Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Cornelia T Brown, doing business as the Oasis Restaurant Bar and Lounge, is the holder of beverage license No. 45-356, Series 2-COP. This license allows the consumption of alcoholic beverages on the premises, located on Douglas Road, Groveland, Florida. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, is an agency of the State of Florida which has its responsibility the licensure and regulation of beverage license holders in the State of Florida. On June 12, 1980, pursuant to a search warrant, Lake County Sheriff and Groveland Police officials accompanied by Petitioner's Beverage Officer, conducted a search of the licensed premises. Respondent was present throughout the investigation. Among the items seized as suspected controlled substances were seven plastic baggies and eight small manila envelopes containing a total of 52.1 grams of cannabis. Currency in the amount of $2,273,67 was also seized. The cannabis and currency were contained in a purse belonging to Respondent. The purse was discovered in the kitchen of the licensed premises, an area not open to bar/restaurant patrons or other members of the public.
Recommendation From the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of violations as alleged in Counts 1, 2 and 4. It is further RECOMMENDED that County 3, which duplicates County 2, and Count 5, be DISMISSED. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's License No. 45-356 be REVOKED. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September 1981 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Cornelia T. Brown Route 1, Box 350-7 Groveland, Florida 32736 James N. Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented here concerns the entitlement of the Petitioner to be granted a new Series 2-COP beverage license from the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Dorothy Risby, filed an application to be issued a new Series 2-COP alcoholic beverage license. The application was filed on January 28, 1980, and if the license were issued, it would allow for the sale of beer and wine to be consumed at the Petitioner's premises known as the V I P Night Club, located at 922 East Brownlee Street, Starke, Florida. After the Respondent, State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, had received and reviewed the application, it was denied. The basis of the denial was, quoting from the license application denial, "undisclosed interest" and reference was made to Section 561.17, Florida Statutes, as the authority for such denial. Specifically, the Respondent is persuaded that Albert Parrish has an "undisclosed interest" in the prospective licensed premises and that in view of this interest the Petitioner is not entitled to receive the beverage license. Albert Parrish was the former holder of an alcoholic beverage license issued by the Respondent, and the licensed premises to which the license pertained was the same premises as contemplated by the present Petitioner. Parrish did business at that location under the name Red Honey until his license was revoked on December 31, 1979. The current Petitioner has known Albert Parrish for a period of ten to twelve years and in the course of that time, Parrish has helped support the children of the Petitioner who presently live at home with her. This support spoken to is financial support. The Petitioner and Albert Parrish have also lived together in that period of time and as recently as February, 1980. The latter statement concerning the living arrangements between the Petitioner and Parrish was ascertained when Beverage Officer Robert W. Cunningham went to the licensed premises in making a pre-licensure inspection in February, 1980, and encountered Albert Parrish on the proposed licensed premises. Parrish indicated that he was just at the licensed premises sleeping following a break-in that had occurred at that location. At the same time he indicated that he was living at Apartment 51 on Brownlee Street, Starke, Florida, which is the residence address given by the Petitioner in her application for licensure. This also was the same residence address that Albert Parrish had put on his beverage license application when he had applied for the beverage license issued to him in the past. In the course of the meeting referred to above, Parrish stated that the utilities for the licensed premises were being paid for by him and that the phone in the licensed premises was primarily for the benefit of the ABC Junk Yard, a business operated by Parrish, which was located at that time behind the prospective licensed premises. The phone located at the licensed premises also rang at the Apartment 51 when calls were made in. At the time of Cunningham's conversation with Parrish, the rent for the licensed premises was being paid month to month and was paid at times by the Petitioner and at other times by Parrish. The most recent rent of August, 1980, was paid by the Petitioner. At the time of the hearing, the utilities for the licensed premises still remained in the name of Albert Parrish, although payment for those utilities was being made by the Petitioner. The telephone remained in the name of Albert Parrish because in the words of the Petitioner, it cost $200.00 to change over the phone from Parrish's name to the Petitioner's name and the Petitioner could not afford to make that change. In the interim, the Petitioner intends to pay for the telephone until such time as she cannot afford to pay and the service charges and at that time she would expect the telephone to be removed for nonpayment. At the time of the hearing, Albert Parrish was no longer in the junk yard business at the licensed premises and was not living with the Petitioner at the Apartment 51 due to the fact that the welfare officials had instructed the Petitioner that if Parrish lived there, the Petitioner could not receive help for her children. At present, the Petitioner does not know the exact residence address of Parrish nor of his future intentions regarding their relationship in which she had been his "girlfriend" in the past. Parrish still gives her $10.00 or $15.00 when he can afford it and when she asks him for the money. The Petitioner presently sells sandwiches and soft drinks at the licensed premises and has an occupational license from Bradford County, Florida, which allows her to do this. This license is in her sole name. Albert Parrish is not involved in the daily operation of this business. It is the intention of the Petitioner to expand the base of her operations to include the sales of alcoholic beverages. In taking over the licensed premises, she intends to continue to pay the month-to-month rent due at the licensed premises. In pursuit of the expansion of her business, Parrish gave the Petitioner certain tables and chairs in the licensed premises to use for her purposes. Parrish was not paid any amount of money for his good will or inventory and no inventory remained to be used by the current Petitioner. The Petitioner receives other income from the licensed premises in the form of a concessions for a "piccolo and pool tables". The average amount of income from those concessions being $65.00 for the piccolo and $80.00 for the pool table, on a weekly basis, of which one-half of the money is paid to the concessionaire of those items in lieu of rentals. Presently, the apartment rent of the Petitioner is paid primarily from funds received from the business, from money provided by the Petitioner's elder sons, and from welfare payments to the Petitioner.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner, Dorothy Risby's application for a new Series 2-COP alcoholic beverage license be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of September, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of September, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Risby 922 East Brownlee Street Starke, Florida 32091 William Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Action and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner, having been issued license number 60-01280, Series 1- APS. No dispute exists that such license permits Respondent to make packaged sales of beer and wine at its establishment. Respondent's last known address is 148 West Avenue A, Belle Glade, Florida. Respondent's establishment is a convenience store. On or about April 17, 2002, Jeremiah Alexander Maxie went to Respondent's establishment for the specific purpose of attempting to purchase beer. Mr. Maxie is employed as an investigative aide for Petitioner. At the time that he visited Respondent's establishment, Mr. Maxie was under 21 years of age; he was 17 years of age, having been born on August 10, 1984. Mr. Maxie did nothing to alter his appearance in an attempt to affect his age. Mr. Maxie attempted to purchase beer at twelve other locations on April 17, 2002. He was paid $35 by Petitioner for that day. Mr. Maxie entered Respondent's establishment at approximately 4:50 p.m. Shortly thereafter, approximately 20 seconds later, Petitioner's Special Agent Danny Stoops, who was undercover, entered Respondent's establishment. Agent Stoops observed the actions of Mr. Maxie. Agent Stoops is a 24-year veteran with Petitioner. He gave Mr. Maxie instructions as to what to do. Agent Stoops instructed Mr. Maxie to attempt to purchase a Budweiser product and, if the clerk requested identification, for Mr. Maxie to politely set the beer down and leave. Mr. Maxie proceeded to the rear of Respondent's establishment to the coolers. He removed a can of beer, a Budweiser product, and proceeded to the cash register. At the time of hearing, Mr. Maxie could not recall the particular type of Budweiser product. Agent Stoops observed Mr. Maxie proceed from the coolers to the cash register although he did not observe the product that Mr. Maxie had obtained. Mr. Maxie gave the cashier/clerk, Armando Rodriguez, who is Respondent's owner, U.S. Currency as payment for the beer. Mr. Rodriguez placed the Budweiser product in a paper bag and gave Mr. Maxie a receipt, but Mr. Maxie did not look at the receipt. Mr. Maxie departed Respondent's establishment. At the time of hearing, Mr. Maxie could not recall the denomination of currency that he gave to Mr. Rodriguez or the amount that he had paid for the beer. Agent Stoops observed Mr. Maxie give Mr. Rodriguez the currency but did not observe the denomination. Agent Stoops departed Respondent's establishment approximately 15 to 20 feet behind Mr. Maxie. When they were outside, the purchased Budweiser product was given to Agent Stoops by Mr. Maxie. Both Agent Stoops and Mr. Maxie initialed the paper bag into which Mr. Rodriguez had placed the Budweiser product. Agent Stoops placed the Budweiser product in an evidence bag, tagged it with an evidence receipt bearing a control number, and secured the bagged evidence in the trunk of his vehicle. Agent Stoops removed the bagged evidence from the trunk of his vehicle and placed it in Petitioner's evidence vault. For hearing, Agent Stoops retrieved the bagged evidence from the evidence vault. The Budweiser product presented at hearing was a can of Bud Light Beer, which was still in the paper bag in which the beer was placed at the time of purchase. No challenge to the chain of custody of the can of beer was made and no problem exists as to the chain of custody of the can of beer. No receipt for the purchase of the Budweiser product was included in the bagged evidence. Agent Stoops could not independently recall that a receipt was presented to him by Mr. Maxie. Respondent entered into evidence cash register receipts for April 17, 2002, which do not reflect the purchase of any alcoholic beverage. However, the cash register receipts reflect, among other things, "taxable" and "grocery" items, not the particular items themselves, and "meat"; thereby, the cash register receipts differentiate only between "grocery" and "taxable" and "meat" items. Further, the cash register receipts are numbered 058616 through 058619, with times of day reflecting 16:05 through 16:09, and 058624 through 058627, with times of day reflecting 16:46 through 16:52. Not included in the cash register receipts are receipts numbered 058620 through 058623, with times of day reflecting 16:10 through 16:45. With the missing numbered-cash register receipts included, a total of 12 transactions were completed, but only eight transactions were offered and admitted into evidence. No explanation was presented for the missing eight transactions. Taking into consideration the overwhelming evidence of the purchase of the Budweiser product by Mr. Maxie, not having a receipt is insufficient to show that the beer-purchase transaction did not occur. Moreover, the evidence is clear and convincing that the beer-purchase transaction did occur. The product purchased at Respondent's establishment by Mr. Maxie was a can of beer, a Budweiser product, a Bud Light. At the time of hearing, Mr. Rodriguez was 76 years of age and had owned Respondent's establishment for 36 years. He is Respondent's agent. Mr. Rodriguez speaks Spanish. At the time of hearing, an interpreter was provided for him. Mr. Rodriguez denies that he saw Mr. Maxie in Respondent's establishment and denies that he sold any beer to Mr. Maxie. Mr. Rodriguez failed to realize to whom he sold the can of beer. At the time Mr. Maxie purchased the can of beer from Respondent's establishment, Mr. Rodriguez was engaged in a conversation with another gentleman. Mr. Rodriguez did not ask Mr. Maxie any questions or ask for his identification. Mr. Maxie said nothing to suggest that he was 21 years of age or older. As a matter of fact, no evidence was presented that any conversation took place between Mr. Maxie and Mr. Rodriguez. The evidence further suggests that Mr. Rodriguez paid very little attention to Mr. Maxie even at the time of the purchase of the beer. Mr. Rodriguez did not knowingly and willfully sell the can of beer to a minor, i.e., Mr. Maxie. Mr. Rodriguez was negligent and failed to exercise reasonable diligence in preventing the sale of the can of beer to Mr. Maxie. No prior disciplinary action has been taken against Respondent by Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a final order: Finding that Lake Supermarket, Inc., d/b/a Lake Supermarket, violated Subsection 562.11(1)(a), Florida Statutes; Imposing a fine of $1,000.00 payable within a time deemed appropriate; and Suspending the license of Lake Supermarket, Inc., d/b/a Lake Supermarket, for seven days. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Chad D. Heckman, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Valentin Rodriguez, Jr., Esquire Valentin Rodriguez, P.A. 318 Ninth Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Peter Williams, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Danny Stoops, Agent Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 North Congress Avenue, No. 150 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for transfer of an alcoholic beverage license should be granted, or denied on the ground that the license has been revoked.
Findings Of Fact On January 25, 1977, Armando Calo, through counsel, filed a Notice of Lien with DABT stating that he was a bona fide mortgagee on an alcoholic beverage license (4-COP, lic. no. 23-1901) held by the Intimo Lounge, Inc., 1601 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. Citing Section 561.65, Florida Statutes, he enclosed a copy of his chattel mortgage and a check payable to DABT in the amount of $5.00. (P-1) By return letter dated February 4, 1977, C. L. Ivey, Jr., DABT's Licensing Supervisor, acknowledged receipt of Mr. Calo's Notice of Lien and stated that it would be made part of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license file. At that time, administrative license revocation proceedings were pending against Intimo Lounge, Inc. So Mr. Ivey sent a copy of his February 4, 1977 acknowledgment letter to DABT's Miami Office, and included this notation: P.S. John: You need to immediately notify Attorney Solomon's [Calo's attorney's] office if and when an order to revoke is issued. He will then go to court to seek a judicial transfer. (P-2) On March 22, 1977, Charles A. Nuzum, DABT's Director, executed an order revoking Intimo Lounge, Inc.`s alcoholic beverage license. (R-1) Eight days later, on March 30, 1977, Armando Calo sued Intimo Lounge, Inc., seeking to foreclose his chattel mortgage on its alcoholic beverage license. By letter of the same date, counsel for Mr. Calo, citing Section 561.65, Florida Statutes, notified DABT of the filing of the foreclosure action; he also asserted that Mr. Calo had no knowledge of or participation in the causes for which the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license was revoked. Copies of subsequent pleadings filed in the action were sent to DABT's legal department. DABT thus knew the suit was filed and was aware of its continued progress. (Testimony of Barone; P-3, P-4, P-11) The Circuit Court of Dade County ultimately entered a final judgment of foreclosure in Mr. Calo's favor. On August 17, 1979, pursuant to such judgment, the Clerk of the Court sold the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license, at public sale, to intervenor Rene Valdes, 1710 N.W. 7th Street, Suite 7201, Miami, Florida for $25,000. Notice of the sale was published in the Miami Review, a newspaper circulated in Dade County. On August 28, 1979, the Clerk issued a Certificate of Title pursuant to Chapter 45, Florida Statutes. This Certificate certified that Intimo Lounge, Inc.`s alcoholic beverage license (4-COP, license no. 23-1901) had been sold to Rene Valdes on August 17, 1979, and that "no objections to the sale have been filed within the time allowed for filing objections." (Testimony of Valdes; P-5, P-6) Although DABT was aware of the protracted mortgage foreclosure litigation involving the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license --which it had earlier revoked -- it never protested or sought to block the foreclosure action. It was not a party to the action; neither did it attempt to become one. (Testimony of Barone, Valdes) In September, 1979, a month after the judicial foreclosure sale, Nathaniel Barone, counsel for Intimo Lounge, Inc., wrote R. B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary of the Department of Business Regulation, asking what steps were necessary to keep the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license viable. An internal memorandum suggests that DABT was, at first, unprepared to answer that question and preferred, instead, to delay answering until an application for the license was filed. But, on October 4, 1979, Harold F. X. Purnell, the Department's General Counsel replied on behalf of Secretary Burroughs: It is the Division's position that the . . . license has been and presently is revoked pursuant to the actions pre- viously taken by [DABT]. Further, that in the absence of an order of appropriate jurisdiction entered in a proceeding to which the Division is a party we are powerless to transfer such license. (Testimony of Barone; P-7, P-10) Meanwhile, Rene Valdes, notified DABT of his purchase of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. beverage license and asked that it be held in escrow while he found a suitable purchaser and location. When DABT refused, Mr. Valdes petitioned the court, which had rendered the foreclosure judgment, to require DABT to process and transfer the license. The court denied his petition, at least in part, because DABT was not a party to the proceeding. After the court hearing, Mr. Valdes, together with his attorney, Charles Kelly, and DABT's counsel, Mr. Purnell, met outside the chambers and discussed their next step. Mr. Kelly discussed seeking a mandamus ordering DABT to issue the license. Mr. Purnell suggested, instead, that Mr. Valdes find a location and purchaser for the license, then submit an application to DABT -- something which Mr. Valdes had not yet done. Although Mr. Purnell did not assure them that the application would be approved, both Mr. Valdes and Mr. Barone gained an impression that it would be. 2/ Mr. Valdes, following Mr. Purnell's suggestion, found a location and buyer, then applied for a transfer of the license. DABT's denial resulted in this proceeding. (Testimony of Barone, Valdes) Under Section 561.65(1), Florida Statutes (1977), a lender licensed by the state holding a lien on an alcoholic beverage license had the right to enforcement of his lien against the license within 12 days after any order of revocation, provided it was revoked for causes which the lienholder had no knowledge and did not participate. If the lienholder purchased the license at foreclosure sale, he could operate under it or transfer it to a qualified person. Until August 17, 1980, it was DABT's long-standing practice and policy to make no distinction between licensed and unlicensed lenders (lien-holders). It allowed both licensed and unlicensed lienholders to file notice of liens against beverage licenses and honored the subsequent transfer of the license if the lien was enforced within 12 days of revocation. This practice was abruptly changed on the basis of an agency legal opinion. On August 17, 1980, one month before Gui-Dom filed its application, DABT's General Counsel rendered a legal opinion limiting Section 561.65 relief to lenders licensed by the state. After that date, until 1981, when the legislature removed the "licensed lender" language of Section 561.65, DABT applied Section 561.65 literally and only accepted liens filed by licensed lenders. (Testimony of LaRosa; P-13) But in October, 1980, DABT did not deny Gui-Dom's application for transfer of the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license because Armando Calo, the lienholder, lacked a lender's license. Instead, the application was denied because the license had been earlier revoked. As later explained by Barry Schoenfeld, DABT's Chief of Licensing: 2 [DABT] felt at the time that . . . there really was no license, that the license had already been revoked, and that there was no license for the court to sell [to Valdes]. (P-13, p. 25). But Section 561.65 specifically permits liens, under specified conditions, to survive license revocation. When asked to explain DABT's position in light of Section 561.65, Mr. Schoenfeld replied, "I don't know that I can explain it." (P-13, p. 16) Neither could Mr. Schoenfeld adequately explain why, in cases similar to this, DABT has approved license transfers while, here, they have not. (P-13, p. 23) It was not until after the denial of Gui-Dom's application that DABT contended that Section 561.65, Florida Statutes (1977), provides no relief because Armando Calo was not a licensed lender. (P- 9, P-13). Rene Valdes, a beverage license broker, operates a business known as "Beverage License, Inc." He specializes in obtaining and transferring alcoholic beverage licenses for clients and has a working knowledge of the Beverage Law, including DABT rules and practice. When he purchased the Intimo Lounge, Inc. license at the judicial sale, he did not know that it had been revoked by DABT. He did, however, know that there was license revocation litigation between Intimo Lounge, Inc. and DABT. He also knew that DABT had issued an emergency order suspending Intimo Lounge, Inc.'s license; and he knew that there were circuit court foreclosure proceedings involving the license. Yet he failed to ascertain the status of the license -- either by checking the files of DABT or the circuit court. But even if he had discovered that the license had been revoked, under DABT's long-standing practice and interpretation of Section 561.65, it would have made no difference. The license would have "survived" revocation because Armando Calo had timely enforced his lien. And it could have been sold at a judicial sale and transferred to a new qualified purchaser. (Testimony of Valdes, Harris; P-13) DABT has provided no record foundation for its abrupt discontinuance of prior agency practice and policy in August, 1980, a policy which allowed both licensed and unlicensed lien holders to file and timely enforce liens against beverage licenses. This policy enabled a lien to survive license revocation; and the license, which had been revoked earlier could then be transferred by judicial sale. The only explanation given for the change in policy, a change which DABT now relies on as cause for denying Gui-Dom's application, is that the agency changed its legal interpretation of Section 561.65 (1977). (Testimony of LaRosa; P-13)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Gui-Dom's application for transfer of alcoholic beverage license no. 23-1901, series 4-COP, be granted. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1983.
Findings Of Fact Eugene Willner is the corporate officer and sole stockholder of G.W. Liquors of Broward, Inc., d/b/a Case Deliveries, and G.W. Liquors of Collier, Inc., d/b/a Discounted by the Case. On August 27, 1980, Eugene Willner entered a plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to a violation of Title 21, United States Code s. 963, Conspiracy to Import Marijuana. Based upon his plea he was convicted and sentenced to two years of imprisonment, and a fine of $5000 was imposed. Willner had never before been convicted of any offense, nor has he been convicted of any offense subsequent to the 1980 conviction. Other than the 1980 conviction, Willner has a reputation of good moral character in his community. On July 8, 1983 Willner received a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights which provided, in relevant part, that he ... is restored to all civil rights in this State, except the specific authority to possess or own a firearm, lost by reason of any and all felonies this person may have been convicted of in another state, federal, or military court . In early 1987, the Petitioner corporate entities controlled by Willner applied for new quota alcoholic beverage licenses. Those applications disclosed Willner's 1980 conviction and his 1983 restoration of civil rights. On October 28, 1987, Respondent denied the applications. Of the 8500 licensed alcoholic beverage premises in Dade and Monroe Counties, only approximately 20 to 25 (or approximately one-quarter of one percent) are experiencing a problem with narcotics.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving Petitioners' applications for alcoholic beverage licenses. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-5565 & 87-5566 Petitioners' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-5 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-4 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's unnumbered proposed finding of fact has been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration herein for the reasons set forth in this Recommended Order. Additionally, that proposed finding of fact contains phrases which are not supported by the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting background information forming the basis for Respondent's proposed agency action in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 7 and 6, respectively, have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel and recitation of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: C. I. Ivey, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Bruce Rogow, Esquire 2097 S.W. 27th Terrace Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 W. Douglas Moody, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Sy Chadroff, Esquire 2700 S.W. 37th Avenue Miami, Florida 33133 Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Moishes Steakhouse & Seafood, Inc., timely submitted an application to record a lien for license number 23-02731 4COP.
Findings Of Fact On or about March 3, 1999, Armar Inc., Arnaldo Bou, individually, and Martha Pinango, individually, as debtors, and the Petitioner, by Eugenio D'Arpino, as president of the company, the secured party, executed a security agreement (chattel mortgage) related to beverage license 23-02731, series 4COP. Such security agreement recognized a priority lien for the Petitioner, Moishes Steakhouse & Seafood, Inc., and included a promissory note executed by the debtors. The promissory note, dated March 3, 1999 (presumably executed on or about that date), provided: THIS NOTE IS NOTE ASSIGNABLE AND NON- ASSUMABLE WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE SECURED PARTY. THIS NOTE IS SECURED BY A SECURITY AGREEMENT (CHATTEL MORTGAGE) AND UCC-1 WHICH SHALL CREATE A PRIORITY LIEN (1ST PLACE LIEN) ON STATE OF FLORIDA ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LICENSE NO: 23- 01686, series 4 COP quota. The security agreement and promissory note were not provided to the Department within 90 days of March 3, 1999. Apparently, the fact that the note and security agreement make reference to different alcoholic beverage license numbers is not an issue. Neither party has raised that issue. The Petitioner forwarded the note and security agreement to the Department for recordation on or about September 21, 1999. At that time the Department received an application to record a lien for license no. 23-02731, series 4COP. On October 11, 1999, the Department sent Petitioner a letter declining the application because it was not made within 90 days after the creation of the lien. The Department requested a newly executed security agreement so that the dates would show the request for recording within 90 days of the application. It is the Department's position that the lien application should have been submitted within 90 days of its creation in order to comply with the mandatory guidelines of the statute. For purposes of this case, the Department argued that the "creation of the lien" was on or about March 3, 1999, or, at the latest, March 15, 1999 (a date noted in the escrow agreement). The Petitioner timely sought an administrative review of the Department's decision. It is the Petitioner's position that the lien did not "break escrow" until August of 1999, and that, as a matter of law, that is the point in time from which the 90 day period should run. From the Petitioner's perspective, the "creation of the lien" as used by the statute dates from when the transaction broke escrow. All parties agree that the statute does not specifically address escrow transactions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, enter a final order approving the Petitioner's application to record a lien on the subject alcoholic beverage license. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Sherrie Barnes, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Major Jorge R. Herrera Department of Business and Professional Regulation 8685 Northwest 53rd Terrace Augusta Building, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33166 Louis J. Terminello, Esquire Terminello & Terminello, P. A. 2700 Southwest 37th Avenue Miami, Florida 33133-2728 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Richard Turner, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for an alcoholic beverage license should be denied because of the direct or indirect interest of John Lee Johnson, a person allegedly lacking good moral character.
Findings Of Fact In May, 1982, petitioner Betty Jean Johnson applied for a 2 APS (beer and wine) alcoholic beverage license to be used in connection with a business known as Johnson's Corner Grocery, 1400 North J. Street, Pensacola, Florida. On her application, petitioner indicated that she owned the business and that no other person had a direct or indirect interest in the business. (R-1) Prior to the petitioner filing her application, John Lee Johnson, her husband, had applied for a beverage license for the same location under his own name. When he failed to disclose his criminal history on the application, his application was denied and he was charged with the crime of filing a false official written statement. On May 12, 1982, he was convicted by the County Court of Escambia County. (Testimony of Baxley; R-3) John Johnson's filing of a false official statement supports an inference that he lacks good moral character. Petitioner did not present evidence sufficient to rebut or negate this inference. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, John Johnson has a direct or indirect interest in Johnson's Corner Grocery. He owns the underlying real property. He signs, and is authorized to sign, checks on the business account of Johnson's Corner Grocery. The business's utilities, light, water, and gas accounts are all in his name. (Testimony of Baxley, Johnson, Kelly; R-4) Petitioner, however, manage's the day-to-day operations of Johnson's Corner Grocery. On her application, she indicated that she had purchased the business for $80,000, with $25,000 down, and $55,000 financed by the Barnett Bank. She now admits that the $25,000 down payment was provided by John Johnson, her husband, and that he also co-signed the $55,000 note and mortgage. Her application, however, does not disclose Mr. Johnson's participation in the purchase and financing of, the business. (Testimony of Johnson; R-1, R-4) On November 9, 1982, three days before hearing, Mr. Johnson leased the Johnson's Corner Grocery property to petitioner for $675.00 per month for three years. The handwritten lease, which was not signed in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, states that Mr. Johnson will not be "responsible for . . . the operations of . . . [the] business." This assertion is rejected as unworthy of belief in light of his extensive involvement in purchasing and setting up the business, and his continuing access to its funds. (P-1)
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, alcoholic beverage license No. 26-01841, Series No. 2-APS, was issued to Respondents, Frank D. and Estella S. Ryers, for their establishment known as the Big B Restaurant, located at 5570 Avenue B, Jacksonville, Florida. A 2-APS license permits the package sale only of beer and wine. It does not permit the consumption on the premises of beer, wine, or liquor. On March 27, 1983, Investigator Wendell M. Reeves conducted an undercover operation directed against the Big B Restaurant predicated upon reports received by Petitioner that Respondents were conducting sales of alcoholic beverages not permitted by the license at the licensed premises. In furtherance of that operation, Reeves utilized another beverage agent, Van Young, in an undercover capacity to make a controlled buy of an improperly sold substance from the licensees. Prior to sending Young into the licensed premises, Reeves searched Young to ensure that he, Young, had no alcoholic beverage or money in his possession. Satisfying himself that that was the case, he gave Young $15 in U.S. currency and sent him into the licensed premises to make the buy. Young entered the Big B Restaurant at 1:00 p.m. and came out 17 minutes later. When he came out of the licensed premises, Young came over to where Reeves was waiting and turned over to him a sealed 200 ml bottle of Fleishman's Gin. Young told Reeves that he had purchased the gin in the licensed premises from a black male whose description matched that of Respondent Frank D. Byers which is contained on Respondent's application for license. Respondent Frank Byers denies making the sale. On balance, however, there is little doubt it was Respondent who made the sale, especially in light of the fact that this same licensee was issued a letter of warning by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco in October 1981 for possession on the premises of an alcoholic beverage not permitted to be sold under the license. Young also stated that he purchased a second bottle which he consumed on the premises with another black male. However, this evidence was in the form of Reeves' report of what was told him by Young. As such, it is clearly hearsay and can be used only to corroborate or explain other admissible evidence. Therefore, as to the allegation regarding the consumption of the gin on the premises, since it is the only evidence of that offense, it cannot be used to support a finding of fact on that allegation. It may, however, be used to explain how Young got the bottle with which he was seen by Reeves to come out of the licensed premises. Several days later, on March 30, 1983, Reeves again entered the licensed premises, where he told Respondent Estella Byers he was there to inspect the site. She opened the cooler for him and he inspected the beer inside and the cigarettes. While he was doing that, however, he noticed her take a cloth towel and drape it over something behind the bar. He went over to it, removed the towel, and found that it covered a bottle of Schenley's gin. Mrs. Byers immediately said she thought it was her husband's, Respondent Frank Byers, but another individual present at the time, Sharon Thomas, said she had taken it from her brother, who was drunk, and had put it there. Again, as to Ms. Thomas' comments, they, too, are hearsay and can only serve here to explain or corroborate other admissible evidence. In any case, after Ms. Thomas made her comment, she was immediately contradicted by Respondent Estella Byers, who again indicated she thought the bottle was her husband's. In any case, at the hearing, Respondent Estella Byers contended she did not know it was there. On balance, Mr. Reeves' testimony that she covered it with a towel while he was inspecting and the evidence of the prior warning for an identical offense tend to indicate she did know it was there and that it was unlawful for it to be there. There is, however, no evidence to establish sufficiently the reason for its being there.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Alice Waldo, holder of Alcoholic Beverage License No. 45- 00293, Series 2-COP, for a licensed premises known as the SILVER DOLLAR CAFE located in Lake County, Florida. On or about February 4, 1989, an investigator employed by Petitioner entered the licensed premises of Respondent. While in Respondent's facility, the investigator observed several patrons smoking a substance, which by its smell and usage, he believed to be marijuana. The investigator then met with a patron, ordered a small quantity of crack cocaine and handed the patron some money for the forthcoming purchase. The patron then asked Respondent to hold the money while he left the premises to retrieve the controlled substance from his automobile. Shortly thereafter, the patron returned with the cocaine. The investigator showed the substance to Respondent's daughter, who had taken her mother's place at the bar. The purpose of displaying the drug to the proprietor, or the proprietor's daughter in this instance, was to later illustrate that Respondent condoned the use and sale of the drug in connection with her licensed premises. A field test by the investigator and a later laboratory test confirmed the identity of the substance purchased as crack cocaine. Petitioner's investigator again entered Respondent's facility on or about February 10, 1989. On this occasion, the investigator purchased a quantity of marijuana from a female patron, then took the substance over to the bar where he proceeded to roll a marijuana cigarette in the presence of Petitioner. At no time did Petitioner inform the investigator that controlled substances were not allowed on the licensed premises. Upon later laboratory analysis, the substance was confirmed to be marijuana. Upon leaving Respondent's facility on February 10, 1989, Petitioner's investigator met an individual within 10 feet of the front door of the premises who sold him a quantity of a substance later determined by laboratory analysis to be crack cocaine. On or about February 24, 1989, Petitioner's investigator entered Respondent's facility. On the front porch of Respondent's facility, the investigator purchased a quantity of a substance later determined by the investigator's field test and a subsequent laboratory analysis to be crack cocaine. After completing the purchase of the substance, the investigator went inside the facility, placed the material on the counter and recounted to Respondent that it had just been purchased on the front porch. Respondent made no reply to the investigator's announcement and, instead, complied with his request for change for a $20 bill. Upon receipt of the change, the investigator wrapped the crack cocaine in a $1 bill in Respondent's presence. On February 28, 1989, Petitioner's investigator again entered Respondent's facility. He approached a black female named "Lilly" and gave her $20 for the purchase of crack cocaine. However, after the lady accepted the $20 and left to retrieve the cocaine, she did not return. The investigator complained to Respondent that "Lilly" had failed to deliver the drug to him. The investigator also told Respondent that the lady could keep the $20 if Respondent would get him some of the drug. At that time, Respondent referred the investigator to a group of three male patrons on the front porch of the facility who appeared to be smoking marijuana. At no time during this incident did Respondent take any steps to prevent the use of any controlled substances on the licensed premises. Subsequently, Petitioner's investigator returned to Respondent's facility on or about March 4, 1989. He purchased a beer and went outside to the front porch of the facility. He observed a number of furtive transactions where currency was passed between certain individuals. He noticed Respondent go to one of the automobiles in the facility parking lot, get into the automobile, engage in conversation with the occupants and shortly thereafter emerge from the automobile. Respondent went back into the facility. The investigator approached a black male and gave him $20 for some crack cocaine. The black male took the investigator's money, then went directly to the automobile where Respondent had been previously. He returned shortly thereafter to the investigator with two pieces of a substance which later tested positive, via field test and laboratory analysis, as cocaine. During another visit to Respondent's facility on or about March 9, 1989, Petitioner's investigator observed a patron rolling what appeared to be marijuana cigarettes in Respondent's presence. While Respondent took no action to prohibit the use or possession of the apparently controlled substance, she did get her coat and leave shortly after the investigator's arrival. On or about March 11, 1989, Petitioner's investigator reentered Respondent's facility. The investigator purchased a small quantity of crack cocaine from a black male on the front porch of the facility. The investigator then took the controlled substance inside the building and displayed it to Respondent, telling her that he had just obtained the drug on the porch. Respondent asked the investigator if he was going to smoke the drug, and he replied yes. Later, a field test and laboratory analysis confirmed the drug to be cocaine. On or about March 17, 1989, Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent's facility. This time the investigator purchased a small quantity of a drug on the front porch of the building which, upon subsequent field test and laboratory analysis, was confirmed to be cocaine. After completing the purchase, the investigator took the substance inside and showed it to Respondent. Later in the evening, the investigator engaged Respondent in conversation on the front porch and related to her that he had observed numerous drug transactions taking place in her facility. Respondent smiled in acknowledgment of the investigator's statement and replied that she certainly hoped he was not a policeman. He told her that he was not a policeman. Respondent took no action to prohibit further use or transactions relating to drugs on the premises.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking Respondent's beverage license bearing number 45-00293, Series 2- COP. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1989 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-10. Addressed. Respondent's Proposed Findings. None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: EDWIN R. IVY, ESQUIRE BOX 3223 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32810 THOMAS A. KLEIN, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 725 SOUTH BRONOUGH ST. TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1007 STEPHEN R. MACNAMARA, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 725 SOUTH BRONOUGH ST. TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1007 LEONARD IVEY, DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 725 SOUTH BRONOUGH ST. TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1007
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following Findings of Fact: On October 24, 1985, Petitioner filed an initial application with Respondent to obtain an alcoholic beverage license. The alcoholic beverage license was to be used in the operation of a small restaurant which Petitioner owned, known as El Conquistador Restaurant, in Homestead, Florida. The Petitioner is the sole owner of El Conquistador Restaurant. The application listed the Respondent, Maria Andarcio as the sole proprietor and only person having a financial interest in the business known as El Conquistador Restaurant. During the processing of the application, Mr. Ross, the investigator assigned to Petitioner's case, noticed that the application appeared to have several discrepancies. In particular, Mr. Ross was concerned because the financial information submitted with the initial application listed Julio Andarcio, Respondent's estranged husband, as the sole depositor of the expense account but he was not listed as having any financial interest in the business. Secondly, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient information regarding her employment history. Lastly, a lease which was part of the initial application, identified a potential undisclosed interest, Jose Osario, as a co- leasee. On November 15, 1985, Mr. Ross, routinely mailed a "14 day letter" to Petitioner requesting additional information. In particular, the "14 day letter" directed the Petitioner to provide additional information within 14 days from the date of receipt of the letter. The additional information requested was as follows: List occupation for the past 5 years on personal questionaire. Julio Andarcio must be fingerprinted and submit personal questionaire." The Petitioner failed to provide the information requested in the 14 day letter. Thereafter, Respondent was unable to fully investigate the license application and denied the Petitioner's license on January 8, 1986. For some reason, the Petitioner did not receive the 14 day letter which Respondent sent by regular mail. Therefore, she did not respond within the requested time period. The Petitioner was born in Cuba and speaks very little English. The language barrier contributed to the apparent discrepancies in Petitioner's initial application. Mr. Ross opined that based on all of the information that he had received up to the time of the hearing, the Petitioner would have been granted a beverage license had she only responded to the "14 day letter."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered allowing the Petitioner 20 days from the date thereof in which to provide Respondent with the information requested in the initial "14 day letter," thereby making her application complete. The Respondent shall thereafter review and process the application in the standard and routine manner. DONE and ORDERED this 24th day of October, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1176 Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner (None Submitted) Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact. Matters not contained therein are rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and/or argument. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact. Matters no contained therein are rejected as subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: Armando Gutierrez, Esquire 2153 Coral Way, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33145 Thomas A. Klein, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1077 James Kearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1927 Thomas A. Bell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301-1927 Howard M. Rasmussen, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301-1927
