The Issue This is a license discipline case in which Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against Respondent on the basis of allegations of misconduct set forth in an Administrative Complaint dated August 13, 2003.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Respondent Jean- Rene Joseph has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bond agent. At all times material to this case, Respondent worked as a bail bond agent with a bail bond company named America's Best Bail Bonds, Inc. At approximately 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. on the morning of January 29, 2002, Santacroce contacted Respondent for the purpose of arranging bail for a friend of hers named John Raymond Moyer ("Moyer"). Moyer needed a bond in the amount of $1,500.00. Respondent agreed to provide, and did provide, the requested bail bond for a fee of $150.00. On the morning of January 29, 2002, Santacroce paid $150.00 cash for the bail bond fee. Santacroce also agreed to furnish collateral for the bail bond issued on behalf of Moyer. In this regard, Santacroce agreed that she would either deliver the title to a specified automobile as collateral, or she would make payments of $250.00 per week until the bail bond on behalf of Moyer was fully collateralized. In the early morning hours of January 29, 2002, Santacroce did not have an original certificate of title to an automobile with her. Instead, she gave Respondent a color photocopy of title number 50460657, which was a certificate of title to an automobile. The certificate showed title to a 1986 Chevrolet in the name of a registered owner named Oliver C. Todd ("Todd"). Handwritten information on the certificate indicated that the registered owner had sold the automobile to AAA National Auto Sales, who in turn had sold the automobile to Santacroce. Santacroce also had with her at that time an affidavit signed by Todd that authorized Santacroce to retrieve the subject automobile from a towing company, as well as a document from Festa Towing Service, Inc, itemizing towing and storage charges. During the early morning hours of January 29, 2002, Respondent and Santacroce both signed a receipt document numbered 11122. Section 4 of that document describes the collateral or collateral documents as consisting of a promissory note and "Fl car title #50460657 or weekly payment of $250.00." Santacroce never made any payments towards collateralization of the subject bail bond. Moreover, Santacroce never delivered to Respondent the original of the certificate of title described above. Less than two weeks later, Moyer was arrested and jailed on other criminal charges. Through another bail bond company, Moyer posted bail on the second arrest. Santacroce no longer wished to have any liability on the bail bond issued on January 29, 2002. Accordingly, she asked Respondent to "surrender" the bond and have Moyer returned to jail. Moyer failed to appear for his court appearance that was guaranteed by the bail bond obtained by Santacroce. A bond forfeiture order was issued on February 12, 2002. Eventually, Moyer appeared, the forfeiture order was set aside, and the surety was discharged. Respondent's employer incurred expenses in the amount of $50.00 to have the forfeiture order set aside. At some point after the surety was discharged, Santacroce asked Respondent to return what Santacroce described as the certificate of title she had given to Respondent. Respondent could not return a certificate of title to Santacroce, because Respondent never received a certificate of title from Santacroce. Respondent never returned the photocopy of the certificate of title to Santacroce. That photocopy was still in Respondent's possession as of the day of the final hearing.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint in this case be dismissed because there is no clear and convincing evidence that Respondent received "car title #50460657" or anything else of value as collateral security for the subject bail bond. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Financial Services Suite N-321 401 Northwest Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Hernan Hernandez, Esquire 1431 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent's temporary bail bond agent license should be revoked based upon his no contest plea in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 95-1792, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: On or about February 6, 1995, a two-count criminal information was filed in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 95- 1972 against Respondent. Count I read as follows: STEVE TORRES, on or about JANUARY 16, 1995, in the County and State aforesaid, did unlawfully and feloniously commit an aggravated battery upon [M. R.] by actually and intentionally touching or striking the person of [M. R.] against her will, while [M. R.] was pregnant and the defendant knew or should have known that she was pregnant, in violation of s. 784.045(1)(b) and s. 775.087, Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. Count II read as follows: And the aforesaid Assistant State Attorney, under oath, further information makes that STEVE TORRES, on or about JANUARY 16, 1995, in the County and State aforesaid, did unlawfully, willfully and maliciously injure or damage certain personal property of [M. R.] by BREAKING THE WINDSHIELD OF [M. R.'S] VEHICLE, such damage being more than two hundred dollars ($200.00) but less than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), in violation of s. 806.13(1)(b)2. Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida. On November 6, 1995, Respondent entered a plea of no contest to both counts of the information. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and the entry of a sentence was suspended. In the summer of 2004, Respondent submitted to Petitioner an application for a temporary bail bond agent license. The application was submitted on an online application form developed by Respondent. One of the questions on the form was: "Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction entered?" Respondent truthfully answered "yes" to this question. Along with his application, Respondent submitted a "temporary appointment" form that had been completed by Jack Hope of No Limit Bail Bonds, Respondent's then-prospective employer. On the form, Mr. Hope truthfully answered "yes" to the question: "Has the above applicant [Respondent] ever been convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a felony?" On October 18, 2004, Petitioner granted Respondent's application and issued him the temporary (18-month) bail bond agent license for which he had applied. Petitioner subsequently determined that, in light of Respondent's criminal history record, the license was issued in error. Although it had already issued Respondent a license, Petitioner, on October 28, 2004, attempted to rescind such action by issuing a Notice of Denial, which purported to deny Respondent's application for licensure because of his criminal history. Respondent requested, and was granted, a proceeding pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on the matter. Hearing Officer Beverly Hayes was assigned to conduct the proceeding. On February 16, 2005, a hearing was conducted at which Hearing Officer Hayes received evidence and heard argument from the parties. On April 1, 2005, Hearing Officer Hayes issued a Written Report and Recommended Order recommending that "a Final Order be entered dismissing the Notice of Denial" inasmuch as the notice was "moot because [Petitioner had already] issued a license to [Respondent] prior to the filing of the Notice of Denial." On May 20, 2005, such a Final Order was issued. Prior thereto, on or about April 13, 2005, Petitioner had sent Respondent the following letter: A review of your records has been made and it has been determined that an error has been made in processing your application. You were inadvertently issued a Temporary Bail Bond license although you did not meet the qualifications specified in Florida Statutes. Section 648.355(1)(c) states that a person may not be issued a Bail Bond license who has been convicted or plead[ed] guilty or no contest to a felony, a crime involving moral turpitude, or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the laws of any state, territory, or country, whether or not a judgment or conviction is entered. On November 6, 1995, in the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, you entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges of Aggravated Battery which was classified as a felony. Since you did not qualify for the license, it has been cancelled as of the issue date. You are not qualified to act in the capacity of a Bail Bond agent. Please immediately return the license to the address shown below. As noted above, on June 7, 2005, Petitioner issued an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that his license should be revoked based on his 1995 no contest plea in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 95-1972.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order finding that Respondent is not qualified to hold a temporary bail bond agent license because of the no contest plea he entered in Dade County Circuit Court Case No. 95-1972 and revoking his license based on this finding of disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2005.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, a licensed physician, should be subject to discipline under section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes (2016),1/ for violating the Final Order entered by the Board of Medicine in case DOH-15-0017-FOF-MQA by failing to pay the administrative fine and costs, as required; and, if so, the appropriate discipline.
Findings Of Fact On January 8, 2015, the Florida Board of Medicine rendered Final Order DOH-15-0017-FOF-MQA. The Final Order resolved charges against the Respondent, a licensed physician who holds license ME 59800, in the administrative complaints in DOH cases 2009-13497, 2011-06111, and 2011-17799. The Final Order suspended Respondent's license for six months and required her to: pay a $10,000 administrative fine and $74,323.56 of costs within a year from reinstatement of her license; and document completion of a medical records course sponsored by the Florida Medical Association and five hours of continuing medical education in the area of ethics within a year from the filing of the Final Order. The Final Order also placed the Respondent on probation for two years, subject to specific supervision and board appearance requirements, and included the following tolling provision: In the event the Respondent leaves the State of Florida for a period of 30 days or more or otherwise does not or may not engage in the practice of medicine in the state of Florida, then certain provisions of the requirements in the Final Order shall be tolled and shall remain in a tolled status until Respondent returns to the active practice of medicine in the state of Florida. * * * Unless otherwise set forth in the Final Order, the following requirements and only the following requirements shall be tolled until the respondent returns to active practice: The time period of probation shall be tolled. The provisions regarding supervision whether direct or indirect by the monitor/supervisor, and required reports from the monitor/supervisor shall be tolled. It is clear from the language of the tolling provision that it did not apply to: the requirement to pay an administrative fine and costs within a year of license reinstatement; or the requirement to document completion of the medical records course and five hours of continuing medical education in ethics within a year of license reinstatement. After entry of the Final Order, the Respondent left Florida and moved to New York. Initially, she practiced medicine in New York, using her New York license, and earned income doing so. However, New York initiated license disciplinary proceedings based on the Florida Final Order, and she was unable to continue to practice medicine in New York. She also had health issues that inhibited her practice of medicine. By the terms of the Final Order, the Respondent's medical license was reinstated on July 8, 2015, and the fine and costs were due to be paid on July 7, 2016. The fine and costs were not paid by the due date. Towanda Burnett, medical compliance officer employed by the Petitioner, contacted the Respondent in July and August 2017 concerning her apparent failure to comply with the terms of the Final Order. As to the obligation to take approved courses of education, the Respondent took the position that she had taken the required courses, or had tried to take them, but was prevented from doing so by the Petitioner. However, she did not document her completion of the required courses, which resulted in one of the charges in the Administrative Complaint filed on November 6, 2017. Eventually, during preparation for the hearing in this case, the Petitioner determined that the Respondent was in compliance with that obligation, and that charge was dropped. As to the fine and costs, the Respondent took the position that her obligation to pay was stayed because she filed for bankruptcy. Information regarding the Respondent’s bankruptcy proceedings was reviewed by attorneys in the Petitioner’s Prosecution Services Unit, who determined that the Respondent’s obligation to pay was not stayed. The Respondent disagreed and declined to make any payments. One of the Respondent’s defenses relies on her direct appeals from the Final Order in the Florida courts. However, at no time did any of the appellate courts stay the Final Order. Ultimately, the direct appeals were denied. The Respondent also argues that the Final Order is “void,” “invalid,” or “moot” for “non-compliance of the mandate” issued by the Second District Court of Appeal after her appeals were denied. This argument is confusing and unpersuasive. At times, the Respondent seems to be arguing that the tolling provision applied to the fine and costs and that the “mandate of the Final Order” was violated by the Petitioner by its attempt to enforce the fine and costs assessment in the Final Order before the Respondent resumed the practice of medicine in Florida. This argument has no merit because the tolling provision clearly only applies to her probation--i.e., her two- year probation runs from the time she resumes the practice of medicine in the state of Florida. At other times, the Respondent seems to be saying her two-year probation was not tolled, but rather began when she resumed the practice of medicine in New York for a period of time, and was already over, placing the Petitioner in violation of the “mandate of the Final Order” by taking the position that the Respondent was still on probation. This argument also has no merit. It is possible that the Respondent’s argument relates to her testimony that an employee of the Petitioner prevented her from taking a continuing education course required by the Final Order. However, the charge of failure to document the required course has been resolved and dropped. In any event, whatever happened with regard to the Respondent’s attempts to take the course did not “void” or “moot” the Final Order. The Respondent also attempted to attack the Final Order in litigation she filed as case 1:16-cv-03038-VSB in federal district court in New York on April 25, 2016. The Respondent’s complaint named the Florida Board of Medicine and the Florida Department of Health as defendants, along with the New York Department of Health. The Florida agencies contested the court’s jurisdiction over them, and an amended complaint filed on September 22, 2016, dropped the Florida Department of Health and Florida Board of Medicine as parties. On February 14, 2017, the Respondent sought a stay and injunctive relief against the remaining defendant in that case, but the New York court denied the request on September 30, 2017. On October 16, 2017, the Respondent appealed this ruling to the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, in case 17-3358, listing the Florida Department of Health and the Florida Board of Medicine as appellees. (At the hearing in this case, the Respondent expressed that she was surprised to learn that the Florida agencies had been dropped from this litigation and that she intended to further amend to add them back.) The Respondent has repeatedly requested extensions of time, and the matter was still in court at the time of the hearing in this case. Neither federal court ever stayed the Final Order. This federal litigation is not an impediment to enforcement of the Final Order by the Petitioner. The Respondent also defends against the charges in this case based on various bankruptcy filings she has made. In 2015, the Respondent filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, in case number 8:15-bk-00594-CPM. She listed the Department of Health as a creditor. On June 3, 2015, the case was dismissed on motion of the trustee, and any funds held by the trustee were ordered to be returned to the debtor. On August 15, 2016, the Respondent filed for bankruptcy under chapter 13 in United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Manhattan Division) in case 16- 12356-cgm. The Respondent again listed the Department of Health as a creditor, and the Respondent believed the bankruptcy automatically stayed her obligations to pay the fine and costs under the Final Order, as she told the Petitioner’s compliance officer, Ms. Burnett, when she contacted the Respondent in the summer of 2017. The Petitioner points to filings the Respondent made in in case 16-12356-cgm as evidence of the Respondent’s supposed knowledge that no automatic stay was in effect. Specifically, on September 13, 2017, the Respondent filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, or in the alternative for temporary Administrative stay, which was denied by the bankruptcy court on September 19, 2017. However, the docket entries introduced into evidence in this case are difficult to decipher, and it is not clear that they refer to a stay of the collection of the fine and costs imposed by the Final Order. On November 22, 2017, the New York bankruptcy court dismissed the Respondent’s case 16-12356-cgm. On November 27, 2017, the Respondent appealed the dismissal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The appeal was assigned case number 1:17-cv-09429-JGK. On December 1, 2017, the Respondent filed in case 16-12356-cgm for a stay pending appeal, which was denied by the bankruptcy court on December 21, 2017. On February 6, 2018, the Respondent moved in district court for a stay pending appeal, or in the alternative, for a temporary administrative stay. On March 21, 2018, the district court affirmed the dismissal of the bankruptcy case, and denied the motion for a stay pending appeal as moot. On March 30, 2018, the Respondent sought review of the district court’s affirmance in the federal Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The case number of the circuit court appeal is 18- 890. On March 30, 2018, the Respondent filed in case 18-890 for an emergency injunction and stay; the filing was defective, for unspecified reasons, according to a court docket entry. On April 6, 2018, the Respondent filed in case 18-890 for a stay pursuant to 11 United States Code section 362(c)(4)(c); this filing also was defective, for unspecified reasons, according to the docket. In December 2017, after the New York bankruptcy court dismissed case 16-12356-cgm, the Respondent filed a second bankruptcy case in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. That filing was designated case 8:17-bk-10140. On January 11, 2018, the Florida bankruptcy court dismissed case 8:17-bk-10140 with prejudice; labeled the Respondent an “abusive serial bankruptcy filer”; “enjoined, barred, and prohibited [the Respondent] from commencing any bankruptcy petition” for a period of two years; and caused notice to be given that state courts should not halt debt collection proceedings based on any bankruptcy petition the Respondent attempted to file in violation of the court’s injunction against her. On January 31, 2018, the Florida bankruptcy court denied the Respondent’s motion for reconsideration. The Respondent’s bankruptcy filings are not a complete defense against the Petitioner’s charges. The Respondent was in violation of the Final Order for failure to pay the fine and costs as of July 7, 2016. No bankruptcy stay was in effect at that time. However, the Petitioner’s collection of those debts was stayed from August 8, 2016, through November 22, 2017. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2016). The Petitioner’s compliance office has a procedure for a payment plan when fines and costs cannot be paid at once. In order to obtain a payment plan, the licensee must propose a payment plan, with specific amounts and due dates, and submit documentation, including: two denial letters from any financial or loan institutions; a copy of the 1040 tax return; copies of bank statements; and any other relevant financial information. Once that information is received, it is sent to the chairperson of the Probation Committee of the Board of Medicine, who either approves or denies the payment plan. The Respondent did not submit the required information, pay anything towards the fine and costs, or express her intention to pay.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order: finding that the Respondent violated section 458.331(1)(x), Florida Statutes (2016), by failing to pay the administrative fine and costs imposed, as required by Final Order DOH-15-0017-FOF-MQA; issuing a reprimand against the Respondent’s Florida medical license; imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 (in addition to the administrative fine imposed by Final Order DOH-15-0017- FOF-MQA); and suspending the Respondent’s Florida medical license until such time as she pays all outstanding administrative fines and costs in full, or until the chairperson of the Board’s Probation Committee approves a payment plan. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2018.
Findings Of Fact John F. Cole, David J. Hayes and Andre LeClerc conveyed certain real estate situated in Broward County ("the property") to respondent by quitclaim deed dated December 16, 1976, and recorded on December 29, 1976. This instrument reflects payment of a documentary stamp tax in the amount of thirty cents ($0.30) as well as a documentary surtax. On September 30, 1971, Thomas N. Sprague and Peggy A. Sprague had mortgaged the property to Merle Ford to secure repayment of the principal sum of twenty-three thousand five hundred dollars ($23,500.00). On October 1, 1971, the Spragues mortgaged the property to Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan Association of Fort Lauderdale to secure repayment of the principal sum of one hundred three thousand dollars ($103,000.00) On November 21, 1973, John A. Kasbar, as trustee, mortgaged the property to the Spragues to secure repayment of the principal sum of twenty- three thousand one hundred dollars ($23,100.00) On June 5, 1969, Esther E. Adams conveyed the property by warranty deed to Andre LeClerc, as trustee. The warranty deed reflected payment of a documentary stamp tax in the amount of five hundred forty-three dollars ($543.00). The property which was the subject of these transactions is evidently worth a substantial sum of money, but the evidence fails to establish the value of the interest quitclaimed on December 16, 1976, and does not establish what consideration for the quitclaim deed was given, if any was given.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the notice of proposed assessment be withdrawn. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Mr. Ronald Payne, Esquire 621 South Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Findings Of Fact Respondent Leroy Ellsworth Hardman has been licensed by petitioner as a limited surety agent since 1974. In January of 1976, he opened an office in Sanford, Florida, under the name of Action Bail Bonds. By December of 1978, he had qualified with the clerks of court in Orange, Seminole and Volusia Counties, and had written bonds in all three counties. Respondent decided to open an office in Deland, in addition to his office in Sanford. He leased office space on December 1, 1978, and began renovation. He had arranged for an advertisement to appear in the yellow pages of the Deland telephone directory, effective December 18, 1978, but did not succeed in opening the Deland office until December 19, 1978. Respondent hired Barbara Linkel to be in the office weekdays until four o'clock in the afternoon. He himself visited the office daily. Respondent, who had a 24 hour answering service and wore an electronic pager, instructed Ms. Linkel to notify him if anybody wanted a bond written. Respondent had charge of his Deland office while continuing to have charge of his office in Sanford. On January 29, 1979, John Wolmac, a limited surety agent, registered at the courthouse and began working for respondent, taking charge of the Deland office. On January 31, 1979, respondent executed the first bond written at the Deland office. Respondent's exhibit No. 8. Records of all bonds written at the Deland office were kept on file there until that office closed on May 31, 1979, when the records were transferred to respondent's office in Sanford. At all pertinent times, respondent's records were complete and open to the public for inspection. At the time of the hearing, respondent still had records of every bond executed or countersigned by him.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint against respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas A. T. Taylor, Esquire Office of the Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James C. Weart, Esquire 201 West Firth Street Suite 206, Paulucci Building Sanford, Florida 32771
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted a temporary bail bond license with the Florida Department of Financial Services?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for licensure as a temporary resident surety agent (temporary bail bond agent) on or about December 31, 2008. The Department deemed his application completed on February 5, 2009. In November 1997 in Colquitt County, Georgia, Petitioner pled guilty to a felony charge of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. He was placed on probation for a period of six years. Pursuant to the Georgia Probation for First Time Offenders Act, there was no adjudication of guilt by the court. On November 7, 2003, Petitioner successfully completed his probation. On November 13, 2003, the Superior Court of Colquitt County issued an order entitled “Record of Discharge and Exoneration of Defendant (First-Offender Act)”. The Notice of Discharge states in pertinent part: THEREFORE, IT IS NOTED AND RECORDED that in accordance with the provisions of the Probation of First Offenders Act (OCGA 42-8- 60 et. seq.): The defendant has been discharged without court adjudication of guilt; That the discharge completely exonerates the defendant of any criminal purpose; asks: That the discharge does not affect any of said defendant’s civil rights or liberties; The defendant is not considered to have a criminal conviction; and The discharge may not be used to disqualify a person in application for employment or appointment to office in either the public or private sector. (emphasis added) Question 3 on the Individual Application for New License Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or plead guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? Yes/No Petitioner answered “no” to question 3 on the application for licensure. Question 20 on the Individual Application for New License asks: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or plead guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory, or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or judgment of conviction was entered? Yes/No Petitioner responded “no” to question 20 on the Individual Application for New License. At the end of the application, just above his electronic signature, Petitioner checked a box manifesting agreement with the following declaration: Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and that the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of the Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application and/or the revocation of my insurance license(s). The Department’s denial letter was based on Petitioner’s criminal history, as well as an allegation of failure to disclose same. Petitioner testified at hearing that during the process of completing his application as a bail bondsman, he sought the advice of an attorney regarding his Notice of Discharge and application. Petitioner received legal advice that his answer to the aforementioned questions should be “no.” Petitioner’s testimony in this regard is found to be credible and is accepted.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner’s application for licensure as a Temporary Resident Limited Surety Agent be granted. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 2009.
Findings Of Fact On September 6, 2001, Petitioner Bowers filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) a Charge of Discrimination against Respondent, Big Red Waste, Inc. The Charge recited that the most recent or continuing date of discrimination was July 10, 2001, for a finite, one-time act of alleged unlawful employment practice, to wit: termination on the basis of race (Black) and in retaliation. One hundred and eighty days from the filing of Petitioner's Charge with the Commission would have been on or about March 5, 2002. On September 19, 2003, the Commission entered a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. On December 23, 2003, the Commission entered an Amended Dismissal and Notice of Rights. The Commission's Amended Dismissal and Notice of Rights (Amended Dismissal) recited that on May 14, 2002, the Commission had received notice that Respondent had filed a voluntary Chapter 7 Petition in Bankruptcy. Therefore, it is presumed that as of May 14, 2002, an automatic stay of proceedings before the Commission was in effect. The Commission's Amended Dismissal also stated: . . . It has been more than 180 days since Complainant's complaint was filed, and since no determination has been made due to the automatic stay that was issued in Respondent's bankruptcy case, and since Complainant has been previously notified by the Commission of his obligation to file a Notice of Claim [in the federal bankruptcy court], the Commission hereby dismisses this Charge of Discrimination and provides the following Notice to Complainant. Since the Commission did not make a determination of cause or no cause on your complaint within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, you may proceed as if the Commission determined there was reasonable cause. Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes; Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2002). You must initiate a civil lawsuit within 1-year from the date of this dismissal, or an administrative action with the Division of Administrative Hearings within 35 days of the date of this dismissal, provided neither date has exceeded a total of four (4) years from the initial date of the violation. Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes; Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2000). If more than four (4) years have passed once the automatic stay is lifted on Respondent's bankruptcy case, you must file your civil lawsuit, or your administrative action within 30 days of the lifting of the automatic stay. Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 739 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1999). If the Respondent has not emerged from bankruptcy, and if you determine you do not want to wait until Respondent emerges from bankruptcy, you may file a Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay, and present your argument and authorities to the bankruptcy judge assigned to Respondent's bankruptcy case. The Commission does not assist Complainants with filing the Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay. You must consult an attorney on your own for that purpose. [Bracketed material added for clarity.] One year from the Commission's December 23, 2003, Amended Dismissal will be December 22, 2004. Thirty-five days from the Commission's December 23, 2004, Amended Dismissal would have been January 27, 2004. Four years from July 30, 2001, the initial date of the violation, will be July 29, 2005. On February 12, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to the Commission stating that the Commission's "right to sue" letter did not include a blank Petition for Relief. However, the referral packet from the Commission to the Division included no "right to sue letter." The Commission's response to the Order of the undersigned dated May 3, 2004, does not contain a "right to sue" letter. On February 17, 2004, the Commission entered an Order to Show Cause Why Case Should Not Be Closed Because of Bankruptcy Proceedings (Commission's Order to Show Cause). The Commission's Order to Show Cause noted that Respondent had filed a Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, on October 9, 2001, and that the same case was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding on May 7, 2002. The Commission's Order to Show Cause also noted that a letter advising Petitioner of the bankruptcy was sent on May 20, 2002, and that a final order distributing all assets and dismissing the bankruptcy case was entered on September 9, 2002. The Commission ordered the parties to show cause, before March 19, 2004, why the discrimination case before the Commission should not be closed. The referral packet from the Commission to the Division included a Response to the Commission's Order to Show Cause, filed with the Commission by the trustee in bankruptcy, on or about March 8, 2004. That Response recites that Respondent's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed by a September 9, 2002, Order and that "upon the dismissal order becoming final all of the assets of Big Red Waste, Inc., reverted to that corporation and the automatic stay was terminated and vacated as to all creditors and claimants against Big Red Waste, Inc." The bankruptcy court docket was provided to the Division by the Commission in response to the May 3, 2004, Order herein. Assuming a 30-day appeal period, the dismissal by the Bankruptcy Court became final, at the latest, as of October 8, 2002. Therefore, the latest date the automatic stay was lifted would also have been October 8, 2002, although the September 9, 2002, date of the Bankruptcy Court's Order would be reverted-to, absent an appeal, and there is no evidence of an appeal. According to the Commission's response to the May 3, 2004, Order herein, the Petition for Relief in the instant discrimination case was "inadvertently dated March 13, 2004," but was filed with the Commission on March 9, 2004. The Petition for Relief recites repeatedly, "see attached complaint." There was no complaint attached to the Petition in the packet referred by the Commission to the Division, and none was provided in response to the May 3, 2002, Order herein. Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the May 3, 2004, Order herein, it is presumed that the "complaint" referred to in the Petition for Relief is the September 6, 2001, Charge of Discrimination, and it may further be presumed that no continuing pattern of discrimination continued after the finite termination date of July 1, 2001. However, by the Petition for Relief, Petitioner attempted to add as a party Respondent, Respondent's president, Yvonne Kiawtkowski. Petitioner has as yet demonstrated no good cause to add Respondent's president, in her individual capacity, to this administrative discrimination case when she was not individually charged in the original Charge before the Commission. The copy of the Petition for Relief and Attachments sent to the most recent address in the Commission file for Respondent's Corporation apparently were returned to the Commission. The same has occurred with regard to all papers mailed by the Division to that address. Therefore, no Notice of Hearing can be sent by the Division to Respondent's Corporation. Telephone calls by the undersigned's secretary to Big Red Waste, Inc.'s last known phone number, which was provided in the Commission's referral packet, have resulted in an oral response that the party at that phone number is not Big Red Waste, Inc. Recently, the Commission determined that Ms. Kiawtkowski has a new personal address. On June 21, 2004, the Petition for Relief and Attachments were returned to the Commission from that address too. The Commission has stated it cannot determine whether Ms. Kiawtkowski ignored the certified mail receipt for this mailing or whether she no longer resides in that area.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wayne N. Bowers 10951 Laureate Drive, Apartment 601 San Antonio, Florida 78249 Yvonne Kwiatkowski, President Big Red Waste, Inc. Post Office Box 549 Alachua, Florida 32615 Yvonne Kwiatkowski, President Big Red Waste, Inc. Post Office Box 730981 Ormond Beach, Florida 32173
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against him, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by the Department as a limited surety bail bond agent. He was employed by and authorized to write bail bond business for County Bonding Agency. When Respondent was hired by County Bonding Agency, the office procedures for receiving and accounting for all paperwork and money were explained to him by Deolinda E. Stolowilsky, the owner and operator, and Olympia Delgado, the office manager. Licensed employees were issued a certain number of bail bond powers of attorney on Monday of each week. Each agent was given a "pay sheet" listing the number of each power of attorney. When a power was used, the agent would write on the pay sheet next to that power the defendant's name, the amount of the bail bond, and the date the power was executed. On the following Monday each agent would turn in all files with executed bail bonds. All unused powers of attorney would be re-issued to the agent and any additional needed powers would be issued. The agent's compensation was computed based on the amount of bail bond business the agent had performed during the preceding reporting period. Each Monday when files with executed bail bonds were turned in to County Bonding Agency, all premiums received by the agent for those executed bonds were required to be turned in with the executed bonds. The office manager would make a notation on the outside of that defendant's file that the premium had been paid. Some of the agents working for County Bonding Agency routinely watched to make sure that the office manager made the proper notation on the file when they gave her money. County Bonding Agency did not give its agents receipts for the money received from them. Although County Bonding Agency had an informal policy that an agent receiving a large amount of money should turn that money in on the same day or the following day, there was no specificity for what would constitute a large amount of money. Further, there was no particular consequence for failure to accommodate the owner's preference that such be done. Much of County Bonding Agency's business was written in its office rather than at the jail. In other words, much of the money received by County Bonding Agency came from indemnitors coming to the office and paying the premium there. When that occurred, the agent sent to the jail to execute the bond received no premium money since the money had already been paid at the office. On June 20, 1998, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency. He turned in files and premiums and was issued powers to be used for future bonds. On June 23, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency and was issued new powers. Thereafter, office manager Delgado began telephoning Respondent and writing to him stating that he had failed to turn in the premium money for five defendants. She also filed a police report and contacted the Department alleging that Respondent had failed to turn in money that he had collected. On July 20, 1998, a courier delivered to County Bonding Agency from Respondent folders for six defendants. The folders did not contain any money. On July 22, Respondent went to County Bonding Agency to turn in his beeper, receipt book, and unused powers. The bond money for four defendants is at issue in this proceeding. Their folders were among the six delivered by courier to County Bonding Agency. At the final hearing, Delgado admitted that one of the six defendants was an office bond, and she could not remember one of the defendants. The four at issue are Alain Yara, Seon T. Carter, Demetrius Robertson, and Stanley Bailey. The Department's exhibits admitted in evidence at the final hearing include the paperwork for those four defendants. The paperwork for Yara includes a receipt for $300 and a collateral receipt. Both are signed by Respondent and dated June 21, 1998, two days before Respondent went to County Bonding Agency and was issued new powers. The paperwork for Carter contains a premium receipt for $550 (10 percent of the $5,500 bond) dated June 21, 1998, and signed by Respondent and a collateral receipt signed by "Curly" for what appears to be the same $5,500. The paperwork for both Robertson and Bailey contain premium receipts and collateral receipts dated June 24, 1998. All four receipts are signed "Curly." "Curly" is the nickname of Irwin Stolowilsky. At the final hearing, Delgado admitted signing Curly's name to receipts for bonds when the premium money was received by the office and the agent went to the jail only to obtain the remaining paperwork and write the bond. Delgado is not licensed by the Department and, therefore, she is not authorized to receive premiums for bail. Accordingly, when guarantors came to County Bonding Agency's office to pay premium money, she signed Curly's name, representing that a licensed person rather than an unlicensed person had in fact received the money.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent not guilty and dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against him in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-321 Miami, Florida 33128 Miguel J. Alvarez 8501 Northwest 8th Street Apartment 311 Miami, Florida 33126 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
