STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF INSURANCE AGENTS AND AGENCY SERVICES,
Petitioner,
Case No. 12-3622PL
vs.
CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
Respondent.
/
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a final hearing was held in this case on February 26 and 27, 2013, by video teleconference at sites in Tallahassee, Florida and Orlando, Florida, before E. Gary Early, a designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of
Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: David J. Busch, Esquire
Department of Financial Services
200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
For Respondent: No appearance
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether Respondent, Chase Carmen Hunter, committed the violations of the Florida Insurance Code alleged in the First Amended Complaint and, if so, the sanctions to be imposed.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On August 2, 2012, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Insurance Agents and Agency Services (Division or Petitioner) filed an Administrative Complaint against Chase Carmen Hunter (Respondent). The Administrative Complaint, consisting of three counts, alleged violations of chapter 626, Florida Statutes, and sought revocation of Respondent‟s non- resident Florida insurance agent license, No. E062693 (license).
On or about October 3, 2012, Respondent executed an Election of Proceeding, in which she disputed the Division‟s factual allegations and requested a formal administrative hearing, and an Answer, in which she disputed all allegations in the Administrative Complaint and pled 24 affirmative defenses.
The Election of Proceeding and Answer were filed with Petitioner on October 25, 2012.
On October 25, 2012, Respondent also filed a Notice of Appeal with Petitioner “just in case there is a final order entered against her by the Department that has not been sent to her, that she cannot find, that is lost or has escaped this Respondent‟s access somehow or some other reason.” That Notice of Appeal, though forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings, has no bearing on this proceeding.
On November 7, 2012, the Division filed its First Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent. The First Amended
Administrative Complaint added two additional counts, and maintained revocation of Respondent‟s license as the appropriate relief.
On November 7, 2012, Petitioner referred the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The case was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Lisa Shearer Nelson, and the final hearing was scheduled for January 8 and 9, 2013.
On November 20, 2012, Respondent filed an Answer to First Amended Complaint in which she disputed all allegations in the First Amended Administrative Complaint and pled 28 affirmative defenses. The Election of Proceeding, Answer, and Answer to First Amended Complaint shall be referred to collectively as the Petition.
On November 22, 2012, Respondent filed a motion to continue the case for a period of six months. The Division did not object to a continuance of the final hearing, but objected to the length of time requested by Respondent. The motion was granted in part, the hearing scheduled for January 8 and 9, 2013, was cancelled, and the final hearing was rescheduled for February 26 and 27, 2013.
On January 18, 2013, in response to a reasoned and procedurally-correct discovery order entered by Judge Nelson, Respondent filed a “Motion to Vacate Order Dated January 16, 2013.” The Motion alleged that Judge Nelson violated “Judicial
Canons regarding the requirement of impartiality,” and asserted that “[i]t shocks the conscience that this Honorable ALJ concluded that the requests below are not relevant and is prima facie proof that this Honorable ALJ is not impartial and is biased against this Respondent.”
On January 18, 2013, Judge Nelson, having determined Respondent‟s allegations to be in the nature of a motion to disqualify, finding the bare allegations of bias and partiality to be legally sufficient, and being prohibited by Rule of Judicial Administration 2.330(f) from disputing the truth of the facts alleged, arranged for further proceedings to be transferred to the undersigned.
Over the course of the next 36 days leading to the final hearing, Respondent filed a series of motions and notices.
Those motions and notices, and their disposition, may be determined by reference to the docket of this case.
On February 26, 2013, Respondent filed an “Affidavit in Lieu of Personal Appearance at the Final Hearing Scheduled for February 26th and 27th, 2013.” An affidavit is defined as "[a] voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths, such as a notary public." Black's Law Dictionary, 62 (8th ed. 2004). Respondent‟s “affidavit” was not sworn before an officer authorized to administer oaths, has no evidentiary value, is
wholly unsubstantiated by competent, substantial evidence, and has not been considered by the undersigned.
The final hearing was convened on February 26, 2013, as scheduled. Respondent did not appear at the final hearing.
At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Dirk Pierce, Mitchel Kalmanson, Donna Nolan, Susan Gorton, and Najla Archer. Petitioner‟s Exhibits 1, 2, 4-54, and 151-160 were received into evidence. Petitioner‟s Exhibit 160 is the deposition testimony of Jacqueline Colon who was, on the date of the final hearing, greater than 100 miles from the location of the final hearing. Ms. Colon‟s deposition transcript is admissible for use by Petitioner pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.330(a)(3)(B), and has been accepted and considered as though the witness testified in person.
On February 28, 2013, the undersigned entered an Order Establishing Post-hearing Procedures that, among other things, set the time for filing proposed recommended orders as 30 days from the date of filing of the transcript.
On April 15, 2013, a three-volume Transcript of the proceedings was filed, and notice thereof was entered on the Division of Administrative Hearings‟ on-line docket.
Petitioner timely filed its Proposed Recommended Order, which has been duly considered by the undersigned in the preparation of this Recommended Order. On May 29, 2013,
Respondent filed her First Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proffers, and her Amended First Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Proffers. Although Respondent‟s post- hearing submittals were not timely, the undersigned finds no prejudice to Petitioner resulting from the late filing, and has therefore considered them in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Department of Financial Services (Department) is the agency of the State of Florida having authority, among its other duties and responsibilities, to enforce the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code. The Division of Insurance Agents and Agency Services is a legislatively-created division of the Department, and is vested with the authority to administer chapter 626, Florida Statutes, and to enforce the provisions thereof.
Respondent holds a license issued by Petitioner,
No. E062693, as a Nonresident Life, Health, and Variable Annuity agent and as a Nonresident General Lines (Property & Casualty) agent. The license was initially issued on March 20, 2003.
During all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was appointed as an agent of RLI Insurance Company, for the sale of property and casualty insurance. She held no other active appointments for the sale of property and casualty
insurance until August 4, 2010, when she was appointed as an agent of the American Alternative Insurance Corporation. The insurance being sold by Respondent that forms the basis for Counts I through III of the First Amended Administrative Complaint were not insurance products of either RLI Insurance Company or American Alternative Insurance Corporation.
Animal Liability Insurance
Animal liability insurance is a specialty form of property and casualty insurance generally available only in the surplus-lines market, and not typically available through admitted carriers. Animal liability insurance is available for domestic and exotic animals.
The Lester Kalmanson Agency
The Lester Kalmanson Agency (Kalmanson Agency) is a Florida-based and licensed insurance agency, headquartered in Maitland, Florida, that has been in operation for more than 50 years. Since its founding, it has been predominantly involved with property and casualty insurance.
Starting at the time Mitchel Kalmanson joined his father‟s agency approximately 25 years ago, the Kalmanson Agency began to develop a specialized niche in animal mortality and liability insurance. The Kalmanson Agency is one of, if not the only agency in the country that offers commercial or individual mono-line animal-liability policies for domestic and exotic
animals. Those specialty lines currently account for approximately 80 percent of the Kalmanson Agency‟s business.
The Kalmanson Agency is now well known for its ability to provide animal-liability insurance. It has received manuscripting ability through Lloyds of London, has created its own hazards and descriptions for animal-liability hazards, and has, over the years, developed and improved the unique forms used for writing animal-liability insurance.
In 2009, Respondent contacted the Kalmanson Agency to become a retail agent for the agency. Respondent entered into a contractual producer‟s agreement that allowed her to produce with the Kalmanson Agency.
At some point thereafter, Respondent engaged in a series of practices designed to infringe upon the Kalmanson name, and to fraudulently and deceptively compete with the Kalmanson Agency in providing insurance marketed by Respondent as animal-liability insurance. Those actions included, but were not limited to Respondent misusing the Kalmanson Agency name to divert Kalmanson Internet business directly to her agency, and posting false information regarding the Kalmanson Agency and its officers and employees on her website. A detailed recitation of the facts and circumstances is not necessary -- suffice to note that Respondent was temporarily, and then permanently enjoined by the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for
Orange County, Florida from using the Kalmanson name in any way, and has been held by the Court to be in Civil Contempt and indirect Criminal Contempt for her failure to comply with the lawfully entered injunctions.
Assurant Specialty Property/American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida
Assurant Specialty Property (Assurant) is the parent company of American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida (ABIC). ABIC is a Florida-admitted underwriting company that markets and sells property and casualty insurance, including renters‟ insurance, in Florida. ABIC has physical offices in Miami, Florida.
ABIC is a “direct sale” company, meaning that it has designed its sales process to allow customers to directly access its website, fill out an electronic application, purchase insurance, and receive policy documents without having to use an agent. As a result, ABIC has appointed no agents to solicit, negotiate, or effect insurance contracts on its behalf.
The only time a regular customer might use an “agent” to purchase ABIC insurance is if the customer contacted another insurance company with which ABIC has partnered, which companies include Geico and Esurance, and that company arranged coverage through ABIC. Such arranged coverage does not require or include a fee. ABIC has not partnered with Respondent.
In order to become partnered with Assurant or ABIC, a person must enter into a written contract with the company. Respondent has not entered into a written contract with Assurant or ABIC.
Among the items of information requested of a customer when insurance is obtained though the ABIC direct-sale website is the customer‟s e-mail address. Upon completion of the application, the customer has the option of receiving the declaration page, the policy, and other insurance documents from ABIC by U.S. mail or by e-mail. ABIC imposes no additional charge to send insurance documents to its policy holders by U.S. mail.
In conjunction with the Division‟s investigation that resulted in these proceedings, Assurant determined that Respondent took out approximately 50 ABIC renters‟ insurance policies for Florida residents using the ABIC website and Assurant forms. In each instance, Respondent provided ABIC with her own e-mail address in the insurance application, and had the policy documents sent to her rather than to the policy holder.
Assurant discovered through its own investigation that Respondent had altered declaration pages describing the coverage provided under policies issued by ABIC. The declaration page forms, and the other policy documents, are approved by the state
of Florida. Assurant had not authorized Respondent to alter the ABIC declaration page forms in any way.
When Assurant determined that Respondent provided customers with altered declaration pages, or had not provided customers with policy documents, it would contact the customers directly, provide them with all policy documents, and give them the option of cancelling the policy and receiving a refund if the actual coverage was not what they had requested or expected.
Upon discovery of Respondent‟s use of the direct-to- customer website, her collection of broker fees, her alteration of declaration pages, and her identification of herself as an ABIC agent, Assurant, through counsel, advised Respondent to stop such actions.
Respondent refused to comply with Assurant‟s request.
Through at least February 8, 2013, Respondent continued to procure policies through the ABIC direct-to-customer website. After Assurant became aware of Respondent‟s “chaseagency.com” domain, she began to use other domain names when she purchased policies through the Assurant system, which allowed her to have policy documents sent to her without detection.
In the absence of an undisclosed animal bite history or other history of liability resulting from animals owned by an insured, general animal liability would be covered under an ABIC renters‟ insurance policy having liability limits of $100,000 or
less. Thus, the issues in this case do not involve denial of claims.
COUNT I - Donna Nolan
Donna Nolan is a Florida-licensed insurance agent.
She works for the Kalmanson Agency.
Ms. Nolan owns a duplex that she purchased in 1992.
Ms. Nolan lives in the “front house.” The “back house” was rented to Donna Jones and her daughter, Erin Jones, who lived there along with their miniature Doberman Pinscher, known as a “Min Pin.”
Donna Jones died in early 2010. Erin Jones continued to live in the duplex.
Ms. Nolan understood the Min Pin to be “a nipper,” and it had a habit of escaping and “running amuck in the neighborhood.” Ms. Nolan required Ms. Jones to obtain animal liability insurance to protect her in the event the dog was to bite someone.
Ms. Nolan priced animal-liability insurance through the Kalmanson Agency. The annual premium was in the range of
$400.00. That amount was more than Ms. Jones could comfortably afford. Ms. Nolan suggested that Ms. Jones research alternative providers, and allowed Ms. Jones to use her computer to do so.
Ms. Jones found the “Chase Agency” online, which offered “canine insurance.” Ms. Nolan assisted Ms. Jones with
the online application form. After submittal of the application, a quote was received from Respondent by e-mail.
Ms. Jones decided to purchase animal-liability insurance through Respondent. Since Ms. Jones had no credit card or checking account, Ms. Nolan agreed to collect the premium from Ms. Jones in cash, and pay for the policy with her credit card. Ms. Nolan was charged $130.00 for the canine insurance policy, and $50.00 for the “broker fee.”
Respondent obtained the insurance for Ms. Jones from the ABIC direct-to-customer website. Rather than purchasing specialized animal liability insurance as requested by
Ms. Jones, Respondent procured standard renters‟ insurance from ABIC.
Respondent entered Ms. Jones‟ personal information into the application but, rather than entering Ms. Jones‟ e-mail address, Respondent entered her own e-mail address. Respondent then elected to have all policy documents delivered by e-mail, which resulted in them being delivered to Respondent, and not to Ms. Jones as the insured policy holder.
Respondent provided Ms. Jones with an ABIC declaration page via e-mail. The declaration page included three material alterations made by Respondent.
The first alteration to the declaration page consisted of the following language, neatly printed and contained within a
box at the top of the form, directly under the name and address of the issuing company:
PURCHASED AT WWW.CHASEAGENCY.COM:: RETAIL AGENT: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER:: 4 PEACE PIPE LANE, FREDERICKSBURG, VA 22401
The second alteration to the declaration page consisted of the insertion of an entry for “Broker Fee $50.00” after the listing of the Total Premium of $130.00. Although Ms. Nolan testified that it appeared to her to be “different typing,” the undersigned finds the type style to be sufficiently similar to the adjacent text as to appear to be a part of the declaration page as prepared and issued by ABIC.
The third alteration to the declaration page consisted of the following language, neatly printed and contained within a box at the bottom of the form, which covered the insurer‟s authorized countersignature:
TEL: 330-333-BUY3(2893)(CALLS & TEXTS) WWW.DANGEROUSDOGINSURANCE.COM
THIS POLICY WAS ISSUED WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE INSURED OWNS A DOBERMAN PINSCHER THAT IS NOT EXCLUDED
The alterations, by their appearance, give the impression that they were printed on the declaration page as issued by ABIC. Since Respondent did not provide Ms. Jones with the original of her declaration page, it was not apparent that the alterations were performed by applying some form of appliqué
or typed addition to the declaration page issued by ABIC. Rather, Respondent created the clear impression that ABIC had authorized Respondent to act as its retail agent, had authorized the assessment of a Broker Fee, had specific knowledge of
Ms. Jones‟ dog, and had acknowledged that the dog was not excluded from coverage. None of those impressions were true.
Ms. Nolan recognized the declaration page as one for a renter‟s insurance policy, and not for an animal liability insurance policy. Ms. Nolan advised Ms. Jones that she had not received “canine insurance,” but had received a renter‟s insurance policy, which she had not requested.
Ms. Nolan called the number provided to her by Respondent in an effort to obtain a complete copy of the policy. The person with whom she spoke, who did not provide identification, refused to send the policy to Ms. Nolan, stating that to do so would cost too much in money and time, and stating that Respondent would maintain the policy in case a claim is made.
Being dissatisfied with the telephone conversation, Ms. Nolan contacted ABIC. On June 9, 2010, Ms. Nolan faxed ABIC a recitation of the facts involved with the purchase of the policy, and provided ABIC with copy of the declaration page sent to Ms. Jones by Respondent.
At some point, Respondent determined that Ms. Nolan, who was not the insured, worked for the Kalmanson Agency. Since the dispute between Respondent and the Kalmanson Agency had by this time become open, and thinking Ms. Nolan to be a “Kalmanson spy,” Respondent refunded the $50.00 broker‟s fee.
Upon request made by Ms. Jones on June 17, 2010, ABIC cancelled the policy, effective June 25, 2010, and refunded the full premium, which was credited to Ms. Nolan‟s credit card.
In her dealings with Ms. Jones and Ms. Nolan, Respondent acted as, and held herself out as an insurance agent of ABIC. Given the facts and circumstances of her dealings with Ms. Jones and Ms. Nolan, including her alterations of the ABIC declaration page to identify herself as the “retail agent,” her collection of a “brokers fee,” and her insistence on keeping the policy in order to manage claims, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from her conduct was that she intended to convey the impression that she was appointed by ABIC to act as its agent in the sale of insurance. Respondent was not appointed by ABIC, nor was she authorized to act as an agent on its behalf.
The only plausible inference that can be drawn from Respondent‟s use of the name “CHASEAGENCY” on the altered declaration page, and her identification of herself as the “Retail Agent,” is that Respondent intended to act and to be
perceived as acting as an insurance agency with regard to the solicitation and sale of Florida insurance. Respondent did not hold an insurance agency license or registration.
The facts of this case demonstrate that Respondent, by her statements and by her alteration of the ABIC declaration page, willfully misrepresented the conditions and terms of
Ms. Jones‟ insurance policy with the intent to deceive her about its true nature. By so doing, Respondent engaged in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under her license.
By consciously altering the declaration page so as to hold the “CHASEAGENCY” out as an insurance agency, and herself out as an agent of ABIC, Respondent knowingly made false material statements regarding herself and the policy.
The only reasonable explanation for Respondent‟s method of providing insurance is that she desired to isolate Ms. Jones, the insured policy holder, from ABIC to the maximum extent possible so as to perpetuate Respondent‟s pattern of deception and manipulation in the sale of insurance under her license. As a result of the foregoing, Respondent exhibited a lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
COUNT II - Jacqueline Colon
During the period of time relevant to this proceeding, Jacqueline Colon rented a home in Leesburg, Florida, where she lived with her husband. She owned two dogs when she first rented the home, without objection by the landlord. When she subsequently added a pit bull to her menagerie, her landlord required that she obtain liability insurance for the dog.
Ms. Colon contacted her automobile-insurance company, Geico Insurance (Geico). She was advised that Geico did not insure for dangerous dog breeds. She thereupon searched the Internet for a provider. Ms. Colon‟s search led her to Respondent‟s website.
On or about March 24, 2010, Ms. Colon spoke with Respondent regarding her desire for insurance to cover her pit bull. Respondent quoted Ms. Colon a premium of $174.03 for the insurance, and $50.00 as a fee, for a total quote of $224.03.
Ms. Colon provided Respondent with her checking account information for the purchase of a policy, which included
$100,000 in liability coverage, and $10,000 in personal property loss coverage. The policy premium of $174.03 was paid through Ms. Colon‟s checking account. Respondent did not collect the additional $50.00 fee.
It was Ms. Colon‟s understanding when she purchased the policy from Respondent that she was purchasing insurance
that was to specifically cover liability for injury caused by her dogs, i.e., “dangerous dog insurance per se.”
Respondent obtained the insurance for Ms. Colon from the ABIC direct-to-customer website. Rather than purchasing specialized dangerous dog liability insurance as requested by Ms. Colon, Respondent procured standard renters‟ insurance from ABIC.
Respondent entered Ms. Colon‟s personal information into the application but, rather than entering Ms. Colon‟s e- mail address, Respondent entered her own e-mail address. Respondent then elected to have all policy documents delivered by e-mail, which resulted in them being delivered to Respondent, and not to Ms. Colon as the insured policy holder.
Respondent subsequently provided Ms. Colon with an ABIC policy declaration page via e-mail. The declaration page included material alterations made by Respondent. The alterations consisted of the following language, printed, and inserted into the declaration page:
PURCHASED AT WWW.CHASEAGENCY.COM RETAIL AGENT: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER,
4PEACE PIPE LANE, FREDERICKSBURG, VA 22401
TEL: 330-333-BUY3(2893)(CALLS & TEXTS)
24-HOUR HOTLINE: 707-706-DOGS (3647)(CALLS & TEXTS)
THIS POLICY WAS ISSUED WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE INSURED OWNS PIT BULL CANINE
The alterations, though not as neatly inserted as the alterations to the declaration pages provided to Ms. Jones and Mr. Pierce, nonetheless give the impression that they were printed on the declaration page as issued by ABIC.
By her alterations, Respondent created the clear impression that ABIC had authorized Respondent to act as its retail agent, and had specific knowledge of Ms. Colon‟s pit bull. Those impressions were not true.
The altered declaration page was accepted by
Ms. Colon‟s landlord as satisfactory to meet her requirement.
Respondent did not provide Ms. Colon with a copy of her policy.
After having received the altered declaration page, Ms. Colon and her husband determined that they should have more coverage for their personal property. Ms. Colon contacted Geico to obtain renters‟ insurance. She purchased the additional insurance and paid the first premium installment to Geico.
In August of 2010, Ms. Colon was contacted by the Division‟s investigator regarding the issues that are the subject of the Administrative Complaint. During the meeting, Ms. Colon realized that the renters‟ policy obtained through
Geico was written by ABIC, as was the purported animal liability policy provided by Respondent.
Ms. Colon called Assurant to inquire as to the coverage provided by the two policies. When it was determined that both policies covered the same risk, and that the policies would not each pay for any losses, ABIC refunded Ms. Colon‟s paid premium for the policy that was obtained through Geico.
Given the facts and circumstances of Respondent‟s dealings with Ms. Colon, including her alterations of the ABIC declaration page to identify herself as the “retail agent,” and her discussion regarding the assessment of a fee, even though it was not collected, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from her conduct was that she intended to convey the impression that she was appointed by ABIC to act as its agent in the sale of insurance. Respondent was not appointed by ABIC, nor was she authorized to act as an agent on its behalf.
The only plausible inference that can be drawn from Respondent‟s use of the name “CHASEAGENCY” on the altered declaration page, and her identification of herself as the “Retail Agent,” is that Respondent intended to act and to be perceived as acting as an insurance agency. Respondent did not hold an insurance agency license or registration.
The facts of this case demonstrate that Respondent, by her statements and by her alteration of the declaration page,
willfully misrepresented the conditions and terms of Ms. Colon‟s insurance policy with the intent to deceive her about its true nature. By so doing, Respondent engaged in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under her license.
By consciously altering the declaration page so as to hold the “CHASEAGENCY” out as an insurance agency, and herself out as an agent of ABIC, Respondent knowingly made false material statements regarding herself and the policy.
The only reasonable explanation for Respondent‟s method of providing insurance is that she desired to isolate Ms. Colon, the insured policy holder, from ABIC to the maximum extent possible so as to perpetuate Respondent‟s pattern of deception and manipulation in the sale of insurance under her license. As a result of the foregoing, Respondent exhibited a lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
COUNT III - Dirk Pierce
At some time prior to June 2010, Dirk Pierce rented a home situated on five acres in Panama City, Florida. The property was zoned so as to allow him to keep his horses, along with a mule that he was boarding for a friend.
As a condition of keeping his horses, Mr. Pierce‟s landlord required that he obtain animal-liability insurance.
Mr. Pierce consulted with his local insurance agent, but that agent did not offer a liability policy for animals. She suggested that Mr. Pierce search the Internet for a provider.
Mr. Pierce‟s search led him to the Chase Carmen Hunter Insurance Agency. While on-line, he filled out and submitted a short questionnaire. The next day, Respondent called
Mr. Pierce. She quoted Mr. Pierce an annual premium of $463.28, plus a $50.00 “administration charge.”
Mr. Pierce asked Respondent if he would be able to transfer the policy to another property. Respondent advised Mr. Pierce that the policy was transferable, and that he “just needed to call in.” Respondent also advised Mr. Pierce that, along with his yearly animal coverage, he would receive a “bonus” of $50,000 in renter‟s furniture content coverage at no additional cost.
Respondent further advised Mr. Pierce that if he ever had a claim on his purported animal-liability policy, he was to “go directly to her and contact her and her only, that she would handle it.” The only inference that can be drawn from Respondent‟s insistence that she be solely responsible for handling any claims is that she wanted to isolate Mr. Pierce from contact with the insurer, and minimize the possibility that her deceptive conduct, described herein, would be discovered.
Mr. Pierce completed the transaction by providing Respondent with his wife‟s credit card number to pay for the policy.
Respondent obtained the insurance for Mr. Pierce from the ABIC direct-to-customer website. Rather than purchasing specialized animal-liability insurance as requested by
Mr. Pierce, Respondent procured standard renters‟ insurance from ABIC.
Respondent entered Mr. Pierce‟s personal information into the application but, rather than entering Mr. Pierce‟s e- mail address, Respondent entered her own e-mail address. Respondent then elected to have all policy documents delivered by e-mail, which resulted in them being delivered to Respondent, and not to Mr. Pierce as the insured policyholder.
On June 10, 2010, Mrs. Pierce‟s credit card was charged $463.82 for the policy premium, along with a $50.00 “broker fee.”
After the completion of the transaction, Mr. Pierce contacted Respondent to request a declaration page for the policy that he purchased. He advised Respondent that it was necessary that he provide his landlord with evidence of the animal-liability insurance policy. Respondent advised
Mr. Pierce that she would provide him with the declaration page by e-mail or fax.
On June 17, 2010, Mr. Pierce made inquiry by e-mail to Respondent as to why he had not received his policy.
Mr. Pierce‟s landlord was demanding proof of animal liability insurance by June 18, 2010, the failure of which was to be grounds for his having to move the horses. On the early afternoon of June 18, 2010, Respondent e-mailed the policy to Mr. Pierce with the message “I am attaching your policy. The original will not be mailed. If you give me your landlord name and address, I will mail the information to him/her as well.”
The policy provided to Mr. Pierce was a renters‟ insurance policy issued by ABIC. Mr. Pierce testified that he received a small, four-page policy for his rental contents, but it said nothing about liability coverage for his horses. The declaration page included with the policy included two material alterations made by Respondent prior to her providing it electronically to Mr. Pierce.
The first alteration to the declaration page consisted of the following language, neatly printed and contained within a box at the top of the form, directly under the name and address of the issuing company:
PURCHASED AT WWW.CHASEAGENCY.COM:: RETAIL AGENT: CHASE CARMEN HUNTER:: 4PEACE PIPE LANE, FREDERICKSBURG, VA 22401
The second alteration to the declaration page consisted of the following language, neatly printed and
contained within a box at the bottom of the form, which covered the insurer‟s authorized countersignature:
TEL: 330-333-BUY3(2893)(CALLS & TEXTS) WWW.CHASEAGENCY.COM
THIS POLICY WAS ISSUED WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE INSURED OWNS FOUR EQUINE THAT ARE NOT EXCLUDED
The alterations, by their appearance, give the impression that they were printed on the declaration page as issued by ABIC. By not providing Mr. Pierce with the original of his policy, it was not apparent that the alterations were performed by applying some form of appliqué to the declaration page issued by ABIC. Rather, Respondent created the clear impression that ABIC had authorized Respondent to act as its retail agent, had specific knowledge of Mr. Pierce‟s horses, and had acknowledged that the horses were not excluded from coverage. None of those impressions was true.
Mr. Pierce recognized that the declaration page provided to him was not for the requested animal liability policy, but assumed it was for the “complementary policy which [he] didn‟t even ask for that she threw in on the deal.” He continued to ask for a declaration page for the animal liability policy he was told he had purchased, to no avail.
The renters‟ policy provided to Mr. Pierce contained little in the way of specific coverages for liability associated
with Mr. Pierce‟s horses. The ABIC renters‟ insurance policy is not an animal-liability policy, and was not the insurance requested by Mr. Pierce.
Approximately 30 days after having purchased what he believed to be transferrable animal liability insurance,
Mr. Pierce purchased a home with acreage for his horses.
Mr. Pierce contacted Respondent to have the policy transferred to his new home, consistent with Respondent‟s earlier representations. Respondent then advised Mr. Pierce that the policy could not be transferred so as to apply to his newly- acquired residence.
Since the policy could not be transferred, Mr. Pierce asked that it be cancelled and his premium refunded. Respondent advised Mr. Pierce that the request to cancel the policy would have to be handled by her, and that it would take 60 to 90 days before he would receive a refund.
Mr. Pierce never received a refund, and never received the animal-liability insurance he was promised.
In her dealings with Mr. Pierce, Respondent acted as, and held herself out as an insurance agent of ABIC. Given the facts and circumstances of her dealings with Mr. Pierce, including her alterations of the ABIC declaration page to identify herself as the “retail agent,” her collection of a “brokers fee,” her insistence that all claims go through “her
and her only,” and that she be solely responsible for payment and cancellation of the policy, the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from her conduct was that she intended to convey the impression that she was appointed by ABIC to act as its agent in the sale of insurance. Respondent was not appointed by ABIC, nor was she authorized to act as an agent on its behalf.
The only plausible inference that can be drawn from Respondent‟s use of the name “CHASEAGENCY” on the altered declaration page, and her identification of herself as the “Retail Agent,” is that Respondent intended to act and to be perceived as acting as an insurance agency. Respondent did not hold an insurance agency license or registration.
The facts of this case demonstrate that Respondent, by her statements and by her alteration of the declaration page, willfully misrepresented the conditions and terms of
Mr. Pierce‟s insurance policy with the intent to deceive him about its true nature. By so doing, Respondent engaged in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under her license.
By consciously altering the declaration page so as to hold the “CHASEAGENCY” out as an insurance agency, and herself out as an agent of ABIC, Respondent knowingly made false material statements regarding herself and the policy.
The only reasonable explanation for Respondent‟s method of providing insurance is that she desired to isolate Mr. Pierce, the insured policyholder, from ABIC to the maximum extent possible so as to perpetuate Respondent‟s pattern of deception and manipulation in the sale of insurance under her license. As a result of the foregoing, Respondent exhibited a
lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
COUNT IV and COUNT V - Unfair Competition or Deceptive Trade Practices
Count IV and Count V are based on the same conduct, described below, and seek relief under the same statutory provision, section 626.611(7).1/ Thus, for purposes of this Recommended Order, Count IV and Count V are considered as a single count for purposes of applying the penalty guidelines set forth in the conclusions of law.
As a result of Respondent‟s actions with regard to the Kalmanson Agency as described herein, the Kalmanson Agency filed suit against Respondent in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, Florida seeking injunctive relief.
The Court entered a Temporary Injunction without Notice on February 3, 2009, and a Final Judgment for Permanent Injunctive Relief against Respondent on March 14, 2011. Those
orders enjoined Respondent from, among other things, using the Kalmanson name in any way on any of her websites, from diverting customers and business by using the Kalmanson name, and from otherwise engaging in unfair competition or deceptive trade practices by using the Kalmanson name.
On August 29, 2012, the Court entered an Order of Civil Contempt against Respondent for her continued violations of the Court‟s Final Judgment for Permanent Injunctive Relief.
On October 31, 2012, the Court entered an Amended Criminal Contempt Order against Respondent for her willful and contemptuous violation of the Court‟s injunction, and her direct and intentional disobedience of the Court‟s orders.
As a result of Respondent‟s willful and contemptuous disregard for the authority of the Florida courts regarding a matter arising from her marketing and sale of insurance in Florida, Respondent exhibited fraudulent and dishonest practices related to her Florida non-resident license, and exhibited a lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Jurisdiction.
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of
the parties thereto pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2012).
The First Amended Administrative Complaint does not specify the codification of the Florida Statutes being charged. The conduct relating to actions taken under Respondent‟s agent license is alleged to have occurred, in large part, from March through June of 2010, making the relevant statutes the 2009 codification. The only subsequent amendment of any statute charged was to section 626.9541(1)(a), which was charged in Counts I through III. The amendment became effective on July 1, 2012, well after the conduct described in those three counts. Section 626.9541(1)(a) was not alleged to have been violated in Count IV or Count V. Accordingly, all statutory references shall be to the 2009 codification unless otherwise specified.
Standards
Section 626.112, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that:
(1)(a) No person may be, act as, or advertise or hold himself or herself out to be an insurance agent, insurance adjuster, or customer representative unless he or she is currently licensed by the department and appointed by an appropriate appointing entity or person.
* * *
(7)(a) Effective October 1, 2006, no individual, firm, partnership, corporation, association, or any other entity shall act
in its own name or under a trade name, directly or indirectly, as an insurance agency, unless it complies with s. 626.172 with respect to possessing an insurance agency license for each place of business at which it engages in any activity which may be performed only by a licensed insurance agent.
Section 626.331 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(2) An agent shall be required to have a separate appointment as to each insurer by whom he or she is appointed as an agent.
Section 626.611 provides, in pertinent part, that:
The department shall deny an application for, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license or appointment of any applicant, agent, title agency, adjuster, customer representative, service representative, or managing general agent, and it shall suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or appointment of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or appointee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist:
* * *
(5) Willful misrepresentation of any insurance policy or annuity contract or willful deception with regard to any such policy or contract, done either in person or by any form of dissemination of information or advertising.
* * *
(7) Demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
* * *
(9) Fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or appointment.
Section 626.621(6) provides, in pertinent part, that: Grounds for discretionary refusal,
suspension, or revocation of agent‟s,
adjuster‟s, customer representative‟s, service representative‟s, or managing general agent‟s license or appointment. --
The department may, in its discretion, deny an application for, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license or appointment of any . . . agent, . . ., and it may suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or appointment of any such person, if it finds that as to the . . . licensee . . . any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist under circumstances for which such denial, suspension, revocation, or refusal is not mandatory under s. 626.611:
(6) In the conduct of business under the license or appointment, engaging in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited under part IX of this chapter . . .
Section 626.752(2) provides that:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), an agent may place with an insurer for which he or she is not an appointed agent only such business for which he or she is appointed and which the insurer by which he or she is appointed is authorized to write.
Section 626.9541 provides, in pertinent part, that:
UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS. -- The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices:
Misrepresentations and false advertising of insurance policies. -- Knowingly making, issuing, circulating, or causing to be made, issued, or circulated, any estimate, illustration, circular, statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which:
Misrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions, or terms of any insurance policy.
* * *
False statements and entries.--
Knowingly:
Filing with any supervisory or other public official,
Making, publishing, disseminating, circulating,
Delivering to any person,
Placing before the public,
Causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public,
any false material statement.
The Burden and Standard of Proof.
The Division bears the burden of proving the specific allegations of fact that support the charges alleged in the First Amended Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. Dep‟t of Banking & Fin., Div. of Sec. & Inv. Prot. v.
Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996); Ferris v.
Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987); Pou v. Dep‟t of Ins. &
Treasurer, 707 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
Clear and convincing evidence “requires more proof than a „preponderance of the evidence‟ but less than „beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.‟” In re Graziano,
696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997). The clear and convincing evidence level of proof
entails both a qualitative and quantitative standard. The evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.
Clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994) (quoting, with approval, Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)); see also In re Henson, 913 So. 2d 579, 590 (Fla. 2005). "Although this standard of proof may be met where the evidence is in conflict, it seems to preclude evidence that is
ambiguous." Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Shuler Bros., 590 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
The sections upon which this disciplinary action has been brought are penal in nature, and must be strictly construed, with any ambiguity construed against the Petitioner. Penal statutes must be construed in terms of their literal meaning, and words used by the Legislature may not be expanded to broaden the application of such statutes. Elmariah v. Dep‟t
of Bus. & Prof‟l Reg., 574 So. 2d 164, 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also Beckett v. Dep‟t of Fin. Svcs., 982 So. 2d 94, 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Whitaker v. Dep‟t of Ins., 680 So. 2d 528,
531 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Dyer v. Dep‟t of Ins. & Treasurer, 585 So. 2d 1009, 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
With regard to the alleged violations of section 626.611(9), the courts have construed that section to require “more than a solitary lapse or single act of misconduct” in order to prove that a party has engaged in “fraudulent or dishonest practices.” Robert v. Dep't of Ins., 854 So. 2d 681, 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003; Werner v. Dep‟t of Ins., 689 So.2d 1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
COUNT I
Given the admissible testimony and evidence presented at the final hearing, and based upon the findings of fact made as to the allegations in Count I of the First Amended
Administrative Complaint, Petitioner proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated sections 626.112(1)(a) and (7)(a); section 626.331(2); section 626.611(5), (7) and (9); section 626.621(6); section 626.752(2);
and section 626.9541(1)(a)1. and (1)(e)1. with regard to that count.
With regard to the violation of section 626.611(9), Respondent‟s conduct as established in Count I, taken in light of her conduct as established regarding Counts II and III, forms a repeated pattern of willful misconduct, thereby establishing “[f]raudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or appointment.”
COUNT II
Given the admissible testimony and evidence presented at the final hearing, and based upon the findings of fact made as to the allegations in Count II of the First Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.112(1)(a) and (7)(a); section 626.331(2); section 626.611(5), (7) and (9); section 626.621(6); section 626.752(2); and section 626.9541(1)(a)1. and (1)(e)1. with regard to that count.
With regard to the violation of section 626.611(9), Respondent‟s conduct as established in Count II, taken in light
of her conduct as established regarding Counts I and III, forms a repeated pattern of willful misconduct, thereby establishing “[f]raudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or appointment.”
COUNT III
Given the admissible testimony and evidence presented at the final hearing, and based upon the findings of fact made as to the allegations in Count III of the First Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated sections 626.112(1)(a) and (7)(a); section 626.331(2); section 626.611(5), (7) and (9); section 626.621(6); section 626.752(2); and section 626.9541(1)(a)1. and (1)(e)1. with regard to that count.
With regard to the violation of section 626.611(9), Respondent‟s conduct as established in Count III, taken in light of her conduct as established regarding Counts I and II, forms a repeated pattern of willful misconduct, thereby establishing “[f]raudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or appointment.”
COUNT IV and COUNT V
Given the admissible testimony and evidence presented at the final hearing, and based upon the findings of fact made as to the allegations in Count IV and Count V of the First
Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(7) with regard to those counts.
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Respondent raised 28 affirmative defenses in her Answer to First Amended Administrative Complaint. Respondent bears the burden of proving the facts that support each defense. Ellingham v. Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs., 896 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Pub. Health Trust of Dade Cnty. v. Holmes, 646 So. 2d 266, 267 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
Respondent did not appear at the final hearing, and offered no competent, substantial, and admissible evidence at the hearing to support her affirmative defenses. Therefore, Respondent failed to meet her burden of proof with regard to her affirmative defenses.
PENALTIES
The Division has promulgated Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 69B-231 to be applied in determining the penalty to be imposed on Respondent for committing the violations proven in Counts I through V of the First Amended Administrative Complaint. Those penalty guidelines must be applied in this case. See Parrot Heads, Inc. v. Dep‟t of Bus. & Prof‟l Reg., 741 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)(“An administrative agency is bound by its own rules.”); State v.
Jenkins, 469 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1985)(“[A]gency rules and regulations, duly promulgated under the authority of law, have the effect of law.”); Williams v. Dep‟t of Transp., 531 So. 2d 994, 996 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)(“DOT was required to comply with its rule for implementing disciplinary action against its employee . . .”).
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.040, entitled “Calculating Penalty,” provides that:
Penalty Per Count.
The Department is authorized to find that multiple grounds exist under Sections 626.611 and 626.621, F.S., for disciplinary action against the licensee based upon a single count in an administrative complaint based upon a single act of misconduct by a licensee. However, for the purpose of this rule chapter, only the violation specifying the highest stated penalty will be considered for that count. The highest stated penalty thus established for each count is referred to as the “penalty per count”.
The requirement for a single highest stated penalty for each count in an administrative complaint shall be applicable regardless of the number or nature of the violations established in a single count of an administrative complaint.
Total Penalty. Each penalty per count shall be added together and the sum shall be referred to as the "total penalty".
Final Penalty.
The final penalty which will be imposed against a licensee under these rules
shall be the total penalty, as adjusted to take into consideration any aggravating or mitigating factors;
The Department may convert the total penalty to an administrative fine and probation if the licensee has not previously been subjected to an administrative penalty and the current action does not involve a violation of Section 626.611, F.S.;
The Department will consider the factors set forth in rule subsection 69B- 231.160(1), F.A.C., in determining whether to convert the total penalty to an administrative fine and probation.
In the event that the final penalty would exceed a suspension of twenty-four
(24) months, the final penalty shall be revocation.
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.080, entitled, “Penalties for Violation of Section 626.611, F.S.,” provides, in pertinent part, that:
If it is found that the licensee has violated any of the following subsections of Section 626.611, F.S., for which compulsory suspension or revocation . . . is required, the following stated penalty shall apply:
* * *
(5) Section 626.611(5), F.S. - suspension 9 months
* * *
(7) Section 626.611(7), F.S. - suspension 6 months
* * *
(9) Section 626.611(9), F.S. - suspension 9 months
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.100, entitled “Penalties for Violation of Section 626.621(6), F.S.,” provides, in pertinent part, that:
If a licensee is found to have violated Section 626.621(6), F.S., by engaging in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices as defined in any of the following paragraphs of Section 626.9541(1), F.S., the following stated penalty shall apply:
(1) Section 626.9541(1)(a), F.S. –
suspension 12 months
* * *
(5) Section 626.9541(1)(e), F.S. –
suspension 6 months; except that the penalty for a violation of Section 626.9541(1)(e)1., F.S., shall be a suspension of 12 months.
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.110, entitled “Penalties for Violation of Other Specific Provisions of the Florida Insurance Code,” provides, in pertinent part, that:
If the licensee is found to have violated any of the following provisions of the Insurance Code, the following stated penalty shall apply:
* * *
(21) Section 626.752, F.S. – suspension 3 months.
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.120, entitled “Penalties for Violation of Other Insurance Code Provisions,” provides, in pertinent part, that:
If the licensee is found to have violated a provision of the Insurance Code, the stated penalty, unless otherwise prescribed in these rules or in the code provision violated, shall be a six (6) month suspension if the violation was willful, or shall be a three (3) month suspension if the violation was nonwillful.
The violations of sections 626.112(1)(a), 626.112(7)(a), and 626.331(2), proven in Counts I through III of the First Amended Administrative Complaint fall within the guidelines of rule 69B-
231.120. The undersigned has determined that the violation of those sections were willful, thus requiring a suspension of 6 months for each count.
Applying the penalty guidelines to the facts of this case, the highest stated penalty -- or “penalty per count” -- for each of Counts I through III of the First Amended Administrative Complaint is a suspension of 12 months for the violation of section 626.621(6). The “penalty per count” for Counts IV and V is a single suspension of six months. Thus, the “total penalty” as defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.040(2) is a license suspension of 42 months.
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.160 establishes “aggravating and mitigating factors” to be
considered in calculating the final penalty assessment. The rule applicable to Counts I through III, prior to its most recent amendment on August 12, 2010, provided, in pertinent part, that:
The Department shall consider the following aggravating and mitigating factors and apply them to the total penalty in reaching the final penalty assessed against a licensee under this rule chapter. After consideration and application of these factors, the Department shall, if warranted by the Department‟s consideration of the factors, either decrease or increase the penalty to any penalty authorized by law.
For penalties other than those assessed under Rule 69B-231.150, F.A.C.:
Willfulness of licensee‟s conduct;
Degree of actual injury to victim;
Degree of potential injury to victim;
Age or capacity of victim;
Timely restitution;
Motivation of agent;
Financial gain or loss to agent;
Cooperation with the Department;
Vicarious or personal responsibility;
Related criminal charge; disposition;
Existence of secondary violations in counts;
Previous disciplinary orders or prior warning by the Department; and
Other relevant factors.
Counts IV and V involved conduct that occurred after the August 12, 2010, amendments to rule 69B-231.160. However, the changes made at that time are not material to the aggravating and mitigating factors applicable to those counts.
Based on the factual record developed in this proceeding, the aggravating circumstances that warrant an enhancement of the applicable penalty beyond the maximum are the “[w]illfulness of licensee‟s conduct,” the “[m]otivation of agent,” Respondent‟s “[c]ooperation [or lack thereof] with the Department,” and the “[r]elated criminal charge,” in the form of the Amended Criminal Contempt Order. Since the “total penalty” for the proven counts exceeds a suspension of 24 months without aggravation, a numeric calculation of the aggravating factors is not necessary.
Based on the factual record developed in this proceeding, there are no mitigating circumstances that warrant a decrease of the applicable penalty.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the “final penalty” in the instant case -- being a suspension of 42 months without aggravation -- exceeds a suspension of 24 months and, by application of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.040(3)(d), requires revocation of Respondent's license.
Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Insurance Agents and Agency Services, enter a Final
Order revoking the license of Respondent, Chase Carmen Hunter, No. E062693, as a Nonresident Life, Health, and Variable Annuity
agent and as a Nonresident General Lines (Property & Casualty) agent.
DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2013.
ENDNOTE
1/ Count IV alleged violations of statutory provisions in addition to section 626.611(7). However, upon review of the cited additional sections, the undersigned has determined that they are not applicable to Count IV which is based on the willful disregard of court orders, rather than on matters pertaining to whether Respondent held herself out as an agent or agency, or whether Respondent engaged in unfair competition or deceptive acts.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Chase Carmen Hunter Post Office Box 9075
Fredericksburg, Virginia 22403
David J. Busch, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larsen Building
200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services
200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this recommended order. Any exceptions to this recommended order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Aug. 06, 2013 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jun. 26, 2013 | Recommended Order | Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated multiple provisions of the Insurance Code. Recommend revocation. |
