Findings Of Fact During 1974, Beker Phosphate Corporation applied to the Board of County Commissioners of Manatee County for a development order approving proposed phosphate mine operations. Beker is seeking to engage in phosphate mining on over ten thousand acres of land located in Manatee County in the watersheds of the Manatee and Myakka Rivers. The TBRPC is the regional planning agency which reviews development of regional impact applications in Manatee County. On December 9, 1974, the TBRPC recommended that the proposed mine be approved with modifications. On January 28, 1975, the Board of County Commissioners of Manatee County issued a DRI Development Order. The order approved the application submitted by Beker subject to thirteen specified conditions which are set out in the order. A copy of this development order was received in evidence at the final hearing as a Appellant's Exhibit 3. Neither the Division of State Planning nor any appropriate regional planning agency appealed the development order to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. Sarasota County did attempt to appeal the order; however, on June 17, 1975, the Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission accepted the Hearing Officer's recommended order and dismissed the appeal. This action was affirmed by the First District Court of Appeal. Sarasota County v. Beker Phosphate Corporation, 322 So.2d 655 (1975). In its application for development order, Beker had proposed to construct two secondary dams prior to commencing mining activities. One of these was to be constructed on the East fork of the Manatee River, and one on Wingate Creek. The dams were located down stream from initial waste clay settling areas. One of the purposes of the secondary dams was to serve as a back up system in the event that there was a break in the primary dam. In approving the application, the Board of County Commissioners of Manatee County required that the secondary dams be constructed prior to the commencement of mining activities. The primary motivation of Manatee County in requiring construction of the secondary dams was not protection from leaks in the primary dam system, but rather a desire to plan for the County's long term water needs. The Board anticipates that a reservoir would eventually be constructed behind the secondary dams, and that these reservoirs would serve the long-term water needs of the people of Manatee County. Since the secondary dams were to be constructed in wetland areas, Beker needed to obtain a permit from the Department of Environmental Regulation in order to construct the dams. An application was submitted. On November 29, 1976, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the application. Beker subsequently petitioned for a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1976 Supp). The request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings. A final hearing was scheduled, but due to subsequent action taken by the Board of County Commissioners of Manatee County, and due to this proceeding, the hearing was postponed and the case has been held in abeyance since April 5, 1977. No formal hearing has been conducted with respect to the application to construct the secondary dams, and no final order has been issued by the Department of Environmental Regulation. While the Department of Environmental Regulation matter was pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings Mr. Louis Driggers, the Chairman of the Board of County Commissioners of Manatee County, became concerned that the proceeding could have an adverse effect upon the county's long-range desire to construct a reservoir which would serve water supply needs. Mr. Driggers had a conference with Secretary Landers of the Department of Environmental Regulation, and learned that the agency's initial objections to the secondary dams were that the dams themselves would cause destruction of wetlands areas, and that since the primary dams were being constructed in accordance with Department of Environmental Regulation Rules and Regulations, there would be no need for the secondary dams. This opinion was set out in a letter from Mr. Landers to Mr. Driggers dated March 14, 1977 (Beker Exhibit 1). Mr. Driggers subsequently relayed this information to other members of the Board of County Commissioners, and on April 12, 1977, the Board adopted a resolution modifying a portion of the DRI development order which it had issued on January 28, 1975. The earlier order was specifically amended to delete the requirement that the secondary dams be constructed prior to the beginning of mining operations. The requirement that the secondary dams be constructed has not been altogether deleted; however, it is no longer a purpose of the dams to provide any secondary protection from a putative phosphate spill. The dams now have as their primary purpose long-range water supply and flood control. Manatee County is in effect now able to insist that Beker construct the dams at any time that the county so desires, assuming that all proper permits can be obtained. It is unlikely that the county will ever request that a secondary dam be constructed in Wingate Creek in the Myakka River watershed. The Board of County Commissioners of Manatee County did not submit the issues resolved in the April 12 order to the appropriate regional planning agency, and did not, through its order specifically consider all of the potential regional impacts of the order. The Commission concluded that the amendment did not constitute a substantial deviation from the original development order. Following entry of the order the SWFRPC filed this appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission. The SWFRPC, and Sarasota County contend that the April 12 amendment constitutes a substantial deviation from the original development order, and that the Board of County Commissioners of Manatee County should have entered the order only after conducting all of the proceedings contemplated in Florida Statutes Chapter 380. Beker Phosphate, Manatee County, and the TBRPC contend that the April 12 order does not constitute a substantial deviation from the original development order. Testimony presented at the hearing related primarily to the secondary dam originally proposed for construction in Wingate Creek in the Myakka River watershed. An initial waste clay settling area with a capacity of 8,848 acre- feet is proposed for construction primarily within the Myakka River watershed adjacent to Wingate Creek. Phosphate slimes would be stored above ground and permitted to settle in this area. The proposed secondary dam would have been located approximately three miles downstream from the settling area. The secondary dam would have had a capacity of 260 acre-feet. The secondary dam would thus have the capacity to contain a limited spill from the primary settling area. The secondary dam would provide no protection from a complete destruction or break down of the dams surrounding the primary settling area, or of any spill from the primary area greater than 260 acre-feet. Such a spill would result in destruction of the secondary dam. Spills of less than 40 acre- feet of material from the primary settling area would have no substantial impact on areas below the secondary dam whether the dam was constructed or not. Spills of a volume between 40 acre-feet and 260 acre-feet could, without the construction of secondary dams, have an impact upon areas below the secondary dams. Turbidity caused by such a spill, and deleterious substances contained in the slime could result in substantial environmental impacts, including destruction of vegetation, and short-term and long-term fish kills at least as far down the system as upper Myakka Lake, which is located in Sarasota County. No evidence was presented to indicate that a spill of from 40 to 260 acre-feet from the primary settling area is likely or more than a mere hypothetical possibility. The only testimony respecting the likelihood of any spill was that if the dams surrounding the primary settling area were constructed in accordance with Department of Environmental Regulation Rules and Regulations, and were properly inspected, there is no likelihood of a breakdown in the dams or of a spill. Argument was presented at the hearing to the effect that phosphate slimes could escape the settling area, or other areas within the mining operation, but there was no evidence to that effect, and certainly no evidence that such leakages or minor spills would be as large as 40 acre-feet. Deletion of the requirement for construction of secondary dams prior to commencement of mining activities as set out in the January 28, 1975 development order, would constitute a substantial deviation from that order only if there were some likelihood of a breakdown in the dams surrounding the primary settling area, or of some leakage at some point in the mining operations that would result in a spill of from 40 to 260 acre-feet of material into the Myakka watershed. No evidence was offered that would serve to establish even the remotest likelihood of such an event. The evidence does, however, establish that construction of the secondary dam in Wingate Creek would have adverse environmental consequences. The construction would take place in a viable wetlands area. The natural flow of water through the Myakka watershed would be disturbed. Construction of the dam would appear to constitute a concession that more than 4 acres of valuable and viable flood plain along Wingate Creek would be given up for the sake of the phosphate mining operations. It is possible that without the dams the result of any spill could be confined to a smaller area than that surrounded by the secondary dams. Without the dams the normal flow of water through the system will not be disturbed, and areas below the primary settling area can remain in their natural condition.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may terminate the employment of Respondent for misconduct in office.
Findings Of Fact Respondent graduated in 1963 with a degree in accounting. He earned his juris doctor degree in 1967. He has practiced public accounting and also been employed by W. R. Grace & Company and Getty Oil Company. For most of the 1970s, Respondent was employed as head of construction for the City of Baltimore. In this capacity, he assumed significant responsibilities in the construction of a major convention center and aquarium, as well as over 50 schools. For most of the 1980s, Respondent ran a construction management company. From 1988-92, Respondent developed residential homes. From 1992-96, Respondent was the executive director of the Port of Bridgeport. From March 1996 to January 2000, Respondent was employed as the executive director of the Port of Palm Beach. While so employed, Respondent directed a $100 million redevelopment project for the Port. Following the conclusion of his employment with the Port of Palm Beach, Respondent was employed for a short period in Tampa. Wanting to return to West Palm Beach, Respondent applied for the position of Respondent's Chief Operating Officer. Then-Superintendent Ben Marlin hired Respondent in July 2000. Superintendent Marlin was implementing a School Board plan that divided the District into academic and business sections. As Chief Operating Officer, Respondent headed the business section. As Chief Academic Officer, Dr. Arthur Johnson headed the academic section during the last six months of Superintendent Marlin's tenure, which ended in February 2001. Dr. Johnson succeeded Dr. Marlin as the new superintendent and was a member of the School Board when it adopted the plan dividing the District into academic and business sections. The creation of a separate business section within the District facilitated the implementation of efficient business and management practices. The School Board designed the new organizational plan to obtain greater productivity from the business side of the District and to maximize the academic benefit from available revenues. Currently the 14th largest school district in the United States, the Palm Beach County School District administers a $2 billion annual budget in the service of 157,000 students in 150 schools. Half of this $2 billion outlay is devoted to operational expenses; most of the remainder is devoted to capital expenditures and debt service. The District operates the largest food service and bus company in Palm Beach County. At the time of the hearing, the District was constructing three high schools, three middle schools, and ten elementary schools-- with a total construction value of over $250 million. Striving to meet the needs of a large, but still fast-growing community, the District will open twelve schools in August 2002. Just over half of the District's 17,000 employees are noninstructional. Hired shortly before Respondent, on June 1, 2000, William Malone became Chief of Facilities Management Services. Mr. Malone graduated with a degree in civil engineering in 1971. His prior experience consisted of 21 years with the United States Army Corps of Engineers and 13 years with the South Florida Water Management District. For the last five and one- half years with the South Florida Water Management District, Mr. Malone oversaw the district's construction projects. He left the district shortly after trying unsuccessfully in 1999 to be appointed as the executive director of the South Florida Water Management District. Upon assuming the duties of the Chief Operating Officer, Respondent analyzed all of the divisions reporting to him. An immediate problem was maintenance. The District had just fired Service Master, and the maintenance department was leaderless and in some disarray. Respondent decided to split off maintenance from Mr. Malone's responsibilities. Respondent contacted three Port employees who had worked under him when he was Executive Director of the Port of Palm Beach: Martin Mets, Michael Scheiner, and Lauriann Basel. On July 17, 2000, Respondent hired Mr. Mets as the Director of Maintenance and Plant Operations. At about the same time, Respondent hired Mr. Scheiner as a business manager and Ms. Basel as the liaison between the maintenance department and the schools. As evidenced in part from the fact that he continues to serve as Director of Maintenance and Plant Operations, Mr. Mets has done a good job for the District. He previously handled similar duties for 19 years at the Port of Palm Beach. Among Mr. Met's responsibilities as Director of Maintenance and Plant Operations is the duty of approving all invoices to be paid by the District. Mr. Scheiner continues to serve as a business manager for the District, although, at the time of the hearing, he testified that his contract might not be renewed. After serving as capital projects coordinator with the Port of Palm Beach, Mr. Scheiner, who has a degree in accounting, implemented the orders of Mr. Mets and Respondent to document all maintenance invoices before submitting them to accounting for payment. To perform this task, Mr. Scheiner had to design and implement internal controls to ensure, among other things, that vendors were doing the work in a satisfactory manner for which they were to be paid. One of Mr. Scheiner's first discoveries were that the District did not maintain the records he needed to ensure that the District had received the goods and services for which it was being invoiced. Prominent among the missing information were purchase orders showing that the District ordered goods or services and identifying the specific goods and services. Also prominent among the missing information was documentation showing that someone from Maintenance and Plant Operations physically visited the site that had purportedly received the goods and services to confirm that the goods and services were supplied and they were satisfactory. At the same time that Mr. Scheiner was undertaking the substantial task of designing and implementing much-needed internal controls to cover future operations, he also had to address the deficiencies that had arisen during past operations. Noticing a number of invoices for the installation of vinyl flooring in which the vendor had agreed to reductions in the amount due, Mr. Scheiner suggested to Mr. Mets that he ask Lung Chiu, the District Internal Auditor, to conduct an audit of these vendors. In August 2000, Mr. Mets submitted a request to Mr. Chiu that he conduct an audit of the District's two vinyl flooring installers. Mr. Chiu has served as the District Internal Auditor for eight years. He has a master's degree in accounting, and he is a certified public accountant and a certified internal auditor. Typically, Mr. Chiu reports to the School Board through the Audit Committee. His method of reporting is through the presentation of a final audit to the Audit Committee. Pursuant to Mr. Mets' request, Mr. Chiu conducted an audit of the two vinyl flooring installers from August to October 2000. Having completed his field work, in October 2000, Mr. Chiu prepared a draft audit report and submitted it for comment to Mr. Mets, as head of the maintenance department, and his counterpart in charge of the purchasing department. The draft audit report is dated November 17, 2000, and addressed to the School Board, Superintendent Marlin, and the Audit Committee because, if finalized in time, Mr. Chiu intended to present the final report to the Audit Committee at its next meeting, which was November 17, 2000. On November 6, 2000, Mr. Chiu reported by memorandum to Mr. Mets that he had found an error in the earlier version of the draft audit report dated November 17, 2000. After the correction, the draft audit report, as revised through November 1, 2000, found vendor overbillings (and, presumably, District overpayments) by the two vinyl flooring installers. According to the draft audit report, Buy the Square Yard, Inc. (Square Yard), overbilled the District $2.29 million, and Padron Brothers overbilled the District $2000. The earlier draft audit report had found that Square Yard had overbilled the District by $2.932 million. The tentative findings in the draft audit report caused District administrators to ask District legal counsel to consider various legal questions concerning the possible recovery of these apparent overpayments. In a nine-page legal memorandum dated November 10, 2000, to Interim Chief Counsel Bruce Harris marked "UNFINISHED PRELIMINARY AND TENTATIVE DRAFT FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION PURPOSES ONLY," Randall Burks discussed without resolution several legal issues concerning such a potential claim. At this point, Mr. Chiu referred the matter to the District police department for the purpose of a criminal investigation into the overbillings. In the spring of 2001, the District police department concluded that insufficient evidence existed to pursue criminal charges. In the meantime, in December 2000, Mr. Chiu considered the accounting error that had necessitated the amendment of the draft audit report. After more work, he concluded that his audit conclusion for 1995-99 was "questionable" due to incomplete billing and accounting records. This conclusion had a major impact on his earlier audit conclusions concerning Square Yard, which had tentatively found overbillings of $1.719 million in 1995-99. In May 2001, after the police investigation had concluded, Mr. Chiu resumed the audit work. He reduced the overbillings by Square Yard by removing the 1995-99 data and making another, much less important change. In May 2001, Mr. Chiu finalized the draft. As revised through June 8, 2001, the draft audit report found overbillings by Square Yard of about $387,000. According to a memorandum dated November 5, 2001, from Mr. Chiu to the Audit Committee, in May and June 2001, he "briefed" the committee members about ongoing projects, including the audit of the vinyl flooring vendors. District policy requires Mr. Chiu to update the Audit Committee about his audits, but Mr. Chiu ordinarily does not share with the committee any of the details of any audits, unless he has already submitted to the Audit Committee a finalized draft report. The District Internal Audit Charter outlines the responsibilities of the Audit Committee and District Auditor, although the charter, as contained in this record, does not address confidentiality. However, the premature release of a draft audit would impair the ability of the District Auditor to conduct effective audits. Given his background and service as a member of the Audit Committee, Respondent clearly understood the importance of confidentiality to the integrity of an ongoing audit. In early July 2001, Mr. Chiu shared his updated findings with the maintenance department and purchasing department, again for the purpose of obtaining their responses to the proposed audit findings and possibly incorporating these responses into the draft audit report. On August 2, 2001, Mr. Chiu received the responses of the maintenance department, by way of Mr. Mets' memorandum of the same date. This memorandum largely restates his response several months earlier to an earlier draft of the audit report. Mr. Mets' counterpart in charge of the purchasing department submitted her response in September 2001, and Mr. Chiu submitted the final draft of the audit report to the Audit Committee in November 2001. On August 3, 2001, Respondent attended a breakfast meeting at a motel restaurant with Henry Harper, Sr., the principal of Square Yard, and Isaac Robinson, the President of the City Commission of West Palm Beach. Commissioner Robinson had arranged the meeting so Respondent and Mr. Harper could try to resolve the problems that Mr. Harper felt that he was having with Respondent. Respondent's relationship with Superintendent Johnson was not as good as Respondent's relationship had been with Superintendent Marlin, who had announced his resignation in January 2001. In April 2001, Dr. Johnson switched Respondent and Mr. Malone's jobs. Superintendent Johnson claims to have been concerned about Respondent's interpersonal skills, but evidence of shortcomings in this area are anecdotal and unpersuasive. Superintendent Johnson also claims to have been concerned about Respondent's performance when he failed to produce a requested $50 million reduction from the business side. However, the record fails to establish sufficient details concerning this matter, which Superintendent Johnson did not pursue with Respondent at the time. Mr. Malone had unsuccessfully applied for the Chief Operating Officer position when Superintendent Marlin had selected Respondent. It appears that Respondent and Mr. Malone enjoyed different sources of support, and the replacement of Superintendent Marlin with Superintendent Johnson was an adverse development for Respondent and a favorable development for Mr. Malone. Also, at this time, a member of the School Board, who had strongly supported Mr. Malone's application for the Chief Operating Officer position, had been exploring the possibility of obtaining a position as the administrative assistant to the Chief Operating Officer and preferred to work under Mr. Malone, rather than Respondent. At some point, this factor was mooted when the School Board member secured a position as the director of a newly formed education commission in West Palm Beach. When switching the jobs of the two men, Superintendent Johnson also transferred to Mr. Malone's new position the responsibility for construction that he had previously borne as Chief of Facilities Management Services. At minimum, Superintendent Johnson preferred that this important responsibility remain in a person with whom he was more comfortable. However, Superintendent Johnson was not trying to rid the District of Respondent, as evidenced by his renewal of Respondent's one-year employment contract on June 30, 2001. Sometime after switching jobs with Mr. Malone, Respondent decided to run for the Commission of the Port of Palm Beach. The election is in November 2002, and, although most of the vote campaigning takes place within two weeks of the election, candidates often file early so that they can open campaign accounts and line up support. Campaign expenditures for each seat, which are all at-large, typically range from $30,000 to $40,000. On July 3, 2001, Respondent filed the paperwork to become a candidate for a seat on the Port Commission and advised Mr. Malone of his candidacy for public office. A few days later, Respondent briefly met with Mr. Mets, Mr. Scheiner, and Ms. Basel and informed them of his filing and warned them that they were not to involve themselves with his candidacy while on District time. Shortly after these conversations, Respondent went on a two-week vacation, from which he returned on July 24. Within a few days after returning to work, Respondent presented to Mr. Mets, Mr. Scheiner, and Ms. Basel three identical letters, all dated July 5, 2001. These letters reiterated Respondent's direction not to conduct any campaign business on District time. Each letter had a place for each of the three employees to sign and add the date. As instructed by Respondent, each employee signed his or her name and wrote in the date of July 5, 2001. The evidence does not establish that, in backdating the letters, any of these employees felt intimidated or coerced by Respondent or felt that they were doing anything wrong. None complained about the request at the time. In an abundance of caution, not inconsistent with feelings of blamelessness, Mr. Mets and Ms. Basel later memorialized the backdating of their letters. More likely than not Respondent had these employees backdate the "July 5" letters in late July. Although there is a conflict in the evidence whether the date on which Mr. Mets and Ms. Basel signed their letters was in late July or late August, it appears more likely that Respondent, in acceding to his wife's wishes to get these letters signed, did not delay in performing this task. It also appears less likely, for reasons discussed below, that Ms. Basel would have backdated such a letter in late August after Respondent's difficulties had surfaced. Mr. Scheiner did not testify to any discomfort in backdating the letter, but Mr. Mets and Ms. Basel testified that they felt discomfort at signing their letters. The most obvious objective distinction between Mr. Scheiner, on the one hand, and Mr. Mets and Ms. Basel, on the other hand, is that Mr. Scheiner believes that his continued employment with the District is already in doubt. This distinction is important in evaluating the testimony of Mr. Mets on this point and Ms. Basel on this and other points. Respondent had been the sponsor of all three of these employees, and they may reasonably have felt that their future with the District was tied to Respondent. Mr. Mets is near retirement. He is also understandably irritated at Respondent because Mr. Mets left his former, higher-paying job at the Port in reliance upon Respondent's unfulfilled promise to raise his pay with the District within a reasonable time after the commencement of his employment. Although Mr. Mets proved a credible witness in many regards, his testimony concerning discomfort at backdating the letter was unpersuasive. Ms. Basel suffers obvious anxiety concerning her continued employment with the District. She eagerly treated her obligation to testify as an opportunity to display her fealty to the District, which had already conducted an unsuccessful investigation against her for improperly requesting leave. Ms. Basel never harmonized her decision to join Respondent at the District with her portrayal of him as an easily angered supervisor. It is impossible to credit her proffered justification that Respondent had told her that he had changed; it is unlikely that she would ever work again with the overbearing man whom she describes. Ms. Basel's claims that Respondent intimidated her at work is also impossible to harmonize with her close relationship with Respondent and his wife and Ms. Basel's frequent expressions of loyalty toward Respondent--prior, of course, to his current difficulties with the District. Ms. Basel's lack of credibility undermines her testimony of intimidation, as well as her unsupported testimony concerning a couple of occasions on which Respondent, in her opinion, asked her to do campaign tasks on District time and property. One of her two recollections of conducting political business on District time and property involved her playing back a message from a District telephone answering machine and finding that someone had called Respondent to confirm a meeting and that a check--presumably a campaign contribution--was in the mail. Petitioner did not offer any evidence that Respondent conducted political business in connection with the call--only that someone, presumably a campaign supporter, had called Respondent at work. From the lack of evidence concerning other such recorded messages, this would appear to have been an isolated incident over which Respondent had no control. In any event, Ms. Basel's testimony on this matter does not suggest that Respondent conducted political business on District time or property. The other incident lacks detail. Ms. Basel testified that Respondent directed Ms. Basel to call a union president to get the union's support and 20 minutes later asked her if she had done so. Ms. Basel's evident desire to assist Petitioner's case inspires no confidence in the existence or details of the brief statements from Respondent or the duration of the interval between the two statements, so as to preclude the possibility of an intervening break, during which Ms. Basel would not be on District time. However, the Administrative Law Judge credits Ms. Basel's emphatic denial that she ever did any political work for Respondent on District time or property. But her testimony fails to establish that Respondent conducted political business on District time or property. To the contrary, given Ms. Basel's obvious motivation to protect her job and her close proximity to Respondent, the absence of testimony from Ms. Basel concerning any substantiated incidents or even more unsubstantiated incidents suggest that Respondent did not conduct political business on District time or property. Respondent's purpose in attending the August 3 breakfast meeting is difficult to characterize, but the meeting did not take place on District time or property. Respondent claims that he viewed Mr. Harper merely as a disgruntled vendor, but this claim accounts for only a small part of Respondent's motivation in meeting with Mr. Harper. Respondent testified that he knew that Mr. Harper was trying to prevent other persons from supporting Respondent's bid for a seat on the Port Commission, so the possibility of a political purpose exists. However, Respondent also testified that he returned from vacation to find that Mr. Malone had settled the District's disputes with Square Yard at a meeting in July during which the District agreed to pay Square Yard about $43,000 on unpaid invoices and to try to give half of all future vinyl flooring work to Square Yard. As noted below, the omission of any mention of the $387,000 in overpayments is probably due to the fact that the District had already decided, or was in the process of deciding, not to pursue any overpayments. In fact, as Mr. Malone testified, he had negotiated this settlement at the direction of Superintendent Johnson, who misrecalled that Superintendent Marlin had decided to pay Square Yard $43,000 (a decision that, if Superintendent Johnson's recollection were accurate, would have inexplicably gone unimplemented until five months into Superintendent Johnson's tenure). Given these circumstances, Respondent, in an abundance of caution, might want to appease a person who had such apparent influence with Mr. Malone and Superintendent Johnson, just in case Respondent were not successful in his Port Commission election. Commissioner Robinson facilitated the August 3 breakfast meeting. He asked Mr. Harper to state his concerns. Mr. Harper blamed Respondent for certain problems of Square Yard with the Port of Palm Beach and the District. Respondent explained what he was doing at the Port and that, while with the District, he was merely following orders. Clearly addressing District business, Respondent also emphasized the internal controls that the District had recently implemented and underscored the importance of vendor compliance with these controls. None of the three men discussed Respondent's political campaign. While dealing with Mr. Harper's concerns about the District, Respondent showed him copies of a draft audit, as revised through October 25, 2000, and June 8, 2001, with Mr. Mets' response dated August 2, 2001. Commissioner Robinson asked Respondent if this was public record, and Respondent replied that it was because it had been brought to the attention of the District. Mr. Harper asked for a copy of these documents, and Respondent gave him one. Respondent did not give Mr. Harper copies of other documents, such as the November 10, 2000, unfinished legal memorandum. Mr. Harper likely obtained a copy of this document at the breakfast meeting from Respondent's files, perhaps due to the inadvertent shuffling of papers in the large stack that Respondent had brought with him to the meeting. The key question in this case is whether Respondent improperly supplied Mr. Harper with copies of the draft audits. Respondent testified that he believed that the audit had been completed because Mr. Malone had settled all pending disputes while Respondent had been on vacation. Respondent testified that he knew that the formal audit had been delayed from last fall, but Respondent testified that he thought that the delay was occasioned by the District's investigation during the first half of 2001 of Mr. Chiu for the possible conducting of a lichee nut business for his brother while on District time. Mr. Mets testified that Mr. Chiu told him on August 2, 2001, that Mr. Chiu had discussed the June 8 draft audit with some, but not all, members of the School Board. Evidently based on this discussion, the School Board had decided, according to Mr. Mets' testimony of his conversation with Mr. Chiu, not to pursue the overpayments to Square Yard. This testimony is largely credited. If the School Board could agree not to pursue the overpayments, the discussion with Mr. Chiu must have been more detailed than a mere briefing or updating. On the same day, after his conversation with Mr. Chiu, Mr. Mets told Respondent that Mr. Chiu had explained that the District was not able to pursue any 1995-99 overpayments because of the District's failures in documentation and internal controls and that Mr. Chiu wanted to close the matter promptly. Mr. Mets also told Respondent that Mr. Chiu had told Mr. Mets that Mr. Chiu had discussed the audit in detail with four members of the School Board and intended to discuss the audit in detail with the other three members by the end of the week. Mr. Mets added that the four members had agreed the District could not pursue any overpayments. Two District attorneys have consistently opined that otherwise-confidential audit materials lose their confidential status when distributed to members of the School Board or Audit Committee. One of the attorneys had concluded on June 19, 2001, not to pursue any overpayments for the reasons stated above and had instructed Mr. Chiu to bring the matter to a conclusion. Immediately after obtaining the documents from Respondent, Mr. Harper gave them to his attorney, who promptly returned them to Mr. Harris due to his concern that the release of the documents had been improper. In his cover letter, Mr. Harper's attorney strongly suggested that Respondent's delivery of the materials to Mr. Harper was improper and if the current administration (apparently of Superintendent Johnson) intended to correct the mistakes of the preceding administration, it had better do so quickly, or else its successor would correct those mistakes. On August 15, 2001, Mr. Malone summoned Respondent, falsely telling him that they needed to discuss a school maintenance matter. Mr. Malone prepared the ruse so that Respondent could not prepare untrue responses to the questions that Mr. Malone intended to ask Respondent. At the meeting, when shown some of the documents that Mr. Harper's attorney had sent to the District, Respondent told Mr. Malone that he had met with Mr. Harper, but the meeting had not been political in nature, and that he had given Mr. Harper some of the documents, but not all of them. A later disagreement arose between Mr. Harper and Respondent concerning what Respondent said at the August 15 meeting, but the discrepancies are not material. One week after the meeting, Mr. Malone recommended that the District Department of Professional Standards investigate the entire matter. Mr. Malone suggested that the investigators take testimony under oath because some of the apparent violations were criminal. The Director of the District Department of Professional Standards referred the entire matter to the District police department for investigation. Two District police department detectives interviewed witnesses, including Respondent on August 30, 2001. During his interview, despite being under oath, Respondent three times denied that he had asked Mr. Mets, Mr. Scheiner, and Ms. Basel to backdate their "July 5" letters. Immediately after the conclusion of the interview, Respondent told his attorney, who had accompanied him at the interview, of the misstatements and that he wanted to correct the record immediately. A short delay ensued because Respondent and his attorney had been instructed to go elsewhere immediately after the interview and did so. However, within 20 minutes after the conclusion of the interview, Respondent and his attorney caused the detectives to reconvene the interview, so that Respondent could correct his misstatement about backdating the "July 5" letters. At the reconvened interview, Respondent admitted to asking the three employees to backdate their letters. No evidence suggests that Respondent's 20-minute delay in admitting to the backdating request materially delayed Petitioner's investigation. After examining the facts of the case, the School Board voted on November 20, 2001, to terminate Respondent's contract, effective 15 days later, rather than not renew it when it expired on June 30, 2002. The charges that engendered this case are that Respondent disclosed confidential materials to Mr. Harper and that he did so for personal gain. Respondent gave Mr. Harper copies of two draft audit reports, but they were no longer confidential because Mr. Chiu had already discussed in detail the findings of his audit with a majority of the members of the School Board. The evidence suggests that Mr. Chiu did so to obtain the approval of the School Board to resolve its long- pending overpayment issue with Square Yard. The evidence fails to establish that Respondent gave Mr. Harper a copy of the other materials. As for the November 10, 2000, unfinished legal memorandum, this document was no longer confidential because, in June or no later than July 2001, the District had decided not to pursue possible overpayments to Square Yard. If the materials were no longer confidential, the motivation of Respondent in delivering them, during a breakfast meeting not on District time or property, loses its importance. Undoubtedly, Respondent was dealing with a disgruntled vendor, as Respondent claims. Undoubtedly, Respondent's underlying motivation was a mixture of concern for his political campaign and for his present job situation; mollifying Mr. Harper could help Respondent in both regards. Nor has Petitioner proved misconduct impairing Respondent's effectiveness in his handling of the three "July 5" letters. The record does not sustain the allegation that Respondent coerced or intimidated any of the three employees into backdating these letters. The letters themselves are not legally required documents, nor are they even significant documents. These letters are self-, or, if Respondent's testimony were credited, ally-serving documents whose effectiveness is undermined by their transparency. They have the force and effect of birthday cards. Backdating these ineffective documents inspires little confidence in Respondent's mental acuity or at least in his assessment of the mental acuity of those around him. At best, undisclosed backdating is a precarious practice, and Respondent's claim that backdating is prevalent in the District is beside the point. However, the insubstantiality of the letters themselves reduces their backdating to a meaningless self-indulgence. The closest issue in the case is Respondent's dishonest denial, under oath, that he had the three employees backdate the "July 5" letters. The insubstantiality of the letters themselves is irrelevant to this issue, which raises the question of Respondent's honesty. Respondent knew that he had asked the employees to backdate these letters, and he denied under oath doing so. The proper characterization of this incident does not permit consideration of Respondent's intention to protect his employees or Petitioner's failure to advise Respondent that he was under criminal investigation; these factors are entirely irrelevant. However, the proper characterization of this incident requires consideration of Respondent's near-immediate correction of his misstatement. The 20-minute delay arose due to logistics, not any delay on Respondent's part after the conclusion of the interview. Respondent had not expected questions concerning the "July 5" letters, nor, in retrospect, should he reasonably have expected such questions. When asked about the letters, Respondent panicked and denied three times that he had asked the employees to backdate them. The fairer characterization of this incident is that Respondent immediately corrected his admittedly intentional misstatements, rather than made the misstatements and later recanted. Not Respondent's most shining moment, his lapse from honesty, which obviously never impaired Petitioner's investigation, was short-lived to the point of being momentary, was not so serious as to impair Respondent's effectiveness in the school system, and factually did not rise to the level of misconduct constituting just cause for his termination. These findings do not imply acceptance of Respondent's assertion, in his proposed recommended order, that the "only plausible explanation" for Respondent's termination was Superintendent Johnson's desire to remove Respondent. This is a oversimplification and distortion of the facts of this case. Superintendent Johnson renewed Respondent's contract hardly one month prior to the August 3 breakfast meeting. Although Superintendent Johnson clearly wanted Respondent out of the position of Chief Operating Officer, he displayed no desire to terminate Respondent's employment with the District. From Superintendent Johnson's perspective, Respondent's August 3 meeting with Mr. Harper was ill-timed. The District had just worked out the long-pending dispute between it and Square Yard by paying $43,000 to the company and promising it more business. Superintendent Johnson's misrecollection--corrected by Mr. Malone--that Superintendent Marlin had decided on the $43,000 payment suggests the sensitivity of this matter. For nearly nine months, many persons within the District, and probably a number of persons outside of the District, had credited Mr. Chiu's preliminary findings that Square Yard owed the District over $2 million in overpayments-- an attractive receivable in times of tight revenues. This dramatic preliminary finding left a more lasting impression than the more thorough findings that the overpayments were less than $400,000, poor District recordkeeping during the earlier period in question precluded reliable findings of any additional overpayments, and poor District recordkeeping concerning even the $400,000 in claimed overpayments probably precluded their proof in a civil action for damages. The letter from Mr. Harper's attorney exacerbated the situation for Superintendent Johnson, who testified that the matter was serious because the attorney took it seriously and, if the District took no action after receiving such notification from an officer of the court, the District would leave itself vulnerable to later recriminations. The subsequent discovery of Respondent's requests for his employees to backdate the "July 5" letters and, worse, his momentary lying under oath, even though concerning tangential matters, made it much more difficult for Superintendent Johnson to coordinate public perceptions with the reality of the Square Yard matter. On this record, the reality of the Square Yard matter is that poor District recordkeeping and internal controls--since corrected--meant that the Square Yard might have been entitled to $43,000 on past-due invoices and future District business, rather than that the District was owed hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars in overpayments.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Palm Beach County enter a final order dismissing all charges against Respondent and awarding him back pay for the period from the date on which he was suspended without pay through the end of the term of his present contract. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ____ ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Arthur C. Johnson, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard, C316 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869 Honorable Charlie Crist Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Alan M. Aronson, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Elaine Johnson James, Esquire Edwards & Angell, LLP 1 North Clematis Street, Suite 1400 West Palm Beach, Florida 31301 Thomas L. Johnson, Esquire Chamblee, Johnson & Haynes, P.A. 215 West Verne Street, Suite D Tampa, Florida 33606 Scott N. Richardson, Esquire Atterbury, Goldberger & Richardson, P.A. 250 Australian Avenue, Suite 1400 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue Introduction. 21 The Parties. 21 General Description of Monroe County 22 The Monroe County Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan 24 The Original Comprehensive Plan. 24 The Remedial Comprehensive Plan. 25 Area of Critical State Concern Review 27 The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. 27 Area of Critical State Concern Review of the Remedial Plan. 28 The DCA Proposed Rules 31 Challenges to the DCA Proposed Rules 33 The Administration Commission Proposed Rules . 34 Challenges to the Administration Commission Proposed Rules 36 The Final Order in the DCA and Administration Commission Proposed Rules Challenge Cases. 36 The Department's Review Pursuant to the Act. 38 Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes 38 The Department's Review. 39 Impact of the Area of Critical State Concern Review on the Department's Review Under the Act. 40 Challenge to the Remedial Plan Pursuant to the Act by the Intervenors 41 Carrying Capacity: The Cornerstone of Monroe County Remedial Plan. 42 Carrying Capacity as a Planning Tool 42 Monroe County's Carrying Capacity Analysis 44 The Settlement Agreement's Reference to a Carrying Capacity Analysis 45 Monroe County's Application of the Carrying Capacity Analysis. 46 Hurricane Evacuation Carrying Capacity 47 Environmental Carrying Capacity. 48 The Department's Review of Monroe County's General Acceptance of a Carrying Capacity Approach 49 Monroe County's Environment. 49 The Unique Environmental Character of the Florida Keys 49 General Habitat Types in the Florida Keys. 51 Upland Habitat Types 53 Wetland and Transitional Wetland Habitat Types. 55 Marine Habitat Types 59 The National Marine Sanctuary. 63 The Upper, Middle and Lower Keys 64 Areas of Critical County Concern 66 Ohio Key 67 Coupon Bight 67 Species of Special Concern 68 The Florida Key Deer 68 Marine Turtles 72 The Impacts of Development on the Environment of the Florida Keys. 72 A Brief History of Development in the Florida Keys 72 The Impact of Development on Water Quality and Marine Resources 73 The Impact of Development on Coral Reefs 79 The Impact of Development on Seagrasses. 80 The Impacts of Boating 80 The Impacts of Docks and Marinas 82 The Impacts of Development on Wetlands and Transitional Wetlands. 83 The Impact of Development on Mangroves 85 The Impact of Development on Beach Berm. 85 The Impact of Development on Hammocks. 86 The Impact of Development on Offshore Islands. 87 The Impact of Development on North Key Largo . 88 The Impact of Development on Ohio Key. 88 The Impact of Development on Key Deer and Big Pine Key 89 The Impact of Development on Coupon Bight. 92 The Impact of Development on Marine Turtles. 92 The Florida Keys' Environmental Carrying Capacity 92 Monroe County's Conclusion 92 The Carrying Capacity of the Nearshore Waters and Seagrasses. 94 The Carrying Capacity of the Coral Reefs of the Florida Keys. 98 The Carrying Capacity of Offshore Islands. 98 The Carrying Capacity of North Key Largo, Ohio Key and Coupon Bight. 99 The Carrying Capacity of the Key Deer and Big Pine Key 101 The Need to Maximize Measures to Protect Other Environmental Features of the Florida Keys Environment 103 Sewage Treatment Systems 104 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 104 The Department's Review Under the Act. 107 Intervenor Challenges. 108 Maintenance vs. Improvement. 109 Delay of the Adoption of the Master Plan 110 The Interim Levels of Service. 112 Cesspool Inspection Program. 117 Disturbed and Undisturbed Wetlands 117 Stormwater Treatment. 118 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 118 The Department's Review Under the Act. 119 Intervenor Challenges. 119 Delay of the Adoption of the Master Plan 120 Impact on Water Quality. 121 The Interim Levels of Service. 121 Marine Resources 121 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 121 The Department's Review Under the Plan 124 Intervenor Challenges. 125 Adequacy of Living Marine Resource Protections. 127 Moored/Anchored Vessels, Marinas and Docks. 128 Provisions of the Remedial Plan Impacting Moored/Anchored Vessels. 128 Provisions of the Remedial Plan Impacting Marines. 128 Provisions of the Remedial Plan Impacting Docks. 129 The Department's Review Under the Act. 131 Intervenor Challenges. 133 F Residential Docks. 135 G. Perpendicular Docks. 136 Canals 137 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 137 The Department's Review Under the Act. 138 Intervenor Challenges. 138 Wetlands. 139 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 139 The Department's Review Under the Act. 140 Intervenor Challenges. 140 Disturbed Wetlands 141 Setbacks 141 Provisions in the Remedial Plan. 141 The Department's Review Under the Plan 142 Intervenor Challenges. 143 The Justification for Setbacks 143 "No Net Loss" of Wetlands 145 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 145 The Department's Review Under the Act. 145 Intervenor Challenges. 146 On-Site Mitigation vs. Off-Site Mitigation 147 ACCC: Big Pine Key, North Key Largo and Ohio Key. 148 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 148 The Department's Review Under the Act. 151 Intervenor Challenges. 152 Big Pine Key; Protection of the Key Deer 154 North Key Largo. 155 Miscellaneous Environmental Provisions. 156 Freshwater Lenses. 156 Open Space Requirements for Hammocks 157 Public Access to Beaches 158 Public Expenditures in the Coastal Zone. 159 Natural Heritage and Park Program. 160 Protection of Upland Vegetation. 161 Clustering 161 Hurricane Evacuation Carrying Capacity. 162 Hurricanes 162 Preparation for Hurricanes 165 The Potential Impacts of Hurricanes on the Florida Keys 167 Evacuation and Refuges of Last Resort 169 Monroe County's Hurricane Evacuation Provisions 172 The Department's Review of Monroe County's Hurricane Evacuation Response in Objective 101.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175 Intervenor Challenges. 177 Alleged Worthlessness of Undeveloped Property and Impact on Taxes. 179 Hurricane Evacuation Clearance Time Calculations 180 The Reasonableness of the Estimated Clearance Time Calculations. 187 Sham Device and Reasonableness of Monroe County's Hurricane Evacuation Goals. 189 Hurricane Shelters 191 The Board of County Commissioner's Meeting of May 4, 1991 198 The Administration Commission's Policy 216.1.19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 The Permit Allocation System 200 Monroe County's Decision to Employ a Permit Allocation System. 200 Provisions of the Remedial Plan Adopting the Permit Allocation System 203 Monroe County's Method of Allocating Allowable Growth Under the Permit Allocation System. 205 The Department's Review of the Permit Allocation System Under the Act. 210 The Department's Review of the Point System Under the Act. 210 Intervenor Challenges to the Permit Allocation System. 216 General Challenges to the Point System 216 Intervenor Challenges to Policies 101.5.4 and 101.5.5. 217 The Number of Permits and Subareas 218 The General Challenges to the Permit Allocation System 219 General Challenges to Policies 101.5.4 and 101.5.4. 222 Negative Points for Habitat, Habitat of Critical Concern and Species 222 Protected Species Habitat Map. 228 Coastal High Hazard Areas. 228 Platted Subdivisions 229 Affordable Housing 229 Transportation Levels of Service 229 Commercial Infill, and the Existence of Infrastructure 230 Points for TDRs. 230 Offshore Islands, Conservation Lands and Historic/Archaelogical Resources 232 Transferable Development Rights Program 233 The Current Transferable Development Rights Program. 233 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 233 The Department's Review Under the Act. 236 D Intervenor Challenges. 238 E. Sender vs. Receiver Sites. 239 Land Use Categories. 242 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 242 The Department's Review Under the Act. 243 Intervenor Challenges. 247 D. Policies 101.4.1 and 101.4.2 248 Maintenance of Community Character and Protection of Environmental Resources. 248 Residential Medium Land Use Category 249 Mixed Use/Commercial and Mixed Use/Commercial Fishing. 249 Disturbed Wetlands 251 Height Limitation. 251 The Future Land Use Map Series. 252 The Future Land Use Map Series Adopted by Monroe County 252 The Department's Review Under the Act. 252 Intervenor Challenges. 253 Are the Future Land Use Maps in Compliance With the Act 254 Vested Rights. 255 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 255 The Department's Review Under the Act. 256 Intervenor Challenges. 258 Definition of Vested Rights. 258 Limited Application of Land Development Regulations to Property with Vested Rights 259 Miscellaneous Provisions of the Remedial Plan 260 Non-Residential Development. 260 The Monroe County Land Authority 263 Transient Residential Unit Moratorium. 264 Nonconforming Uses 266 The Coastal High Hazard Area 268 The Post-Disaster Redevelopment Plan 269 Siting Public Facilities 270 Intergovernmental Coordination 272 The County Geographic Information System 275 Public Expenditures for Services and Infrastructure 275 Affordable Housing 276 L. Goal 101 276 Roadway Improvements 277 Solid Waste Level of Service 278 Proposed Widening of U.S. Highway 1 on Big Pine Key 279 Public Participation 280 Capital Improvements 280 Monroe County's Commitment to Funding the Remedial Plan. 282 Monroe County's Determination of the Economic Impact Consequences of the Remedial Plan and Its Response Thereto 282 The Department's Review of Monroe County's Commitment to Funding the Remedial Plan. 284 Intervenor Challenges. 286 Monroe County's Lack of Commitment to Funding the Remedial Plan. 286 The Justification for Funding Assistance 287 Policy 1, as Modified by the Department and Policy 4 as Adopted by the Administration Commission are in Compliance with the Act. 288 Compliance with the State and Regional Plans. 291 The State Comprehensive Plan 291 The South Florida Regional Planning Council Policy Plan. 292 Constitutional Taking. 293
Conclusions For Petitioner, the Department of Community Affairs: Stephanie M. Gehres Assistant General Counsel David J. Russ Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2796 Overseas Highway, Suite 212 Marathon, Florida 33050 For Respondent, Monroe County: Robert C. Apgar, Esquire David A. Theriaque, Esquire Apgar, Pelham, Pfeiffer & Theriaque 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 For Intervenor, 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc.: Richard Grosso, Legal Director 1000 Friends of Florida Civil Law Clinic Shepard Broad Law Center NOVA Southeastern University 3305 College Aveneue Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33314 For Intervenors, Henry Lee Morgenstern and Florida Wildlife Federation: David J. White, Esquire National Wildlife Federation 1401 Peachtree Street, Northeast Suite 240 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 For Intervenor, Friends of the Everglades, Inc.: Nancy Carroll Brown, President Friends of the Everglades, Inc. 9220 Southwest 166th Street Miami, Florida 33157 For Intervenor, Upper Keys Citizens Association: Dagny Johnson, President Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc. 95,600 Overseas Highway Key Largo, Florida 33037 For Intervenors, George N. Kundtz and Florida Keys Citizens Coalition: Gregg Goldfarb, Esquire 19 West Flagler Street, Suite 707 Miami, Florida 33130 For Intervenor, The Wilderness Society: Debra S. Harrison Florida Keys Coordinator The Wilderness Society 8065 Overseas Highway Marathon, Florida 33050 For Intervenors, George DeCarion, et al.: James S. Mattson, Esquire Andrew M. Tobin, Esquire MATTSON & TOBIN Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES The issue in these cases is whether the remedial Monroe County Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan is "in compliance", as defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Monroe County Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan is not in compliance within the meaning of Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes, consistent with this Recommended Order. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX A Case Numbers 91-1932GM and 93-3371GM The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this Recommended Order, or the proposed findings of fact of the parties, except 1000 Friends of Florida, George N. Kundtz and the Florida Keys Citizens' Coalition and the Upper Keys' Citizens' Association, have been accepted or rejected in this Appendix A. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed findings of fact which are hereby accepted in whole or in part: 1, 9-10, 24, 26, 31-34, 43, 60, 67, 73, 75, 78, 87-88, 91, 97-100, 102-103, 107, 160, 192, 224, 231, 237, 248, 256, 282, 288, 294, 300-303, 313, 316, 331, 338, 340, 355, 376 Proposed findings of fact which are rejected in whole or in part: 2 Not a finding of fact. 108 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Monroe County's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed findings of fact which are hereby accepted in whole or in part: 3, Footnote 4, 42, 55, 93-94, 115, 125-127, 130, 173, 178, and 181. Proposed findings of fact which are rejected in whole or in part: 10 The third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 13 The second sentence to the next to last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence and the rest of the proposed finding is not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 40 The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first and last sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. "DCA" did not amend Policy 1. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and there has been no challenge to the rules that address Policy 1. 48 Not supported by the weight of the evidence and there has been no challenge to the rules that address Policy 1. 58 The last three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 133 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 138 The first two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 146 The last three sentences are not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally true, the proposed finding ignores the fact that the evidence failed to prove that the lack of action by the Service is because the key deer have not reached their carrying capacity, which is the issue in these proceedings. The first two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not relevant. 157-159 Although generally correct summaries of some testimony, these proposed findings are not relevant. 160-163 These proposed findings are generally accepted. They do not, however, justify failing to recognize that the carrying capacity of the key deer has been exceeded. Not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 170 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first and last sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 189 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 191 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 193 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 195 The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 202 The first and last sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 203 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 204 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 205 Not relevant. 205 Not relevant. DeCarion's Proposed Findings of Fact Findings of fact after number 53 have not been numbered in DeCarion's proposed order. They are referred to in this Appendix by the titles of the portion of the proposed order under which they appear. Proposed findings of fact which are hereby accepted in whole or in part: 1, 25-29, 32, 35-38 Proposed findings of fact which are rejected in whole or in part: 1 No evidence to support this proposed finding was presented. Standing was, however, stipulated to. 7-16 Although generally correct, the conclusions reached in these proposed findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 19 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 24 The first sentence is not relevant. 43-44 While these proposed findings are an accurate reflection of some of the testimony in these proceedings, the conclusions suggested by DeCarion are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 46-48 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 49-50 Not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. "Five-Year Moratorium on Hotel-Motel Construction": The second paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. "Marina Expansion Restrictions": The second paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Wilderness Society's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed findings of fact which are hereby accepted in whole or in part: 1, 7, 10, 12, 29, 34, 71-72, 81, 87, 138, 141 Proposed findings of fact which are rejected in whole or in part: 3-6 Not relevant. 73-75 Not relevant. 88-89 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 102-103 Not relevant. Not relevant. The first paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 117-130 Not relevant. 147-248 Not relevant. 154 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 159-161 Not relevant. APPENDIX B ORIGINAL AND REMEDIAL PLAN CHALLENGE CASES: CASE NUMBERS 91-1932GM AND 93-3371GM TABLE OF CONTENTS APPEARANCES. 3
The Issue The issue in this case is the amount of attorney's fees and costs Petitioner, Florida Cities Water Company, should be awarded pursuant to Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996).
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Florida Cities Water Company (hereinafter referred to as "Florida Cities"), is a utility providing water and wastewater service to two communities in Florida. Respondent, the Florida Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "PSC"), has exclusive jurisdiction over water and wastewater service utility providers in Florida, including the determination of rates that utility providers may charge for their services. Section 367.011, Florida Statutes (1995). Florida Cities' 1992 Approved Rate. In arriving at an allowable rate which a water and wastewater service utility may charge, the PSC must determine, among other things, the amount of a utility's plant that is considered "used and useful." Section 367.081(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995). In determining the amount of Florida Cities' plant that was considered "used and useful" in 1992, the PSC determined the amount of investment costs in its North Fort Myers, Florida, plant which was potentially recoverable. Recoverable costs are limited to those expenditures which are considered to be for the public benefit. Florida Cities' recoverable costs as of 1992 were determined to total $6,343,868.00. The amount of Florida Cities' recoverable costs was then multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which was the average daily flow of the plant (calculated on a peak month basis) and the denominator of which was the capacity of the plant (this fraction is hereinafter referred to as the "Capacity Ratio"). In 1992, the average daily flow of the plant on a peak month basis was determined to be in excess of 1.0 million gallons per day (hereinafter referred to as "MGD"), and the capacity of the plant was determined to be 1.0 MGD. Therefore, the Capacity Ratio was determined to be 100 percent and Florida Cities' recoverable costs of $6,343,868.00 was determined to be 100 percent "used and useful." Florida Cities' "rate base" for 1992 was, therefore, determined to be $6,343,868.00. Florida Cities' 1995 Application for Rate Increase and the PSC's Reduction of Rate Base. Subsequent to the determination of Florida Cities' rate base and its approved utility rates in 1992, Florida Cities was required by the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (then known as the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation)(hereinafter referred to as "DEP"), to expand its North Fort Myers plant. As a result of DEP's action, Florida Cities incurred additional plant costs of approximately 1.6 million dollars. As a consequence of having incurred additional plant costs, Florida Cities requested that the PSC treat the additional costs, plus other costs incurred by Florida Cities since 1992, as recoverable costs and as an addition to its rate base. Florida Cities' application was filed in 1995. After consideration of Florida Cities' application for rate increase, the PSC issued a Notice of Proposed Agency Action Order Granting Final Rates and Charges on November 2, 1995. In this order the PSC essentially determined that all additional plant expansion costs incurred by Florida Cities constituted recoverable costs. The PSC also determined that Florida Cities' Capacity Ratio was 100 percent and, therefore, all of its recoverable costs was treated as "used and useful." The decision of the PSC resulted in an increase of Florida Cities' utility rate of approximately 17.89 percent. The proposed decision of the PSC was, however, challenged and proceeded to hearing before the PSC. On September 10, 1996, the PSC entered a Final Order Denying Application for Increased Wastewater Rates, Reducing Rates, Requiring Refund and Requiring Reports (hereinafter referred to as the "PSC Final Order"). In the PSC Final Order, the PSC treated all of the 1.6 million dollars in costs associated with the expansion of the plant required by the DEP as recoverable costs. The PSC, however, reduced the Capacity Formula to 65.9 percent. This resulted in a reduction in Florida Cities' rate base of approximately 2.4 million dollars. The reduction in the Capacity Formula to 65.9 percent was caused, in part, by the manner in which the PSC determined the numerator of the Capacity Formula. The PSC modified the manner in which it calculated the numerator of the Capacity Formula: Instead of using the average daily flow calculated on a peak month basis, it used the average daily flow calculted on an annual basis (to which it added a "reserve" of 4.58 percent) . . . . The reduction in the Capacity Formula from 1992 to 1995 was also caused by the plant capacity figure used by the PSC. The PSC used a permitted capacity of 1.5 MGD instead of the actually designed and built capacity of 1.25 MGD. Florida Cities had urged use of the 1.25 MGD actual capacity figure. As a result of the PSC's conclusion that only 65.9 percent of the amount of recoverable costs was used and useful, Florida Cities' rate base was reduced to $5,525,915.00, a decrease of Florida Cities' used and useful plant as determined in 1992 of over $800,000.00. Although the PSC included the additional costs incurred by Florida Cities in order to comply with DEP regulations, the PSC's use of a Capacity Ratio of 65.9 percent to determine the amount of the recoverable costs considered used and useful had a net effect of disallowing approximately 2.4 million dollars in proposed rate base (1.6 million dollars incurred to meet DEP regulations plus the $800,000.00 reduction of 1992 rate base). Florida Cities' Appeal of the PSC's Final Order. Florida Cities appealed the PSC Final Order to the District Court of Appeal, First District (hereinafter referred to as the "First District Court"). Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D238 (Fla. 1st DCA January 12, 1998). On appeal, Florida Cities raised two grounds for reversal of the PSC's Final Order: The Capacity Ratio used by the PSC to determine the amount of its recoverable costs which was considered used and useful was flawed. Florida Cities urged the First District Court to increase its Capacity Ratio to 100 percent; and The PSC should have included all costs Florida Cities had incurred in order to comply with DEP regulations as part of its rate base without regard to the Capacity Ratio. Florida Cities argued that the 1.6 million dollars it had incurred to comply with DEP regulations should be included as part of its rate base without regard to what the Capacity Ratio was determined to be. Florida Cities' challenge to the Capacity Ratio used by the PSC was based upon two alleged errors: The PSC's use of permitted capacity of 1.5 MGD was improper. Florida Cities argued that the PSC should have used actual plant capacity of 1.25 MGD; and The method elected by the PSC to determine the average daily flow of the plant was a novel and unexplained deviation from past PSC policies. Florida Cities argued that the PSC should have continued to determine average daily flows based upon a peak month basis rather than an annual basis. As to the 1.6 million dollars in costs Florida Cities sought to have included in its rate base, Florida Cities' two arguments were alternative theories advanced to support the same end: 100 percent inclusion of the 1.6 million dollars it had incurred as a result of meeting DEP regulations. While the two arguments were interrelated with regard to the starting point (it had spent 1.6 million dollars on plant) and the result Florida Cities was attempting to achieve (inclusion of 1.6 million dollars in rate base), the two arguments involved different methods of reaching the desired result: (a) direct inclusion; or (b) inclusion through an increase in the Capacity Ratio. As to the remaining $800,000.00 reduction in Florida Cities' rate base, only one of the arguments raised by Florida Cities applied to this amount: the argument that the Capacity Ratio utilized by the PSC was flawed. The First District Court's Decision. The First District Court agreed with Florida Cities' contention that the Capacity Ratio used by the PSC was flawed. The First District Court found that both the calculation of the numerator and the denominator of the Capacity Ratio by the PSC was in error. With regard to the numerator, the First District Court concluded that the PSC's determination of average daily flows by using annual flows constituted a shift in agency policy which was "'unsupported by expert testimony, documentary opinion, or other evidence appropriate to the nature of the issue involved.'" The First District Court remanded the matter to the PSC to "give a reasonable explanation, if it can, supported by record evidence (which all parties must have an opportunity to address) as to why average daily flow in the peak month was ignored." With regard to the denominator, the First District Court opined that "no competent evidence of any substance supports the PSC's determination" of plant capacity. The First District Court concluded that the denominator should be 1.25 MGD. The First District Court rejected Florida Cities' contention that amounts it had expended to comply with DEP regulations should be included in its rate base without regard to the Capacity Ratio. The First District Court concluded that the 1.6 million dollars spent to comply with DEP regulations could be included in rate base "only to the extent the improvements they effect or the facilities to which they relate are 'used and useful in the public service.'" The ultimate impact of the First District Court's decision depends upon what action the PSC takes on remand with regard to determine the appropriate numerator for the Capacity Formula. The PSC issued an Order of Remand on April 14, 1998. In the Order of Remand, the PSC indicated its position that the decision of the First District Court regarding flows was "an invitation" to take additional testimony and evidence on the issue. The PSC, therefore, reopened the record and scheduled a second evidentiary hearing to determine how average daily flows should be calculated. Florida Cities filed a Motion to Stay the PSC's second evidentiary hearing, pending resolution of an appeal of the PSC Order of Remand. Until a final determination is made concerning the intent of the First District Court in remanding the matter to the PSC, it cannot be absolutely concluded what the "result obtained" in this case will be. The parties have, however, assumed for purposes of the matter that the Capacity Ratio should be approximately 98.6 percent. That is the best "result" which can be obtained by Florida Cities in this matter. Florida Cities' Motion for Attorney's Fees. As part of its appeal, Florida Cities also filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees. Florida Cities sought an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). In particular, Florida Cities requested that the First District Court: Grant attorneys [sic] fees to Appellant for this appeal; Remand this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings to determine attorneys fees; and Grant such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate. The First District Court entered the following order on Florida Cities' Motion for Attorney's Fees: The motion by appellant for attorney's fee is granted. If the parties are unable to agree on an amount of attorney's fees, the question should be referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Parties' Effort to Agree. Florida Cities submitted copies of invoices to the PSC documenting the attorney's fees and costs incurred by it in connection with the appeal of the PSC's Final Order. Florida Cities proposed several findings of fact, which are hereby accepted by reference, relating to the manner in which it determined attorney's fees and costs. Those findings of fact include paragraphs 27 through and including 32. The PSC reviewed the invoice copies submitted by Florida Cities and stipulated and agreed that the number of hours and the hourly rates attributable to the appeal of the PSC Final Order were reasonable. The parties stipulated that the total amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred by Florida Cities on the appeal of the PSC Final Order amounted to $74,648.14. On March 18, 1998, the PSC and Florida Cities filed a Joint Petition for Resolution of Attorney's Fees with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties stipulated in the joint petition that they had negotiated in good faith but were unable to agree on the amount of attorney's fees which should be paid to Florida Cities. The parties stipulated and agreed that $74,648.14 is the appropriate lodestar figure. The parties were unable to agree, however, whether the lodestar figure should be adjusted in light of the "results obtained" by Florida Cities on appeal. Therefore, consistent with the order of remand from the First District Court, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the limited purpose of determining whether the agreed upon lodestar figure of $74,648.14 should be reduced based upon the "results obtained" by Florida Cities on appeal. The "Result Obtained" on Appeal. On appeal, Florida Cities argued that it was entitled to a total increase in its rate base of approximately 2.4 million dollars: (a) the 1.6 million dollars it expended to comply with DEP regulations; and (b) the $800,000.00 reduction in rate base which resulted from the PSC's modification of the Capacity Ratio. In effect, Florida Cities argued that it should be allowed to treat 100 percent of its recoverable costs as its rate base. As a result of the First District Court's decision and assuming a Capacity Ratio of 98.6 percent will be achieved, Florida Cities was successful on appeal in increasing its rate base by approximately 2.2 million dollars. Of this amount, approximately $879,000.00 was attributable to the First District Court's conclusion that the PSC had used the incorrect plant capacity. The remaining 1.3 million dollars was attributable to the First District Court's conclusion that the methodology used by the PSC to determine average annual daily flows was a policy change which was unsupported by the record. Had Florida Cities succeeded on both issues it raised on appeal, it would not have resulted in any appreciable increase in Florida Cities' rate base over the increase in rate base allowed by the First District Court. A utility plant cannot be treated as used and useful in excess of 100 percent of its costs. The two issues Florida Cities raised on appeal, at least as to the 1.6 million dollars it was required to expend to meet DEP regulations, were alternative theories for achieving the same result: total inclusion of the 1.6 million dollars in its rate base. Florida Cities contended that the 1.6 million dollars should have been included directly in its rate base because it was required to make the expenditure by a government agency. In the alternative, it argued that the Capacity Ratio used to determine the amount of recoverable costs considered used and useful should have been increased to 100 percent. This alternative argument would also have resulted in inclusion of the 1.6 million dollars in its rate base. Regardless of which argument was accepted by the First District Court or whether the First District Court had accepted both arguments, Florida Cities could not have achieved any substantially greater result than it did. As to the remaining $800,000.00 reduction in 1992 rate base, Florida Cities' argument concerning the direct inclusion of amounts required to be expended to comply with DEP regulations did not relate to this amount. Only Florida Cities' two-pronged argument concerning the Capacity Ratio supported Florida Cities' argument that its rate base should be increased by this amount. Florida Cities' arguments concerning this amount was successful. I. The Consequences of Florida Cities' Failure to Prevail on All Issues. Had Florida Cities prevailed in its contention that costs incurred as the result of meeting government requirements should be included directly in rate base, such a decision would have had significant consequences to most, if not all, utilities in Florida. Such a decision would also have probably had an impact on future rates approved for Florida Cities. Having failed to prevail on this issue, however, prevented the application of this theory by other utilities in Florida to the determination of their rate bases and to the determination of the appropriate rate base for Florida Cities in the future. The loss of the benefit to other utilities and Florida Cities in future rate cases, which would have occurred had Florida Cities prevailed, did not have any impact on the "results obtained" by Florida Cities in the immediate proceedings. While the failure of the argument and the avoidance of the impact on rate-making, which would have resulted had Florida Cities prevailed, was of great consequence to the PSC, the rejection of the argument by the First District Court did not reduce the result Florida Cities hoped to have obtained on appeal. J. Attorney's Fees and Costs of Proceedings Before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Florida Cities incurred attorney's fees and costs in the instant proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Florida Cities has sought recovery of those fees and costs. The parties have not agreed upon the appropriateness of the inclusion of such fees and costs. Mr. Schiefelbein acted as lead counsel during the attorney's fees phase of this matter. As of April 23, 1998, four days before the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Cities had incurred the following attorney's fees during the attorney's fees phase of this matter: Attorney Hourly Rate Total Fees Mr. Schiefelbein $150.00 $6,135.00 Mr. Gatlin $175.00 490.00 Ms. Cowdery $150.00 37.50 Total $6,662.50 It was estimated that an additional 22 hours of Mr. Shiefelbein's time would result in an additional $3,300.00 of fees attributable to completion of the attorney's fees phase of this proceeding "through a Final Order of the Administrative Law Judge." This estimate was based upon 4 hours for witness preparation, 4 hours for other hearing preparation, 4 hours to attend the hearing, and 10 hours for review of the hearing transcript and submittal of a proposed order. The hourly rate charged by counsel for Florida Cities for the attorney's fees phase of this proceeding was reasonable and a combined total of 66 hours to complete this phase of the proceeding was a reasonable number of hours to pursue this matter. Mr. Melson, an expert witness for Florida Cities in this proceeding, charged $220.00 per hour for his preparation for and attendance at the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings. Mr. Melson spent 2.6 hours preparing for the hearing and 2.5 hours attending the hearing. Mr. Melson's fee amounted to $1,122.00. Mr. Seidman, another expert witness for Florida Cities, charged an hourly rate of $90.00 and spent 20.75 hours in preparing for and attending the hearing. It was stipulated that Mr. Seidman's total fee of $1,867.50 was reasonable. Although Florida Cities did not argue that all fees and costs incurred by it during the attorney's fees phase of this proceeding should be recovered, it did seek recovery of the foregoing fees and costs. Those fees and costs totaled $12,952.00.
The Issue Whether the Respondent violated Subsection 112.3145(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1996 Supp.), by failing to file a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, within 30 days of her appointment to the Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council and/or Subsection 112.3145(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), by failing to timely file her 1997 CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented, the following findings of fact are made: The Respondent, Betty Burney, was appointed to the Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council on October 16, 1996, for a term expiring October 1, 1998. The Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council is a broad-based agency that is authorized by Section 186.504, Florida Statutes. The Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council has two primary statutory responsibilities: (1) reviewing local government comprehensive plans under Section 163.3174, Florida Statutes; and (2) coordinating the developments of regional impact process under Section 380.06, Florida Statutes. Both of these activities are land planning responsibilities. The Respondent, as a member of the Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council, held a public position and, as such, was subject to the requirements of Subsection 112.3145(l)(a), Florida Statutes. As a member of the Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council, the Respondent was required to file a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, within 30 days of her appointment. The Respondent was specifically advised of the requirement to file a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, within 30 days in her appointment letter. In addition, the Executive Director of the Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council reviewed this requirement with the Respondent in an orientation session. The disclosure required to be filed within 30 days would have been for calendar year 1995. The Respondent did not file a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, within 30 days of her appointment. The Respondent filed a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, dated April 21, 1997, for the calendar year 1996. As a member of the Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council, the Respondent was required to file a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, for the year 1997. The 1997 CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, was due to be filed by July 1, 1998, with a grace period extending to September 1, 1998. The Respondent's name was on the list of persons required to file financial disclosures provided to the Duval County Supervisor of Elections by the Ethics Commission in 1998, filings required for calendar year 1997. A CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, was mailed to the Respondent by the Duval County Supervisor of Elections for 1997. When the Respondent failed to file her financial disclosure by July 1, 1998, the Duval County Supervisor of Elections sent her a certified letter notifying her of her delinquency. The Respondent did not claim the certified letter, and never filed a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests, for the year 1997.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order and public report be entered finding that the Respondent, Betty Burney, violated Subsection 112.3145(2)(b), Florida Statutes, in the two instances alleged, and imposing a civil penalty of $2,000 for her failure to file a CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests within 30 days of her appointment to the Northeast Florida Regional Planning Council and $2,000 for her failure to file her 1997 CE Form 1, Statement of Financial Interests for a total fine of $4,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of February, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Betty Burney 2553 Soutel Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32208 Virlindia Doss, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Kaye Starling, Agency Clerk Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Philip C. Claypool, General Counsel Commission on Ethics 2822 Remington Green Circle Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
Findings Of Fact Pal-Mar has filed application No. 29454 pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, requesting approval for a surface water management system known as Phase III of Pal-Mar Water Management District, to serve approximately 3,600 acres of residential land in Martin County, Florida. The project discharges to C-44, the St. Lucie canal. SFWMD's staff report recommends approval be granted for the proposed water management system based on considerations of water quality, rates of discharge, environmental impact and flood protection. Approval is subject to certain conditions which are not material to the instant cause. As background material to the staff report, the staff makes reference to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report entitled "Survey-Review Report of Central and Southern Florida Flood Control Project, Martin County," dated September 22, 1967. The Corps of Engineers' report was not used in the decision-making process but rather was included in the staff report to provide a comprehensive overview. Whether the Corps of Engineers' plans were ever implemented would not affect the recommendations of the staff. The land in question is currently zoned "IZ" (interim zoning) according to Martin County's zoning regulations. In this category, if the neighborhood is predominantly one classification of usage, then the zoning director is to be governed by the regulations for that class of usage in determining the standard zoning regulations to be applied to the interim zoning district. If no trend of development has been established in the neighborhood, the minimum standards of the R2 single family zoning district are to be complied with. Rule 16K-4.035, Florida Administrative Code, entitled Basis of Review of Applications for Construction of Works, provides in Section (2) that all applications such as the instant one shall be reviewed in accordance with the provisions of the district's "Basis Of Review For Construction Of Surface Water Management Systems Serving Projects With Two Or More Acres Of Impervious Area Within The South Florida Water Management District - December, 1977." The Basis of Review provides in Part VI that before an application will be considered for the issuance of a permit, the proposed land use must be "compatible with the applicable zoning for the area." The evidence indicates that the land in question has a history of agricultural use. However, the evidence also discloses that far from being a trend towards agricultural use there is a trend away from it. A major portion of the neighboring lands will be devoted to Phases I, II, IV and V, of the Pal-Mar Water Management District. According to Florida Land Sales Board registrations, the land in question is subdivided into one-half acre, one acre, 1.4 acre and two acre lots. The average project density is one lot per acre. In addition, there is some mobile home usage within neighboring areas. If there is a trend, it is toward R2 zoning type usage. SFWMD's staff concluded that the proposed land use was compatible with the applicable zoning for the area. Martin County has failed to establish that such compatibility does not exist. In the Redraft of Order Permitting Change of Plan of Reclamation and Change of Name dated November 4, 1969, the Honorable C. Pfeiffer Trowbridge, Circuit Court Judge of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Martin County, observes that the Petitioner in that case (herein Pal-Mar) "permanently and irrevocably withdrew its application to drain into the St. Lucie canal thereby removing all reasons for objections" to the proceedings in Circuit Court. However, there is no evidence to indicate that there exists a prohibition against drainage into the St. Lucie canal or that Judge Trowbridge's order is intended to preclude approval of Pal-Mar's present application.
The Issue The issue in these cases is whether the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan amendments adopted through Alachua County Ordinance Number 03-05 on August 26, 2003, are "in compliance," as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Parties The Board is a local government charged with the responsibility of adopting and enforcing a comprehensive plan as provided in the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes (2003)(the "Act"). In this Recommended Order, "the Board" will refer to the elected Board of County Commissioners. "The County" will refer to Alachua County staff, as well as to the County as a litigant in these proceedings. The Department of Community Affairs is the state land planning agency with the authority to administer and enforce the Act. David and December McSherry are residents of the County, own and operate a business, and own property in the County. The McSherrys made comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the transmittal and adoption periods. The McSherrys are "affected persons" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and have standing to bring this proceeding. Dr. Adams owns property and resides in the County. Dr. Adams submitted oral and written comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the transmittal and adoption periods. Dr. Adams is an "affected person" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and has standing to bring this proceeding. Dr. Kathy Cantwell owns property and resides in the County. Dr. Cantwell submitted oral and written comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the transmittal and adoption periods. Dr. Cantwell is an "affected person" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and has standing to bring this proceeding. Holly Jensen owns property and resides in the County. Ms. Jensen submitted oral and written comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the transmittal and adoption periods. Ms. Jensen is an "affected person" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and has standing to bring this proceeding. Sierra Club, Inc., is a California nonprofit organization that advocates ecological conservation in the County through its Florida chapter and the Suwannee-St. Johns Group. Sierra Club and a substantial number of its members conduct a business in the County by maintaining a local website, raising funds, participating in governmental meetings and decisions, soliciting and obtaining membership, distributing publications, purchasing, selling and delivering merchandise and goods and services, holding conferences and meetings, maintaining local representatives, distributing information and newsletters, and organizing members and other citizens to petition the government for redress of grievances. Sierra Club provided comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the transmittal and adoption periods. Sierra Club is an "affected person" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and has associational standing to bring this proceeding. SAC is a Florida nonprofit organization that advocates ecological conservation and principles of sustainability in the County. The organization and a substantial number of its members conduct a business in the County by maintaining a local website that is a forum for local comment, raising funds, participating in governmental meetings and decisions, soliciting and obtaining membership, and distributing publications. SAC provided comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the transmittal and adoption periods. SAC is an "affected person" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and has associational standing to bring this proceeding. Each of the Jonesville Petitioners owns property and operates businesses in the County. Each of the Jonesville Petitioners provided comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the transmittal and adoption periods. The Jonesville Petitioners are "affected persons" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and have standing to bring this proceeding. PRPV is a Florida not-for-profit corporation that was created for the purpose of representing landowners of rural and agricultural land, participating with local and state government in the development of reasonable land use regulations, and protecting values of rural properties in the County. A substantial number of PRPV's members reside in, own property in, or own or operate businesses in the County. PRPV submitted oral and written comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the transmittal and adoption periods. PRPV is an "affected person" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and has associational standing to bring this proceeding. BANCF is a Florida corporation that was created for the purpose of educating and advocating on behalf of its members, who are primarily engaged in the residential and commercial construction industry in the County and who are citizens residing in, and businesses located in the County. A substantial number of BANCF's members reside in, own property in, or own or operate businesses in the County. BANCF submitted oral and written comments to the Board concerning the 2003 Amendments during the respective transmittal and adoption periods. BANCF is an "affected person" as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1), Florida Statutes (2003), and has associational standing to bring this proceeding. Background and Procedural Issues The Board adopted the Plan in 1991. In 1998, the Board adopted an Evaluation and Appraisal Report ("EAR") for the Plan. Subsection 163.3191(1), Florida Statutes (2003), requires each local government to adopt an EAR once every seven years, assessing its progress in implementing its comprehensive plan. The local government must then amend its comprehensive plan to reflect the data and analysis and recommendations in the EAR. § 163.3191(10), Fla. Stat. (2003). In August 2001, the Board adopted amendments to the Plan and transmitted them to DCA, and to the other agencies enumerated in Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-11.009(6), for review and comment. On November 30, 2001, DCA completed its review of the amendments and issued its Objections, Recommendations and Comments document (commonly referred to as an "ORC Report") to the County pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-11.010. On April 8, 2002, the Board adopted the 2002 Plan Update, addressing the objections raised in the ORC Report. By letter dated May 31, 2002, DCA notified the Board that it had completed its review of the 2002 Plan Update and determined that it met the Act's requirements for "compliance," as defined in Subsection 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003). DCA published notice of its intent to find the 2002 Plan Update in compliance in The Gainesville Sun on June 3, 2002. On June 24, 2002, PRPV and others filed a petition challenging DCA's determination that the 2002 Plan Update was in compliance. The Petition was forwarded to DOAH on July 5, 2002. BANCF was granted intervenor status, in alignment with PRPV, on July 11, 2002. On July 25, 2002, the PRPV Petitioners joined by BANCF, filed a request for mediation pursuant to Subsection 163.3189(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). On August 1, 2002, the Board filed a response agreeing to participate in mediation. In the instant proceeding, the Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners have alleged several irregularities in the mediation process. They allege that despite the requirements of Subsection 163.3184(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), regarding mediation, "the McSherry Petitioners found that they were not given adequate notices of [mediation] meetings and proposals, that the method in which the mediator ran the meetings denied them a reasonable opportunity to participate, that they were not included in negotiation meetings, and that negotiation meetings were not open to the public, and that when the public did attend meetings the public was not allowed to comment." The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners allege that they were systematically frozen out of the mediation process, which resulted in a settlement agreement favorable to PRPV and BANCF. However, the facts established at the hearing did not support these allegations. One particular complaint by the Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners is that the mediator, Robert Cambric of DCA, split the mediation into two simultaneous meetings, one on land use and one on environmental issues, making it impossible for an individual or a small group to follow all the issues under discussion. This situation did occur at one mediation session on December 12, 2002. Ms. McSherry and Dr. Adams complained about this arrangement, and it was not repeated by Mr. Cambric. Richard Drummond, the County's growth management director, testified that no agreements were reached at the December 12, 2002, sessions; rather, participants were given "homework assignments" to complete for the next mediation session. Mr. Drummond's testimony is supported by the fact that the mediation process continued for another six months after this disputed meeting. The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners were allowed to participate in the mediation sessions even before they were formally granted intervention in the underlying proceeding. No evidence was presented to establish that secret meetings were held. The evidence demonstrated that County staff, at the Board's direction, attempted to negotiate a tentative settlement. On several occasions, the Board held public meetings at which extensive public comment was elicited and during which the Board directed staff regarding its position on issues. The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners actively participated in these public meetings, and were represented at all the mediation sessions. No evidence was presented that the mediator acted less than capably and professionally during the mediation process. Mediation sessions were open to the press and public, though participation at the sessions was limited to the parties, which included the Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners. Every person who requested individual notice of mediation sessions was included on an electronic mail distribution list and received notice. The Board's meetings on the mediation were publicly noticed, and extensive public comment was taken. Beginning in December 2002, a spreadsheet matrix was circulated that outlined the positions of the County and of the PRPV Petitioners on the narrowing list of issues that remained in dispute. As the mediation entered February 2003 and the County and PRPV inched closer to settlement, it became apparent that the County's position on many issues was beginning to diverge from that of its aligned Intervenors, the Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners. Mr. Cambric, the mediator, offered to meet with Dr. Adams and Dr. Cantwell6/ in order to flesh out their issue positions for inclusion in a separate "intervenors" column of the spreadsheet matrix. On or about March 5, 2003, Mr. Cambric, Richard Drummond, and other County staff persons held the proposed meeting with Dr. Adams, Dr. Cantwell and the McSherrys. A revised matrix was circulated on March 11, 2003, that included a separate column setting forth Intervenors' position. On March 20, 2003, the matrix was further amended to add a separate column for the McSherrys, whose positions on some issues deviated from the positions of Dr. Adams, SAC, and the Sierra Club. It is clear from the documentary evidence and the testimony of various witnesses that the Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners felt a degree of betrayal in the County's reaching a settlement with PRPV. However, the evidence was insufficient to establish their allegations that they were denied adequate participation in the process. The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners contend that the driving force in the settlement of PRPV's challenge was a change in the makeup of the Board in the wake of a primary election held on September 10, 2002. The political situation in Alachua County is obviously relevant to the concerns of the parties, but is beyond the scope of this proceeding. There is no need for detailed findings of fact concerning the Board elections or the positions taken by candidates for office in the County. Finally, the Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners contend that jilted Intervenors; i.e., those who supported the County's initial litigation position in defense of the 2002 Plan Update and then opposed the Stipulated Settlement Agreement, should be allowed, by virtue of the realignment of parties pursuant to Subsection 163.3184(16)(f), Florida Statutes (2003), to step into the shoes of the original Petitioners and attack the 2002 Plan Update, as well as the 2003 Amendments. This contention was rejected at the hearing for reasons explained in the Conclusions of Law below. Extensive evidence, testimonial and documentary, was taken regarding the 2002 Plan Update. However, findings of fact concerning the 2002 Plan Update are confined to its interplay with the 2003 Amendments and to issues of internal consistency raised thereby. The Jonesville Petitioners raised procedural issues regarding the concluding phase of the mediation. On July 11, 2003, the Jonesville Petitioners filed a motion to intervene in the challenge to the 2002 Plan Update. Their concern was that the revised definition of "strategic ecosystem" in the proposed 2003 Amendments would adversely affect the value and/or development potential of their properties. At the hearing, the Jonesville Petitioners contended that they were not given adequate notice of the proposed change to the definition of "strategic ecosystem." Policy 1.1.2 of the Conservation and Aquifer Recharge Element of the 1991 Plan required the County "to provide notification to all property owners whose land use may be restricted due to proposed conservation or preservation designation in the Comprehensive Plan prior to official designation in the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan." The evidence established that the County complied with this policy, providing notice by mail in April 2003 to all owners of property proposed to be mapped as part of a "strategic ecosystem" site by the 2003 Amendments. The notice informed the property owners that their properties had been identified within the mapped areas and invited the property owners to attend one of a series of late-April 2003 informational workshops regarding the map. The Jonesville Petitioners received the mailed notices. The Board held a public hearing on approval of the Stipulated Settlement Agreement on July 15, 2003, and a public hearing on August 26, 2003, to adopt the 2003 Amendments. The Jonesville Petitioners had actual knowledge of the public hearings in July and August to approve the agreement and adopt the 2003 Amendments and were represented at those hearings. At the hearing in the instant proceeding, the Jonesville Petitioners complained that they submitted extensive site investigation reports to the Board at the July 15, 2003, demonstrating that their properties should not be considered "strategic ecosystems," but that they were allowed only three minutes to make their presentation at the hearing. There was no requirement that the Board allow lengthy, fact- intensive presentations concerning specific parcels of land during the public hearing to adopt the Stipulated Settlement Agreement. Nonetheless, the evidence established that the Jonesville Petitioners, like the other parties to the underlying litigation, would have been allowed more than three minutes had they requested it before the hearing. There was also no requirement that the County staff or the Board make a detailed response to the Jonesville Petitioners' site reports prior to the Board's adoption of the Stipulated Settlement Agreement or the 2003 Amendments. Further, as is more fully explored below in the findings as to the 2003 Amendments, the information provided by the Jonesville Petitioners was more appropriate to a land development scenario than to the large- scale comprehensive plan amendment process that the County was undertaking. In conclusion, it is found that neither the Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners nor the Jonesville Petitioners demonstrated that their procedural rights under the Act or its implementing rules were violated by the process employed by the County during the mediation and when adopting the 2003 Amendments. 2003 FLUE Amendments Gated Communities and Cul-de-Sacs FLUE Objective 1.2 in the 2002 Plan Update states: Provide for adequate future urban residential development that includes a full range of housing types and densities to serve different segments of the housing market, designed to be integrated and connected with surrounding neighborhoods and the community, with opportunities for recreation and other mixed uses within walking or bicycling distance. The 2003 Amendments included the following changes to FLUE Policy 1.2.1.17/: Residential areas shall be designed to provide for an interconnected system of internal circulation, including the provision of streets dedicated to the public connecting the residential area to the major street system. New development shall not restrict preclude public access to the development or include cul de sacs. Residential areas shall also be designed to provide for substantial interconnectivity between adjacent developments and within developments, except where such connectivity is precluded by constraints resulting from physical layout of existing development or environmental features. If connectivity is precluded by such constraints, cul de sacs may be considered for those roads subject to such constraints. The land development regulations shall detail the requirements for public access and substantial interconnectivity based on standards such as a connectivity index, maximum separations between connections to adjacent developments, and rules relative to hours, operations, and public safety considerations for any restriction of access through use of gates. FLUE Policy 1.2.1.1 was new to the 2002 Plan Update. Its purpose is to assist in discouraging urban sprawl by encouraging street connectivity, thus, moving the County away from a development pattern of isolated residential subdivisions with only one or two points of ingress/egress. Adding connectivity features allows pedestrian or bicycle travel between subdivisions and disperses the flow of vehicular traffic by providing more points of entry to arterial roads. All of the parties agreed that interconnectivity is a positive value. The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners criticize amended Policy 1.2.1.1 for failing to define "substantial interconnectivity" and, therefore, providing no meaningful standards by which to determine whether a new residential development provides "substantial interconnectivity." They point out that the policy leaves it to subsequent land development regulations ("LDRs") to define the term, but provides little guidance and essentially standardless discretion to the drafters of the LDRs. The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners' chief concern was that a lax regulatory regime could define a single connecting road as "substantial interconnectivity" and, thereby, defeat the clear intent of the policy. Similarly, they observed that Amended Policy 1.2.1.1 refers to a "connectivity index," but provides no definition or guidance as to the meaning of the term, again leaving the LDR drafters limitless discretion. The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners suggest that the seeds for lax regulation are planted in the policy through its requirement that the LDRs provide for "maximum separations between connections to adjacent developments." They argue that, if the goal is to provide for interconnected developments, then the LDRs should logically provide for minimum, not maximum, separations between connections. This argument is rejected simply as a matter of logic because providing for maximum separations in the LDRs is precisely what can ensure interconnectivity.8/ Finally, the McSherry Petitioners argue that the amended policy's allowance of gated communities is in direct contradiction to its mandate that "[n]ew development should not preclude public access to the development." They contend that LDRs providing rules for "hours, operations, and public safety considerations for any restriction of access through use of gates" would create an internal inconsistency within FLUE Policy 1.2.1.1. The County presented testimony from Richard Drummond stating that amended FLUE Policy 1.2.1.1 strengthens existing Plan provisions for interconnectivity by adding the requirement for "substantial interconnectivity," and by adding a requirement that new development not preclude public access. Robert Pennock, PRPV's expert witness on local government comprehensive planning, with an emphasis on urban sprawl, testified that the term "substantial," in the context of FLUE Policy 1.2.1.1 and in combination with other policies in the Plan, is a meaningful qualifier indicating the County's intent that its future development pattern will not be a patchwork of isolated subdivisions with a single connection to an arterial road. Mr. Pennock pointed out that a degree of common sense must be applied to the use of the term in the development of LDRs and that it must be acknowledged that the details of the LDRs will be developed by professional planners. Mr. Pennock's comments regarding common sense and good faith on the part of the regulators points out the chief flaw in the Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners' argument that a lax regulatory regime could employ the terms "substantial interconnectivity" and "connectivity index" in such a way as to allow developers to do whatever they wish. The argument fails to explain why such a hypothetical "bad regulator" could not twist the Sierra Club's favored term, "connectivity," in the same fashion. If one accepts the hypothetical premise of the "bad regulator" poised to do the bidding of residential developers regardless of any other considerations, then the text of the Plan will hardly matter; the bad regulator will find a way around the Plan's language. In fact, "substantial interconnectivity" is no more or less vague a term than "connectivity." As Mr. Pennock testified, these terms have meaning in the planning profession, and it must be accepted that the County will draft meaningful LDRs to implement FLUE Policy 1.2.1.1, including the challenged terms. In summary, the Sierra Club Petitioners did not establish that an outright ban on gated communities or cul-de- sacs is necessary for the County to have an efficient road network, meet applicable levels of service or Rule 9J-5 requirements, or that such a ban has ever been imposed elsewhere in Florida. It is at least fairly debatable that 2003 FLUE Policy 1.2.1.1 appropriately responds to the data and analysis and provides adequate guidance for development of LDRs. Clustering Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.003(14) defines "clustering" as "the grouping together of structures and infrastructure on a portion of a development site." Clustering is a planning and development technique that transfers the allowable development density onto smaller lots on a portion of the property to be developed, in a tighter development pattern, that reduces road and infrastructure costs and that sets aside the remainder of the property for conservation, agriculture, or general open space. Residential cluster development is generally promoted as a means of conserving open space, rural character, and important environmental resources in new housing developments. According to the County's "Supporting Data and Analysis for Comprehensive Plan Amendments Updating the Alachua County Comprehensive Plan: 2001-2020" (the "Data and Analysis"), clustering is a "means to protect the characteristics and features of rural areas, while allowing for rural residential lifestyles." FLUE Policy 7.2.8 of the 1991 Plan required clustering in new rural residential subdivisions with 25 or more lots and made no provision to allow clustering for smaller subdivisions. Proposed clustered developments were required to seek permits as Planned Unit Developments, a lengthy and complicated zoning process that included review by County staff, recommendations by the Board, and final approval or denial by the Board at a public hearing. Every witness who testified on the subject agreed that the clustering provision of the 1991 Plan had been a failure. Only two proposed developments have sought permits as clustered developments, and both were denied. The County approved the construction of phased subdivisions, with each phase containing fewer than 25 lots and built to the base rural density of one unit per five acres. Smaller subdivisions were designed to fall below the 25-lot threshold for clustering. Richard Drummond noted that the 1991 Plan would not allow the developer of these smaller subdivisions to cluster even if he so desired. These subdivisions tend to be platted in such a way that each lot owner also owns a small part of the natural resources found in the subdivision, complicating any efforts by the County to preserve those resources. The consensus of the expert opinion was that clustering failed because developers tend to be conservative in designing subdivisions. Clustering is a new pattern for development, and 1991 FLUE Policy 7.2.8 offered insufficient incentive to developers to take the risk of building and marketing nontraditional developments and left them the option of sizing their developments to avoid the clustering requirement. In the 2002 Plan Update, proposed FLUE Policy 6.2.9 addressed the reluctance of developers to cluster by removing their option to avoid clustering by downsizing their projects. The policy would have required clustering in all new rural residential subdivisions. The 2003 Amendments softened the policy as follows: Policy 6.2.9 Clustering The preferred design for Nnew rural residential subdivisions shall be is that they be clustered in order to protect the characteristics and features of rural areas through the following goals: Protect natural and historic resources. Support continued agricultural activities by preserving viable soils and effective land masses. Minimize land use conflicts. Provide recreational and habitat corridors through linked open space networks. Achieve flexibility, efficiency, and cost reduction in the provision of services and infrastructure. Reduce natural hazard risks to life and property. The 2003 Amendments maintain the clustering requirement for new developments containing 25 or more lots, but attempt to provide more incentives to developers to use clustering in developments of any size. 2003 FLUE Policy 6.2.10, relating to allowable density and intensity of new development, provides for a "density bonus" as follows, in relevant part: The overall development density shall not exceed the maximum gross density of one dwelling unit per five acres for the Rural/Agriculture land use category, except as a result of incentive bonuses for clustering as provided under item 4 below, subject to the resource protection standards in the Conservation and Open Space Element. These standards include the following requirements: * * * 4. As an incentive to cluster new residential subdivisions, if a new residential subdivision in the Rural/Agriculture area is clustered with a minimum of 50% of the development in open space, a total of 2 units in addition to the number of units based on the gross density of 1 unit per 5 acres are allowed, plus 1 additional unit per every 10 acres of conservation area set aside as open space; plus 1 additional unit per every 20 acres non-conservation area set aside as open space. As a further incentive, the 2003 Amendments delete the Planned Unit Development aspect of clustered subdivision approval, expediting the zoning approval process. Under the clustering provisions of the 1991 Plan, rural subdivisions with more than 25 lots were required to set aside 80 percent of their area as open space. The 2003 Amendments reduce this open space set-aside to 50 percent. Richard Drummond persuasively noted that there is no practical reduction in the set-aside, because very few people subjected themselves to the clustering requirement of the 1991 Plan. Also, the 1991 Plan expressly disclaimed any intent that the open spaces remain undeveloped in perpetuity. 2003 FLUE Policy 6.2.12.4 provides that all future development in designated open space areas is prohibited and requires the filing of a legal instrument that runs with the land establishing that the open space will be maintained and remain undeveloped in perpetuity. Conservation is the highest priority among the open space uses recognized by the 2003 Amendments' provisions on rural development. 2003 FLUE Policy 6.2.5 requires clustering for a new development of more than 25 lots, then goes on to provide that a new development of fewer than 25 lots must either cluster or employ a development plan "that assures the permanent protection of natural resources consistent with the requirements of the [COSE]." 2003 FLUE Policy 6.2.5 further provides that the LDRs will detail the requirements for "management and permanent protection of the ecological value of natural resources in those developments that are not clustered, through legally enforceable mechanisms" that provide protections equivalent to those provided in clustered subdivisions. The Sierra Club Petitioners attacked the 2003 clustering provisions as being inconsistent with the 2002 Data and Analysis, which emphasize that urban sprawl is a major threat to the County's rural agricultural landscape. The Data and Analysis indicated "a rapid rate of conversion of the rural area to allow low density development," and concluded that "the rural land character is threatened by the piece-meal development of residential uses." Sierra Club places special emphasis on a 1992 report sponsored by the American Farmland Trust, Florida's Growth Management Plans: Will Agriculture Survive?, summarized and discussed in the 2002 Data and Analysis as follows: This report noted that the degree to which rural low density residential zones are effective in conserving farmland is directly related to the minimum lot size required for each residence. The larger the minimum lot size, the more effective the zone is in conserving farmland. The current policy [in the 1991 Plan] allowing residential development on 5 acre lots in the rural area is totally ineffective, according to this report. The minimum lot sizes can be rated as follows according to their effectiveness in conserving farmland: under 4.9 acres totally ineffective 5 to 9.9 acres generally ineffective acres moderately ineffective to 20 acres moderately effective 20.1 to 40 acres generally effective over 40 acres highly effective In the six years, 1995-2000, the average numbers for single family and mobile home permits issued by lot size in unincorporated Alachua County were as follows: Less than 3 acres 162 average yearly 3 to 8 acres 182 average yearly 8 to 12 acres 72 average yearly 12 to 20 acres 35 average yearly Total 20 acres or less 511 average yearly[9/] Relying on the quoted section of the Data and Analysis, Sierra Club argues that only mandatory clustering of subdivisions in the rural area can fulfill the goal of protecting the characteristics and features of the rural area. Sierra Club correctly notes that, in adopting the 2003 Amendments, the County provided no additional data and analysis to demonstrate that the density bonuses added to the Plan would lead to clustering under 2003 FLUE Policy 6.2.9, which eliminated mandatory clustering and simply made it the "preferred design." Sierra Club contends that the County was required to offer some expert testimony to indicate that density bonuses provided in 2003 FLUE Policy 6.2.10 would actually cause landowners to choose clustering. Alternatively, Sierra Club argues that if voluntary density-bonus clustering occurred, it could lead to considerably more dwelling units in rural areas than under the 1991 Plan. For example, if a 20-acre parcel with four 5-acre lots were clustered to leave ten acres of conservation area, then a total of seven units would be permitted for the parcel: four units based on the allowed rural density of one unit per five acres; two units as a bonus for leaving 50 percent of the development in open space; and one additional unit for setting aside ten acres of conservation area. Thus, seven units would be permitted, compared with four units that would have been allowed without the bonuses, and these seven would be situated on the ten unpreserved acres on lots with an average size of 1.43 acres. Sierra Club contends that these "ranchettes" would not meet the objective of maintaining viable agriculture and of providing a separation between urban and rural land uses. Thus, Sierra Club argues that, under any view, the 2003 Amendments are inconsistent with FLUE Objective 6.1: Rural areas shall protect rural and agriculture areas in a manner consistent with the retention of agriculture, open space, and rural character, and the preservation of environmentally sensitive areas and efficient use of public services and facilities. Richard Drummond contended that it is impossible at this point to say that the 2003 Amendments dealing with incentive clustering will not work. He conceded that the density bonuses provided in 2003 FLUE Policy 6.2.10.4 could be too much or not enough, but that the only way to know is to try it in practice, then use the experience to adjust the incentives in future plan cycles. Mr. Drummond credibly testified that given the lack of clustering that occurred under the mandatory provision of the 1991 Plan, it is a virtual certainty that there will be more clustered development under the 2003 Amendments. Sierra Club's criticism that density-bonus clustering will not have a great impact on the density of development in the rural area is well taken, but beside the point. The very 2002 Data and Analysis upon which Sierra Club bases its argument notes that "rural cluster subdivisions are simply an internal transfer of density involving the same number of dwellings." In other words, the chief purpose of clustering is not to affect overall density of development, but to arrange that development on the land in a more environmentally sensitive, aesthetically pleasing way than traditional grid-style platting of lots. The density bonuses offered by the 2003 Amendments will not notably alter the overall density of rural development, but that is not their main purpose. The County hopes that the density bonuses will provide sufficient incentive for developers to avail themselves of the clustering option. The County did not dispute Sierra Club's argument that the 2002 Data and Analysis support the mandatory clustering for all new development that was adopted in the 2002 Plan Update. However, the County does contend that the 2002 Data and Analysis do not require mandatory clustering as the only way to achieve the goals of retaining the rural character and preserving the environmentally sensitive areas of rural lands. The County is correct that the 2002 Data and Analysis provides a generally positive assessment of clustering, but nowhere forces a reader to conclude that mandatory clustering is required. Even accepting the Data and Analysis suggestion that allowing residential development on five-acre lots in the rural area is "totally ineffective" in conserving farmland and that controls show some effectiveness only when the minimum lot size is increased to ten acres, the fact remains that conserving farmland is not the sole value served by the clustering provision, nor should it be the sole measure of the provision's success. In addition to farmland conservation, 2003 FLUE Policy 6.2.9 cites protection of natural and historic resources, minimization of land use conflicts, provision of recreational and habitat corridors through linked open-space networks, achievement of flexibility, efficiency, cost reduction in the provision of services and infrastructure, and reduction of natural hazard risks to life and property as goals of the clustering provisions. While it may be true that lot sizes of more than 40 acres would be "highly effective" in conserving farmland, Alachua County seeks to balance all of the stated goals in its clustering provision and has arrived at a reasonable formula for achieving at least some progress on each of the goals. The County pointed out that Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(5)(l) identifies clustering as an "innovative and flexible" planning strategy, but does not mandate clustering. Given the County's history of failure with one form of mandatory clustering, it is not unreasonable that it would attempt the application of an incentive program as an alternative. Urban Cluster/Urban Services Line10/ The 2003 Amendments amended the Future Land Use Map series ("FLUM"), a necessary part of the FLUE pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.006(4). FLUE General Strategy 1 provides that the Plan must: Minimize the conversion of land from rural to urban uses by maximizing the efficient use of available urban infrastructure, while preserving environmentally sensitive areas, according to the following: Designate and maintain on the [FLUM] an urban cluster that sets a boundary for urban growth. Provide incentives for higher average densities for residential development and mixed uses in the urban cluster, including density bonus and transfer of development rights. Provide a range of urban residential densities with the highest densities located in or near urban activity centers, and lower densities located in outlying rural areas or areas of the County which have physical limitations to development. . . . The "Urban Cluster" is defined as: An area on the [FLUM] for urban development, which includes residential densities ranging from one unit per acre to 24 units per acre or greater, non- residential development, and is generally served by urban services. The Urban Cluster designation on the FLUM sets a boundary for urban growth in order to maximize the efficient use of available urban infrastructure and to preserve environmentally sensitive areas to minimize urban sprawl. The 2002 Plan Update uses the Urban Cluster to differentiate between urban and rural uses and encourages higher densities in the Urban Cluster in order to use land efficiently. To further the efficient use of land, the 2002 Plan Update also established an "urban services line" ("USL") within the Urban Cluster. FLUE Policy 7.1.3.A describes the USL as follows: In order to phase development for the Urban Cluster and promote efficient use of land and infrastructure and minimize sprawl, an urban services line is designated in the Future Land Use Map series. The line identifies the limits of the area within the Urban Cluster within which phased development shall be promoted through the year 2010. The USL's ten-year planning period, through 2010, is shorter than the planning period for the Urban Cluster, which is through 2020. The purpose of USL is to provide better timing of development within the urban area, to encourage redevelopment and direct new development to areas where infrastructure exists or will be available. The 2003 Amendments expanded the Urban Cluster as part of the FLUM series. The 2003 Amendments also expanded the USL within the Urban Cluster on the FLUM series. The appropriate size for the USL and the Urban Cluster depends on the amount of land needed for projected population growth. FLUE Policy 7.1.3 establishes the process for determining the need for additional developable land to accommodate the projected population as follows: As part of the periodic update of the Comprehensive Plan and any proposed amendments to the Urban Cluster, determine a sufficient and nonexcessive amount of land within the Urban Cluster to accommodate urban uses for a ten year and twenty year time frame. The determination (methodology is shown in Appendix A)[11/] shall be based on a comparison of: a forecast need for land for urban residential and non-residential development based on projected population, average household size, a residential vacancy rate, and a market factor. The market factor for the ten year time frame shall be 2.0. The market factor for the 20 year time frame shall be 1.5. land available in the Urban Cluster for urban residential and non-residential uses. Mapping of environmentally sensitive areas shall be utilized as a factor for determining land availability. If the land comparison shows that the land available is less than the forecast need for land, the following measures shall be considered: revisions to density standards and land development regulations, or other measures, to accommodate greater population within the existing Urban Cluster. coordination with municipalities regarding possible reallocation of forecast need to the incorporated areas. phased expansion of the Urban Cluster. If the forecast need for one type of land use exceeds the supply of land for that particular use, a revision to the allocation of land uses within the Urban Cluster shall be considered before the Urban Cluster is expanded. If this methodology determines expansion of the Urban Cluster is warranted, the evaluation of appropriate location shall be subject to analysis including the following economic, infrastructure, transportation, conservation and recreation criteria: rural character and viable agriculture land and the potential impact of expansion of the Urban Cluster on existing agricultural uses. economic development considerations including affordable housing. relationship to existing and planned future urban services and infrastructure. access to the regional transportation network and multi-modal transportation systems. Conservation and Preservation land uses. planned recreation/open space or greenway systems. Thus, FLUE Policy 7.1.3 provides a three-step process for determining "a sufficient and nonexcessive amount of land" to accommodate urban uses. First, there must be a calculation of the estimated need for land to accommodate the projected population. The second step is to calculate the amount of vacant land currently available for urban residential use. Third, a comparison is made between the need for and the availability of vacant land to determine whether and how the FLUM should be amended. In calculating need, the County built into its formula a safety factor to ensure sufficient land for the future population over the projected time period. The real estate market requires some excess capacity to prevent scarcity-driven price increases, and the County, therefore, included a "market factor" in determining the amount of land that should be designated for development. The 2002 Data and Analysis explained the principle as follows: A market factor is included in the calculation to allow for a measure of flexibility between supply and demand. A sufficient market factor allows flexibility in the siting of development, thereby helping ensure that developers can find locations favored by the market. Market factor is a multiplier used in developing a forecast of future land use needs, specifically housing, to allow for market choice. The market factor results in additional developable land in the urban cluster and thereby can have a positive effect on housing affordability. The market factor also addresses market uncertainty with respect to the accuracy of market predictions, for example if some landowners withhold their land from development. The market factor ensures that enough land is set aside for residential purposes to accommodate these residential support activities-- parks, easements for utilities, churches, to name a few. Across the country the range in factors is as low as 1.15 (Portland, Oregon) to over 2.0 (several Florida locations). Alachua County has used the market factor 2.0 for calculations for the year 2010 and the market factor 1.5 for the year 2020. The County multiplied the number of new dwelling units needed over the 2010 and 2020 planning horizons by the market factors chosen for those periods to arrive at a "total capacity needed" number. The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners contended that the market factors chosen by the County were too high and that 1.25 was a more reasonable figure for the County. Mr. Pennock, PRPV's planning expert, testified that there is no "final magic answer" to the question of the market factor number. He stated that 1.25 is a "conservative" market factor, and that 2.0 is a professionally acceptable number. It is found that the County's market factors of 2.0 for the year 2010 and 1.5 for the year 2020 were reasonable, in light of all the evidence. After determining the amount of land needed over the planning horizon, the second step in the County's formula is to determine the amount of vacant land currently available for urban residential use. In order to determine the amount of land currently available, there must be a calculation of the number of units per acre available for future residential development. The two components of this calculation are, first, the number of acres presently within the Urban Cluster or USL, and second, the residential dwelling unit density allowed within that acreage. FLUE Objective 1.3 provides that "[g]ross residential densities shall be established to serve as a guideline for evaluating development in Alachua County." FLUE Policy 1.3.2 classifies the densities as follows: The following classification of gross residential densities shall serve as a standard for evaluating development in Alachua County, unless specific provisions are otherwise provided in the Plan. a. Urban Residential Densities - Areas designated on the [FLUM] for gross residential densities of one unit per acre or greater shall be considered as urban in character. There shall be four gross residential density ranges as follows: Low Density One to Four dwelling units per acre Medium Density Greater than Four to less or equal to Eight dwelling units per acre Medium-High Greater than Eight to less than or equal to 14 dwelling units per acre High Density Greater than 14 to less than or equal to 24 dwelling units per acre The Sierra Club/McSherry Petitioners contend there was already an excess of acres available for development relative to need for the projected population, even before the 2003 Amendments expanded the Urban Cluster and the USL. They point to the 2002 FLUE Data and Analysis, which explained that the need calculations resulted in a finding that there were 7,396 acres available for urban development beyond the projected need in the Urban Cluster through the year 2010, and 4,378 acres beyond the projected need in the Urban Cluster through the year 2020. The 2002 Data and Analysis concluded: "Therefore there is no need in both 2010 and 2020 for modification of the area designated for urban development." Nonetheless, the 2003 Amendments added an additional 434 acres to the Urban Cluster, thereby increasing the available acres for development to 8,370. Richard Drummond explained that the County discovered, after the EAR process and the adoption of the 2002 Plan Update, that some of the population projections for the unincorporated areas were in error. The County also found miscalculations in terms of the existing housing stock. Mr. Drummond stated that the 2002 projections did not reflect the impact that the Plan's new environmental and floodplain policies could have on existing development capacity, or the fact that some private property owners had made it known their land would not be available for development. Mr. Drummond emphasized that the final need projections reflected the methodology that the County chose to employ and conceded that other methodologies could be used to arrive at different projections. The Sierra Club Petitioners have set forth at some length the methodologies they believe should have been employed by the County as regards establishment of the Urban Cluster and USL. At the outset, the Sierra Club Petitioners have challenged the County's methodology for calculating the number of needed dwelling units and corresponding acreage. They contend that the County calculated an excessive amount of acreage based on outdated historical data, rather than on the maximum gross residential densities allowed under the updated Plan. In making its acreage calculations, the County assumed that the low density residential areas would have an average density of 1.6 dwelling units per acre ("DU/acre"). Sierra Club contends that the County placed undue reliance on historical evidence that the density trends in the low density category was 1.34 DU/acre from 1980-1990, and 1.6 DU/acre from 1991-1997, when the County's own EAR provided more recent evidence that the objective of 2.0 DU/acre was being achieved. Mr. Drummond testified that a goal of the 2002 Plan Update was to increase the density of development within the low-density range. Sierra Club contends that using higher densities in the calculations of needed acreage would better support that goal and that the County was, therefore, required to base its calculations of the land presently available to serve the projected need on the maximum available density. The Sierra Club Petitioners argue that basing the projections on historical trends "perpetuates old planning mistakes," and is internally inconsistent with FLUE General Strategy 1's requirement that the Plan provide "incentives for higher average densities for residential development and mixed uses in the urban cluster." They conclude that the maximum available density of 4.0 DU/acre should have been the County's basis for allocating acreage in the low density category, rather than the historically-based 1.6 dwelling units per acre presented by the County. The Sierra Club Petitioners offered a detailed recalculation of the "needed acres" for the Urban Cluster and the USL based on a density of 4.0 DU/acre, rather than 1.6 DU/acre, concluding that Alachua County overestimated the needed land by 2,737 acres in the low-density residential category. They performed a similar recalculation of need in the medium-high and high-density residential categories based on the maximum allowable density, rather than the historic "average density" used by the County. It is not necessary to set out the recalculation here because it is found that the Sierra Club Petitioners failed to demonstrate that the methodology employed by Alachua County to project the acreage needed for development in 2010 and 2020 was so unreasonable as to be beyond fair debate, or that their substituted methodology was correct and accurate beyond fair debate. The Sierra Club Petitioners may be correct in their contention that the Plan's goal of increasing densities in low-density residential developments would be better supported by use of maximum allowable densities in the need projections. There is little doubt that reducing the acreage available for development would force more compact development in the Urban Cluster, but there is no indication that the County's projections present an unreasonable risk of urban sprawl. Both Richard Drummond and Mr. Pennock discussed other Plan goals, such as avoiding a distortion of the real estate market caused by allocating too little land for development, that the Sierra Club Petitioners' methodology arguably does not address or would even subvert. In arriving at its methodology, Alachua County necessarily struck a balance in its priorities. Richard Drummond candidly testified that there were other ways to arrive at the need projections. The Sierra Club Petitioners reasonably disagree with that balance and believe that the community would be better served through tighter controls on expansion of urban development. This is a disagreement to be resolved through the political process and is certainly not beyond "fair debate" for either side of the argument in the context of this administrative proceeding. The Sierra Club Petitioners contend that the "development factor" employed in the calculation of capacity needed within the Urban Cluster and USL also contributes to inflating the estimate. As part of the formula used to calculate the land needed to accommodate the projected population, Alachua County applied a "development factor" of 0.5 to the residential units available on vacant land identified as "strategic ecosystems" or wetland areas, thus halving the available acreage in those areas. The 0.5 development factor was applied in recognition of the Plan's policies requiring that 50 percent of such lands be preserved from development. The Sierra Club Petitioners argue that the County's reasoning ignores FLUE Policy 6.2.10, which allows the landowner to cluster the total number of available residential units for an entire parcel on the developable 50 percent of the property. Thus, while 50 percent of the property is placed in conservation with no dwelling units, the dwelling units for the total acreage can be built on the remaining 50 percent of the property. The Sierra Club Petitioners argue that this methodology leads to an understatement of the acreage available for development and, thereby, underestimates the number of available dwelling units. Mr. Drummond explained that the "development factor" is intended to account for several contingencies. Some property owners might not choose to cluster and, therefore, would not develop the remaining 50 percent at the maximum density. More than 50 percent of some properties might be set aside after their boundaries are ground-truthed.12/ Because of such contingencies, the County decided to adjust the calculations so that its estimate would include the net acreage that would be fully available for development. This rationale could lead to some excess of vacant residential lands if a significant number of the conservation/wetlands properties are developed to their maximum density, but it cannot be deemed wrong beyond fair debate for Alachua County to seek certainty under its formula. FLUE Policy 7.1.3.d, set out in full above, requires the County to evaluate the appropriate location for expansion of the Urban Cluster according to the criteria set forth therein. The Sierra Club Petitioners contend that Alachua County did not provide data and analysis to demonstrate compliance with these locational standards in its 2003 Amendment to the FLUM for the Urban Cluster. The 2002 FLUE Data and Analysis provide that development outside of the USL "must provide a full compliment of urban services." Mr. Drummond testified that because the 2002 Plan Update requires that all new development in the urban area must hook up to central water and sewer services,13/ the 2002 USL was based on proximity to those services, which became "the primary indicator for the rational progression of urban development." The Sierra Club Petitioners have challenged the 2003 Amendments' expansion of the USL to include all land in "common ownership" outside of the parcels on the 2002 FLUM map. According to Mr. Drummond, the common ownership included parcels where there was "a legal relationship between the corporate entities that owned the property." The Sierra Club Petitioners claim that the County "failed to demonstrate that the method of including all parcels within common ownership within the expanded Urban Cluster or [USL] was a professionally acceptable methodology." The Sierra Club Petitioners assert that the effect of this change is to add property within the USL regardless of proximity to existing infrastructure in contravention of 2002 FLUE Policy 7.1.3(d). It is found that the County's recognition of properties under common ownership in setting the USL, where at least part of the property meets all criteria for inclusion within the USL, appears on its face to be a sensible amendment. In this proceeding, the burden was not on the County to demonstrate that its methodology was "professionally acceptable." Rather, the burden was on Petitioners to demonstrate that the methodology did not meet the "fairly debatable" standard of acceptability. Petitioners failed to make that demonstration as to this issue. The Sierra Club Petitioners claim that because the expansion of the USL in the 2003 Amendments was based on availability of central water and sewer, it is internally inconsistent with other provisions of the Plan. FLUE Principle 2 requires the Plan to "[b]ase new development upon the provision of necessary services and infrastructure." FLUE General Strategy 1.f. provides that the Plan should: Minimize the conversion of land from rural to urban uses by maximizing the efficient use of available urban infrastructure, while preserving environmentally sensitive areas, according to the following: * * * f. Time development approval in conjunction with the economic and efficient provision of supporting community facilities, urban services, and infrastructure, such as streets, utilities, police and fire protection service, emergency medical service, mass transit, public schools, recreation and open space, in coordination with the Capital Improvements Element. The Sierra Club Petitioners assert that the County has failed to comply with these provisions because it based the expansion of the Urban Cluster and the USL on only one form of infrastructure, central sewer and water, while ignoring the availability of "supporting community facilities, urban services, and infrastructure" such as schools, police and fire protection, emergency medical service, mass transit, and recreation and open space. The evidence does not support this assertion beyond fair debate. The USL is a timing and phasing mechanism for development within the Urban Cluster over a ten-year planning horizon and is intended to encourage redevelopment and to direct new development to areas where public infrastructure exists or will be available. To the east, the County has located the USL coterminously with the Urban Cluster in order to promote redevelopment in the east Gainesville area. To the west, the USL is located a quarter-mile outward from existing and planned central water and sewer lines, without splitting ownership lines on individual parcels, except that in an area to the southwest near Archer Road, the USL is located a half- mile from existing and planned central water and sewer lines in order to promote this area as a future transit corridor. It is at least fairly debatable that the establishment and location of the USL is supported by appropriate data and analysis and that the County considered other infrastructure factors in drawing the lines of its urban boundaries. Water and Sewer Line Extensions In the 1991 Plan, Potable Water and Sanitary Sewer Element ("PWSSE") Policy 8.2 provided, in relevant part: Proposed extensions of potable water and sanitary sewer lines outside of the urban service area designated by the [FLUE] shall be subject to approval by the Board of County Commissioners. . . . The 2002 Plan Update renumbered the quoted provision as PWSSE Policy 3.5 and changed the term "urban service area" to "Urban Services Line," but otherwise left the text unamended. The 2003 Amendments changed the term "Urban Services Line" to "Urban Cluster." The Sierra Club Petitioners contend that the effect of the latter change is to allow the extension of water and sewer outside the USL, but within the Urban Cluster without the approval of the Board. They point out that the City of Gainesville owns and operates Gainesville Regional Utilities ("GRU") and that Alachua County historically has had little to no control over the pattern of development based on utility service. Mr. Drummond conceded that allowing the utility provider to dictate the pattern of development led to low- density sprawl. Thus, the Sierra Club Petitioners contend that the 2003 Amendment to PWSSE Policy 3.5 weakens the ability of the County to control growth through the phasing envisioned by the USL, because the County has no control over how the growth is "phased" when it lacks control over utilities. The County replies that the 2003 Amendments' change of "Urban Services Line" to "Urban Cluster" merely corrects a scrivener's error. Mr. Drummond testified that the 2002 Plan Update version of PWSSE Policy 3.5, requiring Board approval of water and sewer extensions outside the USL, unintentionally conflicted with FLUE Policy 7.1.3.B, which provides a mechanism for development to occur outside the USL but within the Urban Cluster without Board approval. The 2003 Amendment corrected the error and brought PWSSE Policy 3.5 into harmony with FLUE Policy 7.1.3.B. It is found that the 2003 Amendment to PWSSE Policy 3.5 does not represent a substantive change to the Plan. As to Petitioner's "lack of control" critique, the County responds that the City of Gainesville's Plan calls for coordination with the County's Plan when proposing utility line extensions. Mr. Drummond testified that the City of Gainesville's Plan recognizes that GRU will extend its utility lines in the unincorporated area in a manner consistent with the County's Plan. It is at least fairly debatable that the 2003 Amendments are supported by data and analysis and do not inappropriately delegate planning authority to the City of Gainesville or GRU. 2003 COSE Amendments Strategic Ecosystems The 1991 Plan employed the term "conservation area" to describe properties meriting special protection, including areas with significant geologic features such as springs and caves, wetlands, areas subject to 100-year flooding, and surface waters and their transitional zones. The 2002 Plan Update recognized both "primary" and "secondary" conservation areas. 2002 COSE Policy 3.1.1 provided: Primary conservation areas shall consist of natural resources that, because of their ecological value, uniqueness and particular sensitivity to development activities, require stringent protective measures to sustain their ecological integrity. These areas shall include: Wetlands; Surface waters; Wellfield protection areas; Listed species habitat; Significant geologic features; and Strategic ecosystems.[14/] "Strategic ecosystem" was a new term added by the 2002 Plan Update and was defined in the 2002 COSE definitions as follows: Outstanding examples of ecosystems that are intact or capable of restoration and that require conservation or management to maintain important reserves of biodiversity at landscape, natural community and species specific levels. Strategic ecosystems are greater than 20 acres in size and contain one or more natural ecological communities, including but not limited to scrub, sandhill, xeric hammock, upland pine forest, upland mixed forest, mesic hammock, prairie hammock, wet prairie, seepage slope, slope forest, mesic flatwoods, scrubby flatwoods, floodplain forest, baygall, wet flatwoods, and hydric hammock. The natural resources that comprise strategic ecosystems are identified through means including, but not limited to: the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission's "Closing the Gaps in Florida's Wildlife Habitat Conservation System" (1994), as supplemented with "Habitat Conservation Needs of Rare and Imperiled Life in Florida" (2000); FDEP's "Statewide Ecological Network," contained in The Greenways System Planning Project (1998); the Florida Natural Areas Inventory; and Golder's "Alachua County Ecological Inventory Project" (1996). 2002 COSE Objective 4.10, not amended in 2003, provides that it is the County's objective to "[p]rotect, conserve, enhance, and manage the ecological integrity of strategic ecosystems in Alachua County." The 2002 COSE Policies implementing Objective 4.10, which were all new to the 2002 Plan Update, provided: Policy 4.10.1 Conserve ecosystems that are determined to be strategic based on an overall assessment of the following characteristics: Natural ecological communities that exhibit: Native biodiversity within or across natural ecological communities. Ecological integrity. Rarity. Functional connectedness. Plant and animal species habitat that is: Documented for listed species. Documented for species with large home ranges. Documented as a special wildlife migration or aggregation site for activities such as breeding, roosting, colonial nesting, or over-wintering. High in vegetation quality and species diversity. Low in non-native invasive species. Size, shape, and landscape features that allow the ecosystem to be restored to or maintained in good condition with regular management activities, such as prescribed burning, removal of exotic vegetation, or hydrological restoration. Policy 4.10.2 Strategies shall be implemented through the land use planning and development review process to ensure that each strategic ecosystem is evaluated and protected based on the integrity of the ecological unit. Policy 4.10.3 The County shall create special area plans in cooperation with landowners to establish specific guidelines for strategic ecosystems prior to approval of land use change, zoning change, or development approval. The County shall devise a schedule for creating special area plans, based on current development pressures and anticipated priorities. The County shall create special area plans for each strategic ecosystem, in accordance with the schedule and with the standards under Objective 3.6.[15/] If an applicant seeks development prior to the County's creation of a special area plan for a particular strategic ecosystem, the applicant has two avenues for pursuing development. A special area study may be conducted at the applicant's expense. Alternatively, if the applicant demonstrates that the ecological integrity of the strategic ecosystem will be sufficiently protected, the applicant may proceed according to the clustering provisions in policies under Objective 6.2 of the [FLUE]. Policy 4.10.4 Management strategies for strategic ecosystems shall be developed with landowners in conjunction with special area plans and may include, but are not limited to: Prescribed burning. Control of invasive species. Silvicultural activities according to BMPs [best management practices], with particular emphasis on maintenance and improvement of water quality, biological health, and the function of natural systems. Reduction in the intensity of site preparation activities, including bedding and herbicide application. Provision for listed species habitat needs, including restricting, at appropriate times, intrusions into sensitive feeding and breeding areas. Cooperative efforts and agreements to help promote or conduct certain management activities, such as cleanups, maintenance, public education, observation, monitoring, and reporting. Land acquisition. Policy 4.10.5 Clustering shall be required so that at least 80% of each strategic ecosystem is preserved as undeveloped area. Development shall be designed in accordance with the standards under Objective 3.6 of this Element. In the rural area, development shall also comply with standards under Objective 6.2 of the [FLUM]. Policy 4.10.6 The County shall provide regulatory flexibility to facilitate planning across multiple parcels that protects the integrity of the strategic ecosystem as an ecological unit. Existing cluster and PUD ordinances shall be revised to enhance long-term protection of strategic ecosystems. Policy 4.10.7 The County shall work with owners of agricultural and silvicultural lands to retain the ecological integrity and ecological value of strategic ecosystems through management plans and incentives. A management plan shall be required before any activity occurs in a strategic ecosystem that has not been used for agriculture or silviculture within the last 20 years, in accordance with the following: The management plan shall provide for retention of the ecological integrity and ecological value of the strategic ecosystem. The management plan shall be submitted to Alachua County for review and approval by appropriately qualified technical staff. The management plan may be satisfied by Forest Stewardship Council certification, land acquisition, or participation in a conservation program sponsored by the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service. Passive recreational and ecotourism activities shall be encouraged where consistent with protection of the ecological integrity of the strategic ecosystem. The County shall, through community outreach and collaboration, facilitate participation of landowners in forestry certification programs, land acquisition programs, and federal and state cost-share conservation programs, such as the Environmental Quality Incentive Program, the Conservation Reserve Program, the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program, and the Farmland Protection Program. Policy 4.10.8 Alachua County shall implement an ordinance that specifically addresses the preservation of strategic ecosystems, significant plant and wildlife habitat, habitat corridors, and vegetative communities. The 2003 Amendments deleted 2002 COSE Policy 3.1.2, which had defined "secondary" conservation areas. The 2003 Amendments amended 2002 COSE Policy 3.1.1, set forth above, by deleting the first word, "Primary." The effect of these amendments is that the policy now simply defines "conservation areas" without distinction as to their being "primary" or "secondary." The 2003 Amendments also deleted "Wellfield protection areas" from the definition of "conservation areas," replacing it with "100-year floodplains." Finally, the 2003 Amendments changed the definition of "strategic ecosystem" to read: Outstanding examples of ecosystems that are intact or capable of restoration and that require conservation or management to maintain important reserves of biodiversity at landscape, natural community and species specific levels. Strategic ecosystems are greater than 20 acres in size and contain one or more natural ecological communities, including but not limited to scrub, sandhill, xeric hammock, upland pine forest, upland mixed forest, mesic hammock, prairie hammock, wet prairie, seepage slope, slope forest, mesic flatwoods, scrubby flatwoods, floodplain forest, baygall, wet flatwoods, and hydric hammock. The natural resources that comprise strategic ecosystems are identified through means including, but not limited to: the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission's "Closing the Gaps in Florida's Wildlife Habitat Conservation System"(1994), as supplemented with "Habitat Conservation Needs of Rare and Imperiled Life in Florida"(2000); FDEP's "Statewide Ecological Network," contained in The Greenways System Planning Project (1998); the Florida Natural Areas Inventory; and Sites that are identified in the KBN/Golder's Associates report, "Alachua County Ecological Inventory Project" (1996). The 2003 Amendments amended the 2002 COSE Policies implementing Objective 4.10 as follows: Policy 4.10.1 Conserve strategic ecosystems that are determined through ground-truthing using the KBN/Golder report as a guide to be strategic maintain or enhance biodiversity based on an overall assessment of the following characteristics: Natural ecological communities that exhibit: Native biodiversity within or across natural ecological communities. Ecological integrity. Rarity. Functional connectedness. Plant and animal species habitat that is: Documented for listed species. Documented for species with large home ranges. Documented as a special wildlife migration or aggregation site for activities such as breeding, roosting, colonial nesting, or over-wintering. High in vegetation quality and species diversity. Low in non-native invasive species. Size, shape, and landscape features that allow the ecosystem to be restored to or maintained in good condition with regular management activities, such as prescribed burning, removal of exotic vegetation, or hydrological restoration. The Alachua County 2001 digital orthophotographic series (for purposes of this policy, the date of this photography is March 1, 2001) shall presumptively establish the baseline condition of the strategic ecosystem property as of the effective date of this policy. The County shall adopt land development regulations that set forth additional guidance for the determination of whether and the extent to which strategic ecosystems exist on a property. * * * Policy 4.10.4 Management strategies for strategic ecosystems shall be developed with landowners in conjunction with special area plans or cluster developments and may include, but are not limited to: Prescribed burning. Control of invasive species. Silvicultural activies according to BMPs [best management practices], with particular emphasis on maintenance and improvement of water quality, biological health, and the function of natural systems. Reduction in the intensity of site preparation activities, including bedding and herbicide application. Provision for listed species habitat needs, including restricting, at appropriate times, intrusions into sensitive feeding and breeding areas. Cooperative efforts and agreements to help promote or conduct certain management activities, such as cleanups, maintenance, public education, observation, monitoring, and reporting. Land acquisition. * * * Policy 4.10.5 Clustering shall be required so that at least 80% of each strategic ecosystem is preserved as undeveloped area. Development shall be designed in accordance with the standards under Objective 3.6 of this Element. In the rural area, development shall also comply with standards under Objective 6.2 of the [FLUM]. Policy 4.10.5 Each strategic ecosystem shall be preserved as undeveloped area, not to exceed 50% of the upland portion of the property without landowner consent and in accordance with the following: Upland areas required to be protected pursuant to policies for significant geological features and wetland and surface water buffers shall be counted in calculation of the 50% limitation, however, the extent of protection of significant geological features and wetland and surface water buffers shall not be reduced by this limitation. This limitation shall not apply to 100-year floodplains and wellfield protection areas, which are addressed independently through policies under Objectives 4.8 and 4.5, respectively. This limitation shall not restrict in any way state and federal agency protections. The remaining Policies implementing 2002 COSE Objective 4.10 were not amended by the 2003 Amendments. Thus, the definition of "strategic ecosystem" was amended from an identification of sites based upon the characteristics of their ecological communities to a question of whether a given property is found on a "strategic ecosystems" map sourced from the "Alachua County Ecological Inventory Project" prepared by KBN/Golder Associates (the "KBN/Golder Report"). In 1986, the County retained the Gainesville firm of KBN Engineering and Applied Sciences, Inc. ("KBN") to conduct a survey of potential ecologically significant upland properties. The purpose of the survey, completed in 1987, was to provide information on important upland sites for planning purposes, principally to complete the Conservation Element of what would become the 1991 Plan, and to assist the Alachua County Conservation and Recreation Areas Task Force in greenbelt planning. In November 1996, the County commissioned KBN, now a subsidiary of Golder Associates, to produce the KBN/Golder Report, which built upon the 1987 survey to compile the most extensive study to date of ecological communities in the County. The stated purpose of the KBN/Golder Report was to "identify, inventory, map, describe, and evaluate the most significant biological communities, both upland and wetland, in private ownership in Alachua County and make recommendations for protecting these natural resources." A total of 47 sites were identified and ranked based on their quality of vegetation and landscape ecology, their status as habitats for endangered species and wildlife in general, their hydrology, and their management potential. The 1996 KBN/Golder Report was more comprehensive than its predecessor study in that it covered a larger area, evaluated wetlands as well as uplands, and included mapping of ecological connections and biological communities. KBN/Golder accumulated and evaluated a wide range of data in the process of preparing the Report including: the 1987 KBN survey; a 1995 set of infrared aerial photographs provided by the St. Johns River Water Management District ("SJRWMD"), as well as a 1986 set of infrareds provided by the Alachua County Department of Environmental Services; a 1994 set of black and white aerial photographs provided by the Alachua County Property Appraiser's Office; Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission ("FFWCC") habitat distribution maps; SJRWMD wetlands vegetation maps; Florida Natural Areas Inventory natural community/plant community classification categories; and SJRWMD and Suwannee River Water Management District Floridan Aquifer recharge maps. The KBN/Golder Report described its methodology and limitations as follows: The inventories were done by David Clayton and Bob Simons, working separately. Landowners were contacted where access was necessary for the survey work, and those lands where access was denied were inventoried using aerial photographs, outside sources of information, and whatever information could be obtained by observations from the property boundary. Initially, a review was made of the USGS topographic quadrangle maps (various dates) and aerial photographs... to determine access, location of communities, drainage features, and karst features. Next, vehicle or pedestrian surveys of all accessible areas were used to get an overall view; to discern as many biocommunities as possible; to look for exotic species, listed species, or signs of habitat for listed species; and to evaluate the overall wildlife habitat and the condition of the communities. Specific sites were chosen to inventory in more detail. Limitations for this survey were the large number of sites, the vast acreage, and the restricted time available. Thousands of acres on 47 sites were surveyed within 8 weeks, necessitating limited survey time on the larger sites. Terrestrial species were emphasized because 90 percent of the area surveyed is terrestrial. The Jonesville Petitioners contested the validity of the 2003 Amendments regarding strategic ecosystems on several grounds. Common to all these grounds is a disagreement on the meaning of the strategic ecosystems definition and its interplay with COSE Objective 4.10 and its implementing policies, as amended by the 2003 Amendments. The Jonesville Petitioners argue that defining the term "strategic ecosystem" by way of the map in the KBN/Golder Report is fatally flawed because it provides no flexibility. If a property is identified on the KBN/Golder Report map, then it is a strategic ecosystem subject to the restrictions of COSE Objective 4.10, without regard to the facts on the ground. The definition makes no provision for ground-truthing the property prior to inclusion in the strategic ecosystem category. The County responds that 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1 provides for more detailed identification of strategic ecosystems through ground-truthing, using the KBN/Golder Report as a guide. 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1 also provides that the County's LDRs will provide additional guidance to determine whether and to what extent, strategic ecosystems exist on a property. The Jonesville Petitioners answer that there is a fundamental conflict in the policy's purported use of the KBN/Golder Report as a "guide" to delineating strategic ecosystems, when the definition provides that identification on the KBN/Golder Report is all that is required to establish a property as a strategic ecosystem. Subsequently adopted LDRs cannot provide guidance as to whether strategic ecosystems exist on a property; by definition, the KBN/Golder Report map determines whether there are strategic ecosystems. The Jonesville Petitioners argue that the only correct way to take a property out of the strategic ecosystem category would be to amend the adopted KBN/Golder Report map, thus amending the definition of "strategic ecosystem." The Jonesville Petitioners' argument fundamentally concedes that, if the definition were to provide for ground- truthing based on the characteristics set forth in 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1, it would be unexceptionable. However, they point out that 2003 COSE Objective 4.10 and its policies apply to all "strategic ecosystems," that "strategic ecosystems" are also subject to regulation as "conservation areas" under COSE Policy 3.1.1, and that the ground-truthing provided by 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1 does nothing to change the definition. Under this definitional scheme, a landowner whose property is identified on the KBN/Golder Report map can do nothing to take his property out of the strategic ecosystems definition, short of petitioning the County to amend its Plan, and is subject to all COSE provisions dealing with strategic ecosystems. The undersigned agrees with the Jonesville Petitioners that the County would have been better served to refine its definition of "strategic ecosystem" to include the standards set forth in 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1. The undersigned does not agree that the County's failure to do so invalidates the definition under the "fairly debatable" standard, given the County's interpretation of the interplay among the applicable policies. By using the KBN/Golder Report map to set the boundaries of strategic ecosystems, the County attempted to delineate reasonably large, contiguous areas, rather than create a "swiss cheese" pattern of intermixed conservation and non-conservation lands; i.e., designating isolated pockets of conservation within a large non-conservation area, or vice versa. The County made a general determination that strategic ecosystem site boundaries should be delineated with simple straight lines, rather than by the edges of land features, such as vegetative cover. The County reasonably decided that a straight boundary, such as a section line is easier to administer and more easily communicated to the public than a natural feature such as vegetation, which would require a survey and is often characterized by a gradual change, rather than the sharp demarcation necessary for a boundary. The County recognized that under this approach, strategic ecosystems would include some areas neither particularly environmentally sensitive, nor valuable as habitat. 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1 provides for ground-truthing to further refine the delineation of the boundaries of the strategic ecosystem properties to more specifically identify the most environmentally sensitive portions of the property and to assist in the determination of appropriate protection measures. Under the COSE Objective 4.10 policies, set forth in full above, the County will use the KBN/Golder Report map and the more detailed information provided by additional ground-truthing to identify the least environmentally sensitive portion of the strategic ecosystem property, so that any development can be directed and clustered there, and away from the most environmentally sensitive portion of the property. The landowner will retain the right to transfer the same number of residential units as allowed by the density limits of the underlying land use classification to the least sensitive portion of the property, notwithstanding the strategic ecosystems designation. The County's explanation of the interplay among the Plan provisions effectively addresses the concerns of the Jonesville Petitioners regarding "erroneously mapped" parcels, i.e., parcels that are identified on the KBN/Golder Report map, but that, in fact, are not environmentally sensitive. The Jonesville Petitioners are technically correct that because identification on the KBN/Golder Report map defines a property as a strategic ecosystem, subsequent ground-truthing does nothing to remove the property from that definition. However, the Jonesville Petitioners' argument depends on a reading of the Plan that is not merely literal, but blinkered. One must accept that the definition is absolutely controlling and that if a property is on the KBN/Golder Report map, then every individual plan provision referencing "strategic ecosystem" will apply to the property regardless of the natural characteristics found on the ground. A fair reading of the 2003 Amendments makes it clear that the definition of "strategic ecosystem" is the beginning of the analysis, not the end. The County acknowledged that, while the data on the KBN/Golder Report map are professionally accepted for general planning purposes, the data are not detailed enough for regulatory purposes on the level of individual parcels. Thus, once the map designates a property as a strategic ecosystem, 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1 requires ground- truthing to determine whether and to what extent that strategic ecosystem is subject to conservation. Later adopted LDRs will provide additional guidance "for the determination of whether and the extent to which strategic ecosystems exist on a property." This treatment is similar to that found in 2002 COSE Policy 3.3.4 regarding conservation and preservation areas on the FLUM generally: Site Specific Delineation: The parcel- specific boundaries of preservation and conservation areas shall be verified by ground surveys conducted in the course of special studies or development review. County-initiated mapping efforts shall be performed at the County's expense, except when an applicant seeks land use change, zoning change, or development approval prior to the completion of the County's mapping efforts, consistent with [COSE] policies 3.4.2 and 4.10.3. Conservation policies shall be applied based on the resulting site specific delineation. The referenced 2002 COSE Policy 3.4.2 provides: Where site specific analysis or verification is required to determine the presence of natural resources protected under this Element, the cost of such analysis or verification shall be borne by the applicant. The Jonesville Petitioners contend that there is an internal inconsistency in the fact that the definition of strategic ecosystem does not include the criteria found in 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1. However, the parameters used by KBN/Golder Report to score and rank the sites that appear on the map include: vegetation value (species diversity, presence of exotics); endangered species habitat value (plant and animal); wildlife habitat value; hydrology; landscape ecology (community diversity, ecological quality, community rarity, functional connectedness); and management potential. These parameters are consistent with the characteristics listed in 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1. The Jonesville Petitioners point out that the design of the KBN/Golder Report map was such that no parcel less than 20 acres in size was identified, resulting in the omission of thousands of acres countywide that possess the characteristics identified in 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1 as indicative of strategic ecosystems. The Jonesville Petitioners claim that this presents an internal inconsistency in the Plan, because the COSE policies would protect only 25 percent of those unmapped properties (under 2003 COSE Policy 4.9.12 addressing upland habitat), rather than the 50 percent protected by the strategic ecosystems policies. This alleged inconsistency is simply another example of the County's reasonable policy choice to focus its conservation efforts on larger, more contiguous properties, rather than a myriad of small-acreage lands. Even the 2002 definition of "strategic ecosystem," not challenged by the Jonesville Petitioners, limited strategic ecosystems to properties greater than 20 acres in size. The smaller sites will remain subject to regulation on a site-specific basis as they are proposed for development. The Jonesville Petitioners appear to insist, absent any pending development applications with the County or even any present plans to develop, on their right to have the Plan and its incorporated maps provide them with a definitive, binding delineation of their properties and, thus, their development potential. This claim is unrealistic, given that such a general right would require County staff to ground- truth hundreds of thousands of acres countywide before a conservation land use category could be established at all. The KBN/Golder Report map is sufficient to place landowners, such as the Jonesville Petitioners, on notice of their need to inquire as to the status of their properties prior to the initiation of development activities. Parcel- specific regulation requires parcel-specific ground-truthing, and 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1 provides for such ground-truthing. Further, 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.3 provides that the County will create special area plans for strategic ecosystems "based on current development pressures and anticipated priorities." It further provides that an applicant in the position of the Jonesville Petitioners may pay for its own special area plan, should it not wish to wait on the County to complete its plan process. Finally, the Jonesville Petitioners attack 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.1's use of the Alachua County 2001 digital orthophotographic series dated March 1, 2001, to "presumptively establish the baseline condition of the strategic ecosystem property as of the effective date of this policy." They contend that it is uncertain how the County will treat properties on which the owners have altered ecosystems in the period between the 2001 orthophotographs and 2003 adoption of the new COSE policies and that the policy would have a retroactive impact of dubious constitutionality if the County were to require restoration of those properties to their 2001 state. This valid concern of the Jonesville Petitioners is prematurely raised in this proceeding. The evidence at hearing failed to demonstrate that the County would not allow a landowner to provide information through the development review process to demonstrate that the condition of the property had changed after March 1, 2001, and prior to the effective date of the 2003 Amendments. In summary, it is found that the mere fact that the County determined that the definition of "strategic ecosystem" shall consist of the identification of properties on the KBN/Golder Report map is a fairly debatable decision, given the manner in which that definition is put into effect through amended COSE Objective 4.10 and its implementing policies. The Jonesville Petitioners entered reports prepared by their environmental consultant concerning particular properties and their unsuitability for designation as strategic ecosystems and presented extensive testimony on the subject. The County presented testimony as to each of the Jonesville Petitioners' properties to support the County's contention that they are indeed strategic ecosystems. Each of the Jonesville properties is a small portion of a much larger parcel on the KBN/Golder Report strategic ecosystems map. It is unnecessary to make detailed findings of fact as to the environmental quality of these properties. As the findings above indicate, the appropriate time to consider the qualities of particular properties will be during the special area planning process and/or the development review process.16/ Uplands Habitat 2002 COSE Objective 4.9, titled "Biodiversity," provides: Maintain and enhance plant and animal species diversity and distribution within Alachua County by protecting significant plant and wildlife habitats, providing for habitat corridors, and preventing habitat fragmentation. The 2002 Plan Update provisions implementing COSE Objective 4.9 provided as follows: Policy 4.9.1 A critical portion of each significant plant and wildlife habitat type in Alachua County shall be protected. Protection shall be accomplished using all available methods, including land acquisition, incentives and requirements for the provision of conservation or preservation areas, habitat corridors, greenways, and common open space. Policy 4.9.2 During the land use planning and development review processes, the County shall minimize the effects of development on significant plant and wildlife habitat. All developments shall protect as conservation or preservation areas a minimum of 25% of the significant plant and wildlife habitat that occurs on site. The habitat to be conserved shall be selected based on the quality and viability of the habitat. The County shall work with the landowner to select the portion of the habitat that will be included in the 25% set aside. Conserved habitat shall be located and maintained in areas with intact canopy, understory and groundcover in functional, clustered arrangement which maximizes use by wildlife and maintains the long-term viability of native upland plant communities. Linkages to habitat corridors and greenways shall be required where available. The County shall have the authority to accept alternatives to onsite conservation that provide for the long-term protection and management of significant plant and wildlife habitat of equal or greater habitat value that would not have otherwise been preserved. The land development regulations shall establish criteria for determining which projects warrant the use of alternatives to onsite conservation. Criteria may include but are not limited to: the size of the development site, habitat quality, uniqueness, connectivity, management opportunities, and adjacent uses. Off-site conservation shall not be permitted for listed species habitat that is capable of being managed or restored on- site as a high quality natural plant or animal community or communities. This requirement is not intended to limit the effect of other resource-specific protective measures in this element, such as clustering and buffers. Policy 4.9.3 The County shall require the development and implementation of management plans for all significant plant and wildlife habitat that is to be protected. The management plan shall be prepared at the expense of the developer by an appropriately qualified professional and provide for the following: Removal of invasive vegetation and debris. Replanting with native vegetation as necessary. Maintenance of biodiversity, with special emphasis on protection of listed plant and animal species. Any additional measures determined to be necessary to protect and maintain the functions and values of the habitat conservation areas while ensuring protection from wildfire. Policy 4.9.4[17/] The County shall consult with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services or other appropriate agencies prior to authorizing development that could result in potential adverse impacts to any listed species. The County shall utilize these recommendations to provide specific requirements regarding development where these species are encountered. Conditions of approval shall ensure the maintenance and, where feasible and appropriate, increase the abundance and distribution of populations of listed species. Policy 4.9.5 The use of listed plant and wildlife species habitat shall be restricted to that which is compatible with the requirements of listed species. Development activities[18/] that would threaten the life or habitat of any listed species shall not be permitted. Policy 4.9.6 The County shall prohibit the alteration of natural shorelines or degradation of water quality where listed species feed or breed, through the establishment of buffers as set out in [COSE] Policy 3.6.8. The County shall encourage the restoration of degraded shorelines when possible. Policy 4.9.7[19/] The County shall periodically review monitoring data from federal, state, regional, and local agencies to determine the status of listed species habitats in Alachua County. The County shall use this information to maintain and provide, for the convenience of the public, a table of listed species and listed species habitats in Alachua County. Policy 4.9.8 The County shall recommend specific management and recovery strategies for listed species, as they are developed by the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and shall assist in their implementation. These management techniques shall be incorporated into the land development regulations, as well as the management plans of County-owned preservation areas. Policy 4.9.9 Wildlife habitat enhancement and management programs in urban areas shall be promoted through such techniques as designation of bird sanctuary areas where rookeries or other significant bird populations exist and landscaping schemes for stormwater detention and retention areas that maintain native vegetation and establish littoral zones which encourages wildlife usage. Policy 4.9.10 The County shall develop incentives designed to encourage private land owners to manage land holdings for wildlife attributes. Policy 4.9.11 The County shall establish and preserve habitat corridors that connect significant plant and wildlife habitats throughout the County. The County shall perform an objective analysis to determine the appropriateness of habitat corridors, how extensive they should be, the location of potential corridors, what fiscal resources are available for implementation, and economic incentives for property owners to voluntarily participate in formation of a habitat corridor program. The 2003 Amendments changed 2002 COSE Policy 4.9.2 as follows: During the land use planning and development review processes, the County shall minimize the effects of development on significant plant and wildlife habitat. All developments shall protect as conservation or preservation areas a minimum of 25% of the significant plant and wildlife habitat that occurs on site, subject to the limitation in 4.9.12. The habitat to be conserved shall be selected based on the quality and viability of the habitat. The County shall work with the landowner to select the portion of the habitat that will be included in the 25% set aside. . . . The 2003 Amendments added a new COSE Policy 4.9.12, which reads as follows: Policy 4.9.12 Upland habitat protections under Objective 4.9 shall be limited as follows: No more than 25% of the upland portion of a property may be required to be set aside for preservation pursuant to policies under this Objective without landowner consent. Upland areas required to be protected pursuant to policies for significant geological features and wetland and surface water buffers shall be counted in calculation of the 25% limitation, however, the extent of protection of significant geological features and wetland and surface water buffers shall not be reduced by this limitation. This limitation shall not apply to 100-year floodplains and wellfield protection areas, which are addressed independently through policies under Objectives 4.8 [Flood Plains and Floodways] and 4.5 [Groundwater], respectively. This limitation shall not restrict in any state and federal agency protections. For purposes of applying this limitation, a property shall include all contiguous land under common ownership or control. Properties may not be disaggregated, processed in piecemeal fashion, reviewed or developed in any manner that results in lesser upland protections than would otherwise be required under this Objective. The Sierra Club Petitioners challenged these uplands policies on several grounds. The 2002 Plan Update, as amended in 2003, provides two kinds of protection to uplands. The most highly protected upland is one established as part of a strategic ecosystem. Under 2003 COSE Policy 4.10.5, up to 50 percent of the upland portion of a strategic ecosystem can be preserved as undeveloped area without the landowner's consent. A lesser level of protection is afforded to "significant plant and wildlife habitat." The 2002 Plan Update defines "significant habitat" as "contiguous stands of natural upland plant communities which have been documented to support, and which have the potential to maintain, healthy and diverse populations of plants or wildlife." Under 2003 COSE Policies 4.9.2 and 4.9.12, up to 25 percent of the upland portion of "significant plant and wildlife habitat" may be set aside for preservation without the landowner's consent. Neither the strategic ecosystems provision nor the significant plant and wildlife habitat provision purports to restrict or lessen any protections afforded by state or federal law. The Sierra Club Petitioners complain that the 2003 Amendments modify the categories and levels of upland protection which had been adopted in the 2002 Plan Update, that these modifications weaken the environmental protection provided to upland vegetative communities and habitats, and that the modifications are based on legislative settlement of the 2002 administrative challenge, not on any science or new data or analysis. The 2002 Plan Update was supported by the 1998 EAR and the 2002 Data and Analysis documents. On December 10, 2002, during the settlement process that culminated in the 2003 Amendments, Alachua County's environmental protection director, Chris Bird, produced a memorandum titled "Response to Questions Raised on Conservation Issues in the 12/2/02 Special [Board] Comp Plan Meeting," referred to hereinafter as "the Bird Memo." As of December 2, 2002, mediation had commenced in the 2002 administrative challenge, but the parties had yet to crystallize their respective positions into what would become the 2003 Amendments. As indicated by its full title, the Bird Memo contains the County staff's explanation of the basis for the conservation policies in the 2002 Amendments. The memo sets forth citations to and quotes from the 2002 Data and Analysis, and supplements this with its own comments on the propriety or necessity for the changes to the 1991 Plan made by the 2002 Amendments. The Sierra Club Petitioners point out that the Bird Memo offers a clear explanation as to how the 2002 Plan Update was based on the 1998 EAR and the 2002 Data and Analysis. They contend that there is no equivalent documentation in the record of this case that explains how the 2003 Amendments were based on the Data and Analysis. In answer to the question, "What's wrong with the old [1991] Comprehensive Plan and why do we have to change it?," the Bird Memo stated: Of 70 measurable objectives set forth for the Conservation portion of the [1998] EAR, less than a third of those objectives were met without caveat. At least 10 objectives were not met, and another 40 objectives were only partially met, met in limited fashion, or were in need of revision/update. The Bird Memo noted that the 1998 EAR made the following recommendations under the heading, "Permitted Uses in Conservation Areas": Review and revise requirements for development in ecologically sensitive/environmentally significant areas. Using the PUD[20/] or a modified Cluster Ordinance, consider the following modifications at a minimum: (1) modify the comprehensive plan to include additional natural communities identified in the 1996 ecological inventory [i.e., the KBN/Golder study]; (2) require clustering for all development and eliminate the 20-acre parcel threshold; (3) require stricter long-term protection for Conservation areas and significant natural communities; (4) increase the 50% minimum set-aside; (5) include incentives/requirements for permanent set-aside arrangements. The Bird Memo went on to set forth staff's recommendation as to what "stricter long-term protection for conservation areas and significant natural communities" necessitates for "significant habitat": Significant habitat is defined in the [2002] Comprehensive Plan update as contiguous stands of natural upland plant communities that support and maintain healthy and diverse populations of plants or wildlife. Sandhill and xeric hammock are two examples. Industrial pine plantations are not significant habitat because they are not natural communities. FAC 9J-5 requires that the Conservation Element include objectives and policies that conserve and protect native vegetative communities and wildlife habitat from destruction by development activities. The Plan update approaches this protection at two scales: strategic ecosystems are important at a larger geographical scale; significant habitat and listed species habitat are important at smaller scales. The purpose is to identify and protect natural systems and their fundamental building blocks before they are in the "emergency room" at the brink of crisis, when they can still be preserved for the future in healthy form. To accomplish this, the largest remaining wild areas are afforded the greatest protection (80% preservation of strategic ecosystems), while the smaller but significant natural habitat areas are afforded lesser but still meaningful protection (25% preservation of significant habitat). There is no percentage associated with listed species habitat protection, but protection is determined on a case-by-case basis depending on species and site characteristics. The requirement for 25% preservation of native habitat is clearly less than what is needed to stop habitat and species declines, but represents a compromise.[21/] This percentage was chosen in order to provide for the conditions necessary to preserve some degree of ecological integrity while accommodating the needs of development. . . . The Sierra Club Petitioners concede that some of the quoted conservation recommendations were adopted in the 2003 Amendments, e.g., the map of the KBN/Golder Report inventory lands was adopted as the initial definition of strategic ecosystems and incentives for clustering are provided. However, they contend that most of the staff's conservation recommendations are not reflected in the 2003 Amendments, e.g., clustering is not required for all development in ecologically sensitive and/or environmentally significant areas; the 20-acre parcel threshold for ecosystem protection is not eliminated; 50 percent minimum set-asides are not increased; species on the Florida Natural Areas Inventory ("FNAI") endangered species list but not on federal or state lists are not protected in wetland buffers; the recommended minimum default buffer is not used; and no minimum protection is required for either listed species habitat or significant habitat. The Sierra Club Petitioners contend that the 25 percent maximum upland preservation introduced by 2003 COSE Policy 4.9.12 destroys the impact of 2002 COSE Policy 4.9.5, which under the 2002 Plan Update would have protected the habitat of any "listed species" on a case-by-case determination of what was reasonable and necessary for the species on the particular site, apparently without regard to the amount of a given tract that would be turned over to preservation against the wishes of the landowner. "Listed species" is defined in the 2003 Amendments as: Those species of plants and animals listed as endangered, threatened, rare, or species of special concern by an official state or federal plant or wildlife agency, or the Florida Natural Areas Inventory (FNAI, includes species ranked as S1, S2, or S3), or the Florida Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants and Animals (FCREPA). These species are targeted for protection for a number of reasons, e.g., they are in imminent danger of extinction, are rapidly declining in number or habitat, or have an inherent vulnerability to habitat modification, environmental alteration, or human disturbance which puts them at risk of extinction. This contention is rejected because it neglects to factor in the express limitation expressed in 2003 COSE Policy 4.9.12.c. that the 25 percent limitation "shall not restrict in any way state and federal agency protections." Such "protections" include federal and state listed species protections, meaning that the 25 percent limitation cannot function as a brake on listed species protection. The Sierra Club Petitioners make too much of the distinction between 2002 COSE Policy 4.9.2's language, "All developments shall protect as conservation or preservation areas a minimum of 25 percent of the significant plant and wildlife habitat that occurs on site," and 2003 COSE Policy 4.9.12's language, "No more than 25 percent of the upland portion of a property may be required to be set aside for preservation pursuant to policies under this Objective without landowner consent." They appear to assume that the former provision would allow the County to impose draconian development limitations without regard to the property rights of landowners. In the undersigned's view, the distinction is not so great, particularly in light of 2002 COSE Policy 4.9.2.1's direction to the County to "work with the landowner to select the portion of the habitat that will be included in the 25% set aside." (Emphasis added.) The express reference to a "25% set aside" indicates that Alachua County did not anticipate forcing landowners to cede more than that amount of their property even under the 2002 Plan Update. It is found that the Sierra Club Petitioners overstate the necessary impact of the Bird Memo as "Data and Analysis." Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2), indeed, requires that plan amendments be "based upon relevant and appropriate data," and further explains that to be "based on data" means "to react to it in an appropriate way and to the extent necessary indicated by the data available on that particular subject at the time of adoption of the plan or plan amendment at issue." However, the Sierra Club Petitioners essentially contend that the Board was bound to enact each recommendation of the Bird Memo in every particular or stand in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J-5.005(2). To accept this contention would be to make the elected officials of Alachua County subservient to their own hired staff, an exact reversal of the comprehensive planning process. It is found that the County has reacted to the data and analysis of the Bird Memo "in an appropriate way and to the extent necessary indicated by the data." There is no question that the 2002 Plan Update, as amended by the 2003 Amendments, for the first time "establish[es] an integrated approach to the protection of natural communities and their associated values in Alachua County," in contrast to the fragmented approach of the 1991 Plan. See COSE Data and Analysis, Biodiversity, p. 38. The 2003 Amendments address and, to some degree, adopt every element raised by staff in the Bird Memo. The 2003 Amendments do not adopt the terms of the Bird Memo to the letter as urged by the Sierra Club Petitioners, but the County was not required to do so. It is at least fairly debatable that the COSE uplands policies are supported by data and analysis and provide adequate guidance for the development of LDRs. Wetland Buffers Under the 1991 Plan, standards for natural vegetative buffers around surface waters and wetlands consisted of a minimum 75-foot buffer for Outstanding Florida Waters and a 35-foot buffer for all other surface waters and wetlands. The 2002 Plan Update's version of COSE Policy 3.6.8, referenced in Policy 4.9.6 above, provided detailed new buffer requirements as follows: Policy 3.6.8 Development occurring along the edges of conservation and preservation areas shall be designed to protect and minimize the impact of development on conservation areas through the use of natural vegetative buffers. Buffer width shall be determined on a case-by-case basis depending on what is demonstrated to be scientifically necessary to protect natural ecosystems from significant adverse impact. This determination shall be made in consideration of at least the following factors: Type of development and associated potential for adverse site-specific and off-site impacts; Natural community type and associated hydrologic or management requirements; Buffer area characteristics and function; Presence of listed species of plants and animals. Absent scientific information which demonstrates that a larger or smaller buffer width is appropriate, the following buffer widths shall apply for the resources set forth in the table below. Protected Resource Buffer Distance (feet)** Surface waters and wetlands that do not include the resources listed below 75* Outstanding Florida Waters 200* Areas where listed plant or animal species have been documented within 300 feet of a surface water or wetland 300* from the surface water or wetland Public water supply well 200 * Buffer widths are recommended based on the report, "Calculating Buffer Zone Widths For Protection of Wetlands and Other Environmentally Sensitive Lands in St. Johns County," prepared by Jones, Edmunds & Associates, Inc. in collaboration with Mark T. Brown, Ph.D., University of Florida Center for Wetlands and Water Resources, and Richard Hamann, Esq., University of Florida College of Law, January 2000. ** If the buffer precludes all economically viable use of a particular property, development may be allowed within the buffer in accordance with [COSE] policy 3.6.5, and where applicable, [COSE] policies 4.6.6 and 4.7.4. Buffers shall be measured from the outer edge of the protected resource. The 2003 Amendments made no changes to the text of COSE Policy 3.6.8, but changed the table of buffer widths as follows: Protected Resource Buffer Distance (feet)** Surface waters and wetlands less than or equal to 0.5 acre that do not include OFWs or listed animal species as described elsewhere in this table 50 average, 35 minimum Surface waters and wetlands greater than 0.5 acre that do not include the resources listed below OFWs or listed animal species as described elsewhere in this table 75* 75 average, 50 minimum Areas where federally and/or state regulated vertebrate wetland/aquatic dependent animal species listed plant or animal species have been documented within 300 feet of a surface water or wetland 300* from the surface water or wetland 100 average, 75 minimum Outstanding Florida Waters (OFWS) 200* 150 average, 100 minimum Public water supply well 200 * Buffer widths are recommended based on the report, "Calculating Buffer Zone Widths For Protection of Wetlands and Other Environmentally Sensitive Lands in St. Johns County," prepared by Jones, Edmunds & Associates, Inc. in collaboration with Mark T. Brown, Ph.D., University of Florida Center for Wetlands and Water Resources, and Richard Hamann, Esq., University of Florida College of Law, January 2000. ** If the buffer precludes all economically viable use of a particular property, development may be allowed within the buffer in accordance with [COSE] policy 3.6.5, and where applicable, [COSE] policies 4.6.6 and 4.7.4. The referenced COSE Policy 3.6.5, introduced in the 2002 Plan Update and not amended in 2003, provides: Development on land that includes conservation areas shall be sited and designed according to the following standards and consistent with policies under Objective 6.2 [Rural/Agriculture] of the [FLUE] in the rural area: The preservation of conservation areas shall be required on all development sites to the greatest extent possible, consistent with standards which are outlined subsequently in [the COSE]. Density or intensity shall be transferred from conservation areas to non- conservation portions of the property, to adjoining property under common ownership or management and within a unified development, or to other development receivership areas, at a rate consistent with that of the underlying zoning district, but not to exceed the maximum density allowed by the land use designation. When there are no non-conservation areas to which density or intensity may be transferred, the development shall be clustered in the portion of the site that will result in least environmental impact. When connection to central sewer is not required, septic wastes shall be disposed of according to the Comprehensive Plan, land development regulations, and health department standards, and without adversely affecting ecosystem health. Existing landscape connections to other conservation areas shall be maintained so that fragmentation is avoided. The referenced COSE Policy 4.6.6, under Objective dealing with "Surface Water Systems," was introduced in the 2002 Plan Update, was not amended in 2003, and provides: The following activities may be allowed within the buffer subject to standards that regulate environmental impacts: Agricultural and silvicultural operations consistent with Objective 5.5 [Agricultural and Silvicultural Practices]; Water dependent facilities; Minimal impact activities; Activities that serve the overriding public interest; and Development allowed through implementation of [COSE] policy 3.6.5.3, provided that the development impact area shall not exceed the rate of 1/2 acre per ten acres of conservation area, including the footprint of principal and accessory structures and parking, allowing for reasonable access. 175. The referenced COSE Policy 4.7.4, under Objective dealing with "Wetland Ecosystems," was introduced in the 2002 Plan Update and amended in 2003 as indicated below: Development activity shall not be authorized in wetlands or wetland buffers except when all of the following conditions are met: The applicant has taken every reasonable step to avoid adverse impact to the wetland and buffer; and The applicant has taken every reasonable step to minimize adverse impact to the wetland and buffer; and The applicant has provided appropriate mitigation for adverse impact to the wetland and buffer; and The applicant shows that one of the following circumstances applies: Minimal impact activity; or Overriding public interest; or All economically beneficial or productive use of the property is otherwise precluded. The development impact area shall not exceed the rate of 1/2 acre per ten acres of conservation area, including the footprint of principal and accessory structures and parking, allowing for reasonable access. Notwithstanding the above, mitigated impact may be allowed to any isolated poor quality wetland that is less than 0.25 acre in size, provided the total impact area is not greater than or equal to 0.25 acre per development. Poor quality shall be defined in the land development regulations based on factors relative to ecological value. The 2002 Data and Analysis clearly concluded that the 35-foot buffers in the 1991 Plan were inadequate to protect the natural functions of the affected wetlands. The Bird Memo summarized the data as follows: The Conservation/Aquifer Recharge portion of the EAR, as well as the data and analysis supporting the Comprehensive Plan update, are replete with documentation of the inadequacy of the current 35-foot buffer for wetlands and surface waters in Alachua County. Inadequacy is demonstrated by documentation of at least the following nine facts: (1) the direct loss of the extent and quality of wetlands, (2) the degradation of wetland functions, (3) no change in declining water quality trends since implementation of 35-foot buffers, high sediment loads in surface waters, elevated nutrient concentrations in surface waters, groundwater, and springs, poor surface water systems health documented by macroinvertebrate sampling, poor hydrology, including lake drawdown problems, (8) the continued loss, degradation and fragmentation of wildlife habitat in Alachua County, and (9) the decline of native species concurrent with the spread of invasive non-native species. The Bird Memo also contained appendices that included 11 pages of specific citations from the Data and Analysis discussing the inadequacy of the 35-foot buffers and supporting larger buffer widths. The buffers in 2002 COSE Policy 3.6.8 were based on the Data and Analysis in the 2000 Jones, Edmunds & Associates, Inc., report titled "Calculating Buffer Zone Widths For Protection of Wetlands and Other Environmentally Sensitive Lands in St. Johns County," ("JEA Report"). The Bird Memo summarized the JEA Report's findings and Alachua County's response, as follows: Upland vegetative buffers are widely regarded as necessary to protect wetlands, streams, and other aquatic resources. However, buffer size requirements typically have been established by political acceptability, rather than scientific merit. This often leads to insufficiently buffered aquatic resources and the false perception that the resources are being properly protected from potential impacts. Numerous scientific studies have shown that relatively wide buffers (150 to more than 300 feet) are necessary to protect wetlands. (JEA et al. 2000) A dilemma exists. Undersized buffers may place aquatic and wetland resources at risk, while buffers that are sufficiently large to provide full protection may unrealistically deny landowners use of their land. Therefore, it is important to determine the minimum buffer width necessary for protection of most of the resources, or the most sensitive of the resources. Three goals have been identified and used to determine buffer sizes: protection of wildlife habitat; minimization of sediment transport into wetlands; and minimization of groundwater drawdown in wetlands. The JEA report (2000) concludes that a minimum of 300 feet is necessary to reasonably protect a viably functioning wetland ecosystem. A 300-foot buffer would protect approximately 50% of the wetland-dependent wildlife species in freshwater wetlands, and protect water quality from sedimentation by course [sic] and fine sands. In some site-specific cases, such as with silt or clay soils, or from large draw-down structures, a greater buffer distance would be necessary to protect the wetland. Any reduction in the buffer width below 300 feet can impose adverse impacts to the wetland, particularly to the wetland- dependent wildlife species that require a wide surrounding upland area in which to feed, forage, and use as protection from human disturbance. Lesser alternatives would still provide some protection to wetlands; however, any reduction can result in adverse impacts to wildlife populations, as well as degradation of water quality from deposition of fine sediments. The County has chosen an alternative to one large buffer distance. This alternative is intended to provide flexibility while accommodating private property concerns. The Sierra Club Petitioners emphasize the JEA Report's conclusion that "a minimum of 300 feet is necessary to reasonably protect a viably functioning wetland ecosystem." They note that the language of 2003 COSE Policy 3.6.8.2 provides that "[a]bsent scientific information which demonstrates that a larger or smaller buffer width is appropriate," a 100-foot average, 75-foot minimum natural vegetative "default" buffer would apply in "areas where federally and/or state regulated vertebrate wetland/aquatic dependent animal species have been documented within 300 feet of a surface water or wetland." They conclude that providing only a 75-100 foot "default" buffer in an area documented to contain threatened or endangered species habitat within 300 feet would result in the destruction of that habitat between the 75- to 100-foot buffer zone and the 300-foot extent of the documented habitat. This is another instance in which the Sierra Club Petitioners' conclusion requires an assumption of bad faith on the part of the County regulatory authorities. Whether the default buffer is 300 feet or 75 feet, that default buffer applies only in the absence of "scientific information which demonstrates that a larger or smaller buffer width is appropriate." The Sierra Club Petitioners correctly note Michael Drummond's testimony that, under the 1991 Plan, the default buffers were often employed where the existence of wetland- dependent species was suspected, but not verified. Mr. Drummond also testified that application of a 100-foot buffer would not be adequate for listed species. However, Mr. Drummond's testimony does not demonstrate that the County would ignore scientific information demonstrating the presence of endangered species and apply the default buffers regardless of those species' habitat requirements. The undersigned does not agree that it is beyond fair debate that Florida Administrative Code Rule 9J- 5.013(2)(c)5. requires the County to apply the default buffers in habitats where there is a "high potential" for endangered species to occur, but where the species have not been documented. The cited Rule requires the COSE to contain policies that address implementation activities for the "[r]estriction of activities known to adversely affect the survival of endangered and threatened wildlife." 2003 COSE Policy 3.6.8 complies with the language of the rule by addressing known adverse affects. Alachua County was entitled to make a policy choice not to go farther and address potential adverse effects caused by inadequate buffers in areas that endangered species might inhabit.22/ There is no question that the Sierra Club's policy preference would result in greater protection of endangered species and their habitats, actual or potential. However, this fact alone does not compel the County to enact stricter provisions than the relevant statutes and rules require. The Sierra Club Petitioners' focus on the "300 foot minimum buffer" language in the Bird Memo led them to overlook the fact that the Data and Analysis support 2003 COSE Policy 3.6.8, as well as the version in the 2002 Plan Update. The Bird Memo itself recognizes the County's choice of "an alternative to one large buffer distance . . . to provide flexibility while accommodating private property concerns." The Bird Memo expressly recognized that the scientifically preferable wide buffers "may unrealistically deny landowners use of their land." 2003 COSE Policy 3.6.8 reasonably balances the interests noted in the Bird Memo by providing for a site- specific determination of the proper buffer width based on the scientific information at hand. Application of the default buffer is always contingent upon the absence of scientific information.23/ The Sierra Club Petitioners also challenge the 2003 Amendment's change of language in the table of COSE Policy 3.6.8.2 from "listed plant or animal species" to "federally and/or state regulated vertebrate wetland/aquatic dependent animal species." They argue that the evidence showed that limiting the buffer protection in COSE Policy 3.6.8.2 to only federally and/or state regulated species, rather than to all "listed species" as defined in the 2002 Plan as amended, would exclude approximately 14 species from the threatened and endangered species protection of the buffer provision. The 2002 Plan, as amended in 2003, defines "Listed Species" as follows: Those species of plants and animals listed as endangered, threatened, rare, or species of special concern by an official state or federal plant or wildlife agency, or the Florida Natural Areas Inventory (FNAI, includes species ranked as S1, S2, or S3), or the Florida Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants and Animals (FCREPA). These species are targeted for protection for a number of reasons, e.g. they are in imminent danger of extinction, are rapidly declining in number or habitat, or have an inherent vulnerability to habitat modification, environmental alteration, or human disturbance which puts them at risk of extinction. The Bird Memo explains the inclusion of the FNAI and, until the 2003 Amendments, the Florida Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants and Animals ("FCREPA") lists as follows: The use of FNAI and FCREPA sources does not make the list of protected species significantly broader than the list generated from using federal and state agency lists. Rather, it makes protection efforts more accurate and timely because they are based on scientific judgment responsive to changing natural conditions, rather than political listing decisions which can take years in the making. The use of these data sources to identify species for special protection is considered by many ecological professionals, including state and water management district personnel, as the best available data for the purpose of recognizing plants and animals in decline in the state and in Alachua County. The Sierra Club Petitioners argue that there was no basis in either the 2002 Plan Update or the Data and Analysis for 2003 COSE Policy 3.6.8.2 to exclude the FNAI-listed species from the protection they receive at every other point in the Plan where endangered and threatened species protections apply or to exclude non-vertebrates from the buffering provisions of COSE Policy 3.6.8.2. In response, the County initially points out that the category of buffers for listed species was new to the 2002 Plan Update. The County notes that the 1991 Plan essentially deferred to federal and state agencies in the regulation of plants and wildlife and that in crafting the 2002 Plan Update, the County decided to broaden conservation areas to include the habitat of FNAI-listed species. The County incidentally observes that FNAI is a scientific organization with no regulatory function whatever. The County argues that there is no conflict between its decision to generally broaden conservation areas and its decision to create a new wetland buffer category for federal and state-regulated species. The undersigned agrees that it is at least fairly debatable that the County was not required to apply its "listed species" definition to the buffering provision of COSE Policy 3.6.8.2. The Sierra Club Petitioners simply failed to demonstrate the necessary connection between the definition and the buffer category that might establish an internal inconsistency. The mere fact that the 2002 Plan Update employed the term "listed plant or animal species" in the buffer table does not establish a presumption of correctness. The Bird Memo states that the FNAI and FCREPA lists provide "the best available data for the purpose of recognizing plants and animals in decline," and thus supports the County's decision to reference the FNAI list in its "listed species" definition, but does not require the County to include the list for purposes of defining a buffer category. In further defense of 2003 COSE Policy 3.6.8, the County notes that the policy provides flexibility to respond to the needs of individual species by allowing for "buffer averaging," which permits the buffer area to be distributed in a varying width around the wetland, subject to the minimum widths contained in the table. In addition to the increased buffers, the County substantially improved its protection of wetlands by strengthened requirements in proposed COSE Policies 3.6.1324/ and 4.7.4 for avoidance and minimization of impacts. Avoidance and minimization is also facilitated by proposed Policy 3.6.5, which provides for transfers of densities or clustering. The County notes that the updated Plan contains multiple layers of wetlands protection. COSE Policy 4.7.1 provides that wetlands of all sizes are to be regulated, without exception. COSE Policy 4.7.4 limits the development impact area to the ratio of one-half acre of impact to each ten acres of conservation area. If wetland impacts cannot be avoided or minimized, then the strengthened mitigation requirements of COSE Policy 4.7.7 must be met, including a minimum ratio of 5:1 mitigation area to impacted area, a requirement that the mitigation areas be within the County and no mitigation credits for onsite preservation of wetlands, which are required to be protected in any event. Preservation of wetlands and/or other surface waters or uplands cannot be counted as "mitigation" if federal, state, water management district, or local regulations already require protection of the resource in question. In summary, it is at least fairly debatable that the County appropriately responded to the Data and Analysis by its policies on surface waters and wetlands. D. Agricultural Uses The Jonesville Petitioners criticized 2003 COSE Policy 3.1.2,25/ which provides: In primary and secondary conservation areas, the following uses, if otherwise consistent with the Comprehensive Plan, generally shall be permitted to the extent that they do not significantly alter the natural functions of the conservation area: Public and private conservation, recreation and open space uses. Public and private wildlife preserves, game management and refuge areas. Water conservation and retention/detention areas that are determined to be appropriate for stormwater management. Agricultural uses, employing latest applicable best management practices. The Jonesville Petitioners contend that the quoted policy creates an internal inconsistency in the Plan. The inconsistency is said to stem from a conflict between the County's desire to sustain the ecological integrity of natural resource areas that due to their ecological value, uniqueness and particular sensitivity to development activities, require stringent protective measures, and the fact that some of the uses to be permitted in conservation areas, particularly agricultural uses, can be incompatible with the preservation of ecological integrity as defined in the Plan. While there was some expert testimony as to the difficulty of reconciling agricultural and recreational uses with conservation, the weight of the evidence did not demonstrate such an inherent incompatibility as to establish an internal inconsistency in the Plan. The listed uses are to be permitted "to the extent that they do not significantly alter the natural functions of the conservation area," and there was no showing that this qualification is unenforceable by its terms. The County also pointed out that its authority to regulate agricultural activities by way of development controls is limited by statute. The "Florida Right to Farm Act," Section 823.14, Florida Statutes (2003), provides, in relevant part: (6) Limitation on duplication of government regulation.-- It is the intent of the Legislature to eliminate duplication of regulatory authority over farm operations as expressed in this subsection. Except as otherwise provided for in this section and s. 487.051(2)[pesticide regulation], and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a local government may not adopt any ordinance, regulation, rule, or policy to prohibit, restrict, regulate, or otherwise limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified as agricultural land pursuant to s. 193.461 [property tax assessments of agricultural lands], where such activity is regulated through implemented best-management practices or interim measures developed by the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, or water management districts and adopted under chapter 120 as part of a statewide or regional program. . . . (Emphasis added.) More recently, the Legislature passed the "Agricultural Lands and Practices Act," Section 163.3162, Florida Statutes (2003), effective July 1, 2003, subsection (4) of which provides: Duplication of regulation.-- Except as otherwise provided in this section and s. 487.051(2), and notwithstanding any other law, including any provision of chapter 125 or this chapter, a county may not exercise any of its powers to adopt any ordinance, resolution, regulation, rule, or policy to prohibit, restrict, regulate, or otherwise limit an activity of a bona fide farm operation on land classified as agricultural land pursuant to s. 193.461, if such activity is regulated through implemented best management practices, interim measures, or regulations developed by the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, or a water management district and adopted under chapter 120 as part of a statewide or regional program; or if such activity is expressly regulated by the United States Department of Agriculture, the United States Army Corps of Engineers, or the United States Environmental Protection Agency. (Emphasis added.) The Jonesville Petitioners also raised the specter of sham agricultural uses being used as a cover for the conversion of environmentally sensitive properties to residential development. Richard Drummond candidly acknowledged that such conversions could occur if the County were insufficiently diligent as to events on the ground, but also testified that the County did what it could, within the statutory constraints set forth above, to ensure that the updated Plan would circumvent such covert efforts. Both statutes quoted above restrict a local government's ability to restrict a "bona fide farm operation," but neither statute defines the term "bona fide farm operation." In the 2002 COSE definitions, Alachua County provided a definition of "bona fide agricultural purposes" to mean: Good faith commercial agricultural use of the land, provided the land is classified for assessment purposes by the property appraiser as "agricultural" pursuant to Chapter 193, Florida Statutes. In determining whether the use of the land for agricultural purposes is bona fide, the following factors may be taken into consideration: The length of time the land has been so utilized; Whether the use has been continuous; The purchase price paid; Size, as it relates to specific agricultural use; Whether an indicated effort has been made to care sufficiently and adequately for the land in accordance with accepted commercial agricultural practices, including, without limitation, fertilizing, liming, tilling, mowing, reforesting, and other accepted agricultural practices; Whether such land us under lease and, if so, the effective length, terms, and conditions of the lease; and Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable. The Jonesville Petitioners contend that 2003 COSE Policy 3.1.2 creates an internal inconsistency with 2002 FLUE Policies 6.2.10, 6.2.12, 6.2.13, and 6.2.15. The permitted uses delineated in 2003 COSE Policy 3.1.2 do not list residential activity as a permitted use in conservation areas. The cited 2002 FLUE Policies all contemplate some residential development in "strategic ecosystems," which are included in the definition of conservation areas. The Jonesville Petitioners also note that, within 2002 FLUE Policy 6.2.12, silviculture, common water supply systems, and common septic system drainfields are listed as potential uses in conservation areas that are designated as "open space" in clustered rural residential subdivisions, yet none of these uses is listed as permitted in 2003 COSE Policy 3.1.2. They assert that the definition, treatment, and application of the terms "agriculture" and "silviculture" within the 2003 COSE plan amendments create inconsistency and lack of predictability in the application and treatment of the related policies. As to the last point, the County credibly responds that the COSE definition of "agriculture" includes silviculture and that silviculture is considered in the Plan as a subset of agriculture, except in those instances in which some external factor requires a distinction. For example, Objective 5.5, "Agricultural and Silvicultural Practices," and its implementing policies recognize that agriculture and silviculture have distinct best management practices. It is not unreasonable for the County to interpret 2003 COSE Policy 3.1.2 as permitting silvicultural uses in conservation areas within the constraints applied to agricultural uses, where the COSE definition of "agriculture" includes silviculture. As to residential development and its concomitant common water supply and septic systems, it is evident from the FLUE Policies cited by the Jonesville Petitioners, as well as 2003 FLUE Policies 1.3.1e and 6.2.11 and 2002 COSE Policies 3.6.5, 4.10.3.3, and 4.10.4 to 4.10.6, that the Plan will allow for residential development of the least environmentally sensitive portion of a strategic ecosystems property by means of clustering, gross residential density limits, transfers of density, and other design techniques intended to protect ecosystems and private property rights. There is no inconsistency with 2003 COSE Policy 3.1.2 because that policy does not purport to contain the exclusive list of uses allowed in conservation areas, as indicated by its own text and that of the very next policy, 2003 COSE Policy 3.1.3: Primary and secondary cConservation areas shall be developed only in a manner consistent with protection of the ecological integrity of natural resources, and in accordance with standards which are outlined subsequently in this Element. The COSE Definitions provide the following meaning for the term "development activity": Any dredging, filling, excavation, construction of new structures, expansion of existing structures, installation of utilities, roads, personal wireless service facilities, stormwater management systems, septic tanks, bulkheading, land clearing, tree cutting, mechanized vegetation removal and the disposal of solid or liquid waste. Clearly, 2003 COSE Policy 3.1.2 lists certain uses that "generally shall be permitted," but when read in context with other Plan provisions, does not necessarily forbid residential development on certain properties defined as conservation areas. In summary, it is at least fairly debatable that the County appropriately responded to the Data and Analysis by its policies affecting agricultural uses and their impact on conservation. The alleged internal consistencies in these policies were not demonstrated beyond fair debate. Level of Service 2003 Transportation Policy 1.1.2 and Capital Improvements Policy 1.2.4 raise the level of service ("LOS") for rural collector roads from LOS D in the 1991 Plan to LOS C, which is the standard recommended by the Florida Department of Transportation for rural collector roads. The McSherry Petitioners challenged this amendment because the 2002 Plan Update had upgraded the rural collector roads to LOS B. However, the proper point of comparison is from the 1991 Plan to the 2003 Amendments. Further, the evidence produced at hearing did not demonstrate that a higher LOS than C is required for protection of the state or county transportation network. It is at least fairly debatable that the Amendments regarding the LOS for rural collector roads were adequately supported by data and analysis. Conclusion It is found that, as to the 2003 Amendments in their entirety, the County used the best available data and reacted to it appropriately for planning purposes by applying professionally acceptable analysis in review and application of that data.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order finding the 2003 Alachua County Amendments to be "in compliance." DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of October, 2004.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by Rules 9.110 and 9.190, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Attn: Ronda L. Bryan, Agency Clerk, 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 92, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 and a second copy, accompanied by the filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Florida Appellate District where the party resides. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished via Certified U.S. Mail to Oasis Cafe at Key Biscayne, c/o Carlos Flores, 19 Harbor Drive, Miami, Florida 33149; by regular U.S. Mail to the Honorable Darren A. Schwartz, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399- 3060; and by hand delivery to Marc Drexler, Chief Attorney, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business and Professional Regulations, 1940 North Monroe Styeet, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202, this |@¥day of Yezember , 2013. msn For the Division of Hotels and Restaurants 7196 4008 G11) 4516 1240 | SENDERS, RECORD
