The Issue Whether Respondent failed to maintain the minimum qualifications for employment or appointment as a law enforcement or correctional officer by failing to exhibit good moral character and, if so, the nature of the sanctions.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the entity within the Florida Department of Law Enforcement responsible for the execution, administration, implementation, and evaluation of the powers, duties, and functions established under sections 943.085 through 943.255, Florida Statutes, and is charged with certifying and revoking the certification of correctional officers in Florida. § 943.12, Fla. Stat. Pursuant to section 943.1395, Petitioner is authorized to investigate incidents in which certified correctional officers are alleged to have failed to maintain compliance with the minimum qualifications for certification, and to take disciplinary action against correctional officers found to have failed to maintain those qualifications. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer, and holds Correctional Certificate Number 77370. He was initially certified on April 9, 1987. During the period from his initial certification up to 2007, Respondent rose through the ranks, achieving the rank of captain. In 2007, as he neared his date of retirement, Respondent requested a voluntary demotion to sergeant. The duties associated with being a “correctional officer in charge” were causing difficulties with his marriage, and his voluntary demotion to sergeant allowed him to “lay out the last five years so I could use my leave up easier and kind of have a life.” Respondent has not previously been the subject of any disciplinary action, nor was there any allegation of prior disciplinary history involving Respondent. On March 1, 2010, Respondent served as a correctional officer at the Lowell Correctional Institution. Respondent knew Tracy Coer as an inmate at the Lowell Correctional Institution. Respondent occasionally tasked inmate Coer, along with other inmates, with cleaning the correctional officers? supply room and staff bathroom at the end of a shift. Respondent testified that such activities were never done without another officer present in the officer station. On the evening of March 1, 2010, Respondent was assigned to escort inmate Coer from her dormitory to the medical unit for a breathing treatment. The medical unit has an exterior door, with a clear window described as being “about six inches long and . . . maybe about a foot and a half tall.” The exterior door led into a waiting room, which contained bench seating for inmates. A second secured door led from the inmate?s waiting room into the medical facility. Directly inside the second secured door was a desk for a monitoring correctional officer, which had a clear view into the inmate waiting room. From the dormitory to the medical unit, Respondent and inmate Coer were in view of the guard tower. Respondent intended to turn inmate Coer over to the custody of the monitoring correctional officer on duty and leave. When Respondent arrived at the medical unit, there was no correctional officer on duty at the waiting room monitoring desk.2/ Therefore, Respondent transferred custody of inmate Coer directly to medical staff. Since the monitoring officer was not at her post, Respondent stayed in the waiting room. After about 30 minutes, inmate Coer was returned by medical staff to the inmate waiting room. The monitoring officer had not returned to her duty station, and the waiting room was vacant, but for Respondent and inmate Coer. The time was about 9:25 or 9:30 p.m. It was dark outside, but the sidewalk was lit by security lights. It is Respondent?s practice to always be in view of another correctional officer when with a female inmate. However, for the period after inmate Coer was placed into Respondent?s custody in the waiting room, and before they exited through the exterior door, they were not in direct view of medical staff, the guard tower, or any other correctional officer. Respondent testified that as he was preparing to escort inmate Coer from the medical unit and return her to her dormitory, she became “off balance.” In Respondent?s experience, breathing procedures can make persons “dizzy and lightheaded.” He did not want her to fall, so Respondent grabbed inmate Coer?s jacket sleeve to steady her. She turned towards him, whereupon he grabbed her other sleeve to hold her up. According to Respondent “we came in close proximity at that time and shortly within like seconds I heard the door opening and I turned and looked over my right shoulder and Officer Richardson was standing in the door.” Respondent denied that he kissed inmate Coer, that he tried to kiss inmate Coer, or that he ever tried to kiss any inmate. Officer Richardson testified that she was returning to the medical unit from outside, and was preparing to enter the facility through the exterior door. She looked through the window, and saw Respondent and inmate Tracy Coer “holding hands and he leaned down to kiss her. It was like a lip to lip peck maybe.” She testified that she was able to see lip-to-lip contact between Respondent and inmate Coer. Her description gave a clear impression of a consensual act, with Respondent and inmate Coer holding hands, and inmate Coer in “a leaning upward motion so it?s not really unbalanced, but her face was leaning up.” After the incident, Officer Richardson testified that she reported what she observed to a fellow officer, and then to her captain. She was instructed to fill out an incident report describing her observations, which she did. Her incident report is consistent with and supplements her testimony. After submitting the incident report, Officer Richardson had no further involvement in the investigation of the incident until her testimony at the hearing. Officer Richardson testified that she had a clear view of the inmate waiting room, and of Respondent and inmate Coer, through the 6” x 18” window. Respondent testified that the windows consist of thick security glass, and that “[w]henever you approach one of those small windows at night, the reflection from the security lights, the shadows that are moving . . . [y]ou can?t see as clearly as you think you can.” Inmate Coer did not testify at the final hearing. Instead, Petitioner submitted an affidavit of inmate Coer describing the incident that forms the basis of the Administrative Complaint. The affidavit is hearsay. Inmate Coer?s affidavit could be said to supplement and corroborate Officer Richardson?s testimony in that they both describe an incident that culminated in a kiss. However, the affidavit described an act that was sudden, abrupt, and against inmate Coer?s will, while Officer Richardson described a more intimate and consensual act. Therefore, the affidavit does not serve to establish a firm belief or conviction in the mind of the undersigned as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, but rather suggests a degree of imprecision or confusion as to the facts in issue.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2012.
The Issue Can the Board of Real Estate consider matters surrounding the offense to which a person pleads guilty in determining whether that person possesses the necessary character to be licensee? What is the evidentiary effect of a plea of guilty by an applicant for licensure? Is the Petitioner qualified for licensure?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Edward J. Gibney made application to The Board of Real Estate for licensure as a real estate salesman. The Board denied Petitioner's application pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes, because he was convicted of crimes against the laws of the United States and against the laws of the State of New Jersey involving moral turpitude. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the crimes of conspiring to commit fraud on medicaid and medicare claims, a felony under the laws of the United States. He also pleaded guilty to a similar offense which was a felony under the laws of New Jersey. Both offenses arose out of the same factual situation. The sole grounds for denial of Petitioner's application were his criminal convictions and the matters surrounding them. The Petitioner is otherwise qualified for licensure. After initial notification of the Boards intention to deny his application, the Petitioner requested and received an informal hearing before the Board. The Board notified Petitioner that it still intended to deny his application, and the Petitioner requested and was granted a formal hearing. The transcript of the Board's informal hearing was received as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #1. Petitioner was the only witness at the hearing. He explained very candidly the facts surrounding his entry of guilty pleas to the criminal charges brought against him. His testimony was uncontroverted and is accepted as true. Petitioner, a graduate chemist, was qualified and licensed as a medical laboratory director in New Jersey. For 15 years prior to 1975, he owned and operated a small medical laboratory directly providing clinical laboratory services to private physicians. In 1975, Petitioner was approached several times over a period of three months by Seymour Slaughtnick to provide laboratory services to several doctors for medicaid/medicare patients. Slaughtnick was functioning as an intermediary. Slaughtnick picked up test samples at the doctors' offices and transported them to another laboratory. Slaughtnick wanted to change laboratories because of the poor quality laboratory work. Although Slaughtnick's function was described, Slaughtnick's relationship with the other laboratory or the doctors was never defined. Petitioner described Slaughtnick as a salesman. Petitioner initially refused the Slaughtnick offer because he had not done medicare/medicaid work and did not know how to process the paperwork. Slaughtnick continued to press Petitioner for a commitment to do this work and offered to prepare and submit all the paperwork for Petitioner. Slaughtnick and petitioner eventually agreed to an arrangement under which Slaughtnick picked up the samples, brought them to Petitioner's laboratory, transmitted the test results back to the physicians, and prepared Petitioner's billings to medicare/medicaid for the professional services rendered. Petitioner performed all the laboratory work as ordered by the physicians and prepared all test results, paying Slaughtnick a percentage of the fee for each test for his services. Petitioner was aware that his arrangement with Slaughtnick and permitting Slaughtnick to bill in his name was illegal under New Jersey law. To assure himself that Slaughtnick's billings were in order, Petitioner checked on Slaughtnick's billings after they began to work together. The State of new Jersey's medicaid/medicare plan was administered by Prudential Insurance Company using a blind fee schedule. Petitioner was advised by Prudential that his schedule initially provided various fees for various laboratory tests, but laboratories would not be advised of the amounts of payment or criteria used for assessing the appropriateness of ordering the tests. He was advised Prudential would reject any billings that were inappropriate. In 1976, the State of New Jersey began an investigation of its entire medicare/medicaid system. Initially, the inquiry with Petitioner's laboratory centered on whether he was performing the work ordered. It was determined that Petitioner performed all the work for which he billed the state. This investigation gave rise to an administrative complaint against Petitioner that charged him with overbilling. An administrative hearing was conducted which lasted eight months, during which 55 days of testimony were taken. The New Jersey hearing officer eventually that 50 percent of the orders and billings were correct; however, before the administrative order was entered, the Petitioner was indicated by the state of New Jersey and the United States for conspiracy to defraud under medicaid/medicare. The indictment alleged that Petitioner, Slaughtnick and other unnamed co-conspirators had conspired to defraud medicaid and medicare. The indictment was not introduced at this hearing; however, the Petitioner explained it alleged that the conspirators arranged to order more complex tests than were necessary, performed these tests, and then billed the state for the inflated service. Petitioner denied any knowledge of such a scheme to inflate test orders, however Petitioner did admit that his permitting Slaughtnick to prepare bills to medicaid and medicare in the laboratory's name was not authorized under the New Jersey law. Petitioner also denied knowledge of any kickbacks paid by Slaughtnick to any of the physicians or those in their employment. However, Petitioner stated he had no doubt after the fact that Slaughtnick was engaged in such a practice. Since his release from probation slightly more than 18 months ago, Petitioner has studied real estate and attempted to recover from the strain of the loss of his business, the long hearing, and his conviction and sentencing. The facts upon which this case are based occurred in 1975-76. Petitioner was sentenced in 1977, and has been released from confinement and probation since January, 1980. There is no evidence that petitioner has engaged in any conduct that would reflect adversely on his character since he terminated his laboratory work for medicaid/medicare in 1976.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that Petitioner Edward J. Gibney be denied licensure upon the specific ground that under Section 475.17(1), Florida Statutes, he failed to present sufficient evidence of his reputation in the community to assure the Board of Real Estate that the interest of the public and investors would not be endangered unduly. DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of October, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry H. Spalding, Esquire 6360 South Tamiami Trail Sarasota, Florida 33581 Jeffrey A. Miller, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Administrative Law Section The Capitol, 16th Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street PO Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues in the case are whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulation of pari-mutuel wagering pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2003), and is responsible for licensing employees of pari-mutuel facilities. Respondent is a card dealer holding Florida occupational license number 6927724-1012 for employment as a card dealer at the Tampa Bay Downs racetrack. By application filed at the racetrack on December 3, 2003, Respondent applied for the referenced license. Persons unknown apparently conducted the application process for all employees of the facility. Employees completed the applications and submitted them at the racetrack, again to persons unknown. The application includes a section titled "Background Information." Question 1 asks in relevant part the following question: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contender (no contest) to, even if you received a withhold of adjudication? Question 1 further provides as follows: YOUR ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION WILL BE CHECKED AGAINST LOCAL, STATE AND FEDERAL RECORDS. FAILURE TO ANSWER THIS QUESTION ACCURATELY MAY RESULT IN DENIAL OR REVOCATION OF YOUR LICENSE. IF YOU DO NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THIS QUESTION, CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY OR CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT. Respondent answered the question in the affirmative. The question provides that if the applicant responds in the affirmative to the question, "form 0050-1" should be completed to disclose additional information about the convictions. Form 0050-1 includes space to list three criminal convictions. The application instructions related to the form state: "[i]f you have more than seven offenses to document on form 0050-1, attach additional copies . . . as necessary." Respondent completed a form 0050-1. On the form, he stated that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor in 1987. The Respondent identified the offenses as "trespassing," "suspended license," and "cashed check." Respondent stated that the penalty had been probation, which was violated, and that he was required to finish the sentence. Respondent initially identified the location of the conviction as Pasco County, but crossed through the writing and changed it to Hillsborough County. Above Respondent's signature on the application is a statement that in material part provides as follows: I hereby certify that every statement contained herein is true and correct and that I understand that any misstatement or omission in this application may result in denial or revocation of my pari-mutuel license. Other than the information on the application, there was no evidence offered at the hearing that Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor in 1987 in Hillsborough County. Petitioner asserts that at the time he filed the application, he completed a second form 0050-1 on which he disclosed additional information related to felony convictions. At the hearing, he testified that an unidentified person allegedly involved in the application process instructed him to make the felony disclosures on a second form. Although there is no evidence contradicting Respondent's account of the events, the application submitted through the racetrack to Petitioner did not include a second form 0050-1. In 1983, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of felony charges, including Forgery and Uttering a Forged Check in Pasco County, Florida (Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 8101927CFAWS). In 1990, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of a felony charge of Grand Theft, Third Degree in Hillsborough County, Florida (Circuit Court, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 90-279). In 1991, Respondent was adjudicated guilty of a felony charge of Grand Theft in Pasco County, Florida (Circuit Court, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Case No. 8701762CFAWS). A few days after the application was completed, Respondent met with an employee of Petitioner (identified as "Nick") to discuss the felony convictions. "Nick" did not testify at the hearing. As filed with Petitioner, Respondent's application failed to include a second form 0050-1 and did not disclose the felony convictions identified herein. There is no evidence that Respondent has had any involvement in criminal activity since 1991.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order suspending Respondent's occupational license for a period of three months. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralf E. Michels, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Stefan Thomas Hoffer Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Jerry M. Bonett 7801 Willowbrook Court Hudson, Florida 34667 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against her and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, including the "[s]tipulated [f]acts" contained in the parties' Prehearing Stipulation,2 the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since February 18, 2003, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. She holds Correctional Certificate Number 229286. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections (Department) as a correctional officer and assigned to the South Florida Reception Center (SFRC), a "transient institution for inmates that are [transferring] from one facility to another." Sergeant Shirley McLain is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, employed by the Department as a correctional officer and assigned to SFRC. Respondent and Sergeant McLain have known each other since the time they attended the correctional academy together. In August of 2005, Respondent was responsible for supervising inmates working on the "outside grounds" of SFRC, while Sergeant McLain oversaw the operations of the SFRC property room, where personal items taken from inmates are brought and stored until they are returned or other otherwise disposed of. Sergeant McLain "never supervised" Respondent. In August of 2005, Ricardo Bigio was an inmate at SFRC. Shortly after his arrival at the facility, he had a watch and chain confiscated from him. He was permitted to send these items home. Two days later, Sergeant McLain found Inmate Bigio in possession of another watch and another chain. Upon being told by Inmate Bigio, in response to her questioning, that he had obtained these items "through visitation," Sergeant McLain informed him, since these items were brought into the institution "illegally," they were "now contraband" and he could not have them "sen[t] . . . home." At the suggestion of a fellow inmate, Inmate Bigio approached Respondent and asked her to "speak to Sergeant McLain to see if she would let [him] send [this confiscated] jewelry home." During their conversation, Respondent mentioned to Inmate Bigio that "her dad needed a car." Inmate Bigio told Respondent that, if Respondent spoke to Sergeant McLain about his jewelry, he "would be able to send her to somebody [he knew in the used car sales business] to get a good deal on a car" for her father. Respondent agreed to help Inmate Bigio by speaking to Sergeant McLain about sending his jewelry home. Respondent and Inmate Bigio then went to Sergeant McLain's office, where Respondent asked Sergeant McLain if she would "let[] [Inmate Bigio] send this chain and this watch home," an act that that Respondent believed was within Sergeant McLain's power as the officer in charge of the SFRC property room. Sergeant McLain responded to Respondent's request in the negative. Respondent said, "Okay," and then left with Inmate Bigio. Respondent returned to Sergeant McLain's office with Inmate Bigio "off and on" for the next three or four days to repeat her request that Sergeant McLain allow Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home. On each occasion, in response to the request, Sergeant McLain reiterated that the jewelry "was contraband and [therefore Inmate Bigio] could not send it home." On August 10, 2005, approximately a week after she had first raised the matter with Sergeant McLain, Respondent once again asked Sergeant McLain to permit Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home. This time, in making her request, Respondent revealed her motivation for interceding on Inmate Bigio's behalf. She explained to Sergeant McLain that, if Sergeant McLain granted the request and allowed Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home, Inmate Bigio would make the necessary arrangements with his "people [who] own[ed] a car lot" to enable Respondent to purchase for her father a $5,000.00 car for only $2,000.00. Respondent provided this explanation as to why she was taking up Inmate Bigio's cause in the hopes that Sergeant McLain's having this information would make Sergeant McLain more inclined to grant the permission Respondent was requesting on Inmate Bigio's behalf. Sergeant McLain was taken aback that Respondent would strike such a deal with an inmate. She advised Respondent, as she had in response to Respondent's previous requests, that Inmate Bigio would not be permitted to send his jewelry home.3 Sergeant McLain subsequently reported the incident to the SFRC assistant warden. Inspector Arlethia Clark with the Department's Inspector's General Office subsequently investigated the matter. As part of her investigation, Inspector Clark interviewed Respondent on November 17, 2005. Respondent was placed under oath for the interview. Respondent told Inspector Clark that Sergeant McLain, in describing her August 10, 2005, conversation with Respondent, had "twisted the story around." Respondent knowingly made the false claim that she had gone to Sergeant McLain merely to report the illicit offer that Inmate Bigio had made and to seek guidance from Sergeant McLain "as a supervisor" as to what to do, not to persuade Sergeant McLain to allow Inmate Bigio to send his jewelry home so that she would be able to purchase a car for her father at a discount (which, in fact, contrary to Respondent's sworn statement to Inspector Clark, was the actual reason she had gone to Sergeant McLain). Inspector Clark also interviewed Inmate Bigio and Sergeant McLain. Based on the findings of her investigation, Inspector Clark "found that there was bartering between, or an attempt to barter between," Inmate Bigio and Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of Allegations One and Two and, based on these findings of guilt, revoke her certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 2007.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether, pursuant to sections 475.17(1)(a) and 475.181(2), Florida Statutes, Petitioner has the required honesty and good character to be entitled to take the examination for licensure as a licensed real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact On January 7, 2013, Petitioner filed the Application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. In response to a question asking if she had ever been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of no contest or guilty to, a crime, Petitioner disclosed one crime: exploitation of an elderly person. Although providing a detailed explanation of what she viewed as extenuating circumstances for the exploitation offense, Petitioner failed to disclose any other offenses. In addition to this offense, which is a 1999 conviction for the exploitation of an elderly person for more than $20,000, Petitioner was convicted at the same time of two other offenses that are undisclosed in the Application: organized fraud for $20,000 to $50,000 and grand theft. These three offenses are second-degree felonies bearing the same disposition date of May 12, 1999, based on Petitioner's plea of no contest to the three charges. The court withheld adjudication and sentenced Petitioner to three years' probation, 300 hours' community service, restitution of $1598, and court costs. These offenses arose out of Petitioner's persuading an aged neighbor to cosign a note, so that Petitioner could purchase a car. The neighbor also lent Petitioner $1000, so that Petitioner could obtain insurance for the vehicle. Fifteen years later, Petitioner continues to assert her innocence in this matter, although she does not deny the transactions described above in connection with these three convictions. Petitioner claims that she was poorly represented by a public defender and that the entire matter was the result of an overprotective out-of-state son who visited his aged mother and happened to notice a credit card charge for the insurance premium. At the very least, Petitioner lacks insight into the serious nature of her bad conduct in this matter. In addition to failing to disclose two of three of the offenses described above, the Application also fails to disclose two earlier criminal matters. In 1989, Petitioner was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence, both misdemeanors. The record is undeveloped as to these charges, although it appears that Petitioner pled no contest to at least one of them, and the court withheld adjudication on both of them. Also, in 1990, Petitioner pleaded no contest to a third- degree felony of grand theft, for which the court withheld adjudication and sentenced Petitioner to restitution of $450 and other special conditions. Petitioner claims to have forgotten about these older criminal matters. Without regard to the legitimacy of this explanation as to the 1989 misdemeanor offense, it is unlikely that Petitioner had forgotten about the 1990 felony offense because, in this case, she had stolen a gold bracelet owned by a woman with whom her husband was romantically linked. Under these circumstances, Petitioner has failed to prove, not only that she has the requisite honesty and good character for licensure, but also that sufficient time and subsequent good conduct provide the necessary assurance that her licensure would not present an undue risk to the public and investors.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying the Application. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of March, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Leslie Barnhart, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Evelyn Lozado Apartment 305 3001 South Ocean Drive Hollywood, Florida 33019 Darla Furst, Chair Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 J. Layne Smith, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "C" Private Investigator License, license number C86-00509. The Respondent has held that license at all times material to this proceeding. On July 4, 1994, the Respondent intentionally struck N.S. (a minor) with a flashlight. The striking of N.S. took place immediately after, and was in response to, N.S.'s act of kicking the Respondent while the Respondent was on a stairway landing and was in reasonable fear that his attacker (N.S.) might push him down the stairs. Under the circumstances, the Respondent's act of striking N.S. was a reasonable act of self-defense in the lawful protection of himself from physical harm.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is recommended that a Final Order be issued in this proceeding dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. 1550 _ MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399- (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5321 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. (For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the details regarding the criminal prosecution of the Respondent are not competent substantial evidence of the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.) Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: The Respondent's proposed recommended order does not contain any specific portion designated as "findings of fact." Rather, the Respondent has intertwined his proposed findings, his proposed conclusions, and his arguments throughout his proposal. It appears to be sufficient to note that the findings of fact in this recommended order are generally consistent with the substance of the Respondent's version of the facts. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine Assistant General Counsel Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Number 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. Stephen A. Shields 9441 Southwest 4th Street, Number 311 Miami, Florida 33174 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
