The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses described in the administrative complaint? If so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Respondent has been licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida since September 4, 1970. Respondent was formerly licensed to practice medicine in the State of New York. By order issued July 3, 1987, by the New York Commissioner of Education, Respondent's New York license was revoked on the ground that he had been convicted of committing an act constituting a crime under the law of another jurisdiction, which, if committed in New York State, would have constituted a crime under New York State Law, in that: On or about January 18, 1984, in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, in the People of the State of California v. Jose Minaya (No. A344 720), aff'd No. B005332 (Ct. of Appeals, 2nd App. Dist., Oct. 1985), the Respondent, following a jury trial, was convicted of one count of grand theft and six counts of filing false Medi-Cal claims. Upon his conviction, Respondent was sentenced to four years imprisonment, was fined $10,000 for each of the six counts of filing false Medi-Cal claims, and restitution to the State of California was imposed in the sum of $14,866.80. The convictions which resulted in the revocation of Respondent's New York license were more specifically described as follows in the California appellate court opinion referenced in the Education Commissioner's July 3, 1987, order: [Respondent], specializing in ophthalmology, was charged and convicted primarily of filing falsified Medi-Cal treatment authorization requests (hereinafter referred to as TARs) in order to obtain permission to perform elective cataract surgeries on Medi-Cal beneficiaries. The People of California proved that the cataract surgeries were not medically justified and that the TARs were falsified by the appellant himself or at his direction, so that he could obtain payment from the state by false pretenses. * * * Count VIII, grand theft, was proven by the People as larceny by false pretense for the accumulation of all monies received from the surgeries performed on the Medi-Cal recipients named in the false claims counts.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order revoking Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida based upon the revocation of his New York license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of November, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th of November, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-2120 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner in the instant case: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a conclusion of law than a finding of fact. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a conclusion of law than a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Pius, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jose Minaya, M.D. 536 North 19th Street Montebello, California 90640 Jose Minaya, N.D. c/o Carlos Lorente 1018 Cyrus Lane Arcadia, California 91006 Jose Minaya, N.D. c/o P.A. Boyens Parole Agent II 9500 Norwalk Boulevard Santa Fe Springs, California 90670 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Kenneth D. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes, demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that she should not be disqualified from employment in a position involving direct contact with children or developmentally disabled persons and, thus, whether the intended action to deny an exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact The Agency Action Petitioner seeks an exemption from disqualification to allow her to serve as a direct care service provider for One Mainstream, a direct services provider for developmentally disabled clients. APD is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust, and charged with serving and protecting children or adults with developmental disabilities. Vulnerable populations served by APD include individuals with developmental and intellectual disabilities, autism, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, and Down’s syndrome. Some of APD’s clients are incapable of expressing their needs, or unable to express whether something is wrong. As part of the application process for employment as a direct services provider with One Mainstream, Petitioner was subject to a routine pre-employment background screening pursuant to section 435.04. The screening revealed the existence of two disqualifying criminal incidents (resulting in three charged offenses) in Petitioner’s past. The offenses were described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulations as follows: In April 1998, Petitioner committed her first disqualifying offense, Domestic Violence Battery, a first degree misdemeanor. Petitioner failed to appear before the court and an arrest warrant was issued. Subsequently, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the offense and adjudication was withheld. Petitioner was approximately thirty-four years old at the time of this offense. Petitioner was ordered to pay various court costs/fines. In January 2002, Petitioner contemporaneously committed her second and third disqualifying offenses, two counts of Domestic Violence Battery, first degree misdemeanors. Petitioner failed to appear before the court and an arrest warrant was issued. Petitioner contends there was no physical violence involved in these offenses. Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses and was adjudicated guilty. Petitioner was approximately thirty-seven and nine months old at the time of this offense. Petitioner was ordered to serve thirty days in the county jail and pay various court costs/fines. As a result of the background screening results, Respondent determined that Petitioner was disqualified from further employment in a position of special trust with children or the developmentally disabled. On February 16, 2015, Petitioner filed her Request for Exemption. All such requests are made to the Department of Children and Families, which conducts the initial background investigation. The file was assigned to Beatriz Blanco, DCF’s central region background screening coordinator. By July 10, 2015, the request for exemption had been assigned to Respondent. Daniella Jones, APD’s state office exemption background screening coordinator, requested additional information regarding Petitioner’s drug counseling and anger management courses. The record is not clear as to which items contained in Respondent’s Exemption Review file, if any, were submitted in response to Ms. Jones’ request. Among the items submitted by Petitioner in support of her Request for Exemption were a completed employment history record; information related to her having obtained a certified nursing assistant license; and six letters of recommendation. The Exemption Review file also included Petitioner’s written explanation of the disqualifying offenses and subsequent non- disqualifying incident1/; and copies of law enforcement, prosecution, and court documents related to the disqualifying offenses, a subsequent non-disqualifying incident, and three prior non-disqualifying incidents. Petitioner responded to the best of her ability to each request for information. Among the factors identified by Mr. Lewis as bases for the recommendation of denial of the exemption by staff was the perception that Petitioner’s answers to questions about her past conduct were “immature,” that she did not take responsibility for some of the past incidents, and that she did not show sufficient remorse for those incidents. The exemption request was ultimately provided by APD staff to the director of APD, who entered the notice of denial on August 27, 2015. Petitioner’s Background Petitioner grew up in a tough neighborhood in Brooklyn, New York. Her parents were hard drinkers, and she was raised in an environment in which the use of alcohol was accepted. By the time she was 17 years of age, Petitioner was a drinker and a “brawler.” Over the years, Petitioner’s issues with alcohol led her into drunken choices that resulted in the brushes with law enforcement and the criminal justice system described herein. Petitioner readily acknowledged that she had been an alcoholic during the times when she committed the disqualifying offenses. The Disqualifying Offenses 1998 Disqualifying Offense On or about April 18, 1998, Petitioner was told by a friend that her husband was staying with a girlfriend at an apartment in a nearby town. Petitioner “had some drinks” and went to the apartment to confront her husband. She burst in on the husband and his girlfriend unannounced and became embroiled in a brawl. The police were called. By the time the police officer arrived, Petitioner was gone. The police report,2/ which was based on the statements of the husband and his girlfriend, indicated that Petitioner threw a conch shell at the husband, striking him in the head, whereupon she left the apartment, returning to throw a boot at the husband which missed and broke a clock. Since Petitioner was not on the scene, and based on Petitioner’s testimony described herein, an inference is drawn that the husband and girlfriend painted as exculpatory a picture as possible, omitting anything that could cast any blame on the husband for the incident. Petitioner testified that the altercation was not nearly as one-sided as portrayed in the hearsay police report, with the husband holding her down and choking her at one point. She denied throwing the conch shell, but admitted throwing the boot and breaking the clock. Although the evidence suggests that Petitioner may indeed have thrown the shell, the evidence also supports that the husband was more than a passive victim. Petitioner was arrested for “domestic violence (simple).” She pled nolo contendere to Battery (Domestic Violence), a first-degree misdemeanor. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Petitioner was ordered to pay $620 in court costs. 2002 Disqualifying Offense On or about January 23, 2002, Petitioner was involved in an altercation with her boyfriend, in which her sister was involved. Petitioner was, according to the police report, “intoxicated and [ ] belligerent.” Petitioner had earlier received an inheritance from her mother, which she used to buy a house in Tampa, Florida. Her boyfriend moved in with her. The money soon ran out. Nonetheless, the boyfriend would not get a job, would not contribute to expenses, and would not move out. Petitioner and the boyfriend got into an altercation when she tried to evict him, during which Petitioner hit him with a frozen porterhouse steak. Petitioner indicated that she selected that as her weapon of choice, since he was eating all of her steaks but not paying for them. Petitioner was unclear as to the involvement of her sister, Geraldine Dreviak née Schubert, who also lived in Petitioner’s house, but denied that her sister was injured during the fracas. Petitioner introduced a letter from Ms. Dreviak in which Ms. Dreviak confirmed the boyfriend’s indolence, described her participation in requests that he leave, and substantiated Petitioner’s testimony that Ms. Dreviak was not injured. No objection was raised as to the authenticity of the letter, though it was noted that the letter was hearsay. The letter was admitted, and is used in this proceeding “for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence.” § 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. Thus, the evidence supports a finding that Ms. Dreviak suffered no physical injury in the altercation between Petitioner and her boyfriend. As a result of the altercation, Petitioner was arrested for “simple battery.” She pled guilty to Battery (Domestic Violence), a first-degree misdemeanor. Petitioner was sentenced to 30 days in jail, with credit for time served, and assessed $678 in court costs and liens. Petitioner completed or was lawfully released from all nonmonetary sanctions imposed by the courts, and all fees and costs related to the two disqualifying offenses were paid. Other Non-Disqualifying Offenses Properly Considered Offense In September 2002, Petitioner was arrested in New York with several other persons for Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree, a misdemeanor. The controlled substance was cocaine. Petitioner contended she was wrongfully accused, but pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. She testified that she just wanted to be done with the incident, and failed to appreciate the effect it would have in her later life. Petitioner was sentenced to time served and her license was suspended for six months. The incident was not only a singular and isolated event of its kind, but was Petitioner’s last involvement with law enforcement. Improperly Considered Offenses As set forth in the Joint Prehearing Stipulations, Petitioner was involved in the following non-disqualifying offenses: In September 1983, Petitioner committed the offense of Disorderly Conduct. Petitioner was convicted for this offense and adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately nineteen years and five months old at the time of this offense. In October 1988, Petitioner committed the offense of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property. Petitioner contends she was wrongfully accused, but pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately twenty-four years and six months old at the time of this offense. In December 1994, Petitioner committed the offense of Criminal Mischief with Reckless Property Damage. Petitioner pled guilty to the offense and was adjudicated guilty. Court records concerning this offense were destroyed in compliance with the Criminal Court of New York City’s records retention policy. Petitioner was approximately thirty years and eight months old at the time of this offense. Respondent considered it to be significant that Petitioner was unable to provide information regarding non- disqualifying incidents3/ despite the fact that she had no control over New York City’s records retention policy. Mr. Lewis noted that it would have been to the benefit of Petitioner to have provided records of those non-disqualifying offenses since, without those records, Respondent could not fully review that information. In denying the exemption, Respondent considered the information in totality, including the non-disqualifying offenses committed from 1983 through 1994. Petitioner’s failure to provide a “detailed explanation” of those offenses was a factor in Respondent’s decision. Section 435.07(3)(b) plainly provides that: The agency may consider as part of its deliberations of the employee’s rehabilitation the fact that the employee has, subsequent to the conviction for the disqualifying offense for which the exemption is being sought, been arrested for or convicted of another crime, even if that crime is not a disqualifying offense. (emphasis added). Considering evidence of non-disqualifying crimes committed prior to the disqualifying offenses exceeded the powers and duties granted by the Legislature. Thus, Respondent’s consideration of non-disqualifying offenses that occurred prior to the conviction for the disqualifying offenses was error. Evidence of Rehabilitation Petitioner’s last disqualifying offense occurred on January 23, 2002. Petitioner’s last involvement with law enforcement of any kind occurred in September 2002. Petitioner has no arrests or involvement with law enforcement of any kind since then. At some point, the passage of time itself is evidence of rehabilitation. While by no means dispositive, the passage of almost 14 years since the last disqualifying offense is substantial evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. Petitioner showed contrition and remorse for the disqualifying offenses. Petitioner has been married since 2008 to a man that she describes as supportive. Thus, the stresses of the abusive relationships that led to her disqualifying offenses have been alleviated. Petitioner initially provided letters from six persons who were acquainted with Petitioner, two of whom testified at the final hearing. The letters were sincere, left the impression that they were written by persons with knowledge of Petitioner’s present character, and were consistent with and corroborated by the testimony of witnesses at the hearing. When Petitioner filed her Request for Administrative Hearing, she provided letters of support from four additional persons who knew Petitioner, one of whom testified at the final hearing. As with the previous letters, the letters were sincere, and fully consistent with the witness testimony taken during the hearing. Petitioner has been licensed as a certified nursing assistant, though the date of her licensure was not specified. She has not been able to practice under her license due to the issues that are the subject of this proceeding. Petitioner testified convincingly that she has turned her life around, and is not the same person that she was when she was a drinker. Petitioner’s Work History The Employment History Record form that is part of the Request for Exemption requests “employment history for the last three years.” Petitioner provided an employment history that indicated employment from May 11, 2011, to the date of the filing of the Request for Exemption. During that period, Petitioner was employed to perform custodial duties at the First Baptist Church of Weeki Wachee Acres, and worked as a cook for functions held at the church. Her work ethic and performance was, and is, exemplary. In addition to the foregoing, Petitioner has attended to the needs of Billy Bowling on a volunteer basis for the past five or six years. Mr. Bowling, who is 49 years of age, is significantly developmentally disabled. At the hearing, he displayed obvious affection for Petitioner. Mr. Bowling’s mother, Patsy Bowling Anderson, testified that, at one time, the family employed a licensed direct service provider who was unacceptably rude, and upset Mr. Bowling. Since then, Petitioner is the only person outside of her family that Mrs. Anderson allows to care for Mr. Bowling. Mrs. Anderson testified that she had complete trust that Petitioner would do nothing that would result in harm to her son. Her testimony was substantiated by that of Major Anderson. The testimony of the Bowling/Anderson family was credible and compelling, and is accepted as convincing evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. In addition to her care for Billy Bowling, Major Anderson and Mrs. Anderson testified that Petitioner, on her own time and without compensation, provides care and assistance to elderly neighbors, and to children at their church, all without incident. Their testimony is credited, and is accepted as further evidence of Petitioner’s rehabilitation. Additional Clear and Convincing Evidence of Rehabilitation Mr. Lewis testified that when disqualifying offenses involve violence, Respondent looks for evidence of anger management counseling. The information provided to the APD director suggested that Petitioner had undergone no anger management courses that would mitigate the possibility of a recurrence of the incidents that occurred in 1998 and 2002. The lack of such evidence was, in this case, a significant factor in the recommendation of denial to the director. Although the evidence of counseling in the Exemption Review file was spotty, the evidence adduced at hearing from Petitioner and Mrs. Anderson was convincing that Petitioner is an active, and successful, participant in Alcoholics Anonymous. Petitioner acts as a sponsor for others and on occasion, has taken it on herself to conduct meetings when group leaders have failed to appear. She has been sober for more than ten years. Since both of Petitioner’s disqualifying offenses were largely fueled by alcohol, ongoing participation in Alcoholics Anonymous is a more appropriate and effective means of rehabilitation than a class in “anger management.” Petitioner has been fortunate to find herself in what, by all accounts, is an embracing and supportive community. The individuals testifying on her behalf expressed their firm conviction that Petitioner had turned her life around, with Mrs. Anderson, who has known Petitioner for 14 years, characterizing the change as “remarkable.” None of the witnesses could identify any reason to suggest that Petitioner would not be able to provide capable and safe services to children and developmentally disabled persons. Ultimate Findings of Fact Petitioner meets the objective criteria for an exemption from disqualification established in section 435.07(1). When the decision was made to deny the exemption, it appears that APD staff provided the director with information as to non-disqualifying offenses that occurred prior to the disqualifying offenses. It is not known how, or whether, that impermissible information may have colored the director’s decision. Nonetheless, an evaluation of Petitioner’s suitability for an exemption should be made without consideration of those earlier events. The credible testimony and evidence in this case established, clearly and convincingly, that Petitioner has been rehabilitated from her disqualifying offenses, and that she currently presents no danger to the vulnerable population served by Respondent if she is allowed to be employed as a direct service provider. The concerns expressed by Respondent in formulating its intended action, without the benefit of the hearing testimony, particularly those regarding her lack of “anger management” classes and her lack of remorse for her actions, were effectively refuted by the credible testimony at hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities approving Petitioner, Catherine Schubert Rivera’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2015.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, should pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to Crudele under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, after Crudele appealed and reversed the Department's Emergency Order of Suspension.
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1996, the Department issued an Emergency Order of Suspension of Crudele's eligibility for licensure and license as a Florida life insurance agent and life and health insurance agent. The Emergency Order of Suspension was based on alleged violations of the insurance code in connection with the surrender of insurance annuities for purchase of a startup company's unsecured promissory notes. It stated: Based on the foregoing specific facts and for the reasons of protecting the insurance-buying public and insurers from further harm, preventing further abuses of fiduciary relationships, and preventing further defrauding of insureds and insurance companies by the [Petitioner], the Insurance Commissioner finds that [Crudele] constitutes and is an immediate and serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare necessitating and justifying the Emergency Suspension of all licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations heretofore issued to [Crudele] under the purview of the Department of Insurance. The danger, more specifically, is to the insurance-buying public which must place its trust in the honesty and competence of insurance agents. The trust involves the responsibility that insurance agents have for fiduciary funds accepted by them and insurance matters entrusted to them. The danger is clear and present that failure to properly handle such funds and matters may cause serious losses and damage to the insurance-buying public. Prior to issuance of the Emergency Order of Suspension, the Department received two verified complaints--one by the alleged victim, and the other by her adult daughter. The complaints alleged essentially: Crudele was introduced to Mary Clem, an 84 year-old widow of a tenant farmer, by Charles Perks, Clem's insurance agent, in 1992. In 1992, Crudele and Perks solicited and sold Clem two annuities for a total of $50,000, representing Clem's life savings from working in sick people's homes as a nurses aide. A year after selling the annuities, Crudele and Perks returned to Clem and convinced her to invest the money she had in her annuities into a new company called Zuma that was to recycle automobile tires into useful products. Crudele and Perks represented that Zuma was a "sure fire business." They said they were offering Clem the opportunity to get "in on the ground floor" and that the stock would then go on the open market and double in value. Clem did not have a great deal of education and had no experience investing in stocks or bonds. Her sole source of income was Social Security plus her modest savings. She conceded that when she was offered a 12% interest rate, she found the offer too irresistible to refuse. Neither Crudele nor Perks gave Clem a prospectus or any other descriptive brochure about Zuma. Clem purchased a total of three Zuma promissory notes at three separate times for a total of $60,000. This represented the bulk of her retirement savings. Clem acted based on her trust and confidence in Crudele and Perks. Clem later went to a lawyer to draft a will. The lawyer became very concerned about Clem's purchases of the Zuma promissory notes and her inability to understand the nature of the transaction. Clem was not getting any of her payments from Zuma as promised. Clem was "going out of her mind" with worry. She summoned her daughter, Roberta Anderson, to come down to Florida from Indiana to investigate the matter. Anderson was unable to contact Crudele, and he did not contact her. Anderson and Clem were not aware of any efforts on Crudele's part to recover the funds or otherwise remedy the situation. After a great deal of effort, Anderson was able to recover approximately $23,000 of her mother's money. Crudele apparently played no part in helping Anderson recover the $23,000. The Zuma notes went into default, and apparently the remainder of the money was lost. Clem suffered a very serious financial loss that, given her circumstances, she could ill afford. It may be inferred from the evidence that the Department based its Emergency Order of Suspension on the Clem and Anderson verified complaints. There was no evidence of any other basis for the Emergency Order of Suspension. There was no evidence as to whether the Department conducted any investigation of any kind prior to entry of the Emergency Order of Suspension. Nor is there any evidence as to the Department's decision-making process. The Emergency Order of Suspension stated: (1) that it was being issued pursuant to "sections 120.59(3) [and] 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)], Florida Statutes [1995]; (2) that Crudele had "the right to request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.59(4), Florida Statutes [1995]"; and (3) that Crudele "was entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes [1995], and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." The Emergency Order of Suspension also stated that an Administrative Complaint seeking final disciplinary action would be filed within 20 days. On July 15, 1996, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint on essentially the same allegations as those in the Emergency Order of Suspension. Crudele sought judicial review of the Emergency Order of Suspension in the District Court of Appeal, First District. On August 19, 1997, the court issued an Opinion reversing the Emergency Order of Suspension because it did not "set forth particularized facts which demonstrate sufficient immediacy or likelihood of continuing harm to the public health, safety, and welfare to support a suspension of his license without notice and hearing." The court's Mandate issued on September 4, 1997; it referred to the court's Opinion and commanded that "further proceedings, if required, be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of Court, and the laws of the State of Florida." The Administrative Complaint filed against Crudele was given Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case No. 97-2603. On February 17, 1998, a Final Order sustaining some of the charges and suspending Crudele's license and eligibility for licensure for six months was entered in Case No. 97-2603.
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Petitioner has been rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense(s); and, if so, whether the intended action to deny Petitioner's exemption request pursuant to section 435.07(3), Florida Statutes (2015),1/ would constitute an abuse of discretion by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, and the record as a whole, the following material Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner was a 52-year-old female who sought to qualify, pursuant to section 435.07, for employment in a position of trust as a direct service provider for physically or mentally disabled adults or children. This position requires the successful completion of a Level 2 background screening. See § 435.04, Fla. Stat. APD is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating the employment of persons in positions of trust. Specifically, the mission of the Agency includes serving and protecting the vulnerable population, including children or adults with developmental disabilities. In conformance with the statute, Petitioner was screened by APD since she applied for a position of special trust as a direct service provider of APD. The screening revealed, and the parties stipulated at the hearing, that Petitioner was convicted of the following disqualifying offenses: Theft by Shoplifting--Felony--1987 Theft by Shoplifting--Felony--1987 Forgery (4 counts)--Felonies--1993 Theft by Shoplifting--Felony--1993 Battery-Family Violence--Misdemeanor-- 1996 Forgery--Felony--1998 The stipulation also included the fact that 17 years have elapsed since the last disqualifying offense was committed. The screening revealed, and the parties also stipulated at the hearing, that Petitioner was arrested or convicted of the following non-disqualifying offenses: Simple Battery--Misdemeanor--arrested-- dismissed--1987 Theft by Conversion--convicted--1993 Driving Under the Influence--convicted-- 1994 Criminal Trespass--Misdemeanor-- convicted--2000 The stipulation also included the fact that 15 years have elapsed since the last non-disqualifying arrest or conviction was committed. Rosita Martin At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was unemployed. She had last been employed at Martin's Group Home as a caregiver of vulnerable children who had disabilities or behavioral problems. Her duties included giving out medicines, assisting clients with bathing, and taking kids on outings and to church. She also helped to cook. She explained that most of her convictions occurred during a period of her life when she was in an abusive marriage and suffered from depression. She acknowledged that, during that time period, she was abusing drugs (cocaine) and alcohol. During that same period of time, she admitted that she had purchased and also possessed marijuana. She explained that her battery conviction in 1996 related to a domestic dispute with her husband. She called the police, and they took them both to jail. Although she said she was defending herself, she admitted that she had been convicted and found guilty of battery. Petitioner testified that she is a "good girl now." She attends church every Sunday and "left her problems with drugs." She got sick and tired and "told God to take it away from me and he did." Petitioner testified that she has not used any type of illegal drugs for 20 years. Her sister operates four group homes for children with disabilities. Petitioner worked at one of the homes, and her sister wrote her a letter of support in this case. The evidence was undisputed that she received "excellent" evaluations while at Martin Group Home. Currently, she lives with her daughter, and a granddaughter who is two years old. As a result of one of Petitioner's various felony convictions, she testified that she was ordered to attend in- house drug treatment at the Willingway Hospital in Statesboro, Georgia. Upon questioning by the undersigned, Petitioner stated that she was in rehabilitation at the hospital for "like 6 months" back in the 1990's.2/ The various letters of support and reference provided by Petitioner came from her relatives. These included her sister and father. The record reflects that Petitioner attended and successfully completed numerous training courses (e.g. medicine administration, CPR training, blood borne pathogens, HIV safeguards, etc.) that related to the caretaker work she performs.3/ Other than two certificates for domestic violence training in 2011 and 2012, the other training and educational completion certificates did not relate to treatment or counseling programs related to her drug use, alcohol use, psychological counseling, or financial training-–the personal issues she struggled with in her past when the disqualifying events took place. The evidence reflected that she had numerous and chronic driving violations, pertaining primarily to failing to pay road tolls. She claimed that all of these toll violations occurred when her daughter was driving her car.4/ On cross-examination, Petitioner conceded that she failed to provide a detailed version of the facts or a full explanation for each criminal offense listed on her exemption form.5/ Petitioner claimed that she was "new at this" and did not understand the details she was supposed to provide. For the criminal offenses involving theft of property, she claimed on the form, and testified, that there was "no harm" to the victim. Again, she claimed some confusion and stated that she thought that they were talking about harm in the "violent" sense. She was also cross-examined about the six-month drug treatment program that she testified she had attended at Willingway Hospital. She was asked why she did not provide that information to the Agency in the exemption form or provide the agency with a copy of a completion certificate. Inexplicably, she was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation during the hearing for why she did not disclose the drug treatment program on the exemption questionnaire. She claimed that since the court had ordered her into treatment, she did not think it was necessary to specifically list or describe it. She was asked why she was not able to provide a letter of recommendation from her church pastor. She did not provide an adequate explanation and simply stated that she attends church but is not a church member, that she just goes to church there every Sunday. She worked briefly at a company called Best Walks of Life. Her supervisor was her son, Mr. Walker. No details were provided concerning what she did there. She acknowledged that much of her criminal activity arose from or was related to problems with monetary or financial issues; yet, she conceded that she had not taken any financial courses or other classes to obtain financial or budgeting training or counseling. After working for her sister at Martin Group Home, she has not made any attempts to work in any other places or group homes since leaving. Darnisha Johnson Petitioner is her mother. The witness is 24 years old and lives with her daughter at her mother's house. She testified that her mother is "a great person today. She's great." She also stated that her mother is a "much better person" then when she was involved in criminal activity.6/ She also felt that her mother is not using any drugs now. She acknowledged that she has a car, but that it is in her mother's name. In the context of who pays the bills today and supports her financially, she characterized her mother's role as being her "support system." She also admitted that any failures to pay tolls while driving the vehicle registered in her mother's name were her responsibility. Molita Cunningham She is a friend of Petitioner's. She works as a certified nursing assistant and is certified as such with the State of Florida. She has known Petitioner for a little over three years and met her at a Family Dollar store. She wrote a letter of support for Petitioner. She was not aware of any facts to suggest that Petitioner was engaged in criminal activity, drug abuse, or abuse of her clients in any manner. She acknowledged she had a background similar to Petitioner's. She was "out there in the streets" and is a convicted felon. Other than being a general character witness, the witness offered no substantive evidence touching upon Petitioner's rehabilitation from the disqualifying offenses. Evelyn Alvarez Ms. Alvarez is employed with the Agency as the regional operations manager for the Southern Region.7/ She obtained a master's degree in public administration from Florida International University in 2000. APD serves individuals that have specific developmental disabilities. The disabilities include intellectual disabilities, autism, cerebral palsy, spina bifida, and the like. Her role in this case was to review the background information gathered by both the Department of Children and Families and APD on Petitioner. After her review, the package of information was sent to an exemption committee. That committee then independently reviewed the exemption package and made its own recommendation to the Director of APD. Before deciding on the exemption request, the Director reviewed both Ms. Alvarez's recommendation and the recommendation of the exemption committee. She correctly acknowledged that the applicant for an exemption from disqualification must prove rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence. She also correctly noted that the Agency should consider the circumstances of the disqualifying offense(s), the nature of the harm caused to any victims involved, the history of the employee since the incident and any other evidence indicating that the employee will not present a danger to the vulnerable or disabled adults or children they serve. APD was concerned that Petitioner failed to follow directions and provide the details for each disqualifying criminal event.8/ Also, Ms. Alvarez was concerned that Petitioner's failure to acknowledge that someone was "harmed" by the theft or forgery crimes ignores that there were victims involved, and the response fails to show an acceptance of responsibility for the crime(s). Ms. Alvarez testified that the Agency has no idea what happened with each of the disqualifying events, or of any circumstances that were happening at the time that would allow APD to understand why Petitioner would commit the offenses, and that there was no acknowledgment of any harm to any victims. In the opinion of Ms. Alvarez, the training certificates provided by Petitioner were not persuasive evidence of rehabilitation. More specifically, they were only indicative of employment training and did not include anything in terms of addressing Petitioner's substance abuse issues, her inability to manage her finances, or her involvement in acts of domestic violence. In APD's opinion, the lack of any treatment or professional counseling for those issues militated against a finding of rehabilitation. Likewise, Petitioner did not describe her alleged six- month, in-house drug rehabilitation program in the exemption application, nor was there any certificate of completion of drug treatment provided. APD concluded that Petitioner used poor judgment during an incident when she invited her friend, Ms. Cunningham, to spend a day on the job at Martin Group Home with Petitioner's disabled and vulnerable children. APD felt that this was a breach of client confidentiality, HIPAA rights, and may have put some of the children at risk around a visitor who did not have a background check or clearance to be at the facility. There were no professional references or letters of support offered by Petitioner from past employers (other than from group homes involving her relative). Likewise, there were no letters attesting to her good moral character from her church or other faith-based relationships she may have established. Ms. Alvarez testified that the reason the Agency wants letters of reference from individuals who do not have a conflict of interest is to show her character. Examples of letters of reference would be from a pastor or from an organization where someone had volunteered. The letters provided by Petitioner, while useful, did not reflect an impartial view of her character.9/ The Agency determined that it had no basis of reference for the character of Petitioner due to her failure to provide more impartial references.10/ In Ms. Alvarez's opinion, after reviewing the completed application, Petitioner had not provided any evidence, and APD had no knowledge, to support a finding of rehabilitation. Furthermore, APD did not have any knowledge of any financial planning or budgeting courses that Petitioner may have taken to show rehabilitation in the area of her finances. APD considered it significant during its review that Petitioner had been charged with driving while license suspended ("DWLS") (a criminal traffic offense) in 2012 and again in 2013, less than two years before the application. (Both DWLS offenses were subsequently dismissed.) Respondent's Exhibit 9, Petitioner's Florida Comprehensive Case Information System driving record, reflects in excess of 20 failures to pay required highway tolls in a two-year period from 2012 to 2013.11/ Petitioner did not provide any explanation for her driver's license problems to the Agency at the time of her Exemption Application. The Agency had no knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the DWLS citations. Ms. Alvarez testified that traffic offenses and driving habits are important considerations, since direct service providers are often required to transport persons with developmental disabilities In essence, APD concluded that Petitioner had fallen short of her burden of showing rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities confirm its previous intended denial and enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner should be exempt from disqualification from employment in a position of trust, pursuant to section 435.07, Florida Statutes (2016).1/
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Agency is the state entity which supports vulnerable persons with various developmental disabilities. The Agency contracts with direct service providers and is responsible for regulating the employment of persons serving in positions of trust with these providers. The ARC of Martin County, Inc. (the ARC), is a service provider for the Agency. Ms. Ford applied with the ARC to become an after-school counselor, a position of trust which requires completion of level 2 background screening. The Department of Children and Families conducts initial screening on behalf of the Agency. Background screening and local criminal records revealed a history of involvement with law enforcement, as Ms. Ford admitted in her exemption request paperwork and her testimony at hearing, summarized below. On September 30, 2011, Ms. Ford entered a plea of guilty to forgery, driving on a suspended license, and providing a false name to law enforcement, for events that took place on April 9, 2010. Forgery, a felony of the third degree, is a disqualifying offense for employment in a position of trust. She was ordered to pay court fees and costs, and was put on probation for a period of 18 months for that offense. In her responses in the Exemption Questionnaire, Ms. Ford gave few details as to the events surrounding the disqualifying offense itself. She stated only that she was a witness to an accident on March 20, 2011, almost a year after the forgery incident, and, after identifying herself to the police, was arrested on an outstanding warrant from Martin County for the forgery charge. Ms. Ford wrote in her own words:2/ The forgery was do to traffic when I was pulled over and I gave my sister name to the officer. The officer then allowed me to go to go. I didn't know I had a warrant for Martin County until the night of the crash. In response to inquiries concerning another arrest for driving with a suspended license and providing a false name to a law enforcement officer while being arrested or detained a couple of months later on May 9, 2011, Ms. Ford wrote: I was on my to work and I was running late so I then was doing over milage and I was pulled over and gave officer a other name, cause I didn't want to be late for work. At hearing, in response to inquiries concerning her arrest for shoplifting on January 22, 2013, Ms. Ford acknowledged shoplifting a medical device for her daughter from Wal-Mart. Ms. Ford completed all confinement, supervision, and nonmonetary conditions imposed by the court for her disqualifying offense by March 29, 2013. Mr. Gerry Driscoll is the regional operations manager for the Southeast Region of the Agency. He has served in his current position for three years and has been employed with the Agency for seventeen years. Mr. Driscoll credibly testified that the Agency has responsibility for a very vulnerable population, many of whom are unable to later tell others about the actions of their caregivers. This population is thus very susceptible to exploitation. Mr. Driscoll noted that the Agency must consider any prior criminal conduct or dishonesty very carefully. In her written submission to the Agency, Ms. Ford did not recognize that she caused any harm or injury to any victim. However, at hearing, she admitted that she caused injury to her sister when she provided and signed her sister's name to law enforcement after being detained or arrested on more than one occasion. Ms. Ford submitted three identically worded "form" character reference letters to the Agency, stating generally that she is a responsible, reliable, and honest person. The letters do not indicate the employment status or positions of the individuals signing the references. Ms. Ford further stated that she was remorseful. In her Exemption Questionnaire, Ms. Ford wrote: Yes my remorse is I accepting made bad choose in my life and I accept full responsibility for the actions that I made. I want to move forward and put the pass behind me so I can make a better future for me and my kids. Ms. Ford seems sincere in her desire to assist vulnerable persons and asks for a chance to work with them to demonstrate that she is rehabilitated. However, the statute requires that rehabilitation be shown first; only then may an exemption for disqualification be granted. While Ms. Ford stated that she is rehabilitated, she offered little evidence to clearly demonstrate that. She completed a home health aide course in 2012, but has not participated in other counseling or coursework since the disqualifying offense. Ms. Ford's recent work history includes employment as an administrative assistant with Florida Community Health Centers, Inc., from October 8, 2014, to October 5, 2015, and employment as a mental health technician with Sandy Pines Residential Treatment Center from July 18, 2008, to January 7, 2014. Passage of time is a factor to be considered in determining rehabilitation, and the last disqualifying offense was over five years ago. However, Ms. Ford's history since her disqualifying offense includes more to reflect incidents and does not contain sufficient positive indications of rehabilitation. Ms. Ford failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is rehabilitated and that she will not present a danger if she is exempted from her disqualification from employment in a position of trust.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Ms. Jennifer Ford's application for exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issues are 1) whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense(s); and, if so, 2) whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from employment disqualification would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is seeking employment with The Arc of Alachua County, a service provider regulated by APD. Petitioner’s desired employment is to work as a direct service provider, which requires compliance with background screening requirements. The results of Petitioner’s background screening identified a history of criminal offenses. Petitioner received notification via letter dated April 4, 2016, from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), Respondent’s background screening entity, of her disqualification from employment due to a criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in the letter was Larceny (a violation of section 810.014, Florida Statutes (2016)1/). Florida’s Legislature has designated certain criminal offenses as disqualifying offenses, which would prevent an individual from working as a direct service provider. However, an individual may seek an exemption from the employment disqualification. The granting of an exemption from employment disqualification would allow for Petitioner’s employment as a direct service provider to APD clients. APD’s clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of those individuals whose developmental disabilities are statutorily defined as: intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid Syndrome. See § 393.063(12), Fla. Stat. Without APD’s services, these clients would otherwise require institutionalization. APD’s clients often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. These clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve; consequently, employment as a direct service provider to APD clients is regarded as a position of special trust. APD is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. See §§ 110.1127(2)(c)1. and 393.0655, Fla. Stat. Many of the tasks direct service providers perform for, and/or assist individuals with disabilities with, include those of a social, personal needs, and/or financial nature. APD relies on DCF to initially receive exemption from employment disqualification requests and compile documents received related to such requests. On or around May 10, 2016, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire, a copy of her criminal record, character references, and other various documents (the Exemption Packet) to DCF in order to demonstrate support for the granting of an exemption from employment disqualification. DCF subsequently forwarded the Exemption Packet to APD for review. In beginning its exemption review, APD considered Petitioner’s disqualifying offense. Specifically, in December 1982, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of Larceny/Grand Theft (a violation of section 810.014). The court’s final disposition of the case included the withholding of adjudication of guilt, two years’ probation, and payment of costs. In its continued exemption review pursuant to section 435.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes, APD considered the following non- disqualifying offenses which Petitioner committed subsequent to her December 1982 disqualifying offense: an arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05, Florida Statutes); a second arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); a conviction for Worthless Check on December 24, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); an arrest for Driving While License Suspended/Revoked in June 1996 (a violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes); an arrest for Worthless Check in January 2007 (a violation of section 832.05(4)(a)); and an arrest for Violation of Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court in August 2012 (a violation of section 741.31(4)(a), Florida Statutes). The Disqualifying Offense Petitioner provided an account of her disqualifying offense, Larcency/Grand Theft, in an addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire, dated August 3, 2015. Petitioner indicated in her account that she relocated to Tampa from Gainesville. She was 22 years old, single, and employed with the State of Florida. She became roommates with another female who was attending college at the University of South Florida. Petitioner stated “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner further explained that she received a two- year term of probation and completed all her court-ordered sanctions within a year. Petitioner also noted that “[s]ince that time, I have not committed any further crimes.” Petitioner provided the following record concerning her disqualifying offense: state attorney court record (13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, State Attorney). The Non-Disqualifying Offenses Court records received in evidence indicate a total of six non-disqualifying offenses as previously mentioned. Petitioner did not disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, nor did she provide accounts for such on the Exemption Questionnaire, despite the directions specifically requiring an applicant to do so. Petitioner did not provide records of her non- disqualifying offenses. Records of those offenses were obtained by APD as part of its detailed review process. Records of the non-disqualifying offenses obtained included: worthless check affidavit, witness form, copies of check, and no information filed court filing (Sears 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, and copy of check (Pic’n Save 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, and court judgment (Pic’n Save 12/24/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, copy of court diversion judgment and supporting documentation, and copy of dismissal of charge (Publix 1/30/2007); and warrant affidavit for arrest (Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, August 2012). Petitioner indicated that she has no current involvement with any court system; specifically, she stated “I have not experienced any criminal charges since my last event in 1982.” Regarding whether there was any degree of harm to any victim or property, including damage or injuries, Petitioner stated “I have not experienced any harm or damage to anyone or any property since my last event in 1982.” In answering the question about stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying incident, Petitioner indicated that there were none, other than being on probation. Regarding whether there are any current stressors in her life, Petitioner stated “I have no current stressors with the law.” Petitioner indicated that her current support system and living arrangements include being married and having one daughter and numerous grandchildren. Petitioner also explained that her community activities/volunteer efforts include volunteering with the school system (field trips/activities) and attending church and performing functions for the church’s treasury department. Regarding educational and training achievements, Petitioner stated that she graduated from high school, started a career with the State of Florida, and attended a word processing/information course where she received the Most Outstanding Student Award. The Exemption Questionnaire asks whether an applicant has ever received counseling for any reason. Petitioner indicated that she has not received counseling for any reason; if she felt stress, she would call the Employee Assistance Program. Petitioner noted she has not experienced any “major post- traumatic [stress].” As to whether she has used and/or abused drugs or alcohol, Petitioner replied that she has “not abused any type of drugs or alcohol in [her] life.” Petitioner indicated the following regarding feeling remorse/accepting responsibility for her actions: “I am the type of person to feel remorse towards everything and every person that I have contact with. I always take full responsibility for any action(s) that I encounter when I am in the wrong.” The Exemption Questionnaire asks for an applicant’s prior three years’ work history. Petitioner provided the following information: 4/2016 to 5/2016--The Arc of Alachua County (support tech/direct care); 11/2007 to 7/2014--DCF--North Florida Evaluation & Treatment Center (Human Services Worker III); 3/2004 to 7/2007—DCF--State of Florida Foster Care (word processor/data management specialist); 4/1998 to 9/2003-- American Psychiatric Association (membership coordinator/secretary). In addition to the criminal record submitted, Petitioner also provided the following additional documents that were included in her Exemption Packet: local law background checks, a volunteer award (Head Start), three letters of reference attesting to Petitioner’s character, and an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. The letters were written by persons who have known Petitioner for several years; they described Petitioner as devoted, loyal, honest, kind, and trustworthy. Finally, Petitioner submitted a copy of an exemption letter she received from DCF, dated February 12, 2016. Leslie Richards, regional operations manager for APD’s Northeast Region, advised that APD reviewed all documentation provided by Petitioner in her Request for Exemption, the information indicated in Petitioner’s Exemption Questionnaire, the various records documenting Petitioner’s criminal history, her volunteer award, character letters, and exemption from DCF. Following a review of Petitioner’s Exemption Packet, Agency Director Barbara Palmer, advised Petitioner by a letter dated September 26, 2016, that her request for an exemption from her disqualifying offense was denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to submit clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. Petitioner sent APD a request for hearing on or around October 11, 2016. APD received this request timely and subsequently forwarded this appeal to DOAH. Along with her request for hearing, Petitioner submitted a personal statement explaining her reasons for disputing the denial and requesting the hearing, a copy of the denial letter, and a copy of a training certificate summary for APD-approved courses through her former employer, the Arc of Alachua County. At hearing, Ms. Richards explained APD’s process of reviewing exemption requests and the consideration of Petitioner’s application for such. Per Ms. Richards, APD considers the disqualifying offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the incident, and finally, any other evidence indicating that the applicant will not present a danger if employment is allowed. Additionally, Ms. Richards testified that APD looks for consistency in the applicant’s account of events in his or her Exemption Questionnaire, the passage of time since the disqualifying incident, whether the applicant accepts responsibility for his/her actions, and whether the applicant expresses remorse for his or her prior criminal acts. Because an applicant will be occupying a position of special trust if granted an exemption, APD weighs all of these factors in its determination. Ms. Richards testified that all of Petitioner’s submissions were reviewed and taken into consideration; she noted that the starting point of APD’s review began with the date of the disqualifying offense and any criminal conduct occurring thereafter. Ms. Richards emphasized that in APD’s review, it was noted that Petitioner failed to disclose sufficient details of the account of her disqualifying offense. Specifically, Petitioner provided what appeared to be background information about the time frame surrounding the offense and the person whom she committed the offense with, but indicated in her statement “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner provided other details about this time in her life, but nothing specific about the crime itself. Ms. Richards stated that it left APD with a concern that Petitioner was not forthright with disclosure of the circumstances involving the crime. Ms. Richards also explained that APD took note that Petitioner failed to disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, and that this fact was also of concern. APD obtained records of the non-disqualifying offenses and considered them in its review. Ms. Richards noted that the nature of the offenses, particularly the Worthless Checks and the Violation of the Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court, were troubling because those offenses involved monetary transactions and interpersonal relations. Ms. Richards observed that the individuals APD serves are highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and a person who is in a role as a direct service provider would be assisting those individuals in a social and financial capacity. APD reviewed Petitioner’s involvement with three DCF investigations involving allegations of abuse toward a vulnerable adult, Petitioner’s spouse. Although there were no findings against Petitioner in these cases, based on the issues presented, DCF did make the recommendation for Petitioner to pursue family counseling. Ms. Richards noted that there is no evidence that Petitioner followed through with DCF’s recommendation, and by Petitioner’s own admission on the Exemption Questionnaire, has “not received counseling for any reason.” In addition to both the criminal offense and DCF- related information, APD noted Petitioner’s less than stellar driving record. Ms. Richards advised that a direct service provider will often be in a position to transport clients, and Petitioner’s driving record reflects a series of both moving and non-moving violations, which pose a concern. The record reflects a total of five driving-related violations: driving while license suspended/revoked (previously mentioned); tag not assigned (criminal traffic); red light camera citation; unlawful speeding; and a second red light camera citation. Ms. Richards testified regarding APD’s consideration of Petitioner’s prior employment history with DCF, and the subsequent exemption for employment granted to Petitioner by DCF. At hearing, APD presented employment evaluations and records of written disciplinary action taken against Petitioner by DCF while in its employ. Ms. Richards specifically noted that some of the disciplinary issues for which Petitioner was cited included: sleeping on the job while employed at a forensic facility; not securing the front door of a building at a forensic facility; tardiness; inappropriately streaming media on a state-owned computer; insubordination (refusal to work a shift); failure to report to work; and poor performance/negligence (failure to answer phones/answer front door of facility). Petitioner ultimately was dismissed from DCF due to her inability to perform her job functions because of an injury. Ms. Richards explained that these disciplinary issues gave APD great pause in considering granting Petitioner an exemption, as they were indicators for potential behaviors that could pose a great risk to individuals served by APD, many of whom are unable to communicate their wants and needs. The setting in which Petitioner committed these workplace violations mirrors those in which clients of APD are served. Ms. Richards did state that APD considered the exemption granted by DCF to Petitioner, however, the weight of the prior disciplinary issues outweighed that decision when compared to the possible jeopardy in which APD clients could be placed. Should Petitioner obtain future successful employment with DCF, APD would consider that in a subsequent exemption application review. Petitioner testified on her own behalf at the hearing. She spoke about the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense, reiterating her statement from the addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire. She provided no new information or surrounding details about the crime. Again, she stated that she has not had any legal issues since 1982. Regarding her non- disqualifying offenses, Petitioner remarked that she “didn’t consider those bad checks as crimes,” and though she denied being convicted of such, she admitted having overdrafted checks. Petitioner also stated that regarding the DCF investigations and the Injunction Violation/Contempt of Court charge, “that’s not why we are here today, so I am not going to talk about that.” Petitioner did admit to the driving infractions on her record, but stated that two of them, running red lights, were due to the fault of her daughter, as she was the driver at the time, rather than Petitioner. Petitioner stated that she is older and wiser and has changed. She enjoyed working at the adult day care program with the Arc of Alachua County. She indicated that any bad checks she has written, she “took care of.” Petitioner offered explanations for the disciplinary situations involving her prior employment with DCF, attempting to minimize her role. She explained that she and her husband, who Petitioner described as a vulnerable, disabled adult, no longer have domestic issues; however, they are currently homeless. Petitioner stated that APD’s denial is keeping her in an adverse financial situation, stating “I cannot find a job right now because of this denial.” When cross- examined by counsel regarding her ability to obtain gainful employment with DCF and its covered providers, Petitioner admitted that she can seek a job under DCF’s purview. Petitioner presented the testimony of two witnesses. Her sister, Sherry McCrae, a retired police officer, stated that she lived with her sister the entire time she was in college; Petitioner provided a source of support to her during this period. Ms. McCrae stated that her sister has been working all the years since the disqualifying incident. She affirmed that their maiden name is Williams, Petitioner’s last name at the time of the disqualifying incident. Petitioner’s second witness, Faye Williams, testified that after Petitioner’s disqualifying incident, she got a job and was active in the community. Petitioner has a desire “to be a part of something.” She loves people, especially children. Petitioner asserted that she enjoys working with individuals with disabilities; at her last place of employment, she believed she found her “purpose and mission.” She loves helping people. She admits she made some mistakes, but that was long ago. Petitioner argued that she “really only committed one crime”; she has rehabilitated herself and that should be enough for APD. She believes APD abused its discretion in denying her request for exemption. The individuals APD serves are vulnerable and highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, due to their developmental disabilities. APD’s representative observed that APD’s clients must be assigned to direct care providers without fear of their endangerment. This necessarily requires reliance on a caregiver’s good character and trustworthiness. Individuals who provide direct care are frequently responsible for assisting individuals in making decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. APD must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Ms. Richards cautioned that Petitioner’s criminal history reflects a pattern of poor judgment. Petitioner’s failure to disclose certain details in her account regarding her disqualifying offense calls into question her trustworthiness. Additionally, failure to disclose her non-disqualifying offenses, along with a failure to recognize that those offenses are truly crimes, is not only troubling, but calls into question Petitioner’s trustworthiness. It also demonstrates a complete lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her actions. Petitioner did not admit to any of the harm she caused to her victims. Petitioner’s minimization of the discipline she received while employed by DCF also gives great pause, as the individuals she was charged with caring for were clients in a forensic setting, a clear parallel to the clients she would serve should an exemption be granted by APD. Petitioner’s multiple driving citations are concerning as well, and demonstrate a pattern of questionable decision- making, especially when considering her for a position where she could potentially transport clients. All of the aforementioned factors, along with proximity in time of her application to her last arrest (2012), caused APD to question Petitioner’s fitness for providing services to the vulnerable individuals for which it is responsible, the most vulnerable population in the state. Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation, and therefore, the denial of the exemption was proper.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities issue a final order upholding the denial of Petitioner’s exemption request. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2017.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's life and health insurance license should be disciplined for the reasons set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed on June 15, 1989. That Complaint alleges that Respondent has violated certain provisions of the Florida Insurance Code. Specifically, Petitioner alleges Respondent has violated Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes as a result of a demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance, Section 626.611(14), Florida Statutes as a result of having been found guilty of, or having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to, a felony in this state which involves moral turpitude and/or Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes as a result of being guilty of, or having pleaded guilty, or nolo contendere to a felony in this state.
Findings Of Fact At all pertinent times, Respondent has been licensed by Petitioner as a life and health insurance agent. In October of 1987, Respondent was arrested and formally charged by the State Attorney of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit for the State of Florida with grand theft of over $20,000.00 and three counts of perjury in an official proceeding. The criminal charges against Respondent arose in connection with her relationship with an elderly woman who was stricken with cancer. The evidence provided only sketchy details of the circumstances that led to the criminal charges. From the evidence presented, it appears that Respondent befriended the woman a short time before she died. After the woman died, a controversy arose regarding certain transfers of property to Respondent and a will executed by the deceased woman naming Respondent as beneficiary. A civil law suit was filed contesting the will and the property transfers to Respondent. Ultimately, the will which left all of the elderly woman's property to Respondent was disallowed and certain transfers of property to Respondent were overturned. Criminal charges were initiated against Respondent by the prevailing heir. As part of a plea bargain arrangement, Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the charge of grand theft and the three perjury counts were dismissed. The Circuit Court for Broward County withheld adjudication on the grand theft count and placed Respondent on probation for ten years with a requirement that she make restitution to the victim, an heir of the estate. The restitution required as part of the criminal proceeding was intended to compensate the prevailing heir for attorney's fees incurred in connection with the civil action. While Respondent continues to deny any wrongdoing in her dealings with the deceased woman, she claims she had inadequate resources to fight the criminal matter further. In entering into the plea arrangement, Respondent anticipated that she would be able to continue in the insurance business. Her insurance business is the only source of income which Respondent can reasonably anticipate generating sufficient money to make the restitution payments. It is clear from the transcript of the sentencing proceeding that the circuit court judge withheld adjudication on the grand theft charge with the understanding that by doing so the Respondent would be able to continue to sell insurance. Respondent has been making the restitution payments required as part of her probation and she is dependent upon the continuation of her insurance business in order to make those payments in the future. As a result of the initiation of this proceeding against Respondent by Petitioner, Respondent has been cancelled by the various insurance companies for whom she used to write insurance. Thus, she has been effectively suspended from the insurance business since shortly after the initiation of this proceeding. No evidence was introduced that Respondent committed any other criminal offenses of any nature at any time, nor was any evidence produced of any other violations of the insurance code by Respondent since her initial licensure in 1981.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered suspending Respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure for six- months. DONE and ORDERED this 19 day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19 day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. Langford, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Barbara Helen Askea 2315 Northeast 5th Avenue Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 Tom Gallagher Department of Insurance and Treasurer State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
