Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint, the Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, (Commission), was and is the state agency responsible for the certification of law enforcement officers in this state. The Respondent, Douglas E. Szczepanik, was and is certified in Florida as a law enforcement officer. Late on the evening of August 22, 1988, Respondent was employed as a police officer with the Delray Beach, Florida, Police Department, (Department). While at the hospital with Officer Eberhart collecting a blood specimen from a third person for use in another police matter, he heard a police radio call relating to the hot pursuit of a felony suspect. He and Eberhart went to the scene of the expected apprehension and found that the suspect had been apprehended after a high speed chase by several police cars including one driven by Officer Thomas A. Whatley. It was subsequently determined that the suspect had lost control of his vehicle, a stolen car, and had ended up abandoning it on the city's municipal golf course adjacent to West Atlantic Avenue. He then ran off on foot across the course with Officer Whatley in pursuit in his police cruiser. The suspect ran up a hill and down the other side. Whatley, surmising that the hill was no more than that, and that the other side of the hill was a down slope, drove up the hill after the suspect at a speed of approximately 45 to 50 mph. As he reached the crest, he found that he was on the lip of a sand trap and since he could not stop, his car became airborne, coming to rest some 25 - 30 feet further along, in the sand trap. Though it did not bear significant outward signs of damage, the vehicle was, in fact rendered inoperable as a result of the impact. Fortunately, the suspect was apprehended by other officers on the scene. As a result of the serious nature of the suspect's alleged crimes, suspected murder of an officer and car theft, many Delray Beach officers were involved in the chase and were, therefore, on the scene at the time of the apprehension and Whatley's vehicular mishap, including his Lieutenant, Woods, and his patrol sergeant, then Sergeant Musco. Lt. Woods directed Sgt. Musco to block traffic on Atlantic Avenue and another officer to get the damaged vehicles towed away. He directed Respondent, then at the scene, to write the traffic accident report relating to Whatley's car. There is some indication that initially Woods did not think a report was necessary, but he ultimately became convinced it was and gave the job to Respondent. Since both Respondent and Eberhart were traffic investigators, Eberhart indicated he would do it and Respondent acquiesced. Respondent and Eberhart both discussed the accident and both developed their own theory as to how it happened. Neither, however, bothered to question Whatley who remained at the scene for some time before being directed to resume patrol, using Respondent's cruiser. Even when that was being set up, Respondent did not question Whatley as to what had happened, speaking to him only to caution him not to lose his keys when he turned them over to him. Based on their examination of the scene on Atlantic Avenue, and without even looking at Whatley's vehicle and where it ended up, Eberhart concluded that the accident occurred when the suspect lost control of his vehicle and ran into Whatley's forcing him to lose control and run up the side of and into the sand trap. Had Eberhart bothered to look at the vehicle, he would have seen no body damage consistent with collision. Eberhart was subsequently convinced by Respondent, who did look at Whatley's vehicle, that an alternative theory, indicating that the suspect lost control of his vehicle and prompted Whatley to lose control of his in an effort to avoid a collision, was what happened. In any event, Respondent claims that later that evening, back at Police Headquarters, he saw Whatley attempting to write out his report. Whatley allegedly asked Respondent for help in writing it since he was relatively new to the force and this was his first accident. Respondent also claims that he merely told Whatley the format for the report and the type of information to put in it. He admits that, as an example of what to say, he told Whatley his theory of the accident. When Whatley indicated that was not how it happened, Respondent allegedly told him, then, to write in what did happen as he, Whatley, recalled it, and he denies suggesting that Whatley use his scenario if it was not correct. Whatley, on the other hand, claims that while they were still at the scene of the accident he talked with Respondent and told him what had happened. Respondent supposedly walked around the wreck and then told Whatley to put in his supplement to the accident report that he had been taking evasive action. When Whatley told him that was not the way it happened, Respondent is alleged to have said that the people "upstairs" wanted police accident reports to reflect no fault on the part of the officers. Whatley claims that Sgt. Musco was present at the time but Musco does not profess to have heard that and Respondent categorically denies that Whatley told him at the scene how the accident occurred or that he went to the sand trap to look at the vehicle. In a statement made to Captain Schrader in November, 1988 as a part of the Internal Affairs investigation, Respondent again denied he spoke with Whatley at the accident scene. No evidence was presented by the Petitioner as to what benefit Respondent would gain or what detriment he would avoid by telling Whatley to falsify his supplement. Musco claims that when he first saw Whatley, he appeared depressed about the incident and Musco told him to write it up as it had happened and not to worry about it because he, Musco, was not worried about the car. When Respondent, who Musco had assigned to write up the report, said he was going to show it had happened when Whatley attempted to avoid an accident, Musco told him to write the report honestly as he had been trained to do, and as Whatley had reported it. Musco did not follow up to see if the report or Whatley's supplement thereto was prepared properly. Since he had assigned the duty to a trained traffic/homicide investigator, (Respondent), he presumed it was done correctly. He knows of no policy to falsify reports of police accidents and in fact has had an accident himself, in which he was at fault, and which was written up accurately. Respondent claims that after he spoke with Whatley at Police headquarters and told him to write the report honestly, he left and met Lt. Woods outside. He told Woods that Eberhart was going to write the accident report and that Whatley was going to write his supplement honestly. Woods reportedly responded that was no good because he had already told everyone it had happened because of Whatley's attempt to evade the suspect's car. Because of that, even though Woods did not give him any instructions to do so, Respondent claims he went back inside and told Whatley to write his supplement the way he remembered it. Respondent claims that at no time did he ever tell Whatley to write a false report. He also claims that he never made the statement attributed to him regarding the people "upstairs." He would have nothing to gain or to lose by convincing Whatley to falsify his supplement. After getting advice from Respondent and from Sgt. Musco, Officer Whatley, for some reason, wrote his supplement indicating he had the accident in an attempt to evade the suspect's out of control vehicle. Whatley cites two meetings with Respondent that evening, as does Respondent, but their stories of what transpired differs radically. Whatley claims that Respondent told him to make sure his supplement conformed to what was in Eberhart's report. He did, and when he gave it to Lt. Woods to read, Woods rejected it because it was false and Woods knew it to be false. Woods then told him to hold off on the supplement and about a week later, Whatley was told by Captain Cole to write another supplement which was accurate. Respondent, on the other hand, claims he had little contact with Whatley at the scene of the mishap and denies any direct conversation with him about the accident. All he said, he claims, was, "it doesn't look too bad." Respondent asserts that at no time did Whatley tell him how the accident occurred. Later that evening, when, at the station he saw Whatley writing his report, Whatley asked him for advice as to how to construct and what to put into his supplemental report. Respondent claims he told Whatley to go back and tell the story as it happened. He admits to telling Whatley how he felt the accident occurred but when Whatley said that was not how it was, Respondent again told him to write it as it happened. This whole conversation took no more than a minute or a minute and a half. The only direction he gave Whatley was as to the format of the supplement, not the substance, other than that it be the truth. When, a few minutes later, Respondent saw Woods and told him that Whatley was having trouble, Woods told Respondent how he felt the accident had occurred. At that time, Woods gave Respondent no directions, but Respondent went back into the station and again told Whatley to write up his supplement the way he, Whatley, recalled the accident happening. The following day, according to Respondent, Woods pulled him aside and told him he had just spoken to Major Lincoln who said the report was to be written as Respondent had originally said the accident had occurred, incorrectly. At no time did Respondent speak directly with Lincoln about the accident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered in this case by the Commission dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 17th day of January, 1992. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, regarding the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Petitioner in this proceeding. FOR THE PETITIONER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. 6. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 14. Not phrased as Findings of Fact but more as restatements of testimony. However, the substance of the restatements is correctly stated and has been accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. 19. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein as an accurate recitation of Whatley's story. 24. & 25. Again, not phrased as Findings of Fact. Here, however, the substance of Whatley's statement is rejected as not proven. 26. & 27. Rejected as not supported by evidence of record. - 30. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Whatley and Respondent did meet at the station that evening, but the allegation that Respondent told Whatley to falsify his report is not supported by credible evidence. & 34. These are restatements of testimony but are accepted. 35. - 37. An accurate restatement of the testimony, but the testimony is rejected as unsupported. Even Lincoln denied making the statement. 38. - 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. 41. - 43. Accepted and incorporated herein. 44. & 45. Accepted as accurate recitations of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney Gaddy, Esquire Michael R. Ramage, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Charles Salerno, Esquire 242 Plaza Office P.O. Box 1349 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long Director CJSTC Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are not in dispute, however, the Petitioner appealed the agency's act of suspending him for a period of eight hours without pay based on his contention that the suspension "is excessive". On March 2, 1978, while on duty assigned as a Highway Accident Investigator, the Petitioner investigated an accident which occurred at Kelly's Shell Station which is located on State Road 207 and Interstate 95 in St. Augustine, Florida. After completing his investigation, the Petitioner in an attempt to leave the scene of the accident, struck a sign post with the right front bumper of his car, causing damage to his vehicle in the amount of approximately $728.00. There is no dispute but that the accident was determined to be the fault of the Petitioner. Following the completion of an accident report and an investigation of the matter, Captain Hodges, who is assigned to the St. Augustine Office recommended the issuance of a letter of written reprimand to the Petitioner, however, upon review by the headquarters office, the Petitioner was suspended for a period of one day because in the opinion of the reviewing team, such a penalty was warranted in view of circumstances which prompted the accident and the severity of the damage. During the hearing it was further revealed that there were no view obstructions and the weather was clear and dry. As stated, there is little dispute factually in this case, however, the Petitioner contends that there were no acts of gross negligence on his part; this was his first accident wherein he was charged with fault, and that other troopers involved in similar accidents had only received letters of reprimand. Chapter 22A-10, Florida Administrative Code authorizes the Respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles to discipline employees for violations of its rules and regulations. In view thereof, and inasmuch as the suspension herein was issued pursuant to the guides of Chapter 22A-10 and the admissions of Petitioner that he was at fault in causing the accident to which he was suspended, there is competent and substantial evidence to sustain the action of the Respondent in suspending the Petitioner for a period of eight hours without pay. This appears to be an area of discretion which does not lie within the authority of the Hearing Officer to second guess the wisdom of the Respondent, or to attempt to determine whether or not the suspension was "excessive". I shall therefore recommend that the agency action be sustained.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions I hereby recommend that the action of the agency suspending the Petitioner for a period of eight hours without pay be SUSTSAINED. ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Mail: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Cantrell Rt. 4, Box 241EZ-1 St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Major John Hicks, Deputy Director Dept. of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mrs. Dorothy B. Roberts Appeals Coordinator Career Service Commission 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is guilty of operating an overweight, unregistered commercial vehicle and, if so, the amount of the penalty.
Findings Of Fact On November 3, 1997, Petitioner was operating a U-Haul truck on County Road 951 in Collier County. Respondent's weight and safety officer pulled over the vehicle for a routine inspection. Petitioner was in the moving business and was transporting a third party's household goods from Chicago, Illinois, to Naples, Florida. Petitioner produced an Ohio- apportioned registration, which had expired on May 31, 1997. However, Petitioner had no log book concerning his driving activity. Respondent's weight and safety officer weighed the vehicle, which was a laden straight truck, and found that it weighed 13,400 pounds. Respondent's law enforcement officer thus issued Load Report Citation Number 090045M and collected $170 for the overweight load and Safety Report Number 085886 and collected $100 for the failure to maintain a log book.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's request for a refund of the penalties in the amount of $270 already collected from him. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Kelly A. Bennett Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Christopher W. Campbell 14751 South Homan Number 5 Midlothian, Illinois 60445 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attn: Diedre Grubbs Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact A commercial vehicle owned by Garrett Enterprises of Tampa, Inc. and operated by Respondent Smith entered the weigh station located on I-4 West in Plant City, Hillsborough County, Florida, on August 8, 1991. During the routine inspection, it was discovered that the vehicle's registration had expired on May 31, 1991. The tag on the vehicle clearly bore the expiration date. The statutory legal weight of 35,000 pounds for an expired registration was subtracted from this vehicle's tax class weight of 76,180 pounds to determine the amount by which the vehicle was overweight. A penalty of 5 cents a pound was assessed upon the difference of 41,180 pounds which amounted to a fine of $2,059.00. Respondent Smith has driven commercial vehicles in Florida for seven years. Prior to the registration at issue in this proceeding, he had never purchased an apportioned tag. Although he was originally aware that the apportioned tag he purchased would expire on May 31, 1991, he did not pay attention to the expiration date noted on the tag because he assumed the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles would mail him a renewal notice prior to its expiration. The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles does not mail renewal notices to owners of vehicles with apportioned tags. Respondent did not become aware of this variation in the Department's notification policy until after his vehicle was inspected and he had paid the penalty. Respondent had the vehicle registration renewed within ten days after the instant fine was levied.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that the penalty of $2,059.00 was correctly assessed and denying Respondent's request for a refund or a reduction. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of October, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Jesse Smith 114-L Mitchell Road Land O' Lakes, FL 34639 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an insurance carrier organized and existing under the laws of the District of Columbia, and authorized by the Department to conduct business in the State of Florida. On October 13, 1982, Petitioner submitted a private passenger motor vehicle insurance rate filing to the Department. That rate filing disclosed the following effect of the requested rate revisions: Bodily Injury No Change Property Damage No Change Personal Injury 35.1 percent Medical Payments No Change Uninsured Motorist 6.2 percent Additional Personal Injury 35.1 percent Liability 9.0 percent Comprehensive No Change Collision No Change Physical Damage No Change TOTAL AUTO 5.5 PERCENT The Department conducted an initial review of petitioner's rate filing consisting of a review of premiums and prior rate history of he company, losses, expense components, and underwriting profit and investment income. The Department reviewed the rate level for all coverages included in Petitioner's rate filing, which is customary agency policy when a rate filing is made. The record in this cause establishes that even when an insurer indicates a zero percent change in coverage rate, that rate selection must he justified, in that there are instances when a rate decrease might be indicated by actuarial data. Petitioner's October 13, 1982, rate filing employs a 22.8 percent annual trend factor for Personal Injury Protection ("PIP") coverage. A trend factor is a measure, based upon past experience, which indicates the average change in the cost of claims projected one year into the future. It is, in essence, primarily a measure of the effect of inflation on average claim costs, which are influenced by such factors as wage and medical costs. Petitioner calculated its annual PIP trend factor by assigning a 42 percent credibility weight to Petitioner's countrywide data, and a 58 percent credibility weight to the National Association of Independent Insurers "Fast Track" Florida data. Although the data utilized by Petitioner is actuarially acceptable, Petitioner's methodology failed to include other accepted sources of data which greatly affect the accuracy of Petitioner's selection of a 22.8 percent annual trend factor. The record in this cause establishes that a more accurate prediction can be made utilizing additional data such as "Fast Track" trend data for both Florida and the United States; Insurance Services Office trend data; And medical and wage consumer price indexes. When data from each of these sources were collected and exponential curves and straight lines of best fit were calculated to plot a series of data points to extrapolate an annual trend range, a reasonable range for PIP trend factors was established of from between 9 to 13 percent. Although the Department objects to Petitioner's utilizing only six data points to establish its trend factor, the record in this cause establishes that a range of 6 to 12 data points is actuarially acceptable. However, based upon the information considered by Petitioner in its rate filing, and the record in this cause, it appears that a 22.8 percent trend factor is excessive. In its October 13, 1982, rate filing Petitioner selected an unallocated loss adjustment expense factor of 1.152. An unallocated loss adjustment expense factor is developed to determine a proportionate amount by which loss expenses and allocated loss expenses should be increased to reflect overhead. The unallocated loss adjustment factor is an expense item representing the cost of adjusting claims which cannot be attributed to any particular claim. Petitioner calculated its unallocated loss adjustment expense factor for its rate filing by taking the arithmetic average of the unallocated loss adjustment expense factors experienced in the years 1979, 1980, and 1981, which were, respectively, 1.205, 1.151, and 1.100. As indicated above, the average of these three years proved to be 1.152. It is undisputed that averaging the three most recent calendar years of a carrier's experience is an accepted actuarial technique. The Department objects to this approach primarily because of its contention that the 1.205 factor for 1979 is an "aberration," and that Petitioner's experience or 1979, 1980, and 1981 demonstrates a downward trend. However, the record in this cause establishes that Petitioner's actual unallocated loss adjustment expense results for 1982 produce a factor of 1.134, which result was unknown to Petitioner at the time of the filing here in question. There is no evidence of record to establish that the 1.205 unallocated loss adjustment expense factor for 1979 is other than an accurate reflection of Petitioner's experience, or that that situation might not occur again. Further, Petitioner's actual unallocated loss adjustment expense factor for 1982 of 1.134 establishes that the 1979, 1980, and 1981 unallocated loss adjustment expense factors did not establish a true downward trend. Accordingly, the record in this cause establishes that Petitioner's unallocated loss adjustment factor of 1.152 in this rate filing is reasonable. Rule 4-43.02, Florida Administrative Code, prohibits allocating an insurer's administrative expenses as a percentage of premium, rather requiring that such expenses be "flattened." In the rate filing here in question, Petitioner did not "flatten" its administrative expenses. Further, petitioner contends that, in the context of this proceeding, the "flattening" of expenses applies only to PIP and uninsured motorist coverage since other coverages do not involve a change in rates. However, as indicated above, the Department's policy is to review rates for all coverages in a rate filing so that the issue of "flattening" applies to all such coverages, regardless of the amount of change. In Petitioner's filing, taxes, licenses and fees are not listed as a fixed expense, but are included as a variable expense. As a variable expense, these fees will be charged as a percentage of premium for all coverages, a procedure specifically prohibited by Rule 4-43.02. The record in this cause clearly establishes that there are different base premium rates charged to policyholders by class and territory. Accordingly, when all of petitioner's coverages are considered, the "flattening" of miscellaneous licenses and fees could result in cost savings to high premium policyholders. As a result, the record in this cause establishes that failure to "flatten" all administrative expenses for all coverages could result in unfairly discriminatory rates. By virtue of legislation which became effective October 1, 1982, insurers are required to make available excess underinsured motorist coverage. See, Section 537.727(2)(b), Florida Statutes. Since this legislation created a new type of coverage, standard rate-making procedures do not apply. However, as a result of a study conducted by the Department, the Florida Legislature, and State Farm Insurance Company, relationships were determined between the rate for a given limit of uninsured motorist coverage and the rate for the same limit of excess underinsured motorist coverage. The relationships established by this study, which have been adopted as the policy of the Department are: 10/20 excess underinsured=1.20 x 10/20 uninsured motorist rate 15/30 excess underinsured=1.25 x 15/30 uninsured motorist rate 25/50 excess underinsured=1.10 x 25/50 uninsured motorist rate 50/100 excess underinsured=1.10 x 50/100 uninsured motor. rate It is important that a reasonable rate for excess underinsured motorist coverage be established to discourage insurers from pricing the coverage out of line with the same limit of uninsured motorist coverage, thereby discouraging purchase of that coverage. The excess underinsured motorist rates for 10/20 limits contained in Petitioner's rate filing are approximately 65 percent higher than the uninsured motorist coverage for the same limits. There is no competent actuarial data of record to justify a finding of any risk differential between excess underinsured motorist coverage and uninsured motorist coverage to explain the differential between Petitioner's proposed rate and the rate indicated by the above-mentioned study. This becomes particularly noteworthy when it is considered that other companies previously filing rates for excess underinsured motorist coverage with the Department have been substantially in agreement with, or lower than, rates reflected in that study. As previously indicated, the record in this cause contains no credible evidence to support petitioner's rate proposal for excess underinsured motorist coverage for limits less than 50/100. Effective October 1, 1982, insurers were required to file separate profit and contingency factors as a result of amendments to Sections 627.0651(3)(d), Florida Statutes, and the promulgation of Rule 4-57.01, Florida Administrative Code. Prior to that time, profit and contingency factors had been considered as one factor for rate-making purposes. The purpose of the amendments to the statute and the rule were to require insurers to reflect investment income in their motor vehicle insurance rates. In the October 13, 1982, rate filing as initially filed, petitioner showed a combined profit and contingency factor of 5 percent, and reduced rate level indications to reflect investment income. This was consistent with Petitioner's pattern of having utilized, in all recent prior rate findings, a combined profit and contingency factor of less than 5 percent after investment income. When advised by the Department of the necessity to reflect profit and contingency factors separately, Petitioner amended its application to show a zero percent profit factor and a 5 percent contingency factor. With regard to the 5 percent contingency factor, there is no evidence of record to demonstrate that Petitioner adjusted expected losses for the difference between prior rate level indications and actual selected rate changes. Further, with respect to the profit factor, the record in this cause clearly reflects that Petitioner expects to realize an underwriting profit from its contingency provision, indicating that some underwriting profit is embedded in Petitioner's contingency factor, thereby eliminating the effect of investment income on rates. Inasmuch as the profit and contingency factors in Petitioner's filing apply to all coverages, and are incorrectly filed, the rate level indications based upon these profit and contingency factors for all coverages are likewise incorrect to the extent affected by profit and contingencies. In sum, Petitioner has failed to establish the validity of its choice of a zero percent profit factor and a 5 percent contingency factor in its rate filing.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order pursuant to submission of an Order Closing File by Lawrence P. Stevenson, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings,. The record reflects that the parties have settled their dispute and entered into a Settlement Stipulation. Having reviewed the stipulation and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 1. On or about May 6, 2011, Respondent paid a civil fine of $500.00 by certified cashier’s check. 2. The Settlement Stipulation of Petitioner and Respondent is adopted and incorporated into this Final Order of the Department in accordance with its terms. Respondent shall comply with all terms and conditions herein. Filed May 24, 2011 2:46 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this at day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Copies furnished: Carl Broglin Post Office Box 3683 Ocala, Florida 34478 Lawrence P. Stevenson Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dwight Davis, Bureau Chief Division of Motor Vehicles Wayne Jordan, Program Manager License Installer Program Ubld . Lambert, Interim Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this aeeaay of May, 2011. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer weconse Administrator
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Mary Jean Brooker, is a teaching veteran of approximately 18 years, and most recently was employed by Petitioner as a specific learning disabilities (SLD) teacher at Bear Creek Elementary School in St. Petersburg, Florida, pursuant to an annual contract. Respondent received worker's compensation benefits from June 8, 1992, to November 30, 1992, based on the recommendation of Petitioner's worker's compensation doctor, Scott Russell, M.D., her treating physician, and Terry Dillon, M.D., who conducted an independent medical exam (IME) at Petitioner's request. Respondent's leave (and claim for benefits) was caused by an accident in which she was injured on June 8, 1992, when a recycling truck backed into her vehicle while she was driving on school grounds. The injury in the above accident aggravated a previous back injury that Petitioner sustained when she was "rear ended" in an automobile accident in December 1990. Upon being placed on worker's compensation leave, Respondent was not advised by Petitioner's employees or agents what her limitations were in terms of working at home or elsewhere. Dr. Terry P. Dillon, a self-employed physician employed by Medical Doctors of Morton Plant, Inc., conducted an IME on Respondent. Dr. Dillon specializes in treating and evaluating patients who sustain on the job injuries and consults with industrial managers on work place injuries. Dr. Dillon's evaluation was requested by Petitioner's risk management section. Dr. Dillon took a medical history of Respondent and conducted muscular, skeletal and imaging studies. Dr. Dillon also reviewed Respondent's prior medical records. Dr. Dillon's first examination of Respondent was on September 17, 1992. He noted that Respondent had a long history of low back pain; facial joint pain with some symptoms which were spontaneous and other lower back and neck pain and facial joint injuries stemming from the motor vehicle accident during December 1990. During the more recent accident of June 8, 1992, Dr. Dillon observed an increase in the symptoms and Respondent also consulted with a chiropractor and a neurologist who observed tenderness over Respondent's neck muscles and shoulder blades. Dr. Dillon observed no evidence of injuries to Respondent's upper extremities other than a mild compression of nerves in the upper torso area. Dr. Dillon evaluated the tenderness in Respondent's low back but he detected no spasms. He found some sciatic tenderness in the lower extremities although he noted no lower nerve deficits during the normal clinical exam. Dr. Dillon observed some degenerative changes associated with age and the accident related injuries. He was unable to tell if bony changes were due to the more recent August 1992 motor vehicle accident or were a result of the earlier accident. He opined that it was more likely than not that the injury was not related to the '92 accident. Finally, Dr. Dillon speculated that Respondent evidenced some "psychological investment of pain" however he could not confirm his speculation. Dr. Dillon opined that Respondent should "go forward with an active rehabilitation program" and that after approximately four weeks she should be able to return to work part-time in light duty status and perhaps after eight weeks of following such a regimen, Respondent should be able to return to work full-time after 16 weeks. In concluding, Dr. Dillon opined that Respondent was totally unable to work the entire month of September 1992, although he felt that thereafter she should have been able to work on a part-time basis. Respondent was not issued any work restrictions by Dr. Dillon. Respondent was rated "temporary total disability" by Dr. Dillon which means that she was unable to do a combination of sitting, standing and walking during a three to four hour period. Respondent also served as an SLD coordinator while employed at Bear Creek. As an SLD teacher and coordinator, Respondent had to assess and work with the development of skills for SLD students. Her class sizes ranged from a high of 20 to a low of 8 students and the instruction was individualized. In 1992, Respondent advised her principal, Susan Daniels, that she had an auto accident during 1990 although she did not request any specific accommodation based on the injuries sustained in that accident. During the summer of 1992, while employed as a summer school teacher, Respondent was involved in the August 1992 accident. As a result of that accident, Respondent incurred injuries and advised Daniels that she would be unable to continue teaching during the summer and the beginning of the 1992-93 school year. Respondent also told Daniels during the summer of 1992 that she, at times, experienced severe pain from the 1992 accident. Respondent's husband purchased a daycare center during 1991. When the business was purchased, Respondent often assisted her husband in the operation of the daycare after school hours and on weekends. For her services, Respondent was paid a salary until July 1993. While Respondent was convalescing after the 1992 accident, she often went to the daycare center, out of boredom, to assist the daycare staff. The daycare center has a staff of approximately eight teachers who work a full time schedule. Prior to the accident during 1992, Respondent worked approximately eight to ten hours per week at the center. After the accident, she has been working approximately 2 1/2 to 4 hours per week doing such things as answering the phones, responding to inquiries about rates, assisting in billings and other related chores. Respondent and her husband moved to a new residence on September 18, 1992. Respondent assisted in the move by doing such things as loading clothing, lamps and light items such as pictures and other small memorabilia into her car. Additionally, Respondent assisted in cleaning the old home that they were moving from and she did some cleaning of the new home before they placed heavy furniture and appliances in the home. Respondent did not do any heavy lifting or pulling during the move on September 18, 1992. Respondent has "good" and "bad" days. In other words, her level of pain fluctuates from day to day. Respondent was placed under surveillance by the worker's compensation carrier for Petitioner. During the surveillance, Respondent was observed assisting in the move from periods up to two hours during the a.m. and approximately three hours during the p.m. on September 19, 1992. However, Respondent did not lift any heavy items and the videotape of the move did not establish anything to the contrary. To the extent that she was seen lifting a large trash bin, it could not be determined how heavy that trash bin was. Respondent was assisted, by another female, in lifting the trash bin and taking it to the sidewalk. Investigators Angela Elliott and Clifford Froggat placed Respondent under surveillance during September and November 1992. On November 5, Respondent was observed travelling from her residence to the daycare center where she remained an undetermined amount of time. Respondent has been paid worker's compensation benefits for the injuries sustained in the June 8, 1992, motor vehicle accident. Respondent has filed a tort claim against the alleged tortfeasors and she expects to repay the Petitioner for any worker's compensation benefits that she recovers as a result of that claim. Respondent reported for work when she was released by her treating physician.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order withdrawing the suspension and ultimate dismissal of Respondent and reinstate her to the position of an SLD teacher and make her whole for any loss of pay she sustained as a result of her dismissal. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2293 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraph 6, adopted as relevant, paragraphs 2 and 3, Recommended Order. Paragraph 8, adopted as modified, paragraph 7, Recommended Order. Paragraph 12, adopted as modified, paragraph 17, Recommended Order. Paragraph 14, adopted as modified, paragraph 15, Recommended Order. Paragraph 15, adopted as relevant, paragraph 14, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 16 and 17, rejected irrelevant. Paragraphs 18 and 19, adopted in the Preliminary Statement, paragraph 1. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 5 and 6, adopted as modified, paragraph 22, Recommended Order. Paragraph 9, adopted as modified, paragraph 20, Recommended Order. Paragraphs 10 and 11, rejected, irrelevant and/or subordinate. Paragraphs 15 and 16 rejected, argument. Paragraph 18, rejected, not probative. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esquire 1432 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34616-6147 Lawrence D. Black, Esquire 650 Seminole Boulevard Largo, Florida 34640-3625 Douglas L. "Tim" Jamerson Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. J. Howard Hinesley Superintendent Pinellas County Schools 301 Fourth Street, Southwest Largo, Florida 34640-3536
