The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a "resident public all lines insurance adjuster" should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On or about February 27, 1989, a six-count criminal information was filed in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 89- 4970 against Petitioner. Count I of the information alleged that Petitioner: on the 6th day of February, 1989, in the County [of Dade] and State [of Florida], did unlawfully and feloniously utter and publish as true to and upon DALLY SHUAIB and/or CAMPEAU CORPORATION, doing business as BURDINES, a certain false, forged or counterfeited and printed order or receipt for delivery or merchandise commonly known as a CREDIT CARD RECEIPT or RECORD OF CHARGE, upon which credit card receipt or record of charge the defendant or a person whose name or identity is to the State Attorney unknown, did forge the signature of MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI, thereon, with the intent thereby to injure of defraud MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI and/or DALLY SHARUIB and/or CAMPEAU CORPORATION, doing business as BURDINES or other person or persons whose name or names and identity are to the State Attorney unknown, the defendant at the said time and place well knowing that the said credit card receipt or record of charge was false and forged aforesaid, in violation of 831.02 Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. Count II of the information alleged that Petitioner: on the 6th day of February, 1989, in the County [of Dade] and State [of Florida], did unlawfully and feloniously with intent to defraud CAMPEAU CORPORATION, doing business as BURDINES and/or MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI use for the purpose of obtaining goods, to wit: CLOTHING a credit card which he knows is stolen by representing without the consent of the card holder that he is the holder of the specified card, and such card has not in fact been issued, in violation of 817.61 Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. Count III through VI of the information each alleged that Petitioner: on the 6th day of February, 1989, in the County [of Dade] and State [of Florida], having received a credit card, property of MICHAEL YAMAGUCHI, as owner and custodian, which he knew had been lost, mislaid, or delivered under a mistake as to the identity or address of the cardholder, did then and there unlawfully retain possession of said credit card, with intent to use it, to sell it, or to transfer it to a person other than the issuer or the cardholder, in violation of 817.60 Florida Statutes, contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. On April 17, 1989, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to all six counts of the information (1989 Plea). Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and he was placed on probation for one year. On or about March 31, 2000, a one-count criminal information was filed in Miami-Dade County Circuit Court Case No. F00-8233, alleging that Petitioner: on or about MARCH 1, 2000, in the County [of Miami-Dade] and State [of Florida], did unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly inflict physical injury upon a child, to wit: A. C. (A MINOR), without causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to said child, by SLAPPING C. (A MINOR) IN THE FACE, in violation of s. 827.03(1), Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. On July 17, 2000, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge (2000 Plea). Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and he was placed on 18 months' probation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Armin Toro 490 Southwest 101st Terrace Plantation, Florida 33324 Dean Andrews, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner should be placed on the convicted vendor list.
Findings Of Fact On May 31, 1990, Borden pled guilty to commission of a public entity crime, as defined by Section 287.133(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996), for: a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply milk to school boards within Peninsular Florida, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988; a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply milk to school boards within the Florida Panhandle, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988; and a conspiracy to rig bids for the award and performance of contracts to supply dairy products for use at federal military installations within Peninsular Florida and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and at the Kings Bay Naval Submarine Base in Georgia, lasting from the early 1970's through July, 1988. As a corporate entity, Borden was culpable of the crimes committed by its employees or agents. However, as set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, when the crimes came to the attention of Borden's corporate management, Borden cooperated with state and federal investigations and prosecutions of the crimes, promptly terminated the employees and disassociated itself from individuals implicated in the crimes, and promptly paid the damages and penalties resulting from Borden's conviction. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, Borden notified the Department of Management Services within 30 days of its conviction. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, in addition to terminating the employees implicated in the crimes, Borden has instituted self- policing to prevent public entity crimes. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, after a period of suspension by the Defense Logistics Agency of the federal government in relation to Borden's public entity crime, the suspension was terminated, and Borden's Dairy Division has been reinstated as a qualified government contractor. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, Borden has demonstrated its good citizenship with the exception of the public entity crime of which it was convicted. As set out in more detail in the Joint Stipulation, other than the public entity crime conviction itself, there was no evidence that it is in the best interest of the public to place Borden on the convicted vendor list.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at "formal hearing," and the record as a whole, including the parties' Joint Stipulation, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since February 19, 1998, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. He holds Correctional Certificate Number 178896. On February 19, 1982, Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida and issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 34142, which has since expired. Respondent is now, and has been since shortly after receiving his bachelor of science degree in education from Slippery Rock University, certified as a teacher in the State of Florida. From the early 1980's until 1993, Respondent worked as a police officer for various law enforcement agencies in Florida. In 1985, Respondent was physically arrested and charged with battery in Pinellas County. He was acquitted of the charge following a jury trial. After the acquittal, at Respondent's request, records relating to the matter were ordered sealed. In the mid 1990's, Respondent worked for Wackenhut Corporation as a teacher at correctional facilities in Moore Haven and South Bay, Florida. While working for Wackenhut in South Bay, Respondent was asked to assist in the "start up" of a "work release center" in Broward County, Florida, that Wackenhut was going to operate for the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Pursuant to Wackenhut policy, Respondent had to "go through a correctional academy" before assuming his new duties. After graduating from the "correctional academy," Respondent relocated to Broward County and began his new assignment for Wackenhut. Respondent's primary tasks were to "draw[] up all the rules and regulations for the [soon to be opened] facility" and "interview[] people for jobs." Respondent was housed in a "temporary [Wackenhut] office" in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, Florida, along with others involved in the effort to open the facility, including Richard Fortenberry, who was going to be the facility administrator. On September 26, 1997, Respondent was accused of stealing a "couple of packs of playing cards" from a retail establishment in Palm Beach County, Florida. The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office deputy on the scene issued Respondent a notice to appear2 in lieu of physically arresting Respondent. As directed, Respondent subsequently appeared in the Criminal Division of Palm Beach County Court to respond (in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04) to the retail theft accusation made against him. On November 17, 1997, Respondent signed a Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97- 024167 MM A04,3 which provided that, if Respondent complied with the[] "conditions [set forth in the agreement] during the [three-month] period of Deferred Prosecution, no criminal prosecution concerning this charge [of retail theft] [would] be instituted " On December 22, 1997, the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office issued a Nolle Prosse in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04. The Broward County "work release center" was scheduled to open in February of 1998. Respondent was to occupy a "lead supervisor" position at the facility when it opened. Before he was able to assume this position, however, Respondent needed to fill out an "extensive" application (even though he was already employed by Wackenhut) and pass a pre- employment review conducted by the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Respondent filled out the application, "to the best of [his] ability," in October of 1997. On the application, he mentioned the 1985 Pinellas County battery charge of which he was acquitted, but not the notice to appear that he had received the previous month.4 Deputy James Diefenbacher was the Broward County Sheriff's Office "contract manager" for the Broward County "work release center" project. In November of 1997, after Respondent had entered into his Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04, Mr. Fortenberry told Respondent that Deputy Diefenbacher needed from Respondent certain documents concerning the 1985 Pinellas County battery charge in order for Deputy Diefenbacher to complete his pre-employment review of Respondent's background. Respondent promptly furnished Deputy Diefenbacher the requested documents. On December 31, 1997, Deputy Diefenbacher "showed up" at Respondent's office in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea and told Respondent that he "needed to talk to [Respondent] real quick." It was New Year's Eve. The "handful of people," including Respondent, who were there, were finishing up there work for the day so the office could close early. After he and Respondent "looked over [Respondent's] application" together, Deputy Diefenbacher turned on a tape recorder, "swore [Respondent] in," presented Respondent with a document, and told Respondent, "I need you to sign this document here. It means that you don't have any other arrest history."5 The document, which was typed on Broward County Sheriff's Office letterhead, read as follows: I swear under oath that all information regarding my criminal history has been presented to the Broward Sheriff's Office. My criminal history consists of a charge of simple battery, of which I was found not guilty of all charges by the court. Not [sic] other criminal history exists. SWORN AND ATTESTED TO BY TIMOTHY J. MILLER ON THIS 31ST DAY OF DECEMBER NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN. Signed By: DEPUTY JAMES DIEFENBACHER OF THE BROWARD SHERIFF'S OFFICE Signed CCN# Respondent signed the document without reading it. Respondent took Deputy Diefenbacher at his word that, by signing the document, Respondent was attesting that he had no other arrests other than his 1985 arrest in Pinellas County for battery. Respondent did not intend to deceive anyone in signing the document. He believed that the information contained in the document (as explained to him by Deputy Diefenbacher) was true.6 He did not consider his having been given a notice to appear (on September 26, 1997, in Palm Beach County) to have constituted an arrest.7 Nonetheless, "a couple [of] years later," Petitioner was charged with and tried for perjury in connection with his signing the document; however, he was acquitted of the charge.8
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2004.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s application for a license from the Florida Real Estate Commission was properly denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, his Background, and the Application Leroy L. Baines, Jr., was born on October 31, 1985. Currently 29 years old, he is employed with a financial services company. He serves on the board of a non-profit organization called Butterfly Foundation Group. The organization works with underprivileged and at-risk youth. He also works with J.J.’s Boxing Club and Global Village, both non-profit entities. In 2005, Mr. Baines pled no contest to a criminal traffic infraction: operating a motor vehicle without a valid license (“Criminal Traffic Infraction No. 1”). He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced. Respondent’s Ex. No. 1 at 00028. The following calendar year, 2006, Mr. Baines was convicted of driving while his license was cancelled, suspended, revoked, or he was disqualified from holding a license (“Criminal Traffic Infraction No. 2”). Id. at 00022. In 2008, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Mr. Baines pled guilty and was adjudicated guilty of two federal crimes: 1) conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce by robbery, and 2) carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (the “Federal Criminal Offenses”). Id. at 00013. Mr. Baines was sentenced to 55 months imprisonment for the Federal Criminal Offenses on June 18, 2008. He served his sentence in prisons located in Florida, Texas, and North Carolina. His sentence expired on June 30, 2014, and he was discharged from supervision on September 3, 2014. Id. at 00040. On April 11, 2014, Respondent received Mr. Baines’ application for licensure as a real estate associate (the “Application”). He answered “Yes” to Background Question 1, which asks, “Have you ever been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction . . . ?” Id. at 00010. After the background questions in the Application, the Application states, “If you answered ‘YES’ to any question in [the background questions], please refer to Section IV of the Instructions for detailed instructions on providing complete explanations, including requirements for submitting supporting legal documents.” Id. In the Application’s “Section IV(b) – Explanation(s) for Background Question 1,” Petitioner listed the Federal Criminal Offenses. For one of the two offenses under “Penalty/Disposition,” he wrote “Time Served”; for the other, he wrote “55 months.” Id. Under “Description” as to each of the two Federal Criminal Offenses, Petitioner wrote, “5 years Supervised Release.” Id. Despite the Application’s detailed instructions that require criminal traffic infractions to be listed (“This question applies to any criminal violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including felony, misdemeanor and traffic offenses . . . .” Id.), Petitioner failed to list the two Criminal Traffic Infractions. Petitioner’s Case Mr. Baines testified that his application should be granted because he has cooperated with Respondent by providing everything that was asked of him during the Application review process. Although he had not included the Criminal Traffic Infractions on the written Application, he freely admitted during the hearing it was his responsibility at the time he made out the Application to report them and to offer any relevant explanation of them. With regard to the Criminal Traffic Infractions, Mr. Baines testified he spent 30 days in the Orange County Jail. He seeks leniency in this application process based on his age at the time of the offenses which he claimed, at first, was 16. Noting the difference between his birthday and 2005 and 2006, Mr. Baines conceded during cross-examination that he was several years older than 16 at the time of the Criminal Traffic Infractions. Mr. Baines elaborated on the Federal Criminal Offenses explaining that he had fallen in with former high school friends whom he had not seen for some time when they recruited him to drive the get-away car in a robbery. He stated that at the time of the crime he was in possession of two guns both of which he had been carrying legally prior to the crime: a nine millimeter Glock and a .40 caliber handgun. Mr. Baines’ time in prison was spent without any violations of prison rules, according to his testimony, and he completed the post-release program successfully. His success in serving his time is the basis, Mr. Baines asserted, for his release from federal supervision so promptly after the expiration of the sentence. No documentation of “good behavior” in prison, however, was offered at hearing. In an attempt to demonstrate rehabilitation, Mr. Baines referred to his service to the Butterfly Foundation, J.J.’s Boxing Club, and the other two non-profit organizations with which he works that serve at-risk youth in the Pompano and Fort Lauderdale areas. He also averred that he had been cleared by the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) to work with underprivileged youth for cheerleading and gymnastics although he offered no supportive documentary evidence from DCF. Mr. Baines did submit to Respondent as part of his application three documents related to rehabilitation. The first extolled his work as an employee. The second was written by a teacher at Stranahan High School who is a fellow basketball player at pick-up games in a public basketball court in Plantation, Florida. The third was written by his pastor at the Living Waters Sanctuary in Oakland Park, Florida. The authors of the letters all write highly of Mr. Baines. In support of his case for rehabilitation, Mr. Baines testified that after his conviction for the Federal Criminal Offenses, he had had only one slip-up: a urinalysis (“UA”) positive for marijuana, a substance he had used as a youth. Mr. Baines claimed that the UA was conducted only because those supervising his post-release case sent him for the testing after Mr. Baines had voluntarily acknowledged his recent use of marijuana. But for the single marijuana incident, Mr. Baines asserted under oath that his record after his conviction, in prison and out of prison during a post-incarceration discharge period, had been spotless. His admirable conduct, he testified, is what led to the court to promptly release him from federal supervision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner’s application for licensure as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Leroy L. Baines, Jr. 4808 Northwest 8th Court Lauderhill, Florida 33317 Tom Barnhart, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) William N. Spicola, General Counsel Department of Business and Profession Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Darla Furst, Chair Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Profession Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Before 1989, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, was a community control counselor (in effect, a juvenile probation officer) working for HRS. After several years of satisfactory job performance, his employment was terminated for unsatisfactory job performance in 1989. The Petitioner believes his termination by HRS was unfair. On January 30, 1991, the Petitioner, Gregory Miller, pled nolo contendere to attempted arson in violation of Section Section 806.01, Fla. Stat. (1991). Adjudication was withheld, and the Petitioner was placed on probation for two years. The attempted arson charge arose at a time in October, 1990, when the Petitioner, who has a 20-year history of substance abuse and suffers from bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder, decompensated under financial and other stress and attempted to burn his automobile in order to fraudulently obtain property and casualty insurance benefits. At the time of the arson attempt, his car was parked in the garage, and a tenant was residing in the garage apartment overhead. The tenant noticed the fire started by the Petitioner, put it out and reported it to the Petitioner. The Petitioner berated him for putting the fire out and told him to get his personal belongings out of the garage apartment and leave. While the tenant was in the garage apartment gathering his belongings, the Petitioner was attempting to restart the fire. The tenant had been a worker's compensation client of the Petitioner. The Petitioner continued to have mental and emotional and substance problems that led to additional criminal charges. On February 13, 1991, he was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. On October 3, 1991, the Petitioner pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting arrest without violence, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to seven days time served in jail. On or about December 22, 1991, the Petitioner overdosed on a mixture of drugs and alcohol in a possible suicide attempt. When confronted with law enforcement officers, the Petitioner struck the officers and was arrested and charged with battery of a law enforcement officer, a third degree felony. The Petitioner was involuntarily committed under the Baker Act, and on September 21, 1992, he pled nolo contendere to simple battery, a first degree misdemeanor, and was sentenced to one day time served in jail and ordered to pay $200 in fine and court costs. As a result of his other criminal charges, the Petitioner was charged with violation of his probation on the attempted arson charge. On or about March 16, 1992, the Petitioner pled guilty to violation of probation. Adjudication on the violation of probation was withheld, but probation was revoked, and he was resentenced under the attempted arson charge to a year of community control, followed by a year of probation. On or about March 8, 1992, the Petitioner was charged with driving with his license suspended or revoked for failure to maintain required insurance coverage. Since 1992, the Petitioner has not been involved in any additional criminal activity or charges. On February 23, 1993, his community control was converted to probation. He moved to Pasco County and, on December 22, 1993, his probation was terminated early. The Petitioner has sought professional counseling. On or about March 22, 1993, he was referred to a vocational rehabilitation counselor with the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Since approximately early 1994, he also has been under the care of a psychiatrist. With the help of counseling, the Petitioner has been sober since before August, 1993. Fortunately, therapy seems to have been successful. Except for two short hospitalizations for decompensation and medication adjustment early in his counseling, the Petitioner has been sober and mentally stable over the course of the last three years. From a mental health standpoint, the Petitioner no longer seemed to be a danger to himself or others, and he was making good progress in rehabilitating himself. On or about May 18, 1995, the Petitioner sought employment with Action Youth Care, a provider on contract with HRS. When he applied for the job, he was required to complete an Affidavit of Good Moral Character that swore, in pertinent part, that he had "not been found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under . . . Section 806.01 [Florida Statutes, arson]." The affidavit also required the Petitioner to "acknowledge the existence of any criminal . . . record regardless of whether [he] was adjudged guilty by the court and regardless of whether or not those records have been sealed or expunged." The Petitioner signed without acknowledging his attempted arson record. When his name was screened, the attempted arson record disqualified him from employment, and the Petitioner was terminated from his employment pending his request for an exemption. Despite the Petitioner's commendable progress in rehabilitating himself, there still are signs that some instability persists. He does not seem to appreciate the seriousness of his criminal record and history of substance abuse and mental illness, as they relate to HRS's statutory obligation to properly assess his moral character under Section 409.175, Fla. Stat. (1995). Instead, he blames HRS's actions on a "political" conspiracy to prevent him from obtaining employment. Similarly, he attempts to excuse his criminal record by blaming it all on HRS--the termination of his employment in 1989 allegedly was the sole cause of his decompensation and the resulting criminal offenses. His excuse for falsifying his Affidavit of Good Moral Character was that it was reasonable not to disclose the arson record because it was only attempted arson, not arson. He does not seem to appreciate that there is little or no difference in blameworthiness between the two. (The only real difference between the two is how soon the fire goes out or is put out.) Finally, the Employee Closing Summary produced by Action Health Care upon termination of the Petitioner's employment stated that Action would not re-hire the Petitioner and that the Petitioner's "weak areas" included: "poor rapport with team"; "would not accept authority"; and "documentation skills." (No "strengths" were noted on the form.) The Petitioner again blamed HRS, contending that the person who completed the form was lying to cooperate with HRS's conspiracy against the Petitioner. It is found that the evidence, taken as a whole, was not clear and convincing proof of rehabilitation and good moral character at this time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that HRS enter a final order denying the Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of August, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a Class "C" Private Investigator License, license number C86-00509. The Respondent has held that license at all times material to this proceeding. On July 4, 1994, the Respondent intentionally struck N.S. (a minor) with a flashlight. The striking of N.S. took place immediately after, and was in response to, N.S.'s act of kicking the Respondent while the Respondent was on a stairway landing and was in reasonable fear that his attacker (N.S.) might push him down the stairs. Under the circumstances, the Respondent's act of striking N.S. was a reasonable act of self-defense in the lawful protection of himself from physical harm.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing it is recommended that a Final Order be issued in this proceeding dismissing all charges against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. 1550 _ MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399- (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5321 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. (For reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law, the details regarding the criminal prosecution of the Respondent are not competent substantial evidence of the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.) Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: The Respondent's proposed recommended order does not contain any specific portion designated as "findings of fact." Rather, the Respondent has intertwined his proposed findings, his proposed conclusions, and his arguments throughout his proposal. It appears to be sufficient to note that the findings of fact in this recommended order are generally consistent with the substance of the Respondent's version of the facts. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine Assistant General Counsel Department of State, Division of Licensing The Capitol, Mail Station Number 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. Stephen A. Shields 9441 Southwest 4th Street, Number 311 Miami, Florida 33174 Honorable Sandra B. Mortham Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Don Bell General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Subsections 943.1395(6), 943.1395(7), and 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(a), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Anderson is a certified correctional officer, certified by Petitioner. Her certificate number is 190482. At the time of the incident at issue, Anderson was working for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. On May 27, 2003, Patricia Johns (Johns) was in the Wal-Mart parking lot in Clewiston, Florida. Johns was taking groceries she had purchased from a shopping cart and placing them in her vehicle. She placed her sweater and her purse in a shopping cart while she was loading the groceries. Johns retrieved her sweater from the cart, but left her purse in the cart. She pushed the cart with the purse in it between her vehicle and another vehicle, got into her vehicle, and left the parking lot. A few seconds later Anderson pulled into Johns' parking space. Anderson's vehicle bumped the shopping cart, pushing it forward a couple of feet. She got out of her vehicle, went over to the cart, and removed the purse. Anderson, while wearing her correctional officer uniform, placed the purse in the backseat of her vehicle, took her son out of the vehicle, and went into Wal-Mart. She did not take the purse into Wal-Mart and attempt to locate the owner. The purse was a Tommy Hilfiger brand valued at $50. Inside the purse was a wallet with $18 in cash, a credit card, and blank checks. A cellular telephone valued at $350 was also in the purse. Anderson picked up some prescriptions at Wal-Mart, returned to her vehicle, and eventually returned home. She knew that the purse did not belong to her, but claimed that she was planning to turn the purse in at the police department the next day. Her claim that she was going to turn the purse into the police is not credible based on later actions. Sometime after she had returned home, she remembered she had put the purse in the back of her vehicle and asked her fiancé to get the purse. When he went to retrieve the purse, only the wallet remained minus the cash. During the time that Anderson left Wal-Mart and the time that her fiancé discovered that the purse, cash, and cellular telephone were missing, both Anderson and her fiancé had driven the vehicle while carrying other passengers. Anderson did not remove the purse, cash, and cellular telephone from the vehicle. She believes that one of the other passengers who had been riding in her vehicle on May 27, 2003, took the purse, cash, and cellular telephone. The next day, Anderson placed the wallet in a zip-lock plastic bag and dropped it in a drop box at the post office. She did not notify the owner of the purse that she had taken the purse from the Wal-Mart parking lot, and did not notify the police until later that she had taken the purse. Johns reported to the police that her purse had been stolen. An investigation ensued, and it was learned based on a video tape of the Wal-Mart parking lot on May 27, 2003, that Anderson had taken the purse. A police officer attempted to contact Anderson by telephone concerning the incident. On June 9, 2003, Anderson gave a taped interview to police officers, in which she admitted taking the purse out of the shopping cart and placing it in the backseat of her car. She was arrested for grand theft and released on the same day after posting a bond. An information for grand theft, a third degree felony, was entered against Anderson on August 13, 2003. She agreed to make restitution in the amount of $419, and a Notice of Nolle Prosequi was entered on December 5, 2003. As a result of the incident at issue, Anderson was dismissed from her position as a correctional officer at South Bay Correctional Facility. She is sincerely sorry for her actions and has made restitution for the property taken.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Lenora R. Anderson is not guilty of a violation of Subsection 943.1395(6), Florida Statutes (2003); finding that she failed to maintain good moral character as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (2003), and defined by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011; and imposing the following penalties as set forth in Subsection 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2003): issuance of a written reprimand and placement of Respondent on probation for two years under conditions as specified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Douglas Clayton Brown (Brown), applied to Respondent, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department) , for examination as a general lines agent. By letter of September 9, 1986, the Department advised Brown that his application was denied because he had pled guilty to certain felonies which involved moral turpitude, and that he had failed to divulge on his application for examination that he had been charged with such felonies. Brown filed a timely request for formal hearing to contest the Department's decision. On March 21, 1983, an Information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County, Florida, charging Brown with one count of burglary, Section 810.02(2) Florida Statutes; and two counts of aggravated assault, Section 784.021, Florida Statutes. Brown entered a plea of guilty to the charges. On December 12, 1983, the court entered a judgment wherein it adjudged Brown guilty of having committed one count of burglary with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The court withheld the imposition of sentence, and placed Brown on 10 years probation. 1/ On August 20, 1984, Brown filed a motion in the criminal proceeding to terminate his probation and vacate the adjudication of guilt. By order of March 4, 1985, the court granted Brown's motion to vacate the adjudication of guilt, but continued his probation on the same terms and conditions as previously set. Subsequently, on March 13, 1985, the court entered a formal order that withheld adjudication of guilt and the imposition of sentence on the charges, and reimposed the term of probation previously established. By application dated March 4, 1985, filed with the Department on March 13, 1985, Brown sought examination for licensure as a general lines agent. Pertinent to this case the application requested and Brown responded: 12(a) Have you ever been charged with a felony? No Brown's application contained a material misrepresentation since he failed to disclose that he had been charged with a felony which involved moral turpitude. Brown's attempt to rationalize his nondisclosure was unpersuasive. According to Brown, he inquired of his attorney before completing his application and was advised that he could respond in the negative to the question set forth in paragraph 6, supra. Brown's assertion is not, however, supported by the proof and is inherently improbable and unworthy of belief. (See: Petitioner's exhibit 2).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Petitioner, Douglas Clayton Brown, for examination as a general lines agent be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 9th day of June, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1987.