The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Some time after February 19, 1983, and before March 23, 1983, Wayne W. Hickey opened for business as an auto mechanic under the name Auto Tech at 2350 Fernwood Drive in Pensacola, Florida. He was employed by, but had no ownership interest in the auto repair business known as Motor Exchange that occupied the premises before him. After he had opened his own business, he undertook employment for Lloyd Linville, a principal of Motor Exchange, who asked him to repair a car that belonged to David H. Weinstein which Motor Exchange had been unable to repair. Mr. Hickey could not fix the engine knock, either, and was never paid for his work. While the car was in Mr. Hickey's custody, vandals did $700 damage to it. Mr. Hickey refused to repair this damage or pay Mr. Weinstein money to have it done elsewhere. On February of 1983, while still employed by Motor Exchange, Mr. Hickey signed a warranty on behalf of Motor Exchange covering an engine rebuilt for Jose L. Rodriguez. A week later Mr. Rodriguez discovered that the cam and the lifters were bad, and brought this to Mr. Hickey's attention. Mr. Hickey referred Mr. Rodriguez to Motor Exchange at their new location. The last time that Mr. Rodriguez and Mr. Hickey spoke before the hearing in this cause, Mr. Rodriguez told Mr. Hickey that all was well. At hearing for the first time, Mr. Hickey learned that other problems had developed with the engine since. After she got her income tax refund, Anita Diane Frye took her 1974 Chevrolet to Auto Tech on February 28, 1983. She considers the car hers even though it is registered in her boyfriend's name. He signed the work order authorizing respondent to rebuild the engine. Auto Tech worked on the engine and gave a "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship accessories excluded." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. When Mr. Hickey returned the car after working on the engine, he told Ms. Frye, "You better buy a new set of back tires," because it would go so fast, he claimed. In fact, the car smoked from the time they got it back from Mr. Hickey and he was unable to correct the problem when they took it back for lifters to be installed or when they took it back the second time. The third time they took it back they found the shop closed and no indication of how to get in touch with Mr. Hickey. At the time of the hearing, the car had been driven less than 3,000 miles since the engine had been rebuilt, but the engine spat and sputtered and the car could not be driven faster than 20 or 30 miles per hour: "You sit in a cloud of smoke whenever you stop." After James Clyde Odom heard respondent's radio advertisement, he brought his 1974 Dodge truck to Auto Tech on May 3, 1983, to have the engine rebuilt. Mr. Hickey told him he would rebuild the engine "from the ground up" and guarantee his work. As agreed, Mr. Odom returned for the truck on May 7, 1983, paid Mr. Hickey $644.09 and received a written "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship. Accessories excluded." Mr. Odom had driven the truck approximately three miles when his wife, who was following in another car, honked her horn. Steam was rising from the engine. They turned around and went back to the garage where Mr. Hickey supplied a bolt that had been left out of the water pump housing. The Odoms set out again and made it all the way to Mrs. Odom's father's house, where they noticed oil leaking. They determined that a quart and a half had been lost. They took the truck back to the Auto Tech shop again and left a note describing the problem. A week later Mr. Odom picked his truck up from Auto Tech a third time and drove it about two and a half miles to a friend's house, where oil leaked from the truck again and formed a puddle in the friend's driveway. This time when Mr. Odom returned, Mr. Hickey said he could not work on it right away, that Mr. Odom would have to bring it back at Mr. Hickey's convenience, and he refused Mr. Odom's proposal that another mechanic he asked to repair the engine with the bill being sent to Mr. Hickey. The compression in the truck's engine ranged from 107 or 114 pounds in one cylinder to 160 pounds in another. Mr. Hickey also undertook to repair the brakes on the Odom truck, and was paid for this job. He did not turn the drums or replace the brake cylinders although he did install new brake shoes. The brakes did not hold after the work was done. On May 27, 1983, Ishmael White took a 1974 Dodge engine to Hickey for rebuilding. The job was to include "rings, mains, rod bearings, timing gear, timing chain, lifters, push rods, oil pumps, all new gaskets, complete valve job and" cam bearings. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. On June 1, 1983, Mr. White paid Mr. Hickey $624.75 for this work and he picked the engine up the next day. The head bolt had not been replaced. On June 10, 1983, the engine was reinstalled in Mr. White's pick-up truck. It made the whole truck vibrate. When Mr. White took it to be tuned, the mechanic said he could not tune it because the valves were not closing. When Mr. White reported this to Mr. Hickey, Mr. Hickey said he would not be able to work on the engine until June 15, 1983. On June 15, 1983, Mr. White left the truck with Mr. Hickey and returned to pick it up on June 21, 1983, as they had agreed. The truck was not ready then, so Mr. White inquired again on June 23, 1983. At that time Mr. Hickey told him that the water pump leaked and would cost $70 to replace, but Mr. White refused to buy a water pump from Mr. Hickey since a new one had been installed less than three months before he took the engine to Auto Tech. On July 12, 1983, Mr. Hickey told Mr. White that everything had been fixed except the water pump and that if he towed the truck away without buying another water pump the warranty was "no good." The warranty Mr. Hickey had earlier given Mr. White was a "1 year or 15,000 mile warranty on engine against defective parts & workmanship. Accessories excluded." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7. Mr. White took the truck nevertheless. Bolts were loose. A brand new air filter was wet. Four of the eight cylinders had little or no compression and the engine ran so rough the hood shook, but the water pump was not leaking. Mr. White took the truck elsewhere to be repaired at his expense. On April 2, 1983, James Fisher took his Ford pick-up to Mr. Hickey and Auto Tech and asked that a rebuilt 400 cubic inch engine be substituted for the 351 cubic inch engine it had at the time and that its C-4 transmission be replaced with a C-6. The Fishers retrieved their truck on April 14, 1983, and drove it home. The next day they set out on a camping trip. They had driven 20 miles when the engine "blew up." Smoke came back into the cab and billowed out from under the hood. Employees of Mr. Hickey came for the truck. On April 25, 1983, the Fishers left Auto Tech in the Ford truck a second time. The engine ran rough, the transmission "growled," and they spotted a stream of transmission fluid, so they turned around before they had gone a mile and drove the truck back to Auto Tech. On April 29, 1983, Mr. Hickey said everything was fine and the Fishers set out again. The transmission was better, but the engine was worse, and the car broke down near their son's place of business, a block or so from Auto Tech. The truck was taken back to the Auto Tech garage. Again on May 6, 1983, the Fishers set out in the truck and got all the way to Pace, Florida, this time, notwithstanding problems with the transmission. A mechanic in Pace discovered worn valve guides, worn rings and worn bearings; and that only one bolt attached the engine to the frame; and that the drive shaft had been jammed in without being properly fitted. The Fishers were unable to find Mr. Hickey after he closed down his Auto Tech shop. Without objection, the following affidavit was received in evidence at hearing: I Took The Engine To Wayne Hickey at Auto TECH to be Rebuilt. He was To Rebuild The Engine For $395.00 Plus Taxes, I Paind Him by check $414.75 I took The Engine Home and Installed it in The Car.The engine was Smokeing Real bad. I went back to Wayne Hickey with The Car and he informed me That The Engine Should be Ran For up To 500 miles If IT didn't stop smokeing & useing oil To bring it back. The Engine Froze up. I Towed The car back to AUTO TECH. Wayne Hickey said he would Need to Keep The Car for 3-4 days. My daughter called after 7 days and they haden't Touched The car. They Said to Call back ON The 16 July 83. My daughter Called back on The 16 July 83 and could get no anser, I called back on The 19th & the Recording Said The Phone was Temperoley out of order, I came over here to Auto TECH and talked to Wayne Hickey, 7-28-83. He had not done anything to the Engine, I ask him To give me my Money back and I would get The Engine Fixed Myself. He stated For me to Take The car Home, Take the Engin back out and bring the Engine back To him and He would Fix IT, he didn't say anything about Removeing The Engine when He Told me To bring The car back to Him, A Mr. Watha L. Clayton wrote out the foregoing statement on a form furnished by petitioner's office. The form affidavit was notarized July 28, 1983.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to initiate judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 2d day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2d day of December, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr., Esquire Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Wayne Hickey Motor Exchange 5672 Avondale Road Pensacola, Florida 32506 Curtis A. Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: In late 1990, Robert Sayre filed with Respondent an application for an independent motor vehicle dealer license authorizing him to do business as TNT Auto Sales at 2050 N.W. 36th Street in Miami, Florida. At the time, Sayre leased the location of his proposed business from James Philips. 1/ Sayre no longer holds a leasehold interest in the property. The property is now owned by Teobaldo Cabrera, who is leasing it to Fiory Motors, Inc. Fiory Motors, Inc., has a current license from Respondent to operate as an independent motor vehicle dealer on the property.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for an independent motor vehicle dealer license on the ground that he neither owns nor leases the property identified in the application as "the exact location of [his proposed] place of business." DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11 day of September, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11 day of September, 1992.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to a refund of the fine remitted for a Load Report Citation, citation number 062459M, for operating a commercial motor vehicle with an expired apportioned tag.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of monitoring commercial motor vehicles driven within the state. In this regard, the Department issues Load Report Citations to vehicles failing to comply with the requirements of Section 316.545, Florida Statutes. On April 1, 1997, a vehicle driven by Depriest Ivey, Jr., was issued Load Report Citation number 062459M for operating within Florida with an expired Illinois apportioned tag. Based upon the weight of the vehicle, Mr. Ivey was fined $1,430. Mr. Ivey contested the fine amount and claimed that he had been issued a temporary IRP prior to entering the scales in Old Town, Florida. Mr. Ivey entered the weigh station at Old Town, Florida, at approximately 9:33 a.m., on April 1, 1997. On March 31, 1997, the Illinois apportioned tag used on the vehicle driven by Mr. Ivey expired. At the time of the stop noted above, Mr. Ivey did not possess a valid registration for the vehicle for Florida. After the stop, Mr. Ivey obtained a registration for the vehicle from Landstar Ranger, Inc., via facsimile. By the time Mr. Ivey was able to secure the registration for the vehicle, he had already been operating the vehicle in Florida without a valid registration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: Ms. Diedre Grubbs Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Room 562 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Depriest Ivey, Jr., President Ivey & Ivey Transport Post Office Box 772118 Coral Springs, Florida 33077
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's establishment of North Tampa Chrysler Jeep Dodge, Inc. (North Tampa), as a successor motor vehicle dealer for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge line-makes (vehicles) in Tampa, Florida, is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3), Florida Statutes (2009),1 pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner manufactures and sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles to authorized Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealers. Ulm is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ulm sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 2966 North Dale Mabry Highway, Tampa, Florida 33607. Ferman is a party to Dealer Sales and Service Agreements with Petitioner for Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. Ferman sells Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 24314 State Road 54, Lutz, Florida 33559. It is undisputed that Petitioner has had four dealers in the Tampa metro market for a significant number of years. Petitioner's primary competitors also have had four or more dealers in the Tampa metro market. By appointing North Tampa as a successor dealer to Bob Wilson Dodge Chrysler Jeep (Wilson), Petitioner seeks to maintain the status quo of four Chrysler dealers in the Tampa metro market. In April 2008, Petitioner had four dealers in the Tampa metro market that each sold and serviced Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The four dealers were: Ulm, Ferman, Courtesy Chrysler Jeep Dodge, and Wilson. On April 25, 2008, Wilson filed a Chapter 11 petition in United States Bankruptcy Court in the Middle District of Florida (the Bankruptcy Court). At or about the same time, Wilson closed its doors and ceased selling and servicing Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles. The filing of Wilson’s bankruptcy petition precipitated an automatic stay under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. The automatic stay prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson’s franchise and dealer agreements (dealer agreements). But for Wilson’s bankruptcy filing, Petitioner would have sent Wilson a notice of termination when Wilson closed its doors and ceased dealership operations. Wilson’s cessation of business adversely impacted Petitioner. In relevant part, Petitioner lost sales and lacked a necessary fourth dealer to provide service to Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge customers in the Tampa metro market. Petitioner desired to reopen a dealership at or close to the former Wilson location as soon as possible to mitigate or eliminate the economic loss. During the automatic stay, Petitioner was legally precluded from unilaterally appointing a successor dealer to Wilson. Wilson still had valid dealer agreements for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles and, therefore, was still a dealer. During the automatic stay, Wilson attempted to sell its existing dealership assets, including the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealer agreements. Any attempt by Petitioner to appoint a successor dealer or even negotiate with a successor dealer, would have undermined Wilson’s efforts to sell the dealerships and maximize the estate for the benefit of the creditors. A sale of the dealership required the consent of Wilson and Wilson’s largest creditor, Chrysler Financial. Petitioner did everything it could to accelerate a sale. However, Petitioner was not a party to the sale negotiations and had no ability to require or force Wilson to sell the dealership or its assets to any particular party or to do so within any particular time period. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner did anything to intentionally, or inadvertently, delay or manipulate the timing of a sale. On July 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion with the Bankruptcy Court to lift the automatic stay. The motion also sought the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner filed the motion in the Bankruptcy Court in an attempt to hasten the sale negotiations. Petitioner also wanted to be able to terminate the dealer agreements as quickly as possible in the event that a sale was not consummated. The Bankruptcy Court did not initially grant Petitioner's motion. The court wanted to allow time for a sale of the dealership to proceed. During 2008 and early 2009, Wilson continued to negotiate with potential buyers for the dealership. On January 8, 2009, Wilson's motor vehicle dealer license expired. It became apparent to Petitioner that a sale of Wilson’s assets would be unlikely. Petitioner again asked the Bankruptcy Court to grant Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. On February 9, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting Petitioner's motion to lift the stay. However, the order did not terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. On February 16, 2009, within a week of the entry of the order lifting the stay, Petitioner sent Wilson a notice of intent to terminate Wilson’s dealer agreements. Wilson received the notice of termination on February 23, 2009, and the termination became effective on March 10, 2009. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner attempted to manipulate or delay the timing of the termination of Wilson’s dealer agreements. Petitioner began working on establishing a replacement dealership as soon as Wilson’s dealer agreements were terminated. Establishing a replacement dealership is a lengthy process that primarily involves finding a suitable dealer candidate, finding a suitable location and facility, and making sure that the candidate has the necessary capital to start and maintain the dealership. Petitioner talked to several potential candidates to replace the Wilson dealership, including Jerry Ulm, the principal of one of the complaining dealers in these cases. By letter dated June 24, 2009, Mr. Ulm advised Petitioner that he opposed the opening of a successor dealership for anyone else but wanted the successor dealership for himself should Petitioner decide to proceed. Petitioner determined that Petitioner would not be able to locate the successor dealership at the former Wilson facility. Petitioner considered several potential alternative locations for the successor dealership, including property offered by Ferman. Ferman had a vacant site on Fletcher Avenue in Tampa, Florida, which Ferman leased from a third party unrelated to this proceeding. Ferman offered to sublease the property to Petitioner. In a letter to Petitioner's real estate agent dated July 17, 2009, Ferman stated Ferman's understanding that Petitioner intended to use the property to establish a Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge dealership. Petitioner ultimately decided to locate the dealership at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. It is undisputed that this location is less than two miles from the former Wilson location. Before establishing the successor dealership, however, Petitioner wrote a letter to the Department on February 5, 2010 (the letter). The letter requested the Department to confirm that the establishment of the successor dealership would be exempt under Subsection 320.642(5)(a)1. from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3). The letter explained that Wilson had filed bankruptcy and ceased operations and that the bankruptcy had prevented Petitioner from terminating Wilson and appointing a successor dealership. The letter also provided the relevant dates of the bankruptcy, the lifting of the stay, and the termination of Wilson dealer agreements and advised the Department of Petitioner's intent to locate the successor dealership within two miles of Wilson’s former location. The letter asked the Department to confirm that the establishment of a successor dealership would be exempt if it was established within one year of March 10, 2009, when Petitioner terminated the Wilson dealer agreements. By separate e-mails dated February 9 and 12, 2010, the Department twice confirmed that it had consulted with counsel and determined that the establishment of a successor dealership to Wilson in the manner outlined by Petitioner would be exempt. Petitioner relied on this confirmation by the Department before proceeding with the appointment of a successor dealership. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner sent a second letter to the Department, stating Petitioner's intention to appoint North Tampa as the replacement and successor dealer for Wilson (the second letter). In the second letter, Petitioner again asserted its understanding that the establishment of North Tampa was exempt from the relevant statutory requirements for notice and protest. On February 24, 2010, Petitioner also submitted to the Department an application for a motor vehicle dealer license for North Tampa. On March 3, 2010, the Department issued a license to North Tampa for the Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge vehicles at 10909 North Florida Avenue in Tampa, Florida. On March 7, 2010, North Tampa opened for business. North Tampa has operated successfully and continuously and employs approximately 30 individuals at the site.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the establishment of North Tampa as a successor motor vehicle dealer is exempt from the notice and protest requirements in Subsection 320.642(3) pursuant to Subsection 320.642(5)(a). DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2010.
The Issue Whether the Respondent knowingly sold rebuilt vehicles without disclosing in writing to the purchaser, customer, or transferee that the vehicles were previously titled as rebuilt vehicles.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles R. Kuhn, III, is and was at all times relevant to the allegations in the administrative complaint a licensed independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida. The Respondent did business in the name A-1 Auto and Truck Center and was located at 12180-1 Phillips Highway, Jacksonville. The Department is the state agency authorized by statutes to regulate licensed independent motor vehicle dealers and to maintain the titles of motor vehicles in the State of Florida. Pam A. Albritton testified about her experiences buying a vehicle from the Respondent. On August 22, 2003, as reflected by the date on the installment sales contract, Albritton purchased a 2000 Volkswagen (VW), VIN (Vehicle Identification Number) 3 VWSD 29 M1YM 197846, for $8,281.80. The Respondent did not at any time provide Albritton with a written statement that the vehicle she purchased, VIN 3 VWSD 29 M1YM 197846, hereafter the Albritton vehicle or car, was a rebuilt vehicle and had been previously titled as a rebuilt vehicle. The Respondent did not tell Albritton that this vehicle was a rebuilt vehicle. Albritton did not see the certificate of title to the vehicle until after the sale of the vehicle. Albritton took the car to an authorized VW dealer in November of 2003 because it was not shifting gears properly. The dealer found that the vehicle had suffered extreme damage from an accident and needed extensive repairs to the engine control system and the airbag in order to make the car safe to drive. The dealer told Albritton what had been found and advised her not to drive the car until it had been repaired. Albritton confronted the Respondent about the problems with the vehicle, and the Respondent gave her a handwritten "warranty" dated November 20, 2003. Pursuant to this agreement, Albritton took the car to the Respondent to have the seatbelts fixed; however, the repairs did not actually make the belts safe because the seatbelt retractor mechanism would not lock. In December of 2003, the wheel bearings on Albritton's car broke, and she contacted the Respondent about getting the car fixed. She was informed that the Respondent was away for two weeks, and nothing could be done until he returned. Needing her car for transportation in her work, she paid $200 to have the wheel bearings repaired. Pursuant to a mediation agreement, Albritton agreed to settle her complaint against the Respondent on the basis that he would get her a comparable vehicle. The Respondent was supposed to contact Albritton within 30 days of the mediation but failed to do so. The records introduced at hearing show that Albritton's vehicle had been re-titled as a rebuilt vehicle. Such a title indicates that the vehicle in question had been written off as an insurance loss and the original title cancelled or destroyed. Thereafter, the vehicle was repaired, and the person making the repair obtained a new title, which when issued, showed that the vehicle was rebuilt. Aylwin S. Bridges testified regarding his purchase of a VW from the Respondent. On or about June 14, 2003, Aylwin S. Bridges, purchased a 2000 VW, VIN 3 VWTE 29 MXYM 135556, from the Respondent for $11,555.00. Neither prior to nor at the time of the sale did the Respondent provide Bridges a written statement that the 2000 VW, VIN 3 VWTE 29 MXYM 135556, was a rebuilt vehicle. The Respondent did not tell Bridges that the car he was purchasing was rebuilt. The records introduced at hearing show that the Bridges' car had been re-titled as rebuilt. Bridges did not see a certificate of title to the vehicle prior to the sale of the vehicle. The Bridges' vehicle had extensive mechanical problems. For example, the engine control module had been spliced into the car and several codes had been deleted from it; the seat belts would not work; and the horn would not work. When Bridges sought to trade the vehicle, he found that the most he was offered for the car was only $2,500 because it was rebuilt. The Respondent testified in his own behalf. He did not deny having failed to disclose to Albritton and Bridges in writing prior to selling them their cars that the vehicles had previously been titled as rebuilt vehicles. The Respondent introduced a general disclaimer, Respondent's Exhibit 7, which was provided to Albritton and Bridges. This disclaimer states that the purchaser is buying a used car and that used cars may have any one or more of the listed problems. The Respondent testified that he knew the cars were rebuilt, but felt he had complied with the legal requirements of disclosure by providing the buyers with the aforementioned disclaimer. The specifics of the disclaimer are discussed in the Conclusions of Law for purposes of continuity, but are findings of fact.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter its final order finding that the Respondent violated Section 319.14, Florida Statutes, on two occasions; fine Respondent $1,000 for each violation; and suspend the Respondent's license for six months for each violation, said suspensions to run consecutively, and that payment of the fine be a condition precedent to re-issuance of a license. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Patrick Kuhn, III A-1 Auto and Truck Center 12180-1 Philips Highway Jacksonville, Florida 32256 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Suite A432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Suite B439 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue for disposition in this proceeding is whether Respondent's motor vehicle dealer license should be revoked for his prior conviction of a felony, as proposed in an administrative complaint dated October 26, 1993.
Findings Of Fact It is uncontroverted that Respondent Lorenzo Reddick, Jr. (Reddick) holds an independent motor vehicle dealer license, issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). The complaint fails to allege, and there is no evidence of, when the license was issued. The licensed place of business is 3214 Orange Center Boulevard, #C, Orlando, Florida. On April 27, 1993, Reddick pleaded, and was adjudged guilty of a single count offense in a multi-count superseding indictment, in U.S.A. v. Lorenzo Reddick, Case #92-104 Cr-Orl-19, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The offense, as described in the Judgment, was "Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Specified Unlawful Activity", on 12/30/91, pursuant to title 18 U.S. Code, section 1957(a), and title 18 U.S. Code, Section 2. (Petitioner's exhibit #1) Reddick was sentenced to twenty-four months imprisonment, commencing May 21, 1993, with two years supervision after release. According to the court documents comprising Petitioner's exhibit #1, the sentence was less than provided in sentencing guidelines "upon motion of the government, as a result of defendant's substantial assistance." Reddick is currently serving his prison term. At the time of the offense Reddick was not operating nor was he licensed as a motor vehicle dealer. There is no evidence of whether his license was obtained before or after his conviction. There is no evidence whatsoever of the offense other than what is found on the face of the judgment, as reflected above. DHSMV learned of Reddick's conviction in the process of investigating a filed complaint related to failure to transfer title and registration of a vehicle purchased from Reddick's dealership. Neil Chamelin was the manager of DHSMV's dealer license and consumer complaint programs and was responsible for evaluating requests for administrative action and preparing administrative pleadings for the division director. Chamelin received a copy of Reddick's Judgment of Conviction and Sentence and based the administrative complaint on those documents only. Chamelin has no independent knowledge of the offense. DHSMV has a longstanding policy that a single felony conviction may be sufficient for the agency to take action against a dealer's license. That is, the agency has interpreted the language of the relevant statute to mean that a licensee does not automatically get one free felony before his dealer's license is jeopardized, even after the language was amended seven or eight years ago to include a requirement of sufficient frequency of violations as to establish a pattern of wrongdoing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter its Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint that is the subject of this proceeding. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 17th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 James R. Cunningham, Esquire 200 East Robinson, Suite 1220 Orlando, Florida 32801 Charles J. Brantley, Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Room B439 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
