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SYKES VIEW HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION AND GENE R. SMITH vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, F/K/A DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 94-002578 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida May 06, 1994 Number: 94-002578 Latest Update: Feb. 07, 1996

The Issue Whether petitioners were required to obtain consent or authorization from Respondent to occupy and use sovereign submerged lands for the dock at issue herein; Whether petitioners obtained agency consent or authorization to occupy and use sovereign submerged lands; Whether petitioners are entitled to consent or authorization to occupy and use sovereign submerged lands after-the-fact; and If entitled, what terms and conditions should apply or be imposed incident to granting after-the-fact authorization to occupy and use sovereign submerged lands.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Gene R. Smith is an individual who holds title to real property in Merritt island, Brevard County, Florida, described as Tract A Sykes View Estates. Gene R. Smith originally owned, in its entirety, the upland tract that was developed as Sykes View Estates, a small six-lot residential subdivision. Sykes View Association, or Sykes View Homeowners' Association is an unincorporated entity with certain rights in Tract A, described on the recorded subdivision plat, filed for record on 10/8/87: Tract "A" is dedicated to the homeowners association for river access. Maintenance of Tract "A" is the responsibility of the homeowners association. (Joint Exhibit 1) The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) was created by the Florida Legislature in 1993 with the merger of two previously separate state agencies, the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) and the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). All existing legal authorities of the two agencies and all of their actions, pending and completed, were transferred to the new agency in Chapter 93-43, Laws of Florida. The Project The dock at issue extends from Tract A into waters of the State of Florida, more specifically, sovereignty submerged land lying within a water body known as Sykes Creek, part of the Banana River Aquatic Preserve in Brevard County, Florida. Sykes Creek generally runs north and south approximately 4.25 miles, from State Road 520 on the south to State Road 528 (the Beeline) on the north. Along the western side of Sykes Creek are approximately a hundred canals and thousands of homes. Sykes View Estates is also on the west side of Sykes Creek, and is surrounded on three sides by Catalina Isles Subdivision. Although virtually all of the west side of Sykes Creek from the Beeline to 520 is dredged and bulkheaded, with a myriad of man-made finger canals to access upland properties, the waterfront at Sykes View Estates is not dredged, and in its natural condition the water attains a depth of four feet approximately 220 feet from shore. Unlike the intensely developed west side of Sykes Creek, the east side of the water body is undeveloped; Audubon Park, a state-run park with extensive marshes and lakes, occupies the area east of and across from Sykes View. There are no homes at all on the east side of the Sykes Creek channel. Directly across the open water channel of Sykes Creek from the Sykes View Estates tract is a man-made dredge berm or dike, on the east side of which is both open water and marsh. Since construction of the dock in issue, the dredge berm across from Sykes View Estates has been filled and made into a roadway. For the purposes of this proceeding, the easterly extent of the Sykes Creek water body has not been surveyed. Prior to its development, the Sykes View Estates parcel was used as a dump site, full of trash and debris. In the late 1980's, Gene Smith, with the assistance of Richard Hefley, a licensed general contractor who had recently moved to Florida from Minnesota, determined to create a "tropical paradise." The Process In 1987, the subdivision plat was recorded and some houses were constructed, including houses for Gene Smith and Richard Hefley. Shortly thereafter, Gene Smith became very ill and asked Richard Hefley to help obtain permits for the docks they planned. Hefley had never been involved in the construction of docks, but started at the Brevard County building department for information about the process. He was told that the building department had no jurisdiction over open water but someone referred him to the Army Corps of Engineers, (ACOE), across the street. Hefley met with Irene Sadowski, staff person with ACOE; she gave him a copy of an instructional booklet titled, "State of Florida, Joint Application for permit" for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and Florida Department of Natural Resources. He studied the booklet and retained Fredlund and Packard, a survey and engineering firm, to work on the application. An initial application was prepared in March of 1988. Richard Hefley took it to Irene Sadowski to look over and consulted with Wilbert Holiday from DNR about the water depth requirements; he then went back to the engineers with preparation of an application package for formal submittal. The first application submitted to DER is dated 5/10/89 and is signed by Richard Hefley, who is also listed as the applicant. The survey and engineer's drawings attached to the application show three docks, one each on lots 3, 4, and Tract A. The intent was to have a dock on Tract A for use by the subdivision homeowners and two private docks for the riparian lot owners, including Gene Smith. The application stated that ownership of all of the subdivision was by Gene Smith, except for lot 2, owned by Richard Hefley. The application is date-stamped received by DNR on June 20, 1989; and by DER on June 14, 1989. After the initial application submittal, DER required that Hefley segregate the three proposed docks into three separate applications and resubmit them. The application for the dock on Tract A, which is the subject of this proceeding, is dated June 30, 1989, and is signed by both Richard Hefley and Gene Smith. The applicant is shown as "Sykes View Association." The application is date-stamped received by DNR on August 16, 1989; by DER on July 17 and August 15, 1989; and by ACOE on July 6, 1989. processing of the applications for the two other proposed docks was suspended after the present dispute arose. After resubmitting the joint application, Richard Hefley paid a visit to the DER district office in Orlando, in early August, and met with staff person Barbara Bess. She agreed to see him without an appointment because she perceived he was confused about the process. She also considered the applications he submitted "a bit confusing" and she wanted to make sure that the agency would not need to go through several reviews before his files could be considered complete. In Ms. Bess' view, the application at that time was substantially complete, and she noted this in a handwritten memorandum to the file. DER permit #05-168716-4 for the dock in dispute was issued on October 27, 1989. The permittee is listed as Sykes View Association, and the permit provides that the permittee is authorized "to construct a private multi-dwelling dock 220 feet long by 5 feet wide terminating in a 25 foot T on Sykes Creek in Section 24, Township 24 South, Range 35 East." (Petitioner's exhibit #6) The permit, the application form, and the instruction booklet described in paragraph 10 above, each includes clear statements that all necessary state, federal and local permits must be obtained prior to commencing construction. Gene Smith and Richard Hefley were aware of those provisions. On the joint application, below the signature line with Hefley's signature is this printed statement: NOTICE TO PERMIT APPLICANTS This is a Joint Application; it is NOT a Joint Permit You Must Obtain All Required Local, State and Federal Authorizations or Permits Before Commencing Work (emphasis, underlining, bold, and extra spacing in original, Joint Exhibit 2, page 4) It is apparent that Richard Hefley knew that other agencies' permits and a consent from DNR were required. However, he was also relying on the instructional booklet that he had been given and had studied carefully. The booklet describes a procedure for processing applications and provides that DER will forward the application to the ACOE and DNR. The booklet describes the review by the ACOE, DER and DNR. The booklet also states: Where the proposed activity involves the use of state-owned submerged lands, DER shall not issue a permit before approval or consent of use is obtained from DNR, although DER will continue to process the application to the extent possible. The processing flow chart on page 29 of the booklet states: No time constraints on actions taken by [DNR, Bureau of Lands]. Application submitted to DER is not complete until action by [DNR, Bureau of Lands] is taken, if required. (Petitioners' exhibit #1) Understandably (and consistent with the typical applicant confusion acknowledged by Barbara Bess) Richard Hefley and Gene Smith were elated with their permit. A condition on the DER permit requires the applicant to notify the agency when it is ready to commence construction. Richard Hefley called Barbara Bess and asked if everything was done. He understood her to say "yes", and he said that he was notifying her that they were ready to commence and would get a contractor. He followed his telephone call with a written confirmation dated November 19, 1989. Hefley and Gene Smith retained Darrell's Docks, a qualified builder in Brevard County, and construction commenced on November 27, 1989. By Friday of that week the project was virtually complete. The pilings, stringers, cross- bracing and part of the decking were in place by Friday afternoon when Richard Hefley was notified that he needed to call DNR. He tried to reach Wilbert Holiday, but spoke instead to Todd Vandenberg who said that he needed to speak with Mr. Holiday, who had already left the office. The deck was finished the following day, a Saturday. When Richard Hefley reached Wilbert Holiday he was told there was a problem since the paperwork for the consent for use was not complete. Hefley met with Holiday in the local DNR office on December 5, 1989 and a lengthy process of exchange of questions and information commenced. This process continued for several months in 1990 and culminated in October 1990 with the notice of denial which triggered the request for formal hearing and the instant proceeding. The Controversy If the applicant was confused about the process, the agency reviewers were also confused about the application. The references to the Sykes View Homeowners Association on the joint applications made the ownership and the use intended unclear. During the permit review process and at the hearing these issues were partially resolved as reflected in these findings of fact. At all times relevant, Gene Smith was the record owner of Tract A, the upland parcel upon which the dock is sited. Smith's intent was that the dock would be used by the six homeowners in the small subdivision, for fishing and boating. While the initial plan was for four boat slips, Mr. Smith, at some stage of the review, agreed to reduce the number of slips to two. At all times relevant and throughout the application and review process, Richard Hefley was acting on behalf of Richard Smith, with his express authority. Neighbors enjoy the use of the dock, but there is no evidence of any maintenance by the homeowners' association. The dock, as designed and built, is approximately 220 feet long and five feet wide, with a 25 foot "T" cross at the end. It extends from the upland tract across approximately 29 percent of the width of Sykes Creek. It does not extend into the dredged channel and does not, therefore, interfere with navigation in that channel. The width of Sykes Creek at the dock site is approximately 750 feet, according to crude measurements with a U.S. Geological Survey map and a ruler. In an attachment to one of the application submittals, Petitioners' engineers reflect a width of 750 feet. During the course of its review and before the denial notice, DNR staff recommended that the dock be completely restructured to decrease the width of the walkway to four feet, shorten the length from shore to 150 feet, raise the height of the walkway to five feet above water, space the planks no closer than 1/2 inch, install guard rails and post "no mooring" signs. At any length less than presently existing, boat access is precluded, as the water is too shallow. Power boats would prop dredge the sandy bottom in the shallow water. Turbidity can affect sea grasses as distant as 100 feet from the boat. The modifications recommended by DNR staff would permit some fishing but no boating rights to the riparian owner. In the view of DNR's reviewing staff, boating at this site is inappropriate. The dock as built has received other permits and approvals in addition to the DER permit. The DNR shellfish environmental assessment section stated no objections, since the area is not a shellfish harvest area. The federal Environmental Protection Agency provided a letter stating no objection. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service conducted a review and issued a report and recommendation for approval of the dock. The ACOE issued an after-the-fact permit on July 2, 1992. The DNR consent or approval that is the subject of this proceeding requires a different review, since the Division of State Lands serves a proprietary function on behalf of the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. No agency, including DER, had or claimed to have the authority to waive the requirements for consent of use for state-owned submerged lands. There is no credible evidence that the owner, Gene Smith, or anyone acting in his behalf deliberately acted to frustrate DNR review and approval process.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered, granting a consent of use to Gene Smith, or his successors, for the dock facility described in DER permit no. 05-168716-4, with these conditions: that he shall comply with all terms, conditions or restrictions of any other governmental authorities having jurisdiction over the project; b. that he assume full responsibility for future maintenance of the dock; that no more than two boat slips be maintained; that those slips be confined to the terminal end of the dock; and that guardrails along the main walkway be constructed to limit boat access to the dock except at the terminal end. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY W. CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX APPENDIX The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioners' Proposed Findings 1. Adopted in Paragraphs 1 and 4. 2-6. Adopted in paragraph 5. 7-8. Adopted in Paragraph 6. 9-13. Adopted in substance in Paragraphs 7-9. 14. Adopted in Paragraph 10. 15. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 11. 16-17. Adopted in substance in Paragraphs 12 and 13. 18. Adopted in Paragraph 14. 19. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 17. 20. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 15. 21-23. Adopted in substance in Paragraphs 19 and 20. 24. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 21. 25-32. Adopted in summary in Paragraphs 22 and 30, otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 33-36. Adopted in Paragraph 28. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted in Paragraph 3. 2 & 3. Adopted in Paragraphs 1 and 2. 4-6. Adopted in Paragraph 4. Adopted by implication in Paragraph 29. Adopted in Paragraphs 1 and 2. 9 & 10. Adopted in Paragraph 13. However, Smith and Hefley were also applicants. See Paragraphs 12 and 24. 11 & 12.Adopted in Paragraph 5. 13. Adopted in Paragraph 9. 14 & 15.Adopted in Paragraph 10. Adopted in Paragraphs 12 and 16. Adopted in Paragraph 13. Rejected as unsupported by competent evidence. It is clear that after the DER permit was received and the dock was built, Hefley received notice from DNR, but the record does not establish that the letter, however dated, was received in September or October 1989. Adopted in Paragraph 15. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 20. 21-22. Adopted in Paragraph 16. 23. Adopted by implication in Paragraph 29. 24-27. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Adopted in Paragraph 28. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as summary of testimony. Adopted in Paragraph 29. Adopted in Paragraph 26. Adopted by implication in Paragraph 25. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence, except for the finding that boats have been docked at the site, which is accepted. Adopted in Paragraph 27. Adopted in substance in Paragraph 24. Adopted in Paragraph 25. Adopted in Paragraph 27. Rejected a contrary to the weight of evidence, which evidence establishes that the water is four (4) feet deep at the terminal end of the dock. Rejected as unnecessary, except that in this instance, Smith is an individual owner seeking consent for a single-family dock. See Conclusion of Law, Paragraph 36. COPIES FURNISHED: Allen C. D. Scott, II 120 Commercial Avenue Federal Point, Florida 32131 M. B. Adelson, IV Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (3) 120.57258.42258.43 Florida Administrative Code (2) 18-20.00318-20.004
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ALBERT AND EVELYN OLTMAN, LEONARD AND PAULINE MCNUTT, AND RONALD HURLEY vs. D. S. I. FORMS, INC., AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 85-000622 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000622 Latest Update: Jul. 26, 1985

Findings Of Fact D.S.I. Forms, Inc. is a for-profit corporation with facilities in Palatka, Florida. It is the owner of a river- front house known as the "DSI Lodge," which is the location of the boat dock at issue here. The DSI Lodge has an existing boat dock similar to those of other waterfront homes in the area along this section of St. Johns River, which is a Class III Florida Water.1 The area is predominantly single family residential, but is not so restricted by zoning ordinance. The DSI Lodge is used as a weekend and holiday retreat by the owner of D.S.I. Forms, Inc., who resides in Atlanta, Georgia, and by his business and personal guests. Although the DSI Lodge has a business character, there is no charge to guests for using lodge or dock facilities. The proposed DSI dock extension would add a two-boat covered slip measuring 20 by 22 feet to the end of the existing dock. Since DSI only seeks mooring facilities for one additional boat,2 it has agreed with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to remove its inside boat slip. Although DNR was not a party to this proceeding, the Applicant's stated intent to remove a portion of the existing dock should be reflected in any permit issued by DER. The existing dock is approximately 700 square feet in surface area. With the application as now framed, the total surface area would exceed 1,100 square feet. However, with removal of the inside slip, the proposed dock area would apparently increase to less than 1,000 square feet, and thus may be exempt from DER permitting altogether.3 Petitioners presented a series of grievances concerning use of the DSI Lodge by inconsiderate guests. These complaints included discharging a rifle and fireworks, high speed operation of power boats adjacent to the river's edge (bulkhead) and congestion of boating activity resulting from numerous guests using the DSI facilities during holiday periods. The careless or congested boating activity may affect the quality of life for DSI Lodge neighbors and endanger wildlife such as manatee which sometimes inhabit these waters. However, it was not shown that the proposed dock extension would affect these environmental considerations since D.S.I. Forms, Inc. already owns and operates the boat which would be accommodated by the additional slip (see footnote 2 above). Further, the testimony of the DER field representative established that the presence of the extended dock, as well as its construction, would not degrade water quality.

Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a final order issuing the proposed permit to D.S.I. Forms, Inc. with an added condition requiring removal of the existing inside boat-slip. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1985.

Florida Laws (1) 267.061
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VERNON E. BENTON vs. JOHN E. MAINE AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, 84-001286 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-001286 Latest Update: Aug. 23, 1984

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Benton and Respondent Maine own adjacent tracts on a dead- end, but navigable, oxbow of the Kissimmee River. The Bentons are weekend and vacation residents, and Maine operates a commercial RV-trailer campsite. To accommodate the needs of his guests for boat launching and landing facilities, Maine constructed a 60 foot pier into the river fronting his property in July, 1982. However, he had not obtained any permits for this construction, and later removed 18 feet of the pier at the direction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. He has applied to DER to obtain after the fact approval of the existing 42 foot pier. He also seeks to extend this pier to 52 feet and to add a 12 foot side dock at the end of the extension. DER has studied the site and reviewed the proposed additional construction. There was no evidence to indicate that the existing pier or the proposed extension would harm the environment or create a navigational hazard. However, the extended pier would occupy fully half of this waterway, which is about 100 feet wide in this area. Petitioner objects to the proposed pier extension on esthetic grounds. Although the pier is constructed at a 90 degree angle to Maine's shoreline, it crosses directly in front of the Benton property. This situation results from the layout of the Benton and Maine tracts which intersect the river at approximately 45 degree angles. An imaginary extension of the Benton and Maine property lines into the river would place much of the existing pier and all of the proposed addition within the Benton extension. The proposed side dock would point toward the Benton property and further aggravate this intrusion. Since the location of the pier is close to the Benton-Maine property line, the proposed side dock's placement would require boats to be launched and landed directly across the Benton waterfront. The Benton property derives its principal value from its waterfront character. Therefore, the degradation of view caused by the pier extension along with the additional boat traffic near the side dock would adversely affect Petitioner's enjoyment of his property.

Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a permit to John E. Maine approving his existing 42 foot pier in the Kissimmee River, subject to compliance with Section 253.77, Florida Statutes (1983). It is further RECOMMENDED that the application of John E. Maine insofar as he seeks to lengthen the existing pier be denied; but, that application for a side dock extension, if redesigned as stated herein, be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon E. Benton 1280 North West 127 Street North Miami, Florida 33167 Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire and Astrid L. Wistedt, Legal Intern Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John E. Maine Route 1, Box 508 Lorida, Florida 33857 Bert J. Harris, III, Esquire Post Office Box 548 Lake Placid, Florida 33852 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 253.77
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NORMANDY SHORES, LLC vs DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 08-000217 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jan. 11, 2008 Number: 08-000217 Latest Update: Apr. 29, 2009

The Issue The issue is whether ten applications filed by Petitioner, Normandy Shores, LLC, for an exemption from Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) requirements to construct and install ten docks to serve eighteen private boat slips and a letter of consent to use sovereign submerged lands in Indian Creek, within the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve (Preserve), Miami Beach, Florida, should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: Background The Department is the agency responsible for administering the provisions of Part IV, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes,2 regarding activities in surface waters of the State that may or may not require an ERP. Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3) authorizes the Department to approve exemptions from ERP requirements for the construction of certain docking facilities and boat ramps. In addition, the Department has authority from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund to review and take final agency action on Petitioner's requests for proprietary authorizations. Petitioner is a developer of residential and commercial properties. It owns waterfront land on the eastern side of Normandy Isle at 25-135 North Shore Drive, Miami Beach, Florida. Normandy Isle is surrounded by water, lies just west of Miami Beach, and is accessed by the John F. Kennedy Causeway (also known as 71st Street or State Road 934), which runs between the Cities of Miami and Miami Beach. Normandy Waterway runs in an east-west direction through the center of Normandy Isle, while Indian Creek appears to generally run in a northwest-southeast direction between Normandy Isle and Miami Beach. (Petitioner's property is on the northern half of the island.) Both of these waterbodies are in the northern portion of the Preserve, a Class III and Outstanding Florida Water. The Preserve is a body of water that stretches the length of Miami-Dade County, essentially from Broward County to Monroe County. The property adjoins Indian Creek to the east (the long side of the parcel) and Normandy Waterway to the south (the short side of the parcel) and is situated at the intersection of those two waterways. Petitioner is currently developing the property as Privata Townhomes (Privata), a luxury townhome community. Petitioner holds title to the property and a portion of submerged lands of Indian Creek and Normandy Waterway. The boundaries of the privately-owned submerged lands are accurately depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 12. The Privata development comprises a total of forty- three, single-family townhomes in seven buildings. Eighteen townhomes are being constructed as waterfront homes along Indian Creek (buildings 1, 2, and 3). Seven are being constructed as waterfront homes along Normandy Waterway (building 4), while the remaining eighteen townhomes (buildings 5, 6, and 7) are not situated on waterfront property. Each waterfront parcel is approximately eighteen linear feet wide and consists of both upland and private submerged lands. The private submerged lands facing Indian Creek run the entire length of the property and extend approximately ten feet from the shoreline. On October 1, 2007, Petitioner filed with the Department ten applications for an exemption and letter of consent to construct ten docks (docks 1 through 10) and eighteen boat slips. The proposed docks will be located on the shoreline extending into Indian Creek and the Preserve. Docks 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10 will serve two slips each, or a total of sixteen slips, while docks 3 and 7 will project outward from one single- family parcel each and will be wholly-owned by that respective single-family parcel owner. All of the docks will be spaced less than sixty-five feet from one another. According to Petitioner, the Department has already given Petitioner authorization to construct three docks for the units in Building 4 facing Normandy Waterway to the south, and they are not in issue here. The basis for that authorization, and the distinction between those docks and the ones in dispute here, are not of record. Each of the docks will be built using four pilings with forty square feet of decking. Therefore, each dock will be less than five hundred square feet of surface area over the surface waters. Associated with the docks are eighteen boat slips that will include an additional pile installed approximately thirty feet from the shoreline. The slips and docks are exclusively for the private use of, and will be owned by, the waterfront townhome owners. The eighteen non-water townhome parcel owners will not have any rights to submerged lands owned in fee simple by the purchasers of the waterfront townhomes or the right to use any slip or dock. This is confirmed by Article II, Section 1 of the Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements for Privata Town Homes at Miami Beach (Declaration of Covenants). There have been docks and vessel moorings at the project site for at least forty years. However, the docks do not qualify for automatic grandfathering because a grandfather structure application was never submitted to the Department, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.0081. After reviewing the applications, the Department issued its Notice of Intent on December 13, 2007, as later amended on September 13, 2008, denying all ten applications. Citing Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b), the Department asserted that "the proposed docks are part of a multi-family living complex and therefore must be a minimum of 65-ft. apart in order to qualify for the exemption." As to the letter of consent, the Department asserted that based upon the upland development at the site, the proposed docks constituted a private residential multi-family dock or pier, as defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.003(44). In addition, the Notice of Intent stated that the proposed docks fell within the definition of a "commercial/industrial dock," as defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.004(7), and therefore they required a lease (rather than a letter of consent) in accordance with Florida Administrative Code Rule 18- 18.006(3)(c). Thus, the Department takes the position that an ERP and a lease are required before the docks may be constructed. The parties have raised no issues regarding riparian rights. By an amendment to its Notice of Intent issued on September 13, 2008, the Department added as a reason for denying the letter of consent that the docks will cause unacceptable cumulative impacts on the Preserve within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.008. The Development Each townhome occupies three stories of vertical, independent space. No unit is situated over any other unit. Each townhome has a separate entrance through its own front door, and each has its own garage. The townhomes in each building share a single wall. Petitioner stated that this was done because if the units were constructed with a narrow space between them, it would create safety, fire, water moisture, and mold issues. However, there is no cross-access between the units, and there is no penetration (such as common plumbing, fire sprinklers, or electrical conduits) through the load-bearing walls. Even so, the units have various common structural elements such as bearings, bearing walls, columns or walls necessary to support the roof structure, and siding, finish, trim, exterior sheatings (coverings), and other exterior materials. There is a common area that runs the entire length of shoreline between the buildings and the water. Within the common area there is a seawall, sidewalk, pool, and grassy area that are accessible by any member of the Privata Homeowners' Association (Association). According to the Declaration of Covenants, the Association is responsible for painting the exteriors of the buildings, including the walls, doors, and windows; maintaining and repairing the docks and seawalls; and maintaining the common areas. Members who own docks will pay a higher fee to the Association than non-waterfront owners to offset the additional costs associated with maintaining and repairing the docks. Eighteen of the waterfront townhome parcels are currently under purchase and sale agreements. The boat slips were one of the main selling features of the waterfront townhomes. In fact, the sales are contingent on the docks being constructed, and Petitioner concedes that if the docks are not built, the buyers will not be required to close on their contracts. In its Privata marketing brochures, Petitioner refers to "private boat docks" and owners having "a private boat slip right in their own backyard" that is "[a]ble to accommodate vessels up to 40 feet." It is fair to infer from the evidence that the docks were used as a major inducement for customers to purchase the waterfront parcels. Exemption from an ERP Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b)4. provides in relevant part that no permit shall be required for (b) The construction of private docks of . . . 500 square feet or less of surface area over wetlands or other surface waters for docks which are located in Outstanding Florida Waters. . . . To qualify for this exemption, any such structure: * * * 4. Shall be the sole dock constructed pursuant to this exemption as measured along the shoreline for a minimum distance of 65 feet, unless the parcel of land or individual lot as platted is less than 65 feet in length along the shoreline, in which case there may be one exempt dock per parcel or lot. For the purposes of this paragraph, multi-family living complexes and other types of complexes or facilities associated with the proposed private dock shall be treated as one parcel of property regardless of the legal division of ownership or control of the associated property. . . . (Emphasis added) Under the rule, an applicant will not qualify for an exemption from permitting requirements if the upland structure of a project site is a multi-family complex or facility. In those cases, the owner of the project site is allowed to construct one dock per sixty-five feet of shoreline (assuming the size of the dock comports with the rule). The rule specifically provides that the legal division of ownership or control of the property is not relevant in making this determination. The underscored language in the rule is at the heart of this dispute. The parties sharply disagree over whether the Privata development consists of single-family units or whether it is a multi-family living complex. Although the term "multi- family living complexes and other types of complexes or facilities" is not further defined by the rule, the Department has consistently (with one exception cited below) interpreted this provision to include buildings with so-called "attached townhomes." Because the Privata townhomes share a wall with a neighbor, as well as other common facilities, the Department considers each building on the uplands to "house multiple families." Put another way, multiple families will live in each structure (building). On the other hand, if the units were detached and free-standing, even by a few inches, the Department agrees they would probably fall within the category of "individual, detached, single-family homes." The greater weight of evidence supports a finding that the upland project is a multi-family living complex. This is because the project has the attributes of a multi-family complex, such as units sharing a common wall, multiple families living in each building, and common areas accessible for each member of the project. While Petitioner points out that each townhome owner has fee simple title to his or her upland parcel and the ten feet of adjoining submerged lands, the rule specifically provides that the division of ownership and control of the property is immaterial to the ultimate determination of whether the property qualifies for an exemption. Given these considerations, it is found that the project does not meet the requirements for an exemption from ERP requirements under Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-4.051(3)(b)4.3 Letter of Consent A letter of consent is a form of authorization, but does not by itself determine whether a project is approvable or not.4 In order to qualify for a letter of consent, the docks would first have to be exempt from ERP requirements. As noted in finding of fact 20, they are not. The "18 series rules [in the Florida Administrative Code] are proprietary, essentially, real estate rules" that apply to the use of state owned, submerged lands. (Transcript, page 370). General guidance or "overarching" submerged lands rules are found in Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 18-21, while rules specific to the Preserve are found in Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 18-18. Both sets of rules apply here. The dispute over the letter of consent centers on whether the dock is a "private dock" or a "commercial/industrial dock," as those terms are defined by the rules. The former does not require a lease, while the latter does. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.006 (3)(c)("A commercial/industrial dock on sovereignty lands shall require a lease. Private docks to be constructed and operated on sovereignty lands shall not require a lease of those lands.") A private dock is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.004(18) as a dock located on or over submerged lands, which is used for private leisure purposes for a single family dwelling unit and does not produce income. On the other hand, a commercial/industrial dock is defined in subsection (7) of the same rule as a dock which is located on or over submerged lands and which is used to produce income, or which serves as an inducement to renting, purchasing, or using accompanying facilities including without limitation multi-family residential facilities. This term shall be construed to include any dock not a private dock. Therefore, a dock may constitute a commercial/ industrial dock if it is associated with a multi-family facility; if it is used as an inducement to rent, purchase, or use accompanying facilities; or if the dock does not constitute a private dock, which is used for a single-family upland facility. The more persuasive evidence here shows that the docks are associated with a multi-family facility; they are used as an inducement to purchase the units; and they are not used for a single-family upland facility. For any one of these reasons, then, the docks must be categorized as commercial/ industrial docks. Although the term "multi-family residential facilities" is not specifically defined in Chapter 18-18, another proprietary rule provides clarification of that term. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.003(44). That rule defines the term "private residential multi-family dock or pier" as a dock or pier on a common riparian parcel or area that is intended to be used for private recreational or leisure purposes by persons or groups of persons with real property interest in a multi-family residential dwelling such as a duplex, a condominium, or attached single-family residences or a residential development such as a residential or mobile home subdivision. (emphasis added) As noted earlier, both Chapters 18-18 and 18-21 should be read in conjunction with each other. When doing so, it is found that the proposed docks are associated with "attached single-family residences" (by virtue of sharing a common wall) and fall within the definition of a commercial/industrial dock. Therefore, they do not qualify for a letter of consent. Cumulative Impacts The waterbody in issue here is an Aquatic Preserve, that is, "an exceptional area of submerged lands and its associated waters set aside for being maintained essentially in its natural or existing condition." § 258.37(1), Fla. Stat. The Legislature intended for the submerged lands and associated waters to be maintained "in an essentially natural condition so that its biological and aesthetic values may endure for the enjoyment of future generations." § 258.397(1), Fla. Stat. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.001(1). "Essentially natural condition" is defined as "those conditions which support the continued existence or encourage the restoration of the diverse population of indigenous life forms and habitats to the extent they existed prior to the significant development adjacent to and within the preserve." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.004(10). In determining whether a letter of consent for new docks and piers in the Preserve should be approved, Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-18.008 requires that the Department consider the cumulative impacts of those projects. The burden rests on the applicant to provide reasonable assurances that the project will not cause adverse cumulative impacts upon the natural systems. In meeting this stringent test, the rule recognizes that "while a particular alteration of the preserve may constitute a minor change, the cumulative effect of numerous such changes often results in major impairments to the resources of the preserve." The rule goes on to identify five factors that the Department must consider as a part of its cumulative impact evaluation. In this case, the Department considered "the number and extent of similar human actions within the preserve which have previously affected or are likely to affect the preserve"; the "similar activities within the preserve which are currently under consideration by the Department"; and the "[d]irect and indirect effects upon the preserve which may reasonably be expected to result from the activity." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.008(1), (2), and (3). The fact that the Department discussed only the first three considerations, rather than all five, in its Amended Notice of Intent does not render its evaluation improper or incomplete, as suggested by Petitioner.5 If authorized, the project will allow eighteen boats to dock at Privata along Indian Creek. Although the marketing brochures indicate that boats up to forty feet in length will use the slips, the evidence at hearing indicates that they will be no more than twenty-five feet in length. The project adheres to best management practices. Also, the number of docks was limited by means of dock-sharing for eight of the ten docks. The docks are designed so that boats will be moored parallel to the shoreline rather than horizontal to the seawall; the docks will be over six feet above mean high water; and the docks will be constructed from materials designed to minimize environmental impacts. As noted above, the Preserve extends from Broward County to Monroe County. Within the Preserve, there are literally thousands of docks, including single docks, multifamily docks, and commercial and industrial marinas. Closer to the Privata project, there are docks, boat lifts, cranes, davits (small cranes used for boats, anchors, or cargo), and marinas located on both sides of Indian Creek. The development along Indian Creek and Normandy Waterway includes commercial, multifamily, and single-family docks. Due to heavy boat traffic and extensive development around Indian Creek, it is fair to say that the project is in a high turbidity area. Besides the applications here, there are "several" other applications now pending before the Department for docks, piers, and slips within the Preserve. Two in-water environmental resource surveys by the Department revealed that resources such as paddle grass, Johnson's grass (a threatened species), shoal grass, turtle grass, manatee grass, soft coral, sponge, oysters, and sea urchins are present in the immediate area. However, it is fair to infer that these marine resources have adapted to the existing conditions and are able to withstand the stress created by the heavy usage. The evidence is sharply in dispute over whether the project is reasonably expected to have direct or indirect adverse impacts on the natural systems of the Preserve. Petitioner contends that because a small number of docks and slips are being proposed, best management practices will be used in constructing the docks and slips, the area around Indian Creek is already heavily developed, and the natural resources in Indian Creek appear to have adapted to the stress created by the other activities, the effect on the Preserve's natural systems will be de minimus. There are literally thousands of similar activities and human actions that have already affected the Preserve and are reasonably expected to continue in the future. Other applications to engage in similar activities are now pending, and it is reasonable to assume that others will be filed. The natural resources in the immediate area are diverse, as described by the Department witnesses, including at least one threatened species. There will be direct and indirect impacts that are reasonably expected to occur from the docks and mooring areas such as increased shading and decreased water quality. When the impacts of the Privata project are viewed in isolation, they can be considered "a minor change." However, the cumulative effect of this and other changes can result in adverse impacts to the natural systems. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18- 18.008. The more credible evidence supports a finding that the proposed activities will cause direct and indirect adverse impacts on the Preserve's natural systems, so that the submerged lands and associated waters will not be maintained "essentially in [their] natural or existing condition." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-18.001(1). Therefore, in this respect, the requirement of the rule has not been met. Other Projects in the Preserve Petitioner points out that in June 2001, as later modified in April 2002, another project in the Preserve known as Aqua at Allison Island was given an exemption to construct fifteen single-family docks, nine of which were intended for private use and six to serve as shared structures for adjacent property owners. See Petitioner's Exhibits 28 and 29. The project site lies just south of Normandy Isle on Allison Island, which adjoins Indian Creek and involved a similar upland development of attached townhomes. While the Department concedes that this action occurred, no other project of this nature has ever been granted an exemption or letter of consent to construct docks and use state-owned submerged lands within the Preserve. The Department further explained that it "made an error" when it granted an exemption for the project at Aqua at Allison Island, and that with this single exception, it has consistently denied all similar applications.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order denying Petitioner's ten applications for an exemption from ERP requirements and a letter of consent to use sovereign submerged lands to construct ten docks and associated slips on Indian Creek in Miami Beach, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2009.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57258.37258.397403.813 Florida Administrative Code (7) 18-18.00118-18.00418-18.00618-18.00818-21.00318-21.008140E-4.051
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JOHN E. PHILLIPS, JR. vs OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, DIVISION OF SECURITIES AND INVESTOR PROTECTION, 94-006481F (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Nov. 18, 1994 Number: 94-006481F Latest Update: Mar. 16, 1995

The Issue The issue is whether petitioner is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background This case involves a claim by petitioner, John E. Phillips, Jr., that he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs because of an administrative action improvidently brought against him by respondent, Department of Banking and Finance (DBF). When the complaint was filed, Phillips was registered with DBF as an associated person with Aragon Financial Services, Inc. DBF contends the claim is without merit because Phillips is not a small business party within the meaning of the law, there is substantial justification to support the agency's decision to file a complaint, and special circumstances are present which would make an award of fees and costs unjust. The action which underlies this claim involved an administrative complaint filed against Phillips on February 4, 1994, charging him with violating various provisions within Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. That complaint was assigned Case No. 94-1266. The complaint also denied an application by Phillips to register as an associated person with a new firm. In addition, the complaint named Bruce M. Walker as a co-respondent, and as to that registrant, the complaint was assigned Case No. 94-1358. Both cases were consolidated for hearing and, after an evidentiary hearing was conducted on June 27, 1994, a Recommended Order was issued on September 13, 1994, recommending that all charges against Phillips be dismissed and that his application for registration be approved. The Recommended Order was adopted by DBF without change, and Phillips is accordingly deemed to be a prevailing party in that action. Phillips has requested fees and costs in the amount of $15,000.00, the maximum allowed by law. Respondent does not contest the reasonableness of that amount. Prima Facie Requirements for an Award of Fees and Costs In order to show entitlement to an award of fees and costs, petitioner must demonstrate that he is a "prevailing small business party" within the meaning of the law. Since he has filed the petition on his own behalf, he must show he is a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice, whose principal office is in this state, who is domiciled in this state, and whose business or professional practice has, at the time the action is initiated by the state agency, not more than 25 full-time employees or a net worth of not more than $2 million. At the time the administrative complaint was filed, Phillips was domiciled in Pensacola, Florida, and had a net worth of less than $2 million. According to an uncontroverted allegation in his petition, Phillips had no "employees relating to business that formed the basis for the Agency's charges." Petitioner was also a 50 percent shareholder in a subchapter S corporation known as Phillips, Walker & Associates, Inc. (PWA), a Pensacola firm engaged in the sale of insurance products. Although Phillips was registered with DBF as an associated person with Aragon Financial Services, Inc., that firm was not the subject of the complaint nor is it otherwise relevant to this dispute. Petitioner's principal source of income was through the sale of insurance products sold through PWA although he occasionally sold a few securities during that same period of time. The administrative complaint was not filed against PWA, which held no licenses from the state, but rather was filed against the registration of Phillips as an individual. Although he was an officer, employee and shareholder of PWA, Phillips was not a sole proprietor of an unincorporated business, including a professional practice. Therefore, he does not qualify as a small business party. Was There Substantial Justification? The consumer complaint which eventually led to the filing of the charges in Case No. 94-1266 was made by Jane Hubbard, a Gulf Breeze realtor who had loaned a substantial amount of money ($50,000.00) to PWA in May 1988 and was never repaid. The loan was secured by a promissory note personally signed by Phillips and Walker, as the owners of the corporation. After PWA ceased doing business in May 1990, and both Phillips and Walker had filed for bankruptcy, Hubbard, or her attorney, contacted DBF in an effort to seek DBF's aid in collecting her money from Phillips and Walker. Since petitioner was registered with DBF as an associated person, and thus was subject to DBF's regulatory jurisdiction, Hubbard apparently assumed that Phillips may have violated the law in some respect, and the agency might be able to assist her in recovering all or a part of her money. A similar complaint filed with the Department of Insurance was not pursued by that agency. Hubbard's complaint was eventually referred to a DBF financial examiner, Robert R. Kynoch, who, among other things, interviewed Phillips, Walker, Hubbard, and three other persons who had made loans to Walker (but not Phillips). Although Kynoch did not place the persons interviewed under oath during the investigative stage, there was no requirement that he do so. Based on a representation by Hubbard that Phillips and Walker had failed to disclose to her all relevant information regarding PWA's financial status at the time the loan was made, Kynoch concluded that a reasonable basis existed to bring charges against the two if the loan was actually an investment, and thus subject to DBF's jurisdiction under Chapter 517, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, Kynoch prepared a written investigative report, received in evidence as respondent's exhibit 3, which recommended that the report "be further reviewed for appropriate disposition." The report was first reviewed by Michael D. Blaker, a DBF area financial manager, who approved the recommendation and forwarded it to his supervisor, Richard White. It was then reviewed and approved by a bureau chief, William Reilly, and finally by the division director, Don Saxon. After Saxon signed off on the report, it was sent to the general counsel's office for a legal determination as to whether the loan was an investment. Margaret S. Karniewicz, an assistant general counsel, concluded that it was, and recommended the issuance of an administrative complaint. After an evidentiary hearing was conducted, a determination was made that the loan constituted an investment. This determination in the Recommended and Final Orders was not contested by any party, including Phillips. There was, however, insufficient evidence to establish that misrepresentations were made by Phillips during the sale of the investment. For this reason, the charges against Phillips were dismissed and his application for registration with a new firm was approved. Because DBF had statements, which it assessed to be credible, from a complaining witness (Hubbard) that misrepresentations or material omissions were made by Phillips and Walker during the transaction, and DBF properly construed the transaction as an investment, it had a reasonable basis in fact and law to file the complaint. Since there was no showing that the agency's credibility assessment was unreasonable, DBF was substantially justified in bringing the charges in Case No. 94-1266. Special Circumstances There was no evidence presented by respondent to show that special circumstances exist that would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.6857.111
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SHERRI CRILLY vs JULIA FONDRIEST AND STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 20-002474 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida May 26, 2020 Number: 20-002474 Latest Update: Jan. 23, 2025

The Issue The issue in these consolidated proceedings is whether the proposed single-family residential dock meets the requirements for a letter of consent for use of sovereignty submerged lands pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapters 18-20 and 18-21, such that the Consolidated Regulatory Exemption and Letter of Consent for Department of Environmental Protection File No. 0319584-003EE, as amended on September 30, 2020, should be granted.

Findings Of Fact The Parties DEP is the state agency charged with regulating specified activities in state jurisdictional surface waters, pursuant to chapter 373, part IV, Florida Statutes. Additionally, DEP is charged with performing all staff duties and functions for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Trustees" or "Board") related to the administration of state-owned lands pursuant to chapter 253, including sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves, pursuant to chapter 258. In this case, DEP is responsible for reviewing the application for the dock and issuing the Dock Approval that has been challenged in these proceedings. Fondriest owns the upland property riparian to the sovereignty submerged lands on which the Dock is proposed to be, at 1953 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida. She is the applicant for the Dock Approval that has been challenged in these proceedings. The Trust owns the upland property located at 1975 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, Florida. This property is located immediately adjacent to, and west of, Fondriest's property. DeMaria and Appel own the upland property located at 1997 Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key. This property is located two parcels west of Fondriest's property. Appel owns two other upland properties located on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. Crilly is the holder of a marine turtle permit issued by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission ("FFWCC"), and she volunteers as a sea turtle monitor for the Long Beach Drive area of Big Pine Key. History of the Dock Approval and Notice of Agency Action As stated above, on December 10, 2019, DEP issued a regulatory general permit and letter of consent to Fondriest, approving the 2019 Approval, which was then proposed as an 800-square-foot structure for use as a pier for non-motorized vessels. There was no evidence presented that Petitioners received a clear point of entry to challenge DEP's proposed agency action issued on December 10, 2019, either through receipt of written notice by mail, or constructively through publication of notice of the proposed agency action in a newspaper or other publication medium. The Trust filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on January 30, 2020; DeMaria filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on January 31, 2020; and Crilly filed a Verified Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing on February 27, 2020. On September 11, 2020, Fondriest filed a revised application with DEP, reducing the size of the Dock to 500 square feet; requesting a verification of exemption from permitting, pursuant to rule 62-330.015(5)(b) and section 403.813(1)(b)2; and requesting authorization, pursuant to chapters 253 and 258, and chapters 18-20 and 18-21, to use sovereignty submerged lands. On September 30, 2020, DEP issued Florida Department of Environmental Protection’s Notice of Proposed Changes to Agency Action—i.e., the "Dock Approval"— 2 Because the Dock will have less than 500 square feet of over-water surface area, it is exempt, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). from permitting under chapters 373 or 403. Petitioners have stipulated that the Dock qualifies for the permitting exemption under section 403.813(1)(b). verifying the regulatory exemption and authorizing the use of the sovereignty submerged lands by a letter of consent.3 DEP's agency action proposing to approve the Dock supersedes all prior DEP agency action with respect to the Dock, and constitutes the proposed agency action at issue in these proceedings. Long Beach Drive and the Surrounding Area Fondriest's property is located on Long Beach Drive, Big Pine Key, in Monroe County. Long Beach Drive is located on a spit of land comprising the southern and westernmost part of Big Pine Key. The south side of Long Beach Drive, where Fondriest's, the Trust's, and DeMaria's and Appel's properties are located, borders the Straits of Florida.4 Thus, Fondriest's, the Trust's, and DeMaria's and Appel's properties are riparian to sovereignty submerged lands underlying the Straits of Florida. The land along Long Beach Drive is platted and has been developed for residential and commercial uses. The Long Beach Drive area of Big Pine Key is located within the Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve ("CBAP"), an Outstanding Florida Water and aquatic preserve consisting of approximately 6,000 acres of bays, mangrove forests, seagrass beds, and offshore patch coral reefs. The Long Beach Drive area, including Fondriest's property, is characterized by a rocky shore, with some narrow sandy beaches. The shore accumulates a significant amount of weed wrack consisting of seaweed, seagrass, and other debris. A beach berm created by wave and tide action 3 The Dock Approval states that the Dock does not qualify for the federal State Programmatic General Permit for section 404 of the Clean Water Act and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. Separate federal approval for the Dock has been issued by the Army Corps of Engineers, and Monroe County has issued a Building–Floodplain–Development Permit for the Dock. 4 All references to the shore or shoreline along Long Beach Drive refer to the shore or shoreline abutting the Straits of Florida. exists along much of the shore. The berm is frequently overtopped by water during high tides and storms. The beach is disturbed due to frequent use by residents and sea turtle monitors. Among the activities that take place on the beach are kayak launching, beach walking, beach cleaning and restoration, vegetation planting, and sea turtle nest monitoring. Several docks already exist along the shore on Long Beach Drive. The longshore current along the shore at Long Beach Drive flows, and transports sand from, east to west. The existing mangroves, jetties, and points along the Long Beach Drive shoreline trap sand and cause accretion of updrift beaches and starvation of downdrift beaches. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the docks along the shoreline on Long Beach Drive do not significantly contribute to beach accretion, starvation, or erosion in the area. The Proposed Dock The Dock is a private residential single-family dock associated with Fondriest's single-family residence at 1953 Long Beach Drive. It will not be used for commercial purposes or residential habitation, and there are no boat houses, boat lifts, or other enclosures proposed or approved as part of the Dock. As approved, the Dock will occupy 498 square feet, consisting of a 142-foot-long by 3-foot-wide access dock and a 12-foot-long by 6-foot-wide (i.e., 72-square-foot) terminal platform, and extending a total length of 154 feet. The access dock will be constructed with pressure-treated lumber planks spaced half-an-inch apart, to allow light penetration. The supporting pilings are comprised of PVC-encased aluminum, spaced approximately 9 feet, 5 inches apart. The PVC casing will help protect the piles from corrosion, thus helping to protect water quality. The terminal platform, which also will be supported by PVC-encased aluminum pilings, will consist of fiberglass grating, which allows sunlight penetration in order to prevent shading of seagrasses and other benthic resources.5 The top of the terminal platform is designed to be a minimum height of five feet above the mean high water line ("MHWL"). Handrails will be constructed along each side of the dock for its entire length, to prevent vessel mooring in adjacent shallow areas, thus helping protect against damage to benthic resources. The Dock will be used solely for the water-dependent activities of launching vessels and swimming. Only non-motorized vessels, such as kayaks, canoes, and paddleboards, may be launched from the Dock, and then only when there is a minimum depth of 0.5 feet (six inches, or half-a-foot) of water at the terminal platform.6 Additionally, the terminal platform must include signs of at least one-square- foot each placed on each side of the platform, stating "no mooring of motorized vessels allowed." A ladder is proposed to be located on one side of the terminal platform to provide access to the water for swimming or kayak launching, and the Dock Approval imposes a requirement that the ladder cannot be located over seagrass or hard bottom benthic communities. Although some turbidity in the water column may be generated by launching kayaks or other non-motorized watercraft from the terminal platform, the turbidity would be temporary and would not exceed that currently generated by dragging or hauling a kayak or other vessel from the shore across the substrate, to access sufficient water depth for launching. To prevent potential trapping, under the Dock, of sea turtles and other animals, such as Key Deer, an enclosure consisting of barriers one inch apart must be constructed beneath the portion of the Dock's landward access ramp having less than three feet of clearance above grade. 5 This is a standard construction material frequently used for docks in Florida. As further discussed below, the benthic survey performed for the area comprising the footprint of the Dock showed that no seagrass beds or other significant benthic resources are present. 6 The 0.5-foot water depth is keyed to the mean low water datum. At mean high water, the water depth at the terminal platform is approximately 1.2 feet. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the rest of the Dock will be elevated approximately five feet above the MHWL, so will be of sufficient height to allow animals to pass under without being trapped or impeded, and will provide sufficient clearance for sea turtle monitors to pass under as they traverse the beach. The competent, credible evidence also shows that the Dock will not impede the flow of water. The design is such that there are no structures on, or beneath, the Dock that will act as dams to prevent, or otherwise affect, the flow of water under and around the Dock. The water depth at the end of the terminal dock is 0.5 feet at mean low water, and 1.2 feet at mean high water. The Dock does not extend out to a depth of four feet of water. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not interfere with navigation. The water depth between the shore and the end of the Dock's terminal platform is too shallow to accommodate motorized watercraft, and the Dock will be of sufficient height to enable persons using non-motorized watercraft to pass under it. The Dock will be constructed to meet the 2017 Southern Building Code, so will be able to resist 180-mile-per-hour, three-second wind gusts. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that in a storm, the decking and stringers on the Dock will be washed off the pilings and will not become windborne projectiles. The Dock pilings will be imbedded into the substrate to a minimum depth of five feet, using a vibration hammer, rather than drilling and punching the pilings into the substrate. Using a vibration hammer will generate less turbidity in the water column than using the drill-and-punch installation technique, and turbidity curtains must be erected and maintained around the construction footprint to control turbidity and protect water quality. Additionally, the pilings will be installed using a spud barge elevated above the substrate, which also will help reduce turbidity during construction. Any turbidity generated during construction will be temporary. Installing the dock pilings using a vibration hammer also will generate less noise than the drill-and-punch technique. The Jacksonville Office of the National Marine Fisheries Service has issued a biological opinion stating that the vibration hammer installation technique "may affect/is not likely to affect" certain species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. Additionally, because the Dock will be constructed in an open waterbody, the noise generated by piling installation is anticipated to be insignificant. Construction of the Dock may only be conducted outside of sea turtle nesting season, which runs from April 15 to October 31. Dock construction activities also must meet the requirements and standards established by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to protect manatees, sea turtle species, the Smalltooth Sawfish, and the Eastern Indigo Snake. The 2011 Standard Manatee Construction Conditions for In-Water Work require vessels to navigate at slow speeds; manatee awareness signs to be posted; and construction to stop if a manatee is spotted within 50 feet of the construction site. In any event, manatees are unlikely to be present in the vicinity of the Dock, due to the very shallow water. The sea turtle and Smalltooth Sawfish construction conditions require vessels to operate at idle speeds in the vicinity of the project; turbidity curtains to be erected and maintained; and construction to be stopped if individuals of these species are observed within 50 feet of the construction site. The Eastern Indigo Snake, an upland species, is unlikely to be present at the Dock construction site. To prevent harm to individuals of this species, the letter of consent requires that educational materials be distributed to the construction crew and educational signs be placed at the construction site. No permanent exterior lighting is authorized for the Dock. This will prevent the Dock from attracting sea turtles and other marine species that are drawn to light. No turning basins, access channels, or wave break devices are proposed to be constructed for or used by the Dock. Fondriest's property has approximately 100 linear feet of riparian shoreline. There are no other docks existing on the shoreline along Long Beach Drive for at least 65 linear feet in either direction. The Dock will be constructed perpendicular to the shoreline, and will be located in Fondriest's riparian area, set back more than 40 feet from each riparian line demarcating her riparian area. Thus, the Dock will be located well outside the 25-foot setback from each riparian line. Biological and Other Resources in the Vicinity of the Dock Much of the shoreline along Long Beach Drive below the MHWL, including that along Fondriest's property, consists of bare, hard rock. The water is extremely shallow, and the bare rock is exposed at low tide. Site assessments conducted in 2020 at the location and in the vicinity of the Dock, show that limestone caprock, loose rubble, and some deeper depressions in the rock exist in the footprint of the Dock. The substrate consists of hard, highly uneven rock, with pools of tannin-stained water. Water pooled in the rock depressions is heated at low tide and, due to rotting vegetation, is nutrient-rich. The dissolved oxygen levels are very low, rendering the pools incapable of supporting substantial marine life other than cyanobacteria and filamentous algae, both of which indicate poor water quality. Some algae species are attached to the limestone caprock in the footprint and immediate vicinity of the Dock. However, recent biological resource assessments show that no seagrass beds, corals, or other hard bottom communities exist in the footprint of the Dock. Thus, the competent, credible evidence shows that there are no aquatic resources of any significant value in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. A small seagrass bed is located near the terminal platform. The letter of consent requires avoidance of this seagrass bed during construction and use of the Dock. Additionally, as discussed above, turbidity curtains must be installed to prevent turbidity and siltation of this seagrass bed during construction. The evidence establishes that the area waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive generally supports a rich aquatic community. Fish and aquatic invertebrates inhabit the water in the vicinity, and numerous bird species use the area waterward of the MHWL, including that bordering Fondriest's property, as feeding and foraging habitat. However, no non-speculative evidence was presented to show that the construction, presence, and use of the Dock will result in adverse effects to this aquatic community, or to any plant or animal species in this aquatic community. Additionally, the competent, credible evidence shows that none of these resources exist in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock, and conditions have been imposed in the letter of consent to ensure that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect these resources. To the extent that the vibration hammer installation of the pilings will result in noise that may cause fish, birds, and other animals to leave the area, that effect will be temporary and will cease when piling installation is completed. Although some benthic or attached species, such as seahorses, may be unable to leave the area, so may be subjected to noise stress, no persuasive, non-speculative evidence was presented showing that these species inhabit the area in the vicinity of the Dock. Thus, any alleged harm to these species is speculative. Because the Dock may only be used for nonmotorized vessels such as kayaks and canoes, use of the Dock will not generate noise or otherwise adversely affect the aquatic habitat waterward of the MHWL along Long Beach Drive. The Key Deer is listed as an endangered species. Key Deer traverse and forage along the shore at Long Beach Drive. No credible evidence was presented showing that the Dock would adversely affect the ability of Key Deer to traverse and forage on the beach on, or adjacent to, Fondriest's property. As discussed above, the Dock will be elevated waterward of the MHWL to approximately five feet above grade. The evidence showed that this height is sufficient to allow Key Deer to pass underneath without being impeded or trapped. No credible evidence was presented showing that the three-foot wide access ramp would interfere with Key Deer foraging or traversing along the beach. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Loggerhead Sea Turtle and Green Sea Turtle, both of which are listed as endangered species, use the beach above the MHWL along Long Beach Drive, including the beach on Fondriest's property above the MHWL, for nesting. The FFWCC has determined, through its Florida Sea Turtle Nesting Beach Monitoring Program, that the shore along Long Beach Drive has a relatively low nesting density—i.e., within the lower 25% of nesting density values—for both of these sea turtle species. The evidence establishes that the Hawksbill Sea Turtle, Kemp's Ridley Sea Turtle, and Leatherback Sea Turtle do not use the beach along the Long Beach Drive shoreline for nesting. No competent, credible evidence was presented showing that significant sea turtle food sources are present in the footprint, or immediate vicinity, of the Dock. The competent, credible evidence does not show that the Dock will adversely affect the habitat value of the beach on Fondriest's property for sea turtle nesting, or that it will otherwise adversely affect nesting sea turtles and hatchlings. As previously discussed, an enclosure will be constructed under the access ramp to prevent nesting sea turtles and hatchlings from becoming trapped under the Dock. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not adversely affect other protected species, including the Lower Keys Marsh Rabbit, the Keys Rice Rat, or the Mole Skink—none of which inhabit or use the marine/beach habitat present along the shore at Long Beach Drive. To this point, no evidence was presented showing that these species are, or ever have been, present on the beach at Long Beach Drive. Thus, no evidence was presented showing that the Dock adversely affect these species. The Dock will be Located in a Resource Protection Area 3 Areas within aquatic preserves are classified as Resource Protection Area ("RPA") 1, 2, or 3, for purposes of imposing restrictions and conditions on the use of sovereignty submerged lands, to protect discrete areas having high quality and transitioning habitat. The RPA 1 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that have resources of the highest quality and condition. Areas classified as RPA 1 are characterized by the presence of corals, marine grassbeds, mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, threatened or endangered species habitat, colonial water bird nesting sites, and archaeological and historical sites. The RPA 3 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are characterized by the absence of any significant natural resource attributes. The RPA 2 classification applies to areas within an aquatic preserve that are in transition, either having declining RPA 1 resources, or new pioneering resources within an RPA 3. Recent biological resource assessments conducted at the location of, and in the immediate vicinity of, the Dock show that no mangrove swamps, salt marshes, oyster bars, archaeological or historical resources, or colonial water bird nesting sites are present. As discussed above, although sea turtles nest on the beach along Long Beach Drive, this area does not constitute significant sea turtle nesting habitat, and there is no significant food source for adult or juvenile sea turtles in the vicinity of the Dock. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be located in an RPA 1. The biological resource assessments also showed that no transitioning resources are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. The competent, credible evidence showed that current natural resource conditions at the site are the same as those that historically existed before Hurricane Irma struck the Long Beach Drive area in 2013. Thus, the evidence shows that the Dock will not be located in an RPA 2. Because there are no significant natural resource attributes or transitioning resources in the footprint and the immediate vicinity of the Dock, it is determined that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3.7 7 Some portions of the CBAP do contain seagrass beds, offshore coral patch reefs, and mangrove swamp communities, and provide habitat for protected species, including the Key Deer and colonial water birds, and, thus, merit an RPA 1 classification. By contrast, none of these habitats and conditions are present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. The definitions of RPA 1, 2, and 3 in rules 18-20.003(54), (55), and (56), respectively, refer to "areas within aquatic preserves" which contain specified resources types and quality. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(54) through (56)(emphasis added). Additionally, rule 18-20.004(1)(a) provides that in determining whether to approve or deny a request to conduct an activity in an aquatic preserve, the Trustees will evaluate each request on a "case-by-case basis." See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(a)(emphasis added). These rules make clear that determining whether an activity will be located in an RPA 1, 2, or 3 necessarily entails a site-specific resource assessment to determine the type and quality of habitat, and the conditions present, at that specific site. As discussed above, the site-specific biological assessments conducted show that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3, and Petitioners did not present any site- specific evidence to rebut that classification. Cumulative Impacts Analysis In determining whether an activity proposed in an aquatic preserve may be approved, an analysis must be performed to determine the projected cumulative impacts of the activity. This analysis focuses on determining the impact of the proposed activity, combined with that of similar existing activities and similar activities currently under consideration for approval. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18- 20.006. A cumulative impacts analysis performed by Fondriest's expert witness, Sandra Walters, showed that the Dock, in conjunction with similar existing docks and all other applications for docks that could be proposed for approval, will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the aquatic resources in the CBAP. Walters's cumulative impacts analysis took into account both the acreage and linear footage of parcels within the CBAP for which a dock similar to the one at issue in this proceeding could be approved for construction. In performing a cumulative impacts analysis using linear feet of shoreline, Walters calculated a total of 19,357 feet, or 22.6 miles, of shoreline in the CBAP. Of this linear footage, approximately 7,500 linear feet of shoreline along Long Beach Drive and approximately 1,200 linear feet of shoreline along the ocean side of the Cook's Island portion of the CBAP are developable, for purposes of having the potential to be developed for a minimum-sized single-family residential dock similar to that proposed in this case. Walters's estimate is conservative, in that it included, as developable linear shoreline footage, parcels that likely could not be developed due to rate of growth, conservation easement, or other land use or environmental restrictions. Walters's linear footage analysis showed that approximately 5.7% of the entire CBAP shoreline possibly could be developed for construction of a perpendicular dock. Assuming that each of these docks is four feet wide—which is a valid assumption, using the four-foot maximum access dock width permitted under the aquatic preserves rules—a total of .23% of the shoreline would be impacted if a perpendicular dock was developed on each eligible parcel. Walters opined, credibly and persuasively, that this impact to the resources in the CBAP would be de minimis. In performing a cumulative impacts analysis on an acreage basis, Walters calculated that if a minimum-size single-family residential dock were developed on each of the 68 total developable lots within the CBAP, a total area of approximately 34,000 square feet, or approximately .013% of the acreage in the CBAP, would experience impacts similar to those created by the Dock. Walter credibly and persuasively opined that this impact to the resources in the CBAP would be de minimis. Walters used a conservative approach—i.e., projecting a realistic "worst case" scenario—in performing the cumulative impacts analysis. Specifically, she considered all parcels for which a minimum-size single-family residential dock reasonably could be proposed for approval in the future, rather than limiting her consideration of cumulative impacts to only those currently proposed for approval by the listed agencies. Additionally, she included impacts of similar dock projects for parcels that likely would not qualify for dock approval due to development restrictions. Thus, the cumulative impacts that Walters projected in her analysis are likely greater than the actual cumulative impacts of similar dock projects that reasonably can be anticipated to be developed in the area in the future. Petitioners presented the testimony of Michael Czerwinski regarding the cumulative impacts analysis required under the aquatic preserves rule for approval of an activity in an aquatic preserve. Czerwinski's analysis projected the potential cumulative impacts if every parcel along Long Beach Drive were developed with a minimum-size single-family residential dock, including the parcels on which development restrictions have been imposed such that they would not be eligible to be developed for a single-family residential dock. Based on this assumption, Czerwinski opined that such "buildout" along Long Beach Drive would result in a "cascading" or "nibbling" effect on the resources in the CBAP, and that there would be adverse impacts on sea turtle nesting habitat. Additionally, based on the unsupported assumption of maximum "buildout" of a single-family residential dock on every parcel along Long Beach Drive, Czerwinski projected that the resources within the entire CBAP would be adversely affected as a result of the cumulative impacts from approval of the Dock. Czerwinski's cumulative impacts analysis did not take into account the numerous parcels in the CBAP, including several on Long Beach Drive, that are unable to be developed for single-family residential docks due to conservation easements and local land development restrictions. As such, his analysis considered impacts which could not reasonably be expected to result in the Long Beach Drive area from approval of the Dock. Additionally, based on the unreasonable assumption of maximum dock buildout on every parcel on Long Beach Drive, Czerwinski projected adverse impacts to the entire CBAP as a result of the Dock. This analysis again failed to take into account that numerous parcels within the boundaries of the CBAP that are not located in the Long Beach Drive area also are under development restrictions that will prevent the construction of docks on those parcels. Czerwinski's analysis did not comply with the provisions of rule 18-20.005(1) and (3), which expressly limit the consideration of impacts to only those likely to affect the preserve and which reasonably could be expected to result from the proposed activity. For these reasons, Czerwinski's testimony regarding cumulative impacts as a result of the Dock was not credible or persuasive. As discussed above, Monroe County has issued a permit authorizing the construction of the Dock. This evidences that the Dock is permissible under the Monroe County local comprehensive plan. Additionally, as discussed in detail below, the Dock is an allowable use that is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan ("Management Plan"). As previously discussed, the competent, credible evidence establishes that there are no significant biological resources in the footprint, or in the immediate vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the Dock will not cause the loss of beneficial biologic functions that would adversely impact the quality or utility of the CBAP. As previously discussed, the competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not cause the loss of the beneficial hydrologic functions, either in the immediate vicinity of the Dock, or in the CBAP. As discussed above, the Dock will be a minimum-size single-family residential dock that will not adversely affect the quantity or flow of water. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will not have adverse cumulative impacts on the CBAP. Consistency with the CBAP Management Plan The Management Plan expressly identifies single-family private residential docks as an allowable use within CBAP, and specifies the standards that such docks must meet. Specifically, a dock may not extent waterward of the MHWL more than 500 feet or 20% of the width of the waterbody; must be designed to ensure maximum light penetration; the terminal platform may not be more than 160 square feet in area; and the access dock may not be wider than four feet. As discussed above, the Dock will comply with these standards. The Management Plan also delineates "management areas" within the CBAP, and describes resources and allowable uses within the different management areas. The Management Plan states that final determinations of allowable uses within a particular management plan are made by agency staff on a case-by-case basis. The sovereignty submerged lands along Long Beach Drive, out to a distance of 500 feet from shore, are designated as "Management Area SF/1." The sovereignty submerged lands bordering Fondriest's property are included within the Management Area SF/1. The resources included in Management Area SF/1 generally include grass beds, fringing mangroves, coral banks, coral heads, and hardbottom communities. However, as discussed above, the site-specific biological resource assessment surveys conducted on the sovereignty submerged lands bordering Fondriest's property showed that none of these resources are present at, or in the vicinity of, the Dock site. Furthermore, private single-family residential docks are expressly identified as an allowable use in the Management Area SF/1. Long Beach Drive is not a pristine, undeveloped shoreline. There are residences and some commercial uses along Long Beach Drive, with accessory uses such as seawalls, revetments, and private docks. The Dock is consistent with these existing uses and with the aesthetics of the shoreline on Long Beach Drive. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the CBAP Management Plan.8 Petitioners' Interests and Timeliness of Crilly's Petition The Trust's Interests The Trust owns a parcel of real property located at 1975 Long Beach Drive, immediately adjacent to, and west of, Fondriest's property. Barry Roberts and Gloria Meredith are the trustees of the Trust. 8 Rule 18-20.004(7) states, in pertinent part: "[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by [DEP] to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve. The management plans for each aquatic preserve are available for guidance purposes only." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(7)(emphasis added). Thus, to the extent a rule provision in chapter 18-20 conflicts with an aquatic preserve management plan, the rule controls. See Decarion v. Martinez, 537 So.2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)(an agency must follow its own rules). Neither Roberts nor Meredith, in their individual capacity, is a petitioner in these proceedings. Meredith testified that she and Roberts purchased the property at 1975 Long Beach Drive because of its location and the natural resources in the area, including the tide pool habitat in the rock depressions along the shore, and the animals that forage along, and inhabit, the shore. Meredith testified that she and Roberts both have a keen personal interest in, and use and enjoy, the natural resources along the shore at Long Beach Drive. They engage in bird watching; nature photography; kayaking; and observing nature, including Key Deer, birds, nesting sea turtles, and fish and invertebrates inhabiting tide pools in the rock depressions along the shore. After Meredith and Roberts purchased the property, they placed it in the Trust in order to preserve it, and its value as a residential property, for their children and grandchildren to enjoy in the future. Meredith and Roberts, as trustees of the Trust, have significant concerns about the aesthetic impact the Dock will have on the Trust property, particularly its impact on the view of the beach and the sunrise over the water. Meredith expressed her personal concern regarding the Dock's impacts on the biological resources at, and in the vicinity of, the Dock, and she also expressed concern that the Dock would interfere with her ability to safely walk along the shoreline. She testified that she was concerned that approval of the Dock would constitute a precedent, resulting in the construction of more docks and piers which would adversely affect the natural resources and the beauty of the beach. Meredith conceded that the Dock will be located within Fondriest's riparian area, will be set back more than 25 feet from the common riparian line, and will not cross the common riparian line into the Trust's riparian area. DeMaria's and Appel's Interests DeMaria is an original Petitioner in Case No. 20-2474, which is part of these consolidated proceedings, and Appel has moved to intervene and become a party to that case. DeMaria and Appel own the Deer Run eco-lodge bed and breakfast ("Deer Run") located at 1997 Long Beach Drive, immediately west of the property owned by the Trust. The Deer Run property is not located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. Appel owns two other parcels on Long Beach Drive, neither of which is located immediately adjacent to Fondriest's property. DeMaria testified that she and Appel purchased the Deer Run property because they were attracted to the unspoiled natural environment along Long Beach Drive. Deer Run attracts guests from around the world, who are drawn to the natural environment. These guests engage in nature photography and in-water recreational activities, such as kayaking, paddle boarding, and windsurfing; and they use and enjoy the natural resources and aesthetics of the area. DeMaria and Appel both testified that the presence of a long dock in close proximity to Deer Run would interfere with the view of the water and sunrise from Deer Run, and would significantly detract from the natural beauty and aesthetics of the environment at, and in the immediate vicinity of, Deer Run. Both testified that the presence of the Dock would render Deer Run a less attractive destination for guests. DeMaria testified that the presence of the Dock would interfere with her personal view of the water and the sunrise over the water; her ability to walk along shoreline below the MHWL; and her personal use and enjoyment of the natural beauty and aesthetics of the area. DeMaria also volunteers as a sea turtle nest monitor under the authority of Crilly's marine turtle permit. She expressed concerns similar to those expressed by Crilly—specifically, that the existence of the Dock would interfere with her ability to safely traverse the shoreline below the MHWL on Long Beach Drive to perform her sea turtle monitoring activities. Appel echoed DeMaria's concerns regarding the alleged injury to Deer Run's ecotourism business as a result of the Dock. He also testified that the presence of the Dock on Fondriest's property would injure his personal use and enjoyment of the natural beauty and aesthetics of the Long Beach Drive area. Appel also serves as a volunteer sea turtle monitor, and, in connection with that activity, traverses the shoreline along Long Beach Drive. He testified that the presence of the Dock would interfere with his ability to safely traverse the shoreline below the MHWL to conduct sea turtle monitoring activities. Appel also testified regarding the potential for the Dock to be damaged in storms, resulting in flying and floating debris that may damage his properties and the natural resources in the area. Crilly's Interests and Timeliness of Petition Crilly is the holder of a marine turtle permit issued by FFWCC, authorizing her to monitor sea turtle nesting along the beach at Long Beach Drive. Other volunteer sea turtle nest monitors work with Crilly under the authority of her permit. Crilly and her team of sea turtle monitors walk the beach daily during sea turtle nesting season. Crilly's responsibilities under the marine turtle permit include monitoring sea turtle nesting and false crawls; collecting data on the number of hatchlings that emerge from each sea turtle nest; and collecting data on sea turtle nesting mortality. The data are provided to the FFWCC for use in sea turtle research. Crilly testified that the Dock will impede her ability and that of her team to safely traverse along the shore below the MHWL to perform the sea turtle monitoring duties authorized under her permit. Specifically, Crilly testified that because the property above the MHWL is private, she must walk along the shoreline below the MHWL. The rock is slippery with numerous depressions, and traversing under the Dock would be treacherous. She testified that "I personally would not crawl under a dock and, therefore, I would not ask any of my volunteers on my team to crawl under a dock." According to Crilly, if she and her sea turtle nest monitoring team are unable to traverse the shoreline where the Dock will be located, they will be required to retrace their steps to the roadway on Long Beach Drive, walk down the road to a public access point, walk down to the beach, and walk back to the Dock, significantly increasing the time and effort to conduct their sea turtle monitoring activities. Crilly testified that she "learned of" DEP's approval of the Dock on December 30, 2019. No evidence was presented regarding whether, or how, Crilly received notice of the 2019 Approval sufficient to provide a clear point of entry for purposes of commencing the time for her to challenge that proposed agency action. Crilly filed her Petition challenging the 2019 Approval on February 27, 2020. When DEP issued the Dock Approval on September 30, 2020, superseding the 2019 Approval, Crilly already had filed her Petition at DEP, and the Petition had been referred to DOAH. IX. Findings of Ultimate Fact Regarding Compliance with Applicable Rules The term "dock" is defined in chapters 18-20 and 18-21. Chapter 18-20, applicable to aquatic preserves, defines a dock as "a fixed or floating structure, including moorings, used for the purpose of berthing buoyant vessels either temporarily or indefinitely." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(19). Chapter 18-21, which generally governs approvals to use sovereignty submerged lands, defines a dock as "a fixed or floating structure, including access walkways, terminal platforms, catwalks, mooring pilings, lifts, davits and other associated water-dependent structures, used for mooring and accessing vessels." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.003(22). The Dock meets the definition of "dock" in both rules.9 As discussed above, the Dock Approval limits mooring to non-motorized vessels, and Fondriest, a riparian owner, will use the Dock to access the water for the water-dependent activities of kayaking, paddle-boarding, and other water-dependent activities such as swimming, snorkeling, and fishing, consistent with rule 18-20.004(1)(e)5. 9 The Dock is not a "pier," which is defined as "a structure in, or, or over sovereignty lands which is used by the public primarily for fishing or swimming." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.003(41)(emphasis added). As discussed above, the Dock is a private single-family residential dock that will be constructed on sovereignty submerged lands waterward of Fondriest's property. It will not be open to, or used by, the public for fishing or swimming. As previously discussed, the Dock meets the 500-square-foot threshold for purposes of exemption from regulatory permitting, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). The evidence also establishes that the Dock is a "minimum-size" dock, as defined in rule 18-21.002(39). Specifically, the Dock's area has been reduced to the smallest size possible that will provide Fondriest reasonable access to the water for kayak launching. The Dock's reduced size also will minimize impacts to resources at, and in the vicinity of, the Dock. Thus, the Dock has been designed to minimize any adverse impacts to fish and wildlife and threatened and endangered species habitat, as required by rules 18-21.004(2)(b) and (i), and 18-21.004(7)(d). Compliance with Aquatic Preserve Management Policies, Standards, and Criteria Rule 18-20.004 establishes the policies, standards, and requirements for approval of uses of sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves. As discussed above, the Dock extends a total of 154 feet waterward from the MHWL. This is substantially less than the allowable 500-foot maximum extent from the MHWL, and also is substantially less than 20% of the width of the Straits of Florida, which spans from the Florida Keys to Cuba. Thus, the Dock is consistent with rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not be located in an area of significant biological, scientific, historic, or aesthetic value. However, even if such resources were present, the Dock would not cause adverse impacts due to its specific design features and the use of best management practices during construction. As discussed above, the Dock will minimize shading by reduction of the width of the access dock from four feet to three feet; by elevation of both the access dock and the terminal platform five feet above mean high water; and by the use of light-penetrable grating for the terminal platform. The Dock is designed to ensure that vessel use will not cause harm to site- specific resources, as required by rule 18-20.004(5)(a)3. The types of vessels that may use the Dock are limited to non-motorized vessels, and the letter of consent is conditioned to allow vessel launching only when there is a minimum depth of 0.5 feet of water at the terminal platform. As previously discussed, the evidence establishes that the Dock will be located in an RPA 3. Nonetheless, the Dock will comply with design standards applicable to docks in an RPA 1 or RPA 2. Specifically, the Dock will be constructed of wooden planking less than eight inches wide, spaced half an inch apart after shrinkage; will be elevated five feet above the MHWL; and will have a terminal platform consisting of light-penetrable grating to minimize shading. As previously discussed, the terminal platform will have a total area of 72 square feet—well below the 160-square foot maximum size allowed in aquatic preserves under rule 18-20.004(5)(b)6. The Dock extends out from the shoreline to a depth of approximately -0.5 ft at mean low water. Thus, Dock meets the requirement that it may not extend out from the shoreline further than to a maximum water depth of -4 feet at mean low water. Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(5)(b)3. Consistency with Coupon Bight Aquatic Preserve Management Plan Rule 18-20.004(7), which addresses management plans for aquatic preserves, states, in pertinent part: "[t]he aquatic preserve management plans shall be used by the Department to preserve and restore the distinctive characteristics identified by the inventories for each aquatic preserve." Rule 18-20.004(3)(a) states, in pertinent part: "all proposed activities in aquatic preserves having management plans adopted by the Board must demonstrate that such activities are consistent with the management plan." For the reasons discussed in detail above, it is determined that the Dock is consistent with the Management Plan, and, thus, complies with rule 18-20.004(3)(a). Public Interest Demonstration Chapters 18-20 and 18-21 both require an analysis to determine whether an activity proposed to be conducted on sovereignty submerged lands meets an applicable public interest test. Rule 18-20.004(1)(b), the aquatic preserve rule's public interest test, states, in pertinent part: "[t]here shall be no further sale, lease or transfer of sovereignty lands except when such sale, lease or transfer is in the public interest (see subsection 18- 20.004(2), F.A.C., Public Interest Assessment Criteria)." However, with respect to private residential single-family docks, rule 18-20.004(4)(c) states, in pertinent part: "[f]or the purpose of this rule, a private, residential single-family docking facility which meets all the requirements of subsection 18-20.004(5), F.A.C., shall be deemed to meet the public interest requirements of paragraph 18-20.004(1)(b), F.A.C." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004(1)(b)(emphasis added). As discussed herein, the Dock meets all applicable requirements in rule 18- 20.004(5). Accordingly, the Dock meets the aquatic preserves public interest test in chapter 18-20. The Dock also meets the public interest test codified in chapter 18-21. Rule 18-21.003(53) defines "public interest" as "demonstrable environmental, social and economic benefits which would accrue to the public at large as a result of the proposed action, and which would clearly exceed all demonstrable environmental, social, and economic costs of the proposed action." Rule 18-21.004(1) states: "[f]or approval, all activities on sovereignty lands must be not contrary to the public interest, except for sales which must be in the public interest." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(1)(emphasis added). In this case, the Dock provides recreational water access to the riparian owner, and, as discussed extensively, will not have any adverse impacts on sovereignty lands, aquatic resources, or listed species. Thus, it is determined that the Dock is not contrary to the public interest, as defined in chapter 18-21. Petitioners assert that the Dock is inconsistent with article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution, which states: Sovereignty lands. – The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the states, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people. Sale of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when in the public interest. Private use of portions of such lands may be authorized by law, but only when not contrary to the public interest. Fla. Const., art. X, §11 (emphasis added). Chapters 253 and 258, and the implementing rules codified in chapters 18-20 and 18-21, authorize the use of sovereignty submerged lands for private residential single-family docks when not contrary to the public interest. As discussed above, the Dock is not contrary to the public interest under chapters 18-20 and 18-21. Thus, the use of sovereignty submerged lands for the Dock is consistent with article X, section 11 of the Florida Constitution. Petitioners raised, as a public interest concern, their ability to walk below the MHWL along the shoreline on Long Beach Drive. The evidence shows that the Dock will, within its narrow footprint, present a minor hindrance to Petitioners' ability to walk unimpeded along the shoreline below the MHWL. However, the competent, persuasive evidence established that Petitioners will be able to duck under the Dock, or walk around the end of the terminal platform, where the water is relatively shallow. Importantly, Petitioners did not cite any statutory or rule provisions affording completely unencumbered access, by the general public, to all sovereignty submerged lands.10 Cumulative Impacts Rule 18-20.006 requires that an activity proposed in an aquatic preserve be evaluated for its cumulative impact on the aquatic preserve’s natural system. As extensively discussed above, Fondriest's expert, Walters, conducted a comprehensive cumulative impacts analysis that addressed all pertinent considerations in rule 18-20.006, and she concluded that the Dock will not have any 10 A key purpose of chapters 18-20 and 18-21 is to establish standards for approval of private uses of sovereignty submerged lands which may, to a certain extent, hinder the general public's access to those sovereignty lands. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004 ("[t]he following management policies, standards, and criteria shall be used in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands"); and Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-20.004 ([t]he following management policies, standards, and criteria are supplemental to chapter 18-21 . . . and shall be uses in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands in aquatic preserves.") adverse cumulative impacts on the CBAP as a whole, or on any significant biologic, hydrologic, or other resources within the CBAP. As discussed above, Walters's analysis was comprehensive; her testimony was credible and persuasive; and her conclusion that the Dock will not result in adverse cumulative impacts to the CBAP, or to any resources within the CBAP, was rule- based, and considered all pertinent factual information. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will not cause adverse cumulative impacts to the CBAP, or to any resources within the CBAP, as required by rule 18-20.006. Minimization of Adverse Impacts to Sovereignty Submerged Lands and Resources Rule 18-21.004(2)(b) states, in pertinent part, that activities that would result in significant adverse impacts to sovereignty lands and associated resources may not be approved. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that there are no significant natural resources present at the location, or in the vicinity, of the Dock. Thus, the Dock will not have adverse impacts on such resources or on sovereignty submerged lands. Nonetheless, numerous protective measures have been imposed as conditions to the letter of consent, to minimize the potential for adverse water quality impacts and to protect aquatic resources. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will meet the resource impact minimization requirements in rules 18-20.004(5)(a)1. and 18-21.004(2). Measures to Avoid and Minimize Adverse Impacts to Listed Species and Habitat 18-21.004(7)(e) requires that "construction, use, or operation of the structure or activity shall not adversely affect any species which is endangered, threatened[,] or of special concern, as listed in rules 68A-27.003, 68A-27.004[,] and 68A-27.005." DEP consulted with FFWCC on the Dock application, to determine its potential impacts to species listed as endangered, threatened, or of special concern. As discussed above, FFWCC provided recommendations to minimize the Dock's potential impacts to several listed species, and those recommendations have been imposed as conditions to the letter of consent. As discussed above, the Dock will implement numerous measures to ensure that construction and use will not adversely affect manatees, sea turtle species, the Smalltooth Sawfish, and the Eastern Indigo Snake. As discussed above, Key Deer forage on and traverse the shore along Long Beach Drive. The competent, credible evidence establishes that the Dock will not impose any substantial barrier to the Key Deer's use of the shore on Fondriest's property, and will not otherwise adversely affect the Key Deer. Also, as discussed above, the competent, credible evidence establishes that due to the lack of suitable habitat, other protected species, such as the Lower Keys Marsh Rabbit, Keys Rice Rat, and Florida Keys Mole Skink are unlikely to inhabit, or otherwise be present at or near, the Dock site. Thus, it is determined that the Dock will not have any adverse impacts on these species. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that the Dock will not have adverse impacts to listed species and their habitat. Riparian Rights Chapters 18-20 and 18-21 require that the riparian rights of owners of upland riparian property adjacent to an activity seeking approval to use sovereignty submerged lands be protected. Rule 18-20.004(4) states, in pertinent part: "[n]one of the provisions of this rule shall be implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional, common law and statutory riparian rights of upland property owners adjacent to sovereignty lands." Rule 18-21.004(3) states, in pertinent part: None of the provisions of this rule shall be implemented in a manner that would unreasonably infringe upon the traditional, common law riparian rights, as defined in section 253.141, F.S., of upland riparian property owners adjacent to sovereignty lands. Satisfactory evidence of sufficient upland interest is required for activities on sovereignty submerged lands riparian to the uplands. All structures and other activities must be designed and conducted in a manner that will not unreasonably restrict or infringe upon the riparian rights of adjacent upland riparian owners. [A]ll structures, including mooring pilings, breakwaters, jetties and groins, and activities must be set back a minimum of 25 feet inside the applicant's riparian line. Exceptions to the setbacks are private residential single- family docks associated with a parcel that has a shoreline frontage of less than 65 feet, where portions of such structures are located between riparian less than 65 feet apart. Pursuant to rule 18-21.003(63), "satisfactory upland interest" means owning the riparian uplands or having some other possessory or use interest, as specified in the rule. Section 253.141(1) defines riparian rights as follows: Riparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon navigable waters. They are rights of ingress, egress, boating, bathing, and fishing and such others as may be or have been defined by law. Such rights are not of a proprietary nature. They are rights inuring to the owner of the riparian land but are not owned by him or her. They are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian land. The land to which the owner holds title must extend to the ordinary high watermark of the navigable water in order that riparian rights may attach. Conveyance of title to or lease of the riparian land entitles the grantee to the riparian rights running therewith whether or not mentioned in the deed or lease of the upland. Fondriest owns the upland property riparian to the sovereignty submerged lands on which the Dock is proposed to be located, and Petitioners stipulated that she has a satisfactory upland interest for purposes of rule 18-21.004(3). The Trust owns upland property bordering the Straits of Florida; thus, riparian rights inure to the Trust property, pursuant to section 253.141. As previously discussed, the evidence establishes that the Dock will be set back over 40 feet from the common riparian line between Fondriest's property and the Trust's property. To this point, Meredith acknowledged that the Dock would be set back more than 25 feet from the common riparian line, and will not intrude into the Trust's riparian area. No evidence was presented showing that the Dock would unreasonably interfere with the Trust's traditional riparian rights of navigation, boating, swimming, or fishing within its riparian area. Meredith testified that the Dock would obstruct the view of the waterbody, the shore, and the sunrise over the water, from the Trust property. She appeared to assert these interests on behalf of the Trust and herself. However, as more fully discussed below, under Florida law, the riparian right to an "unobstructed" view does not entail a view completely free of any infringement or restriction by structures or activities appurtenant to neighboring riparian properties. Rather, the right to an "unobstructed" view means that a riparian owner is entitled to a direct, unobstructed view of the channel of the waterbody and a direct means of ingress and egress to the channel. No evidence was presented that the Dock—which will be constructed perpendicular to the shoreline within Fondriest's riparian area—would obstruct the Trust's or Meredith's view of the channel of the Straits of Florida. Additionally, as previously discussed, the Trust presented no evidence to show that the presence of the Dock in Fondriest's riparian area would interfere with the Trust's direct ingress and egress to and from the channel of the Straits of Florida. Accordingly, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the Trust's riparian rights. Similarly, it is determined that the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the riparian rights incident to the Deer Run property, or to Appel's properties on Long Beach Drive. To this point, Demaria and Appel did not present any evidence showing that the Dock will obstruct their view of the channel of the Straits of Florida, either from the Deer Run property, or from Appel's properties. DeMaria and Appel also failed to present evidence showing that the Dock would interfere with direct ingress and egress to and from the channel of the Straits of Florida, either from the Deer Run property or from Appel's properties. Accordingly, it is determined that, consistent with section 253.141 and rule 18-21.004(3), the Dock will not unreasonably infringe on the riparian rights of the Trust or of DeMaria and Appel. General Requirements for Authorization to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands As discussed above, the Dock will be constructed and used in a manner that will avoid and minimize adverse impacts to sovereignty submerged lands and resources, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(d). The competent, credible evidence also demonstrates that the construction and use of the Dock will not adversely affect listed species, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(e). As discussed above, the Dock will not unreasonably interfere with the riparian rights of the Petitioners, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(f). Additionally, the Dock will not constitute a navigational hazard, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(g). Due to the shallow water in the footprint and in the vicinity of the Dock, navigation in the area is typically by kayak or canoe. The competent, credible evidence shows that the Dock will not impede navigation of these types of vessels. Because the sandy beach areas on Long Beach Drive are in private ownership, the Dock will not interfere with the public easement for traditional uses of sandy beaches, as provided in section 161.141, Florida Statutes; thus, the Dock is consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(h). Also, as discussed above, the Dock will be constructed, operated, and maintained solely for the water-dependent uses of launching non-motorized vessels and swimming, consistent with rule 18-21.004(7)(j).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue a Final Order granting Respondent Julia Fondriest's application for a Letter of Consent to Use Sovereignty Submerged Lands and verifying that the Dock is exempt from the requirement to obtain a regulatory permit, pursuant to section 403.813(1)(b). DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia Fondriest Doug Scheele Lifetime Dock & Lumber, Inc. 24536 Overseas Highway Summerland Key, Florida 33042 Luna E. Phillips, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Suite 1400 450 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Deborah K. Madden, Esquire Gunster, Yoakley & Stewart, P.A. Suite 1400 450 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Paul Joseph Polito, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection Mail Stop 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ralf Gunars Brookes, Esquire Ralf Brookes Attorney Suite 107 1217 East Cape Coral Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Noah Valenstein, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000

Florida Laws (14) 120.52120.536120.54120.569120.57120.68161.141163.3161253.03253.141258.36258.42258.43403.813 Florida Administrative Code (15) 18-20.00118-20.00318-20.00418-20.00618-21.00218-21.00318-21.00418-21.00518-21.005128-106.10428-106.20528-106.21762-302.30062-4.24268A-27.003 DOAH Case (9) 04-224017-097217-532819-186520-000420-007120-247320-247420-2535
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PACETTA, LLC; MAR-TIM, INC.; AND DOWN THE HATCH, INC. vs TOWN OF PONCE INLET, 09-001231GM (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pompano Beach, Florida Mar. 10, 2009 Number: 09-001231GM Latest Update: Jun. 26, 2012

The Issue The issues to be determined in this case are whether the amendments to the Town of Ponce Inlet Comprehensive Plan adopted by Ordinances 2008-01 (2008 Amendment) and 2010-09 (2010 Amendment) are "in compliance" as that term is defined in section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1/

Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Pacetta, LLC, is a Florida limited liability company that owns real property in Ponce Inlet. Petitioner, Mar-Tim, Inc., is a Florida corporation that owns real property in Ponce Inlet. Petitioner, Down the Hatch, Inc., is a Florida corporation that owns real property in Ponce Inlet. Petitioner, Pacetta, LLC, controls and manages Mar-Tim and Down the Hatch. Petitioners' real property in the Town is directly affected by the challenged plan amendments. Petitioners submitted objections to the Town during the period of time beginning with the transmittal hearing and ending with the adoption of the challenged amendments. The Town of Ponce Inlet is a municipality in Volusia County that adopted a comprehensive plan in 1990 ("Town Plan"), which it amends from time to time pursuant to chapter 163, Florida Statutes. Petitioners' Property Petitioners' property is located on the north cut of the Ponce de Leon Inlet. The current uses on the property include a restaurant, a marina and boat repair yard with a marine travel lift, and vacant lands. An old cemetery is located on a portion of Petitioners' property. A shell midden (ancient refuse pile) is located on a portion of Petitioners' property. Petitioners' property has single family residences on three sides. A significant tree canopy is adjacent to Petitioners' property and large oak trees are on the property. A historic cemetery known as Pacetti Cemetery is near Petitioners' property. Several historic buildings are located near Petitioners' property. A museum and exhibit building are located nearby on Beach Street. Beach Street and Sailfish Drive are the main roads to access the Petitioners' property. These two roads have been designated by the Town as Scenic Roads. Petitioners' property comprises approximately 15 acres. About 2.4 acres are zoned for multifamily development. The remaining acreage is zoned Riverfront Commercial. There is also a special Riverfront Overlay District ("ROD") that covers Petitioners' property. Background There are at least three areas in the Town designated Riverfront Commercial. The Riverfront Commercial land use category permits wet boat storage, dry boat storage, boat sales and services, fishing charter boat dockage, fishing and boat equipment and supplies, seafood markets, restaurants, boatels, and boat construction and repairs. There is only one area in the Town designated ROD. In the ROD, land uses are more restricted. Dry boat storage facilities are allowed by special exception in Riverfront Commercial, but not within the ROD. The Town created the Riverfront Commercial District and the ROD in its Land Use and Development Code in 2004, but these land use categories were not identified in the Town Plan at that time. After the designation of the ROD in 2004, Petitioners began to acquire several parcels of land located within the ROD. The Town continued to engage its citizens in a visioning process for the Town's waterfront, which lead to the 2008 Amendment. As originally proposed, the 2008 Amendment allowed upland boat storage in the ROD under certain conditions in Future land Use Element ("FLUE") Policy 4.1.5. A citizens group obtained a sufficient number of signatures to place on the general election ballot a charter amendment to prohibit dry boat storage facilities in the ROD. Therefore, when the Town adopted the 2008 Amendment, it changed FLUE Policy 4.1.5 to prohibit dry boat storage facilities. Petitioners challenged the charter amendment in circuit court and the court determined that the charter amendment was invalid. The court also invalidated FLUE Policy 4.1.5, determining that the policy was only adopted to conform to the charter amendment. The circuit court decision was affirmed on appeal. Town of Ponce Inlet v. Pacetta, LLC, 63 So. 3d 840 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). Petitioners also asked the circuit court to invalidate the ROD provisions of the Land Use and Development Code, but the circuit court declined to rule on their validity. Following the court's invalidation of FLUE Policy 4.1.5, the Town adopted the 2010 Amendment, which creates a new Policy 4.1.5. The new policy also prohibits dry boat storage facilities in the ROD. Petitioners' Objections Petitioners' overarching objection to the plan amendments is that they prohibit Petitioners from building a dry boat storage facility. Petitioners claim the prohibition is inconsistent with other policies of the Town Plan and is not supported by data and analysis. The term "dry boat storage facility" is not defined in the Town Plan. The Volusia County Manatee Protection Plan ("MPP"), which is adopted by reference in Coastal Management Element ("CME") Objective 1.6, defines dry boat storage facility as "an upland structure used for storing watercraft." Petitioners already store some boats on trailers or boat stands on the upland while they are being repaired or refurbished in the boatyard. The Town interprets the Town Plan to allow this type of upland storage in the ROD, citing FLUE Policy 4.1.4 of the 2008 Plan Amendment which explains that dry boat storage means "multiple level boat racks" in "fully enclosed buildings" and not the "[l]imited storage of boats on trailers or boat stands" in conjunction with boatyard operations. FLUE Policy 4.1.5 Petitioners' objections to FLUE Policy 4.1.5, which was adopted in the 2010 Amendment, are addressed first because the associated issues affect the other policies that have been challenged. FLUE Policy 4.1.5 states: The Town shall maintain a zoning overlay district over those Riverfront Commercial and High Density Multi-family Residential lands west of Sailfish Drive, south of Bounty Lane and north of the most southerly portion of Sailfish Drive to promote the water-oriented character of the River and compatibility with adjacent residential properties, to ensure protection of view corridors of the River and the tree canopy in the Front Street Area, and to preserve the historic setting and unique character of this area, including, but not limited to, the scenic roads of Beach Street and Sailfish Drive. Dry boat storage facilities shall be prohibited within this overlay district. Petitioners argue that the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in Policy 4.1.5 conflicts with the MPP adopted by reference in the Town Plan because the MPP expresses a preference for dry slips over wet slips. The MPP includes a Boat Facility Siting Plan, which contains requirements that must be met for new or expanded marina facilities. The Plan requires the Town to place a priority on the development of boat slip capacity at or south of Ponce de Leon Inlet, to encourage marinas to include both wet slips and dry slips, and to "utilize dry storage to the fullest extent possible in addition to wet slips." The Boat Facility Siting Plan includes best management practices ("BMPs"). One of these BMPs is "Use of upland dry storage shall take precedence over the creation of new wet slips." The prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in the ROD will likely reduce the number of boats launched in the ROD because fewer boats can be accomodated in wetslips than in upland dry boat storage facilities.2/ This proposition was not rebutted by Petitioners. A major objective of the MPP is to reduce manatee injuries and deaths due to collisions with boats. The fewer boats, the fewer potential collisions with manatees. Therefore, the effect of the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in the ROD is consistent with the objectives of the MPP. Dry boat storage facilities are allowed elsewhere in the Town. The design standards and BMPs in the MPP are described as permitting requirements, not as zoning or land use restrictions. The MPP does not state that all of its design standards and BMPs must be reflected in every permit issued by the Town, County, or State. It does not require, for example, that every marina must have more dry slips than wet slips. The MPP acknowledges that marina sites must conform to local land use and zoning regulations that affect the construction of new wet and dry slips. Under the Policy 4.1.5, utilizing dry storage to the fullest extent possible in the ROD means allowing upland storage of boats on trailers and boat stands in conjunction with boatyard operations. Petitioners also contend that Policy 4.1.5 is not supported by relevant and appropriate data and an analysis by the Town. The prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in the ROD is supported by data and analysis that shows that the noise, fumes, traffic, scale, and appearance of dry boat storage facilities is incompatible with residential uses and with scenic, historic, and natural resources nearby. Petitioners showed that some of the same incompatibility factors exist in other Riverfront Commercial areas, but the factors are not as numerous and pronounced as they are in the ROD. FLUE Policy 1.2.2(g) Petitioners challenge FLUE Policy 1.2.2(g), which limits the floor area for buildings within the Riverfront Commercial District (including the ROD) to 5,000 square feet. Petitioners argue that this limit is in conflict with CME Policy 1.6.6, which requires the Town to adopt and maintain a boat slip allocation program pursuant to which the Town made an allocation of 213 dry slips to Petitioners' property. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law, this argument cannot be raised in this proceeding because the 5,000 square- foot limit was already in the Town Plan before the 2008 Amendment. Petitioners argue that the floor area limit is subject to compliance review in this proceeding because its effect has been substantially altered by new provisions in the 2008 Amendment. The 2008 Amendment added a floor area ratio (gross floor area of buildings divided by upland lot area) limit of 35 percent for Riverfront Commercial, and an increase in floor area up to 10,000 square feet is made possible in a new Planned Waterfront Development District. However, these and other changes in the 2008 Amendment do not alter the fundamental effect of the existing floor area limit. The Town has adopted a boat slip allocation program as required by CME Policy 1.6.6. The allocation of 213 dry slips to Petitioners' property is not required by Policy 1.6.6 or by any other policy in the Town Plan. Petitioners cannot base a claim of internal inconsistency on matters that are external to the Town Plan.3/ Even if the floor area limit in FLUE Policy 1.1.1(g) is subject to compliance review, it is not inconsistent with the MPP for the same reasons that the prohibition of dry boat storage facilities in FLUE Policy 1.4.5 is not inconsistent with the MPP. FLUE Policy 4.2.4 Policy 4.2.4 of the 2008 Amendment states that, in developing design standards for a new Planned Waterfront Development District, limited exceptions might be allowed to the floor area limit of 5,000 square feet, up to 10,000 square feet, but this exception will not apply to dry boat storage facilities. No Planned Waterfront Development District has yet been created in the Town. Despite Petitioners' objection to the 5,000 square- foot floor area limit generally applicable in Riverfront Commercial, Petitioners argue that there is no data and analysis to support the Town's allowance for an increase in the floor area limit to 10,000 square feet in a Planned Waterfront Development District. The knowledge of what a 5,000 square foot or a 10,000 square foot building looks like is all the data needed to set a limit based on scale. CME Policy 1.6.6 CME Policy 1.6.6 of the 2008 Amendment states: The Town shall maintain and enforce its boat slip allocation program. This program shall provide for equitable allocations of new wet and dry slips. Upland slips may be permitted under this allocation program if they can meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Town and the Town Codes. Upland/dry slips development shall be balanced against other community policies, including neighborhood compatibility and visual impacts. Dry slips shall not take precedence over wet slips based solely on environmental concerns. Petitioners contend that Policy 1.6.6 conflicts with the building size limitations in FLUE Policies 1.2.2(g) and 4.2.4 and with the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in FLUE Policy 4.1.5 because the size limits and prohibition do not allow for the balancing called for in Policy 1.6.6. Petitioners are interpreting the policy more literally than the Town. Things are not going to be placed on scales and made to balance in the middle. The Town interprets the policy to direct the Town to consider competing policies according to their relative importance. In Riverfront Commercial areas other than the ROD, there can be combinations of wet and dry slips, including dry boat storage facilities, but the floor area limit of 5,000 square feet is a "community policy" that will also apply to affect the outcome of the balancing. In the ROD, the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities is another community policy that must be applied. The Town has established a community policy to prohibit dry boat storage facilities in the ROD because the Town has determined that such facilities do not harmonize with nearby residential uses and scenic, historic, and natural resources. Data and analysis support this determination. Although Petitioners got a Town witness to testify that a prohibition does not allow for balancing, the record shows that the Town gives no weight to the desirability of dry boat storage facilities in the ROD and some weight to the desirability of wet slips, so that the scales always tip in favor of wet slips and for boats on trailers or boat stands in a boatyard. Petitioners contend that the statement in FLUE Policy 1.6.6 that "Dry slips shall not take precedence over wet slips based solely on environmental concerns," is directly in conflict with the MPP, because the MPP states a preference for dry slips based specifically on environmental concerns (manatees). However, the meaning of the policy statement is that environmental concerns, alone, will not determine how many dry slips are allowed. Other concerns will be taken into account in determining how many dry slips are allowed. That is not inconsistent with the MPP. Recreational and Working Waterfronts Petitioners contend that the floor area limit in FLUE Policy 1.2.2(g), the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in FLUE Policy 4.1.5, and the floor area limit for dry storage facilities in FLUE Policy 4.2.4 are inconsistent with section 163.3177(6)(a)3.c., which requires a FLUE to include criteria to "[e]ncourage preservation of recreational and commercial working waterfronts for water-dependent uses in coastal communities." The term "recreational and commercial working waterfronts," is defined in section 342.201(2)(b): "Recreational and commercial working waterfront" means parcel or parcels of real property that provide access for water- dependent commercial activities or provide access to the public to the navigable waters of the state. Recreational and commercial working waterfronts require direct access to or a location on, over, or adjacent to a navigable body of water. The term includes water-dependent facilities that are open to the public and offer public access by vessels to the waters of the state or that are support facilities for recreational, commercial, research, or governmental vessels. These facilities include docks, wharfs, lifts, wet and dry marinas, boat ramps, boat hauling and repair facilities, commercial fishing facilities, boat construction facilities, and other support structures over the water. There is no current use of Petitioners' property that is prohibited by the challenged amendments. In other words, Petitioners' working waterfront is preserved. To the extent section 163.3177(6)(a)3.c. should be interpreted more broadly to encourage not only preservation, but also economic vitality through further development and redevelopment of waterfronts, the Town has adopted FLUE criteria to encourage their development and redevelopment. The floor area limit and the prohibition against dry boat storage facilities in the ROD do not prevent Petitioners from further developing their working waterfront to add or expand uses. Evaluation and Appraisal Petitioners challenge FLUE Policies 1.2.2(g) and 4.2.4 and CME Policy 1.6.6 as constituting a failure of the Town to update its plan to address the changes needed as identified in the Town's Evaluation and Assessment Report ("EAR"). Petitioners failed to prove that the Town did not make the changes identified in the EAR. Summary Petitioners failed to prove beyond fair debate that the 2008 Amendment or the 2010 Amendment create internal inconsistency in the Town Plan. Petitioners failed to prove that the 2008 Amendment or the 2010 Amendment is not supported by relevant data and analysis. Petitioners failed to prove beyond fair debate that the 2008 Amendment or the 2010 Amendment is not in compliance.

Recommendation Based on foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Economic Opportunity enter a final order determining that the plan amendments adopted by Town Ordinances 2008-01 and 2010-09 are in compliance. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2012.

Florida Laws (8) 120.57163.3177163.3180163.3184163.3191163.3245163.3248342.201
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DR. KENNETH LEVY vs BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, 94-002766RX (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida May 18, 1994 Number: 94-002766RX Latest Update: Aug. 28, 1995

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact 1. Rule 18-20.004(5)(a)1 provides: All docking facilities, whether for private residential single-family docks, private residential multi-slip docks, or commercial, industrial, or other revenue generating/income-related docks or public docks or piers, shall be subject to the following standards and criteria: no dock shall extend waterward of the mean or ordinary high water line more than 500 feet or 20 percent of the width of the waterbody at that particular location whichever is less; * * * Pursuant to stipulation, Petitioner has standing, a dock, and upland access to his property. The parties also stipulated that Petitioner's dock is limited by the 500-foot criterion, as the proposed dock extension would not exceed 20 percent of the width of the waterbody. Petitioner's upland property consists of a single family residence and is located adjacent to sovereign submerged lands located in the Gasparilla Island/Charlotte Harbor Aquatic Preserve. He has lawfully constructed a dock extending about 500 feet from the mean high water mark and into the waters of Charlotte Harbor. The consent of use granted Petitioner acknowledges the relative shallowness of the water adjacent to his property and correspondingly limits the draft of vessels to be moored to the dock. At mean low tide, the depth of the water at the end of Petitioner's dock is about two feet. Petitioner requested authorization to extend his dock waterward another 100 feet. On December 15, 1993, Respondents denied the request, in reliance upon the challenged rule and Section 258.42(3)(e)1, which allows the erection in an aquatic preserve of private residential docks for "reasonable ingress and egress of riparian owners." In a separate administrative proceeding, DOAH Case No. 94-2140, Petitioner is contesting the denial of his request to extend the dock. No single family docks in aquatic preserves extend over 500 feet into the water. In Charlotte Harbor, the average length of a single-family residential dock is 200 feet. Nearby Petitioner's dock is a 600-foot long public fishing pier, which was constructed before the subject 500-foot rule was promulgated. From mean high water waterward, the first habitat surrounding Petitioner's dock is an intertidal sand flat that extends about 100-150 waterward from shore. The next habitat is mostly unvegetated submerged bottom with patches of submerged aquatic vegetation that extends from the end of the intertidal sand flat to about 350-400 feet from shore. The vegetation of the latter habitat is mostly Cuban shoal grass, which occurs in no more than four patches of about 50 square feet, in an area measuring 25 feet in both directions from the dock. Last, extending from 350-400 feet waterward to the end of the dock, is a largely unvegetated area with sporadic pieces of attached algae. Unvegetated bottoms play no role in the propagation of fish or wildlife. The biological or scientific value of unvegetated bottoms is unaffected by a dock, although there is some evidence that toxic substances may leach from the construction materials and adversely impact nearby vegetation. However, the dredging caused by boat propellers scouring any form of submerged bottom suspends sediment that can be carried to areas of vegetated bottom, where the increase in turbidity may reduce the penetration of sunlight and thereby harm the aquatic vegetation. In the vicinity of Petitioner's dock, though, there is no evidence of significant prop dredging from recreational boating. The absence of submerged vegetation is more likely a feature of the high-energy shoreline where wave energy disrupts sediments and provides unsuitable habitat. In promulgating the predecessor to Rule 18- 20.004(5)(a)1, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund attempted to balance interests that sometimes are competing, such as environmental, aesthetic, recreational, and private commercial. There was some concern that previously authorized docks in sovereign submerged lands had infringed upon the riparian access of adjacent upland owners. The 500-foot limitation was not in the original rule, which was promulgated in 1981, but was added by an amendment in 1985. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund tried to set thresholds that would not result in the denial of more than a negligible number of dock applications, based on historic dock application data and predominant vessel lengths of under 27 feet. However, the record does not explain how the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund analyzed the above-described data so as to arrive at the 500-foot limitation now under challenge. Without providing more detail concerning the data and analysis, it is possible that a limitation of 100 feet or 900 feet would have satisfied the considerations stated in the preceding paragraph. Shallow water predominates in the aquatic preserves, and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund realized that a dock extending no more than 500 feet might not reach water depths that are readily navigable. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund could not rationally adopt a rule to ensure minimum water depths for all docks, and chose the 500-foot limitation evidently to provide an easy-to-administer standard.

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.56120.57120.68258.42258.43258.44
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RAYMOND AND NORMA KOMAREK vs RAYMOND AND NANCY SWART AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 95-001983 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Apr. 26, 1995 Number: 95-001983 Latest Update: Nov. 09, 1995

Findings Of Fact The Application On or about November 8, 1994, Raymond and Nancy Swart, Trustees, applied for a permit to construct a private multislip dock facility at their property on Little Sarasota Bay in Sarasota County, DEP File No. 5826007043. As proposed, the dock would consist of: 237' of five foot wide access pier; a terminal dock 45' long and 5.5' wide; and eight finger piers 20' long and three feet wide. All of the structures were proposed to be three feet above mean high water (MHW). Normal construction procedures would be used to "jet" pilings into place, including the use of turbidity screens. As proposed, the dock would provide nine slips for the use of the owners of the nine lots in the Swarts' subdivided property, known as Sunset Place. There would be no live-aboards allowed, and there would be no fueling facilities, sewage pump-out facilities or any other boating supplies or services provided on or at the dock. Under the proposal, verti-lifts would be constructed for all of the slips at a later date. (When boat owners use verti- lifts, there is less need to paint boat bottoms with toxic anti-fouling paint.) As part of the application, the Swarts offered to grant a conservation easement encumbering approximately 400' of shoreline. The Intent to Issue Because Little Sarasota Bay is designated as an Outstanding Florida Water (OFW), and because of concerns regarding the maintenance of its environmental quality, the DEP required that the Swarts submit additional information for review in connection with their application. Specifically, the DEP wanted them to perform a hydrographic study to assure adequate flushing at the site and a bathymetric survey to assure adequate water depths and minimal impacts on seagrasses. After review of the additional information, the DEP gave notice of its Intent to Issue the permit, with certain modifications and conditions. The Intent to Issue would require that the "most landward access pier . . . be extended an additional 15 feet to avoid the mooring of watercraft within seagrasses." It also would require the decking of the main access pier (155' long), which would cross seagrass beds, be elevated to a minimum of five feet above mean high water (MHW). (This would reduce shading and minimize impacts on the seagrasses.) The Intent to Issue included specific measures for the protection of manatees during and after construction. The Intent to Issue specifically prohibited hull cleaning, painting or other external maintenance at the facility. The Intent to Issue specified the width of the 400' long conservation easement (30', for an area of approximately 0.27 acres) and required the Swarts to "plant a minimum of 50 planting units of Spartina patens and 50 planting units of Spartina alterniflora at appropriate elevations imediately waterward of the revetment along the northern portion of the property . . . concurrrent with the construction of the permitted structure." It specified planting procedures and included success criteria for the plantings (an 85 percent survival rate). The Objection On or about March 30, 1995, Raymond and Norma Komarek, the owners of property next to the Swart property, objected in writing to the "magnitude" of the proposed dock facility. They complained that the proposed dock facility "will not enhance anyone's view, but it will create disturbance with noise, night lights, wash and erosion on shore, even possible pollution from up to 35 foot boats." They continued: "We prefer not to live next to a Marina. This appears to be a commercial venture tied to the sale of real estate and/or houses . . .." They conceded that their concerns for manatees had been addressed, but they raised questions regarding the impact on commercial fishermen running crab trap lines, scullers, jet skis, and water skiers. They objected to restrictions on "one's personal rights to use the water by obstruction of navigable waters." They also alleged that the proposed dock facility would be a navigation hazard, especially in fog. The Komareks suggest that the three exempt 125' docks to which the Swarts are entitled under Sarasota County regulations, with the two boats allegedly allowed at each, should be adequate and are all the Swarts should be allowed. The Komareks' objections conclude by questioning the alleged results of alleged "turbidity tests" showing that there is "good action" (apparently on the ground that they believe Little Sarasota Bay has "declined") and by expressing concern about the cumulative impact of future dock facilities if granting the Swart application sets a precedent. The Komareks' Evidence The Komareks were able to present little admissible evidence at the final hearing in support of their objections. Much of the environmental evidence they attempted to introduce was hearsay. Moreover, at best, most of it concerned Little Sarasota Bay in general, as opposed to the specific location of the proposed docking facility. The alleged "turbidity tests" called into question in the Komareks' objection apparently refer to the hydrographic study done at the request of the DEP. The evidence the Komareks attempted to utilize on this issue apparently were the kind of general information about Little Sarasota Bay on which the DEP had relied in requesting the hydrographic study. There was no other evidence presented to contradict the results of the Swart study. While the proposed dock facility would project into the view from the Komarek property looking towards the north (and from the property of the neighbors to the north looking towards the south), there was no other evidence that the proposed dock facility "will create disturbance with noise, night lights, wash and erosion on shore . . .." "[P]ollution from up to 35 foot boats" is "possible," but there was no evidence that pollution is probable or, if it occurred, that the kind and amount of pollution would be environmentally significant. The application clearly is a "commercial venture tied to the sale of real estate and/or houses . . .." But the use of the dock facility would be personal to the owners of lots in Sunset Place; the use would not be public. The Komareks presented no evidence "regarding the impact of the dock facility on commercial fishermen running crab trap lines, scullers, jet skis, and water skiers." Clearly, the dock facility would extend approximately 250' into Little Sarasota Bay. But there was no other evidence either that it would restrict "one's personal rights to use the water by obstruction of navigable waters" or that it would be a navigation hazard. (There was no evidence to support the suggestion made at final hearing that an access dock built five feet above MHW would be a dangerous "attractive nuisance" or that it would be more hazardous than one built three feet above MHW.) Evidence Supporting DEP Intent to Issue Very little pollution can be expected from the actual construction of the dock facility. Primarily, there is the potential for temporary turbidity during construction; but the use of turbidity screens will help minimize this temporary impact. The conditions volunteered in the Swart application, together with modification and additional conditions imposed by the DEP Intent to Issue, limit other potential pollutant sources to oil and gas spillage from the boats using the dock facility. The Swarts' hydrographic study demonstrates that, notwithstanding relatively poor circulation in the general area of Little Sarasota Bay in which the proposed dock facility is located, there is adequate flushing at and in the immediate vicinity of the proposed facility, at least to the limited extent to which pollutants may be expected to be introduced into Little Sarasota Bay from construction activities and use of the facility with the conditions volunteered in the Swart application and imposed by the DEP Intent to Issue. A primary goal of the Komareks' objection is to "downsize" their neighbors' proposed dock facility. They object to its length and its height above MHW. Presumably, they believe that "downsizing" the Swart dock facility would improve their view. If it could not be "downsized," they would prefer that the Swart application be denied in its entirety and that three exempt docks, accommodating two boats each, be built in place of the proposed facility. Ironically, the evidence was that if the Komareks' primary goal is realized, more environmental harm would result. The evidence was that a shorter, lower dock would do more harm to seagrasses, and three exempt docks (even if limited to two boats each) would have approximately three times the environmental impact. Indeed, based on environmental considerations, the DEP Intent to Issue required the Swarts to lengthen the access dock proposed in their application by 15 feet and elevate it by two feet. Lengthening the access dock would move the part of the facility where boats would be moored to deeper water with fewer seagrasses. In that way, fewer seagrasses would be impacted by construction, fewer would be shaded by the mooring of boats, and fewer would be subject to the risk of prop scarring. In addition, the risk of scarring would be reduced to the extent that the water was deeper in the mooring area. Finally, DEP studies have shown that elevating the access dock would reduce shading impact on seagrasses under and adjacent to the dock. Besides having more than three times the environmental impact, exempt docks would have none of the conditions included in the DEP Intent to Issue. Verti-lifts would not be required. Methods of construction would not be regulated by the DEP. Measures for the protection of manatees, before and after construction, would not have to be taken. Hull cleaning, painting or other external maintenance would not be prohibited. Live-aboards, fueling facilities, sewage pump-out facilities and other boating supplies and services would not be prohibited (although County regulation may prohibit some of these activities). Finally, there would be no conservation easement and no planting of seagrasses. The Komareks suggest that County regulation may prohibit construction in accordance with the DEP Intent to Issue. But that would be a question for the County to determine in its own proceedings. All things considered, the DEP Intent to Issue is clearly in the public interest.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order granting the application of Raymond and Nancy Swart, Trustees, (the Swarts) for a permit to construct a private multislip dock facility at their property on Little Sarasota Bay in Sarasota County, DEP File No. 5826007043, with the modifications and conditions set out in the Notice of Intent. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1995.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57373.403373.414 Florida Administrative Code (4) 62-312.02062-312.03062-312.05062-312.080
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ROBERT A. KNUCK vs BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, 90-004286 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Homestead, Florida Jul. 11, 1990 Number: 90-004286 Latest Update: May 14, 1992

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of real property known as Lot 6, Block 10, Angler's Park, in Key Largo, Florida. He purchased that property in November of 1986. Petitioner's property is contiguous to sovereign submerged lands in Largo Sound, a sound of the Atlantic Ocean. The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund of the State of Florida holds title to submerged lands waterward of the mean high water line contiguous to Petitioner's property. The submerged lands contiguous to Petitioner's property lie within the boundaries of John Pennekamp Coral Reef State Park. The Board of Trustees dedicated the submerged lands contiguous to what is now Petitioner's property to the Florida Board of Parks and Historical Memorials, now the Division of Recreation and Parks of the Department of Natural Resources, on September 21, 1967. A dock existed on the submerged lands contiguous to Petitioner's property prior to 1967. The entire dock existed at least by 1938. The historic dock was probably one of the oldest docks in Largo Sound. Due to the passage of time and hurricanes, only the pilings and a concrete pad near shore still existed as of 1967. The dock was not rebuilt until 1988. Throughout the years, boats were moored at the dock. After the planking on the dock no longer existed, people still moored their boats to individual pilings. The dock was considered an excellent location for fishing, and people travelled by boat to the location, tying their boats to the pilings to fish. When Petitioner purchased his property, the only structures left on the contiguous submerged lands were thirteen concrete pilings and the concrete pad near shore. Only four of the pilings were sticking up out of the water. The remaining pilings were submerged. The original configuration of the historic dock was easily ascertained by the pilings and concrete pad. After Petitioner purchased his property, he began constructing a residence. He would travel from elsewhere in the Key Largo area by boat, would tie his boat to one of the pilings, and would wade ashore. Petitioner applied to Monroe County for a permit to rebuild portions of the dock. Although Monroe County accepted and retained his permit application fee, he was not issued a permit. Instead, he was told that he should contact the people at Pennekamp State Park. Petitioner then contacted Respondent's employees at Pennekamp State Park about reconstructing portions of the dock. In response to that inquiry Petitioner received a letter dated June 10, 1987, advising him that Respondent was not a permitting agency. That letter further recited two of Respondent's rules prohibiting the removal or destruction of natural features and marine life and construction activities in that state park. Having been frustrated by his attempts to obtain a permit to rebuild the dock from both Monroe County and from Respondent's employees at Pennekamp State Park, Petitioner made no further effort to obtain a permit or authorization from any other state, local, or federal government agency to reconstruct his dock. One day he backed a pickup truck to the edge of the water, hooked up, and raised the closest piling up in the air. Utilizing the existing pilings and adding additional ones, Petitioner rebuilt the dock "going a step at a time." In the course of his rebuilding the dock, Petitioner replaced the wooden decking and fasteners, replaced the wooden stringers and fasteners, added seven new concrete pilings, raised and repositioned several existing concrete pilings, and poured concrete footings for the new pilings. He completed rebuilding the dock in 1989. During the almost one year that he was rebuilding the dock, he worked in plain view of employees of local and state agencies. He was easily observed by the Coast Guard, the Marine Patrol, and the Park Service boats travelling to and through the Marvin D. Adams Waterway located approximately seventy-five feet from his property. No one told Petitioner to stop his construction activities. When it was completed, his dock was 12 feet wide and 84 feet long, 28 feet shorter than the historic dock. Petitioner's entire dock consists of 1018 square feet. Petitioner's dock is in the same location as the historic dock. Petitioner's dock is a private dock, used only by him when he moors his boat there occasionally. In re-building his dock, Petitioner extended it to a distance so that the water depth at the end of Petitioner's dock is four feet mean low water. Additionally, Petitioner left an open space of one to two inches between each plank on the deck so that sunlight could penetrate between the deck planking the entire distance of the dock. Pilings are an integral part of a dock. In 1988 Respondent began conducting a survey of private docks, commercial marinas, and fills, both authorized and unauthorized, within the boundaries of Pennekamp State Park as those boundaries were extended in 1967 to Key Largo. The survey was to be utilized in developing a policy regarding structures within the extended park boundaries. Petitioner's dock was included in that survey. The information which Respondent transmitted to the Governor and Cabinet regarding Petitioner's dock was that it was not authorized, that it was built in 1990, and that the water depth at the mooring area, considered by Respondent to be the terminal end of the dock, was two feet. Respondent did not advise the Governor and Cabinet that a dock had been in existence at Petitioner's property prior to 1967 and as far back as at least 1938, that the concrete pad and thirteen pilings from the historic dock still existed, or that Petitioner had rebuilt the dock in the same location, but shorter, than the historic dock. Further, Respondent did not advise the Governor and Cabinet that its water depth measurement of two feet was not taken at the waterward end of the dock, the way such a measurement is normally done. Respondent did advise the Governor and Cabinet that the access channel to the dock was four feet deep. On April 12, 1990, the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the head of Respondent, approved a policy regarding development encroachments in Pennekamp State Park. The portion of that policy which relates to private docks provides as follows: Private docks must (1) be in existence prior to 1967 within state park waters to receive authorized structure status; (2) all docks within state park waters legally authorized by the Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees during or after 1967 receive status as authorized structures; (3) that all other private docks in existence since 1967 within state park waters that are not legally authorized by Department of Natural Resources or the Board of Trustees have been evaluated on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration any authorization issued by state and federal environmental agencies and, using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria - 18-21.0041 Florida Administrative Code, as a guideline for reviewing environmental impact on marine communities, designate the structure as either authorized or require removal or modification; and (4) that no future authorizations will be issued for the construction of new private docks in state park waters. Respondent subsequently notified Petitioner that his dock fell into category (3), that it had been evaluated on an individual basis using the Florida Keys Marina and Dock Siting Policies and Criteria, that his dock had an impact on marine communities because it exceeded the size and dimension requirements and did not meet the water depth requirements, and that Petitioner's dock needed to be "modified." Respondent further advised Petitioner that the modifications required included reconstructing his dock to a T-shaped structure rather than Petitioner's rectangular-shaped structure. The new structure would be required to have a four-foot wide walkway with a terminal platform of no more than 160 square feet. Further, Respondent's proposed dock would also extend an additional 28 feet further into Largo Sound than Petitioner's dock. Respondent also required that Petitioner install permanent handrails along the dock in order to convert it to only a swimming/fishing pier, and the mooring of any water craft to the structure would be prohibited. Petitioner has not so modified his dock. There are algae, sea grasses, sponges, coral, and other vegetation and marine life beneath and adjacent to Petitioner's dock, constituting a marine community. Shading has an adverse impact on the growth of sea grasses and marine vegetation. Where shading exists under Petitioner's dock, the submerged land under the dock is nearly barren. However, Petitioner rebuilt the dock in a manner so as to reduce the effect of shading. The dock is 41 inches above water at high tide. The spacing between planks on the deck also allows sunlight to penetrate the water below Petitioner's dock. An underwater videotape of the area beneath and around Petitioner's dock reveals an extensive marine life habitat and nursery. The pilings which have been under water for such a long time have an extensive buildup of sponges and coral which, in turn, provide a habitat for an enormous number of fish. Spiny Florida lobsters live under Petitioner's dock, as do mangrove snapper, barracuda, porkfish, damselfish, reef fish, sea cucumbers, and urchins. In effect, Petitioner has created an artificial reef. Some of the barren areas beneath Petitioner's dock are a result of the halo effect, i.e., the crustaceans and fish living under the dock and in the sponges and soft corals on the pilings only graze so far from their homes in order to avoid predators. This halo effect can also be seen around the free-standing pilings outside of Petitioner's dock area. Even if the planking on Petitioner's dock were removed, the sea grasses would not grow back around the pilings since the grazing organisms would still be present. Although there may be less shading beneath Respondent's proposed dock than exists underneath Petitioner's dock, substantial damage to the marine community beneath Petitioner's dock would be caused by the removal of Petitioner's dock and the building of a new one. It is not clear that the long- term effect of Respondent's proposed dock would have less adverse impact than Petitioner's dock. It is likely, however, that the removal of the present dock, with or without the subsequent construction of Respondent's proposed dock, would have a substantial adverse effect on the healthy marine community now existing beneath and around Petitioner's dock.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered giving Petitioner's dock authorized structure status. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of February, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3 and 5-7 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 9 have been rejected as unnecessary for determination of the issues involved herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 8 and 10-19 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-7, 9-13, 16-18, 20, 21, 26-31, 33, 36, and 37 have adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 8, 14, 15, 25, 35, 40, and 41 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 22-24 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel, or recitation of the testimony. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 19 has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 32, 34, 38, 39, and 42-44 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this case. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Burgess, Jr., Esquire Syprett, Meshad, Resnick & Lieb, P.A. Post Office Box 1238 Sarasota, Florida 34230-1238 Suzanne B. Brantley, Esquire Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 35 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Don E. Duden Acting Executive Director Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 10 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Ken Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources Mail Station 10 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.6835.22 Florida Administrative Code (3) 18-20.00318-21.00318-21.0041
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