STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
SHARON L. HARRIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
HYDRO/ALUMINUM NORTH AMERICA,
Respondent.
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) Case No. 03-1712
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RECOMMENDED ORDER AFTER REMAND
A formal hearing after remand was conducted in this case on May 24, 2006, before Suzanne F. Hood, Administrative Law Judge with the Division of Administrative Hearings.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Sharon L. Harris, pro se
3606 Fort Peyton Circle
St. Augustine, Florida 32016
For Respondent: Alexandra Hedrick, Esquire
Alexandra Hedrick, P.L.
4446 Hendricks Avenue, Suite 398
Jacksonville, Florida 32207
Suzzanne W. Decker, Esquire Miles & Stockbridge, P.C.
10 Light Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21202-1487 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
This issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner in its employment practices contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Administrative Law Judge Stephen F. Dean issued a Recommended Order in this case on April 26, 2004. According to the Recommended Order, Petitioner Sharon L. Harris (Petitioner) did not show that Respondent Hydro/Aluminum North America (Respondent) had terminated her employment based on a discriminatory or retaliatory animus prohibited by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Judge Dean recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief.
Both parties filed Exceptions to Judge Dean's Recommended Order. Petitioner argued that she had not been afforded ample opportunity to complete her cross-examination of Joe Roberts and to present rebuttal testimony. Respondent took exception to the Recommended Order to the extent that it was overbroad and made unsupported conclusions regarding Respondent's obligations to put Petitioner back to work based on workers' compensation law.
On October 1, 2004, FCHR issued an Order Remanding Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. Said order remanded the case to provide Petitioner with an opportunity to complete her cross-examination of Joe Roberts and to allow her to present rebuttal evidence. FCHR found it unnecessary to address other exceptions.
On November 12, 2004, Judge Dean entered an Order Supplementing the Record and Requesting Further Consideration. On February 24, 2006, FCHR issued its second Order Remanding Petition for Relief for an Unlawful Employment Practice.
On March 2, 2006, the undersigned issued an Order Reopening File to provide Petitioner with an opportunity to complete cross-examination of one witness and to present rebuttal evidence, if any. On March 24, 2006, the parties filed a Joint Response to Order Reopening File: Providing Mutually Convenient Hearing Dates.
In a Notice of Hearing dated March 27, 2006, the undersigned scheduled the hearing for May 24, 2006.
On May 12, 2006, the parties filed a Joint Pre-hearing Submission. According to the pre-hearing statement, the parties did not intend to file any additional exhibits.
On May 23, 2006, the day before the final hearing, Petitioner filed Motions to Request a Continuance to Subpoena Documentation and Witnesses, and to Submit Additional Documentary Evidence. After hearing oral argument on May 24, 2006, the undersigned denied these motions on the record.
During the final hearing, Petitioner completed her cross examination of Joe Roberts and presented her own rebuttal testimony. She did not present the testimony of any additional witnesses.
Petitioner offered three exhibits for admission into evidence. Petitioner proffered Exhibits P144 and P145, which are excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Petitioner's Exhibit P146 is hereby admitted as evidence.
On July 7, 2006, the court reporter filed a transcript of the May 24, 2006, final hearing.
On July 17, 2006, Respondent filed a Proposed Supplemental Recommended Order After Remand. Petitioner did not file supplemental findings of fact or conclusions of law.
In preparation for the final hearing, the undersigned reviewed the entire record, including four volumes of transcript and all exhibits from the prior hearing. The following exhibits have been admitted as evidence in this case: R9, R10-R25, R30, R39, R54, R56-R59, R63, R66-R68, R70, R82-R83, R86, R98-R99, R104, R106-R107, R110-R111, R113-R114, R117, R130, R136, R137,
R138, R140, R141, and R143. Petitioner proffered Exhibit P1, which was excluded as inadmissible hearsay.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Respondent produces drawn and extruded aluminum products.
Petitioner was hired as a saw operator in the drawn tube department in 1997. Her supervisor was Sherry Hontz.
Petitioner was promoted to quality auditor technician in a different department in August of 1998. Her supervisor was Nick Newinski.
On December 14, 1998, Petitioner complained to Roger Penn, the plant manager, about sexual harassment on the job. Mr. Penn told Petitioner to take her complaint to Joe Roberts, Respondent's Human Resources manager.
At Mr. Roberts' request, Petitioner provided him with a handwritten complaint. Petitioner complained that two co- workers had called her derogatory names, "Boom Boom" and "Big Tits," and had started rumors of alleged sexual relationships she was having with co-workers. Petitioner also complained that her former supervisor, Ms. Hontz, had been unfair to her after Petitioner dated Ms. Hontz's former boyfriend. Petitioner stated that she was humiliated by the name-calling and rumors.
Mr. Roberts investigated the complaint, and interviewed nine employees, in addition to Petitioner. Roberts interviewed everyone identified in Petitioner's written complaint. Based upon his investigation, four employees, Don Carver, Sherry Hontz, Frank Small, and Carolyn Whitecloud, received written reprimands on December 21, 1998, for either the use of offensive names, gossiping, or failing to stop the conduct. The letter to Ms. Whitecloud, the operations manager for drawn tubing,
specifically cautioned her as the manager to ensure that no retaliation, direct or indirect, was taken against Petitioner.
Petitioner felt that Mr. Roberts' investigation was over-broad and touched on her personal life more than was necessary; however, there was no evidence of this beyond her allegations.
Mr. Roberts retained, in accordance with his standard practice, Petitioner's complaint and the notes of his investigation in a file separate from Petitioner's personnel file. Mr. Roberts did not keep a "secondary secret file" in order to "build a case against her."
Around the time of Mr. Roberts' investigation, two female co-workers complained to Mr. Roberts that Petitioner had rubbed her breasts against a male employee. Mr. Roberts interviewed the male employee, who denied the allegation.
Mr. Roberts took no further action. Petitioner was not disciplined as a result of this complaint.
In 2000, Troy Turlington, a male employee, complained to Mr. Roberts that Petitioner had made a sexual comment to him. However, Mr. Turlington was adamant that he did not want any action taken. Therefore, Mr. Roberts made a confidential record of the complaint. There was no evidence that Mr. Roberts investigated the allegation or took any action against Petitioner.
Following Respondent's official reprimands related to Petitioner's sexual harassment complaint, no employee made sexual comments in Petitioner's presence. However, Petitioner believed there were "whisperings" and other indications of co- worker displeasure with Petitioner's complaint and the outcome.
After December 1998, Petitioner did not complain again to management of being subjected to name-calling or of retaliation.
As a quality control technician, Petitioner's job responsibilities occasionally required her to place "holds" on production material that she determined did not meet specifications. A "hold" prevented the material from continuing through production to the customer. Placing a "hold" on material usually upset production personnel, who were disrespectful and made snide remarks about Petitioner's competence.
Petitioner's supervisor, Mr. Newinski, reviewed her work on one occasion and instructed her to pass the material. Petitioner disagreed with Mr. Newinski, refusing to remove the "hold" she had placed on the parts over her own signature. Mr. Newinski and Carmen Morello, a higher-level manager,
discussed Petitioner's refusal to remove the "hold," which they deemed insubordination.
Petitioner felt that she was being placed in an unfair position. Petitioner was upset because management did not support her determination that the material failed to meet specifications. However, there is no evidence that Mr. Newinski and Mr. Morello discriminated against Petitioner or otherwise retaliated against her for making her prior complaint.
Mr. Newinski and Mr. Morello counseled Petitioner on another occasion for spending time socializing with other employees when she was supposed to be working. Petitioner did not agree with this characterization of her actions. Again, Mr. Newinski and Mr. Morello's counseling session with Petitioner was not meant to be discriminatory or retaliatory.
In early March 2000, Petitioner declined to discuss with Mr. Newinski an incident involving another employee. Petitioner had observed the employee engaging in lifting heavy materials by himself, a potentially dangerous situation. Petitioner decided that the incident had been resolved by the employee's supervisor and that she did not need to discuss it with Mr. Newinski. Petitioner also felt that Mr. Newinski's inquiry was vague. She was not inclined to discuss the matter with him unless he could be more specific about the incident.
Mr. Newinski and Mr. Morello sought Mr. Roberts' involvement to force Petitioner to discuss the incident.
Respondent suspended Petitioner from work when she refused to go to Mr. Roberts' office.
Petitioner presented testimony that she had spoken with the head of the company, Al Styring. According to Petitioner, Mr. Styring indicated that Petitioner should take up issues involving her employment with David Black, Respondent's vice president of Human Resources at a level above Mr. Roberts. Mr. Roberts was never aware of any decision for Petitioner to discuss her employment problems with Mr. Black.
The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent considered Petitioner for promotions following her complaint of sexual harassment. However, Respondent promoted persons with greater experience to these positions. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner or retaliate against her in regard to the promotions.
Petitioner was unable to demonstrate that Respondent did not give her as much opportunity to earn overtime following her sexual harassment complaint. The most persuasive evidence indicates that Petitioner had less overtime than others even before her complaint. Additionally, employees with more overtime were responsible for work in different departments.
Carolyn Whitecloud was a supervisor in the drawn tube department. On one occasion, Ms. Whitecloud yelled at Petitioner because she thought Petitioner was interfering with
another employee's work. Petitioner explained that she was only observing the line to determine if defective metal poles were passing through the inspection and packing procedure. Despite Petitioner's explanation, the other employee received a written reprimand. There is no evidence that Respondent disciplined Petitioner as a result of this incident or imposed discipline on Petitioner's co-worker just to spite Petitioner.
On March 27, 2000, Petitioner slipped in a bathroom while at work. She sustained soft tissue injuries.
Petitioner received treatment from various health care providers during the course of her recovery. Her physicians included Dr. Green, Dr. Noran, and Dr. Pham.
Eight days after the injury, on April 4, 2000, Petitioner's treating physician released her to return to work on light duty with no bending and no lifting greater than 15 pounds. Respondent returned Petitioner to light-duty work within these limitations. However, Petitioner suffered severe pain from leaning over and could not do the work. Additionally, Petitioner's prescription medications made her groggy, lethargic, and dizzy.
Although Petitioner wanted to return to work and Respondent wanted to bring her back to work, Petitioner could not perform her required duties. After returning to work for
only one day, Petitioner decided that she needed more time to heal.
On May 23, 2000, Petitioner's physician again released her to return to work with the specific restrictions of no overhead lifting and no lifting over ten pounds. Petitioner was unable to lean over and measure the materials as required by her position. She complained to Mr. Newinski, who assigned her to completing paper work. Again, after one day at work, Petitioner was unable to continue.
By July 13, 2000, Petitioner had been on medical leave for over 12 weeks. At that time, Respondent decided that it did not need a designated employee to perform Petitioner's responsibilities as quality auditor. Faced with the need to cut costs, Respondent determined that its employees would continue to perform the quality auditor's duties as they had during Petitioner's absence.
Respondent did not let Petitioner know that her position no longer existed. However, Respondent did not terminate Petitioner's employment. She continued as an employee on medical leave.
On November 13, 2000, Dr. Noran released Petitioner to return to work with restrictions based upon Petitioner reaching maximum medical improvement (MMI). Her restrictions at that
time included limited overhead work and limited cervical flexion.
Respondent has different policies for assigning work before and after MMI. Pre-MMI, Respondent attempts to find temporary light-duty work such as office work for recovering employees. Once an employee reaches MMI, Respondent must determine whether the employee can perform the essential functions of an open position. This process could include an analysis of reasonable accommodations if appropriate. Respondent does not offer permanent light-duty jobs. Petitioner did not identify any employees with permanent restrictions after MMI who received permanent light-duty work.
On November 13, 2000, Petitioner met with Wayne LaPierre, Respondent's safety and environmental manager, to discuss her limitations. Petitioner indicated that she was still having trouble bending over to work. Mr. LaPierre believed that the doctor's restriction of "limited cervical flexion" was not in line with Petitioner's complaints of pain. Mr. LaPierre requested Respondent's workers' compensation insurer, Fireman's Fund, to obtain a clarification of Petitioner's work restrictions from her treating physician.
In Janaury 2001, Mr. LaPierre spoke with Petitioner.
Once again Mr. Lapierre explained that he needed further clarification from her doctor with respect to her restrictions.
In response to Mr. LaPierre's request for help, Petitioner stated that she could not get any more information from the doctor than Respondent could.
Fireman's Fund advised Mr. LaPierre that it had tried unsuccessfully on many occasions to obtain a clarification of Petitioner's limitations from Dr. Noran. Respondent continued to request Petitioner's assistance in obtaining this information from her doctor.
On March 19, 2001, Petitioner wrote to Mr. LaPierre to inquire about the status of her return to work. Mr. LaPierre responded in a letter dated March 22, 2001, advising Petitioner that he still needed clarification of her work restrictions and that Fireman's Fund and her doctor had held a conference.
Mr. LaPierre informed Petitioner that he did not know the outcome of the conference.
On April 19, 2001, Petitioner wrote to Mr. LaPierre again. She complained about Respondent's inability to return her to work.
Mr. LaPierre reached the conclusion that Dr. Noran was not going to clarify Petitioner's work restrictions for Fireman's Fund. He then attempted to use other means to obtain the information.
On April 22, 2001, Mr. LaPierre sent Petitioner the job descriptions, including the physical requirements, for all open positions at the plant. This was consistent with
Mr. LaPierre's treatment of other employees attempting to return to work.
On May 5, 2001, Petitioner obtained a more detailed medical note from a different workers' compensation physician, Dr. Pham. The note indicated that Petitioner's restrictions included no lifting and no repetitive bending and twisting of the upper back and neck. Otherwise, Dr. Pham refused to fill out any of Respondent's paperwork relative to the open positions.
On May 15, 2001, Mr. LaPierre acknowledged Petitioner's new restrictions. He requested Petitioner to meet with him to discuss a reasonable accommodation. Mr. LaPierre also sent Petitioner three more job descriptions for open jobs in the plant.
On May 29, 2001, Petitioner responded that none of the open positions met her restrictions. Petitioner further stated that it was up to Mr. LaPierre to determine if "there are jobs available or not that fall under the guidelines set by the doctor's office." She did not agree to meet with Mr. LaPierre to discuss a reasonable accommodation.
On June 8, 2001, Mr. LaPierre wrote to Petitioner to inform her that there were no available jobs that met the restrictions of no bending or twisting. LaPierre requested Petitioner to let him know when her situation changed so that they could "explore other options at that time." Petitioner never contacted Mr. LaPierre again.
Mr. LaPierre did not intentionally discriminate or retaliate against Petitioner. No one told him not to cooperate with Petitioner or to refuse to put her back to work.
On August 13, 2001, Petitioner's workers' compensation attorney signed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Petition for Benefits. At that time, Respondent believed that it had settled Petitioner's workers' compensation claims as well as all other claims.
On August 27, 2001, Respondent officially terminated Petitioner's employment. Respondent took this action without notice to Petitioner because Respondent believed that part of the settlement agreement included Petitioner's resignation. Respondent did not have a practice of sending termination letters to employees under these circumstances. Additionally, Petitioner had informed Respondent that she could not perform any of the open jobs.
Sometime after August 13, 2000, Petitioner changed her mind about voluntarily dismissing her workers' compensation Petition for Benefits. Petitioner would not consummate the settlement agreement because she did not want to waive her retaliation claim.
On April 15, 2003, Petitioner's counsel signed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice in Petitioner's workers' compensation case against Respondent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties pursuant to Sections 120.569, 120.57(1), and 760.11, Florida Statutes (2005).
Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief in which she alleged that Respondent had discriminated against her by failing to permit her to return to work after an injury on the job that required her to miss work, notwithstanding medical clearance to return to work. Petitioner alleges that Respondent did this in retaliation for her having filed a discrimination complaint.
Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, states as follows in relevant part:
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
To discharge or to fail or refuse to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, of privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
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(7) It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any person because that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section, or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this section.
Petitioner has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice. Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
FCHR and the Florida courts have determined that federal discrimination law should be used as guidance when construing Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. See Brand v.
Florida Power Corp., 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Petitioner's initial burden is to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); and
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). If Petitioner makes a prima facie case, Respondent must show some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action taken against Petitioner. Id. Once Respondent offers this non- discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to Petitioner to demonstrate that the reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Petitioner must show the following: (a) She engaged in a protected activity; and (b) Respondent took an action against Petitioner "that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant." See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co., 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
Petitioner met the first prong of her initial burden.
The evidence shows that Petitioner made an internal sexual harassment complaint in December 1998. After Respondent took prompt corrective action, Petitioner did not raise further complaints of continued sexual harassment with management.
As to the second prong of Petitioner's prima facie case, Petitioner presented evidence that Respondent passed her over for promotions in 1999, suspended her from work in March 2000, eliminated her job as quality auditor in July 2000, prevented her from returning to work after she reached MMI in November 2000, and terminated her employment in August 2001.
On the other hand, Respondent proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for each action it took and each decision it made. First, Respondent did consider Petitioner for promotions but selected other applicants who were well qualified or better qualified for the positions.
Second, Respondent suspended Petitioner from work because she refused to go to Mr. Robert's office to discuss an incident involving a safety issue. This was the second time Petitioner had been insubordinate. The first time was when she refused to take a "hold" off production material after being given a direct order to do so.
Third, Respondent eliminated Petitioner's position of quality auditor only after Petitioner had been out of work in excess of 12 weeks. Respondent could have terminated Petitioner employment at that time. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.200. In fact, Respondent could have filled Petitioner's position with another employee. However, Respondent determined that it did not need the position and has never filled it.
Fourth, Respondent had a legitimate reason for requesting clarification of Petitioner's work restrictions. Respondent's inquiry was job-related and consistent with business necessity. Petitioner's ability to perform job-related functions for any available position was a reasonable concern under the facts of this case. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4).
There was no evidence that Respondent treated Petitioner different from other employees returning to work with permanent restrictions. Respondent made a good faith effort to clarify Petitioner's restrictions and cannot be held responsible for the doctor's refusal to provide additional information.
Petitioner concedes that she could not perform any of the open jobs. She never requested an accommodation and even refused to discuss possible accommodations with Mr. Roberts. Respondent was not required to create a permanent light-duty job for Petitioner. See Sheets v. Florida Coast Railway Co., 132 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
Finally, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment after being misinformed that she had settled her claims for discrimination/retaliation as well as her workers' compensation claims. Respondent believed that Petitioner had agreed to termination/resignation as part of her settlement agreement. As stated above, Respondent could have terminated Petitioner's employment in July 2000.
Respondent's reasons for taking the actions it took and decisions it made are not a pretext for discriminatory or retaliatory behavior. Petitioner's sexual harassment complaint occurred 22 months before she attempted to return to work with permanent medical restrictions and 31 months before Respondent terminated her employment. A time gap between the protected
activity and any alleged adverse employment action can undermine a complaint that "the former caused the latter." See Maniccia
v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 1999), citing O'Connor
v. Chicago Transit Auth., 985 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir. 1993).
Petitioner has not shown pretext because Mr. Roberts listened to complaints from other employees about Petitioner's alleged sexual conduct and statements. Mr. Roberts properly investigated these complaints, taking no action against Petitioner.
Petitioner may have encountered normal workplace conflict. For instance, the production employees may have been rude when she placed a "hold" on production material. Other employees may have appeared to blame Petitioner when they were disciplined. A supervisor may have counseled Petitioner or even yelled at her because the supervisor mistakenly believed that Petitioner was interfering with another employee's work. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that such conflict was linked to Petitioner's sexual harassment complaint so as to be a pretext for unlawful retaliation.
If Petitioner had pled a claim of disability discrimination, she would have lost that claim as well. Florida courts analyze disability discrimination claims consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See Tourville v. Securex, Inc., 769 So. 2d 491, 492 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
In order to be entitled to protections, a complainant must be a qualified individual with a disability. In assessing the existence of a disability, the United States Supreme Court has held that
Merely having an impairment does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA, Claimants also need to demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life activity.
See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams 534 U.S. 184, 195 (2002).
Major life activities are those "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." See 29
C.F.R. Section 1630.2(i). The limitation to one of these activities must be substantial and the person must be either
[c]ompletely unable to perform the activity, or significantly restricted in performing the activity as compared to an average person.
See Wimberly v. Securities Technology Group, Inc., 866 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). See also 45 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).
Although she had some percentage of permanent impairment after reaching MMI, there is no competent evidence that the impairment prevented her from performing any of the activities of daily living. She did not show that she met the definition of “disabled” under the ADA. Therefore, she does not
qualify for coverage under its terms. See Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., 357 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2004).
An adverse employment action taken because a person files a workers’ compensation claim has been determined not to be within the statutory rights protected by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. A violation of these rights are addressed under the workers' compensation law. The Division of Administrative Hearings has no jurisdiction over such claims.
Petitioner asserted that Respondent deliberately kept her from returning to work in retaliation for her having filled the sexual harassment charge. Respondent responded appropriately to that charge, showing that the persons responsible for insisting on clarification of Petitioner's medical restrictions were not the same individuals who were reprimanded based on Petitioner's sexual harassment complaint. Retaliation was not the motivation for any of Respondent's employment decisions in this case. There is no persuasive evidence that Respondent acted out of any animus prohibited by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED:
That FCHR enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief.
DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
SUZANNE F. HOOD
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 2006.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Sharon L. Harris
3606 Fort Peyton Circle
St. Augustine, Florida 32086
Alexandra K. Hedrick, Esquire Alexandra Hedrick, P.L.
4445 Hendricks Avenue, Suite 398
Jacksonville, Florida 32207
Suzzanne W. Decker, Esquire
10 light street Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Nov. 13, 2006 | Agency Final Order | |
| Aug. 24, 2006 | Recommended Order | Respondent did not discriminate or retaliate against Petitioner for making a sexual harassment complaint. |
| Feb. 24, 2006 | Remanded from the Agency | |
| Oct. 01, 2004 | Remanded from the Agency | |
| Apr. 26, 2004 | Recommended Order | Petitioner showed that she was treated poorly after her on-the-job injury, but did not show that the treatment was in retaliation for an earlier complaint of sexual harrassment. Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, does not address violations of Chapter 440. |
