The Issue Whether the subject assessment of taxes, interest and penalties should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact By "Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings" dated July 31, 1989, Respondent assessed Petitioner with taxes, interest, and penalties in the total amount, as of the date of the notice, of $161,724.75. This assessment was made pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, following an incident on February 4, 1988. The parties stipulated that this assessment was properly issued, that notice thereof was properly given to Gary Wayne Chitty, and that the mathematical calculations contained therein are accurate and correct. The following findings are made as to Petitioner, Gary Wayne Chitty, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. His full name is Gary Wayne Chitty. His social security number is 261-17-0682. His date of birth is April 27, 1953. His present residence is 6840 S.W. 12th Street, Miami, Florida. He has never declared himself a citizen of any country other than the United States. On, or before, February 1988, he knew Rafael Silvio Pena. On February 4, 1988, he held a valid multi-engine pilot's license which was issued to him by the Federal Aviation Authority. On, or about February 4, 1988, he and Rafael Silvio Pena boarded and flew an aircraft designated N6726L. He and Mr. Pena planned to fly a multi-engine aircraft (N6726L) from a point outside of the United States and to enter the airspace of the United States near Cedar Key, Florida and travel within the airspace of Florida to Marathon, Florida. He filed, or caused to be filed, a flight plan for said trip with Mr. Pena in advance of the trip. He loaded or caused to be loaded marijuana on the aircraft (N6726L) prior to its departure. On, or about, February 4, 1988, he and Mr. Pena flew said airplane (N6726L) from a point in the vicinity of Cedar Key, Florida, to Marathon, Florida. During said flight, the aircraft made no other landings. During the entire flight on February 4, 1988, he and Mr. Pena were the sole occupants of said aircraft. During said flight he was the pilot of N6726L. He flew this aircraft on February 4, 1988 with the full knowledge and/or consent of the airplane's owners and/or official lessees. When he took off from the aircraft's departure point on February 4, 1988, it was loaded with a large quantity of marijuana. When he took control of said aircraft and took off, he knew it was loaded with said marijuana. He discussed his plans to transport the marijuana with Mr. Pena. When he took control of the aircraft, the aircraft (N6726L) contained nineteen (19) bales of marijuana which weighted six hundred ninety-nine (699) pounds. He and Mr. Pena flew this airplane along a course towards Marathon, Florida in a manner which took it over or near Lake Okeechobee, Florida. At a point along his route, he and/or Mr. Pena caused the bales of marijuana to be jettisoned from the aircraft. The marijuana was jettisoned as part of a conscious plan or design. The marijuana that was jettisoned from N6726L during its flight on February 4, 1988, weighed a total of 699 pounds. He did not know that during this flight of February 4, 1988, his aircraft was being observed by law enforcement officers. As part of his original plan, he piloted this aircraft to Marathon, Florida, where he landed. AA. During this entire flight the aircraft performed adequately and experienced no mech- anical difficulties. BB. Upon his landing at Marathon, he and Mr. Pena were arrested. CC. He knew the estimated retail value of the marijuana on board his aircraft (N6726L) was $600 per pound.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which upholds the subject Jeopardy Findings and Assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of January, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: James McAuley, Esquire Mark Aliff, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Department of Revenue Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mel Black, Esquire 2937 S.W. 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33133 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahasseee, Florida 32399-0100 William D. Moore General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Has Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. (Fancy Farms) made proper accounting to Petitioner Wayne Sullivan in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Fancy Farms from November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994, by Wayne Sullivan to be handled by Fancy Farms as agent for Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Wayne Sullivan was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fancy Farms was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8453 issued by the Department, supported by bond number 57 92 20 in the amount of $75,000, written by Gulf Insurance Company with an inception date of September 1, 1994, and an expiration date of August 31, 1995. From November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994 Wayne Sullivan delivered certain quantities of an agricultural product (zucchini) to Fancy Farms. It is the accounting for these zucchini (zukes) that is in dispute. It was stipulated by the parties that Fancy Farms was acting as agent in the sale of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms for the account of Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity or size of the zukes delivered by Wayne Sullivan to Fancy Farms during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Fancy Farms for handling the zukes, including but not limited to the commission charged by Fancy Farms. The agreed upon commission was ten per cent (10 percent) of the price received by Fancy Farms from its customers. There is no evidence that Fancy Farms found any problem with the quality of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms by Wayne Sullivan during the above period of time. Upon delivering the zukes to Fancy Farms, Sullivan was given a prenumbered delivery receipt ticket (delivery ticket) showing Wayne Sullivan as Grower number 116 and containing the following additional information: (a) date and time of delivery; (b) produce number, i.e., 37 indicating fancy zukes and 38 indicating medium zukes; (c) description of the produce, i.e., zukes, fancy; (d) a lot number containing number of delivery ticket, grower number and produce number, i.e. 2074-116-37 and; (e) the number of units of zukes received by Fancy Farm. The accounting for the zukes from the following delivery receipt ticket numbers is being contested in this proceeding: (a) 2127 dated November 8, 1994, lot nos. 2127-116-37 and 2127-116-38; (b) 22145 dated November 10, 1994, lot nos. 2145-116-37 and 2145-116-38; (c) 2181 dated November 15, 1994, lot nos. 2181-116-37 and 2181-116-38; (d) 2242 dated November 29, 1994, lot nos. 2242- 116-37 and 2242-116-38; (e) 2254 dated December 1, 1994, lot nos. 2254-116-37 and 2254-116-38; (f) 2289 dated December 7, 1994, lot nos. 2289-116-37 and 2289- 116-38 and; (g) 2313 dated December 10, 1994, lot nos. 2313-116-37 and 2313-116- 38. Once Fancy Farms found a customer for the zukes, Fancy Farms prepared a prenumbered billing invoice. Additionally, a bill of lading and load sheet was prepared and attached to the invoice. The bill of lading and load sheet would have the same number as the invoice. Basically, the invoice and bill of lading contained the customer's name and address, produce number, description of produce, number of units ordered, number of units shipped and the price per unit. The load sheet contains the customer's name, produce number, description of produce, units ordered, units shipped and the lot number for the units that made up the shipment. On numerous occasions Fancy Farms made adjustments to the selling price after the price had been quoted and accepted but before the invoice was prepared. Fancy Farms did not make any written notations in its records showing the adjustments to the price or the reasons for the adjustments to the price. Salvatore Toscano testified, and I find his testimony to be credible, that this usually occurred when there was a decrease in the market price after Fancy Farms made the original quote. Therefore, in order to keep the customer, Fancy Farms made an adjustment to the price. Sullivan was never made aware of these price adjustments. In accounting for the zukes delivered by Sullivan, Fancy Farms prepared a Grower Statement which included the delivery ticket number, the date of delivery, the lot number, grower number, produce number, description of the produce, quantity (number of units), price per unit and total due. Payment for the zukes was made to Wayne Sullivan from these statements by Fancy Farms. Sometimes payment may be for only one delivery ticket while at other times payment would be for several delivery tickets for different dates. A portion of Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 is the Florida Vegetable Report (Market Report), Volume XIV, Nos. 19, 21, 23, 31, 33, 37 and 40, dated October 28, 31, 1994, November 8, 10, 15, 29, 1994, and December 7, 12, 1994, respectively. The Market Report is a federal-state publication which reports the demand (moderate), market (steady), volume (units) sold and prices paid per unit for numerous vegetables, including zucchini, on a daily basis. The prices quoted for zucchini is for 1/2 and 5/9th bushel cartons and includes palletizing. The average cost for palletizing in the industry is 65 per carton. Fancy Farms receives and sells zukes in one-half (1/2) bushel cartons. Fancy Farms does not palletize the cartons for handling at its warehouse or for shipment. On November 8, 10, 15, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 130 units of fancy zukes and a combined total 206 units of medium zukes represented by delivery receipt ticket nos. 2127, 2145 and 218l, for a combined total of fancy and medium zukes of 336 units for which Fancy Farms paid Sullivan the sum of $1,171.00 as evidenced by the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994. Forty eight units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2127-116-37 was billed out by Fancy Farms to P. H. Lucks, Inc. for $5.00 per unit. Without an explanation, Fancy Farms reduced the price to $2.50 per unit. However, Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.00 per unit for the 48 units of fancy zukes. Five units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2145-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Thirty two units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2181-116-37 were not accounted for by invoice. Nineteen units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2242-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Where there is no invoice the price quoted in the Market Report is used to calculate the amount due Sullivan. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994, is: Lot No. 2127-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 48 units (Invoice 3814) = $ 240.00 Lot No. 2127-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 45 units (Market Report) = $ 157.50 $3.50 per unit x 35 units (Invoice 3783) = $ 122.50 Lot No. 2145-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 3818) = $ 60.00 $5.00 per unit x 38 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 190.00 Lot No. 2145-116-38: $3.00 per unit x 13 units (Invoice 3820) = $ 39.00 $3.00 per unit x 22 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 66.00 $3.00 per unit x 5 units (Market Report) = $ 15.00 Lot No. 2l81-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 32 units (Market Report) = $ 256.00 Lot No. 2181-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 86 units (Invoice 3778) = $ 301.00 Total owed to Sullivan = $1,447.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $1,171.00 Ten per cent commission = 144.70 Net due Sullivan = 131.30 On November 29, 1994, Sullivan delivered 53 units of fancy zukes and 69 units of medium zukes as represented by delivery ticket no. 2242 for a combined total of 112 units for which Sullivan was paid $472.00 by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994. The prices of $3.25 and $3.00 as indicated by invoice nos. 3941 and 3947, respectively are not indicative of the market for fancy zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $8.00 per unit for fancy zukes. Likewise, the price of $3.00 per unit for medium zukes as indicated by invoice no. 3927 is not indicative of the market for medium zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $6.00 per unit for medium zukes. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994, is: Lot no. 2242-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 53 units (Market Report) = $ 424.00 Lot no. 2242-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 69 units (Market Report) = $ 414.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 838.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 472.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 83.80 Net due Sullivan = $ 282.20 On December 1, 7, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 51 units of fancy zukes and a combined total of 87 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 138 units of fancy and medium zukes represented by delivery ticket nos. 2254 and 2289 and was paid $516.00 for these zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 15, 1994. There was no invoice for lot nos. 2254-116-37 or 2254-116-38. The Market Report established a market price of $8.00 and $6.00 per unit for fancy and medium zukes, respectively. The amount due Sullivan from the Growers Statement dated December 15, 1994, is: Lot No. 2254-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 39 units (Market Report) = $ 312.00 Lot No. 2254-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 20 units (Market Report) = $ 120.00 Lot No. 2289-116-37: $6.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 4049) = $ 72.00 Lot No. 2289-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 67 units (Invoice 3946) = $ 234.50 Total owed Sullivan = $ 738.50 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 516.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 73.85 Net due Sullivan = $ 148.65 On December 10, 1994, Sullivan delivered 27 units of fancy zukes and 18 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 45 units as represented by delivery ticket no. 2313 and was paid $211.50 for those zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by Growers Statement dated December 23, 1994. The 18 units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2313-116-38 are not covered by an invoice. The Market Report established a unit price of $6.00 for the fancy zukes. Invoice no. 4075 billed the fancy zukes at zero without any explanation. Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.50 per unit for the fancy zukes. The Market Report established a per unit price of $8.00 for the fancy zukes which is more in line with the market than is the $5.50 per unit paid by Fancy Farms. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 23, 1994, is: Lot No. 2313-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 18 units (Market Report) = $ 108.00 Lot No. 2313-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 27 units (Market Report) = $ 216.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 324.00 Less: Ten percent commission = $ 32.40 Amount received by Sullivan = $ 211.50 Net due Sullivan = $ 80.10 The net amount owed to Sullivan by Fancy Farms: From Grower Statements dated: November 25, 1994 $ 131.30 December 7, 1994 $ 282.20 December 15, 1994 $ 148.65 December 23, 1994 $ 80.10 Total owed to Sullivan $ 642.25
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. be ordered to pay Petitioner Wayne Sullivan the sum of $642.25. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3015A The parties elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Wayne Sullivan 49 Myrtle Bush Lane Venus, Florida 33960 James A. Crocker Qualified Representative Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. 1305 W. Dr. M. L. King, Jr., Blvd. Plant City, Florida 33564-9006 Gulf Insurance Company Legal Department 4600 Fuller Drive Irving, Texas 75038-6506
The Issue The issue in this case is whether proposed amendments to Rule 12A-1.070 are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners and Intervenors challenge Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1) and (4)(a) and (b). Respondent published the amendments in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly on March 18, 1994 and June 10, 1994. As described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the proposed rule amendments address, among other things, the taxation of payments to airport authorities from concessionaires like rental car companies and airport restaurants. The law imposes a sales tax on payments for the use or occupancy of real property, whether the agreement consists of a lease or a license to use real property. The main dispute in these cases is whether the proposed rule amendments illegally extend the sales tax to payments for intangibles like a concession, franchise, or privilege to do business.
Findings Of Fact The Proposed Rules By notice published in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 on March 18, 1994, Respondent proposed amendments to existing Rule 12A-1.070. (All references to Sections are to Florida Statutes. All references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code. All references to Proposed Rules are to the rule amendments that are the subject of this proceeding.) The notice explains that the purpose of the rule amendments is to clarify the application of specific statutory sales tax exemptions for the lease or license to use real property at airports, malls and nursing homes. The rule amendments clarify that the total payment pursuant to a lease or license of real property is subject to tax, unless specifically exempt, irrespective of how the payment, or a portion thereof, is identified. However, if such leased property includes specifically exempt property, then such exemption may be applied on a pro rata basis. 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 (March 18, 1994). In the notice, Respondent cites as specific authority for the proposed amendments Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1). Respondent states that the proposed amendments implement Sections 212.02(10)(h) and (i) and (13), 212.03(6), and 212.031. By notice published June 10, 1994, in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 4096, Respondent proposed amendments to the amendments previously proposed. As amended by both notices, Rule 12A-1.070 provides, with deletions stricken through and additions underlined: * 12A-1.070 Leases and Licenses of Real Property; Storage of Boats and Aircraft (1)(a) Every person who rents or leases any real property or who grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property is exer- cising a taxable privilege unless such real property is: * * * <<a>>. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft. See Subsection (3). <<b. Property which is used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt. This property includes: common walkways inside a terminal building used by passengers for boarding or departing from an aircraft, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (the rooms which are used by passengers as a sitting or gathering area immed- iately before surrendering their tickets to board the aircraft). Departure lounges commonly known as VIP lounges or airport clubs which are affiliated with an airline or a club which requires a membership or charge or for which membership or usage is determined by ticket status are not included as property exempt from tax. The lease or license to use passenger loading bridges (jetways) and baggage conveyor systems comes under this exemption, provided that the jetways and baggage conveyor systems are deemed real property. In order for the jetways and baggage conveyors to be deemed real property, the owner of these items must also be the owner of the land to which they are attached, and must have had the intention that such property become a permanent accession to the realty from the moment of installation. The items shall not be considered real property if the owner, when the owner is not the airport, retains title to the items after the purchase/installation indebtedness has been paid in full. Any operator of an airport, such as an airport authority, which is the lessee of the land on which the airport has its situs is, for the purposes of this sub- subparagraph, deemed the owner of such land. Real property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft which is exempt from tax includes: office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas. If any portion of the above property is used for any other purpose, it is taxed on a pro- rata basis, which shall be determined by the square footage of the portions of the areas in the airport that are used by an airline exclusively for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft (which areas shall be the numerator) compared to the total square footage of such areas used by the airlines (which areas shall be the denominator). Example: An airline leases a total of 3,000 square feet from an airport authority. The airline uses the space as follows: 1,000 square feet are used to process tickets and check in the passengers' luggage; 1,000 square feet are used for the passengers' departure lounge; and 1,000 square feet are used for the management office and the employees' lounge. The 1,000 square feet used to process tickets and check in the luggage is exempt; the 1,000 square feet used as a passengers' departure lounge is also exempt; and the 1,000 square feet used as the management office and employees' lounge is taxable. Therefore, a total of 2,000 square feet is exempt because that portion of the total space leased by the airline is used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. However, the total amount used as office space and the employees' lounge (i.e., 1,000 square feet) is taxable, because that portion of the space leased by the airline is not used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. Real property used for fueling aircraft is taxable when the fueling activities are conducted by a lessee or licensee which is not an airline. However, the charge made to an airline for the use of aprons, ramps, or other areas used for fueling aircrafts is exempt. From July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1), F.S., was exempt from tax.>> * * * (b)1. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of such real property. 2. However, effective July 1, 1987, a person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use such property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property. <<3. For purposes of this rule, the term "retail concessionaire," which may be either a lessee or licensee, shall mean any person .. . who makes sales of food, drinks, or other tangible personal property directly to the general public within the premises of an airport. With regard to airports, any persons which contract to service or supply tangible personal property for airline operations are considered to be providing aircraft support services and are not concessionaires for purposes of this rule.>> * * * The provisions of this rule relating to the license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property are effective July 1, 1986, unless other- wise noted. "Real property" means the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with "realty" and "real estate." "License," with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose. <<1. Example:>> [[(g)]] An agreement whereby the owner of real property grants another person permission to install and <<operate>> [[maintain]] a full service coin-operated vending machine, coin- operated amusement machine, coin-operated laundry machine, or any like items, on the premises is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. The consideration paid by the machine owner to the real property owner <<for the license to use the real property>> is taxable. . . . <<2. Example:>> [[(h)]] An agreement between the owner of real property and an advertising agency for the use of real property to display advertising matter is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. <<The consideration paid by the advertising agency to the real property owner for the license to use the real property is taxable.>> * * * (4)(a)<<1.>> The tenant or person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use any real property from which rental or license fee is subject to taxation under s. 212.031, F.S., and shall pay the tax to his immediate landlord or other person granting the right to such tenant or person to occupy or use such real property. <<2. Where the lessor's or licensor's ability to impose fee(s) is based on its ownership or control of the real property, and the payment made to the lessor or licensor is for the lessee's or licensee's use of the real property, such fees are subject to tax. In such circumstances, the total payment for the use of real property, including airport property, is taxable, irrespective that the payment or a portion of the payment may be identified as consideration for the privilege to do business at that location, privilege fee, guaranteed minimum, concession fee, percentage fee, or by the use of similar terms which seek to distinguish such portion(s) from the payment for the lease of or license to use such real property for any purpose, unless such lease or license is otherwise specifically exempt. Example: A clothing retailer occupying a location inside a mall has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to operate its store at that location. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated real property and the percentage of gross sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall; failure to make any of these payments can cause the agreement to be terminated. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized. Example: A push cart or kiosk vendor has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to sell its merchandise at various locations within the common areas of the mall. Failure to make the payments can terminate the right to sell merchandise in the mall. The total amount under the agreement is subject to tax because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of the privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use the real property to do business. Example: A car rental company has an agree- ment with an airport authority to operate its rental car business with a designated office and counter space within the airport terminal building. The agreement provides for a payment designated as rent for the use of real property as well as a payment based on a percentage of gross sales designated as a privilege fee for engaging in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment can terminate the agreement. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax. All past declarations, including Temporary Technical Assistance Advisements issued pursuant to Emergency Rule 87AER-91, Technical Assistance Advisements, Letters of Technical Assistance, and similar correspondence, issued by the Department, which advised that fees or portions of fees identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and which are inconsistent with this rule are rescinded. Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease or license to use real property for business purposes. (b) Except for tolls charged to the travelling public, both commercial and non- commercial, imposed exclusively for the right to travel on turnpikes, expressways, bridges, and other public roadways, the full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking-up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities by any person providing ground transportation services to such airport, shall be taxable as a license to use airport real property, irrespective of whether the operator of such service enters the airport terminal building while engaged in providing such service. Example: The fee paid by a hotel to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its guests at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a taxicab and limousine company to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its passengers at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a remote location rental car company, for the privilege of using the airport premises to pick-up and drop-off its customers at the airport terminal, is a license to use real property, and is taxable.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Statutes and Legislative History As amended by 66, Chapter 86-152, Laws of Florida, Section 212.031 states: (1)(a) It is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting, leasing, [[or]] letting<<, or granting a license for the use>> of any real property unless such property is: * * * Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Section 212.02(10)(h) defines "real property" as "the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with 'realty' and 'real estate.'" The 1986 amendments extend the sales tax to licenses for the use or occupancy of real property. Section 212.02(10)(i) defines "license." "License," as used in this chapter with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or a parcel of real property for any purpose. Section 212.031 imposes a sale tax for the use and occupancy of real property, but not upon payments for intangibles, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. The sales tax imposed by Section 212.031 is limited to the payments, or portions of payments, for the use or occupancy of real property. Each of the ten subsections under Section 212.031 exempts from the sales tax various types of property. Three exemptions relevant to these cases are at Section 212.031(1)(a)6, 7, and 10, which exempt real property that is: 6. A public street or road which is used for transportation purposes. 7. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft or, for the period July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1). Leased, subleased, or rented to a person providing food and drink concessionaire services within the premises of [[an airport,]] a movie theater, a business operated under a permit issued pursuant to chapter 550 or chapter 551, or any publicly owned arena, sport stadium, convention hall, [[or]] exhibition hall<<, auditorium, or recreational facility. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of real property used for that purpose, but shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use the property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. The indicated changes in subparagraph 10 were enacted by 10, Chapter 87-101, Laws of Florida. The remaining statutes cited by Respondent as law implemented by the Proposed Rules are not relevant to this proceeding. Court Decisions In Quick and Havey v. Department of Revenue, Case No. 72-363, Second Judicial Circuit, decided December 5, 1974, Donald O. Hartwell, Circuit Judge, entered a summary judgement in favor of Respondent. Quick and Havey operated a food concession at the municipal auditorium in West Palm Beach. In return for the concession, they agreed to pay the city base rental and a percentage of gross sales. The agreement entitled Quick and Harvey to the exclusive occupancy of part of the auditorium; they also provided concession services at other locations throughout the auditorium. Quick and Harvey paid the sales tax on the base rental, but argued that the percentage payment constituted "a fee paid for the exercise of a privilege." Judge Hartwell held that the tax applied to the base rent and percentage rent because the latter payments "are so inextricably entwined and enmeshed in the agreement to pay rent that they cannot be separated or distilled . . .." Judge Hartwell reasoned that rent is the "compensation paid for the use and occupation of real property." Recognizing that a tenant might make payments to its landlord that are not rent, Judge Hartwell found that at least under the terms of the instruments before it for construction and analysis that there has not been such a sufficient separation of the source of these funds as to warrant their classification solely as a fee for the exercise of a privilege. The right to use property cannot be separated from the property itself. We, of course, do not pass upon the question of whether the so-called concession rights can be [illegible] separated from the lease of the property itself. Suffice it to say that under the facts as herein presented, the Court is of the opinion that all payments made to the City of West Palm Beach under the agreement before the Court constitute payment of rent and are therefore subject to the tax specified in Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. In Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Askew, Case No. 74- 338, Second Judicial Circuit, decided January 20, 1977, Judge Hartwell decided whether certain payments made by Avis were taxable under Section 212.031. Avis had "entered into various contracts for a concession or license to do business at various airports and for the rental of real property," as well as contracts with private individuals for the rental of real property to conduct business at nonairport locations. Judge Hartwell divided the contracts of Avis into three categories. The first type of contract was for the payment of rental for the use real property. The second type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the payment of a sum explicitly identified as rent for the use of real property. The third type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the use of real property without a sum explicitly identified as rent. Judge Hartwell concluded that all payments for the rights conveyed by the first type of contract were taxable under Section 212.031. He ruled that the payments for the right to rent real property under the second type of contract were taxable, but the payments for the remaining rights were not. Declining to aggregate payments as he had in Quick and Havey two years earlier, Judge Hartwell ruled that the payments for the rights conveyed by the third type of contract required a "reasonable allocation." The allocation was between the payments for the use of real property, which were taxed, and the remaining payments, which were not. Judge Hartwell ordered that the allocation should be based on rental rates charged for the right of occupancy of the real property charged other tenants for comparable space. In a per curiam decision not yet final, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently considered the taxation of concession fees in Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 20 Fla. Law Weekly D552 (March 3, 1995). The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this final order do not rely upon Lloyd Enterprises, which is discussed merely as supplemental material. In Lloyd Enterprises, the taxpayer entered into a concession agreement with Volusia County for the rental of motorcycles at the beach. A fixed- location concessionaire, the taxpayer had the right to park its vehicles within 100 feet in either direction of its assigned spot during its assigned operating hours. Other concessionaires were allowed to roam the beach, but beach rangers would enforce the taxpayer's exclusive right to sell goods within its 200-foot territory if the free- roaming concessionaires parked or tried to sell goods in this territory. Rejecting Respondent's interpretation of its own rules, the court considered the language of the agreement, as well as a county ordinance incorporated by the agreement. The court held that neither document created a lease or license for the use of real property. Rather, they reflected the County's concern with the image that activities on the beach projected to visitors. The documents evidenced the County's intent to enhance the public's enjoyment of the beach through the provision of goods and services, as well as to raise revenue, mostly to defray cleanup costs at the beach. Thus, under the documents, the payments were nontaxable concession fees. Agency Interpretations Interpretations of Law Prior to Proposed Rule Amendments By letter dated May 14, 1968, Mr. J. Ed Straughn, Executive Director of Respondent, advised Mr. Wilbur Jones that tax is due on the space rented to car rental companies in any airport building. If the agreement makes no allocation between rental and nonrent payments, Respondent would require a "reasonable allocation" between rent and other payments with the tax due only on the amount paid for the right of occupancy. Mr. Straughn suggested that the rent component be estimated by the use of comparable rental rates for space elsewhere in the building. By letter dated August 14, 1985, Mr. Hugh Stephens, a Technical Assistant for Respondent, advised Mr. Victor Bacigalupi that a contract between an advertising company and Dade County, concerning advertising at Miami International Airport, did not involve the rental of real property. Mr. Stephens evidently relied on the nonexclusive right of posting advertising displays and the right of Dade County to require the advertiser to relocate or remove displays. By memorandum dated October 28, 1986, Mr. William D. Townsend, General Counsel, proposed policy for the taxation of licenses. Consistent with the Straughn letter 18 years earlier, the memorandum, which is directed to Mr. Randy Miller, Executive Director, states: A license in real property can be defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or orally, to do one or more acts on land without possessing any interest in the land. Every license to do an act on land involves the occupation of the land by the licensee so far as it is necessary to do the act. Example: A concessionaire pays for permission (a license) to sell hot dogs in the building of a wrestling arena. The concessionaire has no possessory interest in the building. He normally has no specifically or legally described area which is his. He is allowed simply to vend his hot dogs in the building. Perhaps he delivers and vends in the stands. Without special permission, he cannot assign his license and it is normally revocable by the licensor unless specifically agreed otherwise. . . . For purposes of F.S. 212.031, however, the Department of Revenue (DOR) takes the position that either a lease or license is present in any business arrangement in which one or more owners, lessors, sublessors, or other persons holding a possessory interest in real property, permits a third party to use such real property for authorized acts unless all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement between the parties conclusively indicate that the agreement is neither a lease nor a license. The form in which the transaction is cast is not controlling. Accordingly, some portion of the consideration paid for an agreement that in form is a joint venture, profits interest, management agreement, franchise, manufacturer's discount, bailment or other arrange- ment will be presumed by the DOR to be allocable to a lease or license if the arrangement involves the use of real property to perform authorized acts by the lessee or licensee. If the terms of the agree- ment are silent with respect to the portion of the consideration allocable to the inherent lease or license or if the consideration allocated under the terms of the agreement is less than its fair market value, the DOR will allocate to the lease or license a portion of the consideration that is equal to the fair market value of the lease or license. Contrary to the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum eight months earlier, Technical Assistance Advisement 87A-011 dated July 2, 1987, which was prepared by Mr. Melton H. McKown, advised the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority that the privilege fees paid by car rental companies to the aviation authority were taxable. The agreement between the parties stated that the fees were "for the concession privileges granted hereunder, and in addition to the charges paid for the Premises .. ., [the car rental company] shall pay a privilege fee " Two months later, Temporary Technical Assistance Advisement TTAA 87(AER)-225 reversed TAA 87A-011. In TTAA 87(AER)-225, which is dated September 10, 1987, Ceneral Counsel William Townsend informed Mr. Samuel J. Dubbin that the payments made to airport authorities from concessionaires are "not for the right to use real property, but are for the right to engage in business at the airport." The letter relies upon Avis Rent-A- Car Systems, Inc. v. Askew. Respondent confirmed TTAA 87(AER)-225 in TTAA 88(AER)- 198, which is dated March 24, 1988, and in a letter dated April 6, 1989, from Mr. Robert M. Parsons, Technical Assistant, to Mr. Thomas P. Abbott. The April 6 letter confirms that payments from on- airport rental car companies are taxed only to the extent that the payments represent rent for space on airport property and not to the extent that the payments represent consideration for the privilege to do business. The April 6 letter adds that the payments from off-airport car rental companies for the right to pick up customers at the airport are not taxable because such payments are merely consideration for the privilege to engage in business. The April 6 letter discusses fees paid by other airport concessionaires. Acknowledging the recent enactment of the statutory exemption for license payments made to airports by food and drink concessionaires, the letter notes that, after July 1, 1987 (the effective date of the statutory changes), such payments, even if calculated as percentages of sales, are not taxable because such payments are construed as payments for a mere privilege or license to engage in business. The April 6 letter evidently marks the first time that, in a single document, Respondent inconsistently treats car rental company concession fees and all other concession fees. The April 6 letter adopts the Straughn/Townsend approach when it states that percentage rent is not taxable because it is payment for the privilege to do business. (The letter actually states "privilege or license" to do business, and this alternative use of "license," not involving the use or occupancy of real property, may have caused part of the confusion.) But the assurance of nontaxability of concession fees in the April 6 letter is limited to the period after July 1, 1987. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter relies on the relatively recent statutory exemption for license payments from airport retail concessionaires. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter later adds that percentage rent was taxable after the legislature amended Section 212.031 to tax payments for a license to use real property. The April 6 letter concludes erroneously that it is treating all airport concessionaires like on-airport car rental companies. In a Notice of Decision dated July 28, 1992, Respondent addressed the taxation of payments to airport authorities from car rental companies. Under a concession agreement, the airport charged a car rental company a fixed rent for occupied airport space, such as for parking, check-in, and service. Under the same agreement, the airport also charges the car rental company the greater of a guaranteed minimum or percentage of gross revenues. Taking the Straughn/Townsend approach, the Notice of Decision reversed a tentative assessment and held that the additional payments were not taxable. The July 28, 1992 Notice of Decision also addresses the taxation of percentage payments to airport authorities from other concessionaires. Explicitly endorsing the inconsistency of the April 6 letter, Respondent determined that percentage payments from concessionaires other than rental car companies were taxable either as leases or, since July 1, 1986, as licenses. The only explanation offered for the inconsistent treatment of concessionaires is that TTAA 87(AER)-225 applies only to rental car companies. Two years later, as reflected in a March 3, 1994 internal memorandum from Ms. Nydia Men,ndez to two Miami auditors, Respondent continued to perpetuate its inconsistent policy of taxing all payments for the privilege of engaging in business at airports, except for such payments from rental car companies. Returning to advertising, the July 28, 1992, Notice of Decision also states that the payments from the advertiser addressed in the letter dated August 14, 1985, have been taxable, as payments for a license, since July 1, 1986. This conclusion represents the correct treatment of licenses, as another means of granting a right to use or occupy real property. This treatment contrasts with the apparent misinterpretation in the April 6 letter that taxable licenses include grants of privileges to do business. In an early attempt to revisit the tax treatment of payments for concessions, franchises, and other privileges to do business, especially at airports, Respondent evidently chose the Quick and Havey and McKown approach that such business payments are taxable, at least when they are combined with taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. By memorandum dated January 14, 1993, from Assistant General Counsel Jeff Kielbasa to Ms. Lorraine Yoemans, Legislative Affairs Director, Mr. Kielbasa explained the purpose of unidentified proposed rule amendments addressing the same issues addressed by the subject proposed rule amendments. He wrote: The proposed rule amendment attempts to level the field by recognizing that any charge for the right, privilege, or license to do business at an airport is fundamentally a charge for the privilege to use or occupy land. If an airport business refuses to pay the fee, the airport's remedy is to have the business removed as a trespasser. It should be pointed out that we are not concerned with true business licenses or privilege fees attendant to use of trademarks, franchises and the like. These are licenses or privilege fees unrelated to the use of real property. The proposed rule does not differentiate between businesses such as on-airport car rental companies (with counterspaces) and off-airport car rental companies. The fee (however characterized) charged by the airport for the privilege to use or occupy the airport for business purposes is subject to the section 212.031 sales tax. See section 212.02(10)(i) defining license with reference to the use of real property as the "privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose." We believe that separation of a payment by characterizing one portion as a lease or license of realty (whether site specific or not) and another for the privilege of conducting business on the premises is artificial. It would be just as easy for the property owner on the corner of College and Monroe to charge a business tenant the average commercial square footage rental in Leon County for the lease and require the tenant to pay the premium attributable to the location at College and Monroe as a separate charge in the form of a license to do business. However carved up and characterized, under the statute each charge would be taxable since both leases and licenses to use real property are taxable. Interpretations of Proposed Rule Amendments On April 14, 1994, Respondent conducted a workshop on the proposed rule amendments prior to the modification published June 10, 1994. Respondent's representatives were understandably reluctant to opine on questions of law without detailed facts. However, explaining the tax consequences of payments from a concessionaire to an airport, Assistant General Counsel Kielbasa stated: I think the notion that there is a separate privilege fee that an airport charges unrelated to the fact that the privilege is being granted to function at the airport, I don't think that's what's happening. I think it's a very simple case, and I think it's very clear. But there may be separate provisions in contracts or lease agreements which have nothing to do with operating at that location, and to that extent, I don't think it would be subject to tax at all under the statute, and that's what we're trying to get at. Respondent's Exhibit 1A, pages 33-34. A major element of the dispute between Respondent and Petitioners and Intervenors (collectively, Petitioners) concerned Respondent's choice to take the Quick and Havey and McKown approach over the Avis and Straughn/Townsend approach in taxing mixed payments for the use of real property and for business intangibles. Following the rule workshop, Respondent made some Avis and Straughn/Townsend changes to the proposed rules, but the changes did not preclude a Quick and Havey and McKown approach, as evidenced by the following statement in the Prehearing Stipulation: "The Department contends that where the amount paid for a privilege fee is so intertwined or meshed with a payment for a license or lease to use real property that it cannot be separated, the full amount is taxable." Airports and Concessions Governmental entities operate and typically own large commercial airports, such as those in Orlando, Miami, and Tampa. By law, these airport authorities are empowered to enter into contracts with third parties to supply persons using airports with goods and services, such as food and beverage, retail sales, and car rentals. In some cases, airport authorities may obtain services by management agreements, which are not subject to sales tax. In most cases, though, airport authorities obtain goods and services for airport visitors by leases and grants of concessions, franchises, or other privileges to do business. The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "concession" as "a franchise for the right to conduct a business, granted by a government body or authority." The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "franchise" as "a privilege or right that is conferred by grant to an individual or group of individuals; usually an exclusive right to furnish public services or to sell a particular product in a certain community." By what are normally labelled "concession" or "franchise" agreements, airport authorities permit a concessionaire to operate a business with some nexus to the airport or at least its passengers, in return for which the concessionaire pays money to the airport authority. The nexus to the airport may take various forms. Some concessionaires sell food or drink or retail merchandise at exclusively assigned locations within the airport terminal. Hotel concessionaires operate hotels at fixed locations in the terminal. Some concessionaires, like taxi companies and nonairport hotels, pick up and drop off passengers at the airport terminal in areas designated for such purpose, but not reserved exclusively for any one concessionaire. An on-airport car rental concessionaire rents cars at the airport, using fixed counter space, parking areas, car service areas, and car pick-up and drop-off areas. A variation of the car rental concession is the off- airport car rental concessionaire, which has no fixed space at the airport except for customer pick-up and drop-off areas and usually counter space. In Florida, all off-airport rental car companies use their own vans to pick-up and drop-off customers. At some airports outside Florida, such as Sacramento, Dallas, and Minneapolis, the airport authorities operate their own vans to pick up and drop off customers of off-airport rental car companies. In such cases, the off-airport rental car companies do not directly use or occupy any of the real property of the airport. In general, the payments from the concessionaires to the airport authorities consist of two categories. First, there is a fixed payment, which the concession agreement typically characterizes as consideration for the use and occupancy of real property. The airport authority normally bases this rental payment on the fair market value of the space leased, as estimated by a licensed real estate appraiser, or under a cost-based formula. Second, there is a payment representing a percentage of the gross revenue of the concessionaire derived from airport business. The concession agreement typically characterizes this payment as consideration for the privilege to do business with airport passengers. Rents typically exceed $50 per square foot per year. Most, but not all concessionaires, make total payments of considerably more that $50 per square foot per year, often totalling hundreds and sometimes thousands of dollars. In entering into concession agreements, airport authorities pursue a variety of goals. They must produce high revenues because airport authorities do not operate on public subsidies, aside from the monopoly grant of the airport operation itself. But high returns from concessionaires are not the only goal. Airport authorities must serve airport visitors in order to maintain successful relations with the airlines. And airport visitors demand a mix of goods and services at acceptable prices and quality. In selecting concessionaires and pricing concession fees, airport authorities therefore balance maximizing revenues with serving visitors' needs. Airport authorities price concession fees based on the type of goods and services offered by the concessionaire. A bank at one major Florida airport pays six times the concession fees of a travel agency, which occupies space of equal size next to the bank. At the same airport, one theme-park retailer pays concession fees of more than three times what another theme-park retailer pays for the identical space. In the typical concession arrangement, the airport authority receives payments consisting of rent and "something else." The rent is attributable to the use and occupancy of real property. The "something else" is business income, which is attributable to an intangible business asset, such as a franchise, concession, or privilege to do business. Like any other lessor, airport authorities undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide their lessees with offices or retail space for their use and occupancy. Unlike other lessors, however, airport authorities also undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide nearly all of the concessionaire's customers through operating agreements with airlines. Through concession agreements, airport authorities allow concessionaires to share in the authority's most valuable asset, which is not the real property comprising the airport, but the exclusive, governmental franchise to operate the airport. In these regards, airport authorities are in very similar roles to the county in Lloyd Enterprises with the subjects of the government monopoly being in one case a beach and another an airport. Both governmental "owner/operators" provide customers for their respective concessionaires and predicate their agreements upon the ability of the contracting party to supply the needs of the customers in a manner that does not compromise the public asset--i.e., an airport or a beach. These elements are not typical of a lessor or licensor. To varying, lesser degrees, airport authorities also distinguish themselves from mere lessors through the marketing, management, working capital, and workforce that characterize the airport operation. Respondent's key witness identified four factors useful in determining whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. These four factors assist in the determination whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property. But the usefulness of the four factors is limited because they do not directly address the other possible component of a mixed payment, which is a payment for a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. It is easy to determine that concessionaire payments typically comprise rent or some other payment for the use and occupancy of real property plus a payment for an intangible, such as the privilege to do business with airport users. Obviously, Respondent is not required to accept the parties' labelling or allocations of these payments. But it is difficult to determine how much of a mixed payment is for the use or occupancy of real property, which is taxable (ignoring, as always, the special treatment of certain airport license payments, as well as other exemptions), and how much is for a privilege to do business, which is nontaxable. The issue is whether a "reasonable allocation" is possible between the two components in a mixed payment. As ordered in Avis and suggested by the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum, the allocation process should begin with finding a fair rental value. It is difficult to estimate the fair market rent for space in a large commercial airport. The universe of comparables is small due to the uniqueness of major airports. But the appraisal of airport real property is not impossible. Nonairport comparables normally exist that, with suitable adjustments, yield reasonable approximations of fair market rentals. A real estate appraisal helps determine how much of a concessionaire's payment should be characterized as rent. However, the allocation problem can be approached at the same time from the opposite end. In appraising business assets, an accountant or business appraiser estimates the value of the concession, franchise, or other privilege to do business with airport visitors. The business-income approach to the allocation problem is aided by analysis of the payments made by completely off- airport car rental concessionaires in Sacramento, Minneapolis, and Dallas. These payments provide a rough approximation of the value of this intangible, even though they probably require major adjustments to reflect, among other things, differing passenger counts and demographics, as well as the costs incurred by the airport authorities in providing transportation to the off- airport sites. Based on the foregoing, the record demonstrates that: a) the payments of a concessionaire to an airport authority ordinarily consist in part of rent or license payments and in part of payments for an intangible, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business and b) these payments may be allocated, with reasonable precision, between the real property and business components. The Proposed Rules Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 and (b) Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)1. is not materially changed by the proposed rule amendments. Consistent with the statute, this paragraph of the rule merely imposes the sales tax in taxable transactions on the person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use the real property and requires that such person pay its immediate landlord or grantor. The next subparagraph is new. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 contains two introductory sentences followed by three examples and a notice. The first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 fairly interprets the statute. The first sentence states that the sales tax is due on payments made to lessors or licensors when the payment is for the use of the real property and is based on the ownership or control of the real property by the lessor or licensor. By limiting the tax to those payments based on the payee's interest in the real property, the proposed rule ensures that the tax is imposed only on the portion of the payment attributable to the use or occupancy of real estate. The first sentence is unobjectionable. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 is no more controversial. This sentence provides that the "total payment for the use of real property" is taxable, even though the payment or part of the payment "may be identified" as payment for a privilege to do business. The use of "may be identified" in the "even though" clause refers to the label given such payments by the parties. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 merely provides that the taxable consequence of the transaction is not governed by the label given the payments by the parties. In other words, just because the parties use "concession fee," "privilege fee," "percentage fee," or "similar terms" does not necessarily make them payments for the privilege to do business. The second sentence assures that Respondent will not be deterred by mere labels from its lawful responsibility to characterize properly the nature of the payments, and make reasonable allocations when allocations are indicated. The three examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 are neither illustrative nor useful. To the contrary, they are vague and misleading and appear to reveal a misunderstanding of the proper taxation of mixed payments consisting of rent and payments for a privilege to do business. The first example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.a. A clothing retailer occupies a location in a shopping mall. The retailer pays the mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated space and the percentage of sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall. The failure to pay either amount is grounds for termination of the agreement. The proposed rule concludes: "The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized." In fact, both payments made by the retailer to the mall owner may constitute taxable payments for the use of real property. Supplying little useful information as to how to determine the true character of payments, the proposed example ignores all of the important factors necessary in making this determination. The proposed example overrides the characterization of the payments by the parties. As discussed above, the parties' labelling of a payment may be tax-motivated, but it may also reveal their true intent. However, the proposed example offers insufficient explanation why it ignores the label of "privilege to do business" at the mall. The only possible grounds for ignoring the label are that the retailer occupies a location inside a mall under which it pays minimum rent and percentage rent and a default in the payment of either amount is grounds for terminating the agreement. The first basis is only that the payments are mixed and, except under the most strained reading of Quick and Havey, cannot, without more, possibly be considered justification for taxing the total payments. The key factor in the first proposed example is thus the presence of a cross-default clause. Such a clause may play a role in distinguishing between payments for the use of real property and other types of payments. In certain cases, the total amount actually being paid for the use of the real property may include all payments that must be paid in order for the agreement to remain in good standing. This would likely be true of base rent and additional rent, consisting of a lessee's prorata share of insurance, taxes, maintenance, and utilities. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that a cross- default clause is of such importance as to confer upon it the status that it is given in the rule example. Nothing in the record supports the assertion that all cross-defaulted payments are therefore payments for the use or occupancy of real property. For instance, Respondent concedes that a lessee/payor might be obligated under a lease to make taxable payments of rent and nontaxable payments of promotional fees, such as for the use of logos or other intangibles. It is conceivable that a prudent (and powerful) lessor/payee might provide in the agreement, even if called a "lease agreement," that a default in either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. Even so, the mere existence of such a cross-default clause does not, without more, transform the promotional fee into rent. The proper characterization of the two payments under the first proposed example requires consideration of, among other things, the four factors identified by Respondent's key witness: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. The proper characterization requires consideration, in some fashion, of the elements that distinguish a real property asset from a business asset, such as any contributions by the mall owner in the form of operating agreements, other leases, marketing, management, working capital, and workforce, as well as the method by which the mall owner decides with whom it will enter into agreements and the total payments that it will require. The second example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.b. A push cart vendor pays a mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales for the right to sell merchandise at various locations within the common area of the mall. The mall owner may terminate the agreement if the vendor fails to make either payment. The example concludes that both payments are taxable "because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of a privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use real property to do business." The only difference in the first two examples is that the second involves a license and the first involves a lease. Like the example of the mall retailer, the example of the push cart vendor elevates the cross-default provision to outcome-determinative status. Again, the record does not support such reliance upon this factor for the above-discussed reasons. The third example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.c. A car rental company pays an airport authority for designated office and counter space in the terminal. The agreement identifies a payment as rent for the use of real property. The agreement also identifies a payment, representing a percentage of gross sales, as a privilege fee for the right to engage in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. The example concludes that the "total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax." As with the preceding examples, the example of the airport car rental company relies upon a cross-default clause to characterize all payments as for the use of real property. Again, for the reasons stated above, the record does not support such reliance upon this single factor. The three examples make no "reasonable allocation" between the real property and business components of what are probably mixed payments. Best revealed by the last sentence of the second example, the examples illegitimately transform business payments into real property payments simply because the business payor uses or occupies real property to conduct its business. In reality, the three examples seek to find their way back to the haven of Quick and Havey by equating cross-default clauses with inextricable intertwining and enmeshment. It is only conjecture whether a court would today so readily abandon an attempt to allocate between real property and business income. In any event, the present record demonstrates that "reasonable allocations" are achievable and require consideration of much more than cross- default clauses. Respondent's defense of the examples is inadequate. Respondent argues that the examples are modified by the language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. As previously stated, the two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 represent a fair restatement of the statutory taxing criteria. But the role of the two examples is to illustrate the application of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, not provide a circular restatement of the rule and, thus, the statute. Given their language, the proposed examples stand alone and cannot be saved by the implicit incorporation of the first two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. Standing alone, the illustrations are erroneous in their reliance on cross-default clauses, misleading in their omission of material factors required for any reasonable allocation, and misguided in their implicit bias against making allocations between payments for real property and business components. Respondent claims that the examples create presumptions that a taxpayer may rebut. This claim is dubious on two counts. First, Respondent's key witnesses disagreed on whether the presumptions created by the examples were indeed rebuttable. One witness testified clearly that, if a nonexempt transaction fit one of the examples, then the transaction was taxable. Nothing in the examples suggests that these presumptions are rebuttable. But the examples do not work even if they establish only rebuttable presumptions. The cross-default provision cannot bear the burden even of creating a rebuttable presumption. A cross-default provision is simply not that important to the proper characterization of the payments, especially in light of far more important factors. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d warns taxpayers that all past declarations, including technical assistance advisements, that "advised that fees . . . identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and . . . are inconsistent with this rule" are rescinded. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)d concludes: "Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease of license to use real property for business purposes." Respondent's key witness could not identify with certainty the past declarations rescinded by Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d or the past declarations left unaffected. This leave the proposed rule unnecessarily vague, at least as to airport authorities. There are a limited number of airport authorities and concessionaires that could be relying on past declarations and, if there are any besides those uncovered in this proceeding, they should be easily found. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) identifies as a taxable license to use real property the "full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking- up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities" by any provider of ground transportation services, regardless whether the provider "enters the airport terminal building while . . . providing such service." The full payment for the real property component is taxable, and Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) accurately interprets the statutes. However, Respondent again encounters problems in the three examples that follow Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b). In Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b)1, a hotel pays a fee to an airport authority for the privilege of coming onto airport property to pick up and drop off hotel guests at the terminal. The example states that the payment is taxable because it is for a license to use airport real property. The second and third examples are identical except they involve a taxicab and limousine company and an off-site car rental company. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) states the obvious-- i.e., that whatever the payor pays for the right to use or occupy real property is subject to sales tax. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) does not require the characterization of all payments between such parties as taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. The problem with the proposed examples is that they depart from the real-property language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) and use the business language of a privilege to do business. The first example baldly provides that a fee paid by a hotel to an airport for the "privilege" to enter airport property and pick up and drop off hotel guests is a license to use airport property and is taxable. There is no mention of allocation or of the factors that would go into a reasonable allocation. The fee is taxable. The language and paucity of reasoning are practically identical for the second and third examples. Respondent argues that Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) must be read in connection with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, which restates the statutory language. This argument fails for two reasons. Like the examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) does not incorporate by reference the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2. Respondent's argument of implicit incorporation is even weaker here because Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) is not even a subparagraph of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. The first set of proposed examples at least mentions a cross-default clause, which could have some bearing on the proper characterization of the payments, even though the omission of far more important factors invalidates the first set of examples. The second set of proposed examples fails even to mention a single factor. If the hotel, taxi cab company, or rental car company pays for the privilege of entering airport property to do business, the entire payment is taxable. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b provides that property "used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt." The proposed rule identifies examples of such property as common terminal walkways used by passengers for boarding or exiting planes, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (but distinguished from VIP lounges or clubs that require a membership not determined by ticket status). Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c adds that "[r]eal property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property . . . which is exempt from tax includes ... office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas." Petitioners object to the use of "exclusively" in subparagraph b. The statute provides an exemption for property used exclusively for aircraft landing or taxiing or property used by an airline for loading or unloading persons or property or for fueling. Clearly, due to the repetition of "property used" in the second clause, the modifier "exclusively" applies only to the first clause, which is consistent with the doctrine of the nearest antecedent argued in Petitioner's proposed final order. It is unclear how Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c work together because they seem to define the same exempt property under different subparagraphs. Both subparagraphs apply to real property, and both seem to describe the same examples of real property, using different words. The subparagraphs under subparagraph b present reasonable rules for determining what is real property based on ownership of the underlying land, with a special rule when the airport authority leases, but does not own, the land on which the airport is situated. The subparagraphs under subparagraph c identify a prorating process, which applies when the property is used for both exempt and nonexempt purposes. It is unclear how property could be used for exempt and nonexempt purposes under the requirement of "exclusive" use in subparagraph b, although such mixed uses is contemplated by subparagraph c. The requirement contained in the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b that the property be used exclusively for loading or unloading passengers conflicts with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, as well as the language of Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.a; neither of the latter two provisions predicates the exemption upon exclusivity of use. More importantly, the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b conflicts with the relevant statutes. However, the remainder of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b, including subparagraphs (I) and (II), is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutes, as is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, including subparagraphs (I) and (II). Petitioners argue that Respondent intends to tax nonairline concessionaires for their use of property used for loading or unloading persons or property. This argument is unclear, perhaps because the unobjectionable proposed rules do not require such an application. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 defines "retail concessionaire" as either a lessee or licensee that makes sales directly to the public within an airport. The words "retail concessionaire" are not used elsewhere in the rule or proposed rules at issue except in Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)1 and 2, which addresses "a person providing retail concessionaire services" involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property in an airport. Subparagraph 1 imposes tax on rent paid by such persons, and subparagraph 2 exempts from tax any license payments made by such persons. Petitioners' arguments against the definitional proposed rule are misplaced. The definition covers lessees and licensees, but does not impose any tax. In conjunction with subparagraphs 1 and 2, the proposed definition of "retail concessionaire" says, in effect, that all lessees and licensees selling food and drink or other personal property are subject to tax on payments for the rental of associated real property, but are not subject to tax on payments for the licensing of associated real property. The subparagraphs that carry tax consequences honor the legislative directives as to taxability.
The Issue The issues in these two cases are whether Respondent violated provisions of chapter 475, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ regulating real estate sales brokers, as alleged in the Administrative Complaints, by (1) failing to return a rental deposit to a potential tenant; (2) serving as the qualifying broker for Friendly International Realty, Inc. (“Friendly”), but failing to actively supervise Friendly’s operations and/or sales associates; failing to preserve Friendly’s transaction records and escrow account documents; and (4) acting in a manner that constitutes culpable negligence or a breach of trust. If there was a violation, an additional issue would be what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Parties The Department is the state agency that regulates the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165, and chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Ms. King is a licensed real estate broker registered with the Department (license numbers BK 3203595, 3261628, 3293588, 3306619, 3335771, 3354773, and 3363985). Ms. King is registered with the Department as the qualifying broker for 16 brokerages located throughout the state of Florida. At all times relevant to this case, Ms. King’s registered address with the Department was 4430 Park Boulevard North, Pinellas Park, Florida 33781. Friendly International Realty, LLC Friendly was a Florida licensed real estate corporation, holding license number CQ 1040825. Records reflect that James Berthelot was the registered agent for Friendly at the time of incorporation, June 2011. At all times relevant, Mr. Berthelot was a licensed Real Estate Sales Associate (license number SL 3226474) registered with Friendly. In May 2014, Respondent drafted and entered into a Limited Qualifying Broker Agreement (“Broker Agreement”) with Friendly and its owner, Ivania De La Rocha.2/ Friendly and Ms. King entered into the Broker Agreement, “in order to comply with the requirements of the Florida Department of [Business and] Professional Regulation.” Under the terms of the Broker Agreement, Respondent was not paid by Friendly per transaction. Rather, Respondent agreed to serve as the “Corporate Broker of Record” in exchange for a payment of $300 a month “as a flat fee for any and all real estate business conducted by [Friendly].” The Broker Agreement also provided for a “late fee” penalty if Friendly was delinquent in this monthly payment. Section 1.1 of the Broker Agreement outlined Respondent’s duties to Friendly, requiring her to: (1) keep her and Friendly’s licenses active and in good standing under Florida law; (2) keep her other business interests separate from those involving Friendly’s interests; and (3) provide Friendly notice of any governmental inquiry involving her serving as Friendly’s broker. There was no mention in the Broker Agreement of either Respondent’s or Friendly’s responsibilities regarding oversight of transactions, training for sales associates, or day-to-day operations. Regarding document retention, the Broker Agreement provided: Section 9.0 AUDIT & REVIEW RIGHT: Broker shall have the right to enter [Friendly’s] offices upon reasonable advance written notice to verify compliance with the real estate laws of the State of Florida. There was no evidence that Ms. King ever provided Friendly with the kind of notice described in section 9.0 of the Broker Agreement. Although the Broker Agreement did not prohibit Friendly from holding funds or assets on behalf of third parties, section 10.0 (Miscellaneous) explicitly prohibited Friendly from operating an escrow account. (g) Escrow and Ernest Money Accounts. [Friendly] shall not be permitted to hold any escrow account(s). On July 31, 2014, Ms. King was registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, as “manager” of Friendly. Ms. King was the qualifying broker for Friendly (license number BK3303898) from August 6, 2014, through September 30, 2015, and November 4, 2015, through January 13, 2016.3/ During the time Ms. King served as the qualifying broker, Friendly operated from a number of addresses in Miami- Dade County, including 11900 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 292, Miami, Florida 33181; and 2132 Northeast 123rd Street, Miami, Florida 33181. The office door of the Friendly office located on Northeast 123rd Street was painted in large letters, “FRIENDLY INTERNATIONAL REALTY” and “ALICIA KING” painted underneath. At the hearing, when asked about Friendly’s address, Ms. King could only confirm that when she became the broker the office was “on Biscayne.” The Biscayne Boulevard address is the one listed on the Broker Agreement. At the hearing, Ms. King was wrong about when the Friendly office had moved from the Biscayne Boulevard to the Northeast 123rd Street location, insisting it was over the Christmas holidays in 2015. Records establish Friendly moved from the Biscayne Boulevard location to the Northeast 123rd Street location sometime between April and July 2014. In January 2016, Ms. King believed the office was still on Biscayne Boulevard. In reality, it had been over a year since the office had relocated to that location. At the hearing, when asked by her own counsel how many transactions a month Friendly handled, Ms. King replied, “That’s hard to say. It was not many at all. Ten, maybe.” Respondent could not give the exact number of employees or sales associates affiliated with Friendly; when asked, she stated she could not remember the exact amount, but knew it was “very limited.” Respondent did not have any agreements or documentation related to how many sales associates were registered under her broker’s license. Respondent could not name any other sales associates affiliated with Friendly while she was the qualifying broker, except for Mr. Berthelot. While she was Friendly’s qualifying broker, Respondent did not perform any of the training for the sales associates at Friendly. Respondent did not have any face-to-face meetings with any Friendly sales associates, except for Mr. Berthelot. Respondent did not have phone or e-mail contact with any of the Friendly sales associates, except for Mr. Berthelot. Respondent did not have copies of any forms, handbooks, reports or files related to Friendly. All of these documents were in paper form and kept in the Friendly office. Respondent had no access or signatory authority for any of Friendly’s bank accounts. Natalie James was a registered real estate sales associate affiliated with Friendly for approximately five months, from November 2015 through March 2016. Ms. James worked out of the Friendly office and was physically present at the office at least three or four times a week. Ms. James was involved in several rentals and one sales transaction while at Friendly. For each transaction she assembled a file, which was kept in the Friendly office. For rental transactions, Ms. James would negotiate and facilitate lease agreements. When she represented potential tenants, she received deposit funds that she deposited with Friendly. Ms. James attended meetings at Friendly; Ms. King was not present at any of them. Ms. James never had any telephonic, electronic, personal, or other contact with Respondent. While at Friendly, neither Mr. Berthelot nor any of Ms. James’ co-workers mentioned Ms. King to Ms. James. Although Ms. King’s name was on the door of Friendly’s office, Ms. James was unaware Ms. King was Friendly’s broker. There was conflicting testimony as to how often Respondent visited the Friendly office. Ms. King’s testimony at the hearing was at odds with the Department’s evidence and testimony regarding this issue. Ms. King insisted that while she was Friendly’s broker, she would travel from Pinellas Park to the Friendly office once or twice a week. This was not believable for a number of reasons. First, had Ms. King visited Friendly’s office as often as she stated, she would have known about the change in location; she did not. Second, Ms. King could not give one concrete date or detail about her travels to the Friendly office. Third, and most compelling, was the testimony of Ms. James (who worked at Friendly for at least two months while Ms. King was its broker) that she had never seen, communicated with, or heard mention of Ms. King while at Friendly. Ms. James’ unbiased and compelling testimony alone supports a finding that Ms. King did not visit the Friendly office as frequently as she indicated. Ms. King was aware that Friendly and Mr. Berthelot provided rental or “tenant placement” services.4/ Friendly collected security deposits and other move-in funds from potential renters and held them in an escrow account. Ms. King was not aware Friendly had an escrow account until January 2016 when she was contacted by the Department in an unrelated case. On January 13, 2016, Respondent resigned with the Department as the qualifying broker for Friendly effective that same day. On January 14, 2016, Respondent filed a complaint with the Department against Mr. Berthelot for operating an escrow account and collecting deposit funds without her knowledge. Facts Related to the Viton Case In November 2015, during the time Ms. King was Friendly’s qualifying broker, Christian Viton signed a lease agreement to rent an apartment located in Miami at 460 Northeast 82nd Terrace, Unit 8 (“Viton transaction”). The Viton lease agreement listed Friendly as the holder of the deposit monies and required Friendly to transfer the deposit and move-in funds to the owner of the property. Pursuant to the terms of the Viton lease agreement, Mr. Viton remitted an initial deposit of $500, and received a written receipt from Friendly dated November 2, 2015. Mr. Viton gave Friendly a second deposit of $380, and received a written receipt dated November 4, 2015. Mr. Viton never moved into the apartment and demanded a refund of his deposit from Friendly. On December 8, 2015, Friendly issued a check to Mr. Viton in the amount of $530. Three days later, Friendly issued a stop-payment order on the $530 check to Mr. Viton. On February 29, 2016, Mr. Viton filed a complaint with the Department seeking a return of the $880 he had given to Friendly. As a result, the Department initiated an investigation into Mr. Viton’s complaint and contacted Respondent. Upon learning about the Viton complaint, Ms. King contacted Mr. Berthelot who admitted Friendly had stopped payment on the $530 refund check, but had reissued the full amount of the deposit to a third-party not named on the lease. There is no evidence Mr. Viton ever received a refund of his $880 deposit. Facts Related to Dorestant Case In June 2015, during the time Ms. King served as Friendly’s qualifying broker, Cindy Dorestant entered into a lease agreement to rent a condominium located at 1540 West 191 Street, Unit 110 (“Dorestant transaction”). In the lease, Friendly was listed as the “broker” and holder of the deposit; TIR Prime Properties (“TIR”) was listed as the owner’s agent. The Dorestant lease agreement required Friendly to transfer the deposit and move-in funds collected from Ms. Dorestant to TIR. Pursuant to the terms of the Dorestant lease agreement, Ms. Dorestant gave Friendly $1,050 as an initial deposit, and received a written receipt dated June 24, 2015. In late July 2015, Ms. Dorestant contacted TIR’s property manager and sales agent to ask for information about the status of her move into the condominium. TIR explained to Ms. Dorestant that Friendly had not conveyed any of monies collected from Ms. Dorestant to TIR. Both Ms. Dorestant and TIR attempted to contact Friendly, but Friendly was non-responsive. The TIR sales associate relayed this information to TIR’s broker, Mariano Saal, who in turn tried to reach Friendly to resolve the issue. Eventually, TIR was told by Mr. Berthelot that Friendly would release the move-in funds to TIR and that Mr. Berthelot would schedule the move-in. TIR did not receive any funds from Friendly, nor did Mr. Berthelot facilitate Ms. Dorestant’s move into the condominium. On August 31, 2015, Mr. Saal contacted Mr. Berthelot and informed him that if TIR did not receive the move-in funds for the Dorestant transaction by 5:00 p.m. that day, it would be required to find another tenant. Ms. Dorestant did not move into the condominium and demanded a refund from Friendly and TIR. On September 14, 2015, Mr. Saal sent an e-mail to what he believed was Respondent’s address, demanding the $1,050 from Friendly because it considered Ms. Dorestant’s failure to move into the property a default of the lease agreement. Respondent, however, did not have access to Friendly’s e-mails. The e-mail was also sent to Mr. Berthelot, and Ms. De La Rocha. TIR did not receive any funds from Friendly for the Dorestant transaction. After discovering she could not move into the condominium because Friendly had not transferred the deposit to TIR, Ms. Dorestant demanded a refund of her deposit monies from Friendly. She did not receive it. On February 10, 2016, Mariano Saal, TIR’s qualifying broker, filed a complaint against Mr. Berthelot and Friendly with the Department regarding the Dorestant transaction. Ms. Dorestant initially did not receive a refund from Friendly and, therefore, filed a police report against Mr. Berthelot and sued him in small claims court. Eventually, Mr. Berthelot refunded Ms. Dorestant her deposit monies. Department Investigations of Friendly Upon receiving the Viton complaint, the Department assigned the case (DPBR Case No. 2016018731) to Erik Lluy, an Investigator Specialist II in the Miami field office. Similarly, on or around the same time the Department received the Dorestant complaint; it was also assigned to Mr. Lluy (DPBR Case No. 2016018069). On April 25, 2016, Mr. Lluy officially notified Ms. King of each of the complaints. On May 25, 2016, the Department transferred both the Viton and Dorestant complaints from Mr. Lluy to Percylla Kennedy. Ms. King provided a written response to both complaints via e-mail to Mr. Lluy on May 26, 2016. At that time, Mr. Lluy indicated the case had been transferred to Ms. Kennedy and copied Ms. Kennedy on the response. Ms. Kennedy was familiar with Friendly, Mr. Berthelot and Ms. King. In January 5, 2016, she had conducted an investigation of Friendly in an unrelated complaint filed against Friendly by Borys Bilan (“Bilan complaint”). As part of the investigation into the Bilan complaint, Ms. Kennedy arrived at the Friendly office address registered with the Department on Biscayne Boulevard to conduct an official office inspection. When she arrived, however, she found the office vacant. As a result, that same day Ms. Kennedy contacted the registered qualifying broker for Friendly–-Ms. King-–by phone. During that call, Ms. Kennedy asked Ms. King where Friendly’s office was located, but Ms. King did not know. Eventually, Ms. Kennedy determined the Friendly office had relocated to the Northeast 123rd Street location. Ms. Kennedy testified that during this call, Ms. King admitted to her that she had not been to the Northeast 123rd Street location. Respondent testified she did not tell Ms. Kennedy this and as proof insisted that the January call was inconsequential and “a very short call.” The undersigned rejects Respondent’s version of events and finds Ms. Kennedy’s testimony and report regarding the January 2016 interview more reliable. First, although Ms. King describes the conversation as occurring on January 7, 2016, both Ms. Kennedy’s testimony and the Inspection Report establish the conversation occurred on January 5, 2016. Second, Respondent’s characterization of the call as inconsequential contradicts her own May 26, 2016, written response to the Department in which Ms. King outlines a number of substantive issues discussed during this phone conversation, including: the nature of Friendly’s practice, whether Friendly had an escrow account, the type of payment accepted by Friendly, and the address of Friendly’s office. After speaking with Ms. King about the Bilan complaint, Ms. Kennedy conducted the inspection at Friendly’s Northeast 123rd Street location. Respondent was not present when Investigator Kennedy conducted the office inspection. Ms. Kennedy then e-mailed the Office Inspection form to Respondent. As a result of the January 5, 2016, phone conversation with Ms. Kennedy, Ms. King contacted Mr. Berthelot about the Bilan complaint. On January 13, 2016, Mr. Berthelot provided Ms. King with the transaction file related to the Bilan complaint. When Ms. King reviewed the lease agreement, she realized that Friendly was holding deposit funds in escrow. As a result, on December 13, 2016, Ms. King filed a resignation letter with the Department explaining she was no longer the qualifying broker for Friendly. Ms. King did not ask Mr. Berthelot or anyone else at Friendly for any other transaction records at this time, nor did she make any effort to review any of Friendly’s transaction files to determine whether Friendly had obtained other deposit funds or conducted other transactions similar to the one that was the subject of the Bilan complaint. After having knowledge of the Bilan complaint and transaction, and suspecting Friendly had been operating an escrow account, Ms. King made no immediate effort to access the operating or escrow bank accounts or reconcile the escrow account. After resigning as Friendly’s qualifying broker with the Department, Ms. King filed a complaint with the Department against Mr. Berthelot for unlicensed activity involving an escrow deposit.5/ Despite no longer being Friendly’s qualifying broker, on January 21, 2016, Ms. King executed and sent back to Ms. Kennedy the Inspection Report related to the Bilan complaint. Five months later, on or around May 25, 2016, Ms. Kennedy notified Ms. King she was taking over the investigation into the Viton and Dorestant cases. Ms. Kennedy testified that as part of her investigation into the Viton and Dorestant complaints, she interviewed Respondent again. Respondent denies she was interviewed by Ms. Kennedy regarding the Viton and Dorestant complaints, and instead insists she was only interviewed in January 2016 in connection with the Bilan complaint. Ms. King testified she believed Ms. Kennedy lied about interviewing her more than once because Ms. Kennedy was “lazy.” The undersigned rejects this assertion. Ms. Kennedy’s testimony was specific, knowledgeable, and credible, unlike Ms. King’s testimony, which was intentionally vague. Moreover, Ms. Kennedy specifically attributes her findings to specific sources such as Ms. King’s written response, her interview with Ms. King relating to the Viton and Dorestant transactions, and to her previous conversation with Ms. King during the Bilan investigation. The citations to information gleaned from the January 5, 2016, call were marked by the following sub-note. SUBJECT was previously interviewed by this Investigator in January 2016 for the unrelated complaint and was unaware that FRIENDLY INTERNATIONAL REALTY LLC had moved from license location 11900 Biscayne Blvd.[,] Suite 292 Miami, FL 33181 to 2132 NE 123ST[,] Miami, FL 33181 (See Ex. 9). At that time, SUBJECT was unable to provide the transaction file. Ms. Kennedy would have no reason to fabricate the source of the conclusions she reached in her report or the number of times she contacted Ms. King. Ms. Kennedy submitted her original investigative report to the Department for the Viton complaint on October 31, 2016. Per the Department’s request, Ms. Kennedy interviewed Mr. Viton and submitted a supplemental report on December 13, 2016. In this report, Ms. Kennedy determined that on February 25, 2016, Friendly issued a check in the amount of $875 to a person who was not listed on either the lease agreement, the receipts Friendly issued to Mr. Viton, or any other paperwork. Similarly, Ms. Kennedy submitted her original investigative report to the Department for the Dorestant complaint on October 31, 2016. Per the Department’s request, Ms. Kennedy interviewed Ms. Dorestant and submitted a supplemental report on December 13, 2016, indicating Ms. Dorestant did eventually receive a refund. During the course of the Viton investigation, Mr. Lluy and Ms. Kennedy requested that Respondent provide the Department with the file related to the Viton transaction, and documentation for Friendly’s escrow account. Although Respondent provided the Department a response (consisting of a written explanation with a copy of the Bilan file and some communications between Mr. Berthelot and herself from May 2016), she did not provide the Department with the transaction file related to the Viton transaction or Friendly’s escrow account documentation. During the course of the Dorestant investigation Mr. Lluy and Ms. Kennedy requested that Respondent provide the Department with the file related to the Viton transaction, and documentation for Friendly’s escrow account. Although Respondent provided the Department a response (consisting of a written explanation with a copy of the Bilan file and some communications between Mr. Berthelot and herself from May 2016), she did not provide the Department with the transaction file related to the Dorestant transaction or Friendly’s escrow account documentation. Professional Standards Mr. Saal, TIR’s qualifying broker, testified he had served as a broker for approximately ten years. As TIR’s qualifying broker, he kept the documentation related to the transactions handled by TIR’s six sales associates. The testimony of the TIR sales associate and property manager established that they relied on Mr. Saal for advice and to resolve issues. For example, when Ms. Dorestant began contacting TIR’s sales associate and property manager regarding the move-in and then for a refund of her deposit, the sales associate went to Mr. Saal to discuss the situation. Mr. Saal then attempted to resolve the issue by attempting to communicate with Friendly, Mr. Berthelot and Ms. King. Mr. Trafton, an experienced real estate broker and expert in brokerages, reviewed the Department’s investigative files and reports relating to the Viton and Dorestant complaints, as well as applicable Florida Statutes and rules. Mr. Trafton’s testimony and report established that in Florida the usual and customary standard applicable to brokers is that they must promptly deliver funds in possession of the brokerage that belong to others. Petitioner showed that Mr. Viton was entitled to a refund of his deposit from Friendly and that Respondent erred in not ensuring he received this refund. Mr. Trafton also testified that the standard of care applicable to a broker in supervising sales associates requires active supervision. “Active supervision” is not defined by statute or rule, but by usual and customary practices exercised statewide. “Active supervision” requires a broker to: have regular communications with all sales associates, not just communicating when there is a complaint; be aware of problems, issues and procedures in the office and among sales associates; have access to and signatory power on all operating and escrow accounts; hold regular scheduled office/sales meetings; conduct in–person training meetings; provide guidance and advice for sales associates; be intimately involved in how transaction forms and other documents are stored and retrieved; and be available to provide advice and direction on short notice. In other words, a broker should set the tone at the brokerage by overseeing her sales associates’ conduct of transactions. Ms. King failed to manage, direct, and control her real estate sales associate, Mr. Berthelot, to the standard expected of a qualifying broker in both the Viton and Dorestant transactions, if not all of Friendly’s transactions. She did not actively supervise Mr. Berthelot as a sales associate. Mr. Trafton also testified that a broker, not the brokerage, is ultimately responsible for preserving transaction files, forms related to transactions, and other related documents. Although less certain than Mr. Trafton about whether a broker or the brokerage firm is responsible for preservation of transaction files, Mr. Saal testified “the broker is responsible for the . . . transactions. It’s [the broker’s] client at the end of the day.” Ms. King failed to preserve accounts and records relating to Friendly’s accounts, the files related to the Viton and Dorestant rental transactions, or any other documents related to Friendly. Petitioner also clearly established that Respondent was guilty of either “culpable negligence” or “breach of trust” in the Viton or Dorestant transaction. As Investigator Kennedy testified, and as corroborated by cost summary reports maintained by the Department, from the start of the investigation of the Viton complaint through September 14, 2017, the Department incurred $1,625.25 in costs, not including costs associated with an attorney’s time. As Investigator Kennedy testified, and as corroborated by cost summary reports maintained by the Department, from the start of the investigation of the Dorestant complaint through September 14, 2017, the Department incurred $1,608.25 in costs, not including costs associated with an attorney’s time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission: Case No. 17-3989 Finding Respondent Alicia Faith King in violation of sections 475.25(1)(d)1., 475.25(1)(u), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.25(1)(b), as charged in Counts I through IV of the Administrative Complaint in the Viton case. Imposing an administrative fine totaling $2,500 ($500 fine per count for Counts I, II and III; and $1,000 fine for Count IV). Imposing license suspension for a total period of nine months (one-month suspensions each for Counts I, II, and III; and a six-month suspension for Count IV). Imposing costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case in the amount of $1,625.25. Case No. 17-3961 Finding Respondent Alicia Faith King in violation of sections 475.25(1)(u), 475.25(1)(e), and 475.25(1)(b), as charged in Counts I through III of the Administrative Complaint in the Dorestant case. Imposing an administrative fine totaling of $2,000 ($500 fine per count for Counts I and II; and $1,000 fine for Count III). Imposing license suspension for a total period of eight months to be imposed consecutive to the suspension in Case No. 17-3989 (one-month suspensions each for Counts I and II; and a six-month suspension for Count III). Imposing costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the case in the amount of $1,608.75. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2018.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed yacht salesman. At the time of the transaction which is the subject of this proceeding, Respondent was employed by Van Hart Yacht Sales, Inc. Respondent had customers who were interested in purchas-ing a 37' Irwin sailboat. Respondent checked the computer list-ings and found that Northside Marine Sales, a yacht brokerage firm, had a listing for a 1979 37' Irwin known as the "Ark Royal". Respondent telephoned Northside and spoke with a secre- tary. She advised him that the man most familiar with the vessel was not there but that if Respondent sent his customers to Northside, someone would show them the vessel. Respondent's customers, Paul Copeland and Val S. Meeker, went to Northside Marine Sales to look at the boat. When they arrived there, only William Fiermonti was present. Fiermonti was a salesman for new boats at Northside and, accordingly, did not need to be licensed as a yacht broker or salesman, and he was not so licensed. Fiermonti told Copeland and Meeker that he knew nothing about sailboats and could not assist them, but he could let them look at the boat. He then took them to the boat and unlocked it. He told them to lock it when they were finished, and he left them alone to look at the boat. On March 7, 1993, Copeland and Meeker entered into a Purchase Agreement and Deposit Receipt with the owners of the vessel Ark Royal. The contract called for final payment and delivery of the vessel to occur on May 1, 1993. The purchase agreement is a standard form contract on Van Hart Yacht Sales, Inc., letterhead. Paragraph numbered 15 in that contract calls for the seller to pay Van Hart Yacht Sales, Inc., a commission of ten percent of the gross sale price. William Fiermonti witnessed a signature on that contract. On March 23, 1993, Maryland National Bank, the lien holder on the yacht, sent to Fiermonti correspondence stating the bank's agreement to the sale of the vessel. A fax transmittal cover page dated March 24, 1993, reflects that Fiermonti sent something to Respondent with the notation that it was regarding the Ark Royal. On April 6, 1993, Respondent sent a fax trans-mittal to Fiermonti enclosing the "acceptance of vessel form", suggesting a closing date of April 24, 1993, and suggesting that the closing would probably be scheduled at the bank since the bank was holding the title. The closing statement for the transaction was prepared by Respondent on Van Hart Yacht Sales, Inc., stationery. Respon-dent took the closing statement to the closing. He handled the closing and gave Northside a check for its share of the com-mission. Fiermonti had no involvement in the transaction other than witnessing a signature on a document, contacting a bank to obtain a "pay-off" figure, transmitting to Respondent a document by fax, and receiving from Respondent a document by fax. The transmittal and document he received from Respondent, he gave to Robert Skidmore, the owner of Northside Marine Sales and a licensed yacht broker. Fiermonti received no commission as a result of the sale of the Ark Royal and did not expect to receive a commission. He did not attend the closing. Fiermonti did not solicit the listing for the vessel. He did not offer the vessel for sale or sell it. He did not negotiate the contract for sale and had no involvement in the negotiations. In short, Fiermonti did not act as a salesman or broker as to the Ark Royal trans-action. Similarly, Respondent correctly believed that he had located the yacht in question as a result of a listing by a licensed yacht broker. He further believed that he was "co-brokering" the vessel with Robert Skidmore. A complaint was filed against Robert Skidmore and Northside Marine Sales concerning a different matter. While Petitioner's investigator was investigating that matter, he saw the fax transmittal sheets between Fiermonti and Respondent in Northside Marine Sales' records. The investigator contacted Respondent and requested copies of the documents related to the sale of the Ark Royal. Respondent transmitted the documents to the investigator that same day by fax transmittal. The investi-gator never interviewed Fiermonti regarding his role in the Ark Royal transaction. On April 13, 1994, Petitioner issued a Notice to Show Cause against Robert Skidmore, alleging, among other things, that Skidmore had allowed unlicensed salemen to conduct brokered yacht transactions. In August of 1994 Skidmore and Petitioner entered into a Final Consent Order. That Final Consent Order specifi-cally recites that Skidmore desired to resolve the matter without the necessity of further proceedings and that Skidmore did not admit to any wrongdoing or violation of the statutes and rules regulating his conduct. The Findings of Fact section of that Final Consent Order did not include any finding of wrongdoing on Skidmore's part. Rather, the Findings of Fact section finds as facts only that Petitioner issued a Notice to Show Cause alleging statutory violations and then quotes the allegations made in the Notice to Show Cause. In other words, the factual findings include that a Notice to Show Cause was issued, not that the allegations in that Notice to Show Cause were true.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations and dismissing the Notice to Show Cause filed against him. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 3, 5, and 6 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 has been rejected since it is not supported by the evidence in this cause. Respondent's first unnumbered paragraph has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Respondent's second unnumbered paragraph has been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Tracy Sumner, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Mr. James Rich c/o Bob Anslow Yacht Sales 400-B North Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Henry M. Solares, Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of a Recommended Order by, Daniel Manry, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Recommended Order as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Petitioner's, Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC and TGT Companies, Inc., d/b/a Extreme Motor Sales, request to establish a new dealership for the sale of motorcycles manufactured by Zhejiang Taizhou Wangye Power Co. Ltd. (ZHEJ) and Filed December 23, 2009 3:50 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. Benzhou Vehicle Industry Group Co. Ltd. (SHWI) at 1918 South Orange Blossom Trail, Apopka (Orange County), Florida 32703 is DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this y /Id of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LCARL A. FORD, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of r¥otor Vehicles this P: day of December, 2009. N alini .DNlerUAdministrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Jude A. Mitchell Jude's Cycle Service Post Office Box 585574 Orlando, Florida 32858 Leo Su Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC 2667 Northhaven Road Dallas, Texas 75229 Tina Wilson TGT Companies, Inc., d/b/a Extreme Motor Sales 1918 South Orange Blossom Trail Apopka, Florida 32703 Daniel Manry Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0635 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Raymond T. Grady, Jr., held registered specialty contractor license number RX DO32138 issued by petitioner, Department of Profession Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. 1/ According to the official records of petitioner, Grady was first licensed in 1977. He later qualified F & L Contracting, Inc., a contracting company doing business in Palm Bay, Florida, in February, 1982. The 1983 annual report filed by F & L Contracting, Inc., with the Department of State reflected that Grady was secretary-treasurer and resident agent of the corporation while a Fred James Henderson served as president. Grady continued to qualify F & L Contracting, Inc. until February 27, 1984, when he notified petitioner that he was no longer its qualifying agent. Presently, his license is on an inactive status. Fred James Henderson did business under the name of F & L Contracting, Inc., F & L Contractors, Inc. and F & L Construction, Inc. All had the same street address and telephone number and were the same for all practical purposes. Only F & L Contracting, Inc. was qualified by Grady with the State. On or about August 25, 1983, Lyman and Dawn Crowshaw of 356 Holiday Park, Palm Bay Florida, entered into a contract with F & L Contractors, Inc., to have a utility room added to their residence for a price of $5,835. The contract was negotiated by Henderson. When the contract was signed, Henderson gave the Crowshaws his business card which reflected the name "F & L Contracting, Inc.," and had the same telephone number and address as F & L Contractors, Inc. Under the agreement, Lyman Crowshaw gave F & L Contractors, Inc. a check in the amount of $1,945 as the first of three payments for the work. The check was deposited into the bank account of F & L Contracting, Inc., the company which Grady had qualified. Because Henderson held no license from the State, he could not pull job permits in the City of Palm Bay. Therefore, it was necessary for Grady to sign all applications and pick up the permits on behalf of Henderson. In this regard, the city building officials perceived Grady to be the individual who qualified Henderson to do business as a contractor. For this reason, the official notified Grady that no permit could be pulled on the Crowshaw job because of a setback restriction on Crowshaw's property. When Crowshaw learned of this, he immediately requested a refund of his money, but Henderson did not oblige. After the Crowshaws sent a letter to F & L Contracting, Inc. on November 18, 1983 demanding payment, and their attorney did the same on January 4, 1984, Henderson and his wife finally executed a promissory note on January 11, 1984 promising to pay the Crowshaws $500 per month plus 18 percent interest until the $1,945 was repaid. Henderson signed the note individually and as president of F & L Contractors, Inc. Mr. Crowshaw received one $500 payment on January 21, 1984 from Henderson. After he received no other payments, Crowshaw filed a complaint against Grady in an effort to recover his money. That prompted the instant proceeding. The Crowshaws and Grady had never seen each other prior to the final hearing. The Crowshaws did have two telephone conversations with someone who represented himself to be Grady in late 1983 and early 1984, and in those conversations, Grady assured them that he would get Henderson to repay the money owed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and that his license be suspended for one year, unless Grady obtains a signed release from the Crowshaws indicating restitution has been made. DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DOANLD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1985.
The Issue Whether C. Fullerton and Landscaping Co., Inc., is indebted to Other Side Sod, LLC, for the purchase of sod and pallets; and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida Limited Liability Corporation located in Arcadia, Florida, and at all times relevant hereto was a producer of agricultural products, as defined by section 604.15(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is also a “dealer in agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(2). Respondent, during all times relevant hereto, was a “dealer in agricultural products,” within the meaning of section 604.15(2). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Great American served as surety for Respondent. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a customer of Other Side Sod. Respondent purchased sod from Petitioner and thereafter resold and installed the sod to Respondent’s customers. Petitioner sold sod to its customers on wooden pallets. An integral part of each transaction involved the pallets. There are 10 invoices in dispute which cover the period October 14, 2016, through February 10, 2017. For the underlying transactions that relate to the invoices in question, the following language is contained on each field/delivery ticket: Terms of Sale: Payment due upon receipt. All payment[s] applied to pallet balance first. Interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month will be charged on unpaid invoice amounts after 14 days. Invoices will be charged $0.02 per square foot additional after 30 days. Purchaser agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorney fees, in [the] event it is necessary to institute suit for collection. Venue will be in DeSoto County, Florida. All Sales F.O.B. Shipping Point. On or about October 14, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47293, which showed a balance due of $462 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 83,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($1,664). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $124.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($1,664 x 7.50 percent). On or about October 23, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47378, which showed a balance due of $224 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 70,400 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($1,408). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $105.60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($1,408 x 7.50 percent). On or about October 24, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47420, which showed a balance due of $280 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 16,000 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($320). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $24 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($320 x 7.50 percent). On or about November 13, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47549, which showed a balance due of $1,526 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 103,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($2,064). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $154.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($2,064 x 7.50 percent). On or about December 6, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47755, which showed a balance due of $434 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 30,400 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($608). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $45.60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($608 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 8, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48093, which showed a balance due of $1,256 for 12,800 units of Bahia sod, $224 for a pallet deposit, and $72 for sales tax. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 12,800 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($256). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $19.20 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($256 x 7.50 percent). On or about December 13, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48166, which showed a balance due of $343 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 163,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($3,264). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $244.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($3,264 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 29, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48285, which showed a balance due of $3,000 for 40,000 units of Bahia sod, $308 for a pallet deposit, and $225 for sales tax (total = $3,533). On February 3, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $3,210.50, which left an unpaid balance of $322.50. The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 40,000 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($800). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($800 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 31, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48301, which showed a balance due of $390 for 5,200 units of Bahia sod, $91 for a pallet deposit, and $29.25 for sales tax (total = $510.25). On February 15, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $468.33, which left an unpaid balance of $41.92.1/ The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 5,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($104). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $7.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($104 x 7.50 percent). On or about February 10, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48409, which showed a balance due of $390 for 5,200 units of Bahia sod, $21 for a pallet deposit, and $29.25 for sales tax (total = $440.25). On February 15, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $398.33, which left an unpaid balance of $41.92. The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 5,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($104). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $7.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($104 x 7.50 percent).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Other Side Sod, LLC, against C. Fullerton and Landscaping Co., Inc., in the amount of $4,981.34. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2017.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of a Recommended Order of Dismissal by Lawrence P. Stevenson, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Department hereby adopts the Recommended Order of Dismissal as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED and a license may be issued to Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC to sell motorcycles manufactured by Kaitong Motorcycle Manufacture Co. Ltd. (KAIT) at 3311 West Lake Mary Boulevard, Lake Mary (Seminole County), Florida 32746, upon compliance with all applicable requirements of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, and all applicable Department rules. Filed September 30, 2009 3:29 PM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles ""-.r.• u this 9Pfh day of September, 2009. Naiini .Dulllr71cenie Admlnlltrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Leo Su Galaxy Powersports, LLC d/b/a JCL International, LLC 2667 Northhaven Road Dallas, Texas 75229 2 Jason Rupp Wild Hogs Scooters and Motorsports, LLC 8181 Via Bonita Street Sanford, Florida 32771 David Cattafi David Cattafi d/b/a Direct Capital Motors 4107 South Orlando Drive, Suite C Sanford, Florida 32773 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Room A432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lawrence P. Stevenson Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602 3
