Conclusions This cause is before the Department of Community Affairs on an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File, a copy of which is appended hereto as Exhibit A.
Other Judicial Opinions REVIEW OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030 (b) (1)®) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT’S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. 4 of 6 FINAL ORDER No. DCA 11-GM-125 CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies have been furnished by U.S. or Electronic Mail to each of the persons listed below on this 2. day of , 2011. Paula Ford Agency Clerk By U.S. Mail The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 By Electronic Mail Mark F. Lapp, Esquire County Attorney Post Office Box 2340 LaBelle, Florida 33975 mlapp@hendryfla.net Katherine R. English, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 katherineenglish@paveselaw.com neysaborkert@paveselaw.com 5 of 6 FINAL ORDER No. DCA 11-GM-125 Neale Montgomery, Esquire Pavese Law Firm 1833 Hendry Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 nealemontgomery@paveselaw.com Ralf Brooks, Esquire 1217 East Cape Coral Parkway, #107 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 ralf@ralfbrookesattorney.com Lynette Norr, Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2555 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Lynette .Norr@dca.state.fl.us 6 of 6
The Issue Whether the Respondent is indebted to the Petitioner as stated in the complaint filed by the Petitioner and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rosario and Vito Strano d/b/a Strano Farms, is a producer of Florida-grown agricultural products as set forth in Chapter 604, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Kelly Marinaro d/b/a Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company, is a dealer of agricultural products doing business at 2101 15th Avenue, Vero Beach, Florida. On April 2, 1999, Respondent purchased garden variety tomatoes from Petitioner. The driver accepting the tomatoes on Respondent’s behalf acknowledged that the tomatoes were received in good condition by signing a truck manifest. The truck manifest provided, in pertinent part, "Any complaint must be made to [sic] Stano Farm in writing, during unloading, and accompanied by U.S.D.A. inspection." Subsequently, Respondent’s agent telephoned Petitioner to advise that there was a problem with the condition of the tomatoes. Respondent did not immediately forward an inspection report and did not promptly make an accounting for the tomatoes that were subsequently liquidated. Eventually, Respondent forwarded a copy of an inspection certificate for an inspection done on April 5, 1999. That certificate, while largely illegible, reportedly found the subject tomatoes to be in poor condition. Petitioner requested payment for the tomatoes as originally agreed by the parties. Its invoice for the 1040 tomatoes claimed $6,084.00 as the amount due. The invoice provided that checks should be payable to Homestead Tomato Packing Co., Inc., but that "any complaint must be made to Strano Farms in writing immediately during unloading, and accompanied by U.S.D.A. inspection." On or about June 29, 1999, by check made payable to Homestead Tomato Packing Co., Inc., Respondent forwarded the sum of $208.00 in payment for the subject tomatoes. On the backside of the payment check Respondent had stamped the following: "Acceptance of this check constitutes payment in full for invoice #12819." Subsequently, Homestead Tomato Packing Co., Inc., negotiated the check. Petitioner did not provide a written dispute regarding the subject tomatoes prior to the tender of the partial payment. In July of 1999 Petitioner filed a Complaint in the amount of $5,876.00 with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bureau of License and Bond, Division of Marketing. The Complaint acknowledged receipt of the $208.00 partial payment but maintained no account of the sales or inspection report was included with the payment to justify the low return on the subject tomatoes. At the hearing in this cause Respondent provided an accounting for the tomatoes that claimed the subject tomatoes were sold for $2,984.00. The accounting acknowledged that $336.00 would have been due to Petitioner. Such amount was not the tendered payment and was not provided to Petitioner at the time of partial payment. To date the parties have been unable to resolve the disputed value of the tomatoes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Bureau of License and Bond, Division of Marketing, enter a final order requiring Respondent to remit $5,876.00 to Petitioner as provided by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: United Pacific Insurance Company Three Parkway Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-1376 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Kelly Marinaro Sunny Fresh Citrus Export & Sales Company 2101 15th Avenue Vero Beach, Florida 32960 Jack Moon Strano Farms Post Office Box 343064 Florida City, Florida 33034 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent committed the acts alleged and violations charged in the Administrative Complaints, as amended1; and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of community association management pursuant to chapters 455 and 468, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Sherry Maycumber Raposo, is licensed in Florida as a community association manager (CAM), having been issued license number CAM 39662. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was the CAM for Turnberry Reserve Homeowner’s Association, Inc. (Turnberry Reserve). Respondent provided CAM services to Turnberry Reserve through Management 35 Firm, Inc., a company she owned. Records Requests Petitioner charges Respondent with the failure to provide certain association records requested by Turnberry members Luz Franco, Maria Napolitano, and Oshmy Barbosa. Ms. Franco and Ms. Napolitano submitted records requests to Respondent on identical forms requesting the following records: Financial Reports, reviews and audits for the past three (3) years. Itemized and detailed records of all receipts and expenditures. 2018 & 2019 minutes of all meetings of the board of directors & members. Bids obtained over the past 12 months for any work to be performed. Management 35 association management agreement. Security service contract. Current copy of all contracts to which the association is a party to. Ms. Franco’s records request is dated May 10, 2019, and Ms. Napolitano’s records request is dated May 24, 2019. Respondent testified, credibly, that all of the records requested were available for inspection on the Turnberry Reserve website, and that individuals were directed to the website to obtain these documents when any such request was received. Respondent’s testimony was corroborated by Sandra Diaz and Cliffie Kennedy, former board members of Turnberry Reserve. Ms. Diaz was a Turnberry Reserve board member from 2016 through 2018, and Mr. Kennedy was a Turnberry Reserve board member from 2019 through 2020. Ms. Diaz and Mr. Kennedy testified that the official records of Turnberry Reserve, including the latest financial reports and a copy of the contract with Management 35 Firm, Inc., were maintained on the Turnberry Reserve website as a matter of course, and were available for member inspection through the website. Ms. Franco and Ms. Napolitano testified that their access to the Turnberry Reserve website was suspended for non-payment of fines levied against them by the Turnberry Reserve board, leaving them unable to access the records they requested. Respondent testified that the Turnberry Reserve board suspended member access to their individual financial ledgers when fines were delinquent, but did not suspend access to official association documents maintained on the website. Respondent’s testimony was corroborated by Ms. Diaz and Mr. Kennedy, and is accepted where it conflicts with the testimony of Ms. Franco and Ms. Napolitano. The records requested by Ms. Franco, Ms. Napolitano, and Mr. Barbosa were available to them on the Turnberry website. As such, Respondent did not delay or deny access to association records. Attempt to Videotape a CEC Meeting Ms. Napolitano requested a meeting before the Turnberry Reserve Covenant Enforcement Committee (CEC) to appeal a fine that had been levied by the Turnberry Reserve board. Ms. Napolitano’s meeting before the CEC was held on August 31, 2019. The participants at the meeting were the three Turnberry Reserve homeowners who were appointed to serve on the CEC, Respondent, and Ms. Napolitano. No other Turnberry Reserve members were allowed to attend. The CEC members did not serve on the Turnberry Reserve board, no Turnberry Reserve board members attended the CEC meeting. Ms. Napolitano attempted to videotape the CEC meeting on her cell phone and was told by Respondent that she was not allowed to do so. Ahmed Elwan, a member of the CEC, testified that the CEC asked that the meeting not be videotaped because the appeals by individual members who had been fined were private meetings and the CEC did not want the meetings posted on social media. Mr. Elwan testified that the CEC voted to reschedule the meeting because Ms. Napolitano became irate and started yelling when she was told she could not videotape the meeting. Mr. Elwan’s testimony was credible and is accepted. Article III, section 9 of the Turnberry Reserve bylaws states, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny Lot Owner may tape record or videotape meetings of the Board of Directors and meetings of the Members.” Petitioner contends that Ms. Napolitano had a right to videotape her meeting before the CEC because it was a special meeting of the association members and therefore constitutes a meeting of the members. The Turnberry Reserve bylaws authorize the board to appoint a committee, like the CEC, to carry out association business. The CEC meeting was not a meeting open to all members; it was a private meeting between Ms. Napolitano and the three unit owners appointed by the board to serve on the CEC. The CEC meeting was not a meeting of the Turnberry Reserve board, because none of the CEC members served on the board. Thus, the CEC meeting was not a meeting of the board or a meeting of the members, and Ms. Napolitano had no right to videotape the CEC meeting under the Turnberry Reserve bylaws. Petitioner also charges Respondent with making a “deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representation” because she told Ms. Napolitano that she could not videotape the CEC meeting. As found above, the Turnberry Reserve bylaws did not confer any right to videotape a CEC meeting, and this charge was therefore unproven for this reason alone. Candidate Forms for 2018 Annual Meeting Petitioner contends that Respondent failed to send out candidate forms soliciting candidates for the 2019 Turnberry Reserve board, resulting in the cancellation of the 2018 annual meeting which was to be held to elect the 2019 Turnberry Reserve board. Petitioner alleges this failure constitutes the failure to serve as a liaison between the Turnberry Reserve board and unit owners and tampering with the Turnberry Reserve 2018 annual election. Respondent testified that candidate forms soliciting candidates for the 2019 board were mailed to all 373 Turnberry Reserve unit owners in advance of the 2018 annual meeting. Ms. Diaz, Mr. Elwan, and Mr. Kennedy corroborated Respondent’s testimony, stating that they all received candidate forms in advance of the 2018 annual meeting. There was no evidence to the contrary. Ms. Napolitano testified that she does not know whether anyone returned candidate forms to Respondent in advance of the 2018 annual election. Ms. Franco testified that she had received candidate forms in years past, but could not recall whether she received a candidate form in advance of the 2018 annual election. Mr. Barbosa was not asked about the candidate form. The testimony of Respondent, Ms. Diaz, Mr. Elwan, and Mr. Kennedy was credible and is accepted. Respondent mailed candidate forms to the Turnberry Reserve unit owners in advance of the 2018 annual election. Respondent did not fail to serve as a liaison between the Turnberry Reserve board and unit owners and did not tamper with the 2018 annual election.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaints at issue in this consolidated proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Sherry Maycumber Raposo 4067 Longworth Loop Kissimmee, Florida 34744 James C. Richardson, Esquire Department Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563 David Axelman, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 S BRIAN A. NEWMAN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2021. Eddy Laguerre, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6563 Krista Woodard, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Julie I. Brown, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issue presented for decision is whether Proposed Rules 20-15.001, 20-15.002, and 20-15.003 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(a)-(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Citrus Commission was established in 1935 to organize and promote the growing and sale of various citrus products, fresh and processed, in the State of Florida. The purpose of the Citrus Commission is today reflected in Section 601.02, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Florida Citrus Commission ("the Commission") and the Department, are set forth in full in Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Department include the power to tax and raise other revenue to achieve the purposes of the Department. In particular, Section 601.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, state: The Department of Citrus shall have and shall exercise such general and specific powers as are delegated to it by this chapter and other statutes of the state, which powers shall include, but shall not be confined to, the following: To adopt and, from time to time, alter, rescind, modify, or amend all proper and necessary rules, regulations, and orders for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this chapter and other statutes of the state, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent therewith. To act as the general supervisory authority over the administration and enforcement of this chapter and to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be imposed upon it by other laws of the state. The Department is authorized to set standards by Section 601.11, Florida Statutes, as follows: The Department of Citrus shall have full and plenary power to, and may, establish state grades and minimum maturity and quality standards not inconsistent with existing laws for citrus fruits and food products thereof containing 20 percent or more citrus or citrus juice, whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, including standards for frozen concentrate for manufacturing purposes, and for containers therefor, and shall prescribe rules or regulations governing the marking, branding, labeling, tagging, or stamping of citrus fruit, or products thereof whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, and upon containers therefor for the purpose of showing the name and address of the person marketing such citrus fruit or products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed; the grade, quality, variety, type, or size of citrus fruit, the grade, quality, variety, type, and amount of the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, and the quality, type, size, dimensions, and shape of containers therefor, and to regulate or prohibit the use of containers which have been previously used for the sale, transportation, or shipment of citrus fruit or the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or any other commodity; provided, however, that the use of secondhand containers for sale and delivery of citrus fruit for retail consumption within the state shall not be prohibited; provided, however, that no standard, regulation, rule, or order under this section which is repugnant to any requirement made mandatory under federal law or regulations shall apply to citrus fruit, or the products thereof, whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or to containers therefor, which are being shipped from this state in interstate commerce. All citrus fruit and the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed sold, or offered for sale, or offered for shipment within or without the state shall be graded and marked as required by this section and the regulations, rules, and orders adopted and made under authority of this section, which regulations, rules, and orders shall, when not inconsistent with state or federal law, have the force and effect of law. The Department is authorized to conduct citrus research by Section 601.13, Florida Statutes. To help pay for these duties of the Department, the Legislature first enacted the "box tax" in 1949. The box tax is now codified as Section 601.15(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: There is hereby levied and imposed upon each standard-packed box of citrus fruit grown and placed into the primary channel of trade in this state an excise tax at annual rates for each citrus season as determined from the tables in this paragraph and based upon the previous season's actual statewide production as reported in the United States Department of Agriculture Citrus Crop Production Forecast as of June 1. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, goes on to set forth specific rates for fresh grapefruit, processed grapefruit, fresh oranges, processed oranges, and fresh or processed tangerines and citrus hybrids. Section 601.15(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the Department's authority to administer the box tax, as follows: The administration of this section shall be vested in the Department of Citrus, which shall prescribe suitable and reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement hereof, and the Department of Citrus shall administer the taxes levied and imposed hereby. All funds collected under this section and the interest accrued on such funds are consideration for a social contract between the state and the citrus growers of the state whereby the state must hold such funds in trust and inviolate and use them only for the purposes prescribed in this chapter. The Department of Citrus shall have power to cause its duly authorized agent or representative to enter upon the premises of any handler of citrus fruits and to examine or cause to be examined any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing on the amount of taxes payable and to secure other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement hereof. Any person who is required to pay the taxes levied and imposed and who by any practice or evasion makes it difficult to enforce the provisions hereof by inspection, or any person who, after demand by the Department of Citrus or any agent or representative designated by it for that purpose, refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part thereof or any books, records, documents, or other instruments in any manner relating to the liability of the taxpayer for the tax imposed or hinders or in anywise delays or prevents such inspection, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The box tax was challenged in 1936 under various provisions of the Florida Constitution as well as the Export Clause, Article 1, s. 9, cl. 5, of the United States Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in 1937 upholding the validity of the box tax. C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). In 1970, the Legislature enacted the "equalization tax," codified as Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. The statute mirrored Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, but added certain processors who were mixing foreign citrus products with Florida products. The purpose of the equalization tax was to have all Florida processors of citrus products help pay for the costs of the Department, rather than have the burden fall entirely on the Florida growers subject to the box tax. Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: The first person who exercises in this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange products or processed grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging processed orange products or processed grapefruit products into retail or institutional size containers or, except as provided in subsection (9) or except if a tax is levied and collected on the exercise of one of the foregoing privileges, the first person having title to or possession of any processed orange product or any processed grapefruit product who exercises the privilege in this state of storing such product or removing any portion of such product from the original container in which it arrived in this state for purposes other than official inspection or direct consumption by the consumer and not for resale shall be assessed and shall pay an excise tax upon the exercise of such privilege at the rate described in subsection (2). Upon the exercise of any privilege described in subsection (1), the excise tax levied by this section shall be at the same rate per box of oranges or grapefruit utilized in the initial production of the processed citrus products so handled as that imposed, at the time of exercise of the taxable privilege, by s. 601.15 per box of oranges. In order to administer the tax, the Legislature provided the following relevant provisions in Section 601.155, Florida Statutes: Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall keep a complete and accurate record of the receipt, storage, handling, exercise of any taxable privilege under this section, and shipment of all products subject to the tax imposed by this section. Such record shall be preserved for a period of 1 year and shall be offered for inspection upon oral or written request by the Department of Citrus or its duly authorized agent. Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall, at such times and in such manner as the Department of Citrus may by rule require, file with the Department of Citrus a return, certified as true and correct, on forms to be prescribed and furnished by the Department of Citrus, stating, in addition to other information reasonably required by the Department of Citrus, the number of units of processed orange or grapefruit products subject to this section upon which any taxable privilege under this section was exercised during the period of time covered by the return. Full payment of excise taxes due for the period reported shall accompany each return. All taxes levied and imposed by this section shall be due and payable within 61 days after the first of the taxable privileges is exercised in this state. Periodic payment of the excise taxes imposed by this section by the person first exercising the taxable privileges and liable for such payment shall be permitted only in accordance with Department of Citrus rules, and the payment thereof shall be guaranteed by the posting of an appropriate certificate of deposit, approved surety bond, or cash deposit in an amount and manner as prescribed by the Department of Citrus. * * * (11) This section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes set forth and as additional and supplemental powers vested in the Department of Citrus under the police power of this state. In March 2000, certain citrus businesses challenged Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, as being unconstitutional. At the time of the suit, Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, read as follows: All products subject to the taxable privileges under this section, which products are produced in whole or in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, are exempt from the tax imposed by this section to the extent that the products are derived from oranges or grapefruit grown within the United States. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. The citrus businesses claimed the exemption in Section 601.155(5) rendered the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, in that processors who imported juice from foreign countries to be blended with Florida juice were subject to the equalization tax, whereas processors who imported juice from places such as California, Arizona and Texas enjoyed an exemption from the tax. The case, Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated) ("Tampa Juice"), was brought in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Polk County. Judge Dennis P. Maloney of that court continues to preside over that case. In a partial final declaratory judgment effective March 15, 2002, Judge Maloney found Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to its discriminatory effect in favor of non-Florida United States juice. In an order dated April 15, 2002, Judge Maloney severed the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, from the remainder of the statute. The court's decision necessitated the formulation of a remedy for the injured plaintiffs. While the parties were briefing the issue before the court, the Florida Legislature met and passed Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, to read as follows: Products made in whole or in part from citrus fruit on which an equivalent tax is levied pursuant to s. 601.15 are exempt from the tax imposed by this section. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit exempt from the tax imposed by this section, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, was given an effective date of July 1, 2002. By order dated August 8, 2002, Judge Maloney set forth his decision as to the remedy for the plaintiffs injured by the discriminatory effect of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Judge Maloney expressly relied on the rationale set forth in Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991)("McKesson II"). In its initial McKesson decision, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling that Florida's alcoholic beverage tax scheme, which gave tax preferences and exemptions to certain alcoholic beverages made from Florida crops, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed that portion of the summary judgment giving the ruling prospective effect, thus denying the plaintiff a refund of taxes paid pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision as to the prospective effect of its decision. The United States Supreme Court held that: The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 496 U.S. at 31 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court set forth the following options by which the state could meet its obligation to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief": [T]he State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. . . . Alternatively, to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. . . . Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render Petitioner's resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 496 U.S. at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court expressly provided that the state has the option of choosing the form of relief it will grant. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court opinion, the Florida Supreme Court granted the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division") leave to advise the Court as to the form of relief the state wished to provide. The Division proposed to retroactively assess and collect taxes from those of McKesson's competitors who had benefited from the discriminatory tax scheme. McKesson contended that a refund of the taxes it had paid was the only clear and certain remedy, because retroactive taxation of its competitors would violate their due process rights. McKesson II, 574 So. 2d at 116. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on McKesson's refund claim, with the following instructions: While McKesson may not necessarily be entitled to a refund, it is entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," as outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion. Because nonparties, such as amici, will be directly affected by the retroactive tax scheme proposed by the state, all affected by the proposed emergency rule must be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in this action. Therefore, on remand, the trial court not only must determine whether the state's proposal meets "the minimum federal requirements" outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion, it also must determine whether the proposal comports with federal and state protections afforded those against whom the proposed tax will be assessed. We emphasize that the state has the option of choosing the manner in which it will reformulate the alcoholic beverage tax during the contested period so that the resultant tax actually assessed during that period reflects a scheme which does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, if the trial court should rule that the state's proposal to retroactively assess and collect taxes from McKesson's competitors does not meet constitutional muster and such ruling is upheld on appeal, the state may offer an alternative remedy for the trial court's review. However, any such proposal likewise must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court as well as be consistent with other constitutional restrictions. 574 So. 2d at 116. In the Tampa Juice case, Judge Maloney assessed the options prescribed by the series of McKesson cases and concluded that the only fair remedy was to assess and collect back assessments from those who benefited from the unconstitutional equalization tax exemption. His August 8, 2002, order directed the Department to "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." On September 18, 2002, the Department promulgated the Emergency Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE. The Emergency Rules were filed with the Department of State on September 24, 2002, and took effect on that date. Those emergency rules were held invalid in Peace River, and are not at issue in the instant case. In the November 15, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 46, pp. 4996-4998), the Department published the Proposed Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP. In the March 7, 2003, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 29, no. 10, p. 1036), the Department published amendments to the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rules, as amended, read as follows: EQUALIZATION TAX ON NON-FLORIDA UNITED STATES JUICE 20-15.001 Intent. The Court in Tampa Juice Service, et al v. Florida Department of Citrus in Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718 (Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Florida) severed the exemption contained in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, that provided an exemption for persons who exercised one of the enumerated Equalization Tax privileges on non-Florida, United States juice. The Court had previously determined that the stricken provisions operated in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On August 8, 2002, the Court ordered that the Florida Department of Citrus "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." It is the Florida Department of Citrus' intent by promulgating the following remedial rule to implement a non- discriminatory tax scheme, which does not impose a significant tax burden that is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limitations. These rules shall be applicable to those previously favored persons who received favorable tax treatment under the statutory sections cited above. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.002 Definitions. "Previously favored persons" shall be defined as any person who exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege as defined by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, but who was exempt from payment of the Equalization Tax due to the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice set forth in the statutory provision, which was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional and severed from Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. The "tax period" during which the severed provisions of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, were in effect shall be defined as commencing on October 6, 1997, and ending on March 14, 2002. "Tax liability" shall be defined as the total amount of taxes due to the Florida Department of Citrus during the "tax period," at the following rates per box for each respective fiscal year: Fiscal Year Processed Rate Orange Grapefruit 1997-1998 .175 .30 1998-1999 .17 .30 1999-2000 .18 .325 2000-2001 .175 .30 2001-2002 .165 .18 Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.003 Collection. The Florida Department of Citrus shall calculate the tax liability for each person or entity that exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege outlined in section 601.155, Florida Statutes, upon non-Florida, United States juice based upon inspection records maintained by Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the United States Department of Agriculture. Subsequent to adoption of this rule, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide to the previously favored persons by certified mail a Notice of Tax Liability which shall contain a demand for payment consistent with the above-referenced itemized statement. The Department will deem late payment of Equalization Taxes owed by previously favored persons to constitute good cause, and shall waive the 5 percent penalty authorized by Section 601.155(10), F.S., as compliance with either of the following is established by Department [sic]: Lump sum payment of the tax liability remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability; or Equal installment payments remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20- 100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection subsection [sic] 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., over a 60-month period, the first payment being due within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability pursuant to subsection 20- 15.003(2), F.A.C.; or The Good Cause provisions of 601.155(10), F.S., shall not apply to persons who do not comply with paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(a), F.A.C., or paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(b), F.A.C. Failure to pay the taxes or penalties due under 601.155, F.S. and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., shall constitute grounds for revocation or suspension of a previously favored person's citrus fruit dealer's license pursuant to 601.56(4), F.S., 601.64(6), F.S., 601.64(7), F.S., and/or 601.67(1), F.S. The Florida Department of Citrus will not oppose the timely intervention of persons who previously enjoyed the subject exemption that wish to present a claim to the Court in the Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus. However, the Florida Department of Citrus does not waive any argument regarding the validity of the calculation of the tax liability or that imposition of this tax is constitutional. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New . The Final Order in Peace River held that the Proposed Rules were not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law below. Judge Maloney has yet to rule on the backward-looking remedy proposed by the Department. On March 26, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an order extending until May 1, 2003, the time for interested parties to file motions to intervene with regard to the Department's proposed backward-looking relief. The order noted that the parties have stipulated to the suspension of the back tax as to plaintiffs and objecting non-parties until further order of the court. On February 19, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-- Import-Export." The sole issue before Judge Maloney was "whether Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, (the 'Equalization Tax'), as it existed in 1997, violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the 'Import- Export Clause')." (Emphasis in original) After setting forth the standard for analysis of whether a taxing scheme violates the Import-Export Clause under Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976), Judge Maloney ruled as follows: It is precisely [the exemption for United States products found in 601.155(5), Florida Statutes] that causes the 1997 Equalization Tax to contravene the Import-Export Clause. Specifically, the court finds that because the statute exempts "citrus fruit grown within the United States," but does not exempt citrus fruit grown in foreign countries, the exemption causes the tax to "fall on imports as such simply because of their place of origin." Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286. Additionally, because the tax falls on foreign-grown citrus as such simply because of its origin but does not fall on domestic-grown citrus, the Equalization Tax, with the exemption, creates a "special tariff or particular preference for certain domestic goods." Id. (i.e. California, Arizona, and Texas citrus products). * * * In conclusion, because the court finds the exemption contained within the 1997 Equalization Tax violates both the first and third elements of the Michelin test,1 the court finds the 1997 Equalization Tax violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the "Import-Export Clause"). On March 31, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." In this order, Judge Maloney found that the box tax itself, Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioners and Intervenor in the instant case are licensed citrus fruit dealers regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, they are subject to the rules of the Department. Petitioners and Intervenor buy, sell, and manufacture citrus juices. They shipped products made with non- Florida U.S. juice during the tax period without paying equalization taxes. Petitioners and Intervenor have been notified by the Department that they are liable to pay back taxes pursuant to the Proposed Rules, as well as the invalid Emergency Rules.
The Issue The dispute here involves the alleged non-payment for watermelons that the Petitioner claims to have sold to the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The case is being considered in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, which establishes the apparatus for settling disputes between Florida produce farmers and dealers who are involved with the farmers' products. Joe Townsend, a Florida farmer, contends by his complaint that one load of watermelons grown and harvested in Florida, was sold directly to Great Lakes Produce of Florida, Inc. as set forth below: July 9, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, 47,430 lbs. at .02, totaling $948.60 An examination of the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, supports the Petitioner's contention. The Respondent has not paid the $948.60 which it greed to pay to the Petitioner and under the facts of the agreement it is obligated to pay the Petitioner.
Recommendation It is Recommended that the Respondent be required to pay, the Petitioner 4 for the watermelons it purchased from the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Townsend Post Office Box 1505 Live Oak, Florida Roger Serzen c/o Great Lakes Produce of Florida, Inc. Post Office Box 11931 Tampa, Florida 33680 L. Earl Peterson, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether the respondent is indebted to the complainant for the sale of Florida-grown agricultural products, and, if so, the amount of the indebtedness.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Rose has a grove of lychee trees on his property; each year he harvests the lychee nuts for sale, but the sale of agricultural products is not his sole source of income. In mid-June, 1996, Mr. Rose heard that the Growers Association was offering $3.50 per pound for lychees, the highest price of which he was aware. Mr. Rose took his fruit to the Growers Association on June 18, 1996. Mr. Rose had not done business with the Growers Association previously but had sold his fruit to another company. Mr. Rose received a grower's receipt showing that, on June 18, 1996, he had brought in 298 pounds of fruit, that 14 pounds were culls, and that the Growers Association had packed 27.9 ten- pound boxes of fruit. The Growers Association packed only marketable fruit. Ninety-nine percent of the tropical fruit grown in Florida is handled in pools.1 According to industry practice, the "handler" does not purchase the fruit outright but is responsible for packing, storing, selling, and shipping the fruit and for accounting for and remitting the proceeds of sale, minus expenses, to the members of the pool on a pro rata basis. The pools are composed of all growers whose fruit is packed during a designated period of time. Prices initially quoted to growers participating in a pooling arrangement are not guaranteed because the actual sales price may vary, depending on market conditions. It was the practice of the Growers Association to handle lychees under a pooling arrangement, and the receipt Mr. Rose received from the Growers Association contained the notation "P- 407LY," which designated the pool to which Mr. Rose's fruit was assigned. The Lychee P-407LY pool to which Mr. Rose's fruit was assigned consisted of fruit packed by the Growers Association between June 15 and 21, 1996. Mr. Rose was told on several occasions by employees of the Growers Association that he would receive $920.70 after expenses for the sale of his lychees. This amount was reflected in a Pool Price Report generated by the Growers Association on July 10, 1997, which also showed that a total of 107.6 pounds of fruit was included in the pool and that the Growers Association anticipated receiving a total of $4,088.65 for the sale of the fruit in the pool. The Growers Association maintained in its files a work order showing that 83 ten-pound boxes of lychees were sold to Produce Services of America, Inc., at a price of $38.00 per box and that the fruit was shipped on June 21, 1996. According to the July 10 report, the Growers Association had received payment of $932.90 for 24.55 ten-pound boxes of lychees sold to "L & V" on June 21, 1996, at $38.00 per box, but there is no indication in the report that the anticipated payment of $3,154.00 had been received from Produce Services of America. Mr. Rose repeatedly called the Growers Association during July and August to inquire about when he would receive payment for his fruit. In accordance with the information he had consistently been given by employees of the Growers Association, he expected to receive $920.70. When he received a check from the Growers Association dated August 29, 1996, in the amount of $367.48, he called the Growers Association for an explanation of why he had received that amount rather than the $920.70 he was expecting. Ultimately, he spoke with Mr. Kendall in early September, who told him that the $367.48 was all he was going to receive as his pro rata share of the pool because Produce Services of American had not paid in full for the 83 boxes of fruit it purchased. As reflected in the Pool Price Report dated September 19, 1996, the Growers Association received a total payment of only $1,847.42 for the fruit in the pool, rather than the $4,088.65 shown in the July 10, 1996, report. After the Growers Association's expenses were deducted, a total of $1,417.25 was distributed to the five growers in the pool. Although a copy of this final price report for the P-407LY pool should have accompanied Mr. Rose’s check, it did not. According to the information contained in the September 19 Pool Price Report, the shortfall in the amount received for the sale of the fruit in the pool is attributable to the Growers Association's receiving only $913.00, or $11.00 per box, for the sale of the 83 boxes of lychees to Produce Services of America, instead of the anticipated $3,154.00. The $913.00 was paid to the Growers Association by check dated August 19, 1996. Mr. Rose did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he had a contract for the outright sale of 27.9 ten-pound boxes of lychees to the Growers Association. Rather, the evidence establishes that Mr. Rose's fruit was handled by the Growers Association under a pooling arrangement and that, consistent with the practice in the tropical fruit industry, the Growers Association assumed responsibility for packing, storing, selling, and shipping the fruit. The Growers Association failed to offer any credible evidence to explain why Produce Services of America paid only $11.00 per box for the 83 boxes of fruit shipped from the pool, notwithstanding that the agreed sales price was $38.00 per box.2 Even if the fruit was damaged or in poor condition when it was delivered to Produce Services of America, the Growers Association packed 27.9 ten-pound boxes of marketable fruit on Mr. Rose’s account, and, once packed, it had complete control of the fruit in the pool. The Growers Association failed to offer any evidence to establish that it acted with reasonable care in fulfilling its responsibilities under the pool arrangement. Consequently, it bears the risk of loss rather than Mr. Rose and is indebted to him for $553.22, which is the difference between the $920.70 Mr. Rose would have received as his pro rata share of the pool had Produce Services of America paid the agreed-upon sales price of $38.00 per box and the $367.48 which the Growers Association paid to Mr. Rose by check dated August 29, 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order finding that the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., is indebted to Mike Rose for the sale of agricultural products and ordering the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., to pay Mike Rose $553.22 within fifteen (15) days of the date its order becomes final. The Final Order should also provide that, in the event that the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., fails to pay Mike Rose $533.22 within the time specified, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, as surety for the South Florida Growers Association, Inc., must provide payment under the conditions and provisions of its bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1997.
The Issue The issues presented are whether Respondent, George Mason Citrus, Inc. (Mason), owes Petitioner $10,000 for citrus fruit that Mason purchased from Petitioner and, if so, whether the surety is liable for any deficiency in payment from Mason.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as a “citrus fruit dealer,” within the meaning of Subsection 601.03(8), Florida Statutes (2005) (dealer).1 The business address for Petitioner is 1103 Southeast Lakeview Drive, Sebring, Florida 33870. Mason is a Florida corporation licensed by the Department as a citrus fruit dealer. The business address for Mason is 140 Holmes Avenue, Lake Placid, Florida 33852. Western is the surety for Mason pursuant to bond number 42292005 issued in the amount of $100,000 (the bond). The term of the bond is August 1, 2004, through July 31, 2005. Petitioner conducts business in Highlands County, Florida, as a dealer and as a “broker” defined in Subsection 601.03(3). In relevant part, Petitioner purchases white grapefruit (grapefruit) for resale to others, including Mason. Mason conducts business in Highlands County as either an “agent,” “broker,” or “handler” defined in Subsections 601.03(2), (3), and (23). On January 31, 2003, Mason contracted with Petitioner to purchase grapefruit from Petitioner pursuant to Fruit Contract number 03-307 (the contract). Mason drafted the contract. The terms of the contract require Petitioner to sell grapefruit to Mason for the 2003, 2004, and 2005 “crop years.” The 2003 crop year began in the fall of 2002 and ended at the conclusion of the spring harvest in 2003. The 2004 and 2005 crop years began in the fall of 2003 and 2004 and ended in the spring of 2004 and 2005, respectively. Only the 2005 crop year is at issue in this proceeding. The contract required Petitioner to deliver grapefruit to a person designated by Mason. Mason designated Peace River Citrus Products, Inc. (Peace River), in Arcadia, Florida, for delivery of the grapefruit at issue. Mason was required by the terms of a Participation Agreement with Peace River to deliver 30,000 boxes of grapefruit to Peace River during the 2005 crop year. In an effort to satisfy its obligation to Peace River, Mason entered into the contract with Petitioner for an amount of grapefruit described in the contract as an “Approximate Number of Boxes” that ranged between 12,000 and 14,000. Petitioner delivered only 2,128 boxes of grapefruit to Peace River. The production of grapefruit was significantly decreased by three hurricanes that impacted the area during the 2005 crop year. The parties agree that Mason owed Petitioner $19,070.03 for the delivered boxes of grapefruit. The amount due included a portion of the rise in value over the base purchase price in the contract caused by increases due to market conditions and participation pay out after the parties executed the contract (the rise).2 On or about October 26, 2005, Mason mailed Petitioner a check for $9,070.03. The transmittal letter for the check explained the difference between the payment of $9,070.03 and the amount due of $19,070.03. Mason deducted $10,000 from the $19,070.03 due Petitioner, in part, to cover the cost of grapefruit Mason purchased from other dealers or growers to make up the deficiency in grapefruit delivered by Petitioner (cover). The $10,000 sum also includes interest Mason claims for the cost of cover and Mason's claim for lost profits. Petitioner claims that Mason is not entitled to deduct lost profits and interest from the amount due Petitioner. If Mason were entitled to deduct interest, Petitioner alleges that Mason calculated the interest incorrectly. The larger issue between the parties is whether Mason is entitled to deduct cover charges from the amount due Petitioner. If Mason were not entitled to cover the deficiency in delivered boxes of grapefruit, Mason would not be entitled to interest on the cost of cover and lost profits attributable to the deficiency. The parties agree that resolution of the issue of whether Mason is entitled to cover the deficiency in delivered boxes of grapefruit turns on a determination of whether the contract was a box contract or a production contract. A box contract generally requires a selling dealer such as Petitioner to deliver a specific number of boxes, regardless of the source of grapefruit, and industry practice permits the purchasing dealer to cover any deficiency. A production contract generally requires the selling dealer to deliver an amount of grapefruit produced by a specific source, and industry practice does not permit the purchasing dealer to cover any deficiency. The contract is an ambiguous written agreement. The contract expressly provides that it is a "Fruit Purchase Contract" and a "delivered in" contract but contains no provision that it is either a box or production contract. The contract is silent with respect to the right to cover. Relevant terms in the contract evidence both a box contract and a production contract. Like the typical box contract, the contract between Mason and Petitioner prescribes a number of boxes, specifically no less than 12,000, that are to be delivered pursuant to the contract. However, the typical box contract does not identify the number of boxes to be delivered as "Approximate No. of Boxes" that ranges between 12,000 and 14,000 boxes. Unlike a production contract, the contract does not identify a specific grove as the source of the required grapefruit. Best practice in the industry calls for a production contract to designate the grove by name as well as the number of acres and blocks. However, industry practice does not require a production contract to identify a specific grove as the source of grapefruit. In practice, Mason treated another contract that Mason drafted with a party other than Petitioner as a production contract even though the contract did not identify a specific grove as the source of grapefruit. The absence of a force majure clause in the contract may evidence either type of contract.3 A box contract typically requires the selling dealer to deliver the agreed boxes of grapefruit regardless of weather events, unless stated otherwise in the contract. However, the absence of such a clause may also be consistent with a production contract because "acts of God" are inherent in a production contract. Such acts, including hurricanes, necessarily limit grapefruit production, and a production contract obligates the selling dealer to deliver only the amount of grapefruit produced. The contract between Petitioner and Mason did not contain a penalty provision for failure to deliver the prescribed boxes of grapefruit (box penalty). The absence of a box penalty in the contract evidences a production contract. The contract identifies Petitioner as the "Grower." A grower typically enters into a production contract. A box contract does not limit the source of grapefruit to be delivered, and the selling dealer in a box contract may obtain grapefruit from anywhere in the state. The contract between Petitioner and Mason limits the source of grapefruit to grapefruit grown in Highlands County, Florida. Mason knew that Petitioner sold only grapefruit from groves in Highlands County, Florida, identified in the record as the Clagget Taylor groves. During the 2003 and 2004 crop years, Petitioner sold only grapefruit from the Clagget Taylor groves. Mason received trip tickets and other documentation related to the delivery of no less than 24,000 boxes of grapefruit, all from the Clagget Taylor groves. The boxes of grapefruit delivered during the 2005 crop year came only from the Clagget Taylor groves. Mason received documentation showing the grapefruit came from the Clagget Taylor groves. Ambiguous written agreements are required by judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law to be construed against the person who drafted the agreement. Mason drafted an ambiguous agreement with Petitioner. The agreement must be construed against Mason as a production contract. Mason owes Petitioner $10,000 for the delivered grapefruit during the 2005 crop year. The terms of the bond make Western liable for any deficiency in payment from Mason.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Mason to pay $10,000 to Petitioner, and, in accordance with Subsections 601.61 and 601.65, requiring Western to pay over to the Department any deficiency in payment by Mason. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2007.
Findings Of Fact The case is being considered in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 604, Florida Statutes, which establishes the apparatus for settling disputes between Florida produce farmers and dealers who are involved with the farmers' products. Lyman Walker, a Florida farmer, contends by his complaint that five loads of watermelons grown and harvested in Florida, were sold directly to Mr. Pagano & Sons, Inc., in the person of Maurice Pagano, on the following dates, by the following types; in the following weight amounts; at the following price per pound, and for the following total price per load: June 2, 1977, small Charleston Gray Watermelons, 51,550 lbs. at .03-1/2, totaling $1,804.00 June 2, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, 47,440 lbs. at .03-1/2, totaling $1,660 June 7, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, 47,850 lbs. at .02, totaling $957 June 7, 1977, Charleston Gray Watermelons, 49,190 lbs. at .02, totaling $983 June 8, 1977, Charleston Grey Watermelons, approximately 46,000 lbs. at .02, totaling $920 Total for all loads $6,325. An examination of the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, supports the Petitioner's contention. The facts in this case also show that Maurice Pagan, acting in behalf of the Respondent gave money to the Petitioner for having the watermelons loaded for shipment. That amount was $2,500, and when deducted from the $6,325 total price leaves a balance owing to the Petitioner of $3,825. The Respondent has not paid the $3,825 which it agreed to pay to the Petitioner and under the facts of the agreement it is obligated to pay the Petitioner. One final matter should be dealt with and that pertains to the approximation of the weight of the June 8, 1977, load. The figure used is an approximation, because the Respondent's representative at the loading in Florida, Phil Pepper, took that load away and failed to return the weight ticket. This caused the Petitioner to have to approximate the weight and the approximation is accepted in determining the amount which the Respondent owes the Petitioner.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent be required to pay the Petitioner $3,825 for watermelons it purchased from the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jon D. Caminez, Esquire 1030 East Lafayette Street Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Maurice Pagano 59 Brooklyn Terminal Market Brooklyn, New York 11236 L. Earl Peterson, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Division of Marketing Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent’s licenses to practice contracting, license numbers CGC057941, CGC1509240 and QB37866, based on alleged violations of Section 489.1425, and Subsections 489.129(1)(g)1., 489.129(1)(g)2., 489.129(1)(g)3., 489.129(1)(j), 489.129(1)(m), and 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes (2007),1 as charged in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following facts are found. Respondent is and has been, at all times material hereto, a certified general contractor in the State of Florida, having been issued license numbers CGC057941 and CGC1509240. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the primary qualifying agent for ProTeam and Associates, Inc. (ProTeam), which has a certificate of authority, QB number 37866. Respondent alleged in his request for a formal hearing that he sold ProTeam on August 11, 2005, and removed his name as qualifying agent on the same date. However, no proof of such sale and withdrawal was offered in evidence. In addition, Respondent claimed to have placed his two contractors’ licenses on inactive status in April 2007. The records of Petitioner show that the licensure status of Respondent’s Certified General Contractor license numbers CGC057941 and CGC1504240 is “Delinquent Inactive.” These licenses expired on September 30, 2008, and became delinquent on October 1, 2008, upon failure to renew by the date of expiration. Facts Pertaining to Counts I – IV Petitioner’s Case No. 2007-022091 On or about November 8, 2006, Van Winkle entered into a contract with ProTeam to repair water damage to Van Winkle’s residence located at 3620 Ironwood Circle, Building O, Unit 402, Bradenton, Florida. The contracted price for the construction, including change orders, was $18,358.50, of which amount ProTeam accepted approximately $15,604.71. The contract did not contain a statement explaining the consumer’s rights under the Florida Homeowners’ Construction Recovery Fund. Construction commenced on or about November 15, 2006, and continued until ProTeam abandoned the project. At the time ProTeam abandoned the project, the percentage of completion was less than the percentage of the total contract price paid by Van Winkle. Van Winkle had paid monies in the amount of $15,604.71, an amount sufficient to cover the first three draws of the contract, which should have included all aspects of the project except for the cabinet installation and punchlist. Respondent received draws to complete the painting and to order and deliver cabinets and vanities, but failed to do so. Respondent accepted 85 percent of the contract price for Van Winkle’s restoration project and provided only demolition and preparation work, carpet and an unfinished paint job. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Respondent provided Van Winkle with any refund within 30 days after the job was abandoned, and, given that the paint was unfinished and the vanities and cabinets were not provided there is no evidence that Respondent was entitled to keep the amount of funds received under the terms of the contract. The excess amounted to $6,425.47 On or about January 25, 2007, a lien was filed against Van Winkle’s property by Carpet Corner, Inc. for unpaid services in the amount of $1,745.09. The valid lien was recorded against Van Winkle’s property for carpeting ordered by Respondent for Van Winkle’s job. Respondent received funds from Van Winkle to pay for the carpet, but Respondent failed to apply those funds towards full payment of the carpet subcontractor. The lien was filed on January 29, 2007, and was not released until Van Winkle paid $1,745.09 to the carpet subcontractor on August 23, 2007, a period greater than 75 days. Van Winkle’s testimony seems, at times, to confuse the amount of the lien and the amount paid to release it with the amount paid by Respondent to the carpet subcontractor. However, her testimony also indicates that Respondent only paid $1,000.00 to the carpet subcontractor out of a $2,745.09 total contract. It is clear that the amount of the lien, and the amount paid by Van Winkle to release the lien, was $1,745.09, as indicated in the records of the Manatee County Clerk of Circuit Court. The total investigative costs to Petitioner, excluding costs associated with an attorney’s time, for Petitioner’s case number 2007-022091, was $253.42. Facts Pertaining to Counts VI – IX Petitioner’s Case No. 2007-039332 On or about August 29, 2006, Berry entered into a contract with ProTeam to repair water damage to Berry’s residence located at 4152 Whittner Drive, Land O’Lakes, Florida. The contracted price for the construction, including change orders, was $17,921.33. ProTeam accepted approximately $18,908.74 from Berry for the project. The contract did not contain a statement explaining the consumer’s rights under the Florida Homeowners’ Construction Recovery Fund. No permit was obtained for the project. However, the job was completed. A permit was required for Berry’s project due to the fact that the contract called for the replacement of a shower pan and removal of a structural element. A thorough search of Pasco County records indicated that Respondent did not obtain a permit for this project. The new stucco did not match the old stucco and needed to be redone, and Berry had to pay an additional $988.40 to have the stucco repaired and repainted. The total investigative costs to Petitioner, excluding costs associated with an attorney’s time, for Petitioner’s case number 2007-039332, was $285.51.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be rendered as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.1425, Florida Statutes, Count One of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine of $2,000.00. Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Subsection 489.129(1)(g)1., Florida Statutes, Count Two of the Administrative Complaint; imposing as a penalty an administrative fine of $2,500.00 and restitution in the amount of $1,745.09;2 and placing Respondent’s licenses (License Nos. CGC057941, GCG1509240, and QB37866) on probation for a period of four years. Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Subsections 489.129(1)(g)2. and (1)(o), Florida Statutes, Count Three of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine of $2,500.00 and restitution in the amount of $6,425.47.3 Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Subsection 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes, Count Four of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine of $5,000.00 Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Subsection 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, Count Five of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine of $2,500.00. Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.1425, Florida Statutes, Count Six of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine of $500.00. Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Subsection 489.129(1)(g)3., Florida Statutes, Count Seven of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing as a penalty an administrative fine of $5,000.00 and restitution in the amount of $1,975.81.4 Requiring Respondent to pay Petitioner’s costs of investigation and prosecution, excluding costs associated with an attorney’s time, in the amount of $511.93. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2009.
