The Issue The issue is whether payment of Petitioner's retirement benefits should have commenced after the filing of an application to retire with the Division of Retirement, with an effective date of April 1, 2004, or be retroactively changed to the date of his termination of employment, July 1, 2003.
Findings Of Fact On July 19, 1995, Petitioner applied for membership in the Special Risk Division of the Elected Officers' Class of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). On August 14, 1995, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter admitting him into FRS. On September 6, 1995, Sarabeth Snuggs, Chief of the Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions for Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter revoking his membership in FRS. On December 17, 1996, Petitioner wrote to Sarabeth Snuggs responding to Respondent's decision to revoke his membership in FRS. Petitioner cited Section 121.052(2)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that membership in FRS includes "any constitutional county elected officer assuming office after July 1, 1981, including any sheriff." The Consolidated City of Jacksonville was created by the Florida Legislature with the enactment of Chapter 67-1320, Laws of Florida. Section 1.01 of the Jacksonville Charter provides that the county government of Duval County and the municipal government of the City of Jacksonville are consolidated into a single body politic. The Charter further provides that the consolidated government succeeds to and possesses all of the properties of the former government. After being denied membership in FRS, Petitioner and other members of the consolidated government and its instrumentalities worked diligently to convince Respondent to admit Petitioner into FRS. During Petitioner's attempts to be included in FRS, Respondent repeatedly took the position that Duval County did not exist as a county agency. In a letter to Petitioner dated January 15, 1997, Ms. Snuggs wrote that the consolidated Duval County government "chose to consolidate as a 'city' government." Mr. Keane worked with the Duval County Legislative Delegation to amend Chapter 121 to specifically clarify the fact that the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court are constitutional officers entitled to participate in FRS. In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted language to clarify the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court's status with respect to FRS. In a letter dated June 24, 2002, Petitioner thanked Ms. Snuggs for recognizing his right to elect membership in FRS. Petitioner observed that, since he was in the last year of his second term as Sheriff (Duval County allows only two consecutive terms), he wanted confirmation of his "right to connect the previous seven (7) years of service as Sheriff." The June 24, 2002, letter also asked for "guidance" from Respondent. The purpose of the June 24, 2002, letter was for Petitioner to learn how Respondent intended to treat his first six years of service. Petitioner sought to avoid any problems since his retirement date was rapidly approaching. On October 10, 2002, Petitioner and Mr. George Dandelake, the Chief of the Budget and Management Division of the Sheriff's Office, wrote to Ms. Snuggs requesting a calculation of the amount of employer contributions required on Petitioner's behalf. The October 10 letter also requested that Respondent "identify what documents are required, in addition to the contribution amount which will be paid by the City, that must be supplied to the Florida Retirement System." Petitioner re-applied for membership in FRS, which was granted on June 1, 2002, after the effective date of the legislation designed to specifically admit the Duval County Sheriff and Clerk of Court into FRS. On June 18, 2003, twelve days before the expiration of his term of office, still not having received confirmation of the status of his prior service, Petitioner sent a letter to Ms. Snuggs advising that FRS had not recognized his service from 1995 through 2002. Petitioner again stated in the letter that he was terminating his position as Sheriff on June 30, 2003. Less than a week prior to the termination of his term, Petitioner received two "Statement[s] of Account" dated June 24, 2003, indicating that "you have until retirement to pay the amount due on your account." The statements further indicated that "when you become vested for monthly benefits, we will provide you an estimate of benefits with and without this service." According to the first Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 1.6 percent multiplier rate for the FRS regular class. According to the second Statement of Account, Petitioner was entitled to purchase prior service at the 2.0 percent multiplier rate for the FRS special risk class. Neither Statement of Account was correct, as both failed to permit Petitioner to purchase service at the 3.0 percent rate for special risk, despite the fact that Petitioner had served a continuous and uninterrupted term as Sheriff. The Statement of Account did not advise Petitioner that he must submit a separate retirement application, Form FR-11, in order to preserve his retirement date. The statement did advise Petitioner that interest would be assessed at a rate of 6.5 percent. This warning appeared in bold face on the Statement of Account. The June 24, 2003, statements were the first time that Petitioner was supplied with the amount due to purchase service credit. Since neither statement applied the correct multiplier rate (3.0 percent) for all eight years of Petitioner's service as Sheriff, neither statement was correct. Recognizing that only six days remained prior to the expiration of Petitioner's term as Sheriff, Mr. Keane advised Petitioner to submit payment to Respondent on an expedited basis. After receiving the June 24, 2003, Statements of Account, Petitioner prepared a letter dated June 26, 2003, to Cal Ray, the Director of the Department of Administration and Finance for the Consolidated City of Jacksonville. In this letter, Petitioner requested an employer contribution in the amount of $163,554.32 to purchase his prior service. Petitioner further requested an expedited preparation of the check to ensure delivery to Respondent by July 1, 2003. The letter to Mr. Ray requested payment of the amounts that would have been periodically contributed by the City of Jacksonville if Respondent had been acknowledged as a participant in FRS in 1995. On June 27, 2003, three days prior to the expiration of his term of office, Petitioner drove from Jacksonville to Tallahassee to meet with Respondent's representatives, including Ms. Snuggs, regarding Petitioner's retirement. Mr. Dandelake accompanied Petitioner on this trip. At the June 27, 2003, meeting, Petitioner personally delivered a check to Respondent in the amount of $163,554.32. Respondent accepted the check and issued a written receipt signed by Sarabeth Snuggs. Petitioner was never told during the June 27, 2003, meeting with Respondent that he would forfeit benefits if he failed to complete an application. Respondent knew that Petitioner was leaving office on June 30, 2003. Respondent never discussed the filing of an application for retirement benefits at any time during the course of its conversations and correspondence with Petitioner. Petitioner was never told by Respondent to complete any forms to protect his rights to the 2.0 percent multiplier during the pendency of his dispute with Respondent. Petitioner was never provided any handbook, notice, statutes, or rules indicating he would forfeit benefits under any circumstances. When Petitioner left the June 27, 2003, meeting, both he and Mr. Dandelake understood that he was still engaged in a dispute with Respondent over his entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Petitioner knew that he was required to file an application in order to receive retirement benefits. Petitioner testified that if he had left the June 27 meeting with any indication that he would forfeit benefits by not filing an application, he would have filed something, with advice of counsel, to preserve his rights. Petitioner received an Estimate of Benefits via fax from Respondent on June 27, 2003, reflecting an annual benefit of $23,105.90. This statement valued 6.92 years of Petitioner's uninterrupted special risk service as Sheriff using the 2.0 percent multiplier, and 1.08 years of service as Sheriff using the 3.0 percent multiplier. The June 27, 2003, statement lists Petitioner's retirement date as July 1, 2003. The estimate does not warn Petitioner that he must do anything in order to preserve his July 2003 retirement date. The estimate states only that it is subject to "final verification of all factors." Petitioner's term of office as elected Sheriff ended on June 30, 2003. Petitioner's employment terminated when his term expired on that date. Respondent was aware of the dates of the expiration of Petitioner's term of office as well as his employment termination date. When Petitioner's employment terminated on June 30, 2003, it was unclear whether he would be credited with the 3.0 percent multiplier for his eight years of special risk service. Petitioner was not notified by Respondent prior to the expiration of his term as Sheriff on June 30, 2003, that he needed to submit a retirement application. The first time Petitioner was advised by Respondent of the need to file an application for retirement benefits was in the comment section of the Estimate of Retirement Benefits provided to him by letter dated March 4, 2004. The warning was printed in bold face type. The Estimate of Retirement Benefits dated June 27, 2003, did not include the bold face warning to file an application. Respondent was not provided with a Division of Retirement publication entitled "Preparing to Retire" prior to his leaving service on June 30, 2003. In fact, the copy of the publication offered into evidence by Respondent is dated "July 2003," subsequent to Petitioner's retirement. As the only member of FRS in his office in Jacksonville, Petitioner had no staff or employees trained in FRS or Florida retirement benefits. Petitioner was provided with a "Preparing to Retire" booklet in March 2004. On November 3, 2003, Florida Attorney General Opinion 2003-46 confirmed that Petitioner, as the elected Sheriff, was eligible for membership in the Elected Officer's Class of the Florida Retirement System. On December 31, 2003, and on January 16, 2004, Petitioner's counsel attempted to obtain clarification from Respondent regarding Petitioner's retirement benefits. The December 31, 2003, letter noted that the "extraordinary delay" in resolving the issue of Petitioner's benefits was at no time due to fault on the part of Petitioner. Respondent never refuted or disputed this statement. By letter dated March 4, 2004, Petitioner was finally advised by Respondent that he was entitled to be credited with the higher 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight years of his service as Sheriff. Petitioner noted that the March 4, 2004, Statement of Account, while properly applying the 3.0 percent multiplier, now had changed Petitioner's retirement date to April 2004 from the previous estimates showing a retirement date of July 2003. The March 4, 2004, statement included the bold face notice to Petitioner that he must file an application for retirement benefits. No prior notices or correspondence from Respondent had informed Petitioner that he must file Form FR-11 in order to retain his retirement date of July 1, 2003. After formally being notified that he would receive the 3.0 percent multiplier for all eight of his years of service as Sheriff, and after having received the notice that he must file Form FR-11, Petitioner submitted the form in April 2004. Respondent is a fiduciary charged with acting in the best interest of participants in FRS. Andy Snuggs, who travels around the state educating employers and employees in FRS, acknowledged that Petitioner was not responsible for the delay by Respondent in recognizing Petitioner's entitlement to the 3.0 percent multiplier. Mr. Snuggs acknowledged that he does not tell employees that they will forfeit benefits if they delay the filing of their applications. Petitioner received his first retirement check in May 2004 which was based upon the benefit established in March 2004 of $32,624.58 annually, not the $23,105.90 previously established by Respondent in June 2003. Petitioner has received no retroactive benefits for the period of July 1, 2003, through April 30, 2004. In a letter dated May 6, 2004, Petitioner stated that his acceptance of the first retirement check was not to be construed by Respondent of a waiver of his rights to retroactive benefits from July 1, 2003, forward.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner be awarded retirement benefits at the rate of 3.0 percent per year for his eight years of Elected Officer's Class of service, retroactive to July 1, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert D. Klausner, Esquire Klausner & Kaufman, P.A. 10059 Northwest 1st Court Plantation, Florida 33324 Robert B. Button, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9000
The Issue Whether petitioner's employment from January 13, 1975 to January 24, 1977, was creditable service for purposes of calculating retirement benefits under applicable statutes and rules? Whether respondent is estopped to deny that this period of employment amounted to creditable service, where respondent's personnel twice advised petitioner it was, and petitioner continued working for Escambia County for some three years in reliance on this advice?
Findings Of Fact 12 In late 1974, Escambia County operated under the CETA program which was operated by the county under three separate programs known as Title I and Title II, and then later under Title VI. Title I was an on-the-job training program which provided training to individuals in jobs that were in addition to the regular employment positions already maintained by the County. Title II was an employment program for targeted groups of persons. At the beginning of the Title II program, the County paid retirement contributions on behalf of some of those participants. However, when it was advised that this was improper, it stopped such payments and refunded those contributions to some of the participants. Title VI was a program to employ as many people as possible. The positions were funded with Federal grant money and were considered public service employment positions for a limited tern. The County administered the program which eventually included about 300 participants. Payment of all CETA participants was made from a special sub-account (set up for this purpose) of the salary account. Mr. Wayne Peacock, currently Assistant County Administrator who was directly involved in the CETA program during its entire existence, testified that none of the participants who worked for the County occupied regularly established positions, or were in budgeted positions and none were paid from county budgeted salary funds. Mr. Little's employment file stated that he was hired in January, 1975, as a Title VI CETA participant and that no record showed payment of any retirement contributions on his behalf. Mr. Little testified that retirement contributions were deducted from his first four (4) paychecks, but thereafter stopped. Ruth Sansom, the Division representative, testified that the Division records as provided by the County reflected that the County began payment of retirement contributions on Mr. Little in January, 1977, and that there was no evidence or record that contributions had been paid from January, 1975, to January, 1977. Mr, Little submitted the Minutes of Escambia County for (inter alia) February 11, 1975, which showed numerous individuals hired as "manpower: laborers and four (4) men hired as "manpower planning aides". Included in that latter group was Mr. Little. Ms. Sansom testified that she checked the retirement records of several persons in the first group and all four (4) persons in the latter group. None of the persons had received creditable service for the employment, and the Division had no record of contributions having been paid. The evidence shows that Mr. Little was employed as a CETA participant and was not a county employee.
Findings Of Fact The petitioner, Leo A. Price, was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) at the time of his retirement in June, 1979. He became an FRS member on January 1, 1979, by transferring from the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS). Mr. Price was appointed to a teaching position for the 1950-51 school year on June 8, 1950, by the Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida. He performed some limited duties for the Board of Public Instruction at the beginning of the 1950-51 school year, but his service was cut short as a result of illness. He received no salary payments for this service. Mr. Price recovered from his illness and began teaching in Dade County on January 31, 1951. He enrolled in the Teachers' Retirement System in February, 1951, and represented on his enrollment blank that he began service on January 31, 1951, and that he had not taught in Florida in prior years. Enrollment forms are required prior to membership in TRS. Mr. Price taught continuously from January 31, 1951, through June 30, 1979. On June 20, 1979, the School Board of Dade County retroactively approved a leave of absence for Mr. Price for the period from September, 1950, through January 30, 1951. No leave of absence had been authorized by the School Board prior to this retroactive authorization. Ruth Sansom, Assistant Bureau Chief, Bureau of Benefits, Division of Retirement, testified that she has worked with TRS and FRS in a supervisory capacity since 1963. In these seventeen years, no member has been allowed a service credit for a leave of absence that was retroactively granted.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner, Leo A. Price, seeking a service credit for the period of time from September, 1950, through January, 1951, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED that the claim of petitioner, Leo A. Price, for interest on all uncashed benefit warrants, be denied. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 19 day of September, 1980. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Leo A. Price 1000 N. E. 96th Street Miami Shores, Florida 33138 Diane R. Keisling, Esquire Suite 207C, Box 81 Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Rebecca Hernandez ("Hernandez"), is entitled to the $22,943.81 her late mother, Darlene Rice ("Rice" or "Mother"), paid to buy into the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan ("Pension Plan"), as well as other monies transferred from Rice's Investment Plan account to the Pension Plan account, or is Hernandez only entitled to the $2,654.17 in employee contributions that Rice paid into the Pension Plan while an active member of that plan.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented and the record as a whole, the following facts were established: Darlene Rice was a Broward county teacher and member of FRS beginning September 1, 2011. Sometime in 2016, she became interested in transferring from the FRS Investment Plan to the FRS Pension Plan and actively began to investigate that option. Petitioner, Rebecca Hernandez, is the daughter of Rice and is entitled to Rice's benefits from FRS as determined by the Order of Summary Administration entered by the Circuit Court of Broward County, Florida, on October 2, 2018. Prior to transferring from the Investment Plan and as a part of her investigation, Rice contacted the FRS guidance line, on numerous occasions to seek guidance and inquire about the process to transfer into the Pension Plan. Resp. Ex. 20. The calls were recorded.3 More precisely, on March 7, 2017, Rice called the FRS guidance line to obtain information and ask questions regarding her contemplated transfer 3 The undersigned listened to all nine audio recordings. from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. On this call, the representative informed Rice that if she terminated FRS employment prior to having eight years of service, she "could not really recover anything." Resp. Ex. 20. During another call to the FRS guidance line, Rice was told that if she left the Pension Plan before vesting, monies she paid to "buy in" would be lost. Rice also acknowledged during one call that if something happened to her, she understood she would lose everything.4 Ultimately, after multiple telephone consultations and discussions with the FRS guidance line, Rice made the decision to transfer plans and buy into the Pension Plan. To do so, Rice was required to complete and submit a 2nd Election Retirement Plan Enrollment Form dated March 7, 2017. Resp. Exs. 2 and 16.5 On March 9, 2017, the Department sent a letter to Rice, confirming her 2nd Election into the Pension Plan. Resp. Ex. 16. The letter included the following: You have elected to move from the FRS Investment Plan and buy into the FRS Pension Plan. The effective date of this election is April 1, 2017. This is your final Plan Choice Election under the Florida Retirement System. You must remain in the FRS 4 The undersigned reasonably infers that this comment was based on what she had been told during previous phone calls to the FRS guidance line. The extensive information and consultation provided to Rice by the FRS guidance line was commendable, useful to her, and no doubt, very well intended. The representatives were patient and thorough with Rice. Regardless, their general admonitions and advice to Rice do not carry the force of law, nor do they necessarily dictate the outcome of this case. Rather, as will be explained, the correct decision in this case is derived by identifying and interpreting the applicable FRS laws and rules to the facts. 5 The top of the form notified her that "before using your 2nd Election, be sure you understand the impact of changing from one plan to another." By signing the form, at Option 2, Rice also acknowledged language that stated "I want to use my existing Investment Plan account balance and possibly other personal resources to 'buy' into the Pension Plan." Other disclosures were also made to her on page 3 of the form. Pension Plan until your retirement from FRS- covered employment. As a member who is switching from the FRS Pension Plan using the available balance in your FRS Investment Plan account. If your account is not sufficient to cover the cost of the buy-in, you will need to submit personal funds. * * * If you terminate employment prior to vesting in the Pension Plan benefit (less than 6 or 8 years) you are only entitled to receive: A refund of your contributions paid into the Pension Plan since April 1, 2017 (the effective date of your 2nd election). * * * If you feel that this retirement Plan election was made in error, you may be able to cancel it … Failure to notify us no later than 4:00 PM EST on the last business day of the month following your election month will void your right to cancel this election. Rice's election to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan was slated to become effective on April 1, 2017. On April 18, 2017, Rice was informed by the Department that it received her notification of her second election and the accrued liability (costs) to transfer to the Pension Plan was $58,366.00; $35,422.19 was liquidated from her investment account and transferred to the FRS Trust Fund and $22,943.81 was the out of pocket cost to her to complete the transfer. Resp. Ex. 7. On June 6, 2017, the Department sent a letter to Rice confirming receipt of her personal payment of $22,943.81, which finalized her transfer to the Pension Plan effective April 1, 2017. Resp. Ex. 8. Less than a year later, on March 17, 2018, Rice passed away unexpectedly. Her death certificate listed a pulmonary embolism as the primary cause of death. Pet. Ex. 8.6 Rice did not have at least eight years of service credit in FRS at the time of her passing. After her mother's passing, Hernandez was contacted by the FRS guidance line to discuss the process and survivor benefits related to the Pension Plan.7 Naturally, Hernandez was shocked and dismayed when the representative informed her that she was only entitled to the total contributions her mother made while she was working and in the Pension Plan. He also regrettably informed Hernandez that she was not entitled to recover the buy-in costs paid by her mother, nor was she entitled to the balance she had in the Investment Plan when the transfer was made. During this telephone discussion, Hernandez lamented that she and her mother had made the decision together to transfer her from one plan to the other. On June 28, 2018, the Department sent a formal letter to Rice's daughter, Hernandez, acknowledging her mother's death and notifying her that since her mother did not have eight years of service, the benefit available to Hernandez was limited to a refund of retirement contributions in the amount of $2,654.17. Resp. Ex. 9. At Hernandez's request, the Department manually calculated the amount Rice paid into the FRS. When Rice transferred to the Pension Plan, the Department's system, which is called the Integrative Retirement Information System ("IRIS"), only showed the accumulation of the contributions that she paid into the Pension Plan after the transfer, since her contributions in the Investment Plan had already been liquidated for the transfer. Resp. Ex. 1. 6 The cause of her death is mentioned primarily to show that her death was unexpected. The undersigned infers from the evidence, particularly the CD recordings, that Rice had no forewarning or suspicions regarding her health when she made the transfer. 7 The date of this phone call is not in the record. Kathy Gould ("Gould"), the Department's Bureau Chief of Retirement Calculations, testified that the manual calculation revealed that a total of $16,042.58 was contributed by Rice since her participation began in the FRS. Based on the calculations and figures provided, her total contributions had two components: (1) $13,388.41 while Rice was in the Investment Plan and (2) $2,654.17 while Rice was in the Pension Plan. In addition to a return of these sums, Petitioner also seeks the return or refund of the "buy in" fee--$22,943.81--Rice paid to transfer to the Pension Plan. Testimony of Kathy Gould Gould's team handles the calculation of costs involved with transfers from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. She testified that there are two plans under the FRS, the Pension Plan and the Investment Plan. At all times related to Rice's tenure under the FRS, the funds for the FRS retirement plans came from employer and employee contributions. Employee contributions are currently three percent of salary. In the Pension Plan a member vests after eight years of service. If a member dies before the member vests, it was her position that the beneficiary would be eligible to receive the accumulated contributions. She referred to the applicable statute, section 121.091(7), Florida Statutes. Conversely, the State Board of Administration administers the Investment plan, and is separate from Respondent. A member vests after only one year in the Investment plan. Exhibit 1 was a screenshot of Rice's profile in the IRIS. This is a computer database that contains the Department's membership information. Rice's total employee balance as reflected in Respondent's Exhibit 1 was $2,654.17. This includes only Rice's payroll contributions while a member of the Pension Plan. Rice's "personal payment" to buy into the Pension Plan was $22,943.81. Gould explained that if a member of the Investment Plan left after only five months, the member would be entitled to receive the employee's contributions only. Tr. pp. 55-56. This would not include the employer's contributions. After one year, an employee is fully vested in the Investment Plan and would be entitled to all contributions made, both employee and employer, if employment was terminated while still in the Investment Plan. The payment that Rice made to buy into the Pension Plan was in the form of a personal check, not a deduction from her payroll. Respondent's Exhibit 21 is an email Gould prepared for the Department's legal counsel. Gould analyzed Rice's reported salaries while she was a member of the Investment Plan and multiplied them by three percent to provide the total amount that Rice had paid into both plans. This totaled $16,042.58. This was the amount from Rice's first payroll through her last payroll while in the FRS. The amount was the total of both the Investment Plan and the Pension Plan. Gould admitted that there are essentially two types of contributions into the FRS, employer contributions and employee contributions. She acknowledged that the $22,943.81 Rice paid to transfer to the Pension Plan was not an employer contribution. Rice was not in the Investment Plan when she died. When she died, Rice was participating in the Pension Plan. As a result, Gould admitted that the state would pay out any benefits utilizing the statutes relating to the Pension Plan. The calculation of the buy-in amount performed by the Department in Rice's case was done on the "calculator" provided by their actuary, Milliman. Testimony of Matthew Richard Larrabee Matthew Larrabee ("Larrabee") was called by the Department. He is a pension actuary with Milliman and specializes in governmental pension plans. He discussed the Department's use of a "calculator" that is designed by Milliman. It is provided and created to allow agency staff to determine actuarial pension calculations without relying upon a certified actuary. The actuarial accrued liability ("AAL") determined by the calculator, establishes the "buy-in" or purchase price for a member that chooses to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. The components of the buy-in cost to transfer from the Investment Plan into the Pension Plan consist primarily of the projected monthly annuity amount, the state multiplier percentage for the employee's position, the years of service, and the member's pay level. There is also an assumption of projected pay increases and the life expectancy of the member. Age is also a factor in the formula. The funds collected and related to the transfer into the Pension Plan are deposited into a commingled, legally restricted pension trust. Respondent's Exhibits 4, 5, and 6 were prepared by the Department's staff at different date intervals using the Milliman calculator. These exhibits represent output sheets produced by the calculator, which was developed by Milliman under Larrabee's supervision. The sheets are accurate. They show different actuarial accrued liability amounts based, in part, on age.8 The final calculation in Respondent's Exhibit 6 is for a transfer date of April 2017 for Rice. The calculated actuarial accrued liability was $58,366.00. Larrabee explained that this calculation is a sound estimation or valuation of the financial present value of the total future retirement benefits for a given member--in this case, Rice. 8 Different dates are notated on the calculator sheets based on differing dates being considered for the effective transfer date by Rice when the individual sheet was run. The actuarial accrued liability calculation and resulting "buy in" amount is premised on the fact that the actuaries do not take into account a potential refund feature, such as the return of funds sought by Hernandez.9 Larrabee went on to explain that if potential refunds, such as those requested by Hernandez, were accounted for in the actuarial calculations, the cost to "buy in" would only be "modestly higher." This is because the mortality rates for people like Rice in their 50's or 60's are "quite low." As a result, the added costs to cover such an infrequent contingency, if that were an option, "would be low." Allison Olson Allison Olson ("Olson") is the Director of Policy, Risk Management and Compliance for the State Board of Administration ("SBA"). Her duties include the review and determination of compliance with contracts and policies by outside vendors for the FRS Investment Plan. She also reviews complaints that are received from Investment Plan members. The Investment Plan is a defined contribution plan, similar to a traditional 401(k). The SBA is a separate agency from the Department. A member has an option of making an election, as part of their initial choice, to be a member of the Investment Plan. Vesting for the Investment Plan occurs after one year of service. Then the member owns the contributions in their account. Under the Investment Plan, each account is funded by employer contributions as well as a mandatory three percent monthly employee contribution. Members in the FRS with questions about their accounts may consult with representatives on a financial guidance line managed by the SBA vendor.10 9 No evidence was offered to explain why this type of feature was not built into the actuarial calculation, or why it was not offered as an option to potential transferees. 10 As previously noted, Rice took advantage of this service on numerous occasions. The Department offered into evidence Respondent's Exhibit 14, an FRS Investment Plan Summary Plan Description (sometimes referred to as an "SPD"). However, this SPD was not issued until July 2018. Because it was issued after Rice passed away and there was no proof she ever received it or a prior version, it was excluded as evidence and not considered based on the objection of Petitioner.11 Garry Green Gary Green ("Green") is the Chief of Research and Education for Respondent. He handles the administrative aspects of the actuarial contract and services provided by Milliman. The liquidation of an investment plan account is the sale of all assets that the member has in the account. It includes all money, both employer and employee contributions. After applying to transfer from one plan to another, an employee has 60 days to "roll in" her "buy in" money, or to cancel the transfer. The money a member pays to buy-in to the Pension Plan, is deposited into the pension trust fund with all the other assets of the trust fund. His view was that if the member is not vested in the Pension Plan, the contributions used to "buy in" are not refundable. Respondent's Exhibit 6 calculates the actuarial accrued liability of $58,366.00. It is a calculation of the total cost to buy in to the Pension Plan. He explained that it is not a statement of the liquidated assets from Rice's Investment Plan or any funds owed to Rice. 11 It should be noted that, aside from notices she received in the enrollment forms she signed or guidance from FRS guidance line representatives, there was no proof presented by Respondent that any of the mandatory educational components required by section 121.4501(10)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes, entitled "Education Components," were complied with, or offered to Rice. This is particularly significant in this case since material "must be prepared under the assumption that the employee is an unsophisticated investor." § 121.4501(10)(e), Fla. Stat. Additional Facts Established by Discovery Petitioner's Exhibits 9-1 and 9-2 establish that Rice contributed $16,042.58 in employee contributions into the FRS. $2,654.17 was into the Pension Plan and $13,338.41 was while Rice was a member of the Investment Plan. The Department admitted that Rice paid $22,943.81 of her personal funds on or before June 6, 2017, to transfer from the Investment Plan to the Pension Plan. Request for Admission No. 19. The Department admitted that Petitioner is entitled to receive $2,654.17, the amount of contributions after Rice was in the Pension Plan. Request for Admission No. 21. The Department admitted that it received the Order of Summary Administration and Death Certificate. Requests for Admission Nos. 25 and 26. The Department admitted that Rice contributed at least $13,388.41 into the Investment Plan. Request for Admission No. 29.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, pay to Rebecca Hernandez, Darlene Rice's daughter and beneficiary, the sums of $2,654.17, $13,388.41, and $22,943.81, totaling $38,986.39, plus the appropriate statutory rates of interest which have accrued from October 2, 2018, the date of the circuit court's Order of Summary Administration, to the date of payment. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of September, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Larry Allan Karns, Esquire Spink, Shrouder & Karns, P.A. 9700 Griffin Road Cooper City, Florida 33328 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) William Chorba, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner, a surviving beneficiary, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits 1 All references to chapter 120 are to the 2019 version. payment option selected by her now-deceased spouse, a member of the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes (2002),2 with administering the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). Petitioner is the spouse of James L. Williams, now deceased, who was employed by the School District of Palm Beach ("District) for 38 years, and was a member of the FRS. Williams retired from his employment with the District on August 23, 2002. At that time, he executed the Florida Retirement System Application for Service Retirement Form, Form FR-11. On Form FR-11, he designated Petitioner as his primary beneficiary and Jones as his contingent beneficiary. Williams signed this form, and his signature was notarized. Also on August 23, 2002, Williams executed the Florida Retirement System Option Selection for FRS Members Form, Form FRS-11o. On that form, he selected FRS retirement benefits payment Option 2, and designated that choice by writing an "X" on the line next to Option 2. Option 2 was described on Form FRS-11o as: A reduced monthly payment for my lifetime. If I die before receiving 120 monthly payments, my designated beneficiary will receive a monthly benefit in the same amount as I was receiving until the monthly benefit payments to both of us equal 120 monthly payments. No further benefits are then payable. 2 All references to chapter 121 are to the 2002 version of the Florida Statutes, which was in effect at the time that the retirement benefits application and option selection forms that have given rise to this proceeding were executed. Form FRS-11o contained a section, immediately below the description of Option 2, that was required to be completed by the spouse of a married FRS member who had selected Option 1 or Option 2. On August 23, 2002, Petitioner completed, signed, and dated that section, confirming that she was the legal spouse of Williams and acknowledging that she was informed that Williams had selected either Option 1 or Option 2. The purpose of that section on Form FRS-11o is to inform the spouse of the FRS member that, by the member's selection of either Option 1 or Option 2, the surviving spouse is not entitled to receive a continuing benefit for the rest of his or her life. The last sentence on Form FRS-11o, immediately above the space for the FRS member's signature, states in pertinent part: "[m]y retirement becomes final when any payment is cashed . . . [or] deposited." DeVonnia Jones was present with Williams at the time he was given Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o to execute. Jones testified that when Williams arrived at the District office on August 23, 2002, Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o already had been filled out by District staff, and were presented to him by his supervisor, who informed him that he needed to retire or he would be terminated. According to Jones, Williams did not wish to retire at that time. Jones asked District staff how much more Williams' monthly benefits would be if he did not retire for another year or two, and was told that Williams' benefits would be between $25 and $30 more per month. According to Jones, "my dad basically shed a couple tears. He was not comfortable, but he went ahead and signed it because I told him to, because they made it seem like he wasn't going to be eligible to get what he was supposed to get." Williams signed and dated Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002, and his signature was notarized. On August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application." This document stated, among other things, that Williams had selected FRS Option 2, and that his retirement was effective September 2002. At the bottom of this document was a standalone paragraph, in bold face type, that read: "ONCE YOU RETIRE, YOU CANNOT ADD ADDITIONAL SERVICE OR CHANGE OPTIONS. RETIREMENT BECOMES FINAL WHEN ANY BENEFIT PAYMENT IS CASHED OR DEPOSITED!" Also on August 28, 2002, Respondent sent Williams a document titled "Florida Division of Retirement Estimate of Retirement Benefit (Estimate only, subject to final verification of all factors)." This document provided information regarding the amount of the monthly benefits Williams would receive for the four options offered under the FRS. A statement in bold face type at the bottom of the document read: "Comments: You have chosen Option 2. Your option selection cannot be changed after you cash or deposit any benefit payment." Had Williams wished to change his retirement benefits payment option, he could have done so up to the time he cashed or deposited a retirement benefits payment. Williams began receiving his monthly FRS retirement benefits payments from Respondent on October 4, 2002. He cashed or deposited the first FRS benefits warrant (Warrant #0618275) that he received. Thereafter, Williams received monthly FRS retirement benefits payments until his death on April 26, 2010. Williams received a total of 92 monthly benefits payments before his death. All of the FRS retirement benefits payment warrants issued to Williams were deposited or cashed. On May 17, 2010, Respondent contacted Petitioner to inform her that she needed to complete a Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Beneficiary of Monthly Retirement Benefits Form, Form FST- 11b, in order for her to receive monthly FRS retirement benefits payments as Williams' beneficiary. In the contact letter, Respondent informed Petitioner that "you will receive the same gross monthly benefits to which the member was entitled through August 31, 2012." Petitioner completed Form FST-11b on June 25, 2010, and began receiving FRS monthly benefits payments on June 30, 2010. Petitioner received a total of 28 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments. The last warrant issued to Petitioner (Warrant #0375196) was issued on August 31, 2012. All of the warrants issued to Petitioner were cashed or deposited. In sum, Williams and Petitioner collectively received a total of 120 FRS retirement monthly benefits payments, pursuant to Option 2. All of the warrants issued to Williams, and then to Petitioner, as his beneficiary, were deposited or cashed. Petitioner testified that beginning in 2003, she made numerous attempts, over a period of years, to contact the District and Respondent regarding changing the FRS retirement benefits payment option that Williams had selected on August 23, 2002. During this time, Williams and Petitioner continued to cash or deposit the benefits payment warrants they received from Respondent. In this proceeding, Petitioner does not claim that Williams accidentally selected Option 2, or that he intended to select another option, when he signed Form FRS-11o on August 23, 2002. Rather, she asserts that at the time Williams retired, he suffered from confusion and memory loss such that he did not understand the option he chose—effectively, that he lacked the mental capacity to have chosen Option 2 as his retirement benefits payment option. Alternatively, Petitioner contends that because Williams was forced to retire under threat of termination from his employment, he was under duress when he chose Option 2 on Form FRS-11o. On these grounds, Petitioner asserts that she should be permitted to change Williams' choice of retirement benefits payment option.3 3 Here, Petitioner, has requested that she be allowed to "change" Williams' choice of Option 2 on the FRS retirement option selection forms. She did not identify, or present evidence, Petitioner's impassioned testimony at the final hearing shows that she fervently believes her husband was wrongly treated by the District when it required him to retire in 2002, against his desire to continue to work.4 However, as was explained to Petitioner at the final hearing, the purpose of this proceeding was not to determine whether the District wrongly forced Williams out of his employment; rather, it is to determine whether there is any factual or legal basis for changing the retirement benefits option that Williams selected when he executed Form FRS-11o nearly 18 years ago. The evidence does not support Petitioner's argument that Williams lacked the mental capacity to adequately understand the option that he chose on Form FRS-11o. Although Petitioner testified that Williams had been treated by a neurologist, no direct medical evidence was presented establishing that Williams was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed Form FRS-11o. Additionally, at the time Williams signed the form, he was accompanied by his daughter, who, after speaking to District staff regarding his options, advised him to sign the form. Petitioner herself also was present at the District office and signed Form FRS-11o, expressly acknowledging that she understood Williams had chosen Option 2. Thus, to the extent that Williams may not, on his own, have fully appreciated his choice of options on Form FRS-11o—and there is no competent direct evidence showing that to be the case—both his daughter and wife were present with him when he executed Form FRS-11o, his daughter told him to sign the form, and his wife expressly acknowledged that she understood his choice of Option 2. These circumstances do not support a finding that Williams lacked the mental capacity to understand, or did not adequately regarding which specific option she would choose, if permitted to change Williams' selected FRS benefits option. 4 The evidence indicates that the District required Williams to retire because he began having difficulty with his job as a mail carrier. According to Petitioner, Williams had an accident in a District vehicle and did not report the accident to the District, and that when he was transferred to the mail room, he had difficulty remembering to do certain required tasks. understand, the consequence of choosing Option 2 when he executed Form FRS-11o. The evidence also does not support a finding that Williams' choice of Option 2 should be changed, due to duress. There is no direct evidence establishing that Williams was under duress when he chose Option 2. Although Jones testified, credibly, that her father was upset about being forced to retire when he wanted to continue working, her testimony that he was under duress was based on her subjective conclusion. Furthermore, even if Williams was emotionally distressed when he signed the FRS benefits options forms, there is no evidence showing that as result of such distress, he chose Option 2 instead of a different option. It also is noted that Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o both expressly informed Williams that once his retirement became final—which would occur when any benefit payment was cashed or deposited—his retirement benefits option selection would become final and could not be changed. Further, Williams received two more pieces of correspondence from Respondent—both containing statements in bold face type—expressly informing him that once any FRS retirement benefits payments were cashed or deposited, his retirement benefits option choice could not be changed. As noted above, Williams could have changed his FRS benefits option at any time before he cashed or deposited a benefits payment; however, he did not do so. Thus, pursuant to the express terms of Form FR-11 and Form FRS-11o, when Williams cashed or deposited the first benefits payment, his selection of Option 2 became final and could not be changed. In sum, the evidence does not establish any factual basis for permitting Petitioner to change Williams' selection of Option 2 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Management Services, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to change the FRS retirement benefits payment option selected by her husband, an FRS member, when he retired. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Deloris Williams 1219 West Ninth Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Mangement Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Mangement Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Between October 1, 1988 and September 30, 1991, Petitioner's salary as the Director of the Department of Emergency Support Services for Hillsborough County was controlled by the compensation structure set forth in the Hillsborough County Exempt Service Classification and Compensation Plan (the Plan). His retirement system benefits were governed by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes as he was a member of the Florida Retirement System administered by the Division of Retirement. The Plan utilized by the County during this period of time created a pay structure for its exempt service employees that caused annual salary increases to be divided into two categories. The Plan referred to the categories as "merit increase" and "performance pay." Any salary adjustment under the "merit increase" category became part of the employee's adjusted base salary. "Performance pay" was an increase granted for a one year term. It was based upon work performance that exceeded performance standards during the preceding year. According to the Plan, the increase in salary from each of the categories was directly tied to the employees' annual performance rating. The possible percentages of the increases were regulated at the high end of the adjustment scale by a Maximum Performance Compensation Table. The one year "performance pay" increase could only be granted if the maximum "merit increase" was granted during the same evaluation. The method used to establish the pay increases for Petitioner under the Plan were applied because his salary was already above the midpoint of the pay grade the Plan dictated the County was willing to pay for the performance of his job when completed to the required standard. Salary increases above the midpoint were divided into the two separate categories in order to balance two distinct County interests. The first was to keep the maximum salary range in a pay grade aligned with the competitive salary indicators in the geographical area for the same type of work. The second was to annually reward each employee whose performance exceeded standards over the past year and to motivate continued high performance on an individualized basis. Petitioner's salary adjustments were divided between "merit increases" and "performance pay" for the three years which are the subject of this proceeding. During the time period between October 1, 1988 and June 30, 1989, the County was required to make a contribution into the Florida Retirement System for Petitioner's benefit. This contribution was a statutorily designated percentage of his monthly salary, including the annual "performance pay" increase. The inclusion of the "performance pay" increase was required by Subsection 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, which defines "compensation". In spite of this contribution into the system by the County, Subsection 121.021(24), Florida Statutes mandated that the Division had to exclude bonuses, whether paid as salary or otherwise, from the calculation of the "average final compensation" for a member seeking to establish the amount of his or her pension benefits. Effective July 1, 1989, the Legislature removed the provision in Subsection 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, which required employers to make a contribution into the system based upon a definition of "compensation" that included "bonuses" in the calculation. The Florida Retirement Systems Act has never included a definition of the word "bonus" as used in Subsections 121.021(22) and (24), Florida Statutes. The term, as used in Subsection 121.021(24) and as previously used in Subsection 121.021(22), is not plain nor the meaning clear. The term "bonus" is defined by the Division's rules, which excludes Petitioner's "performance pay" from any calculation of his "average final compensation." In its computation of Petitioner's "average final compensation", the Division determined that the "performance pay" category of the Hillsborough County Exempt Service Classification and Compensation Plan is a "bonus", as defined by Rule 22B-6.001(11), Florida Administrative Code. A definition of the term "bonus" is necessary to allow the Division to compute the "average final compensation" for each member of the system and for the determination of an employer's contribution into the Florida Retirement System on behalf of the member based on "compensation." Subsection 121.021(22), Florida Statutes, has consistently contained a clear definition of "compensation." The definition included the term "bonuses" until July 1, 1989 and excluded "bonuses" from the definition after that date. The definitions of "bonus" and "compensation" as set forth in Rules 22B-6.001(11) and (16)(a)3, Florida Administrative Code, establish adequate standards for agency decisions regarding retirement benefits. The definitions are based on relevant factors duly considered by the agency and they have been uniformly applied to all members.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Heike Stoll (f/k/a Heike Bybee), has standing to assert a claim or right to any portion of her former husband’s Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) benefits as an “innocent spouse” pursuant to Article II, Section 8(d) of the Florida Constitution, and section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2017).1/
Findings Of Fact Mr. Bybee is a member of the FRS Investment Plan by virtue of his former employment as a deputy with the Sarasota County Sheriff, an FRS participating employer. On October 6, 2017, in Sarasota County Circuit Court Case Number 2017CF001018, Mr. Bybee was found guilty by jury verdict of the following felonies under Florida law: Kidnap- Commit or Facilitate Commission of Felony; Crimes Against Person-Exploitation Elderly or Disabled Adult $20,000 to $100,000 dollars; Fraudulent Use of Personal Identifying Information (8 counts); and Computer Crime to Defraud or Obtain Property (3 Counts) (referred to collectively as the “felony convictions”). On October 6, 2017, judgment was entered against Mr. Bybee adjudicating him guilty of the felony convictions. The SBA notified Mr. Bybee that his felony convictions required forfeiture of his FRS benefits under section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Mr. Bybee did not file a petition for hearing to challenge the Notice of Forfeiture or otherwise assert that his felony convictions did not warrant forfeiture of his FRS benefits under the forfeiture statute. Mr. Bybee’s interest in his FRS benefits is subject to forfeiture due to his commission of the crimes, and his felony convictions. Ms. Stoll was married to Mr. Bybee on August 27, 1994. On or about May 9, 2017, Ms. Stoll filed her Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in Manatee County (Circuit Court Case Number 2017-DR-2067) asserting her interest in, inter alia, Mr. Bybee’s FRS benefits. On December 8, 2017, Ms. Stoll filed an “FRS Investment Plan Petition for Hearing” asserting her claim of entitlement to her spousal share of Mr. Bybee’s FRS benefits as an “innocent spouse.” On February 26, 2018, Mr. Bybee and Ms. Stoll executed a Marital Settlement Agreement. As to retirement accounts, Mr. Bybee and Ms. Stoll agreed to the following: Retirement Accounts/Pension. Wife shall receive as her sole property, and all equity and value therein, all retirement accounts and/or pensions in the Husband’s sole name, in the joint name of the parties, and/or in the Wife’s sole name, free and clear of any claims or interest which Husband may have thereto. Specifically, Husband has a pension and/or retirement account through the County of Sarasota Sheriff’s Department, State of Florida. Wife shall receive as her sole property, and all equity and value therein, in said pension and/or retirement account, free and clear of any claims or interest which Husband may have thereto. Further, Husband assigns, transfers, and relinquishes any legal or equitable claims, causes of action, or remedies of any nature against the pension and/or retirement account through the County of Sarasota Sheriff’s Department, State of Florida; and Husband shall fully cooperate with Wife in any and all respects as necessary for Wife to pursue any such legal or equitable claims, causes of action, or remedies related any manner said pension and/or retirement account. Ms. Stoll was not charged with or convicted of any crimes related to Mr. Bybee’s felony convictions. Ms. Stoll’s testimony was credible that she was unaware of Mr. Bybee’s crimes, and had not benefited from them in any fashion. On April 16, 2018, a Final Judgement of Dissolution of Marriage was entered in Manatee County Circuit Court Case Number 2017-DR-2067 that “approved, ratified and incorporated” the marital settlement agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration issue a final order finding that Petitioner is not entitled to her former husband’s retirement benefits, because he was a public employee convicted of specified offenses; and pursuant to section 112.3173, he forfeited all of his rights and benefits in his Florida Retirement System Investment Plan account upon committing the crimes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 2018.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Daniel Maddox, a deceased retiree in the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan, selected Option 1 (maximum retiree’s monthly benefit without any spousal benefit after death of the retiree) or Option 2 (a reduced retiree’s monthly benefit with continued spousal benefit after death of the retiree, if within a period of ten years after retirement for the balance of the ten-year period).
Findings Of Fact Daniel Maddox was an employee of Pinellas County and a vested member of FRS. Petitioner is Mr. Maddox’s wife. Mr. Maddox retired under the early retirement provisions of FRS in June 2015, and received benefits until his death in December 2016. When Mr. Maddox applied to retire, he submitted an application that included an unexecuted option selection form that had a mark by Option 2. After being notified of the deficiency on two occasions by Respondent, Mr. Maddox submitted an executed option selection form on July 30, 2015, on which he selected Option 1. Option 1 provides the maximum benefit for the life of the member of FRS with no continuing benefit after the member’s death. Option 2 provides a reduced benefit for the lifetime of the member of FRS, but should the member die before 120 payments have been made, the remainder of the first 120 payments will be made to the member’s designated beneficiary. Petitioner signed a Spousal Acknowledgement Form acknowledging that Mr. Maddox selected either Option 1 or 2, rather than an Option 3 benefit, which would have provided a lifetime reduced benefit for her. Mr. Maddox’s signature on the Option Selection for FRS Members form selecting Option 1 was properly notarized. The purpose of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form is to inform the spouse that he/she will not be receiving a lifetime benefit. It does not give control over which option the FRS member selects. That decision is the sole choice of the member. Petitioner testified that she and her husband completed the forms together, with Mr. Maddox selecting Option 2 since he was disabled at the time and on medication. Mr. Maddox took the forms to their bank to have them notarized, but returned without the Option Selection for FRS Members form notarized. While Mr. Maddox was taking his forms to the bank for execution, Petitioner executed the Spousal Acknowledgement Form in the presence of a notary and submitted it to Respondent. She believed her husband had executed the required forms and selected Option 2. Her testimony concerning this sequence of events is credible. Mr. Maddox received a letter entitled “Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application” from Respondent dated May 15, 2014. That letter confirmed that Option 2 had been selected and included an Estimate of Retirement Benefits spreadsheet. Based upon this letter, Petitioner believed that her husband had selected Option 2 and that the selection was in force. The Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application, stating that Option 2 had been selected, required two additional pieces of information from Mr. Maddox: verification of his birthdate; and a notarized Option Selection for FRS Members form, since the one that was submitted (selecting Option 2) had not been executed. When Mr. Maddox submitted the notarized Option Selection form, he had selected Option 1. Respondent relied upon the executed selection in making its determination that Option 1, not Option 2, had been selected by Mr. Maddox. Respondent did not provide an additional Spousal Acknowledgement Form to Petitioner when it received the notarized form selecting Option 1 since its processing people deemed the file complete once all the required forms for retirement had been received. Petitioner testified that she believed she should have been provided a new Spousal Acknowledgement Form when Mr. Maddox selected Option 1 since her acknowledgement signed previously had been executed under the impression her husband had selected Option 2 in her presence and was taking that election to the bank to be notarized. She believes that a Spousal Acknowledgement Form signed several months before and based upon her husband’s election of Option 2 should have been re-sent to her since a different selection was made by Mr. Maddox. She further testified that her husband was disabled and on heavy medication and may have gotten confused when he went to the bank a second time to sign the selection form.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for Option 2 retirement benefits on behalf of Daniel Maddox. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Anne L. Maddox 1579 Jeffords Street Clearwater, Florida 33756-4408 (eServed) Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Elizabeth Stevens, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) J. Andrew Atkinson, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Rina Richard DeMichael (“Petitioner”), the surviving spouse of David DeMichael, is entitled to change the Florida Retirement System (“FRS”) retirement benefits payment Option 1 selected by Mr. DeMichael.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged under chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with administering the FRS. In 1991, Mr. DeMichael began employment with the Broward County Sheriff’s Office (“BCSO”). Mr. DeMichael was a member of the FRS pension plan based on his employment with the BCSO as a deputy sheriff. Mr. DeMichael married Petitioner on November 19, 2011. On February 11, 2013, Mr. DeMichael retired from the BCSO. At that time, he signed the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement form (“Application for Service Retirement Form”) designating Petitioner as his primary beneficiary. On February 11, 2013, Mr. DeMichael also signed the Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Option Selection for FRS Members form (Form FRS-110)(“Option Selection Form”). On the Option Selection Form, Mr. DeMichael was required to select one of four retirement benefit payment options. The Option Selection Form provided an explanation for each of the four options. Mr. DeMichael selected to receive an Option 1 retirement benefit by checking the line next to the Option 1 benefit payment option. Option 1 provides the maximum benefit for the life of the FRS member with no continuing benefit after the member’s death. On February 11, 2013, Petitioner signed the Spousal Acknowledgement Form (Form SA-1)(“Spousal Acknowledgement Form”) acknowledging that Mr. DeMichael “selected either Option 1 or 2.” The purpose of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form is to inform the spouse that he/she will not receive a lifetime benefit following the FRS member’s death. The Spousal Acknowledgement Form does not give a spouse control over which option the FRS member selects. That option selection decision is the sole choice of the member. The Spousal Acknowledgement Form provided an explanation of the four different retirement payment options available to FRS members. At the hearing, Petitioner acknowledged she signed the Spousal Acknowledgement Form. Ms. Tiffany Pieters was a duly licensed notary with the State of Florida and an employee of BCSO on February 11, 2013. Ms. Pieters notarized the Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form signed by Mr. DeMichael, and the Spousal Acknowledgement Form signed by Petitioner. The Division received Mr. DeMichael’s Application for Service Retirement Form, Option Selection Form, and Petitioner’s Spousal Acknowledgement Form on or about February 11, 2013. On February 20, 2013, Respondent mailed Mr. DeMichael an Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application letter acknowledging Respondent’s receipt of Mr. DeMichael’s Application for Service Retirement Form; his selection of Option 1 as the benefit payment option; his employment termination date of February 11, 2013; and retirement date of March 1, 2013. The Acknowledgement of Service Retirement Application letter expressly provides that Mr. DeMichael cannot change the option he selected once his retirement becomes final, and that retirement benefits become final when any payment is cashed or deposited. Mr. DeMichael’s Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form also expressly provide that he cannot change the option he selected once his retirement becomes final, and that retirement benefits become final when any benefit payment is cashed or deposited. On February 20, 2013, Respondent also mailed Mr. DeMichael an Estimate of Retirement Benefit letter, which provides an estimate of the payment benefit for each of the four options. The letter also acknowledges that Mr. DeMichael selected Option 1, and that his option selection cannot be changed after any payment is cashed or deposited. On April 1, 2013, Respondent mailed a request for birth date verification to Mr. DeMichael. In response, on April 30, 2013, Respondent received Mr. DeMichael’s birth certificate. Based on his selection of Option 1, Mr. DeMichael received an initial retroactive payment of $7,809.76 on May 10, 2013; an initial regular retirement payment of $3,904.88 on May 31, 2013; and a subsequent retirement payment every month in 2013 in the monthly amount of $3,904.88. Mr. DeMichael received a retirement payment every month beginning May 2013 until he died on August 25, 2015. Mr. DeMichael received a total of 29 retirement payments for a total gross benefit amount of $119,832.92. Each retirement payment was cashed or deposited into Mr. DeMichael’s bank account. Respondent was notified of Mr. DeMichael’s death in August 2015. On or about October 6, 2015, Respondent notified Petitioner that Mr. DeMichael’s benefit had ended and that there would be no continuing benefit to her based on Mr. DeMichael’s Option 1 selection. In this proceeding, Petitioner claims she is entitled to change Mr. DeMichael’s Option 1 retirement benefit selection and receive a continuing monthly spousal benefit. In support of her position, Petitioner contends Mr. DeMichael’s selection of Option 1 is invalid because he lacked the mental capacity to make a retirement option at the time his Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form was submitted to Respondent. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing, Petitioner failed to establish that Mr. DeMichael lacked the mental capacity to make a retirement option at the time his Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form were submitted to Respondent. No medical evidence was presented establishing that Mr. DeMichael was mentally incapacitated at the time he executed the Application for Service Retirement Form and Option Selection Form on February 11, 2013. In fact, Mr. DeMichael was released from Sunrise Detoxification Center on February 11, 2013, following in-patient rehabilitative treatment for his alcoholism. Petitioner’s Exhibit 7 expressly states that Mr. DeMichael “was medically stable for discharge” at 8:00 a.m. that morning. Moreover, Petitioner and Mr. DeMichael ate breakfast together later that morning at the BCSO cafeteria. Subsequently, Petitioner was escorted to the BCSO Internal Affairs area where she was questioned about Mr. DeMichael’s alcoholism. After Petitioner refused to answer any questions, she was escorted to the BCSO rooftop terrace. After a while, Mr. DeMichael came to the rooftop terrace. According to Petitioner, Mr. DeMichael was smiling and they exchanged pleasantries. After February 11, 2013, Mr. DeMichael continued to manage his own financial affairs, including his bank account. On April 1, 2013, Respondent sent a request to Mr. DeMichael to provide verification regarding his date of birth. In response, Mr. DeMichael sent his birth certificate to Respondent. Finally, at no time did Petitioner ever seek a guardianship or power of attorney over Mr. DeMichael, and at no time was Mr. DeMichael adjudicated incompetent by a court. Petitioner also claims that Mr. DeMichael’s selection of Option 1 is invalid and that she is entitled to a continuing benefit because she lacked the opportunity to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form before signing it. Based on the persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing, Petitioner failed to establish that she lacked the opportunity to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form before signing it. In support of her position, Petitioner testified at one point in the hearing that she only saw the area of the form near where she signed it. However, in the area of the form near where Petitioner signed (Respondent’s Exhibit No. 6) is the express “acknowledgement that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” At another point in the hearing, Petitioner testified she saw the small writing below her signature at the bottom of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form, but she did not read any of the writing. The small writing below Petitioner’s signature at the bottom of the form provides an explanation of the four retirement benefit payment options. Notably, Petitioner did not testify that she asked Ms. Pieters for any explanation of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form. Further, Petitioner did not testify that she needed or asked for more time to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form before signing it, or that Ms. Pieters refused to allow her to read the form. Petitioner could have asked Ms. Pieters for more time to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form if she felt it was necessary, but she did not. At no time did Petitioner ever file a complaint against Ms. Pieters or complain about her handling of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form. Had Petitioner been concerned about the Spousal Acknowledgement form or Mr. DeMichael’s mental capacity on February 11, 2013, she also could have spoken to Judy Cowell, Mr. DeMichael’s supervisor at BCSO. Ms. Cowell greeted Petitioner and Mr. DeMichael at the front office when they arrived at BCSO on the morning of February 11, 2013, and Ms. Cowell escorted them to the cafeteria and rooftop terrace. At hearing, Petitioner testified that Ms. Cowell “was like a mom,” and that she had spoken to her on numerous occasions when Mr. DeMichael had problems with his employment. At hearing, the undersigned had the distinct opportunity to observe Petitioner’s testimony and her demeanor. Petitioner’s testimony regarding Mr. DeMichael’s alleged mental incapacity on February 11, 2013, and her not having the opportunity to read the Spousal Acknowledgement Form and the alleged invalidity of the Spousal Acknowledgement Form, Option Selection Form, and Application for Service Retirement Form, is not credited and is rejected as unpersuasive. In sum, Petitioner is not entitled to change Mr. DeMichael’s selection of Option 1 as his FRS retirement benefits payment option and she is not entitled to a continuing benefit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request to change the Florida Retirement System retirement benefits payment Option 1 selected by Mr. DeMichael and receive a continuing monthly spousal benefit. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Casey, Esquire Law Offices of Slesnick and Casey, LLP 2701 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 (eServed) Ladasiah Jackson Ford, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Nikita S. Parker, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 (eServed) Sean Gellis, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact The petitioner Petitioner, Huey G. Manges, was employed as a fire fighter by the Port Everglades Authority (the Port) in September 1961, and over the years rose through the ranks until in 1975 or 1976 he became Chief of the department. Petitioner served as Chief until 1988 or 1989, and was then promoted to Public Safety Director. As an employee of the Port, petitioner was a member of the Florida Retirement System. The Port's deferred compensation plan In 1983, the Port adopted a deferred compensation plan for all employees. The plan provided that employees could "make contributions into the fund in an amount not to exceed 33.3 [percent] of base salary, with a maximum cap of $7500." Under the plan, the Port, as the employer, made no contribution to the plan. In September 1984, the plan was amended to create a special provision for "key management persons," as an incentive to motivate them to perform in an outstanding manner and to encourage their continued commitment to the Port. At the time, it was observed that such employees have "extensive responsibilities," and "are not compensated for the many hours they work beyond the normal '40- hour' work week." As amended, the Port matched the qualified "key management person['s]" contribution on a dollar for dollar basis, not to exceed a maximum of 5 [percent] of base salary." The combined employer/employee contribution was limited to $7,500, annually. Among the positions designated as "key management persons" was the position of Fire Chief. Subsequently, at a date not apparent from the record, but at least 5 years before petitioner's retirement, the plan was amended to its current format, and further refined the classes of participants. For employees, such as petitioner, who had attained senior management Grade 9 or higher under the Port's management pay plan, and who elected to participate in the plan by executing a participation agreement, the Port agreed to contribute, on behalf of the employee, "an annual amount equal to the lesser of (i) $7,500 or (ii) 10 [percent] of such Employee's Compensation," regardless of whether they contribute to the plan. For employees below senior management Grade 9, and who elected to participate in the plan, the Port agreed to make "a matching contribution equal to 100 [percent] of the amount of a Participant's annual Deferred Compensation, up to an annual maximum matching contribution of 5 [percent] of the Participant's Compensation." According to petitioner, he participated in the plan from its inception, and "maxed it" each year. [Transcript, page 56]. By such testimony, it is concluded that the annual contribution to his deferred compensation account was $7,500, and that the Port's contribution varied, over the years, from a "dollar for dollar" match under the September 1984 amendment, to a full $7,500 contribution during the period that included, at least, petitioner's last five years of employment with the Port. Petitioner's retirement and subsequent events In or about June 1994, petitioner applied with respondent, Division of Retirement, for retirement under the Florida Retirement System, and his request was approved effective July 1, 1994. Since that date, petitioner has duly received his monthly retirement benefits, as calculated from the Division's records at the time of his retirement. On March 8, 1995, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to the Division and requested that his retirement benefits be recalculated predicated on an error he felt was committed by the Port in its contributions to the Florida Retirement System on his behalf. Such error, petitioner contended, was the Port's failure to treat the contributions it made to his deferred compensation account as retirement creditable wages, and to make the necessary contributions to the State Retirement Account. Essentially, petitioner wanted the Division to collect the contributions from the Port, and then recalculate his average final compensation to include the $7,500 annual contribution by the Port, and adjust his pension payments accordingly. 2/ Regarding petitioner's contention, the proof demonstrates that from the inception of the plan until May 1989, the Port, unbeknownst to the Division, had included the contribution it made to an employee's deferred compensation plan in calculating an employee's retirement creditable wages and Florida Retirement System (FRS) contributions. In May 1989, Mary Meynarez, the new director of finance for the Port, wrote to the Division concerning the propriety of such treatment. That letter was in response to a conversation the Port's CPA had with the Division, wherein he was advised that employer contributions to a deferred compensation plan were not subject to FRS contributions because gross or retirement creditable wages do not include matching contributions or fringe benefits. Ms. Meynarez's letter sought written confirmation of the Division's position. By letter of May 19, 1989, the Division advised Ms. Meynarez, consistent with its long established interpretation of the retirement laws, that such was the Division's position. Thereafter, the Port made no further contributions to the FRS based on its contribution to an employee's deferred compensation plan, and it submitted and received from the Division a credit adjustment for the erroneous payments for prior periods. Given the Division's interpretation of the retirement laws, it concluded that the Port properly excluded the contributions it made to his deferred compensation account when calculating FRS contributions, and by letter of July 5, 1995, advised petitioner that his retirement benefits had been correctly calculated and no adjustment would be made. Such letter further advised petitioner of his right to a section 120.57 hearing if he disagreed with the Division's decision. Petitioner timely filed such a request, and this proceeding duly followed. Pertinent legislation and the Division's interpretation Section 121.021(24), Florida Statutes, defines "average final compensation," as that term is used in deriving a members retirement benefits under the Florida Retirement System, to mean: [T]he average of the 5 highest fiscal years of compensation for creditable service prior to retirement, termination, or death . . . The payment for . . . bonuses, whether paid as salary or otherwise, shall not be used in the calculation of the average final compensation. Prior to 1989, section 121.021(22) defined "compensation," as that term is used in the Florida Retirement System, as follows: (22) "Compensation" means the monthly salary paid a member, including overtime payments and bonuses paid from a salary fund, as reported by the employer on the wage and tax statement (Internal Revenue Service form W-2) or any similar form. When a member's compensation is derived from fees set by statute, compens- ation shall be the total cash remuneration received from such fees. Under no circum- stances shall compensation include fees paid professional persons for special or particular services. During the course of the 1989 Legislative session, proposals were made to amend the provisions of section 121.021(22). The reason for amendment was twofold. First, pursuant to subsection 121.021(22) and (24) bonuses were included in the definition of "compensation" but excluded when calculating "average final compensation." This resulted in a conflict because retirement contributions were due on bonuses, but bonuses could not be used in calculating a member's "average final compensation." Second, the definition of "compensation" was silent with regard to the treatment of salaries paid to employees who participated in a deferred compensation, salary reduction, or tax- sheltered annuity program. Consequently, although the Division had consistently interpreted the subsection to so provide, it was felt appropriate to amend the statute to clearly provide that an employee's election to defer a portion of his salary to a deferred compensation plan did not reduce his retirement creditable wages. As a consequence, pursuant to Chapter 89-126, Section 1, Laws of Florida (1989), subsection 121.021(22), effective June 26, 1989, was amended to read as follows: "Compensation" means the monthly salary paid a member by his or her employer for work per- formed arising from that employment, including overtime payments paid from a salary fund. Under no circumstances shall compensation in- clude fees paid professional persons for special or particular services or include salary payments made from a faculty practice plan operated by rule of the Board of Regents for eligible clinical faculty at the Univer- sity of Florida and the University of South Florida. [For all purposes under this chapter, the compensation or gross compensation of any member participating in any salary reduction, deferred compensation, or tax-sheltered annuity program authorized under the Internal Revenue Code shall be deemed to have been the compen- sation or gross compensation which the member would have received if he or she were not participating in such program] [Emphasis added]. Here, while recognizing that the contributions made by the Port to petitioner's deferred compensation plan may be part of a management package designed to encourage employment fidelity, the Division considers such payments fringe benefits, similar to employer paid health and life insurance, and not "compensation," as defined by subsection 121.021(22) for retirement purposes. In reaching such conclusion, the Division first points to the provision of subsection 121.021(22), as amended, which provides that "[f]or all purposes under this chapter, the compensation or gross compensation of any member participating in any salary reduction, deferred compensation, or tax- sheltered annuity program . . . shall be deemed to have been the compensation or gross compensation which the member would have received if he or she were not participating in such program." Since petitioner would not have received the $7,500 Port contribution had he not elected to participate in the Plan, the literal application of the statutory language would exclude such payments from the definition of "compensation or gross compensation" for retirement purposes. In contrast, petitioner points out that the amendment to subsection 121.021(22) relied upon by the Division was not occasioned to address the peculiarities of his situation, but was designed to clarify that the portion of the employee's salary he elected to defer would not reduce his retirement benefits. Such issue is distinct, according to petitioner, from the issue of whether employer contributions to a deferred compensation plan are "compensation" for retirement purposes. While petitioner may be correct as to the purpose of the amendment to subsection 121.021(22), such does not compel the conclusion that the Division's literal application of that subsection, as excluding employer contributions from the calculation of retirement creditable wages, was not consistent with the Legislature's intent. In concluding that the Division's interpretation is reasonable and consistent with the purpose and intent of subsection 121.021(22), it is observed that under that subsection "compensation" is defined to mean "the monthly salary paid a member by his . . . employer for work performed." "Monthly salary," as observed by the Division, is commonly understood and reasonably read to refer to the fixed compensation for services paid to the employee on a regular basis or, as in petitioner's case, his fixed monthly salary under the Port's management pay plan, and does not include fringe benefits, such as employer matching payments or contributions to a deferred compensation plan. 3/ Consequently, the Division's decision to exclude such benefits from the calculation of petitioner's retirement benefits under the Florida Retirement System was reasonable. 4/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing petitioner's petition for formal hearing, and denying his request for additional retirement benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1996.
