Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed with the Board of Medical Examiners an application for licensure by examination in 1983. Included with that application were original "affidavits" submitted on Petitioner's behalf by Dr. Borroto and Dr. Velez. Petitioner filed an application for licensure by endorsement in October of 1984. In conjunction with his application for licensure by endorsement, Petitioner submitted photocopies of the "affidavits" submitted with his 1983 application for licensure by examination. These photocopies of Dr. Borroto's and Dr. Velez's "affidavits" were submitted by Petitioner with notarized attestations that the notary had in fact seen the originals. Petitioner knew that this was not true. On December 28, 1984, Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director of the Board of Medical Examiners (hereinafter "the Board"), sent Petitioner a letter indicating, among other things, that Petitioner had submitted photocopies rather than original letters establishing his five years of licensed medical practice. Furthermore, he was notified that his application would not be complete until the originals were received. The same letter notified Petitioner that all documents to be notarized must be certified as true and correct copies of the original and stated so by the notary. Petitioner was specifically warned that the notary must see the original and copy in order to make the required statement. In January of 1985, Petitioner submitted new affidavits concerning five years of licensed medical practice. On August 2, 1985, Petitioner attended a meeting of the Board's Foreign Medical Graduate Committee (hereinafter "FMGC") in order to address problems with his application for licensure by endorsement. At that meeting, Petitioner failed to satisfactorily address the issues concerning affidavits attesting to his five years of licensed medical practice. The committee voted to recommend denial of Petitioner's application based upon the lack of personal knowledge of the affiants, improper notarization of the purported affidavits and fraudulent notarization of the 1983 affidavits of Dr. Borroto and Dr. Velez. The Board considered Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement on August 3, 1985, and voted to deny licensure based on the recommendations of the FMGC. An Order to that effect was filed on August 26, 1985. On October 4, 1985, the FMGC reconsidered Petitioner's application, including new affidavits from Dr. Oscar R. Bravo-Campa, Dr. Juan A. Enriquez- Elesgaray and two other licensed physicians. However, the FMGC determined that the new affidavits did not overcome the problems raised during Petitioner's original attempt to obtain licensure by endorsement and voted to reaffirm their previous recommendation. On October 5, 1985, the Board reconsidered Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement and voted to reaffirm its previous denial. An Order to that effect was filed on March 27, 1986. Dr. Pedro G. Velez's certification dated January 10, 1983, stated that he had personal knowledge of Petitioner's medical practice in Cuba from January 1971 to June 1980. At the final hearing in this cause, Dr. Velez testified that he has known Petitioner personally only since the 1980s and that he did not know him professionally in Cuba at all. Dr. Velez also testified that he left Cuba in 1966 and that he might have met Petitioner when Petitioner was a student in 1964. Dr. Velez further testified that he signed a second letter in behalf of Petitioner. He testified that Petitioner had probably prepared it for his signature and that no one was present when he signed it. Specifically, the notary who attested to his signature was not present. Dr. Pedro G. Velez clearly had no personal knowledge that Petitioner was licensed to practice or did practice medicine in Cuba from January 1971 through June 1980. The certification completed by Dr. Esperanza Arce-Nunez, regarding Petitioner's five years of licensed medical practice and submitted by Petitioner to the Board in 1985, was not notarized as an affidavit. Dr. Arce-Nunez testified that she could not remember anything about seeing Petitioner in a practice setting in 1971, one of the years covered by her certification. In fact, her only personal knowledge of Petitioner's practice of medicine in Cuba occurred in 1977. Dr. Oscar R. Bravo-Campa testified that he coincided with Petitioner during annual medical rotations in Havana every year. He also testified that he could not remember when or where he saw Petitioner in a practice setting during the nine years covered by his affidavit, which specifically stated that he had contact with Petitioner in a practice setting three times a year in addition to rotations every year between 1971 and 1980. In fact, his only personal knowledge of Petitioner's practice of medicine in Cuba occurred in 1977. Dr. Ignacio Coro initially testified that he knew Petitioner for six years. In fact, Petitioner has resided in this country for approximately six years, since June of 1980. Dr. Coro subsequently claimed to know Petitioner longer than six years, about thirteen years. Although Dr. Coro's certification claimed he saw Petitioner in a practice setting twice a year from 1971 to 1980, he testified that he saw Petitioner only once in 1980. Dr. Coro could not remember seeing Petitioner in a practice setting during 1973. Dr. Coro further testified that the clarification statement, dated September 20, 1985 and attached to his September 9, 1985 affidavit, was included because Petitioner specifically requested it, and he did not know where the document was typed. The certification prepared by Dr. Juan A. Enriquez-Elesagaray and submitted by Petitioner did not contain a notarization. Petitioner testified that the letters dated September 20, 1985 and signed by Dr. Esperanza Arce-Nunez, Dr. Oscar R. Hravo-Campa, Dr. Ignacio Core, and Dr. Juan A. Enriquez- Elesgaray were each composed by the individual doctors. However, the letters are almost identical as to their wording, punctuation mistakes and misspellings. Petitioner testified both that he received his medical degree in 1971 and in 1977. Petitioner further testified that he allowed his application to be notarized by someone who did not witness his signature. Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director of the Board, testified that the Board initially had concerns about Petitioner's application, specifically because he submitted affidavits with attestations stating that the notary had seen the originals. The Board doubted the veracity of such a statement because the originals were in the Board's possession. Ms. Faircloth also testified that the change in the Board's certification forms that took place subsequent to 1983 was an attempt to clarify and emphasize the Board's previous requirement that affiants have actual knowledge, by determining the basis and frequency of such knowledge. Petitioner took his blank application (except for Petitioner's signature) to Dr. Luis Manuel Rodriguez Molina who prepares licensure application documents for Cuba doctors seeking licensure in Florida. Molina translated and/or filled in all documents, obtained signatures, and then later had his son notarize those documents even though none was actually signed in the presence of his son, the notary public. When he submitted it to the Board, Petitioner knew that he had not signed his application in front of a notary public, and, therefore, Petitioner's affidavit portion of his application was knowingly false. The purported "personal knowledge" of each affiant and witness testifying as to Petitioner's five years of actual practice is that each between the years of 1971 and 1980 saw Petitioner at the equivalent of medical association meetings. These meetings were, however, also attended by students. Only Dr. Elesgaray could testify that he saw Petitioner in a practice setting twice each year.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure by endorsement. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of January, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ramon S. Santos, Jr., Esquire 1000 Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Suite 303 Coral Gables, Florida 33134 M. Catherine Lannon, Esquire Allen R. Grossman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings S. Benton, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this case. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1990.
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for licensure as a detection of deception examiner should be denied on grounds that he lacks two years' experience as an investigator or detective.
Findings Of Fact The Department concedes that the applicant meets all criteria for licensure as a detection of deception examiner except for the Section 493.566(3) requirement of "two years experience as an investigator or detective." Id. This requirement applies when, as here, an applicant has a high school diploma but has not completed at least two years at a university, college, or a junior college approved by the Department. For the past four years, the applicant has been employed as a dispatcher for the Jupiter Police Department in Jupiter, Florida. During the past two and one-half years, he has also administered polygraph tests for the Jupiter Police Department. 2 He administered these polygraph examinations after 4:90 P.M.--while off-duty and on his own time--under the supervision of a licensed examiner. His subjects were new employees of the police department, or criminal suspects presented by his department or other police departments in the area. His supervisors report that he was a skillful and competent examiner. (R-1, P-1) The applicant, however, has failed to show that as a dispatcher, or an off-duty polygraph examiner, he performed investigative activities ordinarily - performed by investigators or detectives. His experience as a polygraph (or detection of deception) examiner simply does not equate to experience as an investigator or detective.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the applicant's application for licensure as a detection of deception examiner be denied for failure to satisfy the criteria of Section 493.566, Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert Powers 1881 1/2 Smith Drive Juno Beach, Florida 33458 Thomas G. Tomasello, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for licensure should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed an application with the Department requesting to be licensed as a credit life or credit disability agent, a credit property agent, and a credit agent. Petitioner answered in the negative to question numbered 3, which provides as follows: Have you ever been charged, convicted, found guilty, or pleaded guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a crime under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? Below that question is a warning advising that a criminal history can be cause for denying an application and that misrepresentations as to criminal history can be cause for suspending or revoking a license. Petitioner read that warning when he completed his application. Immediately above Petitioner's signature on his application for licensure is a section entitled "Final Statement" containing the following language: I do solemnly swear that all answers to the foregoing questions and statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief . . . . * * * Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and that the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of The Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application . . . . Petitioner read these statements when he completed his application for licensure. When Petitioner signed his application on April 9, 2003, he was aware that a truthful application was required. The Department obtained Petitioner's criminal history record that revealed that he had been arrested on February 12, 1981, in Lake County, Florida, for possession of marijuana, a controlled substance, in excess of 20 grams, a felony. The Department directed Petitioner to provide certified copies of the court documents related to that arrest. Those certified records reveal, and Petitioner so testified at the final hearing in this cause, that Petitioner was arrested, taken to jail, booked, and posted bail. An information was filed against him. He eventually pled guilty, adjudication was withheld, and he was sentenced to two years of probation, subject to certain conditions, and paid court costs. Petitioner satisfactorily completed the terms and obtained early release from probation. In addition to his court appearance the day after his arrest, Petitioner appeared before the circuit court judge on at least four occasions. Petitioner knowingly provided a false answer to the criminal history question on his application. Petitioner intended to misrepresent or conceal information regarding his criminal history. The Department classifies the crime Petitioner committed as a Class "A" crime.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a credit life or credit disability agent, as a credit property agent, and as a credit agent. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert T. Escueta 1688 Pecan Court Orange Park, Florida 32073-3614 Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Tom Gallagher, Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issues presented here concern the matter of the Petitioner's entitlement to be licensed as a Detection of Deception Examiner, Class "P". See Part II, Chapter 493, Florida Statutes (1981).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner had been licensed beginning in August, 1978, through June 30, 1980, in the categories of Detection of Deception-Intern and Detection of Deception Examiner, Class "P". The most recent license applied to the position, Detection of Deception Examiner, Class "P", which was for the years 1979-80 with an expiration date of June 30, 1980. Elbon failed to renew that license within the grace period set forth in Sections 493.313 and 574, Florida Statutes (1981). He was subsequently informed by correspondence dated January 15, 1981, that his license had expired on December 30, 1980, and was advised that any renewal of his license must be achieved through the requirement of the submittal of a new application, a $150 fee and certificate of insurance. This task was to be performed on or before February 16, 1981. Elbon was told that his failure to so comply on or before the date in question would promote the closing of his license file and the necessity for mandatory reapplication to reobtain a license. This information was provided by the' Bureau Chief of the Regulation and Enforcement Division of Respondent. (Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence, is a compilation of materials related to the facts found in this paragraph.) Notwithstanding the fact that his license had expired on December 30, 1980, discussion was entered into with one Peter Towle, the owner of a vending machine company in Lee County, Florida, on the subject of Elbon conducting polygraph examinations for the benefit of Towle related to the alleged theft of video equipment by relatives of one of Towle's employees. This video equipment was owned by Towle's company. In the preliminary discussions Elbon held himself out to be a polygraph examiner, a position which required a license pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes (1981), in the specialty of Detection of Deception Examiner, Class "P", before conducting a polygraph examination. This same requirement for licensure as a Detection of Deception Examiner, Class "P", existed at all times pertinent to this case. Towle hired the Petitioner on February 13, 1981, to assist him in the investigation; however, Elbon did not conduct a polygraph examination on the suspects in view of the minority of those persons and the necessity to receive parental permission prior to such examination. Instead, Elbon interrogated the two suspects and charged a fee of $600 for his services. Towle felt that the fee was not reasonable and indicated had he known that Elbon was not a licensed examiner that he would not have hired him. On February 23, 1981, Chris Provenzano hired Elbon to conduct polygraph examinations, thinking Elbon was licensed. At the time that the employment arrangement was made, Provenzano did not suspect that Petitioner was unlicensed, having known that Petitioner was licensed in the past. Provenzano did not learn of the true circumstance related to the Petitioner's license situation until October, 1981. Provenzano would not have hired Elbon to conduct the examinations had he known that Elbon did not have a license. On February 23, 1981, Petitioner conducted, four polygraph examinations and was unsupervised in the course of these examinations. Out of the four examinations conducted, there were three complaints from the examinees, which Provenzano found to be an unusual number, even though in those instances in which there is some indication of deception it is not unusual for an examinee to protest. In this instance, there were indications that some of the examinees were deceitful. In addition, one of Provenzano's clients who had requested the conduct of an examinations), asked that Elbon not conduct further examinations for that client. The examinations in question took place in Lee County, Florida. Patricia Slader, a motel manager for the Song of the Sea Motel, which is located in Lee County, Florida, hired Petitioner to conduct polygraph examinations on two of the motel's employees and one guest. He was hired on the belief that he was in fact a Detection of Deception Examiner and upon the recommendation of third parties. Elbon never indicated that his license had expired. The employment arrangement was made in July, 1981, and the tests were conducted on July 14 and 15, 1981. The charges were found to be satisfactory and the results of the tests were acceptable to the manager. Slader stated that she would not have hired Elbon had she realized that he was unlicensed at the time he conducted the examinations. In October, 1981, Ken Stephenson, a management official with Shop-N-Go retail stores hired Elbon to conduct polygraph examinations. The examinations were performed by Petitioner in keeping with his, employment agreement and those examinations were performed in Florida in October, 1981. The purpose of the use of those examination results, in terms of the employer's position, was for background information as opposed to a determining reason for hiring or firing employees. Of the ten or fifteen examinations conducted, there were several complaints by examinees concerning intimidation. This led Stephenson to check with Respondent, at which point it was discovered that Elbon was not licensed and Elbon was dismissed from his duties as examiner for the benefit of Shop-N- Go. Stephenson stated that he would not have hired Elbon to perform the examinations had he known Elbon was unlicensed. With the exception of Provenzano, all those individuals for whom Elbon had provided services in the periods in question, indicated they would consider hiring Elbon to conduct polygraph examinations for them in the future should he be relicensed. Respondent officially notified the Petitioner of what it deemed to be violations for practicing as a Detection of Deception Examiner without the benefit of license. The violations related to the arrangements with Towle, Slader and Stephenson. The notices of violations were issued on May 22, 1981; August 12, 1981; and December 3, 1981, respectively, and dealt specifically with the procedures performed by Elbon. Copies of these notices of violations may be found in Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Respondent also wrote to the Petitioner on the subject of the May 22, 1981, notice of violation. This letter was written June 15, 1981, by Dennis English, Chief of Bureau of Regulation and Enforcement. A copy may be found in Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, admitted into evidence. Through this correspondence, Petitioner was apprised that his Class "P" license could not be renewed beyond the six-month period of the expiration date; referred to the necessity for a new application; cautioned Respondent not to conduct further polygraph examinations, and advised of the possibility that the violation might lead to a fine of $1,000 or other administrative action. This correspondence also attached an application form for the Class "P" license, for the convenience of Elbon, and closed by reminding Elbon that a representative of the Respondent would check to see that he had ceased his operations related to polygraph examinations. Elbon was told that if he had questions about the letter that he could refer those questions to the Department. Through the investigative process related to the three notices of violation, i.e., interviews and telephone conversations with Elbon, he admitted to the facts related in the notices of violation, and as reflected in the facts found in prior paragraphs of this Recommended Order. The explanation Elbon gave for not renewing his license, both in the course of the investigation and in the course of the hearing, was that he did not have sufficient money to allow the payment for the license fee and for the necessary insurance related to renewal of his license. Following conversations with officials of the Respondent and written notification, Elbon reapplied for license in October, 1981. The license application was received October 6, 1981, by Respondent. A copy of the license application may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence., (He continued to do some polygraph-type work following the filing of the application. These activities had ceased prior to the date of the final hearing.) After reviewing the request for licensure, that request was denied by action of the agency on December 21, 1981, based upon the contention that Elbon had been conducting business as a Detection of Deception Examiner without a license or with a revoked or suspended license. The facts found herein demonstrate that Petitioner was conducting business as a Detection of Deception Examiner without having a Florida license for such purpose. Petitioner disagreed with the license denial decision and requested a Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing. Following transmittal of the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings, the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order, was conducted.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law I hereby recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds a law enforcement certificate issued by Petitioner on March 9, 1983. At times relevant to this inquiry he was employed by the Gainesville, Florida, Police Department as a patrolman. In that capacity, his duties included serving the public, issuing traffic citations, investigating automobile accidents, and making drug arrests. On March 16, 1987, Lt. Alan Morrow of the Gainesville Police Department was investigating a suspect, whose name is Carlos Bartee. In the course of this investigation, Bartee told Morrow that Officer Cunningham had been seen to ingest material which Bartee believed to be cocaine. This is said to have occurred while Cunningham was on duty. Further Cunningham is alleged to have talked to Bartee about getting something to put up Cunningham's nose. This latter remark is taken to mean cocaine, in view of the comments of Morrow, who is recognized as having expertise in interpreting the vernacular associated with the use of that drug. As a consequence of the assertions made by Bartee, an internal investigation was commenced by the Gainesville Police Department. In that pursuit, the locker of Cunningham was opened in his absence and a small container was found which, in Morrow's opinion, contained crack cocaine. Morrow has expertise in the field identification of that substance. In furtherance of the investigation, Respondent was interviewed and offered the opportunity to submit to a urinalysis to ascertain if he had been using cocaine. He was encouraged to seek legal assistance before making a decision on that overture. He was also offered some form of test involving hair follicles which is designed to detect the presence of cocaine. He declined the opportunity for the hair follicle test but agreed to undergo a urinalysis. That urine sample was given with his attorney being aware of that matter. The sample was placed in a container which was not contaminated. The giving of the sample was monitored to insure that no mistakes were made concerning whose sample it might be. The sample was sealed and protected against problems associated with the chain of custody. Respondent was asked to reveal any form of medication that he was using that might effect the results of the analysis made on the sample. He responded that he was using Ibupropen and BC powder. The urine sample was subjected to several tests, the Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT) test; the High Performance Thin Layer Chromatography (HPTLC) test; and Gas Chromatography Mass Spectrometry (GCMS) test. Each test revealed the presence of cocaine. Those substances which he had admitted using; i.e., Ibupropen and BC powder, would not effect the accuracy of these results. Based upon these positive results, Respondent was terminated from his position with the Gainesville Police Department. In closing out his tenure with that Department, Captain Robert Samuel Mitchell, II, who was then the Internal Affairs Supervisor, asked Respondent why he took the test if he knew he had ingested it, taken to mean cocaine. Respondent replied that he did not think it would still be in his system that long. As identified by investigators with the Gainesville Police Department, the use of cocaine was contrary to their agency policies and to Florida law.
Recommendation Under the circumstances set out in the Findings of Fact and based upon the Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which revokes Willie C. Cunningham's law enforcement certificate. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of October, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1989.
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted a license to practice medicine in the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Thomas Vincent Savino, M.D., is presently licensed in New York and New Jersey. He has taken and passed all the necessary examinations in order to be licensed under Florida law. Prior to medical school, Petitioner was enrolled in osteopathic medical school for one year. Eventually in part due to financial considerations and in part because Petitioner desired to go to medical school, Dr. Savino was accepted to medical school at the State University of New York (SUNY) medical school. While in medical school, Dr. Savino had some academic difficulties that were documented in the transcript presented to the Board. His academic difficulty was unrelated to his abilities to render medical care. Eventually, the problems he had at SUNY were the subject of a lawsuit against the University. The lawsuit took over a year during which time Petitioner was enrolled and attended classes at SUNY, including a neurology course or clerkship. The neurology course was successfully completed as attested to in a letter from the Dean of Students of SUNY. The letter was submitted to the Board. Petitioner eventually lost his suit against the University and did not receive credit for the neurology course. Therefore, Petitioner's transcript from SUNY showed that Dr. Savino eventually successfully completed every required course except neurology. Neurology is not required by most medical schools. However, Petitioner was permitted to take the course. He successfully completed the course at St. Vincent's Medical Center. Dr. Savino did not list the neurology course under the area designated for listing medical school clerkships in the application. The reason that the neurology clerkship was not listed in Petitioner's application was that Petitioner did not receive credit for it despite completing the course successfully. Petitioner reasonably believed that listing the neurology course as a clerkship would have implied that he had received credit for it. The information was not hidden, but was contained in other documentation to the application. Clearly Petitioner was not attempting to mislead or hide the information from the Board. Petitioner finished his last year of medical school at Ross University. Petitioner was awarded an M.D. degree from Ross University School of Medicine in 1990. Petitioner adequately documented that he attended and passed the medical school curriculum necessary for licensure in the State of Florida. Importantly, since Petitioner has been in practice, there have been no allegations of malpractice made against him, nor have there been any Medicare or Medicaid complaints filed against him. He has had a successful career after graduation. The Board contends that Petitioner misrepresented the facts in response to question 11 on the application. Question 11 states: Was attendance in medical school for a period other than the normal curriculum? Petitioner answered "no" to question 11. In Petitioner's case, he took 4 years to complete medical school while he was officially enrolled in various medical school programs. The question is at best vague, ambiguous, and subject to varying interpretations, especially on facts like those here. Moreover, the dates of Petitioner's attendance at medical school were documented in his application. The Board was never misled by Petitioner's negative response and was well aware of Petitioner's time in medical school. The Board discussed this very subject at its meeting regarding Dr. Savino. In short, the answer to question 11 was not material to any matter necessary to be found by the Board and does not demonstrate bad character. The Board, in its order, and in its pretrial statement, contends that Dr. Savino misrepresented a material fact by stating on his curriculum vitae that he was an Assistant Clinical Physician at a time prior to when he graduated from medical school. It was a phrase Petitioner made up in order to describe his position while he was employed as an assistant office manager/aide in his father's medical practice. Petitioner's father was a clinical physician. The curriculum vitae itself shows that Dr. Savino was not awarded an medical degree until 1990. The curriculum vitae listed the assistant clinical physician's job from 1987-1988. Additionally, Dr. Savino properly reflected his job in his father's office as "assistant and office manager" in a letter he wrote to the Board dated May 6, 1996. The letter was written to the Board prior to the curriculum vitae's becoming an issue. In reviewing the record, all the facts regarding Petitioner's job with his father were contained in Petitioner's application. They were not hidden from the Board. In short, the statement regarding Petitioner's job with his father is not a material misrepresentation. It was a poor choice of words and use of the English language. Finally, the Board asserted that Petitioner received his other medical licenses and medical degree through fraudulent means. The Board bases this charge on the job description discussed above. However, the record is devoid of any evidence that any other jurisdiction or school relied on or used this information or description in any manner or that any fraud was committed by Dr. Savino in regard to these other jurisdictions. There is no evidence that Dr. Savino intended to mislead the Board as to either when he became licensed elsewhere or when he began active practice. There is no evidence in the record that contradicts either his testimony or the written evidence that he supplied concerning the jobs he has held in the past or his medical education, all of which was in Petitioner's favor. None of the technicalities raised by the Board demonstrate that Petitioner is of bad character, lacks candor, or has committed any fraud or misrepresentation to the Board or in any other jurisdictions. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to licensure by endorsement.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered granting the Petitioner's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire Gustafson, Tilton, Henning and Metzger, P.A. 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 200 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lynne Quimby Pennock, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Building 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Pete Peterson, General Counsel Department of Health Building 6, Room 102-E 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Dr. James Howell, Secretary Department of Health Building 6, Room 306 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
