The Issue Is it necessary for Respondent, the Department of Transportation (DOT), to close the southern driveway of the property of Petitioner, Barkmore Resort, Inc. (Barkmore)? If the driveway is closed, will the Barkmore property have reasonable access to the State Highway System?
Findings Of Fact Barkmore is located at 10125 Land O' Lakes Boulevard (SR 45), Land O' Lakes, Florida. The Barkmore property is a single parcel consisting of three lots with commercial operations for Barkmore Resort Kennel and a recreational vehicle and boat storage facility. The property's two driveways connect to SR 45. The northern driveway connects to the Barkmore parking lot and is aligned with the fence gate for the storage area. At some point in the past, the southern driveway had a cross-connection to the parking lot. It does not now. It currently consists of dirt and grass and terminates at a locked gate on the southern run of Barkmore’s fence. Images of the southern driveway do not show signs of recent use. Currently the driveways are "grandfathered" in and not subject to existing driveway requirements. SR 45 is part of Florida’s highway system. DOT regulates access to the state highway system to ensure safe, efficient, and effective maintenance and operation of the roads. Several statutes and rules govern DOT's activities, including when and how it can change a property's access to the system. DOT is planning a roadway widening project that will include reconstructing SR 45 into a four-lane roadway. This will permit a 55 mile an hour speed limit. The SR 45 project's approximate length is 2.7 miles reaching from north of Connerton Boulevard to south of State Road 52. Barkmore’s property abuts that stretch of road. DOT intends for the project to improve road capacity, traffic flow, and safety. The project is a significant change to the roadway and roadway design. The project includes modifications and improvements to driveway connections along SR 45. It also provides for a shared-use path for vulnerable users, including bicyclists and pedestrians, along the east side of the project. The path, however, is on the opposite side of SR 45 from Barkmore. Barkmore's driveway is one of approximately 19 driveway modifications DOT proposes as part of the project. Barkmore's southern and northern driveways are 155 feet apart. Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-97.003 requires 660 feet between driveway connections. This requirement alleviates "driveway confusion" for drivers caused by driveways in close proximity to each other, like those of Barkmore. The fact that Barkmore's southern driveway terminates in a locked gate adds to the confusion for drivers. Every driveway creates a conflict point with vehicles and pedestrians traveling on the road to which the driveway connects. Limiting conflict points promotes better traffic movement and an increased level of safety and mobility for the highway system. Because of these safety and traffic flow considerations, DOT proposed modifying the Barkmore driveways to bring them into compliance with current requirements. DOT proposed elimination of the southern driveway and significant improvement of the northern one. The project will replace the northern driveway's dirt and gravel with asphalt. The project will increase the width of the northern driveway from 12 feet to 24 feet at the right-of-way line. The project also increases the opening, or throat, where the northern driveway connects to SR 45, to 70 feet. After the proposed changes, the northern driveway will provide reasonable and improved access to Barkmore’s property, including to the southern gate. After modification, the northern driveway will provide for adequate vehicle circulation into and out of the Barkmore property. There is no evidence to support the claim of the hearing request that, "[t]here will be no way to access the electric poles, multiple septic tanks, and propane tank if the South driveway is closed" and the business would become "inoperable." On August 2, 2019, DOT sent Barkmore a notice advising of DOT's intent to close Barkmore’s southern driveway and widen its northern driveway connecting Barkmore's property to the DOT right-of-way for State Road 45. The notice also advised Barkmore of its right to request an administrative hearing. DOT conducted a hearing on October 15, 2019, to receive public input, to learn how the project will affect access to businesses, and to hear public input about the project’s potential economic impact on the business community.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent, Department of Transportation, enter a final order approving the closure of the southern driveway of Petitioner, Barkmore Resort, Inc., and improvement of the northern driveway as part of the State Road 45 project. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie N. Carver The Barkmore Resort 10125 Land O' Lakes Boulevard Land O Lakes, Florida 34638 Amber Greene, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Sean Gellis, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Richard E. Shine, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kevin J. Thibault, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS 57 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Marinatown Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker, holding license number 0208680 and located at 3440 Marinatown Lane, Northwest, North Fort Myers, Florida. Marinatown Realty is a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., a publicly held land development and rental corporation whose president is Thomas P. Hoolihan. In late 1977, Hoolihan met L. E. Hutchinson, the complainant in this case, through another broker for whom Hutchinson at the time was employed. In December, 1977, Hoolihan and Hutchinson discussed the marketing of two condominium projects being developed by Hoolihan and reached an oral agreement whereby Hutchinson would be paid $18,000 in salary with a 1 1/2 percent commission on all sales. When the condominium units were completed and mostly sold, the parties' employment agreement was revised in late December, 1979. Under the new agreement, Hutchinson was to receive $30,000 a year salary, commissions on the remaining condominium units that had not yet closed and any commissions on outside property listings neither owned nor controlled by Seago. In return for the $30,000 guarantee, Hutchinson was to forego commissions on future properties owned or controlled by Seago Group, Inc. During the period from 1977-1978 when Hutchinson was receiving $18,000 plus a 1 1/2 percent commission, sales were handled through Lee Hutchinson Realty, Inc., which held license number 0182945. In early 1979, Marinatown Realty was incorporated to market Seago's real estate inventory, to identify and list outside properties and to act as a management agent for purposes of renting condominium units previously sold in recent projects. When Marinatown Realty was formed, the complainant became its active broker. While employed as the broker for Marinatown and receiving $30,000 a year as a salaried employee, Hutchinson held two other broker's licenses, one as L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., and another as L. E. Hutchinson. In January, 1980, Hoolihan agreed to pay a $15,000 bonus to Hutchinson in lieu of a salary increase. Since at that time sales were minimal, Hoolihan decided to pay the bonus in installments as sales occurred. Because Hutchinson left in May, 1980, he received only $10,000 of the bonus which represented moneys previously paid. On April 23, 1980, Hutchinson and Chuck Bundschu, a licensed real estate broker, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Hancock Harbor Properties, Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of Seago Group, Inc., seller, and Frank Hoffer, buyer and licensed real estate broker, in which Hoffer offered to purchase approximately 3.16 acres of unimproved acreage for $500,000. Thomas P. Hoolihan, general partner of Hancock Harbor, executed the contract on behalf of the partnership. Prior to presenting the contract to Hoolihan, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hutchinson decided on a 30 percent, 40 percent 30 percent respective co- brokerage split on the $50,000 commission due on the sale of the Hancock Harbor Property. The co-brokerage fee split was typed on the bottom of the contract submitted to Hoolihan and was signed by the three brokers. The commission due to Hutchinson was made payable to L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. On April 25, 1980, the contract with the original co-brokerage split was presented to Hoolihan who refused to agree to its co-brokerage split provision. In the presence of Hutchinson, Hoolihan informed Bundschu and Hoffer that he would not pay a commission to Hutchinson because he was a salaried employee of the Seago Group and not entitled to a commission on the sale of this property. Accordingly, the co-brokerage fee provision of the executed contract was never signed by the seller, Thomas P. Hoolihan. Instead, on April 25, 1980, Bundschu, Hoffer and Hoolihan agreed to a split of $20,000 to Hoffer and $15,000 to Bundschu in lieu of the split specified on the bottom of the contract. At the closing on July 18, 1980, which was held at Coastland Title Company, a closing statement was prepared which shows that real estate commissions were disbursed to Chuck Bundschu Realty, Inc. ($15,000), Marinatown Realty, Inc., ($15,000) and Hoffer's firm, Landco, Inc., ($20,000). The checks were written and disbursed following a conversation between an official of Coastland Title Company and Hoolihan in which Hoolihan informed the official that Hutchinson was a Seago employee and he would not agree to pay a $15,000 commission to him under such circumstances. On July 18, 1980, a check for $15,000 was issued by Coastland Title Company to Marinatown Realty, Inc. The $15,000 represented Hutchinson's share of the co-brokerage agreement. When received on July 18, 1980, by Billie Robinette, the broker for Marinatown Realty, the check was signed over by her to Seago Group, Inc., since in her opinion it did not represent commissions earned by Marinatown Realty. The oral agreement between Hutchinson and Hoolihan was to terminate at the end of April, 1980, or approximately five days after the Hoffer contract was presented. Hoolihan offered to renew the contract without a provision for a guaranteed salary because Marinatown Realty had been consistently losing money since its incorporation. On May 6, 1980, Hoolihan received a letter of resignation from Hutchinson and concluded that his offer had been rejected. In early May, 1980, Hoolihan received a call from Ms. Robinette, who had been employed as Hutchinson's secretary, regarding filling the open brokerage position at Marinatown Realty, Inc. Hoolihan discovered from Ms. Robinette that Hutchinson had paid himself 50 percent of the commissions due Marinatown Realty, Inc., for the management of condominium rentals. After examining the check stubs from Marinatown's bank account, Hoolihan took personal possession of all the books and records of the company and had the office locks changed. When he examined the books and records of the realty company, Hoolihan realized that his assumption that Hutchinson Realty, Inc., became inactive when Marinatown Realty, Inc. was formed in January, 1979, was erroneous and that Hutchinson had operated his own realty company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., while employed by Marinatown Realty, Inc. Although he held multiple licenses, Hutchinson denied that a conflict ever existed between his duties to Marinatown Realty, Inc., and his own company, L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. When questioned during the final hearing regarding how he decided where to list properties while he was the broker for both companies, the following exchange occurred between Hutchinson and counsel for Marinatown Realty, Inc.: Q Let me ask you, Mr. Hutchinson, how would it be decided when you were to go out and list property as to whether or not that property would be listed under Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc.? Who would make that determination? A I would. Q Solely on your own? A I had no contract with anyone. I had nothing in writing to direct me where to place any business. Q So this would be solely your decision as to how you would list the property? Either Marinatown Realty or L. E. Hutchinson Realty? A If I secured the listing it was my dis- cretion as to where I listed the real estate. I had the choice of one of two companies. * * * Q If you were to list property in my hypo- thetical with Marinatown Realty, is it not a fact that they would receive, and being Marinatown Realty, would receive one half of the commission and you, as the broker, would receive the other half? A That was what I did. Q So it would certainly be beneficial to Seago to have you list as much property as you could with Marinatown Realty because they, in fact, owned the stock with Marinatown Realty, is that not true? A Yes, sir. Q When you would list property with L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc., would you do this with the full knowledge, consent and permission of Marinatown Realty, Inc.? A Yes, sir. Q How would you say that you gave full consent when you just testified that it was solely up to you as to how you would list property? A If I solely decided, I give my consent. I don't have anybody else to answer to. (T. pp. 108-110) During the period that Hutchinson was a broker for Marinatown Realty and L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Hutchinson believed his primary duty was toward his own company as illustrated by the following exchange between counsel for Respondent and the complainant: Q It's a fair statement to say that you, as a broker for Marinatown Realty, Inc. didn't make a whole lot of money for Marinatown Realty, did you? A I didn't run the P & L statement. Q I'm asking you as being the broker. You didn't make a lot of money for Marinatown Realty, Inc., did you? A I made as much money for them as I did for the responsibility. Q Well, did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during that period of time? MR. FERNANDEZ: Objection as to relevancy, this whole line of questioning. MR. NEEL: Your Honor, it isn't. It's germaine. HEARING OFFICER: Objection overruled. THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, the question? Q Did L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. make a lot of money during this period of time? A That's relative. Q In comparison to what money Marinatown Realty made? A Yes, sir, because L. E. Hutchinson Realty had a thirty thousand retainer that was coming in up until April 30th. Q From Seago? A Certainly. Q So L. E. Hutchinson Realty, Inc. made a lot more money than Marinatown Realty, Inc., didn't they? A That's the way its supposed to work. Q And, again, it was at your sole dis- cretion as to how you would list the properties; under which principal. A Yes, but I asked for a specific con- tract and never got it. (T. pp. 124-125) The Administrative Complaint in this case was filed on July 22, 1981. The preliminary investigative report compiled by Robert Corno, DPR Investigator, was filed on September 24, 1981 and the final investigative report was filed on September 30, 1981. The following is a synopsis of the investigator's findings and recommendation: That the COMPLAINANT [Hutchinson] worked for the SUBJECT [Hoolihan] and their contractual agreement was verbal. COMPLAINANT was paid on a salary/commission basis by companies of which SUBJECT is Chief Officer. That the COMPLAINANT filed civil action suit against SUBJECT in this case and it was dismissed with prejudice. That prior investigation by the DPR re- commended that no action be taken against the SUBJECT in this case. That two weeks after this investigation was undertaken, an Administrative Com- plaint was being filed by the DPR against the SUBJECT. That the existing BROKER for MARINATOWN REALTY, INC. was not involved in this case, and that since the time of the above referenced transaction, the SUBJECT has acquired his BROKER'S license #020462 which had no effect in this case. That conflicting statements by inter- viewers, namely former and present em- ployees and other agents involved in this case revealed that there is a reasonable doubt for probable cause against the SUBJECT. (Respondent's Exhibit 1) As noted by Investigator Corno, this was the second time Marinatown Realty had been investigated in relation to this case. In both instances a recommendation that no action be taken against the Respondent was apparently made. At the final hearing on December 1, 1981, counsel for the Department saw the complete investigative report, including the investigator's recommendation of a lack of probable cause, for the first time. Count II of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Hutchinson is entitled to compensation for services rendered on the following sales contracts: Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to Michael T. and Judith Marchiando as buyers, Seago Group, Inc. as seller, to John E. and Charlotte A. Ferguson as buyers, and Seago Group, Inc. as sellers, to Kenneth J. Dawson as buyer. In regard to the first transaction, the Marchiandos were personal friends of the son-in-law of Seago's major shareholder, Mr. R. Berti. Hutchinson's role in this transaction was limited to preparing the contract and mailing it to the Marchiandos for signature. Hutchinson had no part in selling this property and never met the Marchiandos. The sale of the Ferguson's arose in a manner similar to the Marchiandos. Mr. Ferguson is the manager of a Detroit company owned by Mr. Berti. Similarly, Mr. Dawson works for Mr. Berti in Detroit as an accountant. These sales were made by Mr. Berti and Hutchinson furnished administrative assistance by completing the contracts and sending them to these individuals for signature. Under the terms of the agreement between Hoolihan and Hutchinson, a commission was not due on these properties to Hutchinson since these were not outside listings and his agreement with Hoolihan did not contemplate that commissions be paid in such situations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed against Marinatown Realty, Inc. be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of April, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire NUCKOLLS JOHNSON & FERNANDEZ Suite 10, 2710 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 James A. Neel, Esquire 3440 Marinatown Lane, N.W. Fort Myers, Florida 33903 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issue is whether General Motors is inadequately represented in the relevant community or territory and whether Collection Chevrolet, Inc., (Collection) should be permitted to relocate as requested in its application.
Findings Of Fact Abraham timely filed with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles its July 6, 1987 letter of protest, which became the initial petition herein. On July 24, 1987, Collection and GM filed a Motion to Dismiss that initial petition. Abraham moved for leave to file an amended Petition. Collection and GM consented to the filing of an amended petition. By Order of August 25, 1987, the undersigned granted the filing of the proposed amendments, which had not been incorporated by Abraham into a fully new petition. Collection and GM addressed these amendments in a Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition, which addressed the new matters raised in the Abraham's amendatory paragraphs. This August 24, 1987 Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition also incorporated Collection's and GM's arguments from heir earlier Motion to Dismiss. Abraham filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the August 25, 1987 Order, together with Abraham's Amended Petition on September 2, 1987; upon which pleadings oral argument was heard by telephonic conference call. Thereafter, by September 18, 1987 Orders Abraham's Amended Petition filed September 2, 1987, was deemed to be Abraham's duly filed second Amended Petition; GM's and Collection's July 24, 1987 Motion to Dismiss and August 24, 1987 Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition were permitted to stand over against Abraham's September 2, 1987, second Amended Petition; GM and Collection were permitted to file amendments to their motions to dismiss directed specifically to the September 2, 1987 second Amended Petition, which amendments Collection and GM timely filed; and Abraham was permitted to file a response to Collection's and GM's final motions/amendments, which response was filed October 5, 1987. Although untimely by the terms of the September 18, 1987 Order, Abraham's response has also been considered. Collection has applied to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for a license to relocate Collection's GM dealership from its existing location at 9200 N.W. 27th Avenue between 91st and 95th Streets, to a new location on the south side of the Tamiami Trail between N.W. 139th and 143rd Avenues, in Miami, Dade County, Florida. The relocation would result in the distance between applicant Collection and protestant Abraham being more than doubled from 4.4 miles to 9.6 miles. Collection's application is not an initial applications and seeks only a change of physical address. Thus, it is not an application for a new license but an application for relocation. The map attached to the second Amended Petition as Exhibit A contains the legend, "Abraham AGGSA 11" and a line drawn on the map outlining an area of central Dade County, Florida. The western boundary is irregular but is between 87th Avenue and 67th Avenue, centering around the Palmetto Expressway, State Road 826, which is approximately at 78th Avenue. On the north, the boundary is irregular but centers around N.W. 30th Street. The southern and eastern boundaries are irrelevant. In its second Amended Petition, Abraham pleads the map's boundaries as its area of primary responsibility. In its October 5, 1987 Response to the motions to dismiss, Abraham admits there is no dispute of fact regarding the further distance relocation, the existing physical location of Collection, or the proposed physical location of Collection but perversely argues that, "In dispute as well is the area of primary responsibility contractually assigned to Abraham by GM. Abraham has serviced for a number of years, the proposed area into which Collection proposes to move, with the knowledge and consent of GM." GM does not admit that the area designated on the map attached as Exhibit A to Abraham's second Amended Petition has been contractually assigned by GM to Abraham as a primary area of responsibility or by any other designation as alleged by Abraham. However, assuming arguendo for purposes of these motions, that the area specifically pled by Abraham has been so designated, then Collection's proposed new location will be no closer to Abraham's alleged area of responsibility than is Collection's existing location. The existing Collection location north of 91st Street is approximately 61 blocks north of the northern boundary of Abraham's alleged area of responsibility, which is in the vicinity of 30th Street. The proposed relocation of Collection west of 139th Avenue is similarly approximately 61 blocks west of the western boundary of Abraham's alleged area of responsibility, which is in the vicinity of 78th Avenue.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is, RECOMMENDED that Abraham's second Amended Petition/protest be dismissed with prejudice. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 21st day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 1987.
The Issue Is it necessary for Respondent, the Department of Transportation (Department), to close two driveways on the property of Petitioners, Joe David and Barbara Jean Riggins? If the driveways are closed, will the property affected by the driveway closings still have reasonable access to the State Highway System?
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the following facts: On October 4, 2016, the Department sent Joe David and Barbara Jean Riggins a Notice of Intent to Modify Driveway Connection. Mr. and Ms. Riggins received the Notice of Intent to Modify Driveway Connection on October 8, 2016. The Notice of Intent to Modify Driveway Connection related to the property located at 964 State Road 441 Southeast, Okeechobee, Florida. The approximate 0.787 acre property has been held by the Joe David and Barbara Jean Revocable Trust since September 24, 2012. The property is not developed, with the exception of a boat ramp aligned with the property’s westernmost driveway that is scheduled to remain open. The remainder of the property consists of asphalt and a bare concrete slab from a demolished structure. State Road 441 is a part of the state highway system. Mr. and Ms. Riggins own two adjacent lots located at 964 State Road 441, Southeast, in Okeechobee County, Florida. The Okeechobee County Property Appraiser identifies them as lots 13 and 14. The lots are vacant. Three driveways exit those properties. The driveways have been in existence since at least 1992. The driveways have not gone a year without use. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida. It regulates access to the state highway system to ensure safe, efficient, and effective maintenance and operation of the roads. The Department is planning a resurfacing project for State Road 441 from State Road 78 to Southeast 30th Terrace in Okeechobee County. That approximately two-mile stretch of road runs past the Rigginses’ property. The Department intends for the project to enhance roadway safety through improvements to the roadway surface, driveway modifications, sign and pavement markings, elevation corrections, bridge retrofits, and guardrails. The planned resurfacing project also includes modifications and improvements to driveways along State Road 441 and installation of a bicycle lane adjacent to the Rigginses’ land. The project is a significant change to the roadway and the roadway design. As part of the resurfacing project, the Department conducted an evaluation of modification of all driveways along the project corridor to improve motorist, bicyclist and pedestrian safety and operation of the roadway. When the Department plans significant changes in roads, it conducts an evaluation to determine whether existing driveways meet design standards in conformance with access management act standards. Mr. Leon, Engineer of Record and Project Manager for the project, conducted the evaluation. He recommended closing the eastern and middle driveways on the Rigginses’ two lots. The Department gave the Rigginses’ notice of the plan to close the two driveways. Department representatives reviewed the plan and the reasons for it with the Rigginses, by telephone and in person. The Department maintains that closing the driveways is necessary to improve safety and compliance with the Department’s design standards. Because of their age, the driveways are “grandfathered” and without the substantial changes of the project would not be subject to current design standards. Most recently, the Rigginses leased the lots to Edison Power Company for parking utility line trucks. The utility company used the two lots as if they were one. The lease expired December 31, 2016. If Edison Power were to resume use of the lots, there is sufficient room for its trucks to maneuver and to enter and exit the property using only the westernmost driveway. The eastern driveway is 16 feet wide at its throat where the driveway meets the road. The throat of the middle driveway is 27 feet wide. The throat of the western driveway is 35 feet wide. This driveway lines up with a boat ramp on the other side of the lot. Each driveway is substantially less than 1,320 feet apart from the adjacent driveway. The Department has design standards for driveway dimensions. For rural roadways, like the one involved here, the size range for driveway throats is 24 feet to 36 feet. Department Rule 14-97.003 classifies roadways and establishes driveway spacing for each class. State Road 441 is a Class 5 roadway. Its speed limit is 45 miles per hour. The rule requires driveways on the roadway to be spaced 1,320 feet apart. The spacing requirement is important for reducing driver confusion and wreck potentials caused by multiple turns onto or from the road in quick sequence. The project design work included examining existing driveways and their effect on traffic flows and interaction with motor vehicle, bicycle, and pedestrian traffic on State Road 441. The Department reasonably focused on limiting conflict points created by driveways and bringing affected existing driveways into compliance with current access standards. Closing the two easternmost driveways will reduce conflict points on the roadway caused by vehicles entering and leaving the property. The activity increases risks of crashes for motor vehicles and for bicyclists who will use the newly created bike lanes and vehicles entering and leaving the property. As a rule, limiting the number of driveway connections promotes better traffic movement and an increased level of safety and mobility for the system as a whole. The westernmost driveway on the Rigginses’ property will provide reasonable access to the property.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Transportation, enter a final order approving the closure of the easternmost and middle driveways on the property of Respondents, Joe David and Barbara Riggins, as part of the Department's State Road 441 Resurfacing Project. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 28th day of July, 2017.
The Issue The issues in this case are those announced by the Administrative Complaint brought by the Petitioner against Respondent claiming that the dirt drive entrance to the Ugly Duckling Rent-A-Car at 2555 U.S. 1 South, St. Augustine, Florida, is an unpermitted drive connection used for commercial purposes. It is further alleged that it is, by its nature, a residential driveway that is used in a commercial endeavor and that it does not meet design standards. The stated authority for these accusations are Sections 335.187 and 335.1825, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On October 2, 1979, Leroy E. Wall, Jr., and his wife Freda purchased the property which is in dispute in this case from Alex Hein and Virginia Hein, his wife. That property is located in St. Johns County, Florida, and its dimensions include approximately 300 feet of frontage on U.S. 1, also known as State Road 5. The frontage runs roughly north and south. The east-west depth of the property is approximately 350 to 360 feet. U.S. 1, for about 20 years, has been a four-lane road at this location with a median separating the northbound and southbound lanes. The property in question is on the western side of U.S. 1 and the southbound lane of that highway passes in front of the property. Petitioner holds a right-of-way from the white line on the shoulder of the road 38 feet inward. It has maintenance responsibility for a five foot strip inward from that white line. At the time Mr. Wall and his wife purchased the property in question, there was a residence located on the property with a free standing garage. Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence contains a copy of the warranty deed from the Heins to Mr. Wall and his wife. It also shows a description of the property through a survey done on November 14, 1984. It was the intention of Mr. Wall to have the property rezoned from residential to commercial. In addition, he had intended to build a commercial building and to seek approval of Petitioner for a driveway permit associated with that commercial venture. That driveway permit was approved on November 1, 1979. A copy of the driveway permit may be found in Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence. The date of approval of that permit is November 1, 1979. The driveway permit and a small drawing reflect the two paved driveways associated with the intended commercial building. It shows frontage in the amount of 165 feet as opposed to the 300 foot expanse that constituted the entire parcel which Mr. Walk and his wife had bought from the Heins. Nonetheless, Mr. Wall is confident that the Petitioner was made aware of the entire 300-foot expanse when he sought the permit. His recollection of those events is credited. As reflected in Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1, a report and recommendation was made by the zoning board suggesting to the Board of County Commissioners that they approve the rezoning of the subject property. That recommendation dates from December 10, 1979. The zoning change was effected. The residential building and detached garage was used by a tenant of Mr. Wall's who was in the import business. Subsequent to that time Vernard W. Fletcher, Jr., who owns Ugly Duckling Rent-A-Car became a tenant at that location on July 1, 1983. The commercial building that had the two paved drives permitted on November 1, 1979 has four tenants. The dirt driveway which enters U.S. 1 from the residence with the detached garage has been there from the time of the purchase by the Walls from the Heins until the present. Mr. Fletcher has described the peak usage of that driveway as 20 trips per day in 1987. In the period July 1, 1988, through June 15, 1989, the number of trips has dropped to 15 cars a day. Mr. Fletcher's explanation of the number of trips is accepted. July 1, 1988, through June 15, 1989, describes the period from the advent of Section 335.187, Florida Statutes, (1988), until the Administrative Complaint was brought against the Respondent on June 15, 1989, as described in the statement of the issues. As Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Wall both explain, the dirt drive is used mostly for ingress. One of the paved drives associated with the commercial building is used for egress onto U.S. 1. On March 16, 1989, Respondent received notice from the Petitioner that the dirt driveway was an unacceptable access point onto U.S. 1. This correspondence was received by Mr. Fletcher on March 17, 1989. It sets forth the same basis of concern as announced in the Administrative Complaint which was prepared on June 15, 1989. Marshall Sander who is a permit engineer for the Lake City District of the Petitioner testified at the hearing. Although he did not confirm in absolute terms the expectation of the Petitioner as to the type driveway that it would accept for permitting, it is clear that some other form of driveway than the present type is contemplated. Mr. Sander's remarks to Mr. Wall made it obvious that the Petitioner is more likely to look with favor on a paved driveway with deceleration lane than any other form of improvement. This would cost as much as $15,000. A not-to-scale drawing of the immediate area is found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. It depicts the commercial building with its two paved driveways and the Respondent's site with its dirt driveway. It also shows the approximate location of a shopping plaza which was under construction and expected to open in October 1989, which is 500 feet north of the property in question. That shopping center is located on the same side of the road as the property that is at issue. There is a traffic signal at Lewis Point Road and U.S. 1, the location of the new shopping center. That traffic control device protects automobiles which are exiting the location of the Respondent and the commercial properties adjacent to that location which are leased by Mr. Wall. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7 is a series of photographs which depict the site in question with descriptions of the exact nature of those photographs specifically set out. Petitioner's Exhibit 8 also contains a series of photographs. The first photograph is one of Moultrie Plaza which has a Publix food store and 14 other tenants with the possibility of 8 additional tenants in the future. This shopping plaza opened in January 1989 and is approximately two miles south of the Respondent's business location. The shopping plaza which is immediately north of the location in question has a Food Lion grocery store, a McDonald's restaurant, a bank and several other retail shops. It is located on the same side of U.S. 1. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9 contains other pictures associated with the basic location of the business in question. Mr. Sander's concern about the use of the dirt driveway in a commercial application relates to the edge of pavement drop-off and the formation of ruts that develop with the kick-out by wheels that spin as cars are leaving or pulling into the location and under braking, and the fact that they slide and move the gravel material in the dirt driveway. In his analysis this creates a possible safety hazard. There is no evidence that any accidents have ever occurred because of the use of this dirt driveway or any safety problem associated with its use. Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Wall have no recollection of such events and the Petitioner presented no indication that accidents or other safety problems had occurred. Mr. Sander also was of the opinion that Mr. Wall should have revealed the existence of the additional 135 feet of frontage when the 165 feet of frontage associated with the commercial building was set out in the attachment to the permit for the two paved driveways that have been mentioned before. Again, the facts are found that the 300 foot frontage was made known to the Petitioner based upon the testimony given by Mr. Wall. Section 385.187(1), Florida Statutes (1988), provides that unpermitted connections to the state highway system, to include U.S. 1, in existence before July 1, 1988, which had been in continuous use for a period of one year or more do not require permits. The dirt driveway was in existence before July 1, 1988, and was in continuous use for a period of one year or more. However, that same section speaks in terms of the ability of the Petitioner to require a permit in those instances where the connection undergoes a significant change in the use, design, or traffic flow of the connection or of the state highway that provides access. Beyond July 1, 1988, the use, design, or traffic flow of the driveway connection has not significantly changed. The use and design of the state highway has not significantly changed. The point of dispute is whether the traffic flow on that state highway has changed in a significant way. Notwithstanding the existence of two residential developments known as St. Augustine South and St. Augustine Shores, the two shopping plazas that have been described and other activities in the general vicinity, it was not shown that the traffic flow had increased in a significant way beyond July 1, 1988, up until June 15, 1989, the point at which the administrative complaint was brought or for that matter up until the time of the final hearing. Moreover, as stated, there is no suggestion that the driveway has presented a safety hazard in that time frame, particularly not when taking into account the preference to use the paved drives associated with the commercial building in the egress. That usage is facilitated by the fact that some of the equipment that is being rented is brought up one of the paved driveway exits from an area behind the commercial building. This set of circumstances is considered in light of the fact that the traffic signalization at Lewis Point Road and U.S. 1 protects a person entering U.S. 1 southbound.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX CASE NO. 89-3898 Petitioner's Facts Petitioner's facts in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4, are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 6 is accepted but it is not essential that it be found as a fact. Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Facts Respondent has described facts it wishes to have found in two categories. Those categories are a preliminary statement of facts not in dispute and a category associated with the issues deemed to be in dispute. These suggested facts are subordinate too the facts found in the recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Frederick L. Rice, Esquire 5611 St. Augustine Road Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Ben Watts, Interim Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated in accordance with those statutes. Respondent is now and was at all times associated with this administrative complaint a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0251002 under the authority of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent's last license was issued as a real estate broker with the firm of Eastern Marketing, Inc. which is located at 17841 U.S. Highway 441, 3 Mount Dora, Florida 32757. RESPONDENT'S ROLE At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been involved in the real estate profession for approximately 18 years. This real estate practice has been exclusively in the state of Florida. In addition to being a real estate broker, Respondent is licensed as a general contractor in Florida and as a mortgage broker in the state. His general contractor's license is a certified license. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was a real estate broker with Collins and Associates, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. He also had affiliation with Collins Builders, Inc., a licensed general contracting firm. He was a one half owner in Tallahassee Properties, a Florida general partnership in which the other ownership was held by W. Ronnie Collins, Respondent's brother. All of these firms did business in Florida and particular as these firms are involved with the issues in dispute, they did business in Tallahassee, Florida. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was involved in a sales promotion program which has been referred to as a trade-in program. In essence, this program was designed to allow persons who had purchased residences from a firm or through affiliated Collins companies to turn over the initial residence to Tallahassee Properties in exchange for a new home bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with the builder using the real estate services of Collins and Associates, Inc. to sell the new home. The house that was being traded was deeded to Respondent or one of the companies with which he was affiliated. In this case, the company with which Respondent was affiliated with which had property deeded to it was Ralco, Inc. Those persons who were trading one home for another had been solicited by Collins and Associates, Inc. as a realtor in an advertising program. No realtor was involved in making commissions associated with the closing that took place between the sellers who were trading in a home and Tallahassee Properties, Respondent and Ralco, Inc. with whom he was affiliated. This arrangement was designed to stimulate sales of the new home being purchased. The traded homes typically had mortgages. Tallahassee Properties not only took possession of the traded or exchanged homes but was responsible for the activities associated with the closing of the transaction, to include assumption and payment of mortgages associated with the exchanged property. As grantee on the deeds in the traded homes Respondent and Ralco, Inc. were also responsible for assumption and payments. As Respondent identified in his testimony, he and his brother W. Ronnie Collins; Collins and Associates, Inc.; Collins Builders, Inc. and Tallahassee Properties were anticipated as being the individuals to apply for the assumption of loans with the lending agencies who held the mortgages on the traded property. W. Ronnie Collins was also one of the names in the overall scheme in which the traded-in property could be placed as grantee. Approximately 80 homes were traded over a period of 6 or 7 years. The properties in dispute in this case were among them. Respondent had authorized Tallahassee Properties and in particular his brother W. Ronnie Collins as managing partner of that partnership, to place the properties in Respondent's name, W. Ronnie Collins' name or any of several companies affiliated with Respondent in furtherance of identifying a grantee that the mortgage holder would allow to assume the mortgage. Respondent's expectation was that Tallahassee Properties and the title company involved in the closing of the transaction associated with the traded property would facilitate the assumption arrangement with the mortgage holder. The title company used in the cases that are at issue here was Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. In the closings for the traded homes, which are at issue in this case, the evidence presented at hearing which may be relied upon for fact finding did not reveal what attempts were made to have the mortgage holders for the traded homes ultimately accept the substitution of Respondent, his brother or one of the companies with which he was affiliated as parties responsible for the existing mortgages on the traded properties. The reason which Respondent gave for allowing his brother, W. Ronnie Collins to act in his behalf in Tallahassee Properties was that he felt that it was impossible for him to involve himself in that business and its day to day process and at the same time be active in Collins and Associates, Inc. and Collins Builders, Inc. Therefore, he allowed W. Ronnie Collins to act for him in the business of Tallahassee Properties. This explanation has not been disputed and being tenable is credited as true. In accepting deeds related to the traded property, as will be described in the individual instances that follow, Respondent recognized that he had obligated himself to take the responsibility for assumption of and payment of the mortgage. Respondent has no direct knowledge of whether any of the trade-in transactions were followed up by gaining permission from the mortgage holder to allow someone other than the original mortgagor to become responsible for the mortgage payments. The contracts for obtaining the traded-in homes were executed by Tallahassee Properties. Nonetheless, as described, Respondent was given a deed to some of the properties purchased, to include properties in dispute here. Respondent never orally or in writing advised the sellers of the traded property that the routine mortgage payments associated with the traded property and the overall mortgage obligation would no longer be the responsibility of those sellers. In one of the cases which is at issue here involving the trade-in property of John M. and Jeanne B. Miller, Respondent stated that he received their traded property as grantee on the deed. In fact Ralco, Inc. was grantee. When asked about whether he had assumed the obligation for the mortgage that existed on that home, Respondent replied that he had assumed the loan. When asked if he explained the fact to that assumption to the Millers, he pointed out that he had never talked to the individuals. When asked if he had directed anyone in any of his companies or his real estate company in particular to explain the details of the transaction, Respondent pointed out that Collins and Associates, Inc. as realtor, and as a licensed broker had trained each associate to explain all of the rules and procedures associated with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, VA and HUD loans and that Respondent as the broker of those associates would expect that the associates would explain everything to the Millers. Whether the Millers were informed about such matters by Collins and Associates, Inc. employees was not proven. The traded in properties were rented, repaired and sold or kept in inventory by Tallahassee Properties. After purchase of the traded-in properties, Respondent's expectations as a partner in Tallahassee Properties was that the partnership would take possession of the properties and manage them and make payments on existing mortgages associated with any of those properties. Respondent believes that until the latter part of 1985 when he and some of his operations were involved in a Chapter 11 Federal Bankruptcy declaration, payments on the existing mortgages for traded properties were being made, in that had it not been so that he would have been notified. The record offers no proof that can be relied upon to satisfactorily corroborate or rebut this assumption on his part. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was not caused by problems associated with the traded properties. Ralco, Inc. was not involved in the bankruptcy. Some of the traded properties in question were owned by Ralco as grantee. Although Ralco was not involved in the bankruptcy, it was unable to make payments because of the bankruptcy in that the houses in question had a negative cash flow and Respondent was unable to take funds from the bankruptcy court and place them with Ralco, Inc. to make the payments on mortgages that existed on the traded properties. Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. were not involved in the closings of the traded property. Their involvement was with the new house being purchased following the trade. The closing associated with the new house under purchase was a separate closing and Collins and Associates, Inc. received a real estate commission for its participation. None of the exact details of the solicitation process by Collins and Associates, Inc. in which homeowners were encouraged to trade existing residences on other homes built by Collins Builders, Inc. were made known, so that it might be understood whether Collins and Associates, Inc. promised to make the attempt to have the lender accept a substitute for the original mortgagor on the mortgage indebtedness, to include the possibility of the outright release of the original mortgages from the debt obligation. Therefore, that solicitation process has no part to play in examining the issue of Respondent's conduct associated with the closings of the traded homes. In the latter part of 1985, following the filing of the petition under Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Laws, Respondent and Duval First Corporation with which he was affiliated were granted an order of relief on December 23, 1985 in Case Nos. 85-07179B and 85-07178C, respectively in the United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division. As part of the disposition in front of the bankruptcy court, the bankrupt estates and Real Estate Financing, Inc. agreed that the bankruptcy estates would surrender certain properties and the automatic stay in all expressed injunctions associated with those properties were lifted. The bankruptcy court held that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 506, Real Estate Financing, Inc. would not be entitled to an unsecured claim against the bankrupt estates for debts secured by the lien on those properties. Those properties had been encumbered by a first mortgage in favor for Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Court found that the value of those properties was equal to or exceeded the debts secured by the mortgage lien of Real Estate Financing, Inc. as of the date of the Order for Relief. In that Order for Relief, Real Estate Financing, Inc. was allowed a secured claim for the full extent of the debt due as of the date of the Order for Relief plus interest accrued up to the extent of the value of each property and up to the date of November 18, 1986. The bankruptcy court did not hold that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was entitled to any unsecured claim for any pre-petition debt that was secured by the lien on its mortgages. Among the properties affected by this action were those properties of David Walsh, Troy Brewer, Sam Hinson, Harold C. Miller, Peter Hartman, and John Miller, all of whom are listed as individuals whose transactions with Respondent are found in the Administrative Complaint and about which Respondent is said to have violated the aforementioned disciplinary provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. By this arrangement in bankruptcy court, Respondent hoped to avoid the circumstance by which the mortgage was foreclosed leaving a deficiency against the original mortgagor/homeowner of the traded-in property which would in turn lead to some claim against the bankruptcy estates for the amount of the deficiency. Nonetheless, Real Estate Financing, Inc. proceeded to foreclose on its mortgages as subsequently discussed in commenting on the individual counts to the Administrative Complaint pertaining to individual homeowners. While the bankrupt estates would have preferred to deed back the property in lieu of foreclosure, it accepted the foreclosures given the protections to the bankrupt estates that have been identified in this discussion. It should also be mentioned that two of the accounts in the Administrative Complaint pertaining to Eric Larsen and Robert Aubin, to be discussed, were not part of this arrangement in the bankruptcy court associated with Real Estate Financing, Inc. At the closings on the traded homes in question some explanations about the mortgage assumptions were made by persons who may have been representing Tallahassee Properties or other Collins affiliates, but these persons are not clearly identified in the record as to their actual position with those organizations and how Respondent was accountable for their remarks. Those remarks will be discussed in the assessment of the individual counts that follow. Respondent, following the petition for bankruptcy in his own name and that of companies with which he was associated, wrote to advise homeowners who had traded in their homes about his perception of the homeowners' status following that bankruptcy. These letters were written on February 18, 1986 on stationary of the Respondent and were signed by him. In this correspondence, which is the same format in all instances, he would make reference to the date upon which the transaction closed at which time the homeowner deeded over the traded property to Respondent or a company with which he was affiliated. He described the existence of the prior mortgage to Real Estate Financing, Inc. with a loan number and the existence of the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause and, according to the letter, that the loan was not paid off at the time of the closing and the assertion that the lender would not allow the assumption of that loan by Respondent or one of his companies. Again this record is silent on the subject of what attitude the lender held about this, or even the matter of whether an attempt was made to have the lender accept a new obligor. He described how the lender was not considering Respondent or his company as purchaser but that the original mortgagor was being considered. This was taken to mean that Respondent was trying to express that the lender was looking to the original mortgagor as a responsible entity on the mortgage. The letter described how Respondent or one of his companies had been renting and making payments since the time of closing until December 23, 1985 when declaration of the Petition in bankruptcy went forward. It described how the Respondent and his companies were unable to continue funding payments related to the mortgages on the traded property which was in the name of the homeowners who had traded the property. The letter went on to describe how the payments would be brought current until February 28, 1986. The letter is interpreted to suggest that beyond that point, the property would either be deeded back to the original owner or the lender would foreclose. The letter expressed a preference by Respondent that because, interpreting the letter again, there was no cash flow that he preferred to see the property deeded back to the original owner. The name Bobbie May was given as a contact person and a telephone number provided for the homeowners to call regarding the return of the property back to the original homeowner. The letter goes on to describe an apology from Respondent to the homeowners. Movaline Hill who was a property manager for Tallahassee Properties traded in homes, to include the homes in discussion in the Administrative Complaint, offered her testimony at hearing. The principal business of Tallahassee Properties as established in her testimony was to rent homes. Ms. Hill advertised the property for rent, collected the rent, made payments on existing mortgages on the homes, and took care of maintenance matters. Tallahassee Properties took the rent and put the payments in escrow. One of the homes that Ms. Hill was involved with had belonged to David Walsh. It was a traded home and she had discussed with Walsh getting payment cards or coupons for the mortgage that existed on the traded home. The mortgage company had sent these cards or coupons to Walsh and Hill desired to have them so that the payments on the mortgage could be made. In this connection, Hill wrote Walsh a letter. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20. It indicates enclosure of a recorded deed on the traded property of Mr. Walsh showing Respondent as having the title in his name. It further states that Mr. Walsh should sign and mail a pre-prepared letter to Real Estate Financing, Inc. telling that lender to change the mailing address and requesting new payment cards. The letter describes that Real Estate Financing, Inc. did not know that the title was no longer in Mr. Walsh's name and that the lender would not transfer the mortgage to anyone and asks Walsh not to send the copy of the deed to the Respondent to the lender. Emphasis is placed in this correspondence on not sending that information to the lender. Ms. Hill was not instructed by anyone to write the letter. The reason why Ms. Hill said that she put an indication in the letter that the transfer of the mortgage could not be done was based upon her assertion that she had been told this by the lender. What connection Respondent had with the letter, if any, was not established. The cards that she received from Mr. Walsh on coupons for payments would have his name struck over and Respondent's name placed on it and Hill would send the check to the mortgage company for payment of the mortgage. With Real Estate Financing, Inc., Ms. Hill was sending one or two checks per month that dealt with 15 or 20 mortgages. There would be a lump sum payment with account numbers and backup materials sent with the check. The backup materials would include the payment cards or coupons. During Ms. Hill's tenure with the Tallahassee Properties, she says that she kept the mortgage payments current. No evidence was presented to the contrary which is competent. From this it is found that mortgage payments were kept current for a period of time which is not specifically shown. She received no contact from the mortgage companies on the topic of any assumption packages for these loans being assumed. She did receive some coupon books with the Respondent's name affixed. Those latter circumstances were not shown to be associated with any of the traded properties that are at issue in this case. Charles O. Middleton testified at the hearing. He had worked in 1981, 1982 and up to September, 1983, with Capitol Abstract and Title, Inc. which served as a closing agent on traded properties that were picked up by Tallahassee Properties. His recollection of the events is that, as closing agent for the title company, he worked from a contract which identified the terms of the transaction. His recollection is that the transactions associated with a trade property and the new home being purchased after trade was handled together. This is in contrast to the understanding of those homeowners whose traded properties are the subject of this Administrative Complaint and Respondent. The explanation by those homeowners and Respondent that two separate closings were held, one for the traded property and one for the newly purchased property is accepted as factually correct. Middleton recalls that explanations were given by him as closing agent concerning the nature of the transaction to include the matters of the paragraph 17 "due on sale" clause. He describes this arrangement as involving an affidavit or hold harmless agreement that had to be signed. This included the initialing of the paragraphs within that agreement by the buyer and the seller. Again, none of the homeowners who sold traded property that is described in the Administrative Complaint recalls such explanations and documents and their recollection is deemed more creditable and is accepted in lieu of the comments by Mr. Middleton. Likewise, the document for purposes of explanation which was offered as Respondent's Exhibit 8 containing disclaimers about the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause, while admitted, offers no insight into the nature of what the homeowners were told in the cases that are at issue here because it isn't the same form that Middleton recalls using in the transactions he participated in as closing agent and hasn't been shown to be a form used in any of the cases here. Middleton explained that in the transactions he was involved in, the homeowners were provided a copy of every document to be utilized in the closing and that the original documents had their pages turned while the copies for the homeowners were being examined at the same time. A brief explanation would be given about each document and the homeowners were asked if they wished to take some time to read the documents and to ask any questions. Middleton as closing agent would offer to answer questions or put them in touch with the lender and let the lender answer questions. In Middleton's estimation, it was the closing agent's responsibility to make sure that necessary documents were presented to the lenders in the assumption of the mortgage for the traded in property. Respondent had not instructed Middleton in any of the closings on the topic of what to do with closing documents that were used at the time of transaction. Middleton said that he was unable to produce any of the documents of explanation concerning the closings which he participated in for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. because he has no access to those files. Middleton identified the fact that in a circumstance in which a home had a mortgage and an assumption was called for, an assumption packet would be customarily ordered at the time of the request for assistance in the closing, which he refers to as an order. Middleton identifies the fact that he is only vaguely familiar with the transactions that are at issue in this Administrative Complaint. He thinks he may have closed some of them but he has no specific recollection about that. As a consequence, he has no worthwhile knowledge of how many of those transactions had assumption packages completed. COUNT I Samuel Hinson, Jr. owned property in Arbor Hills which he had bought from Collins Builders, Inc. on June 30, 1982. This house was taken in trade for a house on Starmount. This Starmount home was also purchased from Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. served as the real estate firm for the purchase of the new home as agent for the seller. Andrew Jackson Federal Savings financed the new purchase. The traded in home was sold to Tallahassee Properties with Capital Abstract and Title, Inc., serving as closing agent according to documents presented at hearing. Mr. Middleton did not appear for Capital Abstract at that closing. In the purchaser's closing statement, W. Ronnie Collins is shown as the representative for Tallahassee Properties. Two warranty deeds were made from Hinson in selling his Arbor Hill property. In deeding his Arbor Hill property on May 20, 1983, one of those went to the Respondent and the other to Tallahassee Properties. In both warranty deeds, the grantee promised to assume and pay an existing mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. The existing mortgage on the Arbor Hills property had the paragraph 17 clause which absent certain exceptions allowed Real Estate Financing, Inc. at its option to declare all sums secured by the mortgage to be immediately due and payable, if the property was sold or transferred without prior written consent from the lender. None of the exceptions pertained to this transaction between Hinson and either Respondent or Tallahassee Properties. The paragraph 17 clause also stated that the mortgage holder was considered to have waived its option to accelerate if prior to the sale or transfer, the mortgage holder reached agreement with the purchaser in writing that the credit of the purchaser was satisfactory to the mortgage holder, thus allowing the purchaser to become responsible for the mortgage. In that instance, interest payable on the sum secured by the mortgage would be at the rate requested by the mortgage holder. The mortgagor, Hinson, would be released from all obligations under the mortgage note if the purchaser was substituted on prior written approval. Hinson went into the transactions involving the sale of his Arbor Hill house and the purchase of the Starmount house with the impression that he had to sell the Arbor Hill house in order to purchase the Starmount house. This was his surmise. Money realized in the sale of the Arbor Hill house was used as a down payment for the Starmount home. Petitioner believed that he had an arrangement to purchase the Starmount home with Ralph Collins. In reality, he was purchasing the home from Collins Builders, Inc. with Collins and Associates, Inc. being the seller's broker. In Mr. Hinson's mind, Respondent and Collins Brothers, Inc. and the then Collins real estate firm through Century 21 were all the same. Going into the transaction, Hinson was not familiar with Tallahassee Properties and its business purpose. Respondent was at both closings, the closing to sell the Arbor Hill house and the closing to purchase the Starmount home. No one discussed the matter of the assumption of the mortgage associated with the Arbor Hills house during the course of the closing of that home. Hinson got the impression from events that Respondent had bought his Arbor Hills house and that everything was being paid off. This impression was not based upon anything Respondent said to him. Hinson, after the closings, requested his insurance company to write to First Alabama concerning the cancellation of his homeowners policy on Arbor Hills. His understanding was that the insurance company sent a letter to do this and that First Alabama sent back a letter saying that they needed certain information. That latter correspondence was then taken to the Respondent. Respondent, under those circumstances, stated to Hinson that it was a mistake and that he would handle it, but that it would take some time to get some of the paper work done. Respondent did not comment to Mr. Hinson on that occasion that he had not assumed the mortgage for the Arbor Hill property nor did he indicate that none of the companies with which he was affiliated had assumed the mortgage. Respondent made no comment whatsoever about assumption of the mortgage in this conversation shown by facts presented at hearing. Hinson then got a new payment book from First Alabama, which he received a couple of days after the insurance letter. This was taken to Respondent and Respondent said that he would take care of it, that it was just a mistake. Again, what was meant by this remark was not developed at hearing. Hinson got one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent that has been referred to previously. Having received this correspondence, Hinson complained to the Tallahassee Board of Realtors. Out of the process of his complaint, Hinson met with Keith Kinderman, Respondent's counsel and the Respondent together with Eric Hoffman, counsel to Hinson. Respondent told Hinson he would help get information and that his counsel, Mr. Kinderman would help in getting some form of restitution and help clear Hinson's name and seek relief from the Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. who had closed the Arbor Hill home. In attempting to obtain a Visa credit card and a Sears credit card, Hinson has been denied that credit. The reason given for the denial is the circumstance associated with the Arbor Hills home and non-payment of the mortgage. The exact circumstance of the Arbor Hills property, concerning who holds it now was not proven at hearing by evidence that can be relied upon for fact finding. COUNT II David P. Walsh and Leila DeJarnette Walsh, his wife bought a home in Huntington Woods from Collins Builders, Inc. on December 23, 1981. This home was financed through Real Estate Financing, Inc. and carried a mortgage from that lender. The mortgage included a paragraph 17 whose language was the same as the Hinson home financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Walshes traded in the Huntington Woods property for a home on Faversham Drive which was financed by Citizens and Southern Mortgage Company. Separate closings were conducted. One was for the sale of the Huntington Woods property with Respondent receiving a warranty deed for that property which property was to be taken over by Tallahassee Properties. The second closing was associated with the sale of the Faversham Drive property from Collins Builders, Inc. to the Walshes. In executing the warranty deed in favor of Respondent as grantee pertaining to the Huntington Woods property, a condition of the warranty deed was an agreement by the grantee to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. and pay Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. through some person other than Middleton was the closing agent at the transaction involving the sale of the Huntington Woods property, according to documents at the hearing. Both that sale and the purchase of the Faversham Drive property took place on March 30, 1983. The Walshes signed a document reference the escrow account held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. on its Huntington Woods property. There is no indication whether this was or was not signed by Tallahassee Properties or the Respondent and sent to the Real Estate Financing, Inc. pertaining to funds in the escrow account and insurance coverage being transferred from the Walshes to Tallahassee Properties or Respondent as contemplated by the form. The separate closing associated with the Faversham Drive property was done through Tallahassee Title Company. Respondent was at the closing associated with the homes. Mr. Walsh is not in a position to pay for mortgages on two homes. Mr. Walsh's understanding of the trade in of his Huntington Woods home for the Faversham Drive home was to the effect that he could buy a new home from the transaction and that he would no longer be liable for the traded home, that all paperwork would be taken care of. Some salesman involved in these transactions made these remarks to Mr. Walsh; however, he doesn't know who that person was. Consequently, it is not possible to attribute responsibility for those remarks to Respondent. Subsequent to the closings, the Walshes received correspondence purportedly from First Alabama having to do with Real Estate Financing, Inc.'s mortgage held on the Huntington Woods' property. This correspondence of April 4, 1983, by its terms, reminds the Walshes that the mortgage holder has received notification of cancellation of the homeowner's policy and that the Walshes were to provide insurance coverage at all times. What the real circumstances of the homeowners policy was is not proven by competent evidence. In connection with the transactions, Mr. Walsh describes that he felt that he was dealing with a reputable real estate broker and that they had his best interest in mind. He was not represented by counsel at the closings. Mr. Walsh received one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. Mr. Walsh hired a lawyer to try to address the situation of the Huntington Woods property without success in the endeavor. To his knowledge the Huntington Woods property has been foreclosed on. No proof which is competent has been presented in the hearing to describe the exact nature of the developments with the property. Nonetheless, Mr. Walsh has had problems receiving credit twice since that time. Before the situation with the property he had never had credit problems. Mr. Walsh was proceeding in these transactions on the basis on the belief that Tallahassee Properties and the Respondent were the same entities. COUNT III Troy A. Brewer and Tina J. Brewer, his wife purchased a home from Collins Builders, Inc. in Huntington Woods on December 30, 1981. This home was financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. A mortgage was given by the Brewers in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. and it included a paragraph 17 assumption clause as described in the Hinson mortgage financed by that lender. On March 25, 1983, the Brewers traded their Huntington Woods property for a home on Faringdon Drive. The seller of the Faringdon Drive property was Collins Builders, Inc. In these transactions, the Huntington Woods property was deeded to Respondent with the provisor in the warranty deed that Respondent would assume and agree to pay for the mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. Mr. Brewer is not in a position to meet mortgage payments associated with two mortgages; one on the Huntington Woods property and one on the Faringdon Drive property. Therefore, he would not knowingly obligate himself to assume mortgages associated with both of those properties. In the transactions associated with the traded property and new home purchased, Mr. Brewer proceeded on the basis that the first home was being taken over by the Respondent and that the mortgage would be paid off after a month or so as a means for him to purchase the second home. What led him to believe this is not clear. Mr. Brewer's recollection is that he was told that everything would be taken care of and he would not have to worry about anything and there wouldn't be any problems about the house being traded and that he could stay in the home that he was selling until the new home had been built and that once built, all transactions would be taken care of. Both the traded property and the property being purchased were financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. He was not represented by an attorney in these matters. Some undisclosed realtor had told Mr. Brewer he could have an attorney but that he really didn't need one. As shown in the testimony of Mr. Brewer given at hearing, he had spoken to Respondent at closing. He also had conversations with Jackie Collins whom he believed to be a representative of Respondent. Jackie Collins was understood by Mr. Brewer to be a realtor. Again, the exact nature of the affiliation of Jackie Collins to the Respondent or his companies was not established in this hearing. Mr. Brewer did state that at the closing he was told by Respondent that there would be no problems. The nature of that remark was not further developed under interrogation of the witness. Nor was the matter of Mr. Brewer's comment to the effect that he had questioned the fact that his first mortgage on the Huntington Woods home was not assumable and had made that question known at the closing, other than to state that in response "they" had assured him everything would be taken care of and he wouldn't have to worry about it. This was associated with some remarks to the effect that Mr. Brewer should not worry that "we" would take it all in and that "they" would transfer everything over and take it out of the Brewers' name, again not pursued as to who "they" and "we" were and whether Respondent was a "they" or "we" or was in attendance when a "they" or "we" made the comments if he was not a "they" or "we." On this subject, Mr. Brewer was of the understanding that the transfer of the mortgage from Mr. Brewer to Respondent had in fact been tentatively approved by Real Estate Financing, Inc. but this was not proven by competent proof either. Mr. Brewer received one of the February 8, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. He in turn composed a letter of complaint concerning the transactions associated with the traded property. The complaint is dated March 31, 1986 and is addressed "To whom it may concern". As a result of the non-payment of the Huntington Woods property, Mr. Brewer received a letter purportedly from First Alabama for Real Estate Financing, Inc. dated February 13, 1986 that indicated that payment for the mortgage in the Brewer property had not been paid in January and February, 1986 and under paragraph 18 of the mortgage, Mr. Brewer was being notified of the failure to make payments and the possibility of the pursuit of these delinquent payments through legal means. Whether the assertions in this unauthenticated hearsay document are true was not proven by competent evidence. Beyond that date, in an action in which Respondent and the Brewers were named as defendants, Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. obtained a Summary Final Judgment of foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property on June 1, 1988. This points out that the Brewers were not released from the mortgage obligation as envisioned by paragraph 17. It does not address what attempts were made by Respondent or his companies to gain their release. As a result of the foreclosure, Mr. Brewer has had problems with his credit. Notwithstanding the foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property, there has been no deficiency judgment entered against Mr. Brewer, to his knowledge. COUNT V On November 30, 1983, Collins Company of Pensacola, Inc. conveyed property at Eldorado Drive in Pensacola, Florida to Harold C. Miller, Jr., a Collins employee. That property was subject to a mortgage from Real Estate Financing, Inc. which included a paragraph 17 as included in the facts pertaining to the Hinson transaction involving that lender. This house was purchased because of a transfer of Mr. Miller to Pensacola as a condition of his employment with the Collins Company. The Collins Company of Pensacola was responsible for paying the mortgages during that time frame. In conversation with Respondent, it was determined that Miller would buy the house and the Respondent would buy it back and in the interim, Mr. Miller would live rent free. On May 23, 1985, a quit claim deed was executed by Mr. Miller in favor of the Respondent returning possession of the Pensacola home. Because Respondent had told Mr. Miller that Respondent would make payments on this home, Mr. Miller did not make any payments. Mr. Miller speaks of a contract that was in writing and was involved in the closing on the Pensacola home when it was purchased and that there was a promise to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Finance, Inc. This comment is made in a deposition of Mr. Miller which was entered as Exhibit 71 by the Petitioner. Whether this refers to an assumption by the Respondent or someone else is not clear. As pointed out by the deposition testimony, more importantly, this contract was not produced then and is not available now for consideration in the deliberation of this case. Mr. Miller bought another house from Collins Construction in Leon County which is at Foxcroft. At the time of the deposition it was occupied by Susan, Mr. Miller's wife. Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued the Respondent and Harold C. Miller, Jr. and Susan F. Miller, his wife, in a foreclosure associated with the Pensacola property and received a Final Judgement for foreclosure on May 11, 1988. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. By the circumstances, Mr. Miller was persuaded that the Respondent would take care of the mortgage on the Pensacola home until it was paid off. What the payment history was on the mortgage prior to foreclosure has not been established in this record. In terms of any promises from Respondent about further obligations on the mortgage on the Pensacola home, Mr. Miller describes that Respondent never told him that he was relieved of that obligation or that he wasn't. Mr. Miller did not question the Respondent about this because he trusted him. COUNT VI On September 25, 1981, Collins Builders, Inc. sold a home to Peter A. Hartmann at Grantham Lane in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Hartmann borrowed money from Real Estate Financing, Inc. to purchase that home secured by a mortgage that included paragraph 17 the language of which is the same as in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. That property was subsequently deeded to Respondent on March 25, 1983. In the deed Respondent as grantee promises to assume and pay the Real Estate Financing, Inc. mortgage on the property. The Hartmann property upon which Real Estate Financing, Inc. held a mortgage was foreclosed upon in a suit by Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. against Respondent and in Peter A. Hartmann. Action was taken by order of court on May 3, 1988 and the property sold on May 27, 1988 as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Second Judicial Court in and for Leon County, Florida. This points out that Mr. Hartmann was not released form the mortgage obligation. There is a potential for a deficiency judgement against Mr. Hartmann following that sale. The details of the Hartmann transaction were not presented at hearing through his testimony or anyone else. COUNT VII On April 22, 1982, Collins Builders, Inc., sold John A. Miller and Jeanne B. Miller, his wife, a home in Lakewood Estates. That home was secured by a mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. It contained a paragraph 17 which had the language set out in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. which has been described. The home at Lakewood Estates was traded for a home in Huntington Woods II. Those transactions took place on March 2, 1984, and on that date the Millers executed a deed to Ralco, Inc., one of Respondent's companies. The warranty deed contained language to the effect that Ralco, Inc. promised to pay on the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. Bobbie G. May signed the contract for sales and purchase as representative of Ralco, Inc. The Huntington Woods II property that was bought by the Millers was bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with Bobbie G. May serving as representative for Collins Builders, Inc. in the contract for sale and purchase. The payments were not made as promised by Ralco, Inc. and Respondent sent the Millers one of the February 18, 1986 letters as previously described. Ultimately, Florida National Mortgage Association through Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued Ralco, Inc. and the Millers in foreclosure and obtained a summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure against those defendants. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. This as with other foreclosures does not speak to attempts by Ralco, Inc. to be allowed to assume the mortgages in a novation. The property at Lakewood Estates which had been traded in was then sold June 28, 1988, as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida. That judgment against the Millers is shown on the credit report of John Henry Miller. Mrs. Miller understood that the mortgage payments on the traded home would be made until the property was sold by Ralco, Inc. Visits to the neighborhood where that traded home was found did not indicate any activities toward the sale by way of for sale signs. No one was living in the traded home at that time. The Millers were not represented by counsel during the course of the closings associated with the two homes. They were represented in the foreclosures suit. In reference to the credit circumstance of the Millers, in trying to buy a vehicle they had been denied credit once. They were eventually able to buy the vehicle. The Millers had been told when purchasing the initial home at Lakewood Estates that the reason for buying it would be the possibility of being able to trade for a larger home at some later date if needed. Again, it is not clear who made those statements to the Millers. On the day before the closing of the traded home, Mrs. Miller spoke with Sissie Collins whom she understood to be affiliated with Respondent or one of his companies. The record does not show what that affiliation would have been, if anything. In this conversation with Sissie Collins, Mrs. Miller pointed out to Ms. Collins that the loan with Real Estate Financing, Inc. was not assumable without qualifying. Moreover, Mrs. Miller believed that Respondent did not qualify for the loan and that it was not assumable unless he did. Sissie Collins stated that this was not a problem and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. or First Alabama allowed Respondent to assume a mortgage and make the payments until the property was sold and the mortgage was paid off and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was fully aware of the circumstance. Whether this was true or not was not proven by competent evidence. What Respondent knew about these matters wasn't shown either. At the time of hearing, the Millers had not been called upon to pay any deficiencies associated with the foreclosure of their Lakewood Estates property. COUNT VIII Eric R. Larsen and Young Oak Larsen, his wife, purchased a home from a Collins Company in Huntington Woods Unit II. That house was eventually traded for a home in Cross Creek. The traded home was deeded to Respondent with the promise that Respondent would assume an existing mortgage on the Huntington Woods Unit II property which is owed to Andrew Jackson State Savings and Loan Association and make payments. The closing associated with the traded property took place on December 2, 1982. The new home was being purchased through the same lending institution as the traded home. The Larsens were not represented in the closings associated with the traded home and the purchased home. The closing of the traded home took place in offices of the Respondent's business. The second closing for the purchased home took place at the Andrew Jackson Federal Savings. When Mr. Larsen asked why the deed for his Huntington Woods II property was being made to the Respondent, he was told that it was to facilitate the assumption of the mortgage. By his remarks, Mr. Larsen is not clear on whether the Respondent attended the closing associated with the traded property. He does recall someone whose name is Chip who he thought was the real estate broker who worked with Respondent was at the closing. No further indication of who this man named Chip might be as to association with Respondent or his companies was shown in this record. The Larsens received a February 18, 1986 letter from Respondent as previously described, when the problems occurred about payments for the traded property, and at that time the mortgage was shown as being held by Colonial Mortgage Company. Mr. Larsen also received a letter on April 8, 1987, purportedly from Colonial Mortgage Company, which states that Mr. Larsen is not released from liability on the traded property and some comment about assumption packages having been sent on various dates and reminds Mr. Larsen that the loan could not be assumed without the prospective purchaser's credit having been approved. The letter describes other perceptions about the ability of the Respondent to take over responsibility for the mortgage on the traded property. All of the matters set out in this unauthenticated correspondence are hearsay and they cannot form the basis of fact-finding in terms of whether Respondent or his companies were ever allowed to assume the mortgage on the traded property. People who had a direct knowledge of the mortgage circumstance with Colonial Mortgage Company pertaining to this traded property as with other traded property on which a lender held mortgages and sent letters have not been presented to explain that circumstance by competent evidence. Likewise, the outcome of what has happened with the traded property in the Larsen transaction has not been proven by competent evidence. The explanation of the outcome with that property is hearsay which may not be used as a basis for fact finding. COUNT IX Robert R. and Patricia A. Aubin, husband and wife, traded property under the program which Respondent was affiliated with for taking in one residence and selling another. Mr. Aubin thought that this kind of transaction was common and that led to his telling his financing institution that the same builder was taking back the original home in order to build Mr. Aubin another house, thinking that this might simplify the transaction. In speaking to someone about the obligation to deal with the existing mortgage on the traded property, he identifies the person he was talking to as Ed Hines. Again, it is not clear what Mr. Hines' association was with the Respondent and his companies. The traded home was going to be given to Tallahassee Properties. Mr. Aubin was not certain of the arrangement Respondent had with his individual companies. Ultimately, there was a problem with the payments on the house that had been traded in. Respondent wrote the Aubins one of the February 18, 1986 letters reference the property at Huntington Woods Unit I. An arrangement was being made whereby Real Estate Financing, Inc. received $3,704.48 from Ralco, Inc. by a check of June 26, 1986. That check was issued after Ralco, Inc. conveyed the traded property back to the Aubins on June 17, 1986 and this resolved the problem for the Aubins.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-3850 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed fact-finding offered by the parties. PETITIONER'S FACTS Paragraph 1 is utilized. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. 4-5. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are set out in the findings of fact. 6-10. Paragraphs 6-10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 has not been proven. Paragraph 12 is correct in terms of Hinson's decision to convey the property; however, what Hinson was allowed to believe concerning the matter of assumption as it might show culpability on the part of the Respondent has not been proven. This matter set forth in paragraph 13 has not been proven. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 15 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 16 has not been proven as to any financial losses due to dishonest acts or false promises of the Respondent. Hinson was found to have been denied credit cards. The latter sentence in paragraph 16 is speculation and not fact. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 18 in the suggestion that the Respondent through his real estate office and salesmen made representations and promises to the Walshes was not proven in the sense that persons involved with the Walshes and the transaction to trade in the home were not sufficiently identified to understand how those persons were affiliated with the Respondent. Paragraph 19 is accepted as to the documents and promises by the Respondent. Again, what the association was of the other person identified as the salesman may have been is not clear in this transaction. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 21 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 is not proven in the first sentence. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 23 was not proven. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found except in its suggestion that the Walshes had been deceived in the sense of the idea of the mortgage not having been assumed or attempts made to have it assumed. Paragraph 26 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to facts found except as it identifies the nature of the salesperson and what the affiliation was with Collins and Associates insufficient proof was made to show the true nature of the position of the salesperson in Collins and Associates, Inc., if any, and what Respondent had in mind and any instructions to this person who was reportedly the salesperson. Paragraph 29 is subordinate to facts found as to promises in the document system responsibilities of Respondent. Otherwise it is not accepted. Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found except as to its suggestion that deceit has been proven relating to the Respondent's attempts to have the mortgage assumed. Paragraph 31 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found except as to the suggestion that this problem of the foreclosure dissolved the marriage. Paragraph 35 in its first sentence is contrary to the Impression of the facts. There was a discussion and a decision reached to buy the house, whether Respondent was acting as a real estate broker individually or as a builder developer is unclear. Whether he made his employee buy the house or directed him to is not accepted as a fact. Paragraph 36 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 37 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 38 was not proven on the issue of whether Respondent applied for an assumption. The Final Judgment of closure was proven. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found in a suggestion of an agreement to take over the Huntington Woods property. Reference to the allegations and the foreclosure petition are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute and do not constitute an explanation of how Respondent may have carried out his promise to take over responsibilities for the mortgage and the traded property which is the true issue. Likewise, paragraph 42 where it is acknowledged in that suit the agreement to assume the mortgage does not answer the issue of whether attempts were made to bring about that assumption. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 44 and its suggestion as to any intended action on the part of a mortgage insurer has not been proven by competent evidence. Paragraph 45 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 47 in the suggestion of activities by a salesperson of Collins and Associates has not been shown in terms of the affiliation with the Respondent's companies or with the Respondent in terms of the details of that affiliation sufficient to show that Respondent is culpable for any acts of his employees. Respondent through Ralco, Inc. had agreed to assume and pay for the existing mortgage on the traded property. Paragraph 48 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 49 is subordinate to facts found. Suggestion by counsel that Respondent's admission of 86 coincide with the fact finding in paragraph 50 is erroneous as is reference to page 11 in the transcript which speaks of the admissions. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found with the exception that the Respondent was not shown to have been deceitful in saying that the mortgage had not been allowed for assumption in that no competent proof was offered as to the attitude of the lender concerning the assumption. Paragraph 53 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 54 is correct in terms of the credit report on foreclosure, otherwise it is rejected as heresay. Paragraph 55 is inaccurate when it suggests that proof was made that Respondent did not take care of the assumption in the Larsen trade-in property. Paragraph 56 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 57 constitutes legal argument. RESPONDENT'S FACTS 1-7. Paragraphs 1-7 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence of Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. The remaining sentences within paragraph 8 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 9 is subordinate to facts found. In paragraph 10, Charles Middleton was not shown to have been the closing agent for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. in the transactions which are at issue here. In paragraph 11, Respondent was responsible for applying for the mortgage assumptions but the proof was not made that he did not do so or that he did. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 14 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 15 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 16 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 19 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 20 is not accepted. Paragraph 21 is not accepted. Paragraph 22 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23 is not relevant. Paragraph 24 is the reputation of the Respondent is only relevant if culpability has been shown. It has not been. 25. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 26 is not accepted in terms of what position Chip Miller held and what capacity he was acting in when involved in the Hinson transaction as employee of Collins and Associates, or Tallahassee Properties or exactly what capacity. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 29 is heresay and not accepted. Paragraph 30 is contrary to the impression of the credit circumstance of Mr. Hinson. Whatever the current credit report may say, Mr. Hinson's credit had been hurt. Paragraph 31 is true. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to the facts found except for deprivation of credit. Paragraph 33 is not necessary to the resolution of dispute. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 35 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 36 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 37 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 38 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 42 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found, except in its suggestion of what capacity Sissie Collins really served which is not established. Paragraph 44 is subordinate to facts found, except not proven that mortgage assumption tentatively approved. He did make representations as the mortgage grantee. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 47 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 48 is contrary to facts found. There is no paragraph 49. Paragraph 50 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found. 53.-55. Paragraphs 53-55 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 56 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 57 is subordinate. Paragraph 58 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 59 is subordinate to the facts found. 60.-62 Paragraphs 60-62 are subordinate to the facts found. 63.-64. Paragraphs 63-64 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 65 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 66 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 67 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 68 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 69 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 70 is subordinate to the facts found. 71.-72. Paragraphs 71-72 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 73 in the first sentence is subordinate to the facts found. The second sentence has to do with whether Andrew Jackson gave preliminary approval for the assumption of the mortgage on the traded property and is heresay not accepted. Paragraph 74 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 75 is subordinate to the facts found. 76.-77. Paragraphs 76 and 77 are accepted as true but are not needed. 78.-79. Paragraphs 78-79 are subordinate to the facts found. 80. In this instance and all that have discussed before, Respondent did make representations through the February 18, 1986 letters. 81-82. Paragraphs 81-82 are subordinate to facts found. 83. Paragraph 83 is subordinate to facts found. 84.-85. Paragraphs 84-85 are subordinate to facts found. Suggestion that the paragraph 86 relates back to initial paragraphs is acknowledged and accepted in the manner that has been described in the discussion at the paragraphs set forth in the proposed fact finding. Paragraph 87 is legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR-Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32817 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Eaton, Davis, Marks, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Keith Kinderman, Esquire 906 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
The Issue Was the Department of Transportation's action in closing an existing driveway connection to US Highway 27 from the property located at 2623 US Highway 27, South in Sebring, Florida, in compliance with Chapter 14-96, Florida Administrative Code, and the Access Management Act?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The driveway connection to US Highway 27 which the Department has closed, and is the subject matter of this proceeding, served the property located at 1623 US Highway 27 South, Sebring, Florida (Merrill Lynch property) which is situated at the intersection of Highway 27 and Sparta Road in Sebring, Florida, and abuts both US 27 and Sparta Road. MacBeth Associates, LTD., a Florida limited partnership, is presently the owner of the Merrill Lynch property. However, MacBeth Associates, LTD. (MacBeth) did not acquire the Merrill Lynch property until after the commencement of this proceeding. Ross MacBeth, sole owner of a corporation that is one of the general partners of MacBeth, appeared on behalf of MacBeth. However, Ross MacBeth did not file a motion or request that MacBeth be made a party to this proceeding. John Clark, Petitioner, is employed by Merrill Lynch who was leasing the Merrill Lynch property at the time the Department made the decision to close the driveway connection which is the subject matter of this proceeding. On December 17, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Change Driveway Connection to Petitioner advising that due to the road improvement project on State Road 25 (US 27), Petitioner's existing driveway connection onto US 27 would be closed because it would cause a safety or operation problem on the State Highway System. This driveway connection is identified as No. 73 on the Department's Access Management Plan. Between Lakeview Avenue and Highland Avenue which includes the Sparta Road and US 27 intersection and Petitioner's driveway connection, US 27 is classified as level five under the Department's Access Management Classifications for Highlands County which was signed into effect by the Department's District I Secretary in January 1993. The Department utilizes the Florida Department of Transportation Roadway and Traffic Design Standards (Design Standards) as guideline specifications for designing and building driveway connections onto state roads. Aim Engineering and Surveying, Inc. prepared a Connection Access Management Study (Study) for the Department for the project which is the subject matter of this proceeding. Ronald L. Schlegel, Professional Engineer, registered in the State of Florida, who is qualified in transportation engineering was the engineer of record for the Study. The Study recommends the removal of Petitioner's driveway connection because of potential vehicle movement conflicts with bank's driveway connection and that site access is provided from Sparta Road which connects with US 27. The Merrill Lynch property has two access points off Sparta Road, one adjacent to the Merrill Lynch building and one connecting to the rear parking area of Merrill Lynch. Access Management Standards (Standards) require a clearance of 230 feet between the curb line of the intersection and curb line of the access immediately downstream of the intersection. Additionally, the Standards require a minimum of 240 feet between access points (driveway connections). The Merrill Lynch driveway connection (driveway connection 73) does not conform to the Standards in that it is approximately only 90 feet from its curb line to the curb line of the intersection of US 27 and Sparta Road. Additionally, it appears that the curb line of driveway connection 73 and the curb line of the bank's driveway connection (driveway connection 72) is considerably less than 230 feet and therefore, does not conform to the 230 foot requirement of the Standards. The Standards require a 35 foot turning radius for driveway connections on US 27. Conditions on US 27 at driveway connections 72 and 73 would not allow a 35-foot turning radius. Therefore, since the bank had no other access to US 27, the closing of driveway connection 73 was necessary to prevent any safety and operational problems existing at driveway connections 72 and 73. One of the criteria used in the Study to evaluate existing driveway connections was: C. Use of joint driveways, if adjacent property owners agree with such use, where such use will solve a safety or operation problem. A joint use agreement shall be executed by property owners. The Department must design driveway connections to connect to a paved point where the Department's right-of-way joins private property. The Merrill Lynch property that is adjacent to the bank property is not paved. Therefore, driveway connection 72 could not be constructed by the Department such that it straddled the bank property and the Merrill Lynch property which would have allowed joint use of driveway connection 72. In response to a contact by Representative Spratt, the Department did a field review of driveway connection 73 and confirmed that joint-use access was the best alternative for Petitioner. Although joint use of driveway connection 72 is possible, Petitioner has not pursued this matter with the bank. Also, in response to a contact by Representative Spratt, the Department conducted a traffic count at the intersection of US 27 and Sparta Road. From the results of this traffic-count study, it was concluded, barring joint use of driveway connection 72, that access to the Merrill Lynch property off of Sparta Road created less safety and operational problems than would driveway connection 73 if it were allowed to remain open, notwithstanding any evidence to the contrary presented by Petitioner which I did not find to be totally credible. While some of the traveling public (including Petitioner and his customers) may be inconvenienced as a result of the closure of driveway connection 73, it is prudent, from a traffic engineering and safety perspective, to close driveway connection 73.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to re-open driveway connection 73. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Ross MacBeth, Qualified Representative MacBeth Associates, LTD. 2543 U.S. Highway 27, South Sebring, Florida 33870 John Clark c/o Merrill Lynch 2623 U.S. Highway 27, South Sebring, Florida 33870 Brian F. McGrail, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue Whether Respondent Banta is guilty of dishonest dealing, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in a business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, (1993). Whether Respondent is guilty of operating as a real estate broker without a valid and current license, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1993). Whether Respondent is guilty of failing to provide written agency disclosure to a party in a real property transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(q) and (1)(e), Florida Statutes (1993) and Rule 61J2-10.033, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0165881. As of March 31, 1992, the Respondent failed to renew his real estate broker’s license, for the 2-year period of April 1, 1992 to March 31, 1994. Renewal would have consisted of completing the required continuing education, paying the required fee, and sending the required form to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. The Respondent’s license was delinquent after March 31, 1992. As of March 31, 1994, the Respondent had not renewed his broker’s license and his license remained delinquent. On May 9, 1994, the Respondent renewed his license, in order to make a claim for a commission. As of March 31, 1996, the Respondent failed to renew his license again. His license was delinquent after March 31, 1996, and was delinquent as of the hearing date. The Respondent operated as a real estate broker during the period of approximately February 1993 through May 1994, specifically including a period when his license was delinquent as “involuntary inactive.” Sam Morrow is a licensed real estate broker and is a real estate developer and home builder. Effective February 10, 1993, Respondent entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement with Florida’s Preferred Homes, Inc. (FPH), a company in which Morrow is a principal. Respondent was originally retained on a fixed salary basis for an indefinite term to assist in finishing a number of low-income housing tax credit apartment applications for tax credits. At the request of Morrow, Respondent assumed other duties. Respondent represented FPH, and other business entities of which Morrow was the principal, in other business dealing from February 10, 1993 through May 24, 1994, when Respondent was terminated. The Respondent received a fixed salary throughout the period of his association with Morrow with the promise of additional undefined compensation in the future. For the purposes of this matter, Respondent was an employee of FPH and was supervised by Morrow. Respondent’s association with Morrow was not an exclusive employment agreement. During this same period in February 1993, Morrow became engaged in a transaction involving affordable housing. The transaction involved the purchase of land, by a purchasing entity, the Community Housing Trust, Inc., a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, from the seller, Rouse Road Corporation. After this purchase the property was to be transferred to another corporation, of which Morrow was to be the principal along with another business partner, and affordable housing units would be constructed upon the land and then sold to the public. The structure of the purchasing and developing entities was complex, involving various public and private entities, including Orange County. Morrow was a principal and the overall coordinator of the entire project which came to be known as the Oak Grove Circle project. There was no specific agreement for the Respondent to receive any particular additional compensation for the Respondent’s services in the affordable housing project. Respondent was familiar with the property that the Rouse Road Corporation had for sale and brought it to the attention of Community Housing Trust, as a prospective purchaser. This particular property was suitable for purchase and development as an affordable housing project. Respondent facilitated the purchase and prepared the contract for sale and purchase which was executed by the parties: Community Housing Trust, as purchaser, and Rouse Road Corporation, as seller. The contract was executed on March 5, 1993 for the property later known as the Oak Grove Circle property. Respondent represented neither the purchaser nor the seller in the transaction. He considered himself a transactional broker. The contract indicates on its face that Respondent, J. Scott Banta, is the real estate broker in the transaction. The contract called for the payment of a 10% commission to the Respondent. Respondent was not at any time prior to or during the purchase and sale transaction, either an agent, employee, independent contractor or representative of the seller, Rouse Road Corporation. Respondent was not at any time prior to or during the purchase and sale transaction, either an agent, employee, independent contractor or representative of the purchaser, Community Housing Trust, Inc. In September 1993, Morrow formed a Florida corporation known as FPH Venture 2, Inc. He was the sole incorporator. During this period in the fall of 1993, certain negotiations took place regarding the structure and goals of FPH Venture 2, Inc. The principals of the firm were to be Sam Morrow and Long Farms North. All of the prospective partners agreed that because of the need for cash equity, the real estate commission on the Oak Grove Circle property would remain in the FPH Venture 2 proposed project. For this consideration Respondent expected to be a principal also. The goals for the FPH Venture 2 project were set out in some detail in a memorandum developed by the prospective venturers and typed by Respondent. Respondent was included as one of the principals. The goals memorandum provides that the 10% commission payable to Respondent on the Oak Grove Circle purchase and sale would be assigned by Respondent to FPH Venture 2 “for cash flow and total profit benefits.” Respondent’s understanding of the proposed FPH Venture 2 project was that he was to receive a one-third ownership participation in FPH Venture 2, Inc., which was to have included the proposed Oak Grove Circle project and another proposed project in Lakeland, Florida, in exchange for the prospective commission. The terms of Respondent’s proposed participation in FPH Venture 2 were never reduced to any form of written agreement. Nor was Respondent ever made a principal in the company or issued any stock, or otherwise given anything to evidence his interest in the proposed venture. The closing of the purchase and sale of the property, later known as the Oak Grove Circle property, as anticipated by the contract for sale and purchase, was consummated on May 19, 1994. James L. Bishop, vice-president of Community Housing Trust, Inc., executed the settlement statement which provided for payment of $28,000 real estate commission to J. Scott Banta from the seller’s proceeds of closing. The commission check was delivered to Respondent at the closing without objection. On the day after closing of the Oak Grove Circle purchase and sale, May 20, 1994, Respondent gave Morrow a memorandum suggesting a procedure for payment of the $28,000 commission into FPH Venture 2, Inc. On May 24, 1994, the matter culminated in a conversation between Respondent Banta and Morrow. Respondent requested Morrow reduce their agreement regarding his proposed participation in FPH Venture 2, Inc., to writing. Morrow refused to do so, and at 4:45 p.m. on the same day, terminated Respondent’s employment, stopped payment on Respondent’s consulting fee check for the prior week and changed the locks on his office with Respondent’s personal property still inside. Respondent has retained the commission from the sale of the Oak Grove Circle property. Morrow’s account of this business relationship with Respondent and the agreed disposition of the proceeds of the commission is not credible.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent be found guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(e) and (1)(q) and be found not guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1993). It is further recommended that Respondent be fined the sum of $1,000 and that his license be suspended for a period of three months, subject to reinstatement upon such reasonable conditions as the Florida Real Estate Commission shall require. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of January, 1997, at Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven D. Fieldman, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building - North Tower, Suite N308 Orlando, Florida 32801 Allen C.D. Scott, II, Esquire Scott & Scott, P.A. 99 Orange Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Lynda L. Goodgame, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Henry M. Solares Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building - North Tower, Suite N308 Orlando, Florida 32801
