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EASTERN FEDERAL CORP. vs. OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, 86-001437 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001437 Latest Update: Sep. 25, 1986

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner, a corporation headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, is in the business of operating movie theatres both within and without the State of Florida. At these theatres Petitioner Operates concession stands which sell both candy items and drinks in various sizes at different prices to persons who frequent the theatres. For the period of time from September, 1985 through May, 1985, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue sales tax on the total taxable value of all taxable items sold at its concession stands in all of its Florida theatres, in accordance with the presumptive effective rate of tax of 5.63 percent contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code. As a result of an audit for a previous period dated October 1, 1982, Petitioner remitted to the Department of Revenue the amount of $10,637.00 for sales tax on taxable items sold at its concession stands during this audit period in accordance with the presumptive effective tax rate of 4.5 percent as contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code during the audit period. On August 15, 1985, Petitioner filed with the Department of Revenue, as agent for Respondent, two (2) applications for sales tax refund in the amount of $16,876.52 and $10,637.00. The applications were dated August 13, 1985, and were timely filed. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner: (a) posted and charged flat prices for the various items offered for sale, which prices included sales tax (b) kept records of daily and weekly sales of taxable items at each of its Florida theatres (c) kept records of daily attendance at each movie shown by each Florida theatre and (d) kept records of weekly calculations, through inventory analysis, of sales of drinks and candy items, including the number, size and price of each item sold at each of its Florida theatre. During the refund periods at issue in this matter, the Petitioner did not maintain cash registers at its concession stands in its Florida theatres and did not maintain records made contemporaneously with the sale of taxable items from the concession stands which separately itemized the amounts of sales tax collected on each sale transaction occurring at the theatres' concession stands. Rather, Petitioner chose, for its own convenience, to operate a "cash box" operation at each of its concession stands in its Florida theatres and willingly remitted sales tax to the Department of Revenue pursuant to the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code for the relevant periods. In April, 1985, Petitioner placed computerized cash registers in each of its Florida theatre concession stands. These cash registers provided tapes of each individual transaction each day, specifically recording each taxable and nontaxable sale and the amount of sales tax due on each taxable sale with a daily summation on each tape at each theatre. Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code, requires concessionaires such as Petitioner to remit sales tax at a rate of 5.63 percent of taxable sales under the present 5 percent statutory sales tax schedule and at 4.5 percent of taxable sales under the previous statutory sales tax schedule unless a concessionaire, through its records, shows another effective rate by "proof to the contrary". Petitioner produced an effective tax rate of 5.13 percent for the month of April 1985, for all its Florida theatres by dividing the total sales tax collected during April, 1985 by the total taxable sales during April, 1985, as evidenced by the cash register tapes from all of Petitioner's concession stands in Florida. Petitioner then used that tax rate as a base to retroactively reconstruct an effective tax rate for the refund periods by assuming that the product sales mix (product mix of products sold) and the transactional sales mix (the number of items purchased together in a single transaction by a customer) experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the month of April, 1985. There was no competent evidence that the product sales mix or the transactional sales mix experienced during the refund periods were the same as that experienced during the nonth of April, 1985. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support Petitioner's reconstructed effective tax rates that were used to calculate the refunds. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to show "proof to the contrary" that its reconstructed effective tax rates are correct or that the presumptive effective tax rate contained in Rule 12A-1.11(37), Florida Administrative Code were incorrect for the refund periods at issue in this matter.

Recommendation Based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Comptroller enter his final order DENYING Petitioner's refund applications. Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of September, 1986.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57215.26876.5290.956
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CALLAGY TIRES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 10-005094 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Jul. 12, 2010 Number: 10-005094 Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2017

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Callagy Tires, Inc. (Petitioner), collected and remitted the correct amount of sales and use tax on its operations for the audit period.

Findings Of Fact DOR is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing the tax laws of the state of Florida. In conjunction with that duty, DOR performs audits of business entities conducting sales and use transactions. At all times material to the issues of this case, Petitioner conducted business in Palm Bay, Florida, and was obligated to collect and remit sales and use tax in connection with the activities of its business enterprise. Petitioner’s Federal Identification Number is 59-2221722. Petitioner sells tires (wholesale and retail), provides tire services such as installation, and performs other repair and towing services subject to sales or use taxes. In order to properly perform its audit responsibilities, DOR requires that businesses maintain and present business records to support the collection of sales and use taxes. In this case, DOR notified Petitioner that it intended to audit the business operations for the audit period, June 1, 2004, through May 31, 2007. After the appropriate notice to Petitioner, the audit was initiated on or about July 18, 2007. Employees of DOR went to Petitioner’s place of business, requested business records, and attempted to audit and reconcile Petitioner’s reported tax payments with the amounts and types of taxes that should have been remitted, based upon the records kept by Petitioner. Theoretically, the sums remitted to the Department should match the records of the business entity. In this case, the amount remitted by Petitioner could not be reconciled with the business records maintained by the business entity. As a result of the audit, DOR sent Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes that claimed Callagy Tires, Inc., owed sales and use tax in the amount of $121,707.41. By letter dated August 13, 2009, Petitioner filed a protest of the audit findings. Thereafter, the parties exchanged information that Petitioner claimed should require reconsideration of the audit results. Nevertheless, the Department could not reconcile the bank and audit information based upon the documentation submitted by Petitioner. The amounts of the Notice of Reconsideration remain at issue. As of the time of the hearing in this cause, Petitioner had not provided documentation to refute the findings of the Department’s audit. At hearing, DOR maintained that Petitioner owes $173,718.66, together with accruing interest. Specifically, the audit found that there was a difference between the gross sales reported by Petitioner on its federal return and the amounts reported on its state forms. The difference between the two returns constituted unreported sales for state tax purposes. Secondly, the Department determined that certain sales were not “exempt” as maintained by Petitioner. Based upon a sample of invoices provided by Petitioner, DOR found that Petitioner did not remit the full sales tax due on certain types of services. For example, the correct sales tax was not remitted on machining brake rotors, truing brake rotors, or making repairs that included the use of tangible personal property. The taxable event required a calculation of sales tax on the entire amount, not a percentage of the cost. The third area of discrepancy identified by the audit, related to unpaid sales tax on machinery, equipment, supplies, and services purchased by Petitioner for use in the operation of its business. Throughout the audit process, and, subsequently, Petitioner never presented documentation to dispute the Department’s audit findings. DOR gave Petitioner every opportunity to present records that would establish that the correct amounts of sale and use taxes were collected and remitted. Petitioner timely challenged the audit findings, but, has not, through its principal owner or its agents, provided documentation that show the taxes were appropriately calculated and paid. Petitioner maintains that an amended federal tax return verifies the state return previously filed is accurate. Notwithstanding that assertion, Petitioner has not presented the underlying documentation to support the state or federal return. Further, Petitioner refused to allow DOR to review all of its electronically stored records, and did not make the records available to DOR.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the audit findings, and require the Petitioner to remit the unpaid sales and use taxes in the amount of $173,718.66, together with accrued interest, as provided by law. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Eugene M. Callagy, Jr. Callagy Tires, Inc. 6625 Babcock Street, Southeast Malabar, Florida 32950 Patrick Hanley, Esquire 185 Forest Road Troy, Montana 59935-9572 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Lisa Vickers, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668

Florida Laws (14) 120.569120.68120.80212.02212.11212.12212.13213.21213.34213.35213.67775.082775.08395.091
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JOHN RICHARD MARSON AND JUNE PERRY MARSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 78-000392 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000392 Latest Update: Jul. 13, 1979

The Issue Petitioners' liability for sales tax, penalty and interest as set forth in revised notice of proposed assessment dated February 1, 1978.

Findings Of Fact On September 15, 1975, Miles L. Johnson, a Beverage Agent with the Division of Alcohol and Tobacco, Department of Business Regulation, conducted a surveillance of premises occupied by Petitioners located at 4440 Southwest 64th Court, Dade County, Florida. Shortly after 8:00 a.m., he observed one Andy Tucker arrive and enter the residence and later exit the same carrying something which he placed in the trunk of a car. He then reentered the house. Agent Johnson looked in the trunk and observed that it contained numerous cartons of cigarettes. Tucker again exited from the residence carrying a case of cigarettes which he also placed in the trunk. He then drove to another house, followed by Johnson, who observed him take the cigarettes into a garage. Johnson then prepared an affidavit and obtained a warrant from the Dade County Circuit Court to search the Marson residence for un-taxed cigarettes. Johnson gave the warrant to another agent, John Fay, to serve the same upon the Marsons. Johnson later arrived at the residence and observed that Marson had a copy of the warrant in his possession and that Fay had his copy and was executing the return thereon. Johnson was informed by officers at the residence that 420 cartons of cigarettes, marijuana and contraband liquor had been found in the house. The agents also had found certain records in the form of invoices from a cigarette distributor in North Carolina indicating purchases of a large amount of cigarettes, together with handwritten notes showing the sale of cigarettes to a large number of individuals, Johnson observed that the cigarettes had North Carolina excise tax stamps, but no Florida tax stamps thereon. The Marsons were thereafter arrested and the cigarettes and other materials were seized and retained by the Beverage Agents. No return was made on the search warrant, however, due to the fact that the Department's copy of the warrant was inadvertently left in the Marson residence and was never recovered (testimony of Johnson). Agent Victor E. Sosa of the Department of Business Regulation was assigned to prepare an excise tax warrant on the cigarettes seized from the Marson residence. For this purpose, he used the case report prepared by Agent Miles Johnson. Thereafter, the report was forwarded to the Department of Revenue. It contained information to the effect that 24, 171 cartons of un- taxed cigarettes allegedly sold by the Petitioners were subject to State sales tax. Respondent's auditor thereafter issued a formal demand to the Marsons to produce records concerning cigarette transactions, but they did not produce any such records pursuant to the request. The auditor proceeded to prepare an estimated proposed assessment on the basis of the information provided by the Department of Business Regulation. Notice of proposed assessment of tax, penalties and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the total amount of $6,094.08 was issued to Petitioners on December 27, 1977 (Testimony of Sosa, Pooley, Tompkins, Respondent's Exhibits 1, 2).

Recommendation That the proposed assessment against Petitioners be withdrawn. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 1st day of June, 1979. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: William D. Townsend, Esq. Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Richard A. Burt, Esq. 527 Ingraham Building Miami, Florida 33131

Florida Laws (2) 212.05212.12
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WEST BROWARD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 79-000570 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000570 Latest Update: Dec. 07, 1979

The Issue The issue herein is whether the Department of Revenue's sales tax assessment against West Broward Chamber of Commerce as a result of the purchase of promotional books by the Chamber from Creative Public Relations and Marketing, Inc., is valid.

Findings Of Fact The West Broward Chamber of Commerce (Petitioner) entered into an oral contract with Mr. Randy Avon, a representative of Creative Public Relations, to purchase a promotional booklet pertaining to the West Broward area for distribution to the public. (Petitioner's Exhibit #1). Creative Public Relations in turn contracted with International Graphics to print the booklet. Mr. Bernard Fox, the Department of Revenue's (Respondent Area Manager in the Fort Lauderdale office and Mr. James W. Darrow, who worked with International Graphics during the time the transaction in question took place, testified and established that Mr. Randy Avon secured a sales tax number for the purchase of the promotional books in issue and presented the sales tax number to International Graphics. International Graphics sold the books to Mr. Avon for resale, without tax. The Department of Revenue issued an assessment against Petitioner for sales tax, penalty and interest due on the purchase of the books in question by Petitioner in the total amount of $1,307.56. Evidence reveals that said assessment was due as of December 20, 1978, and that since that time interest is accruing at a daily rate of $.31. This assessment was based on a total purchase price of $24,214.10, which, according to Mr. Fox and the statements contained in Respondent's Exhibit #1, was the price that Mrs. Gail Duffy, Petitioner's Executive Director informed the Respondent that the Chamber paid for the promotional booklets. Petitioner's treasurer, Helen Kerns, also testified that the total purchase price paid by Petitioner for the books was $22,104 and that part of the purchase price was paid directly to Creative Public Relations due to a dispute with an officer of the contracting entity, International Graphics. Mrs. Kerns testified that commissions were, however, paid by the Petitioner to Creative Public Relations, which commissions were not included in the purchase price as testified to by Mrs. Kerns. James W. Darrow, a witness who was allegedly privy to the agreement and understanding between the Petitioner and the seller, Creative Public Relations, testified that the oral contract price specifically included sales taxes on the transaction. Additionally, Mrs. Duffy testified that in her opinion, the sales taxes due on the purchase by Petitioner had been paid because she under stood that the total purchase price paid to Creative Public Relations by Petitioner included the sales tax. No sales invoices, receipt, or other tangible evidence of sales were offered into evidence at the hearing herein. Petitioner contends that the sales tax in question was included in the total purchase price. Based thereon, Petitioner contends that Creative Public Relations is now liable for the tax. Respondent, on the other hand, takes the position that the taxes from the sales transaction can be imposed on either the seller or the purchaser.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's sales tax assessment against Petitioner be upheld. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of September 1979 in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of September 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: James T. Moore, Esquire 1265 Northwest 40th Avenue Lauderhill, Florida 33313 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert A. White, Esquire 5460 North State Road #7, Suite 220 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33319

Florida Laws (3) 120.57212.05212.07
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RON ROSS MEARDY, D/B/A AUTO LIQUIDATION CENTER vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 99-003064 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine, Florida Jul. 16, 1999 Number: 99-003064 Latest Update: Jun. 21, 2001

The Issue What, if any, is Petitioner's tax liability to the State of Florida, after any legitimate tax credits are applied, for June 1998 through December 1998?

Findings Of Fact During the period of June 1998 through September 1998, Petitioner Ron Ross Meardy operated a used car lot from a location in Duval County, Florida, to wit: 1400 Mayport Road, Atlantic Beach, Florida, 32233-3440. Mr. Meardy conducted business through a sole proprietorship named Auto Liquidation Center (ALC). Mr. Meardy's business included both retail sales and wholesale sales of motor vehicles. Between June 1998 and December 1998, Mr. Meardy was a registered dealer with DOR. Mr. Meardy's sales tax registration number was 26-02-151942-23/4, which registration number pertains to the Mayport location in Duval County, Florida. Mr. Meardy filed State of Florida Sales and Use Tax returns, standard form DR-15, for each month between December 1997 through May 1998. In so doing, he relied entirely on his employees. Mr. Meardy also filed State of Florida Solid Waste returns, standard form DR-15SW, for each month between December 1997 through May 1998. In so doing, he relied entirely on his employees. In September 1998, Mr. Meardy opened a car lot in St. Augustine, St. John's County, Florida and closed the Duval County car lot. Mr. Meardy filed no DR-15 (sales tax) forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998. Mr. Meardy filed no DR-15SW (waste tax) forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998. Mr. Meardy asserted that he did not know that his employees had made a lot of bad loans or failed to file tax returns for June 1998 through September 1998. Mr. Meardy admitted that from September to December 1998, he deliberately filed no tax returns. First, he claimed he did not file returns because there were no taxable sales made in that period. Then, he asserted that he did not file because, in an unrelated matter, the Florida Attorney General's Office, investigating several businesses "run" by him, held necessary business documents from October 27, 1998 until December 11, 1998 (+/- 45 days). Mr. Meardy's credible testimony that he did not have his business records from October 27, 1998 to December 1998 was unrefuted. As a result of Mr. Meardy's not having filed any DR-15 and DR-15SW forms for the period of June 1998 through December 1998, DOR filed a sales and solid waste tax warrant against him dated March 30, 1999, for $11,937.86. As permitted by law, this audit/warrant merely estimated Mr. Meardy's liability. Mr. Meardy did not then file formal tax returns, file a formal request for an alleged credit (DR-95 form), or provide DOR access to his business records so that DOR could make an accurate assessment/audit/warrant for any tax, penalty, interest, and/or credit. Instead, he timely-filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing on May 28, 1999. The Petition for Administrative Hearing, dated May 21 and filed May 28, 1999, was the first written expression by which Petitioner alerted DOR that he was seeking a tax credit due to repossessions he claimed to have made on defaulted loans. The Petition only stated that DOR "owes ALC money due to repossession credits." The Petition does not contain all of the information required by rule or by the standard credit claim form DR-95B. Petitioner had, in the past, applied for credit for tax paid on repossessed items by attaching the DR-95B form to his monthly tax returns (P-3). He maintained he had relied on his employees for this function. Petitioner's credible testimony that the Attorney General again held some of his documents from the end of May 1999, until September 30, 1999 (+/-five months), due to an unrelated matter, was unrefuted. However, at no time did Petitioner ever file a formal request for credit (form DR-95B) or any tax returns for the period at issue in this proceeding. Only during the course of discovery in the instant proceeding, which discovery Petitioner resisted by every legal means, did it become clear that Petitioner was claiming a tax credit from his May 1998 sales tax return, and that the credit he sought was in excess of the tax he had paid by way of his May 1998 tax return. Only during the discovery process herein did Petitioner provide DOR with any information concerning repossession and default amounts that he was claiming. He did this by producing a "database" (DOR-4). It is unclear from the evidence at hearing when this information was provided, but the date Petitioner claims in his Proposed Findings of Fact to have first produced DOR-4 is February 10, 2000. Petitioner also claims to have given someone at DOR a computer disc with his supporting information, but no DOR witness confirmed this. Petitioner produced no such disc at hearing. Exhibit DOR-4 did not provide the vehicle registration number as part of the property description, the date the sales and use tax was paid, the purchase price less trade-in, the purchase price less cash down, or the actual date of repossession. A copy of each invoice supporting each repossession was not attached. Petitioner did not submit any tax return with DOR-4. Petitioner admits that DOR-4 does not contain all of the information required by the tax credit claim form, DR-95B. DOR revised its assessment once, based on the information Petitioner was required to produce in this proceeding. DOR revised its assessment a second time as a result of the information Mr. Meardy provided in the course of his deposition taken January 19, 2001, approximately a week-and- a-half before final hearing. As agreed-to within the Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, the revised assessment figure in this case is now limited to $2626.31 sales tax, $1313.40 penalty, and $75.35 interest, for a total of $4735.56, as of January 31, 2001. If the foregoing base amounts are, in fact, owed, penalties and interest continue to accrue, pursuant to statute. In making the final audit/assessment/warrant, DOR's Auditor IV, Thelmesia Whitfield, used original materials supplied by Petitioner. From these, she took the actual amounts Petitioner had listed on his dated invoices and other original records as the tax he collected for June 1998 through December 1998. She then calculated the sales tax due, but not remitted, for that period. In so doing, she determined that no additional taxes were due for the months of August 1998 through December 1998. She also concluded that for Petitioner's sales in June and July 1998, a penalty should be assessed at the legal rate of 10% per month on a cumulative basis up to 50% and interest should be assessed at the legal rate of 12% per year or 1% per month on the cumulative balance that is due. Petitioner's solid waste fee liability was calculated by Ms. Whitfield on the basis of the dated sales invoices provided by Petitioner where he had charged fees for tire and battery disposal. Ms. Whitfield's calculations did not include transactions without invoices or other original records. She noted that on several transactions Petitioner had collected more solid waste tax than was required, and she concluded that once collected, those amounts should be remitted to DOR unless they had been refunded to the customer. She calculated local option taxes at the applicable rate for Duval County. Ms. Whitfield's re-calculations do not reflect credits for the repossessions shown on DOR-4, because no state tax returns were filed from June through December 1998, because all the necessary information had not been provided, and because she believed the information on DOR-4 had been provided beyond the period available to claim repossession credits, which is 13 months after the repossession takes place. Ms. Whitfield's re-calculations also do not include credits for worthless accounts orally claimed by Petitioner in the course of his January 19, 2001, deposition or which he urges that she extrapolate from DOR-4, because Petitioner did not also provide either federal tax returns or equivalent financial statements as required by law. Because Petitioner was asking for a refund of more than he said he had paid, and because the sales he was referencing took place before the period being audited, Ms. Whitfield had no way to verify that the amount of sales tax actually had been paid. Therefore, Ms. Whitfield only used DOR-4 where there was a question as to whether a sale had taken place at all. Although DOR-4 is merely a summary, because it was produced by Petitioner and listed sales dates, she used it only as his admission that certain questionable sales had, in fact, taken place. Accordingly, it is found that DOR has not relied on estimations based on prior sales outside the time frame audited, but has made its final assessment (DOR Composite Exhibit 3) upon reasonable documentation provided by Petitioner, which documentation he represented as being accurate to the best of his ability. It is further found that DOR applied defineable legal standards. Petitioner essentially challenges DOR's last assessment/audit/warrant because Ms. Whitfield did not use DOR-4 to assign him a credit or off-set. He seeks to have the undersigned relate, according to his theory of repossession/default credits, DOR's final assessment reflected in DOR's audit report and work papers (DOR Composite Exhibit 3); DOR-4, Petitioner's "database"; and Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3 so as to determine Petitioner's sales tax and solid waste liability for the June 1998 through December 1998 period, and to thereby assign him a credit against his May 1998 tax return and payment (P-3). Petitioner's theory is based on his representation that his database (DOR-4) uses the first time he received money from each sale of a vehicle as the date of the sale/transaction, even though his own invoices and other original supporting data which he provided to DOR, showed different dates as the date of each sale. Then, he asserts that where vehicles have been repossessed, or where a sale has not "gone through," or where a loan has been defaulted (presumably even without repossession, of the car, although this is unclear), a credit should be related back to his May 1998, tax return (P-3). His argument and evidence are not persuasive for the following reasons. At the outset, it is noted that Petitioner's credit claim in excess of $12,000, is more than the tax Petitioner paid in May 1998, as reflected on Exhibit P-3. Likewise, although Petitioner's invoice used in Ms. Whitfield's calculations recorded a sale on June 22, 1998, to Lori Armstrong at $1500.00, Petitioner, without any supporting evidence, asserted at hearing that this sale actually was made on June 23, 1998, and that someone stole $500.00 of the tendered price, so he should pay tax, if at all, on a sale of only $1,000. He had a similar unsupported reason for attempting to reduce, by $100.00, the sales price on another invoice amount for Randy Davis, which invoice Ms. Whitfield had utilized. Petitioner also claimed, at hearing, again with no supporting evidence, that invoices he had previously produced and which were relied upon by Ms. Whitfield for customers Crumley, Mosley, and Lebourgeois "did not go through," and therefore he should not be liable for sales tax on these invoices. He asserted that since DOR could not find any title at the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) for these customers, the inference must be drawn that those sales never closed and therefore no sales tax on them is owed by him. Petitioner also claimed at hearing that the Lebourgeois sale had resulted in a repossession. At hearing, Petitioner admitted liability for a $1,000 sale to a customer Millwater, but claimed that a credit from May 1998 would cover it, without any clear explanation of how this should occur. Petitioner maintained at hearing, again only because no title in that name had been located at the DHSMV, that an invoice of September 14, 1998, to a customer Wilkerson for $200 meant that the sale to Wilkerson was an out-of-state sale, and therefore no tax was owed. In his Proposed Findings of Fact, Petitioner does not address theft as an alleged reason he did not collect the full amounts shown on his invoices (see Finding of Fact 35), but he does seek a tax credit for all sales where no title was found at DHSMV and discusses at least the Crumley, Mosley, and Lebourgeois transactions as a source of these alleged "credits," sometimes for months in which he did not file any tax return. He also addressed customers Varner, Bailey, Little, Wright, Emanual, Lanier, Maynard, Porter, Williams, Arenas, Bays, Beasley, Butt, Carvey, Catlin, Chapman, Clendenin, Cunningham, Forbes, Catina Friend, Gonzalez, Knight, Lloyd, Owens, Strickland, Daniels, Johnson, and McDade, whose names and information (except for Bailey) appear on DOR-4, Petitioner's database, as repossessions or defaulted loans. Bailey appears on DOR-4 but in a different portion of DOR-4. (See Finding of Fact 47). The two biggest problems with Petitioner's theory are that he submitted no evidence to affirmatively demonstrate that any vehicle was repossessed, and Exhibit P-3 does not allow the undersigned any way of determining which vehicle sales were included in the May 1998 tax paid. Exhibit P-3 does provide information as to the repossessions claimed in May 1998 for previous months' sales, but it does not itemize or identify May 1998 sales upon which the tax was being paid in that month. Simply testifying that a repossession or default occurred and that someone entered that information into Petitioner's database (DOR-4) is not competent and credible proof that repossession occurred. In light of Petitioner's testimony that he relied on unreliable and dishonest employees to handle both his sales and tax matters at the Duval County office and without any explanation or documentation of how repossessions or loan defaults were handled from either of his business locations, the undersigned is left with the sense that Petitioner had neither hands-on experience with the listed repossessions nor with the subsequent entries of repossessions and/or loan defaults into his database. Although Petitioner has made a logical argument for "starting at ground zero" with regard to his May 1998 tax return, without more than is in evidence here, vehicles allegedly sold prior to June 1998 cannot be related to vehicles allegedly repossessed after June 1998 by way of the May 1998 tax return (P-3). (See Findings of Fact 21 and 41.) The absence of a title of registration in a given individual's name, without more, is not sufficient to infer that a sale was not consummated or that there had been an out-of- state sale. If the buyer had the duty to transfer title, failure of title proves nothing. If the dealer had the duty to transfer title, Petitioner's failure to transfer title does not automatically translate into a tax credit. The minimal documentation underlying DOR-4 which Petitioner offered (Exhibits P-1 and P-2), also is not persuasive of Petitioner's theory of the case, including but not limited to his suggestion that DOR is required to regard the sale date as being a date when money allegedly was first received, instead of the dates of sale on his invoices or other underlying documentation. It seems undisputed that "Ralston Varner" and "Varner Dean" are the same customer, full name "Ralston Dean Varner." Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is a receipt showing a payment by Ralston Varner for an "'88 Chevy Caviler" [sic] and is dated May 1, 1998, which is the date Petitioner claims to be the completion of sale date. By Petitioner's theory, sales tax on this purchase should have been included in his May 1998 tax return, entitling him to receive a tax credit upon repossession of this or some other vehicle. This cannot be determined from the tax return (P-3). Exhibit DOR-6 is a composite exhibit concerning a sale to Ralson Varner. Those pages preceding the page titled "Certification," dated July 19, 1998, were produced by Mr. Meardy at his office. The materials following the certification constitute a DHSMV "body jacket." The first page of DOR-6 reveals "6-10-98," as the date of the used car order, but pertains to a "1989 Ford T-Bird." The twelfth page, the "Installment Sale Contract-Motor Vehicle," is dated June 10, 1998, and also relates to a 1989 Ford "T-Bird." DOR's final audit refers to a 1989 Ford Thunderbird sold to "Varner Dean," not an '88 Chevy Cavalier, as urged by Petitioner. Petitioner's Exhibit 2 shows two receipts from Dennis Bailey, one on May 26, 1998 and one on June 2, 1998. Petitioner maintained that the sale in question went through on May 26, 1998, the sales tax was remitted on his May 1998 tax return, and the car was later repossessed. The May 1998 tax return (P-3) does not help decipher this. A Dennis Bailey appears on DOR-4 as of May 26, 1998, in relation to a Ford Taurus, but it is not one of the transactions Petitioner has singled out by the hand- written notations on DOR-4 as being defaulted or repossessed. Exhibit DOR-5 is a composite exhibit concerning the sale to Dennis Bailey which Ms. Whitfield audited. Those pages preceding the page titled "Certification," dated July 19, 1999, were produced by Petitioner. The materials following the certification constitute a DHSMV "body jacket." Exhibit DOR-5, page one, shows "June 2, 1998," as the date of the used car order. DOR-5, page 10, the fourth page following the certification, reveals the date of sale as "6-2-98," as reported to the DHSMV, both related to a 1988 Taurus. Under these circumstances, Petitioner's view of this sale cannot prevail. Also, Petitioner admitted that even by his theory and calculations, his May 1998 tax return was "off" by $1,007, and he had been unable to discover the reason (TR-103). Moreover, the evidence does not clearly establish that DOR-4 was presented to DOR within either 12 or 13 months of all the repossessions in question. (See Findings of Fact 19 and 21- 22.) Lastly, Petitioner did not present any evidence of refunds to customers of solid waste tax overpayments.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order finding Petitioner is liable for the amounts as set out in Finding of Fact 24, without any credits or set-offs, and providing for accruing interest and penalties, pursuant to law. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Ross Meardy Post Office Box 1853 St. Augustine, Florida 32085 Charles Catanzaro, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (8) 120.57212.06212.15212.17213.756403.718403.718572.011 Florida Administrative Code (1) 12A-1.012
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CAUSEWAY LUMBER COMPANY, INC. vs. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER AND DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 78-000546 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000546 Latest Update: Mar. 29, 1979

The Issue The parties stipulated that the following legal issues were presented on the facts: When the taxpayer fails to claim the tax credit for sales tax on bad debts charged off during the month for which the return is filed as permitted by Section 212.17(8) Florida Statutes, may the taxpayer claim a refund of the overpayment pursuant to Section 215.26, Florida Statutes? Does claiming a bad debt credit on a return for a month later than the month in which the charge-offs were made constitute an "application for refund" within the meaning of Section 215.26(2), Florida Statutes? STIPULATIONS The parties entered into a written stipulation of the issues, of the facts, and stipulated to the introduction into evidence of the attachments to the written stipulation of facts and the Exhibits 1 through 6. The following are the pertinent findings of fact in this case.

Findings Of Fact Causeway Lumber Company, Inc., (Causeway) is a Florida corporation engaged in the sale of lumber and building materials. During the years 1973- 1977 it operated two yards; one at 2701 South Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, and one and 400 Northwest 2nd Avenue, Boca Raton, Palm Beach County. Because it operated in two counties, separate tax returns were filed for the Fort Lauderdale yard and the Boca Raton yard. Causeway uses the accrual method of accounting, the specific charge-off method of writing off bad debts, and its fiscal year ends March 31. Causeway did not collect the sales tax on credit sales at the time such sales were made, but billed sales tax to its customers as part of the credit sales. Although the sales taxes were not received by Causeway at the time the credit sales were made, Causeway reported and paid the sales tax on credit sales on the return for the month in which the sale was made as required in Section 212.06, Florida Statutes. In March of 1974, 1975, and 1976 the accounts receivable were reviewed and the account deemed worthless were written off as uncollectable and so reported on the corporation's income tax returns for those years. Causeway attempted to take as a credit in September of 1976 all of the bad debts written off in March of 1974, 1975 and 1976. The taking of this credit was questioned by the Comptroller, and Causeway paid the taxes due on the September 1976 sales tax remittance and then filed an application for refund on January 20, 1978, pursuant to provisions of Section 215.26, Florida Statutes. The Comptroller denied the application for refund stating as the grounds that there was no authority in Section 212.17, Florida Statutes, for a refund. Causeway's two outlets overpaid sales taxes in the following amounts in the years indicated: 1974 1975 1976 Boca Raton $ 1,072.51 $ 9,208.17 $ 30,477.11 Ft. Lauderdale 3,323.15 10,237.33 10,004.22 $ 4,395.66 $ 19,445.50 $ 40,481.33

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends to the Comptroller that the taxpayer be refunded the taxes overpaid in 1975, and 1976, in the total amount of $59,926.83. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of October, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of October, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Roe 2900 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Harold F. X. Purnell Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Eugene J. Cella General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 212.02212.06212.17215.26
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DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs TAMPA HYDE PARK CAFE, LLC, 14-004647 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 06, 2014 Number: 14-004647 Latest Update: Apr. 11, 2018

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's Certificate of Registration 39-8011930243-9 should be revoked for the reasons stated in an Administrative Complaint for Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Administrative Complaint) issued by the Department of Revenue (Department) on June 5, 2014.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing the state revenue laws, including the laws related to the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes pursuant to chapter 212. Respondent is a Florida limited liability corporation doing business as The Hyde Park Cafe at 1806 West Platt Street, Tampa, Florida. For purposes of collecting and remitting sales and use taxes, it is a dealer as defined in section 212.06(2) and is required to comply with chapter 212. Respondent holds Certificate of Registration number 39- 8011930243-9, which became effective on July 27, 2000. A certificate of registration is required in order to do business in the state and requires its holder to collect and remit sales tax pursuant to chapter 212. See § 212.05(1), Fla. Stat. Respondent is also an employing unit as defined in section 443.036(20) and is subject to the unemployment compensation tax (UCT) provisions of chapter 443, as provided in section 443.1215. Through an interagency agreement with the Department of Economic Opportunity, the Department provides collection services for UCTs. See § 443.1316(1), Fla. Stat. In doing so, the Department is considered to be administering a revenue law of the state. See § 443.1316(2), Fla. Stat. A dealer must file with the Department sales tax returns and remit the tax collected on a monthly basis. See § 212.15(1), Fla. Stat. Also, an employment unit must remit payment to the Department for UCTs due and owing on a quarterly basis. The Department is authorized to revoke a dealer's certificate of registration for failure to comply with state tax laws. See § 212.18(3)(e), Fla. Stat. If the Department files a warrant, notice of lien, or judgment lien certificate against the property of a dealer, it may also revoke a certificate of registration. See § 213.692(1), Fla. Stat. Before revoking a certificate of registration, the Department must convene an informal conference that the dealer is required to attend. See § 213.692(1)(a), Fla. Stat. At the conference, the dealer may either present evidence to refute the Department's allegations of noncompliance or enter into a compliance agreement with the Department to resolve the dealer's failure to comply with chapter 212. Id. After a compliance agreement is executed by the dealer, the Department may revoke the certificate of registration if the dealer fails to comply with its terms and conditions. See Pet'r Ex. 6, p. 2, ¶ E. If a breach occurs, the entire amount is due and payable immediately. Id. at ¶ G. An informal conference can be characterized as the Department's last administrative remedy to collect delinquent taxes before beginning revocation proceedings. A dealer can also enter into a diversion program with the State Attorney's Office to resolve liabilities, but the record shows that Respondent defaulted on that arrangement. According to the Department, collection problems with this dealer first began in 2003. Department records show that Respondent failed to remit required sales taxes for the months of January 2012, August through December 2012, January through December 2013, and January and February 2014. In addition, Respondent failed to remit UCTs for the calendar quarters ending September 2010, December 2010, March 2011, June 2011, September 2011, December 2011, March 2012, June 2012, September 2012, December 2012, and March 2013. Respondent does not dispute that it failed to timely remit and pay the foregoing taxes for the time periods listed above. For the purpose of collecting the delinquent taxes, the Department issued and filed against Respondent delinquent tax warrants, notices of lien, or judgment lien certificates in the Hillsborough County public records. See Pet'r Ex. 3. Before seeking revocation of Respondent's certificate of registration, on February 5, 2014, the Department's Tampa Service Center served on Respondent a Notice of Conference on Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Notice). See Pet'r Ex. 4. The Notice scheduled an informal conference on March 21, 2014. It listed 16 periods of sales and use tax noncompliance and 11 periods of re-employment tax noncompliance and provided the total tax liability as of that date. This number was necessarily fluid, as the taxes owed were accruing interest, penalties, and/or fees on a daily basis. The purpose of the informal conference was to give Respondent a final opportunity to make full payment of all delinquent taxes, or to demonstrate why the Department should not revoke its Certificate of Registration. As pointed out by the Department, an informal conference allows a dealer to bring up "any concerns" that it has regarding its obligations. Respondent's manager and registered agent, Christopher Scott, appeared at the conference on behalf of Respondent.1/ At the meeting, he acknowledged that the dealer had not timely paid the taxes listed in the Notice and that the money was used instead to keep the business afloat. However, Mr. Scott presented paperwork representing that sales and use tax returns and payments for the months of November 2013 through February 2014 had just been filed online, and checks in the amount of $8,101.41 and $9,493.99 were recently sent to Tallahassee. It takes 24 hours for online payments to show up in the system, and even more time for checks to be processed in Tallahassee. Accordingly, the Department agreed that Mr. Scott could have a few more days before signing a compliance agreement. This would allow the Department to verify that the payments were posted and recalculate the amount of taxes still owed. Also, before entering a compliance agreement, Respondent was required to make a down payment of around $20,000.00. Mr. Scott had insufficient cash, and a delay of a few days would hopefully allow him to secure the necessary money for a down payment. When none of the payments had posted by March 25, 2014, the Department calculated a total liability of $113,448.13, consisting of sales and use taxes and UCTs, penalties, interest, and fees. As of that date, none of the taxes listed in Finding of Fact 9 had been paid. On March 25, 2014, Respondent's controller, who did not attend the informal conference, sent an email to the Department requesting a breakdown on the new tax liability. In response to her request, the Department faxed a copy of the requested information. See Resp. Ex. 4. After getting this information, the controller continued to take the position that the Department's calculations overstate Respondent's tax liability. On March 31, 2014, Mr. Scott signed the compliance agreement. See Pet'r Ex. 6. Despite the controller testifying that she did not agree with the numbers, no question was raised by Mr. Scott when he signed the agreement. By then, the check in the amount of $8,101.41 had cleared and been credited to Respondent's account. Along with other funds, it was used towards the down payment of $20,000.00. The record does not show the status of the other payments that Mr. Scott claimed were mailed or filed online prior to the informal conference; however, on March 31, 2014, except for the one check, none had yet posted. The compliance agreement required scheduled payments for 12 months, with the final payment, a balloon payment in an undisclosed amount, being subject to renegotiation in the last month. Payments one and two were $1,500.00, while payments three through 11 were $2,900.00. The compliance agreement reflected a balance owed of $95,887.36, consisting of $60,504.34 in sales taxes and $35,347.02 in UCTs.2/ In return for the Department refraining from pursuing revocation proceedings, the compliance agreement required Respondent to "remit all past due amounts to the Department as stated in the attached payment agreement," "accurately complete and timely file all required tax returns and reports for the next 12 months," and "timely remit all taxes due for the next 12 months." Pet'r Ex. 1, p. 1. In other words, the compliance agreement addressed both delinquent taxes and current taxes that would be due during the following 12-month period, and it required that both categories of taxes be timely paid in the manner prescribed by the agreement. To summarize the salient points of the agreement, all taxes were to be timely paid; delinquent taxes were to be paid by certified check, money order, or cash and were to be mailed or hand delivered to the Tampa Service Center and not Tallahassee; and while not specifically addressed in the agreement, the dealer was instructed to pay all current obligations electronically, as required by law. Otherwise, Respondent was in violation of the compliance agreement. A Payment Agreement Schedule for past due taxes was incorporated into the compliance agreement and provided that the first payment was due April 30, 2014, payable to: Florida Department of Revenue, Tampa Service Center, 6302 East Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard, Suite 100, Tampa, Florida 33619. Payments 2 through 12 were to be mailed or hand delivered to the same address. This meant, with no ambiguity, that money should not be sent to Tallahassee. There is no credible evidence that these instructions were misunderstood. Unless a waiver is granted, Respondent is required by statute and rule to electronically file sales and use tax returns and UCT reports. See § 213.755, Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 12-24.009 (where a taxpayer has paid its taxes in the prior state fiscal year in an amount of $20,000.00 or more, subsequent payments shall be made electronically). No waivers have been approved. In 2003, the Department notified Respondent of these requirements and Respondent complied with this directive until 2009. For reasons not disclosed, in 2009 Respondent voluntarily quit filing electronically. The record is silent on why this was allowed.3/ In any event, at the informal conference, Mr. Scott was specifically told that all current returns, reports, and taxes must be filed electronically, and not by mail, and that no money should be sent to Tallahassee. There is no credible evidence that he misunderstood these instructions. In its PRO, Respondent correctly points out that the requirement to file current returns electronically was not specifically addressed in the compliance agreement. This is because the compliance agreement does not set forth every statutory and rule requirement that applies to a dealer. If this amount of detail were required, a dealer could ignore any otherwise applicable rule or statute not found in the compliance agreement. This contention has no merit. Respondent failed to electronically file the current sales and use tax return and payment for the month of March 2014, due no later than April 21, 2014. Instead, it sent a paper check, which was returned by the bank for insufficient funds. This constituted a breach of the compliance agreement. Despite repeated instructions on how and where to pay the delinquent taxes, payment 1, due on April 30, 2014, was paid by regular check and sent to Tallahassee, rather than the Tampa office. This contravened the compliance agreement. When payment was not timely received by the Tampa Service Center, Respondent was told that a check must be delivered to the Tampa office by May 9. Respondent hand delivered a second check, this one certified, to the Tampa Service Center on May 9, 2014, or after the April 30 due date. The second check was treated as payment 1. Respondent points out that on May 7 the Tampa Service Center granted its request for an extension of time until May 9 in which to deliver the certified check. While this is true, the extension was allowed in an effort to "work with" the Respondent on the condition that the account would be brought current by that date; otherwise, revocation proceedings would begin. Even if the extra ten days is construed as a grace period for payment 1, there were other violations of the compliance agreement set forth below. Payment 2 for delinquent taxes, due on May 30, 2014, was paid by regular check and sent by mail to Tallahassee rather than the Tampa Service Center.4/ This contravened the compliance agreement. After the May 30, 2014 payment, Respondent made no further payments pursuant to the Payment Agreement Schedule. This constituted a violation of the compliance agreement. Respondent did not remit payment with its current sales and use return for the month of August 2014. This contravened the compliance agreement. Respondent did not file any current sales and use tax returns or remit payment for the months of July 2014 or September through January 2015. This contravened the compliance agreement. Beginning in March 2014, Respondent filed current reemployment tax returns and payments using the incorrect tax rate on every return. This delayed their processing and resulted in penalties being imposed. In addition, even though Respondent was repeatedly told that such returns must be filed electronically, none were filed in that manner, as required by statute and rule. This contravened the compliance agreement. In its PRO, Respondent contends the compliance agreement cannot be enforced because there was no "meeting of the minds" by the parties on all essential terms of the agreement. Specifically, it argues that the total amount of taxes owed was still in dispute -- the dealer contended that it owed $23,000.00 less than was shown in the agreement; the Payment Schedule Agreement did not specify the amount of the final balloon payment; the compliance agreement failed to state when payments are due if the due date falls on a weekend or holiday; the compliance agreement did not specify how the dealer's payments would be allocated between UCTs and sales and use taxes; and the compliance agreement failed to address the issue of filing electronically. Although some of these issues were not raised in the parties' Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation, or even addressed by testimony at hearing, they are all found to be without merit for the reasons expressed below. First, Mr. Scott did not dispute the amount of taxes owed when he signed the agreement, and he brought no evidence to the conference to support a different amount. Second, as explained to Mr. Scott at the informal conference, the precise amount of the balloon payment can only be established in the 12th month. This is because the exact amount depends on the dealer's compliance with the agreement over the preceding 11 months, and the amount of interest, penalties, and/or other fees that may have accrued during the preceding year. Third, there is no evidence that the dealer was confused when a due date for a payment fell on a weekend or holiday. Even if it was confused, reference to section 212.11(1)(e) and (f) would answer this question. Fourth, there is no statute or rule that requires the Department to specify how the delinquent payments are allocated. Moreover, neither Mr. Scott nor the controller requested that such an allocation be incorporated into the agreement before it was signed. Finally, the issue of filing electronically already has been addressed in Finding of Fact 22 and Endnote 3. At hearing, Respondent's controller testified that she was out of town when the conference was held, suggesting that Mr. Scott, who is not an accountant, was at a disadvantage when he attended the informal conference. However, Respondent had six weeks' notice before the conference, and there is no evidence that Respondent requested that the meeting be rescheduled to a more convenient day. Also, Respondent does not dispute that Mr. Scott was authorized to represent its interests at the conference, or that he could have been briefed by the controller before attending the informal conference or signing the compliance agreement. See also Endnote 1. Notably, at hearing, the controller testified that she "was involved in actually negotiating the agreement both before and after it was actually signed" even though she did not attend the conference. Tr. at 89. Respondent also contends that after the Department considered the compliance agreement to be breached, the dealer had no further obligation to make payments pursuant to the agreement or state law until the parties negotiated a new agreement. Aside from Respondent's failure to cite any authority to support this proposition, nothing in the compliance agreement comports with this assertion. To the contrary, the compliance agreement specifically provides that if a breach occurs, the entire tax liability becomes due immediately. See Pet'r Ex. 6, p. 2, ¶ G. Thus, Respondent is obligated to pay the entire tax liability, which now exceeds $200,000.00. All other arguments raised by Respondent have been carefully considered and are rejected as being without merit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order revoking Respondent's Certificate of Registration 39- 8011930243-9. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2015.

Florida Laws (12) 120.68212.06212.11212.12212.15212.18213.692213.755347.02443.1215775.082775.083
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GREAT LAKES DREDGE AND DOCK COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 77-001054 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001054 Latest Update: Oct. 03, 1978

Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Petitioner is a joint venturer with two foreign corporations who subcontracted to perform the dredging portion of the contract to develop the port of Dammam in Saudi Arabia. The joint venture is called GLABVO and the joint venture agreement was admitted as Exhibit 1. The parties contributed capital and leased equipment to the joint venture while the latter paid for all supplies used by the parties in carrying out the subcontract. All of the equipment and materials purchased and which is the subject of the tax assessment here involved is personal property of a nature subject to sales and use tax, was ordered by Petitioner for GLABVO and shipped to Miami where it was loaded for shipment to Saudi Arabia. The property was purchased from both within and without the state. The nature of the operation, the urgency of the contract with respect to time of completion, and the lack of existing port facilities necessitated special shipping arrangements which involved a contract carrier in lieu of a common carrier. Accordingly the various dredges, workboats, barges and related equipment here loaded on a large barge which was towed from Ft. Lauderdale to Saudi Arabia. Lack of port facilities at Dammam necessitated the capability to unload being carried with the equipment so the larger elements transported wore floated onto the barge, and off the barge upon arrival, by sinking the barge. Most of the supplies were packaged for overseas shipment before being shipped to Miami where this material and equipment was marshalled at Petitioner's facility on Dodge Island at Miami, Florida. At this marshalling yard, which was the Florida shipping destination for materials purchased, the supplies were inventoried, repackaged, if necessary, for the barge shipment by placing in containers that could be floated off the barge and segregated into the three shipments that would be needed to move the equipment and supplies to Dammam. Petitioner used its tax registration number in purchasing the supplies on behalf of GLABVO and the vendors were relieved from collecting the sales tax. At the time the supplies were shipped to Petitioner there were no export declarations in connection with these items but much of the equipment was packaged for export and the shipping documents represented the material was shipped "for export". The contract carrier that had been engaged to provide the transportation had no facility that could be used as a marshalling yard and Petitioner did have such a facility. Due to the nature of the operation it was essential to assemble the supplies and equipment at a marshalling point for inventory and checking against the list of needed supplies before continuing the transportation to Saudi Arabia. Bills of lading and export declarations were made up where the material was placed on board the contract carrier's barge. On those items shipped from outside Florida Respondent assessed a use tax and on those items purchased in Florida Respondent assessed a sales tax. It is undisputed that all property on which the tax was assessed was purchased for use in Saudi Arabia and was shipped to Saudi Arabia; that the property had an initial Florida destination at Dodge Island, Florida; that the property was shipped from Florida to Saudi Arabia on bills of lading; and that export declarations were executed. For the purpose of this case no distinction exists with respect to the export nature of those shipments purchased from a supplier in Florida and those purchased from a source outside of Florida.

Florida Laws (3) 212.02212.05212.06
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KARSTEN ENTERPRISES-FL, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 10-002310 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 27, 2010 Number: 10-002310 Latest Update: Nov. 08, 2010

The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue's final assessment of sales and use tax plus interest against Petitioner Karsten Enterprises FL, Inc., is correct.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a corporation headquartered in Dothan, Alabama, doing business in Florida. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida that has been delegated the responsibility to collect sales and use tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. During the audit period in controversy, from October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2007, Petitioner was a dealer in manufactured or modular homes and did business at one or more Florida locations. During the pertinent period, Petitioner entered into various contracts to provide manufactured or modular homes to its customers for delivery at locations in Florida. At a Karsten Sales Center, models of residential factory-built buildings are displayed. These residential factory-built buildings are produced by manufacturers that Karsten uses for that purpose. In most of the transactions during the audit period, Petitioner's customers would contract with Petitioner for the sale and installation of a factory built building on property owned by the customer. In the remainder of the contracts during the audit period, Petitioner would either purchase the property or enter into a contract for the sale of the property to the customer, and Petitioner would install a home that Petitioner had purchased from a manufacturer and then sell the home and land package to the customer. The contract prices were a lump sum, which included not only the manufactured or modular home, but also installation of the home at a Florida location. Petitioner’s contracts with its customers did not itemize individual components of the modular or manufactured homes, such as individual nuts, bolts, and shingles, but instead agreed to deliver the entire modular or manufactured home on an installed basis. The contracts between Petitioner and its customers specify the type of home that the customer wanted to have erected or installed on the property. Upon selection of a floor plan, options, and other customization, the customer would agree to order a specific home from a manufacturer. Petitioner purchased the pre-fabricated manufactured or modular homes from various manufacturers. The manufacturer would produce the home upon receiving an order from Petitioner. The manufacturer shipped the completed home to Petitioner, delivering the home to the property where the home would ultimately be erected and installed. Once shipped to the site, the factory-built buildings were placed on a foundation constructed for that purpose. Petitioner would either directly, through the manufacturer, or through subcontractors, construct the foundations, place the homes on the foundations, and connect the homes to required utilities. All of these activities were done as part of Petitioner's contracts with its customers for real property improvement. In many instances, the manufacturer both delivered the homes to the sites and provided post-delivery services to the homes. Additional services provided by the manufacturer after it installed the homes on the foundations included trim work, repair work, and fit and finish work. Petitioner paid the manufactures directly for these post-delivery services. During the audit period at issue, Petitioner sold, erected and installed approximately 30 residential modular or factory-built buildings in the state of Florida. If the home was built by a Florida factory, the factory would include sales tax in its invoice to Petitioner, based upon the cost of materials, but not including labor, that the manufacturer used in the construction of the home prior to its delivery to the site. If an out-of-state manufacturer built the home, the manufacturer would not include a sales tax amount in its invoices to Petitioner. Rather, the out-of-state manufacturers indicated that the cost of materials for construction of the homes at the factory was approximately 60% of the purchase price Petitioner paid for the homes. When Petitioner closed its contracts with its customers, if the manufacturer was an out-of-state manufacturer that had not previously included a sales or use tax in its invoice to Petitioner, Petitioner would remit a use tax directly to the Department, based upon 60% of Petitioner’s purchase price of the manufactured or modular homes. In either case, whether paying sales tax directly to a Florida manufacturer based only on the Florida manufacturer's cost of materials, or remitting use tax on 60% of its purchase price of manufactured or modular homes from out-of-state manufacturers, rather than paying tax on 100% of the price it paid for the homes, Petitioner did not pay sales or use tax on the manufacturer’s labor or fabrication costs. In remitting use tax, or paying sales tax to the Florida manufacturers, Petitioner was seeking to pay tax only on the manufacturer’s cost of materials used in the manufacturing process. There is no dispute concerning the Department’s math calculations. Rather, Petitioner disputes that the labor costs were taxable. Petitioner has no proof that the Department has ever received payment of tax from any person on the manufacturer’s labor costs at issue in this proceeding. Drenea York, who testified for the Department, is an accountant and auditor with twenty years of experience, all in sales and use taxation. Tammy Miller, who testified for the Department, is an attorney who has worked with the Department for eight years within the Department's Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution section (Department's Dispute Resolution Section). The Department's Dispute Resolution Section employs “Tax Conferees,” such as Ms. Miller, who hear informal taxpayer protests, issue the Department's notices of decisions regarding final assessments, and provide guidance to the public upon request. Her practice has focused principally upon sales and use taxation, and she has handled several cases involving taxation of modular home contractors. Tammy Miller signed the notice of decision regarding the Final Assessment at issue. She also wrote the article for the Florida Institute of Certified Public Accountants, which Petitioner introduced into evidence as P1. She testified as the Department’s corporate representative. Douglas Uhler testified as a former employee of Petitioner and also as an expert witness for the Petitioner. He is a CPA with some tax experience, who was not shown to be a specialist in taxation or in Florida sales and use taxation. He practices in Birmingham, Alabama, where he is licensed. He has knowledge and expertise in valuation and other areas, but was not qualified as an expert to testify as to the tax determinations at issue in this controversy. Neither Petitioner nor Mr. Uhler applied for a TAA. Mr. Uhler was permitted to testify, over the Department’s hearsay and relevancy objections, that he relied on an oral statement from an alleged Department employee, concerning how Florida sales and use tax law is applied in the manufactured and modular home industry. During his testimony, however, Mr. Uhler did not know the name of the person to whom he allegedly spoke and he was not sure that the person he spoke to was an employee of the Department of Revenue. Therefore, no weight was given to his testimony regarding his recollection of a conversation with an alleged Department employee on the issue of how Florida sales and use tax law is applied in the manufactured and modular home industry. During the audit period at issue, the Department made four revisions to its original audit report in response to additional information provided by the Petitioner. During this period, the Petitioner paid the uncontested portion of the Department's assessment, leaving only one issue in dispute: whether additional tax and interest is due on Petitioner’s purchase of the modular homes. The Department’s audit and resulting tax assessment considered Petitioner, and not the manufacturer, to be the “real property contractor” responsible for the payment of the tax, within the meaning of the aforementioned rule provisions. The Department’s determination that Petitioner was the responsible “real property contractor” is consistent with the fact that the real property improvement contracts at issue were entered directly between Petitioner and its customers, and not between the manufacturer and Petitioner’s customers. In its contracts with its customers, Petitioner directly arranged installation work, either providing the installation itself or through the manufacturer or a subcontractor on behalf of Petitioner's customers. The issue of whether Petitioner or the manufacturer performed the installation work, however, was not considered by the Department to be a determinative factor, in and of itself, in making the Final Assessment. According to the Department, it would not consider a manufacturer to be the responsible “real property contractor” unless the contracts for real property improvement were directly between the manufacturer and Petitioner’s customers. The evidence does not support a finding that Petitioner's customers had direct contracts for real property improvements with the manufacturers of the homes. The Department also considered Petitioner to be the “end user” under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.051(3) and (4), which, according to the Department, imposes tax on the “end user.” The Department considered Petitioner, as opposed to Petitioner's customers, to be the end user based upon the reasoning that Petitioner was the last party to purchase the modular units as “tangible personal property,” before the modular homes became affixed to real property. Ms. York and Ms. Miller explained that the Department did not consider Petitioner’s customers to be the “end users” because Petitioner's customers did not purchase resold items of “tangible personal property,” itemized in detail under Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.051(3)(d). Rather, they explained that Petitioner’s customers, who purchased under lump- sum contracts, were considered to have purchased an improvement to real property, and improvements to real property fall outside the scope of the Florida sales and use tax chapter. In its audit, the Department examined Petitioner’s contracts with its customers solely to determine that the Petitioner was the end user or the “real property contractor.” The Department’s assessment did not seek to impose tax or interest liability on Petitioner’s transactions with its customers. Instead, the Department taxed Petitioner on Petitioner’s “cost price” of purchasing modular homes, giving Petitioner full credit for any partial tax that Petitioner had paid. As noted above, during the audit period, when it was dealing with a Florida manufacturer, Petitioner generally remitted sales or use tax directly to the manufacturer, at the time of purchase. More often, however, Petitioner paid sales or use tax on a monthly basis, by direct accrual or remittance to the Department on approximately 60% of the amount Petitioner paid for homes manufactured by out-of-state manufacturers. The invoices to Petitioner frequently included other itemized charges, which the Department did not consider part of Petitioner’s “cost price” of the purchased modular units. For example, if an invoice included sales or use tax, the Department excluded charges for tax when calculating Petitioner’s “cost price,” so as to avoid imposing tax on the itemized tax. Likewise, no charges for installation of the modular units onto real property were included in the Department’s calculation of “cost price.” The Department instead determined “cost price” by adding up the “Base Price” for purchasing the modular homes, together with itemized home “Options,” as they appeared on the manufacturer's invoices to Petitioner for the modular homes. Examples of several “Options” would be such things as better carpeting, a sliding glass door, or a plywood floor. The combined total of “Base Price” and “Options” were used by the Department in determining Petitioner’s “cost price” of purchasing the units as items of tangible personal property from the manufacturer’s factory. Petitioner's "cost price" as determined by the Department reflected the seller’s (in this case the manufacturer’s) material and labor costs. The Department's Final Assessment, however, did not include costs related to the installation of the modular homes onto real property, as those were considered by the Department as costs arising subsequent to the sale of the product as tangible personal property. The Final Assessment only sought tax on Petitioner’s purchase cost of the modular homes as tangible personal property leaving the factory. Because Petitioner had already paid tax on approximately 60% of its cost price, the Department’s assessment sought to capture the 40% of sales and use tax that Petitioner never paid. The Department's assessment determined that Petitioner owed tax on its own “cost price” as invoiced by the manufacturer. The Department determined that the Petitioner’s “cost price” was a different “cost price” than the manufacturer’s “cost price.” According to the Department, the manufacturer’s cost price excluded labor on its factory floor but Petitioner’s “cost price” included all materials and labor costs that were necessarily a component of Petitioner's actual purchase price. The Department’s auditor gave Petitioner full credit for all taxes paid, whether Petitioner had paid the tax by direct remittance or at the time that it paid an invoice, with one exception: credit was generally not given for payments made by Petitioner to a company named Cavalier because during the audit period at issue, Petitioner remitted certain amounts of sales tax to a manufacturer named Cavalier, but Cavalier refunded these amounts to Petitioner.3/ The Department’s audit and assessment did not treat Petitioner as a “manufacturer” nor give Petitioner the benefit of the special exemption, under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which is available to manufacturers of a “factory- built building.” This is because the Department did not consider Petitioner to be a manufacturer. Although Petitioner argued that it qualified for the special exemption under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, under the theory that it was a "manufacturer," Petitioner failed to show that it is a “manufacturer” entitled to such exemption. In accordance with Petitioner's Application for Registration with the Department, Petitioner was registered as a “Manufactured (Mobile) Home Dealer” rather than as a manufacturer. In response to audit interview questions, Petitioner advised the auditor that it was in the business of “Retail Sale” of “Mobile and Modular Homes.” Petitioner made this same representation again in its response to a Pre-Audit Questionnaire and Request for Information. The first time that Petitioner ever asserted that it was a "manufacturer" was after Petitioner received the Department’s Notice of Intent to make Audit Changes, and became aware that, as a “real property contractor,” it would be assessed tax on 100% of its “cost price.” Petitioner then changed its self-description of its business model, asserting that it was a “manufacturer.” When Petitioner protested the Department’s assessment, however, it abandoned, at least at the informal protest stage, the argument that it was a manufacturer. Petitioner instead argued that it should be treated like a real property contractor engaged in the business of stick built homes. According to Tammy Miller, Petitioner's president, Mr. Copeland, told Ms. Miller during the informal protest process, that Petitioner was not a manufacturer. The Final Assessment corroborates Tammy Miller’s recollection because it addressed Petitioner’s various legal arguments but did not address Petitioner’s argument that it is a manufacturer, because that argument apparently was not made during the informal protest. The Amended Petition does not allege that Petitioner was a manufacturer or that it should be treated like one. Petitioner instead asserts that it is a modular home dealer who purchases from “the factory” and that it should be treated like a stick-built contractor. Petitioner stipulated that it is a modular home “dealer” and that it purchased the pre-fabricated manufactured or modular homes from various manufacturers. No evidence was introduced that Petitioner owns or operates factories or an assembly line. Rather, the evidence showed that Petitioner operated out of an office building in Alabama. No evidence was presented that Petitioner has been licensed or certified as a “manufacturer” by the Department of Community Affairs, which is the agency that regulates manufacturers of factory-built buildings. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 9B-1.002(15) and 1.007(1). Petitioner’s representative repeatedly referred to Petitioner, throughout opening statement, argument and testimony, as a dealer purchasing from the factory. The Department’s witnesses testified that the sales and use tax applies to “real property contractors” in a way that taxes all real property contractors (stick-built or modular) on their full “cost price” of purchased materials, regardless of whether the purchased materials are lumber, shingles, nails, finished kitchen cabinetry, or assembled modular home modules. The Department's witnesses explained that the cost price of each item purchased will vary because the item purchased in each instance is different and some items will include greater material and labor costs than others. The Final Assessment reflects the unpaid balance assessed, after all revisions and payments made, and provides a per diem amount so that accrued interest may be readily calculated. The Final Assessment determined that the unpaid balance of tax and interest for the audit period (after crediting Petitioner with all payments made) was as follows: $41,446.31 combined tax and interest through 1/26/09, with $7.57 per day for each day thereafter until the postmark date of payment. The Final Assessment waived all penalties.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that, consistent with the Final Assessment and this Recommended Order, the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding that Petitioner owes tax and interest due as of January 26, 2009, in the amount of $41,446.39, with interest thereafter accruing at $7.57 per day, without penalties. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2010.

Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.80212.02212.05212.06212.07213.2272.011
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