The Issue Whether subject sign is in violation of state and federal law for the reason that no permit was secured at time of erection of subject sign.
Findings Of Fact Respondent proceeded to erect subject sign prior to January 29, 1975, and continued such erection after January 29, 1975, the date a Notice of Outdoor Advertising Violation was served on Respondent Corporation by the District Sign Inspector. Said notice of violation notified Respondent that Respondent Corporation was in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes or Section 335.13, Florida statutes for the reason that no permit had been secured and that the erection of said sign was in violation of the specific requirement of Chapter 479, Florida statutes inasmuch as subject sign was approximately 250' from an existing sign. Respondent continued to erect subject sign despite objections from the Florida Department of Transportation. On the date of the hearing the Respondent testified that as of that date an application had been made and permit had been approved. The sign coordinator testified that the sign which had been permitted and which was so spaced to prohibit the building of Respondent's sign had been removed after the Notice of Hearing had been set. The complainant contended that Respondent erected subject sign without first applying for a permit; that after Notice of Violation Respondent disregarded the notice and the law and continued to build subject sign; that not until notice of this hearing was received did Respondent "buy out" the offending sign which prohibited the issuance of permits. The Respondent did not deny that no permit was issued before erection of subject sign but contends that permits have now been issued.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or, if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact In June 1982, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.5 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 6868 issued by the City of Clearwater (the City), on October 22, 1981, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AF604 and AF605 issued by DOT on November 18, 1981. In January 1983, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.4 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 10406 issued by the City on October 15, 1982, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers A1288 and A1289 issued by DOT on December 20, 1982. On or about July 1, 1984, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.3 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number SN - 24060117 issued by the City on June 6, 1984, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AM631 and AM632 issued by DOT on January 12, 1984. National maintained the three outdoor advertising billboard structures, containing six advertising faces, as identified in Findings of Fact numbers 1, 2 and 3, above (the "subject sign structures"), in the same condition as they were when erected. Following the lawful erection of the subject sign structures, National paid DOT the required annual permit fees through the year 1995, which allowed National to maintain and operate the subject sign structures through December 31, 1995. In March of 1995, DOT notified National that it was dropping state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory because DOT had no jurisdiction over the segment of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, adjacent to which the subject sign structures were located. The evidence was that DOT did so by serving on National a "Notice of Violation," citing DOT's lack of jurisdiction. The "Notice of Violation" gave National the opportunity to request an administrative hearing to contest DOT's action. National had no reason to question DOT's position on the jurisdictional issue but rather relied upon DOT's determination that DOT did not have jurisdiction in March of 1995. National chose not to request a hearing. The evidence was not clear as to when the DOT lost, or believed it lost, jurisdiction; the evidence also was not clear whether the DOT ever had, or believed it ever had, jurisdiction. At the time DOT dropped state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory, DOT did not refund any permit fees to National, including the permit fees which National had paid for the 1995 calendar year. Consequently, permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 were fully paid through December 31, 1995. On November 2, 1995, the section of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, along which the subject sign structures are located became part of the National Highway System (NHS), and became jurisdictional for the purpose of permitting outdoor advertising billboard structures. On August 26, 1996, Kenneth M. Towcimak, as Director of DOT's Office of Right of Way, issued a memorandum to all District Outdoor Advertising Administrators addressing implementation of outdoor advertising control over roadways which were previously uncontrolled by DOT, and which became designated as part of the NHS on November 28, 1995. The Towcimak memorandum of August 26, 1996, required notification by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to all owners of such outdoor advertising billboard structures, that they must obtain state permits by January 1, 1997. There was no evidence as to whether DOT ever notified National by registered mail, with return receipt requested, that National was required to obtain state permits by January 1, 1997, for the subject sign structures. National filed six applications for the subject sign structures on or about December 29, 1997 (one for each of the two sign facings on each sign structure). On the part of the forms asking for the location of the sign, the six applications described the location of the signs, respectively, as: "Reinstated State Tag # AF 604-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AF 605-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 631-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 632-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AI 288-10"; and "Reinstated State Tag # AI 289-10." The applications contained copies of the permits previously issued by DOT for the operation and maintenance of the subject sign structures, copies of Landowner's permission and copies of City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures. Although the applications included copies of the City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures, DOT knew that the City no longer considered the sign structures to be legal under the City's code. In 1989, the City amended its code to place limitations on the size (height and area) and concentration (one per lot) of signs in the locations of the subject sign structures. The subject sign structures exceeded at least some of the new limitations; however, the code amendment provided for a seven-year "amortization" period, until January 19, 1996, during which the signs would be permitted as legal, non-conforming signs. At the end of the "amortization" period, the signs no longer were legal under the City code. Some of the information on National's six applications was incorrect or incomplete. But all of the incorrect or incomplete information could easily have been remedied, and "incorrect information" is not the real basis upon which DOT gave notice of intent to deny the applications. The real basis for the notice of intent was the illegality of the sign structures under the City code. On or about November 22, 1999, National filed with DOT a Petition for Reinstatement for each of the three signs (each petition seeking reinstatement of the two permits for the two advertising facings for each sign structure) under Section 479.07(8)(b)1-3, Florida Statutes (1999). On January 31, 2000, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Reinstatement as to each of the three such petitions filed by National.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Transportation enter a final order denying National's petitions for reinstatement and National's applications for new sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
The Issue As to DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 and 14-4927, the issues are whether the billboards identified in the notices of violation are located on the premises of Respondent's business and, thus, exempt from licensure; and, if not, whether the billboards are eligible for licensure pursuant to section 479.07, Florida Statutes, or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, Florida Statutes. With respect to DOAH Case No. 14-4928, the issue is whether Respondent engaged in, or benefitted from, the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation.
Findings Of Fact I. DOAH Case Nos. 14-4926 & 14-4927 The Parties The Respondent in these proceedings is I-10 Pecan House, Inc. ("Pecan House"), an entity currently owned and managed by Olan Q. Nobles. As discussed in greater detail below, Pecan House is a small country store that has conducted business in Jefferson County, Florida, for nearly 40 years. The Department is the state agency responsible, inter alia, for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs located within 600 feet of, and visible from, interstate highways. The Events In or around 1976, Erma Jean Walker (Mr. Nobles' sister) and her husband, Lyman Walker, III, purchased three tracts of land that are relevant to this proceeding. The first such parcel, upon which the Walkers quickly constructed an open- air market, comprises one acre and is located on State Road 257, immediately north of the intersection of that roadway and I-10. The second relevant parcel, .18 acres in size and located a short distance to the southeast of the first tract, is situated adjacent to the westbound lanes of I-10. Upon their acquisition of this parcel, the Walkers constructed a billboard that advertised the open-air market and the related business activities conducted on the third parcel. The third parcel, which is roughly 2.3 acres in size and likewise adjoins the westbound lanes of I-10, is located less than 1000 feet to the east of the second tract. It is upon this tract that, in mid-to-late 1976, the Walkers built a concrete structure to be used for the purpose of manufacturing candy and jelly——products the Walkers offered for sale at the nearby open-air market. By the end of 1976, the Walkers also constructed (upon the third parcel) a billboard advertising the open-air market and jelly/candy manufacture. Although the billboards referenced above were visible from I-10 and located within 600 feet of the roadway——and, thus, within the Department's "controlled area"——the Walkers did not apply for outdoor advertising permits. This is because, as the Department concedes, the billboards were exempt from licensure from 1976 until the mid-1990s (or perhaps later, as Mr. Nobles asserts) under the "on premises" exemption set forth in section 479.16, Florida Statutes. Under the definition of "premises" in effect during that period, the land upon which a sign was located did not need to be contiguous to the advertised business in order for the exemption to apply. For reasons that will soon be apparent, it is necessary to inject a third billboard into this discussion: in 1993, the Walkers constructed on the third tract of land a "double-stack" billboard, which is situated less than 200 feet and 1000 feet, respectively, from the signs erected in 1976 upon the third and second tracts. Although the double-stack billboard would have ostensibly satisfied the on-premises exemption, the Walkers nevertheless applied for——and were granted——an outdoor advertising permit. For all that appears, the Department has never initiated any proceedings to revoke the permit, which remains valid to this day. In 1995, Mrs. Walker transferred control of Pecan House to Mr. Nobles, who until that time had assisted the Walkers on an as-needed basis. Soon thereafter, Mr. Nobles upgraded the open-air market (on the first parcel) to a secure building and, of particular relevance here, ceased all manufacturing activities at the concrete building (on the third parcel). At or around that time, the Legislature amended the definition of "premises" to include a contiguity requirement.3/ This is significant, for the second and third parcels——the locations of the two billboards at issue herein——are not contiguous to the first parcel but, rather, are separated by a tract in which neither the Walkers nor Mr. Nobles holds a leasehold or ownership interest. Further, there is no recorded easement connecting Mr. Nobles' three parcels. Thus, although the two billboards constructed in 1976 lost their on-premises status in the mid-1990s, this fact apparently went unnoticed by the Department for roughly 13 years. Then, in March of 2008, the Department issued notices of violation in connection with both billboards. Among other things, the notices alleged that "outdoor advertising permit[s] [were] required, but ha[d] not been issued" for the billboards, which Mr. Nobles was instructed to remove within 30 days. A short time thereafter, an inspector or other agent of the Department conducted, in Mr. Nobles' presence, an examination of the 1976 billboards and Pecan House's business operations. At the conclusion of her inspection, the Department employee erroneously opined that, in fact, there was "no problem"4/ with the billboards in question, which Mr. Nobles reasonably took to mean that the signs continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption and, thus, were exempt from licensure. The reasonableness of this understanding was bolstered by the fact that, subsequent to the inspection, Mr. Nobles heard nothing more from the Department concerning the March 2008 notices of violation.5/ More than four years later, on December 17, 2012, the Department issued new notices of violation in connection with the 1976 billboards: notice 1352, relating to the billboard constructed upon the third parcel, which presently reads "Exit Now" and bears a Shell gasoline logo (hereinafter "Exit Now"); and notice 1487, relating to the billboard erected upon the second parcel, which presently reads "Welcome to Big O's / We Appreciate Your Business" (hereinafter "Big O's"). The parties thereafter engaged in settlement negotiations, in the course of which Mr. Nobles' counsel struggled mightily to convince the Department that the billboards continued to satisfy the on-premises exemption. When the Department rejected this argument, Mr. Nobles applied for an outdoor advertising permit for each billboard. The applications were ultimately denied, prompting the Department to refer the matters to DOAH for further proceedings. Based upon the evidence adduced at final hearing, it is evident that the billboards in question no longer meet the on-premises exemption and, thus, are subject to removal unless the signs meet either the current statutory requirements for a permit or, alternatively, the "grandfather" provision set forth in section 479.105, which authorizes licensure if the billboards satisfy earlier statutory criteria and certain other conditions. Eligibility for Licensure – "Exit Now" Beginning first with the "Exit Now" billboard, the record makes pellucid that the current statutory requirements for licensure cannot be satisfied. Among other things, the sign is located a mere 190 feet from the permitted, double-stack billboard erected in 1993, a distance far less than the minimum spacing requirement of 1500 feet. See § 479.07(9)(a)1., Fla. Stat. As for the potential applicability of the grandfather provision to the "Exit Now" billboard, it is critical to observe that the Department's delay of nearly five years (March of 2008 through December of 2012) in pursuing removal has placed Mr. Nobles at a significant disadvantage. In particular, had the Department moved forward in 2008——instead of inexplicably abandoning the action, which, along with the statements of its inspector, led Mr. Nobles to believe, incorrectly, that no permit was required——Mr. Nobles likely would have applied for a permit,6/ which the Department would have evaluated pursuant to the version of the grandfather provision in effect at that time. This is significant, for the 2008 codification of the grandfather provision, which remained unchanged until July 1, 2014, did not preclude licensure in situations where a billboard had previously enjoyed on-premises status or some other recognized exemption from the permitting requirement. Further, the pre-July 1, 2014, grandfather provision was quite favorable in that it allowed a potential licensee to demonstrate that the billboard would have met the criteria for licensure in effect "[a]t any time during the period in which the sign has been erected." § 479.105(1)(e)2., Fla. Stat. (2013)(emphasis added). The current version of the grandfather provision is quite a different animal. For one thing, grandfather status can only be granted if the billboard at issue "has never been exempt" from permitting. § 479.105(1)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added). For another thing, the current grandfather provision looks not at "any" time in which the sign has been erected but, rather, at the criteria in effect during the initial seven years in which the sign was subject to the Department's jurisdiction. § 479.105(1)(c)2.b., Fla. Stat. (2014). As Mr. Nobles readily acknowledges, his effort to obtain a permit for the "Exit Now" billboard is a nonstarter under the 2014 version of the grandfather provision, whose plain language prohibits the issuance of a permit where, as here, the sign was previously exempt from licensure. This does not end the matter, however, for the undersigned finds that the Department's unjustified delay in pursuing removal——along with its agent's erroneous statement that the billboard was legal, upon which Mr. Nobles relied——requires that the "Exit Now" application be evaluated under the version of the grandfather provision that was in effect from 2008 until July 1, 2014. Pursuant to the pre-2014 codification of section 479.105, "grandfathering" was authorized if the owner could demonstrate: 1) that the sign in question had been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for at least seven years; 2) that, at any time during the period in which the sign has been erected, the sign would have satisfied the criteria established in chapter 479 for issuance of a permit; 3) that the Department did not file a notice of violation or take other action to remove the sign during the initial seven-year period in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location; and 4) that the sign is not located on a state right-of-way and is not a safety hazard. § 479.105(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2013). Upon such a showing, the Department was authorized to treat the sign as conforming or nonconforming and issue a permit. Turing to the merits, the first prong is easily satisfied, as the "Exit Now" sign has been unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained at the same location for 39 years, far longer than the seven-year period the statute requires. The third prong is also met, for the record makes clear that the Department took no action to pursue removal during the initial seven-year period, i.e., 1976 through 1983, in which the sign was unpermitted, structurally unchanged, and continuously maintained. In addition, the Department stipulates that the sign neither poses a safety hazard nor is located upon a state right-of-way, thereby satisfying the fourth prong.7/ This leaves only the second prong, which asks if the sign would have met the criteria for licensure at any time after it was erected. The selection of any time period subsequent to 1993 would surely doom the application, as the sign would be unable to satisfy the minimum spacing requirement due to its close physical proximity to the double-stack billboard——which, as noted previously, was issued a permit in 1993 and remains licensed. Prior to 1993, however, there does not appear to be any spacing conflict that would preclude licensure in this instance.8/ With the spacing concern resolved (and the relevant period of inquiry narrowed to "any" time between 1976 and 1993), the undersigned turns to the only other criterion for licensure that appears to be in dispute: section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes the issuance of a permit only if the sign is located in "commercial-zoned and industrial-zoned areas or commercial-unzoned or industrial-unzoned areas." Unfortunately, this issue cannot be resolved on the instant record, for there is a dearth of persuasive evidence concerning the zoning designation of the third parcel (the location of the "Exit Now" sign) during the critical period of inquiry. Indeed, the record contains only the Department's speculative assumption that, because the area is presently unzoned, it therefore must have been unzoned at all times in the past.9/ Further, even accepting the Department's assumption at face value, it is impossible to determine whether the business activities conducted on the parcel from 1976 until the mid- 1990s——namely, the manufacture of candy and jelly and the sale of pecans——would satisfy the use test at any time between 1976 and 1993.10/ Under ordinary circumstances, such an absence of evidence would necessitate an adverse result for the permit applicant. Owing, however, to the unusual history and posture of this case, as well as the undersigned's conclusion that the pre-2014 grandfather provision should govern, it is recommended that the Department reevaluate Mr. Nobles' application to determine if the third parcel could have satisfied the requirements of 479.111(2) at any point between 1976 and 1993. Eligibility for Licensure – "Big O's" The undersigned turns next to the "Big O's" sign, which, like the "Exit Now" billboard, is unable to satisfy current licensing criteria due, among other reasons, to its close proximity to the double-stack billboard.11/ Further, as with the "Exit Now" billboard, the fact that the "Big O's" sign was previously exempt from licensure (owing to its on-premises status from 1976 through the mid-1990s) renders it ineligible for licensure under the 2014 codification of the grandfather provision. However, in sharp contrast to the "Exit Now" billboard, the "Big O's" sign is positioned within 500 feet of an interstate exit ramp, thereby constituting a safety hazard. This distinction is fatal to Mr. Nobles, as every codification of the grandfather provision from the mid-90s (when the sign lost its on-premises status) onward has prohibited the licensure of billboards that present a safety issue. The short of it, then, is that the sign was no more eligible for licensure in the past than it is today, which obviates the need for any further analysis under the pre-2014 version of the grandfather provision. For the reasons articulated above, Mr. Nobles has failed to prove that the "Big O's" sign is exempt from licensure by virtue of the "on-premises" exception. Further, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that, due to safety concerns, the sign would not have been eligible for licensure at any point in time. Accordingly, the undersigned is constrained to recommend the sign's removal pursuant to section 479.105. II. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 As noted earlier in this Order, DOAH Case No. 14-4928 involves an allegation that Mr. Nobles engaged in——or benefitted from——the unpermitted removal, cutting, or trimming of vegetation. The relevant facts are recounted below. On January 21, 2013, Mr. Nobles executed a lease agreement with Michael McDougal, who owns a parcel of land adjacent to the eastbound lanes of I-10, approximately .6 miles from County Road 257. In relevant part, the terms of the lease authorized Mr. Nobles to place on the property a pickup truck, attached to which was a billboard that advertised the I-10 Pecan House. Shortly thereafter, in late January 2013, Mr. Nobles relocated the truck to a position on Mr. McDougal's property a short distance to the south of the fence line that separates the parcel from the Department's right-of-way. But trouble soon followed: in late February or early March, the Department received several reports of unusual vegetation removal in the general area of Mr. Nobles' truck sign. In response, the Department requested one of its contractors, Metric Engineering, Inc. ("Metric"), to conduct a field inspection of the area. The inspection was performed on or about March 12, 2013, by Bill Armstrong, a certified arborist employed by Metric. During the course of his inspection, Mr. Armstrong observed, first, an area that the Department had previously cleared to facilitate the installation of a new fence, which had yet to be installed. This particular area, which ran along the length of the fence line and had been cleared within the preceding six months, had a width (as measured from the fence toward the roadway) of approximately 12 feet. Immediately beyond this 12-foot zone, however, Mr. Armstrong noticed evidence of other activity that had occurred much more recently. Specifically, Mr. Armstrong observed, on the side of the fence immediately opposite Mr. Nobles' truck, an area 120 feet in length (parallel to the fence line) and approximately 25 feet in width that had been cleared of vegetation. Within this 120 by 25 foot area, Mr. Armstrong discovered 30 tree stumps, which, upon close examination, exhibited signs of having been recently cut. Such indications included the presence of sawdust; the fact that the stumps were bright in color and relatively clean; and the observation of fresh debris at both ends of the swath. These findings were recorded in a report dated March 25, 2013, which Metric promptly forwarded to Morris Pigott, the Department's Project Manager of Vegetation and Resource Management. Several weeks later, Mr. Pigott conducted his own site visit, during which he examined the particular area that had concerned Mr. Armstrong. Consistent with the findings contained in Metric's report, Mr. Pigott observed, within the 120 by 25 foot area, numerous, freshly-cut tree stumps. Mr. Pigott further concluded, quite reasonably, that this activity had not been performed by the Department or one of its contractors, for the stumps had not been cut to ground level, the vegetation immediately to the east and west of the area was "very dense," and the area had not been "grubbed."12/ (As explained during the final hearing, "grubbing" involves the removal of the top six inches of surface material, an action designed to prevent regrowth.) To cinch matters, Mr. Pigott observed that the selective clearing of the 120 by 25 foot area had enhanced the visibility of Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard for eastbound traffic. Thereafter, on April 14, 2013, Mr. Pigott cited Mr. Nobles for violating section 479.106(7), which provides that any person who engages in or benefits from the unauthorized removal of vegetation shall be subject to an administrative penalty. Mr. Pigott further notified Mr. Nobles that, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.057, the Department intended to assess mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25. Mr. Nobles promptly denied any and all involvement in the removal, claiming that a road crew had cleared the vegetation two years earlier. In response, Mr. Pigott contacted Mr. Armstrong, disclosed Mr. Nobles' explanation, and asked that a follow-up inspection be performed. Mr. Armstrong conducted his second inspection on August 8, 2013. At that time, Mr. Armstrong observed that Mr. Nobles' truck-mounted billboard was still present, and that the stumps within the 120 by 25 foot area had sprouted and grown to a height of two to three feet. Samples of the sprouts were collected, which Mr. Armstrong later examined for evidence of internodes——i.e., rings that denote growth, with one ring forming during each growing season. Due to the absence of internodes, Mr. Armstrong concluded that the stumps were in their first growing season, thereby eliminating any possibility that the vegetation had been cleared several years earlier.13/ Finding that the evidence proves clearly and convincingly that Mr. Nobles benefitted from the unauthorized vegetation removal, the undersigned turns finally to the question of mitigation. As noted above, the Department seeks mitigation in the amount of $8,304.25, a figure derived from Mr. Armstrong's use of the formula referenced in rule 14-10.057. It is at this juncture that the Department's case falters. Although Mr. Armstrong offered credible testimony concerning the number and species of trees (water oaks, Florida maples, and the like) that were removed from the area, the record evidence regarding their market value consists entirely of hearsay. Indeed, the Department called no witness who possessed any firsthand knowledge as to the market value of the trees; instead, it presented only the testimony of Mr. Armstrong, who explained that he had telephoned three nurseries, obtained price quotes over the phone, averaged the three figures, and plugged the averages into the formula. To be clear, the undersigned has no quarrel with either the formula or Mr. Armstrong's initial reliance upon the price quotes. The problem is that, in the absence of a stipulation from Mr. Nobles concerning the amount of mitigation, the Department was obligated to adduce at least some non-hearsay evidence of the market values——the starting point of the calculations. Inasmuch as the record is devoid of such evidence, the Department's request for mitigation must be denied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: DOAH Case No. 14-4926 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the billboard identified in Notice of Violation 1487 ("Big O's") is illegal and subject to removal pursuant to section 479.105, Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Department enter a final order denying the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. DOAH Case No. 14-4927 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation take no further action on Notice of Violation 1352 until such time that it reevaluates (under the pre-July 1, 2014, codification of section 479.105) the related application for an outdoor advertising permit. If the application is granted, the Department should enter a final order dismissing Notice of Violation 1352. In the event, however, the application is once again denied, the Department should afford Respondent a point of entry into the administrative process. DOAH Case No. 14-4928 RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 479.106, Florida Statutes, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00 DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S EDWARD T. BAUER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2015.
The Issue Whether a sign owned by Respondent and located on the southbound side of I- 95 north of Pembroke Road in Broward County, Florida, violates Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the notice dated August 8, 1991; and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Chapter 479 regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system. Respondent is the owner of a sign located adjacent to the southbound side of Interstate 95 ("I-95") near Pembroke Road in Broward County, Florida. Respondent maintains the sign on the side of the trailer portion of a so-called 18 wheel tractor-trailer (an "18 wheeler") in a stationary position. No truck or tractor is affixed to the trailer. The sign and 18 wheeler were situated on property owned by Air Stern. Air Stern is an air conditioning company. Petitioner's Outdoor Advertising Inspector (the "inspector") first observed the sign in August, 1991. The sign consisted of a large advertisement affixed to the side of an 18- wheeler which was placed in a stationary location. The message in the advertisement consisted of the words "Father & Son Moving & Storage" and the company's telephone numbers in Broward and Dade counties. The advertising message was clearly visible from I-95. The advertising message was clearly visible from I- 95. A light facing the sign was affixed to the ground and positioned to illuminate the sign on the side of the 18 wheeler at night. An expired 1990 Florida license plate was affixed to the back of the trailer. Grass had grown up around the tires of the trailer and the trailer had been in its same position for several months. The inspector issued a Notice of Violation by physically attaching it to the trailer on August 8, 1991. The inspector determined that the printed advertisement on the trailer's side was an unpermitted sign that violated Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. The inspector based his determination upon his observation of the trailer on the premises, its position in relation to I- 95, and the type and content of the message printed on the side. Another copy of the Notice of Violation was mailed to Respondent. After more than 30 days had elapsed with no action by Respondent, Petitioner had the first sign removed by Sal's Towing on September 23, 1991. The sign was stored at Petitioner's maintenance facility in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On November 9, 1991, Respondent paid the towing charge for removal of the sign and then returned the sign to its original location adjacent to I-95 near Pembroke Road in Broward County, Florida. In addition to placing the sign in its original location, Respondent placed a second sign next to the first sign. The second sign was substantially similar to the first sign. The second sign consisted of a large advertisement affixed to the side of an 18- wheeler which was placed in a stationary position with no truck or tractor attached. The message in the advertisement consisted of the words "Father & Son Moving & Storage" and the company's telephone numbers in Broward and Dade counties. The advertising message was clearly visible from I-95. A sign permit has not been applied for by Respondent nor issued by the Department for either of the signs located adjacent to I-95.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding that Respondent shall have ten days from the date of the Final Order to comply with Notice of Violation No. 4-369 by removing the sign or be subject to the cost of removal and imposition of an administrative fine. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of April 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April 1992.
The Issue Whether an application for an outdoor advertising permit for a sign in Santa Rosa County should be granted or denied.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation is the state agency responsible for the regulation of outdoor advertising signs that are located on all federal-aid primary highways. U.S. Highway 90 (U.S. 90) is a federal-aid primary highway. A permit is required prior to erecting an outdoor advertising sign on all federal-aid primary highways. Southeast- SD, LLC (Southeast) filed an application for an outdoor advertising permit, application # 57549/57550 (the application) on June 29, 2009. Southeast's proposed sign structure meets the size and height requirements of section 479.07. The parcel was commercially zoned in accordance with the provisions of section 479.11, Florida Statutes. Southeast's application site is located on U.S. 90 at milepost 3.118, approximately 550 feet east of the centerline of Woodbine Road. The Department denied Southeast's application and issued a Notice of Denied Outdoor Application (initial denial) on July 29, 2009. The reason stated in the initial denial was: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500' for interstates, 1000' for FAP). [s. 479.07(9)(a),1.,& 2. F.S.] In conflict with permitted sign(s), tag#(s): CC479. Held by: Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. Bill Salter Advertising, Inc. (Salter's) sign with tag CC479 was located on U.S. 90 less than 500 feet from the application site. Permit CC479 was the subject of a Department revocation proceeding.2/ On March 8, 2010, the Department issued a Clerk's Order of Dismissal on the challenge to the revocation of CC479. Thus, the revocation of the conflicting sign, CC479, was final on March 8, 2010. On August 16, 2010, the Department issued an Amended Notice of Denied Application (Amended Notice). In the Amended Notice, the Department gave a different reason for the denial. The reason given in the Amended Denial concerned a different Salter tag: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500' for interstates, 1000' for EAP). [s. 470.07(9)(a),1., & 2. FS] In conflict with permitted sign(s): CF793. Held by: Bill Salter Advertising, Inc." CF793 was originally permitted in 1978. At that time, an application for a sign permit was reviewed and notated by the Department, and became the actual permit. The application for CF793 contains information that is type-written on the application form, presumably by the applicant, Salter. In the portion of the application form stating "DOT DESCRIPTION OF SIGN LOCATION (DOT USE ONLY)" the following is hand-written: "Sect. 59 W- 39.95 Miles W-SR 85." Most of the application/permit was filled out by the applicant, and part of it was filled out by the Department. In 1996, the Florida Legislature amended section 479.02, directing the Department to inventory and determine the location of all signs on the state, interstate, and federal-aid primary highway systems. The Department conducted the inventory and, upon completion, sent the database information to each sign owner, giving each owner an opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the results. Salter did not file such a challenge regarding CF793. As of July 30, 2009 (the date of the initial denial), tag CF793 was shown at milepost 13.205 on U.S. 90, in a location approximately 13 miles away from the application site in the Department's database created pursuant to section 479.02(8). Tag CF793 was physically located 13 miles away from its originally permitted location. The Department acknowledges that tag CF793 was not valid in its location 13 miles away from its current location, where it was located from at least 1998 to 2010. The database reflected milepost 13.205 as the location for CF793 from 1998 until 2010. In 2004, the Department sent Salter a Notice of Non- Compliance demanding that Salter post tag CF793 at milepost 13.205. In October 2009, the Department received a letter from Salter regarding moving CF793 to the location specified in the 1978 permit. At this point, the Department investigated the original application and discovered a "huge discrepancy" between the database location and the permit location in the Department's files. The Department has no documentation regarding how tag CF793 came to be located at milepost 13.205 since the 1998 inventory. The Department decided that its database was incorrect and that it needed to be corrected. On February 1, 2010, the Department changed its database to reflect the location for CF793 as milepost 2.993 on U.S. 90. Salter posted the tag for CF793 at its current location sometime after March 22, 2010 and prior to May 3, 2010. Once Salter placed the tag for CF793, the database was changed again to reflect the physical tag location at milepost 2.950 on U.S. 90, the "current location." The Department hired Cardno TBE, an engineering firm, to conduct field work. An inspector performed field measurements on May 3, 2010, using the wheel and laser methods for field measurement. The inspector identified the stake that was in the ground on Southeast's proposed sign site. He measured along the edge of the pavement on U.S. 90 from the location marked by Southeast to the new location of Salter's CF793 tag. The inspector determined that the distance between the proposed site and the nearest permitted sign, CF793, is 890 feet. Based upon these findings, the Department then determined that Southeast's proposed sign did not meet the 1000- foot spacing requirement. By letter dated May 27, 2010, the Department notified Salter that the location of CF793 was "nonconforming" and that pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007, a completed sign must be erected within 270 days or the permit would be revoked. No sign has been built, and the permit has not been revoked. Moreover, it appears that a sign will never be built, as the Department is in possession of correspondence from Santa Rosa County to Salter indicating that a sign cannot be constructed at the current location of tag CF793 due to conflict with several local ordinances. Also on May 27, 2010, the Department sent a letter to Southeast stating that CF793 "now presents a spacing conflict" with Southeast's application location. The letter further states that the Department had advised Salter that a completed sign must be erected within 270 days and that if no sign is erected within that time frame, the permit would be revoked. On August 16, 2010, three months later, the Department amended its denial as set forth above in paragraph 8. Just prior to the hearing, the Department again sent the inspector to conduct another field measurement. This time, the inspector relied upon information regarding the location of the sign from the original application/permit that was provided by the applicant (Salter) in 1978. That is, the inspector measured from a location described by the applicant in the original permit application, then measured the distance from the location to Southeast's proposed site, and determined the distance to be 884 feet. In making these measurements, the inspector assumed that the nearest intersection in 1978 was in the same location as today, that the original measurer started the measurement from the centerline of that intersection, and that the distance from the nearest intersection indicated by Salter on the original application/permit was measured with the same accuracy as a hand-wheel or laser.3/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order approving Southeast's sign permit application. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Barbara J. Staros Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2011.
Findings Of Fact Interstate Highway 95 (I-95) and State Road 16 (SR 16) intersect in St. Johns County, Florida. There is an interchange located at the intersection of I-95 and SR 16 in St. Johns County. The sign in question is the northernmost of three signs constructed by Respondent on properly zoned private property owned by Charles Usina located southwest of the above interchange and adjacent to I- 95, fifteen feet from the DOT right of way. There is an entrance ramp southwest of the interchange that permits traffic traveling eastbound on SR 16 to enter the southbound lane of I-95. Prior to submitting sign applications to DOT, Respondent's President, Robert Harry, met with Helen Hession at the interchange. Ms. Hession is a Property and Outdoor Advertising Inspector employed by DOT in its District II. Mr. Harry requested the meeting with Ms. Hession to obtain her interpretation of where to begin measuring along the southbound lane of I-95 under DOT's "500 foot rule." At that meeting, Ms. Hession gave her interpretation as to how to locate the point of beginning measurement according to Rule 14-10.009 F.A.C. as enforced by DOT through Section 479.02(1) F.S. The relevant language of Rule 14-10.009 F.A.C. provides: Outside incorporated towns and cities, no structure may be located adjacent or within five hundred (500) feet of an interchange, intersection at grade, or rest area. Said five hundred (500) feet shall be measured along the interstate from the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way, or an interstate highway. Mr. Harry had been in the business of outdoor advertising for many years, but this was his first experience with this type of measurement using the "500 foot rule" at this type of interchange. Mr. Usina was present with Mr. Harry and Ms. Hession for their pre-application meeting on January 19, 1991. At that time, Ms. Hession indicated the point of beginning for them to measure from in order to utilize the "500 foot rule." Ms. Hession testified consistently and credibly that she had told Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina that the point to begin measuring the 500 feet pursuant to the rule was at the southern tip of the "gore" located between I-95 and the southbound entrance from SR 16. The "gore" is an asphalt triangle marked with white lines that is widest at the northern end where vegetation grows between the southbound lane and the entrance. According to her testimony, Ms. Hession stood in the middle of the gore, facing south, and stated that, under the rule, the measurement should start at the point of the triangle. Ms. Hession illustrated her formal hearing testimony by marking "Point 3" on Joint Exhibit 12, a demonstrative sketch of the interchange and environs, to show the location she had indicated to Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina as the point of beginning. Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina testified equally credibly and consistently that during their pre-application meeting, Ms. Hession had indicated to them that the point to begin measuring was located at the northern end of the gore, or the place at which the vegetation and the asphalt met. For purposes of illustration, they identified the point that Ms. Hession indicated during their pre-application meeting as being "Point 2" on Joint Exhibit 12. While it is clear that Mr. Harry was not seeking Ms. Hession's personal interpretation of "the 500 foot rule," but was seeking the agency's interpretation of the rule it has promulgated and is charged with administering, it is equally clear that Ms. Hession and Mr. Harry never had a meeting of the minds on the exact location that she told him to begin his measurements. Ms. Hession was in her bare feet and unwilling to move around with Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina on the roadway during part of their meeting, and Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina are not entirely consistent as to where everyone was standing at crucial times during their discussion. It is easy to see how a misunderstanding occurred. Mr. Harry made the measurements for Respondent's sign permit application beginning at "Point 2," the northern end of the gore where the end of the asphalt gore meets the vegetation between the entrance and the highway. This location is over 400 feet closer to the interchange than the point Ms. Hession testified she had indicated to Mr. Harry. On January 29, 1991, Respondent filed an application for a DOT permit to construct the sign in question and for the two other signs. The application for the sign in question stated that the sign would be located on private property adjacent to the southbound lane of I-95, fifteen feet (perpendicular measurement) from the right of way and .15 miles from the nearest intersection. Simple arithmetic shows .15 miles equals 792 feet. The sign in question was not actually in existence at the time the application was reviewed and approved. For purposes of DOT review and approval of Respondent's permit application, Mr. Harry had placed stakes bearing the FCOA initials on the DOT right of way at locations parallel to where he intended to erect the signs on Mr. Usina's property. 2/ When reviewing Respondent's application prior to permit approval, Ms. Hession did not rely on the location stated in the application, (.15 miles from nearest intersection), but made her own on-site measurements. She measured using a Distance Measuring Instrument (DMI) mounted in Bartley (Bob) Burch's truck. Mr. Burch drove the truck and observed the stakes but did not participate in making the measurements. Use of the applicant's stakes and DOT's own measurements is standard operating procedure for DOT in reviewing/approving permit applications because sometimes the applicants' measurements as made or as stated on the application are incorrect. Use of the DMI is also standard operating procedure for DOT in this process. The DMI in question was calibrated for accuracy by Mr. Burch immediately prior to Ms. Hession taking the measurements. During her pre-approval application review, Ms. Hession measured the distances between stakes bearing FCOA initials and the distance of the first stake from the SR 16 overpass. She also used the southern tip of the gore ("Point 3") as a reference point when taking her measurements. She measured to the first stake from SR 16 and found the first stake to be .3 miles distant therefrom. (TR-44-45, 53) She reset the DMI at zero and then measured 1500 feet south to the next stake; again reset the DMI at zero and measured 1500 feet south to the third and final FCOA stake. During her pre-approval application review, Ms. Hession found the first FCOA stake to be in a location consistent with her understanding that "Point 3" was the correct point of beginning for applying the "500 foot rule." The first stake was 500 feet south of the tip of the gore ("Point 3"). Using the measurements obtained with the DMI during the pre-approval application review, Ms. Hession approved Respondent's application for a sign .3 miles (not the applied-for .15 miles) south of SR 16, the intersection of SR 16 and I-95. Simple arithmetic shows .3 miles equals 1584 feet. Subsequent to the pre-application meeting with Ms. Hession, but prior to the issuance of the DOT sign permits/tags, Respondent entered into a ground lease agreement with Mr. Usina 3/ and also entered into outdoor advertising lease agreements for the sign (two sign faces) involved here. 4/ These advertising lease agreements were later voided due to a stop work order issued by DOT (See Finding of Fact 19). Respondent has subsequently mitigated some of its loss therefrom by entering into other leases at lower figures. Respondent's six applications for outdoor advertising sign permits were approved by Ms. Hession and processed through DOT's main office in Tallahassee. Permits and tags were issued by DOT on February 22, 1991. Issuance of these permits and tags constitutes final agency approval of the application in question. The permits authorized the erection of three signs in the vicinity of the I-95 and SR 16 interchange at .30, .58, and .86 miles respectively south of the SR 16 intersection. Respondent has never challenged the fact that each of these signs was permitted significantly further south and further away from the intersection than each of the locations applied for: .15, .43, and .72 miles, respectively. Respondent has never protested that the permit issued for the sign in question was not for .15 miles (792 feet) from the intersection, but was for .3 miles (1584 feet) from the intersection. Respondent timely and properly affixed the permit tags to the three monopole structures, as they were constructed. After the permits/tags were issued, Respondent borrowed $25,000 to erect the monopole/sign and Mr. Harry obligated himself to repay that loan with interest. Respondent began construction of the sign in question after February 22, 1991. After a monopole support for the sign in question was installed, two of Respondent's business competitors notified Tom Brown, DOT's Outdoor Advertising Administrator for District II and supervisor of Ms. Hession and Mr. Burch, that Respondent's northernmost sign in this location had been placed too close to the intersection/interchange. Mr. Brown reacted by issuing the stop work order on construction on May 2, 1991, which was posted on Respondent's monopole. The stop work order stated that the structure was within 500 feet of an intersection, in violation of Rule 10-14.009 F.A.C., as enforced through Section 479.02(1) F.S. Mr. Brown subsequently notified Mr. Harry by letter that pursuant to the authority of 479.105(1)(a), the stop work order had been issued because of an alleged violation of Chapter 14-10.009(B) SPACING OF SIGNS (2)(b) F.A.C. which is enforced through Florida Statutes Chapter 479.02(1). Respondent completed the sign in question after the stop work order was issued. Subsequent to her approval of the sign permits, Ms. Hession was instructed by Mr. Tom Brown that her interpretation of the agency rule was incorrect and that the proper place to have begun measuring for purposes of the "500 foot rule" was where the outside edge of the interchange entrance lane disappeared into the outside edge of the through lane of I-95. Bob Burch, a District II Outdoor Advertising Inspector of equivalent rank with Ms. Hession, testified that he interpreted the rule in a manner identical to Mr. Brown's interpretation. For purposes of illustration, this location is marked as "Point 1" on Joint Exhibit 12. The testimony of Tom Brown as to why his interpretation should be considered the agency's interpretation of the rule is sketchy but together with the corroboration of Bob Burch that this interpretation has been the standard application, it is accepted that DOT, as an agency, has interpreted the "500 foot rule" language to mean that a sign may not be located within 500 feet of the point at which the outside edge of an entrance disappears into the outside edge of a through lane on an interstate highway. This interpretation ("Point 1," for purposes of the instant case) is also consistent with the language of the rule and is the most reasonable reading of that language. "Point 2" is not consistent with the language of the rule. "Point 1," Mr. Brown's and Mr. Burch's interpretation of the rule's point of beginning, is furthest from the intersection, at the beginning of the through lane for I-95. "Point 3," Ms. Hession's original erroneous interpretation, is next furthest from the intersection, at the tip of the gore. "Point 2," Mr. Harry's mis-understanding of Ms. Hession's erroneous interpretation is closest to the intersection, where the gore meets the vegetation. Naturally, any distance measured from Mr. Harry's understanding of the point of beginning would be further north than, and closer to, the interchange than would be locations measured from either of the other two points. Immediately after the stop work order was issued, the sign in question was inspected and measured by Ms. Hession. This time she measured its location using a 100-foot tape. She used SR 16 and its overpass as her starting point. SR 16 and its overpass are permanent markers. (TR-47-49) She and Mr. Burch found that the monopole in question had been erected several hundred feet north of the location at which they had previously found Respondent's first stake. The monopole as constructed was less than 100 feet south of the tip of the gore, "Point 3," and north of "Point 1". According to these after-the-fact measurements, Respondent's erected monopole is not 500 feet or more south of either "Point 3" or "Point 1" and it is not located .3 miles from SR 16, as specified in the permit or even .3 miles from Points 1, 2, or 3.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order affirming the May 2, 1991 notices, revoking the permit for the single sign in question, and ordering the removal of the sign within 30 days. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of October, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1992.
Findings Of Fact A McDonald's sign visible to automobile traffic on the I-75 is located .08 miles north of CR-54 along the I-75, 934 feet into the interchange between the I-75 and CR-54 in Pasco County, Florida. The I-75 at this location is part of the federal interstate highway system and is outside an incorporated town or city. The sign has no permit tags attached and no permit tags have ever been approved for the site. The property on which this sign is erected is approximately 77' by 52' with the southeast corner cut off owned by McDonald's Corporation. The site is connected to the restaurant site by a 15 foot strip of land which intersects a proposed road 275 feet north of the restaurant site. The sign is 1122 feet from the restaurant as measured along the paved surface between the sign and restaurant. Between this sign and the restaurant along CR-54 is a Standard station, an Amoco station, a Circle K shop and a Days Inn. The closest businesses to the sign are Abe Chevron station and the Days Inn Motel. Respondent presented proposed plans evidencing an intent to construct a McDonald's playland on the property on which the sign is located, presumably as an integral part of the restaurant. However, at the time of the hearing the property served only as a site for the sign. McDonald's playlands have been developed as a selling tool for families traveling over interstate highways and are generally located adjacent to the restaurant so children occupying the playland can be monitored by the parents from inside the restaurant. Respondent's witnesses were aware of no McDonald's playland located other than immediately adjacent to the restaurant building. Construction of the playland at the site of the existing sign has never-been started due to construction, drainage and sewage disposal problems at the restaurant site.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's sign permits and retrieve Petitioner's permit tags because Petitioner violated Sections 479.07(5) and 479.08, Florida Statutes, 1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 10.004(7), 2/ by allegedly removing its sign from its property and by failing to display the permit tag prior to removing the sign.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation formed in 1983 by Mr. Rodney Forton. Mr. Forton is the president and sole shareholder of Petitioner. Sometime in 1987, Petitioner entered into a management agreement with Cotee River Outdoor Advertising Company ("Cotee River"). The management agreement provided that Cotee River would construct a sign on property owned by Petitioner on U.S. highway 19 in New Port Richey, Florida (the "Cotee River sign"). Cotee River agreed to pay Petitioner a portion of the advertising revenues from the sign. The Cotee River Permit On May 26, 1987, Cotee River applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit from Respondent. The application described the Cotee River sign as a rectangular wood sign measuring 10 feet by 20 feet, with its lowest point approximately 15 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 25 feet above the crown of the road. Respondent approved the application and mailed the approval to Cotee River on May 29, 1987. On June 3, 1987, Respondent located the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory at, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.06 in F/N." The number "5.06" indicates that the sign is located at milepost 5.06 on U.S. 19. 3/ Mileposts describe the location of each sign by the distance of the sign from a fixed point. Each of Respondent's outdoor advertising inspectors measures the milepost for each sign in his or her territory using a distance measuring instrument. Respondent then enters the milepost for each sign in Respondent's sign inventory. The milepost of 5.06 that Respondent assigned to the Cotee River permit was incorrect. In May 1987, Cotee River constructed a sign on Petitioner's property pursuant to the permit granted by Respondent. The sign was a metal monopole sign rather than the wood sign described in the application. The Cotee River sign was not constructed at milepost 5.060. Cotee River rented the sign to outdoor advertisers. However, Cotee River failed to pay any portion of the advertising revenue to Petitioner, and the parties resolved the matter by mutual agreement. Petitioner and Cotee River agreed that Cotee River would release its right to manage the Cotee River sign in consideration for the right to manage a sign located on other property owned by Petitioner. The agreement provided that Petitioner would pay Cotee River a prescribed sum in exchange for the performance of specific duties by Cotee River. Cotee River failed to perform the duties specified in the agreement. Petitioner refused to pay the balance of payments. Petitioner sued Cotee River. Cotee River went into bankruptcy and was dissolved. Petitioner's Permit On July 14, 1992, Petitioner applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the Cotee River sign. The application described the sign as an existing rectangular, metal, monopole "sign in place," measuring approximately 10 feet by 20 feet. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Petitioner and mailed the approval to Petitioner on October 12, 1992. Respondent again incorrectly listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.060 in F/N." Respondent issued permit tag number BG341-25 to Petitioner. Although Petitioner used the Cotee River sign to generate advertising revenue, Petitioner never displayed any tag numbers on the sign. The tag numbers remained in Petitioner's files until sometime in 1995. Dr. Goluba's Permit At about the same time that Cotee River went out of business in 1992, Robert L. Goluba, D.D.S., owned property immediately adjacent to Petitioner's property. Prior to March 1993, an unidentified representative of Respondent contacted Dr. Goluba. The representative told Dr. Goluba that there were two signs on Dr. Goluba's property that were going to be taken down if the sign permits were not renewed. The representative mistakenly identified one of the two signs as the Cotee River sign. The representative went on to explain that Respondent could avoid the expense of taking down the two signs if Dr. Goluba obtained permits for the signs. Dr. Goluba wanted the advertising revenues and agreed to obtain the necessary permits. On March 2, 1993, Dr. Goluba applied for a sign permit for the Cotee River sign he mistakenly believed to be located on his property. The application described the sign as an "existing" rectangular, metal, monopole sign measuring approximately 10 feet by 24 feet, with its lowest point approximately 18 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 30 feet above the crown of the road. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Dr. Goluba and mailed the approval to him on March 8, 1993. Respondent listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/M.P. 4.870 in F/N." Respondent incorrectly listed Dr. Goluba's permit in the sign inventory at milepost 4.870. On March 24, 1993, Respondent issued permit number BG960-35 to Dr. Goluba. Although Dr. Goluba never derived advertising revenue from the Cotee River sign, he did display his permit on the sign. Dr. Goluba inadvertently failed to pay the fee required to renew the sign permit in 1994 and, therefore, failed to display current permits on the sign. On April 11, 1994, Respondent issued a Notice of Violation, Failure To Display Permit Tag. The New Outdoor Advertising Inspector In early 1995, a new outdoor advertising inspector assumed responsibility for the territory in which the Cotee River sign was located. On April 11, 1995, the inspector conducted a field inspection to verify the mileposts and signs in the territory for which he was responsible. The inspector correctly identified the milepost of the Cotee River sign as milepost 4.980. He found no sign subject to regulation by Respondent 4/ located at milepost 5.060. Milepost 5.060 and 4.980 are approximately 422 feet apart. Relevant law prohibits the location of regulated signs within 1,000 feet of each other. 5/ No exceptions to 1,000 foot prohibition applied to the Cotee River sign. The inspector concluded that Petitioner had removed the wood sign originally permitted to Cotee River in 1987 and which Respondent had incorrectly listed in its sign inventory as being located at milepost 5.060. On July 12, 1995, Respondent issued to Petitioner a Notice Of Violation -- Removed Sign. On August 22, 1995, Respondent ordered the revocation of Petitioner's tag permit because Petitioner had allegedly removed the Cotee River sign from milepost 5.060. Respondent never issued a Notice of Violation to Petitioner for failure to display his tag numbers on the Cotee River sign. Petitioner protested the revocation of its permit and refused to return the permit tags to Respondent. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. In the meantime, Dr. Goluba's accountant had inadvertently failed to pay the permit fee for the Cotee River sign. Respondent placed the Cotee River sign on Respondent's "cutdown list" for failure to pay the required fees. On June 20, 1995, Respondent had the Cotee River sign cut down and removed. Respondent sent Dr. Goluba a bill in the amount of $4,990 for the cost of cutting the sign down and removing it. Prior to the date Respondent cut down and removed the Cotee River sign, Petitioner notified the inspector verbally and with written documentation that the sign was owned by Petitioner, located on Petitioner's property, and permitted to Petitioner. The inspector found that Respondent's records did not agree with Petitioner's records. The inspector informed Petitioner that the "cutdown order" came from Tallahassee and there was nothing the inspector could do. Dr. Goluba's tags were displayed on the Cotee River sign at the time it was cut down and removed. Ms. Maria Passanisi was the broker who managed the sign for Dr. Goluba. Ms. Passanisi was at the site when the sign was cut down and removed. She protested Respondent's action so vehemently that the police officers regulating traffic at the scene had to intervene to quell the disturbance. After Respondent cut down the Cotee River sign, Petitioner drove a stick into the ground where the sign had been located and displayed the permit tags for the removed sign on the stick. The tags were displayed on the stick at the time of the hearing. The Computerized Sign Inventory Respondent uses a computer system to maintain its sign inventory. The computer system does not accept the same milepost for two or more regulated signs. When Petitioner applied for its sign permit in 1992, Respondent was required to carry the Cotee River permit in the inventory as a void permit. The computer system would not accept the same milepost for Petitioner's permit and the void Cotee River permit. In order to circumvent the computer system, Respondent's supervisor of property management arbitrarily changed the milepost number entered for the Cotee River permit from milepost 5.060 to milepost 4.970. As late as September 20, 1993, Respondent's computerized sign inventory identified the Cotee River sign as being located at three incorrect mileposts. The inventory located the same sign permitted to Cotee River, Petitioner, and Dr. Goluba, respectively, at mileposts 4.970, 5.060, and 4.870. In 1995, the new outdoor advertising inspector correctly located the Cotee River sign at milepost 4.980. However, he mistakenly assumed that milepost 5.060 was the correct milepost for Petitioner's sign and erroneously concluded that Petitioner had removed its sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not remove the permitted sign and that the permits issued to Petitioner are valid. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1997.
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1982, outdoor advertising sign permits AR946-06 and AK947-06 were issued by the Department of Transportation to Sandy Advertising Company. The permits were for a location on the west (north) side of U.S. Highway 90 approximately two miles east of its intersection with U.S. Highway 29 within the city limits of Pensacola, Florida. Sandy Advertising Company transferred those permits to Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. Annual renewal payments have been made each year in a timely manner by Lamar Advertising Company of Pensacola, Inc. No permit tags have been displayed at the Lamar sites and no sign has been built or maintained at the Lamar sites since issuance of the permits. Without having submitted an application for a permit to the Department of Transportation, Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc., obtained a building permit from the City of Pensacola for the erection of an outdoor advertising sign located in Escambia County approximately 3,790 feet east of State Road 296 on the north side of U.S. Highway 90. Pursuant to the building permit, Outdoor Media erected a sign at that location. The sign had an east and a west face and was less than 500 feet from the site for which permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 were issued. Each face of the sign required a separate permit from the Department of Transportation. Learning of the erection of Outdoor Media's sign, the Department notified Petitioner to remove it. Instead Outdoor Media applied for two sign permits for each face of the sign. On August 8, 1988, the Department of Transportation received Petitioner's applications for a state outdoor advertising permit. The applications were for each face of the sign located on U.S. 90 (Scenic Highway), a federal aid primary highway in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida. The applications were denied on the ground that two other permits, permit AK946- 06 and permit AK947-06, had been issued to Lamar Advertising of Pensacola, Inc., for a location on the same side of the highway within one thousand feet of Petitioner's site. The spacing impediment caused by the earlier permits is the sole basis for denial of Petitioner's permit applications by the Department of Transportation. Petitioner meets all other permit requirements. In 1984, the legislature extensively revised Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. See Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida. Of particular concern in this proceeding are the changes to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, and whether those changes apply to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The revisions to this section introduced very specific tag display as well as sign erection and maintenance requirements for all permits. The revisions increased the fee schedules and provided that all permits expire annually on January 15. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, as amended states in part: (5)(a) For each permit issued, the department shall furnish to the applicant a serially numbered permanent metal permit tag. The permittee is responsible for maintaining a valid permit tag on each permitted sign facing at all times. The tag shall be securely attached to the sign facing or, if there is no facing, on the pole nearest the highway; and it shall be attached in such a manner as to be plainly visible from the main-traveled way. The permit will become void unless the permit tag is properly and permanently displayed at the permitted site within 30 days after the date of permit issuance. If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. (b) If a permit tag is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the permittee to whom the tag was issued must apply to the department for a replacement tag. Upon receipt of the application accompanied by a service fee of $3, the department shall issue a replacement permit tag. A permit is valid only for the location specified in the permit. Valid permits may be transferred from one sign owner to another upon written acknowledgment from the current permittee and submittal of a transfer fee of $5 for each permit to be transferred. However, the maximum transfer fee for any multiple transfer between two outdoor advertisers in a single transaction is $100. A permittee shall at all times maintain the permission of the owner or other persons in lawful control of the sign site to have and maintain a sign at such site. (8)(a) All licenses and permits expire annually on January 15, and all license and permit renewal fees are required to be submitted to the department by no later than January 15. On or before November 1 of each year, the department shall send to each permittee a notice of fees due for all permits which were issued to him prior to September 30. Such notice shall list the permits and the permit fees due for each sign facing. The permittee shall, no later than January 1 of each year, advise the department of any additions, deletions, or errors contained in the notice. Permit tags which are not renewed shall be returned to the department shall be accounted for by the permittee in writing, which writing shall be submitted with the renewal fee payment. (b) If a permittee has not submitted his fee payment by January 15, the department shall, no later than February 1, send a notice of violation to the permittee, requiring the payment of the permit fee within 30 days after the date of the notice and payment of a delinquency fee equal to 10 percent of the original amount due or, in the alternative to these payments, requiring the filing of a request for an administrative hearing to show cause why his sign should not be subject to immediate removal due to expiration of his license or permit. If the permittee submits payment as required by the violation notice, his license or permit will be automatically reinstated and such reinstatement will be retroactive to January 15th. If the permittee does not respond to the notice of violation within the 30-day period, the department shall remove the sign without further notice and without incurring any liability as a result of such removal. (9)(a) A permit shall not be granted for any sign for which a permit had not been granted by the effective date of this act unless such sign is located at least: One thousand five hundred feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on an interstate highway. One thousand feet from any other permitted sign on the same side of the highway, if on a federal-aid primary highway. The minimum spacing provided in this paragraph does not preclude the permitting V-type, back-to-back, side- to-side, stacked, or double-faced signs at the permitted sign site. A permit shall not be granted for a sign pursuant to this chapter to locate such sign on any portion of the interstate or federal-aid primary highway system, which sign: Exceeds 50 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if outside an incorporated area; Exceeds 65 feet in sign structure height above the crown of the main- traveled way, if inside an incorporated area; or Exceeds 950 square feet of sign facing including all embellishments. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed so as to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of this act to become nonconforming. The effective date(s) of the amendments to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, is stated in Section 27 of Law 84-227. Section 27 specifically and explicitly made permits issued prior to June 30, 1984 subject to the new provisions of Law 84-227. Section 27 states: This act shall take effect October 1, 1984, except that the amendments to Section 479.07 F.S. shall take effect July 1, 1984; however, any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. In spite of the language of Section 27, it is DOT's interpretation that for permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, permittees are not required to display tags within thirty (30) days and erect signs within 270 days as provided in Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, effective July 1, 1984. DOT nonetheless requires pre-1984 permits to comply with Sections 479.07(5)(b) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes. While DOT's interpretation is not in writing and has not been promulgated as a rule pursuant to Sections 120.54 or 120.55, Florida Statutes, it is applied statewide and has been held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule in Case NO. 5227R, Final Order issued December 29th, 1988. DOT relies upon the definition of "non-conforming" signs given in Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes. Section 479.01(12), Florida Statutes, states in part: `Nonconforming sign' means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. [Emphasis supplied.] 1/ DOT does not rely upon the exceptions listed in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 84-227. The exceptions are numerous, but do not specifically enumerate "Pre-July 1, 1984 permits." It is DOT's view that permits issued before July 1, 1984, are valid with or without a sign being erected or tags maintained or displayed. These "secret signs" can only be discovered after the application is submitted and DOT checks its computer records. The effect of DOT's interpretation is that pre- 1984 outdoor advertising sign permits can exist into perpetuity without the holder thereof ever erecting a sign or posting a metal tag as long as the permittee renews its permit. This interpretation is directly opposed to the legislature's purpose in enacting the 1984 amendments, i.e., the prevention of advertisers stockpiling unused sites and permits. Moreover, this interpretation is contrary to the pre- or post-1984 statutory language and is not a reasonable interpretation of the statute. DOT bases it's interpretation on the ground that the constitution prohibits the retroactive application of the 1984 amendments to permits existing prior to the effective date of those amendments. DOT did not offer any evidence as to the accuracy of its view on the requirements of the constitution. Failing such evidentiary support, DOT has failed to carry its burden of proof when utilizing an unpromulgated rule on a case by case basis. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and subject matter of this cause. Section 120.57(1) Florida Statutes. Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, was amended by Chapter 84-227, Laws of Florida, to require that parties obtaining outdoor advertising permits post their permit tags within thirty (30) days and erect their signs within two hundred seventy (270) days or their permits would automatically become void. The amendment became effective July 1, 1984. The amendment also expressly and explicitly provided for treatment of pre-July 1, 1984 permits by stating" . . . any permit or license which is valid and applicable as of June 30, 1984, shall remain valid and applicable until January 15, 1985, unless the license or permit earlier expires or is revoked. [Emphasis supplied]. Section 479.01(12) only makes exceptions for nonconforming "signs lawfully erected." Section 479.07(9)(c) only provides that nothing in subsection (9), pertaining to spacing requirements or permitting of new signs after July 1, 1984, may be construed to cause a sign which is conforming on the effective date of the Act to become nonconforming. See the definition of "sign" contained in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes, and of "erect" contained in Section 479.01(4), Florida Statutes. However, in spite of the clear language of the statutes, DOT interprets the term "permitted signs" as including permits issued prior to July 1, 1984, but which have no sign erected on the site. DOT has placed an interpretation upon the statutes that is not apparent from their language. The plain language of Sections 479.01(12) and 479.07(9)(c) only applies to signs which have been constructed on the permit site. The sections do not apply where no sign has been constructed. Since no signs were ever erected on the sites covered by permit AK946-06 and AK947-06 neither Section 479.01(12) nor 479.07(9)(c) applies to Lamar's permits. Further, DOT interprets the amendment to Section 479.07, now codified as Section 479.07(5)(a), requiring permit display and sign erection within a specified time period, to be applicable only to permits initially issued after the effective date of July 1, 1984. The agency has not enforced that subsection against preexisting permits and renewals of such preexisting permits, irrespective of whether or not a sign has ever been erected on the permitted site. However, the agency has applied and enforced against preexisting permits all other portions of the amendments, including but not limited to the mandatory recurring uniform annual January 15 renewal date and increased renewal fee with regard to preexisting permits. The agency has taken this approach on the grounds that the constitution prohibited the amendment from being applied retroactively to such preexisting permits. In Administrative Case NO. 88-5227R, this interpretation was held to be an invalid unpromulgated rule. However, agencies have the choice of properly promulgating rules and applying them with the full force and effect of law or of fully explicating those policies by demonstrating the policies' reasonableness and factual accuracy on a case by case basis in Section 120.57 proceedings. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Amos v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 444 So.2d (Fla, 1st DCA 1983); Gulf Coast Home Health Services Of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 513 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). As noted earlier, the sole reason for DOT's policy was that it was required by the constitution. Such a bare bones claim as "the constitution requires it" is tantamount to the claim that was asserted in Florida Cities Water Company v. Florida Public Service Commission, 384 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1980) that a previous statutory interpretation was "wrong as a matter of law." In Florida Cities, no record foundation was made for the non-rule policy being followed in that case. The Florida Supreme Court held that such a rationale was not sustainable absent adequate record support for the application of non-rule agency policy. In this case, DOT has failed to affirmatively show the reasonableness and factual accuracy of the policy that sign permits which were issued prior to July 1, 1984, should not be subject to Section 479.07(5), Florida Statutes, enforcement and should be treated as if they constituted, erected and maintained signs for purposes of Section 479.07(9), Florida Statutes. It is doubtful that DOT could ever show the accuracy of its view of the constitution. The case law in the area clearly establishes that permits such as these are not property in the constitutional sense. Such permits do not confer any right, estate or vested interest, and are revocable at the will of the legislature. Such permits are also subject to new permit conditions. State ex rel First Presbyterian Church of Miami v. Fuller, 187 So. 148 (Fla. 1939); City of Miami Beach v. Deauville Operating Corp., 129 So.2d 185 ( Fla. 3d DCA 1961) and Kawasaki of Tampa, Inc. v. Calvin, 348 So.2d 897 ( Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Moreover, the 1984 amendments to Chapter 479 do not require retroactive application to be applied to permits AK946-06 and AK947-06. The new permit conditions were applicable only upon the expiration of the old permits on January 15. Thereafter, the new permit conditions applied to the renewal. Therefore, since Lamar did not build any signs on the sites covered by either permit AK946-06 or AK947-06 within 270 days of its first renewal after the effective date of the statutory revisions to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and has not posted the required tags at the sites, permits AK946-06 and AK947-06 are void and cannot be used as a basis for denying Petitioner's sign applications. As in Florida Cities, having failed to establish the reasonableness and accuracy of its policy, the foregoing policy cannot form the basis of the permit denials. This is especially true in light of the fact that DOT's policy ignores the clear language of the statutory amendments.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order voiding Permits AK946-06 and AK947-06, held by Respondent, Lamar Advertising Company, Inc., and granting the applications of Outdoor Media of Pensacola, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1990.
