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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. JOSEPH R. KENNEDY, 85-000377 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000377 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 1985

The Issue The issues in this cause are those promoted by the filing of an Administrative Complaint by the Department of Professional Regulation accusing the Respondent of various violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. Should the Respondent be found guilty, this action contemplates the imposition of a penalty against Respondent's license as a commercial pool contractor in Florida.

Findings Of Fact 1. Respondent, at all times relevant to this inquiry, was a registered commercial pool contractor having been issued license number RP0041725. This is a license issued by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. 2..On November 18, 1983, Respondent entered into a contract under the name Kennedy Pool and Construction Co., an entity for whom Respondent serves as a qualifying agent in the commercial pool contracting business. This contract was with one Marie Robertson; however, the contract was not for the purpose of construction of a pool. It was for construction of a 20' by 24' block garage. This structure was to be free-standing and would be located adjacent to Ms. Robertson's residence, which is also used in her business. Petitioner's exhibit number 2 is a copy of the contract and reflects the $4,800.00 contract price. Robertson has paid the full amount of the contract and the garage construction was completed in January, 1984. Respondent personally built the garage. Respondent built the garage without obtaining a building permit from the City of Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent also failed to submit plans and specifications to the City of Jacksonville, which set forth the design and placement of this garage structure. Having failed to request a permit or to submit plans and specifications, Respondent made no request of the City of Jacksonville Building Department to inspect the construction related to the garage. Finally, Respondent in his licensure with the State of Florida, and license recognition with the City of Jacksonville, was not authorized to serve as a building contractor engaging in the construction of structures such as the garage in question. The project at issue entailed the pouring of a foundation; the erection of block walls the erection of a roof truss system and the installation of a roof covering of shingles. All of these items were beyond the license recognition which respondent held with the State of Florida and the City of Jacksonville. When the City of Jacksonville discovered the existence of the garage, it made the owner aware that the structure was in violation of the City of Jacksonville Building Code related to the need for obtaining a building permit, and the fact that the garage structure violated the city's set-back requirement. This later item pertained to the fact that given the commercial utilization of the property, on the part of Ms. Robertson, the garage was too close to the city street. As a consequence, Robertson was put to the inconvenience of obtaining and paying for a building permit and gaining a variance from the set-back requirements mentioned. Had the City of Jacksonville been presented with building plans and specifications, this would have alerted the city to the fact that the placement of the garage was too close to the street. When confronted with her difficulty, Ms. Robertson contacted the Respondent to gain his assistance in obtaining a building permit. The Respondent indicated that it was her problem and said that he could not get a permit because the property was business property and not private property. The Respondent was charged by the City of Jacksonville through a notice of violation of local zoning requirements related to the failure to obtain a building permit and the fact that the Respondent was not licensed by the City of Jacksonville to construct a garage at the Robertson residence. Attempts at serving the violations were not successful in that calls to the Respondent and issuance of notice of violations through certified mail, return receipt requested, were not acknowledged by the Respondent.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57489.105489.117489.129
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VERNON AND GLENDA SHAW vs EPI TOWNSEND, LLC AND EPOCH PROPERTIES, INC., 11-005105 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Frink, Florida Oct. 04, 2011 Number: 11-005105 Latest Update: Dec. 19, 2012

The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioners were the victims of a discriminatory housing practice, by allegedly being denied the opportunity to renew the lease of an apartment from Respondents, based upon their race.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners Vernon and Glenda Shaw are husband and wife. They and their children are African-Americans. Respondent EPI Townsend, LLC owns an apartment community located in Gainesville, Florida, known as Uptown Village. Respondent Epoch Management, Inc. (Epoch) manages Uptown Village on behalf of EPI Townsend, LLC. On June 25, 2010, Ms. Shaw submitted an application to lease an apartment at Uptown Village. She listed herself, her husband, and her two children as the proposed occupants. Ms. Shaw noted the family had a dog. She provided her email address on the application, as requested. At the time of application, prospective tenants of Uptown Village are given a document entitled ?Epoch Management, Inc. Rental Application Approval Criteria.? It contains an ?Equal Housing Opportunity? statement and displays the ?Equal Housing? logo approved by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (?HUD?). When she submitted her application, Ms. Shaw acknowledged receipt of the Rental Application Approval Criteria form. The Shaws’ application was approved, and Ms. Shaw subsequently signed a one-year lease (?the Lease?) agreement on June 26, 2010. Soon thereafter Ms. Shaw moved into Apartment 2- 201 of Uptown Village with her children and their dog. Mr. Shaw was living in Alabama at the time and planned on moving to Gainesville at a later date to join his family.1/ At the time the Shaws began their tenancy at Uptown Village, Rhonda Hayden served as the property manager and Stacy Brown as the assistant property manager for Epoch. Both were experienced property managers and both had received Fair Housing training. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown testified that Epoch tries to create a sense of community among its tenants. Its efforts include hosting monthly breakfasts and other events for tenants. Information about upcoming community events is sent to all tenants with email addresses on file via Constant Contact, an on-line social and business networking platform. The email address provided on Ms. Shaw's rental application was entered into Epoch’s Constant Contact list. The Uptown Village Lease The Lease contained several provisions intended to ensure a safe and peaceful living environment for tenants. For example, paragraph 4 of the Lease provided that a resident shall ?. . . not permit any disturbance, noises or annoyance whatsoever detrimental to the comfort and peace of any of the inhabitants of the community or its Landlord.? Similarly, paragraph 30(G) provided that the ?Resident shall ensure that the pet(s) does not, at any time, disturb any other Resident of the apartment community.? The Lease reserved to Epoch the right to determine, in its sole discretion, whether a pet was disturbing residents. The Lease also incorporated a code of community rules (?the Rules?) for Uptown Village, which provided in pertinent part, ?all garbage, refuse and other types of waste shall be placed in garbage receptacles? and that ?loud and boisterous noise or any other objectionable behavior by any Resident or guests is not permitted.? The Rules also noted that the "quiet time" hours of the complex were from 10:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. Paragraph 12 of the Lease provided that a tenant must give 60 days’ advance notice of his or her intent not to renew the Lease. If notice was not given, then the Lease would renew on a month-to-month basis at the then current market rate, plus $50.00. The Shaws' Neighbors The Alcubilla family, who are Hispanic, lived across from Petitioners’ apartment, in Apartment 2-202. The Alcubilla family included a husband and wife, as well as the wife’s mother (Mrs. Alcubilla), who spoke little English. A Caucasian graduate student, Amanda Watson, lived on the third floor of the building directly above the Shaws in Apartment 3-201. A Hispanic tenant, Angelo Caruso, lived with his girlfriend on the same floor as Ms. Watson. In October 2010, four months after the Shaws became residents, the Kohl family moved into Apartment 2-101, the first floor apartment directly beneath the Shaws’ apartment. Trouble in Paradise The Shaws' first rent check, dated July 9, 2010, was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease violation. On July 14, 2010, Epoch issued a reminder to Ms. Shaw advising her that a neighbor had complained about her dog barking all hours of the day. This was a violation of the Lease and the Community Rules. Mr. Shaw joined his family at Uptown Village on or about August 8, 2010. On the day he moved in, Epoch leasing agent Breanne Parks was conducting a survey of the community grounds and noticed empty boxes outside the Shaws’ apartment on the walkway, as well as trash outside another tenant’s apartment. She issued a warning notice to the Shaws and the other tenant in the building. Leaving trash outside of an apartment is a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On August 20, 2010, the Shaws’ rent check was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease Violation. On October 8, 2010, the Shaws were notified by Epoch that they were being assessed a late fee for failure to pay their rent on time. One week later, on October 15, 2010, Epoch sent the Shaws notification about an outstanding balance on their account. The notices concerned Lease violations. On October 21, 2010, Ms. Watson complained to the office about loud arguments and sounds emanating from the Shaws’ apartment the night before. One of the noises sounded like someone or something had been thrown against a wall. Though she feared that someone was being physically abused due to the intensity of the impact, she decided not call the police. In response to Ms. Watson's complaint, Epoch posted a notice on the Shaws’ door for a second time warning them about noise and asking them to be considerate of their neighbors. The noise violation was considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. The same day Epoch posted the noise violation notice on the Shaws' door, Ms. Shaw called the management office and lodged a retaliatory noise complaint against Ms. Watson. As a consequence of this complaint, a warning notice was sent by Epoch to Ms. Watson. The noise violation was considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On November 4, 2010, the Shaws’ rent check was returned for insufficient funds. This was a Lease violation. Epoch allows sworn officers from the Gainesville Police Department to reside on the premises in exchange for services to the community as a Courtesy Officer. At some point during the Shaws' tenancy, Courtesy Officer Farah Lormil, an African-American female police detective, noticed a car belonging to the Shaws parked in an area that was not a designated parking space. This was a violation of Community Rules. Detective Lormil testified that she left a note on the car asking the owner to move the vehicle because "your car doesn't belong here." Detective Lormil also included her name and badge number on the note. At hearing, Ms. Shaw testified that the note read "you don't belong here." Inasmuch as Petitioners did not offer the note in evidence, and given the context in which the note was written (a parking violation), the testimony of Detective Lormil as to the actual wording of the note is the more credible. On December 27, 2010, leasing agent Erin Napolitano wrote a memo to Ms. Parks reporting that Mrs. Alcubilla’s daughter, Mater Alcubilla, had come to the management office the prior weekend to complain about an incident involving Ms. Shaw. Consistent with her memo, Ms. Napolitano testified that Mater Alcubilla had told her that Ms. Shaw had screamed at her family, followed them up and down the stairs to their apartment, and loudly knocked on their door. Mater Alcubilla also accused Ms. Shaw of stating that she knew what type of vehicles the Alcubillas drove and dared them to call the police. The memo recorded Ms. Alcubilla’s daughter as stating the police were called but when they arrived at Building 2, Ms. Shaw already was gone and therefore, no enforcement action was taken. Ms. Napolitano ended her memo to Ms. Parks with a personal observation: ?I just don’t know what to do about all of this but it certainly seems to be escalating.? Whatever the source of the friction between the two families, Ms. Napolitano testified that she had no reason to believe there was any racial animus on the part of the Alcubillas. On December 30, 2010, Ms. Hayden invited Mater Alcubilla to the office to discuss the incident with Ms. Shaw. Following their meeting, Ms. Hayden notated the date of the meeting and substance of their discussion in the Alcubilla’s resident conversation log. Ms. Hayden recorded in her own handwriting: ?Resident very frightened, Resident plans on moving at the end of her lease-Resident claimed Ms. Shaw yelled at her and threatened her and told her she needed to return to her country.? Ms. Hayden considered this to be an interpersonal dispute between the Alcubillas and Ms. Shaw. Also on December 30, 2010, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Parks invited Ms. Shaw to the management office to discuss the Alcubillas’ complaints. Ms. Hayden recorded in the Alcubilla’s resident log that Ms. Shaw denied the Alcubillas’ accusations, became upset and told Ms. Hayden and Ms. Parks that her neighbors needed to mind their own business. Ms. Hayden also noted that the meeting ended when Ms. Shaw got up, stated, ?you wait? and left the office. Based on what she perceived as a threat by Ms. Shaw of continuing trouble with the Alcubillas, Ms. Hayden recorded her intent to notify a Courtesy Officer of the situation. On February 15, 2011, the Shaws received a three-day notice from Epoch for failure to pay rent, and a notice of an outstanding balance due. This was a Lease violation. Three weeks later, on March 4, 2011, the Shaws were issued another three-day notice for failure to pay rent. This concerned a Lease violation. Ms. Watson continued to hear the Shaws' dog barking and loud voices and other noises, included stomping and footsteps, emanating from the Shaws' apartment. On one occasion, the Shaws left Gainesville for the weekend and placed their dog out on the balcony because it barked continuously. The noise and barking interfered with Ms. Watson’s ability to study and to enjoy her residence. On March 5, 2011, Epoch posted a letter on the Shaws' door regarding complaints received from the Shaws' neighbors about the dog barking for hours at a time, often late at night and in particular on March 3, 2011. This concerned a Lease violation. The loud barking, stomping, and talking within the Shaws' apartment did not abate, and on March 9, 2011, Epoch sent the Shaws a "Seven Day Notice to Cure Lease Violation" which cited their violation of Lease Provision 30 and Community Rule Y. On March 17, 2011, Epoch send the Shaws an ?Urgent Outstanding Balance Due? notice regarding their outstanding unpaid utility bill. This concerned a Lease violation. Also on March 17, 2011, an email was generated by Epoch’s answering service which reported that Tara Kohl of Apt. 2-101 had called. The generated message stated Ms. Kohl’s complaint as, ?Apt. Above Very Noisy/Heavy Walking Again.? On March 19, 2011, Ms. Napolitano printed off the email note and called Ms. Kohl to get more information about the complaint. Ms. Napolitano recorded hand-written notes about the conversation on a printed copy of the email which read: ?Last couple nights—beating down on floor–jumping/walking. 3-4 am can hear them all the time.? The email with Ms. Napitano’s hand- written notes was placed in the Kohl’s tenant file. Immediately following Ms. Kohl’s complaint, Ms. Shaw wrote the following note and faxed it to the management office: To Uptown Village On Saturday night, March 19, 2011, I noted a very loud bumping noise coming from my floor. I was home alone and very afraid. I even feared calling the office or security in fear of retaliation. From past experiences when I have voiced a complaint, I receive notes on my door alleging that my dog was barking, that I had trash beside my door, we were stomping, we were too loud and have even found handwritten notes on my car. My family and I can no longer live in such turmoil. Please accept this letter as a formal complaint regarding harassment. If these occurrences continue, I will have no other choice than to contact HUD. Thank you in advance for your help. Glenda Shaw Prior to the date of the faxed letter neither Petitioner had ever complained about discrimination of any kind to anyone at Epoch. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown discussed the content of Ms. Shaw's fax and how to handle its allegations. They viewed Ms. Shaw’s complaint against the Kohls as retaliation against the Kohls for making a complaint about noise from the Shaws’ apartment the day before, and therefore a personal dispute. They also considered whether to respond to Ms. Shaw’s allegation of harassment by Epoch, and decided that any response would just be viewed by Ms. Shaw as evidence of further harassment. They decided to place the faxed letter in the Shaw’s tenant file and take no other action. It was a normal business practice of Epoch to generate a list of tenants whose leases were due to expire within the following 90 days. The list was used to create flyers reminding those tenants to contact the management office regarding renewal. Flyers were sent to each tenant on the list regardless of whether the tenant was in default of the lease or potentially a candidate for non-renewal. A renewal flyer was placed on the Shaws’ door in late March and a second renewal flyer was posted on the Shaws' door the following month. Neither renewal notice elicited a response from the Shaws. On March 25, 2011, Epoch sent the Shaws an ?Urgent Outstanding Balance Due Notice? regarding their overdue utility bill. This concerned a Lease violation. Just prior to Easter, 2011, an Uptown Village tenant asked the management office for permission to hold a private Easter egg hunt for their friends on the community’s volleyball court. Epoch approved the request. Uptown Village residents were not notified of the event through Constant Contact because the Easter egg hunt was not an Epoch-sponsored event. The individual who organized the event made the decision whom to invite. On May 10, 2011, Ms. Shaw came to the management office and was assisted by Ms. Brown. Ms. Shaw accused Brian Kohl of confronting her daughter and calling her ?two-faced.? Ms. Shaw demanded that Epoch take action against Mr. Kohl and stated that if Epoch would not do anything about the situation, she was going to call the police or the Florida Department of Children and Families. Before Ms. Shaw left, Ms. Brown asked about the Shaws' intentions to remain residents upon the expiration of their Lease. Ms. Shaw did not give a definitive answer. Ms. Brown then told Ms. Shaw that if the Shaws decided not to renew, Epoch would not hold them to the 60-day advance notice required by the Lease. Three days after this meeting, Ms. Brown notified Ms. Shaw that Epoch could not send a notice of violation to Mr. Kohl because the accusations against him were not Lease violations. However, Ms. Brown offered to discuss the allegations with Mr. Kohl, a truck-driver who was often on the road. On May 18, 2011, Ms. Brown met with Brian Kohl to discuss Ms. Shaw’s complaint. Mr. Kohl gave his side of the story. After he left, Ms. Brown entered the following note in the Kohl’s resident conversation log: Brian came in wanting to break lease b/c [because] daughter is being harassed by girls in 2-111 and 2-1012/ so badly that she won’t go outside. Told him that one 2-111 should be finish soon (they are on NTV [Notice to Vacate] and the other may too, (2-101) lease expires 6/25. Otherwise would do what I can and to give us the opportunity to help before he moves. Ms. Brown also made an entry in the Shaws' resident conversation log regarding Mr. Kohl’s allegation that the Shaws' daughter was bullying the Kohl’s daughter. The following day, May 19, 2011, Ms. Watson came to the management office and gave notice that she was moving out of Uptown Village when her lease expired in August 2011. She was asked to complete a form entitled ?Notice to Vacate from Resident.? In her own handwriting, she wrote the reason for vacating as ?loud tenants.? The Notice to Vacate from Resident was placed in Ms. Watson’s tenant file as part of Epoch’s regular business practices. At hearing, Ms. Watson testified that she and her fiancé had considered living in her apartment after they married and decided they could not live there due to the continued noise and disturbances emanating from the apartment below. With Ms. Watson’s notice to vacate, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown came to the realization that three tenants in Building 2 had levied complaints against the Shaws and two had made decisions to move out in whole or in part due to the Shaws’ conduct. Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown then conducted a more thorough review of the Shaws’ tenant history, and discussed whether the Shaws should continue to reside at Uptown Village. They called Epoch’s attorneys to get legal advice and left a message. On May 29, 2011, Epoch received a handwritten letter from Tara Kohl making numerous complaints against the Shaws, including loud noises late at night, and the Shaws parking one of their cars in a handicapped parking space. On June 8, 2011, the management office received a hand-written letter from Brian Kohl giving notice of his family’s intent to break their lease and move out. The reasons given all centered on the noise being generated in the Shaws' apartment, and alleged threats that had been made by Ms. Shaw against Ms. Kohl. On June 17, 2011, Ms. Shaw called the management office and spoke with Ms. Brown. Ms. Shaw asked for a copy of her lease, inquired about the shortest lease term possible, and the amount of any rent increase. Ms. Brown did not commit that the Shaws' lease would be renewed nor did she quote a renewal rate. Ms. Shaw continued to press the issue and Ms. Brown finally stated that a normal rent increase on renewal was $100 a month. On June 20, 2011, Ms. Hayden and Ms. Brown spoke to Epoch’s attorneys regarding options for ending the Shaws' tenancy. A decision was made to non-renew their lease as that would cause the least disruption to the Shaws. Ms. Hayden prepared a non-renewal letter, and it was posted on the Shaws' door the same day. Later that afternoon, Mr. and Ms. Shaw came to the management office, met with Ms. Brown, and demanded to know the reason why their Lease would not be renewed. Ms. Shaw insisted that Ms. Brown had told her their Lease would be renewed at a rate of $937.00. Ms. Brown denied she made this statement. Ms. Brown asked Ms. Hayden to intervene in the dispute. Ms. Hayden explained that Epoch had a right to issue a non-renewal notice and that the decision was based on the numerous complaints received about the Shaws. Ms. Shaw insisted that if there were grounds to terminate the Lease for cause, Epoch should issue them a seven-day notice to vacate. Ms. Hayden explained that they had decided to issue a non- renewal notice rather than a notice to vacate to allow the Shaws more time to make arrangements and to foster an amicable parting. Epoch has sent non-African-American, White and Hispanic tenants notices of violation regarding excessive noise and non-payment of rent and fees, and also has terminated leases (through eviction) on these bases. There is no competent substantial evidence in this record to even suggest that the decision to non-renew the Shaws' lease was in any way related to their status as African-Americans. On June 23, 2011, Mr. Caruso’s girlfriend was walking their dog outside Building 2 off leash (in violation of the Rules) when it began to chase the Shaws' son. The dog nipped at their son’s leg but did not draw blood or break his skin. When Mr. Caruso learned of the incident, he came to the Shaws' apartment to apologize. He later returned and asked to take a photo of their son’s leg because he feared Ms. Shaw might bring legal action against him, given her hostility after he had offered her a bag to clean up her dog’s waste on a previous occasion. Ms. Shaw refused to allow Mr. Caruso to photograph her son’s leg. Instead, she told him if he did not leave she would call the police, and if his dog ever attacked again she would report him and have the dog put to sleep. On June 27, 2011, a second non-renewal letter was posted on the Shaws' door to ensure that Petitioner’s understood their lease would not be renewed. The following day the Shaws returned to the management office and insisted that at the end of the June 20th meeting, they had been told their lease would be renewed. Ms. Hayden denied this and reiterated that their lease was being non-renewed based on complaints from neighbors. As the meeting continued, Ms. Shaw became increasingly agitated; she turned to Ms. Brown and asked if Ms. Brown found her to be confrontational. Ms. Brown responded that she thought Ms. Shaw had a ?strong personality.? To that, Ms. Shaw replied, ?It’s my culture.? As the meeting continued, Ms. Shaw began to inject the issue of race into the conversation. For example, in response to Ms. Hayden’s remark that the decision to non-renew was not personal, since she would not even recognize Ms. Shaw if she saw her at a mall, Ms. Shaw stated that ?white people think we all look alike.? As the conversation was taking an uncomfortable turn, Ms. Hayden ended the meeting and referred the Shaws to Epoch’s attorneys if they had any further questions or concerns. In early July 2011, Mr. Caruso was returning to Building 2 after walking his dog on leash and encountered Mr. Shaw. Mr. Shaw told Mr. Caruso to keep his dog away or he would kick it. On July 11, 2011, Ms. Shaw complained to the management office about Mr. Caruso’s dog charging at her while it was on a leash. She noted this was the second incident involving the dog. Ms. Brown told Ms. Shaw she would look into the matter, since this would be considered a violation of the Lease and Community Rules. On July 12, 2011, Ms. Brown spoke with Mr. Caruso’s girlfriend and cautioned her to keep the dog under control. Ms. Brown noted their conversation in both the Shaws’ and Mr. Caruso's resident conversation log. On August 4, 2011, Ms. Watson completed a "Move Out Survey" and in response to a question about what could have been done by management to encourage her to stay, wrote in her own hand-writing: ?Dealt with loud neighbors more consistently and effectively . . .? She added that her reason for leaving was ?loud, inconsiderate tenants.? The Shaws refused to move out by the date given in their non-renewal notice and stopped paying rent. On August 3, 2011, the Shaws dual-filed a charge of housing discrimination (race and color) with the Commission and the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. The charge alleged that Epoch had refused to rent to them, made discriminatory statements, and had offered them less favorable terms, conditions, privileges, services or facilities than other non-African-American tenants. The facts supporting their charge were that they were not invited to the Easter egg hunt; that they had been told their lease would be renewed yet it was not; and that Ms. Hayden had made racist statements. The Shaws did not pay rent for July 2011,3/ and on August 4, 2011, were sent a "Notice to Pay Rent" by Epoch. The Commission investigated the Shaws' charge of housing discrimination and issued a determination on August 31, 2011, finding there was no probable cause to support the claims. On September 29, 2011, the Shaws filed a Petition for Relief from an alleged discriminatory housing practice, giving rise to the instant proceeding. During the pendency of this matter, the Shaws were evicted from Uptown Village for non- payment of rent.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that Respondents did not commit a discriminatory housing practice based upon Petitioners’ race and that the Petition be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of October, 2012.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68760.23760.34760.37
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. DAVID H. HAMILTON, 79-000018 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000018 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 1980

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Hamilton held registered residential contractors license number RR0015037. Hamilton agreed to construct a house in Clearmont, Florida, with a completion date no later than May 1, 1977, for Robert J. and Margaret M. Phlepsen. The construction price was $75,000.00. After construction of the house it was discovered that there existed two violations of the Southern Building Code. First, the "step-down" from the kitchen to the garage was an eleven inch riser contrary to the code requirement that the height of a riser shall not exceed seven and three quarters inches. The second violation occurred through the use of 2 X 8 joists where the code would require 2 X 10 joists. The extra high riser between the kitchen and the garage was apparently caused by an oversight. Hamilton merely failed to install an intermediate step at that location. The second violation occurred because the owner and Hamilton agreed to use the smaller joists in order to save money on the contract price. In neither case is there sufficient evidence to establish that Hamilton's violations were willful or deliberate as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. On June 6, 1978, the Lake County Board of Examiners suspended Hamilton's Lake County Certificate of Competency because of violations of building code requirements in the construction of Phlepsen's house.

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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. LEONARDO SANCHEZ, 88-003445 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-003445 Latest Update: Dec. 29, 1988

The Issue At the commencement of formal hearing, Petitioner voluntarily dismissed Paragraphs 5 and 7 of the pending Administrative Complaint, and the formal hearing proceeded upon Paragraphs 1-4 and 6 of the Administrative Complaint. The Department of Professional Regulation prosecuted Respondent for one count of the following enumerated alleged violations: Sections 489.129(1)(d), willful or deliberate disregard of building codes; (j), failure in any respect to comply with the Act; (m), fraud, deceit, or gross negligence; and 489.105(4), Florida Statutes, all of which arise out of a single incident.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the Administrative Complaint, Respondent, Leonardo Sanchez, was licensed by the State of Florida as a certified general contractor holding license numbers CG C004810 and CG CA04810. Robert G. Wolf, Investigator Specialist II with Petitioner, investigated a complaint made by Mirta Garcia against a contractor named Leonardo Sanchez. Ms. Garcia told him she had entered into a contract with a Mr. Sanchez; that she had paid Sanchez a sum of money for an addition to her house; that Sanchez never supplied her a written contract; and that Sanchez pulled a permit for the work and never completed it. Ms. Garcia did not appear and testify at formal hearing and her representations to Mr. Wolf are mere hearsay. They do, however, supplement or explain other competent proof. Mr. Wolf spoke with a Mr. Sanchez who, in Mr. Wolf's words "acknowledged the contractual relationship with the Garcias." (TR-15) Mr. Wolf visited Ms. Garcia's home and determined that a job of construction had been begun there but that interior work had yet to be completed. John Delaney is Assistant Chief Code Enforcement Officer for the Board of Rules and Appeals for the Building and Zoning Department, Dade County. He also visited the Garcia home and on August 18, 1987 it was approximately 80 per cent complete, in his opinion. He presented as a certified business record, a building permit application for an owner "Mirta Garcia" by "Caribean Window" [sic] applied for in the name of Leonardo Sanchez, dated "accepted 12/9/85," and carrying the contractor number CGC004810 and the social security number 109-42- 4859 (P-2). The contractor number and social security number on the application match Respondent's contractor's license and social security number. "Caribbean Window" is one of the entities for which Respondent is the registered qualifying agent. Dade County Ordinance 57-22 establishes that the South Florida Building Code was in effect in Dade County at all times material to this Administrative Complaint. Section 305.2(a) of the South Florida Building Code establishes a mandatory duty for the permit holder to obtain a reinforcing inspection. Mr. Delaney also presented a certified computer printout of a Building Inspection log or record (P-3) showing that no one, including Respondent, had obtained the required reinforcing inspection related to the Garcia job as of the date of the computer inquiry. The computer printout reflects the dates of other inspections and the date and number of the application to which it pertains; it does not clarify when Mr. Delaney made his computer inquiry but a reasonable inference is that it was made the date of his visit to the Garcia home, August 18, 1987. No reason was presented to excuse Respondent as permit holder from obtaining the appropriate inspection.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(d), assessing an administrative fine therefor of $250.00, and dismissing the remaining charges. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of December, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3445 The following constitute specific rulings upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF) pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner's PFOF 1-7 are accepted as modified to reflect the evidence of record. Respondent's PFOF Respondent submitted no proposals. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 G. W. Harrell, Esquire, and Donald Osterhouse, Qualified Representative Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Leonardo Sanchez 12700 Southwest 37 Street Miami, Florida 33175 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (3) 120.57489.105489.129
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. RUBEN S. ARES, 83-003402 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003402 Latest Update: Dec. 04, 1990

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent Ruben S. Ares was a certified general contractor in the State of Florida holding license number CG CO 14769. Sentinel Building Company of Central Florida, Inc. was engaged in the business of building residential homes for sale. It was the practice of Sentinel Building to buy the land, engage the services of a general contractor to obtain a building permit and help in the supervision and consultation on construction and sell the hones built to others. The contractors were paid a fee of between $250 and $500 per residence for obtaining permits and providing consultation and services. The Vice-President of Sentinel Building was responsible for hiring and paying subcontractors and suppliers. Sentinel Building was not a Florida licensed general contractor, nor was it qualified by respondent or other Florida registered or certified licensee to engage in the business or contracting in Florida. Respondent Ares was not an officer, stockholder, member of the board of directors or employee of Sentinel Building Company. In 1980, respondent entered into an agreement with Sentinel Building to act as the general contractor for the con- struction of at least four residences. His responsibilities were to supervise the construction of the hones and obtain all necessary permits, including the original building permit and the final certificate of occupancy. The responsibility for engaging subcontractors and ordering and purchasing materials and supplies remained with Sentinel Building Company. Respondent was paid a fixed fee of $350 per house. During the period of time in which four residences in Seminole County were constructed, respondent held another full time job with a building company for which he worked 43 to 44 hours per week. His activity with Sentinel Building consisted of obtaining permits and periodic checks on the construction work. According to respondent, his inspections on construction activity occurred once every three to ten days and consumed approximately too to four hours of respondent's time per week. In 1980 and 1981, respondent applied for and obtained building permits for four single-family residences in Delmar Estates, Seminole County. The applications and permits listed Sentinel Building as the owner of the property and respondent Ruben S. Ares as the contractor. At least one of the four homes was under a contract of sale prior to construction. Three of the four purchasers were under the impression that the homes were built by Sentinel Building. None of the three had ever met respondent Ares, nor were they aware that he was the general contractor.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(e) and (f), Florida Statutes, that an administrative fine in the amount of $1500 be imposed against respondent and that the remaining charges of the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. Respectfully submitted and entered this 22nd day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Aldo Icardi, Esquire P.O. Box 879 990 Lewis Drive Winter Park, Florida 32790 James Linnan Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202

Florida Laws (4) 489.113489.119489.128489.129
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. ALVIN C. SMITH, 82-000705 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000705 Latest Update: Jan. 31, 1983

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified general contractor holding license number CG C008351. Respondent obtained Osceola County Building Permits and agreed to help property owners construct improvements or additions to four motels located in Osceola County, Florida. (Testimony of Record, Popesco, Matay, Solms, respondent.) Specifically, on January 29, 1980, respondent pulled Osceola County Building Permit ("building permit") No. 364-80B to construct the Record Motel, an 11-unit motel owned by Frank B. Record. On March 17, 1981, respondent pulled building permit No. 694-81B to construct a five-unit addition to the Record Motel; on January 30, 1980, he pulled building permit No. 2613-80B to add eight units to the Lakeview Motel owned by Michael Popesco; on February 2, 1980, he pulled building permit No. 2996-81B to construct a 20-unit motel known as The Key Motel, owned by Reinhold Matay; on April 8, 1981, he pulled building permit No. 3087-81B to construct a second floor addition to The Key Motel; and on March 2, 1981, he pulled building permit No. 3038-81B to construct a 20-unit motel known as the Siesta Motel, owned by Herbert Solms. (Stipulation dated June 30, 1982.) II. Respondent had a similar working arrangement with each motel owner, none of whom were licensed contractors. As the general contractor, he pulled the necessary building permits. He would perform the carpentry work on each project. The owners actively supervised and participated in their building projects. After consulting with respondent, they solicited, selected, and awarded bids to electrical, masonry plumbing, paving, and drywall subcontractors. They paid subcontractors directly and supervised their work daily. Respondent, however, would inspect the job sites intermittently, usually on weekends, sometimes during the week. But he did not directly and actively supervise the subcontractors; some were even unaware that he was the general contractor for the job. (Testimony of Record, Popesco, Matay, Solms; P-3, P- 10.) No evidence was presented to establish that the owners, for compensation, constructed these improvements for others or for resale to others. All the buildings were constructed in a satisfactory manner. The buildings passed all inspections, and the owners are entirely satisfied. (Testimony of Record, Popesco, Matay, Solms, respondent.) The owners of the various motels did not act as "contractors" within the meaning of Section 489.105(3), Florida Statutes (1981).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against respondent be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1982.

Florida Laws (7) 120.57489.103489.105489.113489.119489.127489.129
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. THURSTON L. BATES, 79-002175 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002175 Latest Update: Mar. 26, 1981

Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, the Respondent was licensed as a contractor by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. His license for the 1979-1981 license period had not been renewed at the time that the hearing was conducted, and he was therefore delinquent. [This finding is determined from Petitioner's Exhibit 1.] During June, 1977, the Respondent entered Into a contract with Emily D. Wohanka and Ruby Sue Dennard. Ms. Wohanka and Ms. Dennard, who are sisters, agreed to purchase a lot in Satellite Beach, Florida, and the Respondent agreed to construct a single-family dwelling on the lot. The parties agreed to an addendum to the contract during July or August, 1977. The addendum included some specifics with respect to construction and provided: Home will be complete and ready for occupancy within a reasonable period of time--normally three to five months. [This finding is determined from Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 9, and the testimony of Wohanka and Jordan.) The lot which Ms. Wohanka and Ms. Dennard purchased was not cleared until December, 1977. No progress on construction was made during January or February, 1980. The Respondent obtained a building permit from the City of Satellite Beach, Florida, on February 20, 1978. Construction work commenced in either March or April, 1978. By June, 1978, Ms. Wohanka became concerned that work was commencing too slowly. She told the Respondent that she needed to move in by the end of July. Respondent told her that it was probable that construction would not be completed until mid-August. By September, the project was still not completed. Ms. Wohanka tried to reach Respondent by telephone, but he would not return her calls. She tried to locate him at home, but no one would answer the door. She complained to the building official in the City of Satellite Beach, but the building official had similar problems reaching the Respondent. Ms. Wohanka also complained to N. M. Jordan, the real estate agent who had negotiated the contract. Ms. Jordan was able to locate the Respondent, and the Respondent told Ms. Jordan that he could not complete the project because he was losing money. In late September or early October, Ms. Wohanka and her sister located the Respondent at his home. The Respondent was just walking out of the front door when they arrived. The Respondent told them that he could not discuss the matter, that he had turned it over to Ms. Jordan, and that he was not a part of it anymore. [This finding is determined from Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 3; and from the testimony of Wobanka, Hijort, and Jordan.] When Ms. Wohanka contacted the Respondent in late September or early October, no work had been done on the project for at least a month, and the house was not completed. Light fixtures, appliances, and air conditioning had not been installed. Cabinets and other fixtures were stored in a bathroom. Inside doors had not been installed. Flooring was not completed. No sidewalks or concrete driveway had been constructed. There had been no landscaping or sodding, and the sprinkler system had not been installed. The plumbing was not operational. Ms. Wohanka contracted with a new builder to complete the project. She was able to move into the residence on December 28, 1978, but work was not finally completed until late January, 1979. Additional expenses beyond those agreed to by the Respondent were incurred by Ms. Wohanka. The Respondent had drawn on a construction loan; but, there is no evidence in the record that the Respondent used these funds for any purposes other than the construction of the dwelling. [This finding is determined from the testimony of Wohanka.] During July, 1977, the Respondent entered into a contract with James and Eleanor A. Lawrence. The Lawrences agreed to purchase a lot in Satellite Beach, Florida, and the Respondent agreed to construct a duplex dwelling on the lot. The Respondent obtained a building permit from the City of Satellite Beach on February 22, 1978. Unknown problems developed, and the project was not being completed. The Satellite Beach building official had difficulty locating the Respondent, but he was ultimately assured by the Respondent that the project would be completed. The Respondent told the realtor who negotiated the contract, Ms. Jordan, that he could not complete the 3 reject because he was losing money. The Lawrences did not testify at the hearing, and specifics regarding their relationship with the Respondent are not known. It is not known whether the Respondent abandoned the project uncompleted without notifying the Lawrences, or whether some agreement was made between them regarding completion of the project. There is no evidenced that the Respondent diverted any funds from the project. [This finding is determined from the testimony of Hjort and Jordan.] No building codes from the City of Satellite Beach were received into evidence. There is no evidence in the record from which it could be concluded that the Respondent violated any provisions of the building codes in either the Wohanka or Lawrence transactions.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57489.129
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FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS ON BEHALF OF JEANNETTE SHAW-PEREZ vs CITY OF HOLLY HILL, 11-003319 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jul. 01, 2011 Number: 11-003319 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 2012

The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference in the exercise of her rights in connection with Respondent?s regulatory actions regarding rental property owned by Petitioner, in violation of section 818 of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011).

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, an African-American woman, owns and manages a residential tri-plex rental unit located at 302 Dubs Drive, Holly Hill, Florida. Dubs Drive is zoned R-2 single-family residential. Petitioner?s tri-plex was constructed in 1955, and is grandfathered as a non-conforming use. The other houses on Dubs Drive are newer, and are all single-family homes. Petitioner purchased the tri-plex in 1998. At the time of her purchase, the tri-plex consisted of a single-story building with 3 apartments and two garages, and was configured, from south to north, as a two-bedroom apartment, a two-bedroom apartment, a one-bedroom apartment, a garage with a washer/dryer connection, and a garage with a toilet. The garages had drywall interiors, except that the ceilings lacked drywall. After she purchased the tri-plex, Petitioner hired Arthur Kowitz, a realtor, to manage the property for her. He performed management services from the time of the purchase until 2001. Mr. Kowitz is white. In 2001, Petitioner retained All-Florida Realtors to manage the property. All-Florida performed management services from 2001 to 2004. All-Florida is a white-owned company. In 2004, Petitioner retained John Benzette to manage the property. Mr. Benzette performed management services from 2004 through November 2007. Mr. Benzette is white. In 2004, Petitioner applied to Respondent for a permit to install an electric meter at the tri-plex. The purpose of the meter was not to serve the apartments -- each of which already had meters by which the tenants individually received and paid for service -- but was a “house meter” or “landlord?s meter” for exterior lighting, garage lighting and outlets, and other uses common to the tri-plex. The permit was issued, and the meter was installed. During one of the 2005 hurricanes that hit the area, the meter was knocked off of the unit by falling debris. It was not reinstalled at that time. The property managers from 1998 through 2007 were responsible for general maintenance and repair activities. Those types of activities did not require building permits. From the time she purchased the tri-plex in 1998, until 2008, the unit was not subject to any formal code-enforcement actions by Respondent. Starting in December, 2007, Petitioner began managing the tri-plex on her own. One of the first activities she performed as owner/manager was the conversion of the garage on the northern end of the building -- separated from the apartments by the other garage -- to a living space. That was accomplished by removing the garage door, constructing a block wall with a window and exterior door, completing interior drywall work, and installing a shower. Petitioner did not apply for or receive a building permit for the work. As part of the construction, Petitioner had the electric meter that was knocked off in 2005 renovated and reinstalled onto the unit. When Petitioner requested service from Florida Power & Light, Florida Power & Light contacted Respondent to confirm a legal connection. Respondent sent employees Mark Ballard and Tim Harbuck to the tri-plex. At that time, it was determined that Petitioner had performed construction without a building permit. Respondent?s employees initially thought the new living space was to be rented as a fourth apartment, an act that would have constituted an unallowable expansion of the non- conforming use of the property. Their belief was not unreasonable, as the configuration of the converted garage was conducive to its being used as a separate apartment, and since Petitioner subsequently placed a “For Rent” sign on the unit, despite the fact that she was living in apartment #3 at the time. However, Petitioner has denied that the rental of the converted garage as a separate unit was her intent, but that the converted garage was intended as an added room for apartment #3. Regardless of whether the conversion of the garage was intended to result in a separate apartment, the construction required a building permit. As a result of the determination that the construction was not permitted, the meter was removed on February 8, 2008. The requirement that the meter be removed, despite the 2004 permit, was not related to Petitioner?s race, but was related to the unauthorized construction and intended use of the converted garage. On April 25, 2008, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notice to Appear at a hearing before a special magistrate. The notice provided that the purpose of the hearing was the “violation of City Ordinance Building Permit Required.” The hearing was set for May 14, 2008. Petitioner asserted that she called the telephone number printed on the notice to ascertain the purpose of the May 14, 2008, hearing. She alleged that she was told by an unnamed city employee that the hearing was to be held regarding issues pertaining to her rental license. The evidence of the call was entirely hearsay, and was not corroborated by any non- hearsay evidence. Regardless of the substance of the telephone call, the notice plainly stated that the purpose of the hearing was related to a required building permit. The hearing was held as scheduled on May 14, 2008. At the hearing, Petitioner was advised that the subject of the hearing was the unpermitted construction at the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner, claiming to have had no knowledge of the subject of the hearing, requested a continuance to retain an attorney to represent her. The request was denied. At the hearing, it was determined that, at a minimum, Petitioner removed the garage door, blocked up the front of the garage and installed a door and window in its place to convert it to living space, and installed a shower. On May 22, 2008, the special magistrate entered an Order of Non-Compliance in which he concluded that Petitioner violated the Holly Hill Zoning Ordinance requiring a building permit for the work done on the property, required Petitioner to obtain a building permit, and imposed an administrative fine of $250.00. If the corrective measures were not taken, or the fine was not paid, the Order authorized an additional penalty of $150.00 per day, and authorized Respondent to place a lien on the Dubs Drive location. Petitioner was warned that she was not to use the renovated garage as a separate dwelling unit, but could only use it as an addition to apartment #3. The action by Respondent to enforce its building code was entirely appropriate, and was undertaken with all due process rights having been afforded to Petitioner. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s reaction to Petitioner?s unpermitted construction, or that Respondent failed to enforce its building code, including permit requirements, against similarly-situated property owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Petitioner paid the administrative fine on June 2, 2008, and received the after-the-fact building permit on June 10, 2008. On September 5, 2008, Respondent placed a lien on the Dubs Drive location based on its mistaken belief that Petitioner had failed to pay the $250.00 administrative fine. The notice of lien letter was received by Petitioner on November 18, 2008. Petitioner advised Respondent that she had paid the fine. Ms. Sue Meeks confirmed that the fine was paid, and Respondent promptly recorded a satisfaction of lien. The evidence indicates that the decision to record the lien was a bureaucratic error that was immediately corrected. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race was Respondent?s motive for recording the lien. A business tax receipt is required for each of the three apartments at the Dubs Drive location in order for Petitioner to engage in the business of real estate rental. Authorization for the business tax receipt was adopted by ordinance by Respondent in July, 2000, and is applicable to all rental units in the city of the type owned by Petitioner. Prior to July 2000, Respondent did not require an owner of a small rental location to obtain a business tax receipt. The business tax receipt ordinance required Respondent to perform annual inspections of businesses within its municipal boundaries. The inspections were started in 2000 or 2001. Business tax receipts are issued for a term from October 1 to September 30 of each year. If a business tax receipt is not renewed on time, Respondent is authorized to assess a 25 percent penalty, plus additional filing fees. For 2008-2009, Petitioner timely paid the business tax receipts for apartment Nos. 1 and 2. The tax was $45.00 for each apartment. Petitioner failed to pay the business tax receipt for apartment #3 until March 2009, after the renewal date had passed. Therefore, a penalty and additional filing fees were assessed which raised the business tax receipt fee for that apartment to $70.00. Petitioner alleged that Respondent “overcharged” her for the apartment #3 business tax receipt, which she construed as evidence of a pattern of discrimination. The evidence demonstrates that the $70.00 charge was the result of Petitioner?s failure to timely renew, and was not the result of discrimination based on her race. There was no evidence presented to support a finding that Petitioner?s race had anything to do with Respondent?s assessment of late penalties and fees, or that Respondent failed to assess such late penalties and fees against similarly-situated rental apartment owners who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. On or about February 6, 2009, Respondent issued a violation notice alleging that Petitioner failed to renew her business tax receipt for apartment #1 and #2. The notice was posted on the doors of the apartments on February 10, 2009. The notice allowed three days to correct the violation, a period that had already passed when the notice was received. Petitioner had already paid the business tax receipt, and went to city hall to inquire about the violation notice. She was advised that her check, identified by Petitioner as check #486, had not been received. Petitioner went to Bank of America to stop payment on check #486, for which a banking fee of $30.00 was assessed. Upon her return to city hall, Petitioner was advised that a search had resulted in the discovery of check #486 on a city employee?s desk. It had not been cashed. Petitioner wrote a replacement check. Respondent credited Petitioner?s utility bill for $30.00 to reimburse her for the Bank of America stop-payment charge and the matter was resolved without further ado. Petitioner alleged that the incident was “harassment,” which she construed as further evidence of discrimination. To the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the violation notice was a minor bureaucratic error that was promptly corrected, and for which Petitioner was made financially whole. There is no evidence in the record that the incident was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On February 19, 2009, Petitioner wrote Respondent to express her belief that she was being overcharged for water. She had a single meter to serve the Dubs Drive tri-plex, but was being charged for three connections. In fact, Petitioner had three apartments. In such cases, Respondent bills for each unit served by a single “master meter.” The minimum bill per apartment includes 2000 gallons of water per month, with additional usage added as an additional charge. Respondent billed for three connections at the Dubs Drive location since at least 1997, prior to Petitioner?s purchase of the tri-plex. Petitioner inquired whether she could have separate meters installed for each apartment, rather than having minimum and total bills determined by the “master meter.” Respondent would not allow separate meters since the Dubs Drive tri-plex was a non-conforming use in a single-family zoned area, and the installation of separate meters would “enhance the non- conformity.” Respondent?s approach to billing for water in multi- family locations accounts for the demand created by three families versus one family. The evidence demonstrates that Respondent bills all multi-unit complexes in a manner to account for the demand of multiple family consumption on its water facilities. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s billing practice for water consumption was applied to Petitioner differently from any other multi-family facilities, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 3, 2009, as a result of an annual inspection conducted as part of the business tax receipt process, Respondent cited Petitioner for several deficiencies at the Dubs Drive tri-plex, including a lack of smoke alarms, some windows that would not open, and a lack of GFI (ground-fault interrupter) electrical outlets at one location in apartment #1, and two locations in apartment #2. GFI outlets are commonly known to prevent shocks, and are required at locations where the outlets may be exposed to water, e.g. kitchens and bathrooms. Petitioner installed the GFI outlets. There was no other sanction or penalty. There is no evidence in the record that the requirement that Petitioner install a reasonable and necessary safety feature in apartments being rented to others was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On or about March 24, 2009, during the follow-up compliance inspection of the tri-plex, one of Petitioner?s tenants advised the inspector that Petitioner had been living in the converted garage for two months, and was receiving mail in “mailbox #4” during that period. The use of the converted garage as a separate living unit would be a violation of Respondent?s zoning ordinance regarding limitations on the expansion of a non-conforming use, and would have violated the special magistrate?s Order entered at the May 14, 2008, hearing. As a result, Respondent issued violation notices to Petitioner on March 24, 2009, and March 27, 2009, each of which concerned the use of the converted garage as a separate living unit. The March 27, 2009, notice indicated that Petitioner and Respondent were “working to resolve” the issue. On March 31, 2009, Respondent provided Petitioner with a letter resolving the separate living unit issue that stated: This letter is to inform you of the requirements of Compliance in reference to 302 Dubs Ave. Your triplex must not be occupied by more than 3 separate families. The new addition on the north end of the building can be used in conjunction with #3, [b]ut can not be used as a separate unit. Mailbox #4 must be taken down within 45 Days of this date. (March 31, 2009) The letter contained nothing more than a straight-forward recitation of the terms and conditions applicable to the non- conforming residential structure. Respondent imposed no penalties or sanctions. There is no evidence to suggest that Respondent imposed terms or conditions on the use of the tri- plex different from any other similarly-situated non-conforming structure. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent?s response to the tenant?s statement that Petitioner was using the converted garage as a fourth apartment was either disproportionate under the circumstances, or was the result of discrimination based on Petitioner?s race. On April 30, 2009, the tenants of apartment #2 wrote to Petitioner with a long list of complaints regarding the conditions at the apartment that, on their face, were very serious, and which included structural, electrical, plumbing, and safety issues. The couple that lived in the apartment was white. The fact that the tenants were white does not minimize the fact that their concerns were legitimate. Having received no response to their complaints, the tenants called Respondent about the living conditions. In accordance with Respondent?s routine practice regarding complaints, Ms. Meeks was dispatched to inspect the property. Her inspection of apartment #2 confirmed the tenant complaints. Ms. Meeks also inspected apartment #1 at the request of the tenants of that apartment, and noted problems with “the bottom of the walls pealing [sic.] off and has some kind of bugs that are biting the children that live there.” The tenants also provided Ms. Meeks with a list of dates on which they alleged Petitioner had been staying in the converted garage which, if true, would have indicated that Petitioner used the addition as a separate living unit for more than 50 days over a three-month period. Respondent sent Petitioner a letter detailing the problems observed during the inspection, and advising Petitioner that her issues would be taken up at a hearing before the Special Master on July 8, 2009. The letter was received by Petitioner on June 15, 2009. The time between the letter and the scheduled hearing was ample time for Petitioner to correct the problems. On June 24, 2009, Respondent served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear at the July 8, 2009, hearing. On June 25, 2009, and June 29, 2009, Respondent obtained written statements from the tenants of apartment #2 detailing the problems that they had encountered with their leased apartment. Their statements were consistent with their earlier descriptions and the results of the inspection. On July 7, 2009, Petitioner requested a continuance of the July 8, 2009, hearing due to the death of her father. The request was granted by notice dated July 15, 2009, and the hearing was continued to August 12, 2009. Respondent was directed to “bring proof of her father?s passing” to the August hearing. On July 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for the August 12, 2009, hearing. On August 12, 2009, a hearing was convened before the special magistrate. Petitioner was represented by counsel. At the hearing it was determined that the back door of apartment #2 had been replaced to the tenant?s satisfaction, though Petitioner failed to obtain a building permit for the same, and that the electrical issue with the GFI outlet and the water heater breaker had been resolved. It was ultimately determined to be in the best interest of all of the parties to have the tri-plex inspected by Respondent, and to reconvene the hearing in September, 2009. Petitioner asserted that the August 12, 2009, hearing was continued because a white tenant had not appeared at the hearing to testify against her. The record does not support that reason. An Order Continuing Case was entered on August 26, 2009. The Order noted that Petitioner had not produced evidence of her father?s death as instructed. On August 27, 2009, Respondent reissued a Notice to Appear for September 9, 2009. On August 18, 2009, Respondent conducted an inspection of the tri-plex. It was determined that some of the deficiencies identified in the June notice had been made, but others had not. The hearing was reconvened on September 9, 2009. Petitioner was represented by counsel. After considerable discussion, it was determined that Petitioner had substantially resolved the issues identified in the June notice, some more recently than others. The special magistrate assessed a $250.00 administrative fine for the initial items of non-compliance resulting in the need to have the hearings, and $300.00 for failure to make repairs within a reasonable period after the initial notice in June. Petitioner also produced a copy of her father?s obituary as proof of his death in July. An Order of Non-Compliance reciting the outcome of the hearing was entered on September 25, 2009. The Order was not appealed. Petitioner stated her belief that the requirement that she provide evidence of her father?s death to substantiate the basis for the July 7, 2009, request for continuance was imposed as a result of harassment and discrimination against her due to her race. Although the requirement that she produce an obituary or the like seems insensitive and unnecessary, there was no evidence that Petitioner?s race was the basis for the request, or that such a requirement was not imposed on all persons seeking a continuance of a code enforcement hearing, regardless of race. On November 4, 2009, the special magistrate, after having received evidence of the completion of the repairs from Respondent, entered an Order of Compliance by which he found all of the deficiencies at the Dubs Drive location had been satisfactorily resolved. Petitioner has alleged that the code enforcement actions taken by Respondent were part of a pattern of harassment and intimidation directed at her because of her race. She argued that her white property managers were not cited for violations, thus establishing evidence of racial bias. While it is true that some of the violations for which Petitioner was cited concerned issues that pre-dated Petitioner?s assumption of management duties in December 2007, e.g., the use of interior- grade doors being used as exterior doors and the lack of GFI outlets, there was no evidence that Respondent ever noticed those deficiencies, or that any tenant had ever complained. The evidence demonstrates that the triggering event that drew the attention of Respondent?s code enforcement section was not Petitioner?s race, but was Petitioner?s unpermitted conversion of the garage into living space. The other triggering event was the complaint filed with Respondent by Petitioner?s tenants that alleged crumbling infrastructure, including the very poor condition of the exterior doors. Both incidents properly resulted in thorough inspections. There was no event at the Dubs Drive location prior to December 2007, that would have resulted in increased scrutiny. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Respondent?s actions were reasonable and appropriate responses to conditions at the Dubs Drive location that were brought to its attention by the actions of Petitioner and her tenants, conditions for which Respondent would have been remiss had it failed to act. The evidence in this proceeding does not support a finding that Respondent?s actions were taken due to Petitioner?s race. The evidence produced at the hearing contained not a shred of competent, substantial evidence that would support a finding that Respondent took any action regarding the Dubs Drive tri-plex because of Petitioner?s race. Rather, the evidence supports a finding that Respondent was appropriately exercising its police powers to ensure that rental dwelling units within its jurisdiction are safe and sanitary. If anything, Respondent and the special magistrate treated Petitioner with considerable patience, restraint, and leniency given the nature of the non- compliance resulting from the unpermitted renovations, and from the delays in making necessary repairs to the property. Petitioner?s dated signature on the Housing Discrimination Complaint that forms the basis for this proceeding indicates that Petitioner filed her initial complaint of discrimination no earlier than August 31, 2010. However, the HUD Determination gives two dates on which Petitioner supposedly filed her complaint -- August 13, 2010, and September 2, 2009. Given the findings and conclusions herein that Respondent had no racial animus or bias in its actions regarding Petitioner -- going back to the December 2007 date on which Petitioner assumed her property management duties -- it is not necessary to determine which of the dates is accurate. However, to the extent it were to become an issue with regard to the application of the jurisdictional limits established by section 760.34(2), the most persuasive evidence demonstrates that Petitioner filed her Housing Discrimination Complaint on or after August 31, 2010. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent took any regulatory, utility billing, or code enforcement action regarding Petitioner, or the Dubs Drive location, in an effort to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with Petitioner in the exercise of her rights as an owner of rental housing due to Petitioner?s race. Respondent?s actions were, in each instance, a legitimate response to unpermitted building activities, a correct application of Respondent?s ordinances, or a reasonable response to complaints filed by Petitioner?s tenants. At worst, Respondent committed two minor bureaucratic errors that were quickly resolved, and for which Petitioner suffered no loss. There was no evidence that Respondent applied its code enforcement ordinances or policies in its dealings with Petitioner in a manner that was inconsistent with their application to similarly-situated persons who were not members of Petitioner?s protected class. Having found no evidence to demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2011H0053. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2012.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57760.20760.34760.35760.37
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FLORIDA HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; VOLUSIA HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; AND STAN SHIRAH vs CITY OF DAYTONA BEACH, CITY OF SOUTH DAYTONA, AND CITY OF PORT ORANGE, 03-000131BC (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Jan. 15, 2003 Number: 03-000131BC Latest Update: Jul. 24, 2003

The Issue The issue is whether the local technical amendments to the Florida Building Code adopted by the City of Port Orange and the City of South Daytona comply with the requirements of Section 553.73(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2001).

Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing and the parties' stipulations, the following findings are made: Parties Petitioner Florida Home Builders Association, Inc. (FHBA) is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. FHBA's organizational purpose is to monitor government activity affecting the construction industry and to provide assistance to its local chapters on statewide issues. The local technical amendments adopted by Respondents are within FHBA's general scope of interest and activity because they affect the construction industry and because they have the potential to undermine the statewide uniformity of the Florida Building Code. FHBA has over 15,000 members statewide, including 553 members (approximately 3.69 percent) in Volusia County. FHBA's Volusia County membership corresponds to the membership of the Volusia Home Builders Association, Inc. (VHBA), and includes only 20 members (approximately 0.13 percent) in South Daytona and only 50 members (approximately 0.33 percent) in Port Orange. Petitioner VHBA is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. VHBA is a local chapter of the FHBA. VHBA's organizational purpose is essentially the same as that of the FHBA, except that the scope of its interest is Volusia County and not statewide. The local technical amendments adopted by Respondents are within VHBA's general scope of interest and activity. VHBA has 553 members, all of whom are located in and conduct business in Volusia County. Of those members, 20 (or 3.62 percent) are located in South Daytona and 50 (or 9.04 percent) are located in Port Orange. The members of FHBA and VHBA include all types of persons and businesses involved in the construction industry, including general contractors, sub-contractors (including electrical contractors), real estate professionals, lenders, and attorneys. The record does not reflect the precise number of electrical contractors in either organization. FHBA and VHBA both initiate and participate in legal proceedings on behalf of their members that relate to regulatory issues affecting the home-building industry. Both organizations were duly authorized to initiate this proceeding, and the relief that they are seeking -- invalidation of the local technical amendments -- is the type of relief that is appropriate for them to receive on behalf of their members. Petitioner Stan Shirah is a general contractor whose firm, Shirah Builders, is located in Volusia County. Mr. Shirah is a member of both FHBA and VHBA. Mr. Shirah engages in new home construction, remodeling, commercial development, general construction, and land development throughout Volusia County and central Florida. He has undertaken these activities within the cities of Port Orange and South Daytona in the past, and intends to do so in the future. As a result, he will be required to comply with the local technical amendments. Neither Mr. Shirah nor his firm does electrical installations. That work is done by sub-contractors on projects that Mr. Shirah is the general contractor. However, as the general contractor (and president of his firm), Mr. Shirah is ultimately responsible to the owner for the building's compliance with the applicable regulatory requirements. Mr. Shirah and the members of FHBA and VHBA are affected by the Florida Building Code on a daily basis. A uniform building code is important to them (and, with respect to FHBA and VHBA, their members) because it allows them to conduct their business in any jurisdiction under the same set of rules. Local amendments to the Florida Building Code undermine that uniformity and, potentially, make compliance with the Code more difficult and/or time consuming thereby causing delays in construction and increasing construction costs. Each of the Petitioners participated in the challenge to Respondents' local technical amendments at the Volusia/Flagler Counties Code Compliance Review Board. Respondents are incorporated municipalities located in eastern Volusia County. Each municipality adopted the same nine technical amendments to the Florida Building Code which are at issue in this proceeding. The amendments add more stringent requirements to the National Electric Code (NEC), which is incorporated by reference into the Florida Building Code. Respondents are coastal communities. A small portion of Port Orange's boundary extends to the Atlantic Ocean. South Daytona's boundary does not extend to the Atlantic Ocean, but it abuts the Halifax River, which is a salt-water body. Port Orange also abuts the Halifax River. Adoption of and Challenge to the Local Technical Amendments Adoption of the Amendments City of South Daytona South Daytona adopted the local technical amendments at issue in this proceeding on or about December 11, 2001. The amendments became effective on March 1, 2002, to coincide with the effective date of the Florida Building Code. The amendments were filed with the Commission on April 2, 2002, which is 112 days after their adoption and 32 days after they became effective. The ordinance or resolution through which the amendments were adopted is not part of the record of this proceeding. Nor does the record include agenda items or meeting minutes which might reflect what information or evidence was before South Daytona's City Council when the amendments were adopted. Accordingly, there is no credible evidentiary support for the representation made by South Daytona's attorney at the hearing (and in the interrogatory responses received as Exhibit P2) that the City Council relied upon the findings and recommendations of the Volusia County Unified Code Committee (Volusia UCC) as the basis for adopting the local technical amendments. City of Port Orange Port Orange adopted the local technical amendments at issue in this proceeding on February 19, 2002, through Ordinance No. 2002-10. The first reading of the Ordinance occurred on January 29, 2002. The Ordinance included determinations that "local conditions justify the local amendments"; that "the local amendments do not discriminate against products, materials and construction techniques"; "that the products, materials and techniques referred to and restricted in the local amendments do not have demonstrated capabilities"; and that "it is in the best interests of the citizens of the City of Port Orange to adopt the local technical amendments " The Ordinance also included the following "findings of fact": Port Orange is partially a coastal community and is more susceptible to the effects of corrosion than other non-coastal parts of Florida due to the close proximity of large bodies of salt water. This corrosion has negative, unique, and possibly dangerous, local effects on the following materials rendering these materials unsafe for local use: Aluminum or Copper Clad Aluminum conductors which are smaller than #1 [see NEC Table 310.16]; Service drop conductors and wiring [see NEC Section 336-4]; Ground fault circuit breakers [see NEC Section 680-20]; Swimming pool equipment rooms with wiring not suited for a coercive [sic] environment including galvanized and sheradized conduit [see NEC Section 680-11]; Electrical metallic tubing for protection above ground [see NEC Section 230-50] The Ordinance made no specific findings or determinations with respect to the high wind conditions in Port Orange, nor did it make any specific findings or determinations with respect to the local amendments to NEC Sections 230-52, 230-70, 339-3, or 680-8. The amendments became effective on March 1, 2002, to coincide with the effective date of the Florida Building Code. The agenda package for the City Council meeting at which the amendments were adopted included detailed information relating to the amendments. Specifically, the package included a report prepared by the Volusia Chapter of the Electrical Council of Florida (Volusia ECF) analyzing each of the amendments, the minutes of a meeting of Port Orange's Construction Regulation Board which recommended approval of the amendments after considerable debate, and a vote sheet indicating that the Volusia UCC recommended approval of the amendments. The agenda package also included letters from various electrical engineering firms or consultants expressing their support for the amendments. None of those letters cited specific local conditions that necessitated the amendments. Instead, they focused on the greater protection to the public that would result from the amendments by exceeding the minimum standards in the NEC. The Volusia ECF's report included a general analysis of the fiscal impact of each of the amendments and also included a justification for each of the amendments. In most instances, the justification listed was not a specific local condition such as high winds or the corrosive local environment. Instead, generalized public safety concerns were listed as justifications for the amendments. The agenda package also included letters from the VHBA and the Florida Pool and Spa Association expressing opposition to the amendments upon the basis that they were not supported by any unique local conditions. Also included in the agenda package was a report prepared by Alcan Cable which compared the performance and reliability of aluminum and copper conductors (wires) and concluded that there were no significant differences in the performance of the two types of wires. That study contradicts the justification set forth in the Volusia ECF report for the local technical amendment to NEC Table 310.16. The justification in the Volusia ECF report was apparently accepted by the City Council through its adoption of the amendment to that table. A City of Port Orange staff report, dated January 18, 2002, recommended against approval of the ordinance containing the local technical amendments. The staff report stated: Staff . . . has not contested the fact that certain proposed amendments may be more stringent and create a safer condition than provided in the Florida Building Code. However, we do not feel they meet the criteria in the Florida Building Code, established by State Statute for local technical amendments. Specifically [sic] are not unique to Volusia County or the City of Port Orange as the same conditions exist throughout the State of Florida and are discriminatory against a product. Therefore, staff cannot recommend approval of this ordinance. (Emphasis supplied). Despite that adverse staff report, the agenda for both City Council meetings at which the ordinance was considered -- January 29 and February 19, 2002 -- stated that staff recommended approval of the ordinance. The amendments were sent to the Commission on September 26, 2002, which is 222 days after the adoption of the amendments and 210 days after the amendments became effective. The amendments were received by and filed with the Commission on October 3, 2002. 2. Petitioner's Challenge to the Amendments On or about April 4, 2002, Petitioners initiated a challenge to Respondents' local technical amendments at the Volusia-Flagler Counties Code Compliance Review Board (Board). The Board was established through an interlocal agreement between Respondents and other municipalities in Volusia and Flagler counties, and it serves as the "countywide compliance review board" for those counties in accordance with Section 553.73(4)(b)7., Florida Statutes (2001). The Board conducted a hearing on Petitioners' challenge on November 19, 2002. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board adopted motions upholding the local technical amendments and finding them in compliance with Florida law. On January 3, 2003, the Board memorialized its decision through a "Written Determination" which stated that the local technical amendments adopted by the Respondents "are hereby found to be in compliance with [Section] 553.73(4)(b), Florida Statutes." Petitioners timely "appealed" the Board's decision by filing a petition with the Commission, and this proceeding followed. Substance of and Respondents' Justification for the Local Technical Amendments Generally The local technical amendments modify Sections 210-52, 230-50, 230-70, 336-4, 339-3, 680-8, 680-11, 680-20, and Table 310.16 of the NEC. The NEC was incorporated by reference into the Florida Building Code without modification. Each of the local technical amendments was part of the Respondents' local building codes in effect prior to the adoption of the Florida Building Code. Accordingly, by adopting the amendments, Respondents sought to maintain the status quo within their jurisdictions, at least with respect to the subjects of the amendments. Each of the local technical amendments impose more stringent requirements than the NEC. The local technical amendments do not introduce new subjects into the Florida Building Code. The electrical installations required by the local technical amendments are more costly than those which would be required under the NEC without the amendments. Thus, if the amendments were not part of the local building codes, the cost of electrical installations in Port Orange and South Daytona would be lower. The Commission and the Commission's Electrical Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) considered revisions to the NEC similar to those in the local technical amendments when it adopted the NEC as part of the Florida Building Code. Those revisions were rejected by the Commission and the TAC because there was no Florida-specific justification for them. Respondents contend that the local technical amendments are justified on account of corrosive conditions and/or high wind conditions which purportedly exist within South Daytona and Port Orange. Salt is a corrosive agent, and corrosion can adversely affect electrical equipment. Corrosion also affects other materials, as reflected by the corroded metal pipe received into evidence as Exhibit R4. Coastal communities, to varying degrees, have a higher level of atmospheric salt than inland communities. This higher level of atmospheric salt is experienced by communities in proximity to either the Atlantic Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico, including 35 counties that border on the coast, and, to a lesser extent, other counties that are located close to the coast. The evidence fails to establish that the corrosive conditions in Port Orange and South Daytona are more severe than in all other areas of Florida. Nor does the evidence establish that the corrosive conditions in Port Orange and South Daytona are more severe than in other coastal communities. The Florida Building Code includes a map designating six different wind speed zones in Florida ranging from 90 miles per hour (mph) to 150 mph. Generally, the higher wind speed zones are located closer to the coast, and the lower wind speed zones are inland. The Florida Building Code prescribes stricter construction standards for structures located in higher wind speed zones, but the electrical provisions of the Florida Building Code do not change based upon the wind speed zone designation. The evidence does not establish that the wind conditions in Port Orange and South Daytona are more severe than in all other areas of Florida, or even in all other coastal communities. To the extent that Port Orange and South Daytona experience higher winds than might be experienced in inland communities, they are no different than other coastal communities around the state, or at least those along the Atlantic Ocean. Port Orange is located in the 120 mph wind speed zone, which is not even the highest wind speed zone. Other coastal communities are located in higher wind speed zones, such as Palm Beach (140 mph zone) and the Keys (150 mph zone). 2. NEC Section 210-52 (Separate Circuit for Certain Appliances) NEC Section 210-52 requires certain kitchen appliances to be on dedicated (i.e., separate) circuit breakers, and allows some items to be placed on circuit breakers with other items. The local technical amendment to this section requires more appliances -- dishwasher, refrigerator, freezer, microwave, and water pump systems -- to be on separate circuit breakers. The amendment allows the garbage disposal to be on the small appliance circuit breaker. The circuit breakers are attached to a "bus bar" which is located behind the panel of the breaker box. The breaker box has multiple "bus bars." The breaker box is typically (although not always) placed inside rather than outside where the corrosive conditions that might exist could impact the box. Multiple circuit breakers can be attached to each "bus bar" depending upon its rating. For example, a 60-amp "bus bar" can accommodate four 15-amp circuit breakers or two 30-amp circuit breakers or one 60-amp circuit breaker. The purpose of the amendment is to spread the electrical load from the listed appliances among more circuit breakers, rather than concentrating the load on one or two circuits breakers. The effect of spreading the electrical load among more circuit breakers is to reduce the number of times that the breaker might "trip" on account of an overload. The evidence fails to establish that the amendment would actually have its intended effect, i.e., reducing the possibility of a fire resulting from overloading a corroded "bus bar." Although the amendment prevents multiple appliances from being on a single circuit breaker attached to the "bus bar," it does not prevent those same appliances from being attached to the same "bus bar" on separate circuits breakers. As a result, the same electrical load would be placed on the "bus bar." The evidence also fails to establish that "bus bar" corrosion is a common problem in Port Orange or South Daytona. The burned "bus bar" received into evidence (Exhibit R2) was not in service in either municipality and it was not established that the burning was the result of corrosion. Respondents have not attempted to justify this amendment based upon high wind conditions, and it is not. 3. NEC Section 230-50 (Types of Conduit Allowed for Risers) NEC Section 230-50 establishes requirements for protecting service entrance conductors from physical damage, and specifies five types of conduit which can be used to run the wires through. The conduit is also called a "riser" because the wires in the conduit rise from the meter to the overhead power lines. The local technical amendment to this section eliminates two of the conduit alternatives -- EMT and "other approved means" -- which are comparably the "weakest" means of protecting the service entrance wires. The remaining options are rigid metal conduit, intermediate metal conduit, and rigid nonmetallic conduit (i.e., PVC pipe) suitable for the location. Service entrance conductors are the wires that run from the electric meter at the building, up the side of the building, to the point at which the power company's overhead utility lines come to the building. That point is typically several feet from the structure itself. As a result, there is typically several feet of exposed wire between the top of the conduit in which the service entrance wire is located and the point at which the power company's line is connected. EMT is a metal pipe. The EMT's exterior wall is thinner than that of rigid metal conduit and the other remaining means of protecting the service entrance wires. EMT is commonly called "thin wall" by electricians. "Other approved means" allows flexibility in meeting the requirements of the Florida Building Code. One example of "other approved means" is service entrance cable, which is a cable made up of individual wires wrapped with a copper braid and a protective plastic sheath. Because of its relatively thinner wall, EMT may be more be more impacted by corrosive conditions than rigid metal conduit. However, the evidence does not establish whether the degree to which EMT is more affected is material or not. It is possible that high winds can affect the conduit used to protect the service entrance wires. The winds typically do not blow the conduit itself because the power company and the NEC require the conduit to be securely attached to the wall of the structure. However, if hurricane winds down a tree or some other large object onto the overhead power line, that line could pull on the attached service entrance wire which, in turn, could crease, bend, or collapse the conduit. Under such extreme circumstances, EMT and rigid metal conduit would be similarly affected. EMT and "other approved means" have proven to be effective and capable means of protecting service entrance wires in coastal communities and elsewhere. This amendment discriminates against EMT by prohibiting it from being used as a riser for service entrance conductors. 4. NEC Section 230-70 (Location of Main Disconnect Switch) NEC Section 230-70 prescribes standards for locating the "main disconnect" for the building's electrical power. The NEC allows the "main disconnect" to be located within five feet of the point that electrical service enters the building. If electrical service enters the building underground, it is possible that the "main disconnect" could be located inside the building. The NEC does not require a "shunt trip" even if the "main disconnect" is located inside the building. The local amendment to NEC Section 230-70 requires the "main disconnect" for commercial or multi-family buildings to be located outside of the building or, alternatively, for such buildings to have a "shunt trip" control located outside of the building. The "main disconnect" is similar to a master on/off switch for all of the electric power to a building. A "shunt trip" is an electronic device or button placed on the exterior of the building which can be used to turn off the power to the building from the outside when the "main disconnect" is located inside the building. It can be important for firefighters to turn off the power to a building in the event of an emergency. If the "main disconnect" is located in the interior of the building, it may not be easily accessible. Other alternatives are available to the firefighters in such circumstances, including contacting the power company to turn off the power to the building at the transformer or "pulling" (i.e., removing) the meter. "Pulling" the meter can be accomplished in virtually no time. This amendment cannot be justified on account of any corrosive conditions that might exist within Port Orange or South Daytona. Indeed, by requiring the "main disconnect" to be located outside of the building, it is more subject to corrosion than it would be if it is located inside of the building. The amendment is not justified by wind conditions in Port Orange or South Daytona. Indeed, there are any number of circumstances unrelated to hurricanes or high wind which would make it desirable for there to be a means to turn the power to a building off from the outside, but those same circumstances exist throughout Florida. 5. NEC Table 310.16 (Minimum Size of Aluminum Wires) NEC Table 310.16 is an ampacity chart for wires, and prescribes the size of wire that can be used for various purposes. The uses vary based upon the wire's size and its composition, i.e., copper or aluminum. The NEC allows the use of aluminum wire as small as "number 12"; it allows the use of copper wires as small as "number 18." The local technical amendment to NEC Table 310.16 prohibits the use of aluminum wire smaller than the "number 1" size. Wire sizes are measured such that the smaller the number, the larger the wire. "Number 1" wire is relatively large, approximately one-half inch in diameter. (For sake of comparison, the wire received into evidence as Exhibit R3 is a "number 6" wire.) The effect of the amendment is to require copper wire to be used in applications involving wire smaller than "number 1." This, in turn, has the effect of increasing construction costs because aluminum wire is typically less expensive than copper wire of the same diameter. Aluminum wire has a higher resistance than copper wire of equal size. Corrosion of the wire increases its resistance, and because resistance creates heat, the chance of a fire is also increased. Copper wire and aluminum wire are both susceptible to corrosion. Aluminum wire has demonstrated capability. It is used in coastal communities throughout Florida and, more specifically, it is used by the power company within Port Orange and South Daytona in a variety of sizes (including smaller than "number 1") in outdoor environments. Aluminum wire functions effectively in those applications. Moreover, data reflects that aluminum wire, when used with approved connectors (as the NEC requires), is more durable than copper wire. The local amendment to NEC Table 310.16 discriminates against aluminum wire by prohibiting its use in a size smaller than "number 1." Respondents have not attempted to justify this amendment based upon high wind conditions, and it is not justified. 6. NEC Section 336-4 (Limitation on Use of NM Wires) NEC Section 336-4 relates to the use of Type NM, NMC, and NMS wires. These non-metallic wires are typically referred to as Romex cable, which is a common brand name for the wires. The local technical amendment to this section restricts the use of Romex cable to one- and two-family dwellings, and prohibits its use in other structures -- e.g., commercial and multi-family -- unless it is routed through conduit. Romex cable typically consists of two to four wires wrapped in paper and all within a plastic sheath. It is used for internal wiring. Because Romex cable is used indoors and because it is protected within a plastic sheath, it is not directly subject to corrosive conditions or wind conditions. Respondents attempt to justify this local amendment upon safety concerns which, Respondents contend, are heightened in multi-family and commercial buildings since those buildings are typically not owner-occupied. To the extent those concerns are legitimate, they are certainly not unique to Port Orange and South Daytona. Romex cable has been used extensively for more than 30 years, and has proven effective. There is no evidence that Romex cable has ever failed on account of corrosive conditions, high wind conditions, or that its use in multi-family and commercial buildings is unsafe. The local amendment discriminates against Romex cable by providing additional standards for its use in multi-family and commercial buildings. 7. NEC Section 339-3 (Limitation on Use of UF Cable) NEC Section 339-3 relates to the use of underground feeder wire, which is also known as UF cable. The local technical amendment to this section restricts the use of UF cable to single-family residential property. UF cable is similar to Romex wire in that it is a group of wires inside a plastic sheath. UF cable is designed for use outside, and is most commonly used for wiring exterior lights. UF cable is installed underground. As a result, it is not impacted by wind conditions. UF cable is not subject to corrosion unless the plastic sheath is breached. UF cable is sometimes nicked after installation. In such circumstances, a breach in the cable would likely result in the circuit breaker being "tripped" and the cable no longer being energized. UF cable has demonstrated capabilities and has proven effective for external uses. There is no evidence that UF cable has failed on account of corrosive conditions. The alternative to UF cable is running standard wires through conduit. The conduit might protect the wires from being nicked by a shovel, but it might not protect the wire from being cut altogether by a backhoe or similar piece of large equipment which could break the conduit. The potential for damage to UF cable on account of digging by the property owner is a circumstance that can occur in any community in Florida. This amendment discriminates against UF cable by restricting its use to single-family residences and thereby effectively prohibiting its use in connection with all other types of structures. 8. NEC Section 680-8 (Prohibition on Wires Over Pools) NEC Section 680-8 is a table that establishes overhead clearances for wires. It provides height requirements for wires that run over swimming pools and surrounding areas. The local technical amendment to this section eliminates the table and, as a result, prohibits the installation of wires above existing pools and prohibits the placement of new pools under existing wires. Respondents have not attempted to justify this amendment based upon corrosive conditions, and it is not. The justification for the amendment offered by Respondents is that the amendment will prevent the wires from falling into and energizing the pool in the event of a hurricane or other the high wind condition. None of the witnesses who testified at the hearing, including those who testified for the Respondents, had ever heard of a situation where an overhead wire had fallen into and energized a pool. As a practical matter, swimming pools are no longer (if they ever were) constructed under overhead wires and overhead wires are no longer (if they ever were) strung over swimming pools. 9. NEC Section 680-11 (Protection of Wires in Swimming Pool Equipment Rooms) NEC Section 680-11 prescribes requirements for electrical wiring in swimming pool equipment rooms. The local technical amendment to this section requires such wiring to be placed in PVC pipe or other conduit designed for use in the chlorine environment. The amendment specifically prohibits plain galvanized and sheradized conduit which are metal pipes that are susceptible to rust and corrosion. The justification for the amendment offered by Respondents is that by requiring electrical wiring in the pool room to be placed in PVC or similar pipe, the risk of the wiring coming in contact with water (which is not uncommon in pool equipment rooms) is reduced. That requirement in turn, reduces the risk that a person in the pool room might be electrocuted by an ungrounded wire. Pool equipment rooms are highly corrosive environments because of the presence of chlorine, not because of atmospheric conditions. Respondents have not attempted to justify this amendment based upon high wind conditions, and it is not. 10. NEC Section 680-20 (Underwater Pool Light Voltage) NEC Section 688-20 allows underwater lights in swimming pools to carry as much as 150 volts. The local technical amendment to that section reduces the maximum allowable voltage to 15 volts. Underwater swimming pool lights are protected by glass and water-tight seals. If the pool water somehow comes into contact with the light bulb or its wiring, a ground fault interrupter (GFI) "trips" and shuts off the electrical current to the light. A GFI measures the amount of current going to a device and returning from the device. If there is a difference between the current going and coming, the GFI "trips" and stops electrical current from being delivered to the device on that circuit. The GFI used in connection with a pool light has two components. One is the "push to test" button located in the breaker box, and the other is the "test" and "reset" buttons located on an outlet in a bathroom, garage, kitchen, or similar location. Because of their locations, neither component is exposed directly to the weather. The purpose of the local technical amendment is to reduce the potential harm that a swimmer might suffer in the event that water came into contact with the pool light or its wiring and the GFI failed. To the extent that GFIs are susceptible to corrosion (and because of their location they are not likely to be), they are no more so susceptible to corrosion in Port Orange and South Daytona than they are elsewhere. In any event, if a GFI fails (because of corrosion or otherwise) it is not likely to fail in the "closed" position. Instead, it will fail in the "open" position and, in that position, no electricity is being delivered to the pool light. It is also possible that the GFI will fail if it is installed backwards. To the extent that a safety hazard is created by that failure, it is the result of the incorrect installation, not a local condition such as the corrosive environment or high winds. The newer GFIs are designed in such a manner that if the GFI is installed backwards, it will not work. Respondents have not attempted to justify this amendment based upon high wind conditions, and it is not.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Building Commission issue a final order which determines that: Each of the local technical amendments adopted by the City of South Daytona fails to comply with the requirements of Section 553.73(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2001); and Each of the local technical amendments adopted by the City of Port Orange fails to comply with the requirements of Section 553.73(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2001). DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2003.

Florida Laws (8) 120.52120.56120.569120.57553.72553.73553.88553.898
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. ALBERT HEISLER, 87-004452 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-004452 Latest Update: Mar. 10, 1988

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a certified air conditioning contractor, holding License No. CAC009065, and has been the qualifying agent for Residential Air Conditioning Corporation (hereinafter "Residential Air") in Miami, Florida. On October 1, 1985, Residential Air entered into a contract with June Davidson to install air conditioning in her mother's house in the City of Miami on a rush basis because of the health needs of the elderly mother and because Davidson needed to return to New York. Residential Air's salesman was told by Davidson that a medical emergency situation existed for the Davidson job. The following notation appears in the comments section of the contract signed on October 1, 1985: "Please rush this job--woman needs a/c for health ... woman going back to New York--mother needs job." In the contract addendum signed on October 2, 1985, it was noted that Davidson was waiving her 3-day rescission rights because of the medical situation in the family and that the air conditioner needed to be installed immediately. Respondent was out of town on vacation at the time and was not scheduled to return for several days. Respondent has done job drawings and pulled permits for the company over its 16 years of existence. It was Respondent's practice to pull all permits necessary to cover the next several weeks before going on vacation. As a special accommodation to the customer in an emergency situation, Richard Vanni, a part-owner of Residential Air with 30 years of experience in air conditioning installation, assembled a crew to install the system for the Davidson job on October 2, 1985. Mr. Vanni assumed that Respondent would pull the permit on a late basis when he returned from vacation. The ordinance adopting the South Florida Building Code in the City of Miami provides for a late fee in the event an application for job permit is filed after the job begins. It was Mr. Vanni's understanding that in rush or emergency situations legitimate contractors could proceed with work and file late for the permit, that this was acceptable to the various municipal building departments in the south Florida area, and that most building departments are fair in the administration of permit laws and allow appropriate latitude to responsible contractors proceeding in good faith. No evidence was presented that Mr. Vanni or Residential Air had any intent to avoid paying a permit fee, including the appropriate late penalty, or to evade final inspection when the job was completed. Respondent, as qualifying agent for Residential Air, regularly procures permits for all of the company's jobs, and the company is a highly responsible air conditioning contractor. Conner Adams, the Chief Mechanical Inspector for the City of Miami, is aware of no code violations or previous late penalties regarding Respondent or Residential Air and recalls no problems of any kind with Respondent or with the company. Respondent's only previous violation of the state contracting laws involved payment to the Department of Professional Regulation of a small stipulated fine to settle a highly technical charge of using the word "company" instead of the word "corporation" on its contract form prepared by its attorney. The air conditioning unit for the Davidson job was installed with a temporary hook-up which was to be followed by an audit inspection by Florida Power & Light Company and an increase in the electrical service by the electrical subcontractor. The increased service was not done because the customer stopped payment on her check and would not let the company back on the premises. When Respondent returned from vacation a few days later, he immediately became immersed in accumulated office problems and the problem created by the Davidson job. He tried to pacify and accommodate Davidson by visiting the premises and proposing compromises. No one called to Respondent's attention the fact that the Davidson job was not yet permitted. Respondent was not focusing on that issue, and with the other problems engrossing him, it simply slipped his mind to inquire or to check. 12. As Respondent explained, it would be absurd for him to intentionally not procure a permit for a job involving electrical service increase or customer problems. Lack of a permit is readily discovered in such instances and may provide an excuse for the customer to try to avoid payment. Mrs. Sylvia Vanni, wife of co-owner Richard Vanni, is and has been the office manager of Residential Air. Her system has been to place pending job orders and contracts into a "3-day rescission file." After the 3-day rescission time has elapsed and payment arrangements have been made, the job orders or contracts are routinely given to Respondent to pull permits for those jobs. Because Respondent was not present when the Davidson job was undertaken, the contract was not then given to him to pull a permit. When the job was started, Mrs. Vanni mistakenly placed the contract into the "jobs in progress" file, and it was never presented to Respondent to pull a permit after he returned from vacation. The electrical subcontractor also did not notify Respondent of the need for a permit. Since the company was not allowed back on the premises, the electrical subcontractor was not called upon to apply for an electrical permit to increase the electrical service, which would have called Respondent's attention to the need for a mechanical permit. The system and procedures normally relied upon in the office did not function to alert Respondent to apply for a permit on the Davidson job. When the City of Miami Building Department contacted Respondent pursuant to Davidson's inquiry whether a job permit existed, Respondent immediately made application, paid the late fee, and obtained a mechanical permit on November 5, 1985. Respondent's plans and drawings for the job were deemed satisfactory by the City of Miami Building Department. No evidence was presented of any intentional or willful disregard of, or obstinate indifference to, the building permit laws. Respondent's delay in obtaining a late permit after he returned from vacation was caused by simple oversight in the midst of trying to satisfactorily resolve a difficult customer problem in that no one advised him that a permit had not been pulled or that the Davidson job was not one for which he had pulled a permit prior to going on vacation. The initial charging document in this cause is an Amended Administrative Complaint signed on August 24, 1987. The charges in the Amended Administrative Complaint are the same charges that were contained in an Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner against Respondent on July 24, 1986. That complaint was voluntarily dismissed by Petitioner on February 10, 1987, just before the final hearing scheduled in that case for February 16, 1987. Petitioner's probable cause panel met on August 12, 1987, and approved the filing of the Administrative Complaint which became the initial charging document in this cause. The probable cause panel was not told that charges related to the same matter had been dismissed by the Department six months earlier. Indeed, no explanation or discussion of the charges occurred at all. There was only an approval of the prosecutor's recommendation, and the entire discussion of the probable cause panel regarding the existence of probable cause to file the Amended Administrative Complaint consists of the following exchange: MR. SHROPSHIRE [agency attorney]: The next case is against Mr. Heisler, No. 65634. Prosecutor recommends a finding of probable cause and the filing of a formal complaint. MR. CARSON: I'd like to make a motion we accept the prosecutor's recommendations. MR. SUTTON: Second. MR. CARSON: All in favor say aye. MR. SUTTON: Aye. MR. CARSON: All opposed? MR. SHROPSHIRE: The next case is ... Whether probable cause was properly determined was reserved in the Prehearing Stipulation as a issue for determination at the final hearing in this case. No evidence bearing on the probable cause determination was offered by the Department. The charges in the Amended Administrative Complaint were brought (signed) on behalf of the Secretary of the Department of Professional Regulation by Douglas A. Shropshire, an attorney and the Tectonics Section Chief. Whether Mr. Shropshire had authority to institute the complaint on behalf of the Department was also reserved as an issue for final hearing. Mr. Shropshire is not the head of the agency. The Department offered no evidence of his designation to act for the Secretary in regard to instituting disciplinary charges.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing with prejudice the Amended Administrative Complaint filed in this case. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 10th day of March, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-4452 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-10 have been adopted in substance or verbatim in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-27 have been adopted in substance or verbatim in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 David L. Swanson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 M. Stephen Turner, Esquire Post Office Box 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-3300 William O'Neil, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 =================================================================

Florida Laws (6) 120.5720.03455.225489.105489.119489.129
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