepage from the Everglades and increase groundwater recharge in to the aquifers when compared to development under the agricultural land use designation of alternative (a). As a result of the more detailed analysis, the SFWMD concluded that essentially all of its goals could be achieved for Management Unit 5 if the western section of Management Unit 5 is preserved even if development is allowed in the eastern section. The SFWMD concluded that the eastern two-thirds of the Property, consisting of approximately 1,280 acres, could be developed as "Irregular 1.5 Residential" if the western one-third, consisting of approximately 685 acres, was utilized as a recharge area. Intervenors agreed to preserve the western third of the Property (685 acres) and grant the SFWMD a flowage easement, consistent with the East Coast Buffer and at a savings of $43 million. On December 14, 1994, the staff of the SFWMD presented the results of the computer modeling to the SFWMD. On December 15, 1994, the SFWMD withdrew its objection to Application PC 94-15, conditioned upon the deletion of the 685 acres from the application and the granting of a flowage easement. The County and the Department were informed of the decision of the SFWMD. Approval of Application 94-15. On December 20, 1994, the County Commission adopted by Ordinance 94-55 an amendment to the Plan, Amendment PC 94-15 (hereinafter referred to as the "Amendment"), subject to the conditions suggested by the SFWMD, which resolved the SFWMD's objections. The Amendment included modifications to the FLUM and text amendments. The Amendment, in relevant part, modifies the future land use designation of approximately 1,280 acres of the Property from "Agricultural" to "Irregular 1.5 Residential". This will allow the construction of a total of 1,920 dwelling units on the Property, or an increase of 1,408 dwelling units over the number of dwelling that may be constructed under the current future land use designation for the Property. In light of Intervenor's modifications of the application, the removal of the SFWMD's objections and the approval of the application by the County, the Department found the Amendment to be in compliance with the Act. On February 14, 1995, the Department issued a notice of intent to find the Amendment in compliance. The County and the Department accepted and relied upon the data and methodology employed by the SFWMD and the conditions for removal of the SFWMD's objections. Petitioner's Challenge. On or about March 8, 1995, Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department challenging the Amendment. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition on April 25, 1995. At the commencement of the final hearing, Petitioner withdrew all issues it had raised in the Amended Petition except the issues of: (a) whether the data and analysis available supports a conclusion that there is a need for additional residential development; and (b) whether the Amendment is supported by data and analysis in light of an ongoing study of the East Coast Buffer. Residential Housing Need. The Plan includes the following Goal and Objective concerning the provision of adequate areas for residential use: Goal 01.00.00 Provide residential areas with a variety of housing types and densities offering convenient and affordable housing opportunities to all segments of Broward County's population while maintaining a desired quality of life and adequate public services and facilities. Objective 01.01.00 Accommodate the projected population of Broward County by providing adequate areas on the Future Broward County Land Use Plan Map (Series) intended primarily for residential development, but which also permit those non-residential uses that are compatible with and necessary to support residential neighborhoods. The Plan, including the methodology utilized to determine residential need, was found to be in compliance by the Department. The residential need methodology of the Plan utilized the Broward County Population Forecasting Model to project the population of southwest Broward County in 1994 to be 225,489 people. This projected population formed the basis for the allocation of residential housing units for Subregion 5 under the Plan. The Property is located in an area of southwest Broward County designated as Subregion 5 in the Plan. In reviewing the Amendment, the County conducted an analysis of the need for additional residential development in southwest Broward County. This analysis utilized, and was consistent with, the residential need methodology of the Plan. A summary of the data and analysis utilized by the County was provided to the Department. The County's analysis indicated that the population of Subregion 5 has exceeded the population projections for the Subregion of the Plan. By 1994, there were 284,361 people living in Subregion 5 or 17,872 more than projected in the Plan. The increased population rate of growth in Subregion 5 was projected to represent an increase in projected demand for approximately 6,847 residential units in excess of the projected demand expected under the Plan. The analysis also took into account amendments to the Plan which have resulted in a reduction of 1,087 residential units for Subregion 5. When combined with the increased population, the data and analysis supports a conclusion that there is a need for 7,934 additional residential units in Subregion 5. The Amendment increases residential housing in Subregion 5 by 1,134 dwelling units (1,920 units allowed under the Amendment, less 786 dwelling units allowed under the current agriculture classification), well below the projected need for additional residential units for Subregion 5. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and submitted to the Department supports the conclusion of the County that there is need for the proposed additional residential development approved by the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was professionally acceptable and adequate to support the Amendment. The evidence presented by Petitioner failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County and the Department was not professionally acceptable and adequate. Rather than attempting to prove that the County's methodology was not professionally acceptable or was flawed, Petitioner utilized a methodology based upon an annualized population growth rate for Subregion 5. Petitioner offered evidence that there is sufficient residential housing approved under the Plan to meet the projected population for 15.6 years, beyond the remaining life of the Plan. The methodology utilized by Petitioner was, by the admission of the Petitioner's own witness, not a professionally acceptable methodology. The evidence failed to prove that the data and analysis relied upon by the County does not support its conclusion that there is sufficient need for the additional residential housing authorized for the County by the Amendment. The East Coast Buffer Zone. Efforts to restore the Everglades have been initiated and are ongoing. As a part of these efforts a group of technical and scientific staff members of various federal agencies involved in the restoration efforts were formed as the "Science Sub Group." The Science Sub Group was formed as an advisory group to provide guidance towards ecosystem restoration efforts. The Science Sub Group had no implementing authority. It issued at least one report in late 1993 which included an East Coast Buffer concept. The East Coast Buffer identified by the Science Sub Group included the area in which the Property is located. The Science Sub Group relied upon data obtained from the SFWMD and various computer models developed by the SFWMD, and SFWMD personnel contributed to the preparation of the report. The East Coast Buffer concept generally includes a series of interconnected water flow-ways along the eastern edge of the water conservation areas necessary to restore the Everglades. The federal government has also instituted a study known as the "Central & South Florida Project: Comprehensive Review Study" (hereinafter referred to as the "Restudy"). The United States Corps of Engineers is the lead agency of the Restudy. The first phase of the Restudy's efforts has resulted in a "Reconnaissance Report", also known as the "Recon Study". The second phase of the Restudy's efforts will be the feasibility phase. The feasibility phase will begin in the summer of 1995 and will be completed several years later. The purpose of the Restudy is to bring together the interested federal agencies to review the current management of the Everglades and identify strategies for altering management practices and systems to improve the Everglades. The Recon Study was completed in late 1994. It describes various conceptual strategies for restoring the Everglades. The determination of the feasibility of the strategies has not, however, been started, much less completed. Therefore, although the East Coast Buffer concept is considered in the Recon Study, the actual identification of the area which will constitute the Buffer has not been identified. Nor has the area which should constitute the East Coast Buffer been recommended in the Recon Study. The Recon Study identifies problems and opportunities, formulates alternative plans, evaluates conceptual alternative plans and recommends further study. The Recon Study is advisory. It does not identify, recommend or implement a plan of action. The Coalition presented evidence concerning the ongoing analysis of Everglades restoration efforts. That evidence proved that the Property is located within a very large area, which completely surrounds the Everglades, which is being considered as part of the Everglades restoration effort because of the impact of this large area on restoration efforts. The evidence presented by the Coalition, however, failed to prove that the Property has been, or will be, determined to be essential or even necessary for future Everglades restoration efforts. At the time of the approval of the Amendment and, even at the time of the final hearing of this case, no such determination had been made. Nor had any determination been made as to what will be necessary for the restoration of the Everglades or whether decisions will be made to carry out the necessary restoration efforts. As recognized by the Coalition in its proposed order: 52. The study necessary to make [a determination of the water levels needed] for the areas which are implicated by this amendment will be done in the next two years or three years. * * * 55. There is no way of telling, based on the data and analysis available at this point, how much water will be necessary in order to fully restore the Everglades. . . . Coalition proposed findings of fact 52 and 55. The Coalition also recognized the following: The Reconnaissance study has not reached the point where conclusions can be drawn about parcel specific uses. The next step is the feasibility planning phase, which is a much more detailed phase which will run for several years. . . . Coalition proposed finding of fact 107. Instead of attempting to prove that the data and analysis at the time of adoption of the Amendment indicated that development of the Property authorized by the Amendment would be detrimental to restoration efforts, the Coalition attempted to prove that development of the Property should be delayed until data and analysis is available indicating conclusively what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts. The Act does not require such delay. In addition to failing to prove what the impact of development of the Property will be on restoration efforts, the evidence presented by the Coalition also failed to prove that the conclusions reached by the Science Sub Group and the Restudy will even be implemented. The evidence presented by the Coalition failed to prove that the conclusions of the SFWMD with regard to the impact of the Amendment are not supported by data and analysis or were not arrived at by professionally acceptable methods. While the evidence proved that there will be some reduction in the amount of groundwater recharge function and seepage control function as a result of the Amendment, the evidence failed to prove what ultimate impact the reductions in recharge and seepage control will be or that the SFWMD's conclusions are not reasonable. While the Coalition proved that the SFWMD's conclusions were not based upon a consideration of what should be done to restore the Everglades, the evidence failed to prove that the information available was sufficiently conclusive that the SFWMD should have objected to the Amendment. The data and analysis relied upon by the County in approving the Amendment was collected and applied in a professionally acceptable manner. None of those agencies charged with responsibility to review the Amendment raised objections to its approval. The evidence failed to prove that the state of the data and analysis available to the County from the Science Sub Group and the Restudy or any other source concerning the area referred to as the East Coast Buffer and the Property is such that it proved that the data that was relied by the County upon was inadequate.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department dismissing finding the Amendment "in compliance" and dismissing the petition in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Coalition's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1-2. Accepted in 2. 3-4 Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5 Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5. Accepted in 4-6. Accepted in 5-6. Accepted in 6. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12 14-15 Not relevant. 16-18 Not relevant. See 81-84. 19-25 Not relevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 81-84. Accepted in 29. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 26 and hereby accepted. 30-31 See 24. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 36 and 62. Accepted in 62. 35-41 Hereby accepted. 42-48 These proposed findings are generally correct. They are not, however, relevant to the ultimate determination in this case. 49-50 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is not relevant. See 96. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted in 96. The last sentence is not relevant. Hereby accepted. 57-63 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 64-65 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 89 and 91 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90 and 92. See 86 and 92. Hereby accepted. Although generally true, the evidence failed to prove that this finding specifically applies to the Property. Except for the first sentence, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31-33. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76-87 Although generally correct, these findings were too broad and the evidence failed to prove that they specifically apply to the Property. 88-90 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-97 Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 98 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 99-100 Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings are not relevant. 104-105 Not relevant. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 97. Accepted in 90. Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 111-114 Too speculative. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The County's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Accepted in 1. 2 Accepted in 7. 3 Accepted in 8. 4 Accepted in 11. 5 Hereby accepted. 6 Accepted in 12. 7 Accepted in 13. 8 Accepted in 14. 9 Accepted in 15. 10 Accepted in 9-10. 11 Accepted in 18. 12 Accepted in 16. 13 Accepted in 17. 14 Accepted in 61. 15 Accepted in 60. 16 Accepted in 19-20, 26 and 62. 17 Accepted in 23. 18 Accepted in 21-22 19-20 Accepted in 24. 21 Hereby accepted. 22 Accepted in 37. 23-24 Hereby accepted. 25 Accepted in 68. 26 Accepted in 65-67. 27-28 Accepted in 67. 29-30 Hereby accepted. 31-32 Accepted in 28. 33 Accepted in 29. 34 Accepted in 30. 35 Accepted in 34. 36 Accepted in 31 and hereby accepted. 37 Accepted in 32-33. 38 Accepted in 31. 39 Accepted in 33. 40 Accepted in 35. 41 Accepted in 316. 42 Accepted in 37. 43 Accepted in 39. 44 Accepted in 40. 45 Accepted in 41. 46 Accepted in 42. 47 Accepted in 72. 48-49 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 73-77 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 76-77. Accepted in 38. Accepted in 79-80 Accepted 58 and 62. 55-57 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 82. Hereby accepted. 60-61 Accepted in 81-84. 62 Hereby accepted. 63-65 Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 43 and 45. Accepted in 88. Accepted in 89-90. 69-70 Accepted in 85-86. 71 Accepted in 90 and 92-93. 72-77 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 32 and 44. Hereby accepted. None proposed. Accepted in 33. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 49 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. 87-88 Accepted in 52. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 53 and 58 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 54. Accepted in 56. Accepted in 58. 95-96 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 60. Accepted in 61. The Department's and Intervenors' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 7. Accepted in 8. Accepted in 11. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 15. Accepted in 9-10. Accepted in 18. Accepted in 16. Accepted in 17. Accepted in 61. Accepted in 11 and 19-20. Accepted in 20. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 24-25. Accepted in 26. Accepted in 27. Accepted in 36-38. 22-37 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 43. Accepted in 88. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 31. 42-43 Accepted in 44. Accepted in 43 and hereby accepted. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 42. Accepted in 42 and 46. Accepted in 46 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 46. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 46. 52-53 Accepted in 48. Accepted 49. Accepted in 49, 52 and 54. Accepted in 50. Accepted in 51. Accepted in 54 and 57. 59-60 Accepted 54. 61-63 Accepted in 54 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 55. Accepted in 56-57. 66-67 Accepted in 58. 68-70 Accepted in 59. Accepted in 64. Accepted in 58 and 62. Accepted in 60 and 62. Accepted in 63. Accepted in 67. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 67 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 37 and hereby accepted. Not relevant. Accepted in 86. Hereby accepted. 82-83 Accepted in 86. Accepted in 87. Accepted in 89 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 90. Accepted in 90 and 92-93. Accepted in 93. 89-90 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 72-78. Accepted in 69-71. Accepted in 70. Accepted in 73-74 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 75. Accepted in 76. Accepted in 77. Accepted in 78. Accepted in 79-80. 101-102 Accepted in 82. Accepted in 83. Accepted in 83-84. Accepted in 81 and 84. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dan Stengle, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Brion Blackwelder, Esquire Jack Milbery, Esquire 8751 West Broward Boulevard, #206 Plantation, Florida 33324 Sherry A. Spiers Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Tracy Lautenschlager, Esquire Broward County Attorney's Office 115 South Andrews Avenue Suite 423 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Glenn Smith, Esquire Michael A. Cohn, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A. 200 East Broward Boulevard Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Honorable Gerald F. Thompson Chairman, Broward County Board of County Commissioners Governmental Center 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue The issue is whether two map changes on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM) of the Comprehensive Plan (Plan) adopted by Taylor County (County) by Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17 on December 15, 2009, are in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: The Parties The Department is the state planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing and approving amendments to comprehensive plans adopted by local governments. The County is a local government that administers a Plan. It adopted the two plan amendments that are the subject of this proceeding. It is considered a "rural" county with a current population of around 20,000 residents. Dr. Hutchins owns property in the County. Although his initial pleading alleges, and his Proposed Recommended Order states, that he "submitted oral comments regarding the subject amendments at transmittal and prior to adoption of the amendment," no evidence was presented at hearing that Dr. Hutchins did so during the adoption process. Ms. Redding and Mr. Wood are siblings and along with three other members of the Wood family jointly own property in the County. Like Dr. Hutchins, no evidence was presented at the hearing that either Intervenor submitted written or oral comments to the County during the adoption process. History Preceding the Amendments The process for adopting the County's first Plan, including the FLUM, began around 1988. For the purpose of drafting a FLUM, a Planning Board (Board) was created consisting of seven individuals, all of whom were volunteers with no formal planning experience. However, they received advice and assistance from two outside consultants, who also advised the County concerning the appropriate text to be used in the new Plan. Four members of the Board, including its former Chairman, testified at the final hearing. Over the next two years, the Board conducted meetings, spoke with numerous property owners, and collected information in order to assign each parcel an appropriate land use category. The collective efforts of the Board culminated in a large, hand- colored FLUM (consisting of numerous sections of aerial maps patched together) that was affixed to the wall of what is now the courtroom on the second floor in the County Courthouse. Testimony by former members of the Board established that the Hutchins parcel (then owned by Colin and Lucille Kelly) and the Bird Island parcel (owned by Wood, Redding, and other family members) were assigned a classification of Mixed Use-Urban Development. Because the County does not have a zoning code, the properties were never assigned a zoning classification consistent with that land use category. This classification was based upon the fact that at least two different businesses were being conducted on each parcel at the time, and the owners requested that they be given that classification. In the case of the Hutchins (then Kelly) property, it was being used to conduct a commercial fishing operation as well as a small construction company (with dump trucks, bulldozers, and front end loaders) that had a contract with Proctor & Gamble (now known as Buckeye Technologies, Inc.) to maintain roads. An office for the construction company was located in a separate mobile home placed on the property. Mr. Bird was a commercial fisherman and operated a wholesale fish business on Bird Island. Also, both he and his mother had separate homes on the property, another structure was used to store fish nets, and docking facilities for other commercial fisherman were maintained. Many of these structures were blown away during the so-called Storm of the Century on March 13, 1993, and never replaced. Except for property within the small communities of Keaton Beach, Dekle Beach, Denzel Beach, and Steinhatchee, and a few other small parcels, such as Dark Island, Cedar Island, and Intervenors' property, all of the remaining land along the coastline was placed in either Conservation or Agriculture. An unusual feature of the County is that it has one of the longest coastlines in the State (58 miles), stretching on the Gulf of Mexico from Jefferson County to Dixie County. Because around 88 percent of the coastline is owned by the State, very little waterfront land is left for development. In fact, Dr. Hutchins pointed out that except for his property and Bird Island, no other vacant, upland Gulf-front property within the County is in private ownership at this time. The FLUM, with the foregoing classifications, was adopted by the County by Ordinance No. 90-4 on June 19, 1990. Before it was submitted to the Department for its review, the County was advised by the Department that it would not accept the large, hand-colored FLUM in that format. Rather, the Department required that the map be reduced in size and digitized. To comply with this request, the original FLUM was dismantled into smaller sections and hand-carried to a firm in Crystal River that had the capability of reducing the large map into digital form. The original FLUM was then returned to the County Courthouse. When the larger map was reduced in size and converted to a digital format, it was not parcel-specific and failed to pick up the Hutchins parcel and Bird Island. Instead, except for larger tracts of land, especially in the small communities noted in Finding of Fact 8, the entire coastline was shown as being Conservation or Agriculture. This error was not detected by County officials or the affected property owners since they continued to rely upon the designations shown on the large, hand-colored FLUM in the Courthouse. The Department reviewed the FLUM, as digitized, assumed that the Hutchins and Bird Island property were Agriculture and Conservation, and found those parts of the FLUM to be in compliance. This agency action occurred on or about October 1, 1990. Thus, the Department never undertook a compliance review for either parcel with the intended higher density/intensity land use. In 1995, the room in which the original FLUM was mounted was taken over by another occupant of the Courthouse, and the original FLUM was moved to a different floor. During or after the moving process, it was lost or accidentally destroyed and its whereabouts have been unknown since that time. In 1993, Dr. Hutchins purchased his property from Colin and Lucille Kelly. Based on a conversation with a County employee, he purchased the property with the understanding that it was classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development. Although he had no specific plans to develop the property at that time, and still has none, the Mixed Use-Urban Development land use category was the major inducement for him to purchase the property. In 2005, Dr. Hutchins was approached by an investor who wished to develop the property at a later time. When the investor contacted the County to confirm its land use designation, Dr. Hutchins learned for the first time that the digitized map approved by the Department reflected the property carried an Agriculture/Rural Residential land use. Because of this, the agreement with the potential investor was never consummated. In a similar vein, Mr. Wood, who served on the Board that assigned land use designations to property on the original FLUM, and knew that the Board had designated his property as Mixed Use-Urban Development, placed the Bird Island property on the market in 2005 representing that it was classified in that category. A prospective purchaser checked with the County to verify its land use and learned that it was Conservation. Mr. Wood was unaware of this error until that time. Because of this, the sale was never consummated. After 2005, the County and Department held numerous meetings in an attempt to resolve this dispute. The Department refused to allow the FLUM to be changed to reflect the original land use designations. This led to the County adopting the two challenged amendments to correct what it characterizes as a "scrivener's error." Besides the two parcels that are in dispute here, on an undisclosed date, two other parcels (in the interior part of the County) were discovered by the County to have the wrong land use category as a result of the digitizing process. Both should have been placed in the Industrial land use category, and after a review, the Department had no objection to those errors being corrected by an amendment. The Plan Amendments On December 15, 2009, the County adopted Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17, also known as CPA 08-1 and CPA 08-3. The first amendment changed the land use on the 14-acre Hutchins parcel from Agriculture/Rural Residential to Mixed Use-Urban Development. The present land use allows one dwelling unit per 5 acres while the new land use designation allows up to 12 dwelling units per acre and a 60 percent impervious surface ratio for nonresidential development. See Department Exhibit 1, Future Land Use Policy I.3.2. Thus, up to 126 residential units and 96,476 square feet of non-residential development could be built on the Hutchins site. The second amendment changed the land use on the 3.36-acre Bird Island parcel from Agriculture-2 and Conservation to Mixed Use-Urban Development. The former land use allows one dwelling unit per 40 acres while the new land use would permit the same density/intensity as the Hutchins parcel. The new category would allow up to 30 residential units and 21,954 square feet of non-residential development. The amendments were transmitted by the County to the Department for its review in early April 2009. On June 5, 2009, the Department issued its Objections, Recommendations and Comments (ORC) report. The Department lodged objections to both amendments generally on the grounds the sites are not environmentally suitable for the proposed density and intensity increases; the amendments authorize an improper increase in density within the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA) without proper mitigation; the amendments failed to discourage urban sprawl; and they are internally inconsistent with existing provisions within the Plan. The ORC recommended that the County not adopt the amendments. Besides the Department, DEP and the Regional Planning Council also provided written comments on the amendments. By letter dated May 8, 2009, DEP generally noted that it had concerns regarding development adjacent to the Big Bend Seagrasses Aquatic Preserve (the Preserve) where the parcels are located, and that careful planning strategies should be used for any development on the land. See Department Exhibit 4. The Regional Planning Council issued a staff report on February 25, 2010, generally concluding that the amendments were consistent with the applicable Strategic Regional Policy Plan goals and objectives. See Department Exhibit 15; County Exhibit 1. The County did not respond in writing to the ORC. On December 15, 2009, it adopted the amendments without change. On March 10, 2010, the Department published its Notice of Intent to find the amendments not in compliance in the Taco Times. On March 16, 2010, the Department filed its Petition with DOAH raising the same grounds that are in its Notice of Intent. The Property The Hutchins parcel is located in the southwest part of the County, a few miles south of Keaton Beach, with around 500 to 600 feet fronting on the Gulf of Mexico. The 14 upland acres that are the subject of this case are a sub-site of a larger 25-acre parcel owned by Dr. Hutchins, with the remaining 11 acres being adjoining wetlands on the north and south sides. Dr. Hutchins has built a home on pilings on his property along with a smaller ancillary structure. Photographs indicate that except for trees, the remainder of the upland property is vacant. Bird Island also lies on the Gulf of Mexico just northwest of the Hutchins parcel and is surrounded by water on three sides. Photographs reflect one residence and a dock still on the property. The two parcels are separated by "marsh grass and a little water." Both parcels of property are easily accessible to, and just west of, County Road 361, a paved two- lane highway that begins south of the subject properties and runs adjacent to, or near, the coastline, eventually turning northeast and terminating on U.S. Highway 19 south of Perry. Both properties abut portions of the Gulf of Mexico that have been designated as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW). The waters are a part of the Preserve, which was established in 1985 and is managed by DEP. The Preserve has exceptional biological, aesthetic, and scientific value. The two parcels are located in the Coastal High Hazard Area (CHHA). That is to say, they are in "the area below the elevation of the category 1 storm surge line as established by a Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computerized storm surge model." § 163.3178(2)(h), Fla. Stat. In order to increase density within the CHHA, the County must meet certain criteria set forth in Section 163.3178(9)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department's Objections As summarized in its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department contends that the two plan amendments are not in compliance because the sites are not environmentally suitable for the proposed density and intensity increases; there is an improper increase in density within the CHHA without proper mitigation; and the amendments fail to discourage urban sprawl. Although the Notice of Intent also raised the issue of whether the amendments are internally inconsistent with other provisions in the County's existing Plan, the Proposed Recommended Order does not address any specific internal inconsistencies, and the evidence focuses on the first three concerns. Therefore, the undersigned has assumed that those objections have been withdrawn or abandoned. Environmental Suitability With the exception of an area in the middle part of the County's coastline (where the Fenholloway River flows into the Gulf), the Preserve extends along the County's entire coastline, including the area in which the two parcels are located. The Preserve, designated as an OFW, contains various types of seagrasses, whose function is to provide habitat for a number of species, improve water quality, and reduce currents or wave energy in the event of a storm. It is undisputed that the seagrass beds near the amendment sites are high-quality, healthy, and of high environmental value. Coastal marshes are prevalent in the area of the County where the amendment sites are located. They serve many functions, including cleaning water flowing into The Preserve, functioning as a habitat for a number of species, and acting as a coastal barrier against storm surge during large storm events. Section 163.3177(6)(d), Florida Statutes, requires that local governments protect and conserve natural resources through the conservation element of the local plan. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.006(3)(b)4. A Department rule also requires local governments to limit the specific impacts and cumulative impacts of development or redevelopment upon water quality and living marine resources. See Rule 9J-5.012(3)(c)1. High-density development (up to 12 units per acre) on the parcels clearly has the potential to negatively impact coastal marshes and seagrasses adjacent to and near the subject sites. Although Dr. Hutchins indicated that he would develop his property only to the extent allowed by DEP so that the marshes and seagrasses would be safeguarded, the Department's practice for many years has been to assume that the property will be developed at its maximum allowable density and intensity. See, e.g., Sheridan v. Lee Cty, et al., Case No. 90- 7791 (DOAH Jan. 27, 1992; DCA June 28, 1993; Admin. Comm. Feb. 15, 1994)(compliance determination must be made based on maximum impacts authorized by the amendment terms, not speculation of a lesser impact). Mr. Wood's development intentions are not known. In any event, the two parcels potentially authorize 156 residential units and 113,430 square feet of non-residential uses adjacent to an OFW. Even so, the Mixed Use-Urban Development land use designation may still be permissible if specific conditions limiting the density/intensity on the parcels are incorporated into the Plan by asterisk or text language in conjunction with a new amendment. As noted in the Conclusions of Law, this planning practice has been used in other cases. Without any limitations, though, the preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the maximum allowable density/intensity contravenes the cited statute and rules. CHHA Both parcels are located within the CHHA of the County. Section 163.3178(2)(h), Florida Statutes, requires that the County establish mitigation criteria for plan amendments located in the CHHA. Probably because of its small size in terms of population, and the lack of development (or ability to do so) along the coastline, the County has no goals, objectives, or policies addressing criteria for mitigation. Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)6. requires that a plan "direct population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high-hazard areas." Also, Rule 9J-5.012(3)(b)7. requires that a plan "maintain or reduce evacuation times." Prior to 2006, the Department would allow a local government to comply with the foregoing rules by allowing density increases in the CHHA if the local government decreased a similar type of density elsewhere. This practice was known as "offsets." In 2006, however, the Legislature amended the statute to include criteria for compliance with the two rules. Due to the change in the law, the Department no longer engages in the practice of offsets for land use changes in the CHHA. Instead, it requires a local government that proposes to increase density within the CHHA to meet the requirements of Section 163.3178(9)(a)1.-3., Florida Statutes. Under the statute, if the County can demonstrate a 16-hour out-of-county evacuation time for a category 5 storm event as measured on the Saffir-Simpson scale and a 12-hour evacuation time to shelter within the County for a category 5 storm event, an increase in density within the CHHA may be allowed. See § 163.3178(9)(a)1. and 2., Fla. Stat. Alternatively, the County may use one of the mitigation measures described in Section 163.3178(9)(a)3., Florida Statutes. Except for Coastal Element Objective IX-7 of the Plan, which provides that the County maintain a hurricane evacuation time of 9 hours for a category 1 storm, see County Exhibit 7, no data and analysis, such as a hurricane evacuation study for a category 5 storm event, was presented to demonstrate compliance with these requirements. Dr. Hutchins' submission during the mediation process of an evacuation plan for a category 3 storm does not satisfy this criterion. Typically, a local government will have an adopted plan for a category 5 storm, as well as an evacuation model. The preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the mitigation measures in Section 163.3178(9)(a), Florida Statutes, have not been satisfied. At hearing, the County and Dr. Hutchins contended that offsets should still be used in this case to satisfy the mitigation requirements. They point out that the County has recently purchased property (totaling 51.7 acres) that is designated Mixed Use-Urban Development and more than compensates for any potential increase of residents needing to evacuate if the two amendments are found to be in compliance. As noted above, however, the practice of offsets was discontinued in 2006 with the passage of the new law. Notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, there was no legal requirement that the Department notify every affected local government and property owner that it was discontinuing that practice to comply with the new law.2 Urban Sprawl Rule 9J-5.006(5)(g)1.-13. identifies thirteen "primary" indicators of urban sprawl. The Department contends that eight indicators are "tripped" or "triggered" by the new amendments and collectively they indicate that the proliferation of urban sprawl is not discouraged. No evidence was presented regarding five indicators. According to the rule, "[t]he presence and potential effects of multiple indicators shall be considered to determine whether they collectively reflect a failure to discourage urban sprawl." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J- 5.006(5)(d). Indicator 1 is tripped if the amendments allow uses in excess of demonstrated need. In this case no need analysis for additional land in the Mixed Use-Urban Development category was submitted by the County. The absence of a study is sufficient to trigger this indicator. Indicator 2 is tripped if the amendments allow "significant" amounts of urban development to occur in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas. The only true existing "urban" area in the County, as that term is commonly understood, is the City of Perry. Other residential and some commercial development (but to a much lesser degree) is found mainly in a few small communities on the coastline such as Steinhatchee, an unincorporated community perhaps 15 miles south of the subject parcels with probably around 1,500 residents, and Keaton Beach and Dekle Beach, both having no more than a few hundred residents each. (Official recognition has been taken of the population data.) Keaton Beach is around 2 or 3 miles north of the subject property and has condominiums and other limited residential/commercial development. In addition, Dark Island is located a short distance north of Bird Island and is classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development, which authorizes the higher density/intensity development. Given this lack of "urban areas" in the County, virtually any development outside of Perry could arguably be considered "urban development . . . in rural areas at substantial distances from existing urban areas while leaping over undeveloped lands which are available and suitable for development." Fla. Admin. Code R. 9J-5.006(5)(g)2. Notwithstanding this unique (and perhaps unfair) situation, it is fair to characterize the potential addition of 12 units per acre as urban development and a total of around 150 residential units with associated commercial development as "substantial" when considering the County's size and existing development. Therefore, the second indicator has been triggered. Indicator 3 is triggered if the amendments allow urban development in "radial, strip, isolated or ribbon patterns generally emanating from existing urban development." Because urban development will occur in a rural, isolated area, this indicator is triggered. Indicator 4 is triggered if there is premature development of rural land that fails to adequately protect and conserve natural resources. The evidence supports a finding that this indicator is triggered. Indicators 6, 7, and 8 are related to the orderly and efficient provision of existing and future public services and facilities. The evidence shows that the area is not currently served by central sewer and is not near any fire or police stations. While no public facilities are planned for that area in the five year capital improvement schedule, at a meeting in March 2010 the Taylor County Coastal Water & Sewer District indicated that a request for partial federal funding to extend central sewer services to Fish Creek, which lies beyond and to the south of the subject parcels, would be placed on the April agenda. See County Exhibit 7. Whether a request was actually made at that meeting is not of record. In any event, Coastal Element Policy IX.6.5 provides that where central sewer is not available in an area classified as Mixed Use-Urban Development, septic tanks may be used within the CHHA. See Department Exhibit 1. As to fire and law enforcement support, there is insufficient evidence to establish that these services cannot be provided in an efficient manner. Given these circumstances, there is less than a preponderance of the evidence to support a finding that indicators 6 through 8 are triggered. Indicator 9 is triggered if the plan amendments fail to provide a clear separation between rural and urban uses. There is insufficient evidence to support a finding that this indicator is triggered. Collectively, the presence of four indicators is sufficient to support a finding that the County has failed to discourage urban sprawl. E. Scrivener's Error The County and Intervenors rely heavily upon the fact that the plan amendments are in compliance because the amendments simply correct an error that occurred when, at the Department's direction in 1990, the original FLUM was reduced in size and digitized. While at first blush this argument is appealing, it assumes that the Department would have approved the new land use classifications in 1990 when it performed a compliance review of the original FLUM. But this never occurred, and the new amendments give the Department its first opportunity to determine if the new land uses are in compliance. It is undisputed that on an undisclosed date the Department approved an amendment based on the same type of error. While the record is somewhat confusing, it appears that in that case, the two properties were Industrial, they were not located in the CHHA, and on-going business concerns were operating on the properties. Intervenor Hutchins also cited several instances where mapping errors were allowed to be corrected by subsequent plan amendments. Where final agency action in those matters is of record, however, it shows that approval was given only after a compliance review was made by the Department.3
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a final order determining that Plan Amendments CPA 08-1 and CPA 08-3 adopted by Ordinance Nos. 2009-15 and 2009-17 are not in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2010.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Carla Brice, has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to a vested rights certificate to develop certain real property located in Alachua County, Florida without complying with the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan?
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding (hereinafter referred to as "Lot 111"), consists of approximately 6 acres of real property located in Alachua County, Florida. Lot 111 is currently owned by the Petitioner, Carla Brice. Ms. Brice acquired Lot 111 through inheritance from her father, Carl L. Brice. Ms. Brice acquired the property in approximately January of 1993. Early History of the Development of Arredonda Estates. During the 1950s Mr. Brice acquired a platted subdivision in Alachua County known as Arredonda Estates Unit 1 (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 1"). Approximately 100 acres of property located adjacent to Unit 1 were also acquired by Mr. Brice. Unit 1 met the existing plat law of Alachua County. Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 1 and the sale of lots therein. Part of the 100 acres acquired by Mr. Brice was subsequently platted and developed for sale as residential lots as Arredonda Estates Unit 2A (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 2A"). Arredonda Estates Unit 2B (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 2B") was to be located to the north of Unit 2A. Because of the lack of access out of Unit 2B, the then County engineer of the Alachua County, Roy J. Miller, informed Mr. Brice that he would not allow Mr. Brice to proceed with Unit 2B until Mr. Brice completed development of approximately 33 acres of real property located to the east of Unit 1. Mr. Miller believed that there would be better access from the various phases of Arredonda Estates if the 33 acres were developed first because there would be access out of the 33 acres onto County Road 24 and onto Broken Arrow Road to the east of the 33 acres. Mr. Miller, as the County engineer, wielded a great deal of influence in the development of property in Alachua County at the time Mr. Brice developed Units 1 and 2A and at the time he was beginning development of the 33 acres. Although the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Miller could have legally required Mr. Brice to develop the 33 acres before developing Unit 2B, the uncontroverted evidence proved that it was believed that Mr. Miller's approval was necessary in order to complete a development. The 33 acres surround Lot 111 on the east, west and north. The south boundary of Lot 111 is County Road 24, Archer Road. One of the two access roads to County Road 24 from the 33 acre development was located to the immediate east of Lot 111 and the other was located to the immediate west of Lot 111. Lot 111 is bounded on the south by County Road 24. The 33 acres were to be developed as Arredonda Estates (hereinafter referred to as "Unit 4"). The Development of Unit 4. Mr. Brice informed Mr. Miller that he was concerned about developing Unit 4 before developing Unit 2B because Mr. Brice planned to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center. He did not plan to build the shopping center until all phases of Arredonda Estates were completed, including Unit 2B. In agreeing to develop Unit 4 before Unit 2B, Mr. Brice was concerned about making expenditures for larger drainage facilities and obtaining additional easements necessary for the development of Lot 111 before he planned to begin actual development of the shopping center. Mr. Brice informed Mr. Miller of these concerns. The shopping center Mr. Brice planned to develop was to consist of 296,000 square feet of paved surface and 50,000 square feet of roof area. These plans required a redesign of the drainage for Unit 4. In particular, the following modifications were necessary: In conclusion I find it necessary to change the diameter of pipe #7 from an 18 inch diameter to a 21 inch diameter, placed at a 0.15 percent slope pipe grade. Some necessary amendments are required at this point. The larger size pipe in place will cost $9.20 per linear foot. Some sixty-two feet are needed, therefore the total cost will be $570.40. Brice exhibit 9. Despite Mr. Brice's concerns, Mr. Miller continued to insist on the development of Unit 4 before Unit 2B and Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 4. Unit 4 was platted on July 19, 1970. The plat was recorded in Plat Book H, Page 30, Official Records of Alachua County. The initial design of Unit 4 provided for one point of ingress and egress on to State Road 24 from Unit 4. Mr. Miller required that two points of ingress and egress be provided and Mr. Brice agreed. The evidence failed to prove that this requirement was agreed to in exchange for any representation from Alachua County that Mr. Brice would be allowed to develop the shopping center. The final plat provided two means of ingress and egress to State Road 24 and one means of ingress and egress to County Road Number Southwest 24-C (Broken Arrow Road). Lot 111 is contained on the plat. No intended use for Lot 111 was designated on the plat of Unit 4. The plat simply identifies the lot. See Brice exhibit 5. The plat identifies the development of residential lots only. The 33 acres was initially zoned as "A" (agriculture). In order to develop Unit 4 it was necessary to obtain approval of re-zoning of the property as R1C, residential use. The re-zoning of the 33 acres was sought and approved. Lot 111 was also zoned for agricultural use when acquired. On February 11, 1969, 4.27 acres of Lot 111 were re-zoned from "A" (agriculture) to "BR" (retail sales and service). On July 1, 1969, a special use permit allowing a mobile home trailer sales agency was issued for use of 1.1 acres contiguous to the 4.27 acre parcel of Lot 111 by Alachua County. On July 7, 1975, the 1.1 acres, which the special use permit had been issued for, was zoned from "A" to "BR." Construction plans for site improvements for Unit 4 were subsequently prepared, filed with Alachua County and were approved. See Brice exhibit 10. Included on the plans is a rectangular shape identified as "Proposed Shopping Center" containing indications of measurements representing 50,000 square feet of building space. The "Proposed Shopping Center" designation is located on Lot 111. Mr. Brice was subsequently informed that the site improvements for Unit 4 were approved by Alachua County. The evidence failed to prove, however, that Alachua County specifically considered or approved the construction of a shopping center on Lot 111 in approving the site improvement plans for Unit 4. The approved site improvements for Unit 4 were ultimately made and accepted by Alachua County in September of 1970. Government Action Relied Upon. Mr. Miller intended to allow Mr. Brice to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center "as he had planned." Mr. Miller's approval was conditioned on the completion of development of Units 2B and 4 and the sale of lots thereon. The shopping center to be approved was to be limited to what Mr. Brice "had originally proposed" which was a shopping center of 50,000 square feet. Mr. Brice complied with Mr. Miller's condition that he complete development of Unit 4 before developing Unit 2B. The evidence failed to prove that it was reasonable for Mr. Brice to believe that Mr. Miller's representations concerning the approval of Mr. Brice's intended development of a shopping center on Lot 111 would last indefinitely. It was also unreasonable for Mr. Brice to believe that the representations of Mr. Miller would survive indefinitely beyond the time that Mr. Brice completed development of Arredonda Estates. In July of 1970, Alachua County Zoning Regulations contained the following site plan approval requirement for shopping centers: No permit shall be issued for construction of a shopping center until the plans and specifications, including the design of ingress and egress roads, parking facilities, and such other items as may be found of importance have been approved by the zoning commission. Based upon this provision, Mr. Miller did not have the authority to approve the construction of a shopping center on Lot 111 in July of 1970. If the representations made by Mr. Miller to Mr. Brice concerning construction of the shopping center had been made in July, 1970, it would be unreasonable for Mr. Brice to rely upon Mr. Miller's representation because of the Alachua County Zoning Regulations quoted in finding of fact 31. If the representations were made before July, 1970, it would be reasonable for Mr. Brice to rely on Mr. Miller's approval of the shopping center because the evidence failed to prove that Alachua County Zoning Regulation quoted above was in effect before July, 1970. The weight of the evidence proved that Mr. Miller's representations were made before July, 1970. Detrimental Reliance. Mr. Brice proceeded with the development of Unit 4. Roads and drainage facilities associated with Unit 4 were constructed by 1971. The cost of these improvements was approximately $68,989.54. The total cost of improvements associated with Unit 4 was $121,947.54. Mr. Brice also had to obtain a drainage easement but the evidence failed to prove the cost of doing so. The exact amount expended on Unit 4 attributable to work performed just for Lot 111 and the shopping center was not proved by Ms. Brice. One method of allocating costs associated with the development of Unit 4 to Lot 111 suggested by Ms. Brice is to determine the percentage of acreage Lot 111 represents of the whole of Unit 4: approximately 17.9 percent. Applying this percentage to the total costs equals $21,828.61. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove that $21,828.61 was actually incurred in association with Lot 111. The evidence failed to prove that it would be reasonable to attribute any part of the expenditures listed in paragraphs 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 11 or 12 of Brice exhibit 30 as attributable to Lot 111. Based upon evidence presented by Alachua County, the total expenditures made by Mr. Brice associated with Lot 111 and the shopping center were approximately $1,005.50. Subsequent Events. Mr. Brice caused preliminary plans for a shopping center for Lot 111 to be developed. Brice exhibit 14. Those plans were never submitted for approval and no building permit was issued approving the construction of a shopping center for Lot 111. The preliminary plans for the shopping center indicate a substantially different configuration for the shopping center than indicated on the site improvement plans for Unit 4. Brice exhibit 14. No final development plan or plat approving a shopping center on Lot 111 was issued by Alachua County. Efforts were made during the 1970s to market Lot 111 for development as a shopping center. These efforts were not successful. As a part of this effort, Mr. Brice incurred $7,000.00 for the construction of a three dimensional model of the proposed shopping center evidenced on the preliminary plans. It has been suggested that Mr. Brice did not proceed with the development of the shopping center during the 1970's and into the 1980's for a number of reasons: A dispute between Mr. Brice and Alachua County arose in 1976 concerning the road in Unit 2A; A dispute also arose concerning the water system in the area of Arredonda Estates; The state of the economy was not conducive to development. The evidence, however, failed to prove why the shopping center was not developed. In 1973, Alachua County created a development review committee. Final site plans for commercial sites were required to be approved by the committee. Mr. Brice did not obtain approval for the proposed shopping center or seek assurances from Alachua County that Mr. Miller's representations concerning the shopping center on Lot 111 were still valid. During 1982 and 1983, Mr. Brice became aware of proposed revisions to the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Brice met with Alachua County officials concerning the revisions and followed the progress of the revisions. In 1984 Alachua County adopted a comprehensive plan. Under this plan commercial use of Lot 111 was not allowed except for a neighborhood convenience store with square footage of 10,000 square feet. In 1985, during a meeting with Alachua County personnel, Mr. Brice and his attorney were informed that Lot 111 could not be developed as a shopping center without a comprehensive plan amendment. No amendment was applied for. In 1989, offers to purchase Lot 111 were received. Those offers were continent upon the property being developed consistent with the BR zoning. Ms. Brice's name, then known as Carla B. Sutton, first appears in connection with Lot 111 in 1989 when offers to purchase Lot 111 were received. The evidence, however, failed to prove that she was owner of Lot 111 at that time. In 1989 or 1990, a conceptual site plan review was applied for by David Miller, Mr. Brice's representative, concerning Lot 111. Brice exhibit 21. The application was considered at an Alachua County Development Review Committee meeting on March 22, 1990. Consideration of the application was deferred for two weeks. The development Review Committee met on April 19, 1990 and considered the application for conceptual site plan review for Lot 111. The Committee was concerned about how the fact that Lot 111 had been zoned BR before the comprehensive plan had been adopted impacted the fact that development of Lot 111 as a shopping center was prohibited by the comprehensive plan. A decision was delayed for a month and staff was asked to prepare a report dealing with similarly situated parcels. By January 1991, proposed language providing for vesting of certain zoning had been drafted by Alachua County. Brice exhibit 24. By letter dated January 30, 1991, Kurt Larsen, Director of the Office of Planning and Development of Alachua County, informed all affected property owners that Alachua County was "considering" allowing a period of time during which existing zoning would be honored. Brice exhibit 25 Comments were invited. By letter dated February 15, 1991, counsel for Ms. Brice responded to Mr. Larsen's January 30, 1991 letter. Brice exhibit 26. A Transmittal Draft of the Future Land Use Element of the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan dated April 1991 was sent to the Florida Department of Community Affairs for review. See Brice exhibit 27. The Draft provided a two- year period during which undeveloped parcels zoned for a use that was otherwise inconsistent with the Comprehensive Land Use Plan would be allowed to be developed essentially in accordance with existing zoning. This policy was ultimately rejected by the Department of Community Affairs. Alachua County informed Ms. Brice of the action of the Department of Community Affairs by letter dated September 18, 1991. Brice exhibit 28. Rights That Will Be Destroyed. Alachua County adopted a Comprehensive Land Use Plan in 1991. The following policy was agreed to in a compromise between Alachua County and the Department of Community Affairs concerning commercial enclaves: Policy 3.4.3. Commercial Enclaves are designed within the Urban Cluster on the Future Land Use Map. These sites shall be subject to the following location and compatibility standards: Development of Commercial Enclaves shall be required to meet all concurrency requirements. Development shall be required to minimize access from arterials and collectors. Whenever possible, driveways shall use common access points to reduce potential turn movements. A maximum of 20,000 square feet of gross leasable area shall be permitted within each enclave. Uses may include neighborhood convenience centers consistent with Policy 3.8., offices consistent with Policy 3.9.1. and sit-down restaurants. The land development regulations for this land use category shall specify performance standards required to mitigate any adverse impact of such development on adjacent land uses and affected public facilities. Such performance standards shall include buffering and landscaping provisions, site design measures to locate such uses away from less intensive adjacent land uses, signage and parking restrictions, and intensity provisions (e.g. height and bulk restrictions). In the interim, until land development regulations consistent with these policies are adopted, the standards and criteria governing Commercial Enclaves shall be implemented through the County's Development Review Committee process. This policy shall be reviewed by 1993 to determine the effectiveness of the land use category. Mr. Brice was informed, after contacting the Alachua County Growth Management Department, that his development of Lot 111 was limited by the commercial enclave policy. Pursuant to the commercial enclave policy, development of Lot 111 is limited to a size of 20,000 square feet and the uses to which Lot 111 may be put are less than would be allowed under BR zoning. Carla Brice's Reliance and Detriment. The evidence in this case failed to prove that Ms. Brice, the current owner of Lot 111 and the applicant in this case, was aware of any representations made by Mr. Miller. More importantly, the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Brice in any way reasonably relied upon the representations made to her father. The evidence also failed to prove that Alachua County made any representations to Ms. Brice that she would be allowed to develop Lot 111 as a shopping center. In fact, Alachua County has indicated just the opposite to Ms. Brice since she became the owner of Lot 111. In light of the amount of time that passed after Mr. Miller's representations were made to Mr. Brice and the intervening events concerning development in Alachua County before Ms. Brice acquired Lot 111, any reliance by Ms. Brice on Mr. Miller's representations would not be reasonable. Finally, the evidence failed to prove that Ms. Brice detrimentally relied upon any representation of Alachua County concerning the development of Lot 111. Only Mr. Brice, Ms. Brice's father, made expenditures related to the development of Lot 111 as a shopping center. I. Procedural Requirements. On June 9, 1993 Ms. Brice filed her Application seeking an equitable vested rights certificate or a statutory vested rights certificate. On September 22, 1993 Kurt Larsen, Director, Department of Growth Management, Alachua County, informed Ms. Brice that the Application was denied. Ms. Brice appealed the decision to deny the Application by letter dated September 28, 1993. The Division of Administrative Hearings was requested by letter dated January 18, 1994, from Alachua County to assign a hearing officer to conduct a formal administrative hearing. The formal administrative hearing of this matter was conducted on March 14, 1994.
The Issue The issue is whether Plan Amendment 98-51C adopted by the City of Ocala by Ordinance No. 2869 on August 4, 1998, is in compliance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this land use dispute, Petitioner, Shady Historic and Scenic Trails Association, Inc. (SHASTA), has challenged the consistency of a plan amendment adopted by Respondent, City of Ocala (City). The amendment changes the land use on certain real property owned by Intervenor, Norbert M. Dorsey, as Bishop of the Diocese of Orlando (Intervenor). By stipulation, the parties have agreed that SHASTA is a not-for-profit corporation whose members include residents of Marion County, Florida (County). Through the testimony of its registered agent, it was established that SHASTA is a "county- wide organization" formed in 1985 because of its concern "about where growth was going," and the potential impact of growth on the "plan." Another witness (Baldwin) made comments to the City at one of its meetings concerning the adoption of the plan. Whether she is a member of SHASTA is not of record, and it can reasonably be inferred that the witness resides and owns property outside of the City. SHASTA's registered agent also presented testimony at hearing, but whether she resides within the City or in the County is unknown. Finally, while SHASTA's registered agent presented argument during her opening statement concerning the organization's standing, she presented no evidence (through sworn testimony or exhibits received in evidence) that any member of the organization who resides, owns property, or owns or operates a business within the City made comments, recommendations, or objections to the City during the course of its review and adoption of the amendment. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Petitioner is an affected person within the meaning of the law. The City is a local government located within the County. It is one of five cities in the State designated by the Department of Community Affairs (DCA) as a "sustainable community" under Section 163.3244, Florida Statutes (1999). To this end, the City has entered into a sustainable community designation agreement with the DCA, and thus its plan amendments are not reviewed by the DCA or the regional planning council. Intervenor is an affected person since it owns the property which is the subject of the amendment. The amendment The City adopted plan amendment 98-51C by Ordinance No. 2869 on August 4, 1998. That amendment changed the land use on Intervenor's property from agriculture to public buildings and facilities. Section 1.1.12 of the City's Future Land Use Element specifies that the public buildings and facilities category "includes areas or facilities that serve the general public," such as "government buildings, public grounds, airports, cemeteries, churches and educational facilities." In making its recommendation, the City's Planning Department considered factors such as the type of soil on the property; the absence of known caves, sinkholes, or wetlands on the site; the suitability of the property for development; the property's location in the City's urban service area; the County's land use designation of the property as an urban land use; and the compatibility of the property with the surrounding land uses, including the proximity of the property to adjacent developments of regional impact (DRI), malls, large movie theaters, shopping centers, and other heavy commercial and retail development. In addition, the Planning Department considered the comments of other state and governmental agencies, including the DCA, St. Johns River Water Management District (SJRWMD), and County. The County did not object to the amendment. Based on the foregoing data and analysis, the Planning Department recommended to the City's Planning and Zoning Commission (Commission) that the plan amendment be adopted. The Commission in turn recommended to the City Council that the amendment be approved. That recommendation was accepted by the City on August 4, 1998. The property The subject property consists of 40 acres and was annexed into the City in 1998. It lies within the boundaries of the City at the southeastern corner of the intersection of Southwest 42nd Street and Southwest 27th Avenue. Both roads are two-lane paved roads designated by the County as special scenic roads. This means that the right-of-way on those roadways cannot be widened or altered, and trees cannot be removed in or adjacent to the right-of-way. Prior to annexation, the property had a low-density residential land use designation in the County, and it was zoned agricultural. However, this zoning was inconsistent with the land use designation and a more likely zoning classification under the County comprehensive plan would have been R-1, which permits a maximum of four dwellings per acre. Had the property been assigned a City zoning classification most similar to the County's R-1, it would have received a low-density residential use allowing five residential units per acre. Intervenor purchased the property for the purpose of building a private school on the site. In the County, schools are located in both rural and urban areas. Under the County's land use designation for the property, schools are an allowable use. Before the property was annexed, it was located within what is known as the City's "urban service area." Under an interlocal agreement with the County, the City had the exclusive right to provide water and sewer services to that area and to condition the provision of such services upon annexation. At the time the plan amendment was adopted, the property immediately south of the subject property was being operated as a thoroughbred horse farm known as Glen Hill Farm. Immediately to the north and across Southwest 42nd Street was property with a land use designation of low-density residential allowing five residential units per acre. That property was previously approved as a planned unit development of mixed commercial and residential uses. The adjacent property on the northwest corner of the intersection of Southwest 42nd Street and Southwest 27th Avenue has been developed as a high-density assisted living facility. Immediately behind the assisted living facility are two DRIs. The first includes retail uses (including a shopping center), professional and medical offices, two large apartment complexes (consisting of more than 700 units), and three or four nursing homes or adult living facilities; this DRI would allow a vocational or technical school with approximately 500 students. The second DRI consists of the Paddock Mall, which includes 580,000 square feet of developed retail use and another 173,000 square feet of available but undeveloped use. Across Southwest 27th Avenue to the west is property commonly known as the Red Oak Farm property, which is the subject of another plan amendment challenge by Petitioner in Case No. 98- 4144GM. That amendment allows medium-density residential use. Finally, the property is located within one mile of the fastest growing and most intensively developed property within the City, which lies in and around State Road 200. The objections raised by Petitioner In its Amended Petition filed on November 2, 1998, SHASTA has alleged that the plan amendment is not in compliance for a number of reasons. They include contentions that the property is unsuitable for a private high school in that all of the land slopes to the south where extensive flooding has occurred (paragraph 9); that the site cannot be engineered to prevent flooding or that control surface water flow by retention ponds will leak into the aquifer (paragraph 10); that the site is vulnerable to stormwater pollution (paragraph 11); that the City has inadequate data and analysis to support development regulations for natural resources protection, including sinkholes and floodplains pursuant to the Conservation Element (paragraph 12); that the City has not specified how sinkholes or solution pipes to the aquifer will be protected pursuant to Policies 1.5 and 1.7 of the Conservation Element (paragraph 13); that the City has violated Policy 1.4 of the Conservation Element by not continuing the County land use designations on the property (paragraph 14); that the City has not distributed proposed interlocal agreements for annexation and future land uses as required by Policy 2.8 of the Future Land Use Element (paragraph 15); that the amendment is not in compliance with Goal II of the Future Land Use Element (paragraph 16); that the amendment is not in compliance with Policy 3.5 of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element (paragraph 17); that the amendment is inconsistent with revisions made by the 1998 Legislature concerning school siting in Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1999)(paragraph 18); that the amendment does not further "the six broad principles of sustainability," as set forth in Section 163.3244(1), Florida Statutes (1999)(paragraph 19); that extending water and sewer lines to the property is unfair to City taxpayers (paragraph 20); that City taxpayers will be forced to pay a higher rate to fund expansion of City services into the area (paragraph 21); and that the school will not be compatible with adult living facilities located northwest of the property (paragraph 24). Allegations not raised until hearing, such as a contention that the amendment would promote urban sprawl, were deemed to be untimely raised and were not considered. Finally, concerns about the specific design of the school, assuming one is built, are not relevant to a determination of whether the amendment is in compliance. As to the allegation in paragraph 18 concerning the amendment's lack of compliance with school siting requirements in Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, that allegation is irrelevant since the new law became effective more than a year after the amendment was adopted. Likewise, the allegation in paragraph 19 has been found to be irrelevant for the reasons stated in the Conclusions of Law, while the allegation in paragraph 16 regarding Goal II of the Future Land Use Element has no relevance to the amendment since it refers to a transportation concurrency exception/urban area redevelopment area, a matter not in issue here. Finally, the allegations in paragraphs 20 and 21 regarding the potential for taxes being raised are not grounds on which to find an amendment not in compliance. The undisputed (and only) evidence shows that there are no sinkholes or known wetlands on the property; that the property did not have a conservation land use under the County's Comprehensive Plan; that the City has entered into an interlocal agreement with the County establishing an urban service area; that the amendment is compatible with surrounding land uses, including adult living facilities; and that the City considered and analyzed all of the data summarized in Findings of Fact 6 and 7 before it adopted the amendment. Therefore, the allegations in paragraphs 12-15, 17, and 24 of the Amended Petition have not been sustained. Still in issue are the allegations in paragraphs 9-11 of the Amended Petition concerning potential flooding and stormwater pollution. They will be discussed below. The property The property was once one of the three largest horse farms in the County. These farms have already been developed or, as is the case here, are in the process of being developed. The entire City, including Intervenor's property, and most of the land in the County, lie within a Karst sensitive area, which features sinkhole and cave systems. Mapped and documented cave systems are found approximately one-half mile to the west- southwest (Briar Cave) of the property and a like distance to the east (Oak Creek Caverns). However, no sinkholes, caves, or wetland systems have been found on the property, and the rules of the SJRWMD pertaining to Karst sensitive areas do not prohibit the construction in question. The tract is part of a high Floridan Aquifer (Aquifer) recharge area which permits very rapid infiltration of surface waters to the Aquifer, and it discharges into a 100-year-old flood plain. However, the property itself is not located in a flood plain. Two basic soils are found on the property. They are the Kendrick soil and Zuber soil. Due to shrinkage or swelling of the clay and "low strength," these types of soil present "slight" or "moderate" construction limitations. Expert testimony confirmed, however, that through good planning and design, or presite removal of the soils, these limitations could be readily overcome. This was also acknowledged by two of Petitioner's witnesses. At the same time, if SJRWMD regulations for construction of water retention areas in Karst sensitive areas are followed, those limitations would be resolved. Typically, the City does not impose specific requirements concerning stormwater retention or groundwater protection at the comprehensive plan stage. Rather, these are normally imposed through the City's land development regulations at the site plan stage of the process. Presumably, at that point, Petitioner will have an opportunity to raise these types of concerns. The City has had experience with other properties having Karst topography and water recharge features similar to the property in question. For example, on the Heathbrook DRI, the City imposed groundwater protection provisions which other local governments throughout the State have used as a model for other developments. To prevent groundwater contamination, the City uses a tool called a DRASTIC Index (Index), which was prepared by the United States Environmental Protection Agency. The Index is used by the City and a host of other regulatory agencies to determine the potential of property for groundwater contamination. According to the Index, the property is less vulnerable to contamination than approximately seventy percent of the rest of the land in the County. City water facilities are available in the right-of-way on the north and west sides of the property, while City sanitary sewer facilities are approximately one-half mile away. If the project goes forward, Intervenor would be required to run sewer lines from the existing sewer facility to the improvements to be located on its property. If stormwater retention facilities are constructed on the property pursuant to City land development regulations, more pre-development water would be retained on the property than would be the case if the property were not developed. In addition, less runoff would be generated from the property if it were developed under the public buildings and facilities land use than would occur if the property was developed under the City land use most comparable to the County's R-1 classification. The potential for flooding Because the property slopes from the north to the south, stormwater run-off naturally flows over the property to the south and east across Glen Hill Farm to a natural low area or pond located on that farm. The evidence shows that in February and March 1998, when unusually heavy rains occurred, substantial flooding occurred on the farm, causing one of its road to be closed for almost two weeks. Intervenor has entered into an agreement with Glen Hill Farm whereby the farm has agreed to allow a portion of stormwater to continue to flow onto its property. Without such an agreement, the City would have required that Intervenor retain all stormwater from a 100-year storm on its property. A stormwater run-off system and a drainage system can be designed on the property to fully satisfy the SJRWMD's Karst sensitive development regulations. Such a system will retain all post-development run-off created by a 100-year storm. Thus, development of the property is unlikely to cause flooding on adjacent properties. Stormwater runoff As noted above, the SJRWMD has promulgated regulations for the design and construction of drainage systems and drainage basins within Karst sensitive areas, which are designed to protect against stormwater run-off contamination of the underlying aquifer. These regulations are more stringent than those that apply to other areas; if adhered to by Intervenor, they will adequately contain and control stormwater run-off and prevent groundwater contamination. In order to develop the property, Intervenor will be required to go through the site plan approval process with the City and to comply with the SJRWMD Karst sensitive regulations. Sufficient testing has been performed on the property to determine that stormwater retention systems may be designed for the property which will avoid unreasonable risk of groundwater contamination. The land use assigned to the property has less potential for detrimental impact upon the environment than would occur had the County permitted development using an R-1 classification, or a similar one by the City upon annexation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the City of Ocala enter a final order finding Plan Amendment 98-51C to be in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER , Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene Weesner, Registered Agent Shady Historic and Scenic Trails Association, Inc. 655 Southwest 80th Street Ocala, Florida 34476 W. James Gooding, III, Esquire Gilligan, King & Gooding, P.A. 7 East Silver Springs Boulevard Suite 500 Ocala, Florida 34470-6659 Bryce W. Ackerman, Esquire Hart & Gray Post Office Box 3310 Ocala, Florida 34478-3310 Cari L. Roth, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Suite 325A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
Findings Of Fact The Department of Environmental Regulation published notices of this land hearing on January 25, 1990, in the Miami Herald and on January 26, 1990, in the Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel and the Ft. Lauderdale News. Notice of this hearing was also published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on February 2, 1990. The DER mailed notice of this hearing to the chief executives of the local and regional authorities with responsibility for zoning and land use planning whose jurisdiction includes the site. The Applicant, FPL, posted notices of this hearing at the proposed site. The Lauderdale Repowering Project FPL submitted an application for site certification for the Lauderdale Repowering Project which was filed with DER on November 29, 1989. The application was determined complete by DER on December 13, 1989. The project will involve the "repowering' of existing Units 4 and 5 at FPL's Lauderdale Plant Site, resulting in the replacement of the unit's steam generators with new combustion turbines and heat recovery steam generators. The project will increase the net generating capacity at the site by approximately 680 megawatts. The existing 24 gas turbines at the Lauderdale Site will be unaffected by the Repowering Project. In addition, new water and wastewater treatment facilities and stormwater runoff ponds will be constructed as part of the project. The tallest structures on site will be the 150 foot tall stacks associated with the new hear recovery steam generators. No principal structure will be constructed closer than 25 feet from the site's south boundary along the Dania Cutoff Canal. The Site The site for the proposed Lauderdale Repowering Project is a previously-developed, 392-acre parcel of land in southeastern Broward County. An adjacent ten-acre parcel will be utilized temporarily during construction for parking and equipment laydown. The site lies about 1 mile east of the Florida Turnpike and 1 mile west of Interstate 95. State Road 84 and Interstate 595 are north of the site. Griffin Road is about one-half mile south off the site. The site is bounded on the north and west by the South New River Canal and on the south by the Dania Cutoff Canal. The site has been utilized for the generation of electricity since the 1920's. Current use of the site consists of two fossil-fuel-fired steam generating units (which will be repowered) and 24 gas turbine units. The total net generating capacity of the existing Lauderdale Plant is 1,248 megawatts. Consistency of the Site with Local Land Use Plans and Zoning Ordinances The site was located entirely within the unincorporated area of Broward County on the dates the application was filed and determined complete. A small portion of the southeast corner of the site was annexed into the City of Hollywood, Florida in December, 1989 but subsequent to the submittal of the Site Certification Application. The applicable land use plans and zoning ordinances are those adopted by Broward County in effect as of the date of the application. Since the annexation occurred after the application was filed and determined complete, the land use plans and zoning ordinances for the City of Hollywood cannot be considered as part of this land use hearing. The City of Hollywood does not have land use designations or zoning classifications assigned to the portion of the site that has been annexed into the City of Hollywood. The land use plan that governs the Lauderdale Site for purposed of this hearing is the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element of the Broward County Board of County Commissioners on March 1, 1989, and its accompanying map. The applicable zoning regulations are Broward County's Zoning Ordinance as codified in Chapter 39 of the Code of Broward County. The entire proposed site for the project is designated as either Utility or as Industrial under the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element and its accompanying map. Electrical power plants, such as that proposed by FPL, are uses permitted in both the Utility and Industrial designations under the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element. The site is also consistent with location-oriented objectives and policies of the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element concerning Utility and Industrial designations. The site is similarly designated for utility and industrial uses under the Broward County Land Use Plan. The Broward County Land Use Plan was prepared as a guide in the preparation of the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element. The Broward County Planning Council has certified the Future Unincorporated Area Land Use Element as the effective land use plan for the unincorporated areas of Broward County. The site is zoned M-3 under the Broward County Zoning Ordinance, which is the general industrial zoning district permitting a variety of industrial uses. Electrical power plants are a permitted use within the M-3 zoning district as electrical power plants are not prohibited by Section 39-1073 of the Broward County Zoning Code; are not otherwise prohibited by other resolutions or by law; and are not listed as permissible only in an M-4 or an M-5 zoning district. The DER, the DCA, and Broward County concur that the location of the Lauderdale Repowering Project at the Lauderdale Site is consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Siting Board, enter a Final Order finding that the proposed Lauderdale Repowering Project Site is consistent and in compliance with existing land use plans and zoning ordinances. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of April 1990. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April 1990. * NOTE: THE APENDIX TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER IS AVAILABLE FOR REVIEW IN THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING'S CLERK'S OFFICE. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter C. Cunningham, Esquire Douglas S. Roberts, Esquire Hopping Boyd Green & Sams Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Hamilton S. Oven, Jr., P.E. Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Steven Pfeiffer, General Counsel Kathryn Funchess, Senior Attorney Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Sarah Nail, Esquire South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680 Suzanne S. Brownless, Esquire Division of Legal Services Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Fletcher Building, Room 212 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850 Gary Smallridge Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Noel M. Pfeffer, Esquire Deputy County Attorney Governmental Center, Suite 423 115 South Andrews Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Thomas R. Henderson Broward County Resource Recovery 115 South Andrews Avenue, Room 521 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Patricia Woodworth, Director Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Planning and Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001
