The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund of motor fuel taxes paid for motor fuel exported from Florida when Petitioner was not licensed as an exporter at the time of the transactions.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of purchasing and reselling motor fuel. Petitioner, whose principle place of business is 1201 Oakfield Drive, Brandon, Florida 33509, does business within and without the State of Florida. Petitioner currently has a Florida Fuel Tax License, which is number 59-2150510. On April 5, 2004, and May 7, 12, and 13, 2004, upon Petitioner's orders, Kenan Transport loaded diesel fuel at the Marathon facility in Jacksonville, Florida, and delivered the fuel to Petitioner's Kingsland, Georgia, location. Daniel Way, the driver employed by Kenan Transport, delivered the April 5, 2004; May 7, 2004; May 12, 2004; and May 13, 2004, fuel loads to Petitioner's Kingsland, Georgia, location. 6. For the April 5, 2004; May 7, 2004; May 12, 2004; and May 13, 2004, fuel deliveries to Petitioner's Kingsland, Georgia, facility, Petitioner paid a total of $8,775.16 in Florida fuel taxes. The amount of Florida fuel taxes paid for each delivery was as follows: $2,192.99, for the April 5, 2004, delivery; $2,187.77, for the May 7, 2004, delivery; $2,187.20, for the May 12, 2004, delivery; and $2,187.20, for the May 13, 2004, delivery. At the time the four fuel deliveries noted in paragraphs 4 and 5 above were made to Petitioner's Kingsland, Georgia, facility, Petitioner did not have an exporter fuel license. Petitioner obtained an exporter fuel license that became effective December 1, 2004. The parties stipulated to the findings in paragraphs 1 through 9. Petitioner asserts that the Department should refund the fuel taxes it paid because, in the four transactions, Petitioner's account was mistakenly billed for the fuel. Gowan Oil Company (Gowan) is a distributor based in Folkston, Georgia, and has contracts with many fuel terminals in Jacksonville. Pursuant to an arrangement between Petitioner and Gowan, Petitioner did not usually buy fuel from any of the terminals in Jacksonville. Instead, Petitioner bought fuel for its truck stop in Georgia from Gowan, since Gowan could buy fuel at the Jacksonville terminals for less than Petitioner could. Depending on the price of fuel on a particular day, Petitioner would call Kenan Transport and tell the company to pick up fuel from a particular terminal in Jacksonville. The instructions relative to the above transactions were for the driver to pick up BP fuel and to put it on Gowan's account. Notwithstanding the specific instructions given to the driver, he made two mistakes with respect to the four fuel purchases. He not only mistakenly picked up the wrong fuel, Marathon fuel, but he also put the fuel he picked up on Petitioner's account, not on Gowan's account. The mistake made by the Kenan Transport driver is a common mistake made by transport drivers, who are "hauling out of multiple terminals every day." Drivers have loading cards for all of the accounts on which they pick up fuel. When picking up fuel, the driver should use the loading card which corresponds to the account for that particular load. In the four transactions that are at issue in this proceeding, the driver "loaded" the card for Petitioner's account, not the card for Gowan's account. Petitioner did not have an export license at the time of the transactions. Therefore, Marathon properly billed Petitioner for the Florida fuel taxes on the fuel that was picked up in Jacksonville, Florida, charged on Petitioner's account, and delivered to Petitioner's truck stop in Kingsland, Georgia. Petitioner tried unsuccessfully to have Marathon bill the subject fuel purchases to Gowan. If Gowan had been billed, it would not have been required to pay Florida fuel taxes on the four fuel purchases because it had an export license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a refund of fuel taxes. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Florida Export Tobacco Co., Inc., Petitioner, operates, as a concessionaire, duty-free stores at Miami International Airport. The premises are owned by the Dade County Aviation Department and the stores are leased to Petitioner pursuant to the terms of a lease and concession agreement dated 19 July 1977, effective 1 August 1977 and continuing until 30 September 1987. (Exhibit 1 to Deposition) Pursuant to this agreement Petitioner occupies six stores and additional warehouse space at the Terminal Building and the International Satellite Facility. Article II in Exhibit 1 entitled Rental Charges and Payments provides for rental payments for each store and space occupied based upon a fixed fee of $X per square foot per year with the dollar per square foot cost varying with the space occupied. In addition to this minimal rental fee, Section 2.03 of this agreement provides: County Profit Participation: As additional consideration for the rights and privileges granted Concessionaire herein, Concessionaire shall pay the County a portion of its profits. As a convenience and in order to eliminate requirements for detailed auditing of expenditures, assets and liabilities and in order to provide an even flow of annual revenues for budgeting and bond financing purposes, said portion of the profits of the Concessionaire shall be calculated as the amount by which sixteen percent of the monthly gross revenues, as defined in Arti- cle 2.07, exceeds the sum of monthly rental payments required by Articles 2.01 and 2.04. Concessionaire shall pay such portion of its profits to County by the twentieth (20th) day of the month following the month in which the gross revenues were received or accrued. For the period October 1, 1982 through September 30, 1987, the percent of monthly gross revenues to be paid by Concessionaire as a portion of its profits shall be eighteen percent, payable and calculated in the same manner as above. The lessor provides air conditioning, garbage and sewage disposal facilities, security, and many other services to the lessee in addition to the space leased. From October 1976 through September 1977 Petitioner paid $40,499.66 in additional sales tax over the guaranteed minimum amount; for the year ending September 1978 this additional sales tax was $66,284.85; for the year year ending September 1979 this additional sales tax was $93,837.15; and for the year ending September 1980 this additional sales tax was $137,521.87. (Exhibit 2 to the Deposition) As the owner of the facility Dade County has the option of operating the various facilities and services available to the public or having these operated by a concessionaire. Dade County has opted for the manner it believed more profitable to the county and in the case of the duty free stores this has resulted in leasing the space to a concessionaire. The hotel at the airport is operated by the Aviation Department under a management contract. It is Petitioner's and Dade County's position that a sales tax should not be paid on the county profit participation charges because, if the Aviation Department operated the stores there would be no sales tax on any rental income and the County operates the facilities at the airport so as to maximize profits to the county. Therefore by requiring the concessionaire to pay sales tax, this reduces the profit available to share with the County.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Schooley Cadillac, Inc. is a dealer in Cadillac automobiles in West Palm Beach, Florida. The firm requires its salesmen to purchase a new Cadillac automobile each year. When a salesman decides to acquire the new automobile, an order is placed with the Cadillac Motor Car Division and delivery is made some eight to ten weeks thereafter. During the interim period, the salesman's used automobile is placed in petitioner's used car department and sold to a customer. State sales tax is collected by petitioner and remitted to respondent based on sales of the used cars. Title to the used car is transferred from the salesman to petitioner at the time it is resold. Although there is no contract or purchase agreement executed between the salesman and petitioner for the purchase of the new automobile, he is credited with the sale price of the used car on the books of the petitioner at the time the used car is sold. When the salesman's new car arrives, an invoice is prepared that reflects the amount credited to the salesman for the used car on the purchase price of the new car as a "previous trade." State sales tax is collected by petitioner and paid to the state on the price of the new automobile, less the amount credited for the used automobile. Petitioner handles a lesser number of transactions for General Motors retirees and a few winter residents using basically the same procedures involving purchases of new automobiles and prior sale of the individual's used car. In such cases, however, title to the used car is normally transferred to petitioner prior to its sale. (Testimony of Eichhorn) Respondent's tax examiner examined the books of petitioner in 1977 and determined that credit should not have been allowed for the price of the used automobiles in determining the amount of sales tax payable to the state because he viewed the amounts credited for the used automobiles as "down payments" rather than "trade-ins." Based upon 33 such transactions which took place between May 1, 1974 through April 30, 1977, a Notice of Proposed Assessment was prepared and sent to petitioner on August 2, 1977, in which delinquent sales tax in the amount of $9,814.44 was claimed, together with a penalty in the amount of $2,367.19, and interest through June 23, 1977, in the amount of $1,703.79, for a total assessment of $13,885.39. A prior Notice of Proposed Assessment in a somewhat larger amount had been scaled down after certain credits had been allowed to the petitioner. The 33 transactions in question involved 24 sales to petitioner's salesmen and the remainder to General Motors retirees or regular customers. As a result of the proposed assessment, petitioner filed its petition for an Administrative Hearing in the matter. At the hearing, petitioner conceded that tax was payable on three of the transactions in which used vehicles were not sold by the petitioner. These three transactions involved the purchase of new automobiles for the price of $7,500 and $5,200 respectively, and the purchase of a motorcycle for $375, thus making a total of $13,075 upon which petitioner acknowledges sales tax in the amount of 4 percent is due. Such tax amounts to $523, plus applicable interest and penalties thereon. (Testimony of Eichhorn, Elliot, Exhibits 1-2)
Recommendation That petitioner Schooley Cadillac, Inc. be held liable for sales tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the amount of $523, plus an appropriate amount for penalty and interest thereon. Done and Entered this 7th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Jensen and James Adams, Esquires 186 Southeast 13th Street Miami, Florida 33130 Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioners are responsible for unpaid taxes as alleged in the Notices of Final Assessment issued in this cause.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioner Nana's Petroleum, Inc. (hereinafter "Nana's"), has been licensed by the Department to sell special fuel (diesel) and gasoline. At all times material hereto, Emilio Perez has been the vice president of Nana's, and Edilia Perez has been the secretary. At all times material hereto, Nana's has been required to file with the Department on a monthly basis, and Nana's did so file, Special and Alternative Fuel Tax Returns, including Local Option Tax Schedules, and Refiner, Importer and Jobber Gasoline Tax Returns. Although the Department cannot locate its copy of Nana's May 1988 return, the Department does have copies of the other returns for the six years in question. If the Department had not received the May 1988 return from Nana's, it would have sent a delinquency notice at that time, and no delinquency notice was sent to Nana's. Nana's purchased its fuel from two suppliers at Port Everglades: Belcher Oil Co., n/k/a Coastal States Refinery and Marketing, and Union Oil Co. of California under the same procedures. Nana's sent its trucks to Port Everglades. The driver used a loading card (similar to a credit card) which carried the identification number of the purchaser. The driver put the loading card in the loading rack and received a manifest, which the driver signed and dated, noting the time on it. After the truck was loaded and left the Port, an invoice was issued by the supplier, referencing the manifest and specifying the amount of fuel obtained and when, and whether the fuel was diesel or gasoline. The invoice also specified the amount and kind of taxes charged, or if the purchase was tax exempt, and provided a total purchase figure. The invoices were then sent by the suppliers to Nana's, and Nana's paid those invoices within ten days in order to obtain a 1 percent discount. Nana's kept each invoice, using each to provide the detailed information required on its monthly tax returns. Also, when the Department audits a license holder such as Nana's, the Department audits the invoices against the invoice numbers shown on the tax returns. Each Special and Alternative Fuel Tax Return filed by Nana's itemized fuel acquired or received in Florida by invoice number, the date received, the point of origin, the point of delivery, the name and license number of the supplier, and the invoiced gallonage. Nana's computed any tax due by county for local option taxes. It itemized any gallonage exempt from taxes and why. It further included an itemization of the number of gallons sold, the purchaser's name and license number, the point of delivery, and the invoice number and date. The Refiner, Importer and Jobber Gasoline Tax Returns filed by Nana's were similar and contained a detailed listing of fuel acquired or received in Florida tax paid, specifying the county of origin, the county of destination, the supplier's name and license number, the date, the invoice number, and the number of gallons. Nana's was audited by the Department in 1987, with the audit running through November of that year. As a result of that audit, Nana's hired an accountant in January of 1988 in order to assure that its books and records were properly kept. In 1992, the Department began another audit by sending an employee to the office of Nana's for one day. The Department then contacted Nana's and advised that it was too far for them to come from Ft. Pierce to the office of Nana's in Pahokee and told Nana's to bring its books and records to the Department. Nana's took boxes of records to the Ft. Pierce office. Two weeks later, the Department contacted Nana's, advising that the Department would not be completing the audit and that Nana's should come and pick up its records. In April of 1994, pursuant to a subpoena, Nana's supplied 35 or 36 boxes of records to the Department. Those boxes contained Nana's original invoices from 1987 forward and the original certificates it had obtained from its purchasers reflecting tax exempt status. On April 25, 1994, the Department issued to Edilia Perez as secretary of Nana's its Notice of Final Assessment for Fuel Tax, Penalty and Interest Due for the period of December 1987 through June 1990 in the amount of $414,714.67. That Notice of Final Assessment was accompanied by a Notice of Jeopardy Findings. On April 25, 1994, the Department issued to Emilio Perez as vice president of Nana's its Notice of Final Assessment for the period of December 1987 through June 1990 in the amount of $515,240.25. That Notice of Final Assessment was accompanied by a Notice of Jeopardy Findings. On April 25, 1994, the Department issued to Nana's its Notice of Final Assessment for the period of April 1992 through August 1993 in the total amount of $27,947.84. That total figure represented tax due in the amount of $18,083.17, interest of $2,786.23, and penalty of $7,078.44. That Notice of Final Assessment was accompanied by a Notice of Jeopardy Findings. On September 13, 1990, the Department had previously issued to Nana's its Notice of Final Assessment for the period of December 1987 through June 1990 in the total amount of $573,988.67. That total figure represented tax due of $414,714.67, penalty of $97,201.36, and interest of $62,072.64. That Notice of Final Assessment was accompanied by a Notice of Jeopardy Findings. On September 13, 1990, the Department had previously issued to Emilio Perez d/b/a Nana's Stations its Notice of Final Assessment for the period April 1988 through June 1989 in the amount of $147,291.20. That total figure represented tax due of $100,625.58, penalty of $25,156.43, and interest of $21,509.19. That Notice of Final Assessment was accompanied by a Notice of Jeopardy Findings. On May 23, 1994, an evidentiary hearing was conducted by the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Palm Beach County on a Petition for Review of the Jeopardy Findings filed by the Petitioners in this cause. In a detailed Order Reversing the Department of Revenue's Jeopardy Findings and Releasing Seizure of Assets, entered June 2, 1994, Circuit Judge Lucy Brown analyzed the deficiency of the notice given by the Department in its two groups of Jeopardy Findings and accompanying Notices of Final Assessments: the September 13, 1990, group and the April 25, 1994, group. In her factual determinations, Judge Brown determined that the Department had not provided notice as required of the Department as to its September 13, 1990, Notices of Final Assessment and Notices of Jeopardy Findings issued to Nana's and to Emilio Perez d/b/a Nana's Stations in that the Department knew at the time that Emilio Perez was the principal of Nana's and that Perez was not at the time present at the address used by the Department to serve notice on him and on Nana's, that no officer or director or employee of Nana's was shown to have received notice of the issuance of the Notices of Final Assessment and Notices of Jeopardy Findings, and that the Department made no attempt to effectuate personal service. It was further found that no notice or knowledge of the outstanding September 19, 1990, Notices of Final Assessment and of Jeopardy Findings was received prior to April 1994. After concluding that the Department did not fulfill its obligation to provide notice of its September 13, 1990, Notices of Final Assessment and Notices of Jeopardy Findings, and after concluding that the Department had not shown the existence of jeopardy upon which its April 25, 1994, Notices of Jeopardy Findings were based, Judge Brown reversed both groups of Notices of Jeopardy Findings and further set aside and vacated the Department's seizure of Petitioners' assets. The Department did not file an appeal from that Order. Accordingly, the Circuit Court determination that Petitioners were not notified that the Department was seeking additional taxes from them until April 1994 cannot be disputed herein. The Special and Alternative Fuel Tax Returns filed with the Department by Nana's for the months of February 1990 through June 1990 each declared that money was due from Nana's to the Department. The Department has no record of payment being received with each of those returns or thereafter. The Department's summary sheet itemizes the tax due with penalty and interest computed through August 1990 as follows: Nana's Petroleum 10011605 DATE TAX DUE AS REPORTED PENALTY THRU 8/19/90 INTEREST THRU 8/14/90 TOTAL DUE 2/90 26,376.57 6,594.14 1,274.75 34,245.46 3 16,459.04 3,291.81 627.70 20,378.55 4 8,287.07 1,243.06 234.31 9,764.44 5 11,339.26 1,133.93 205.04 12,678.23 6 11,822.56 591.13 97.17 12,510.86 74,284.50 12,854.07 2,438.97 89,577.54 Accordingly, Nana's is responsible for unpaid taxes in the amount of $74,284.50, together with the increasing penalty and interest until date of payment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered sustaining Petitioners' contest of the assessments issued against them but for that portion of the September 13, 1990, Notice of Final Assessment issued to Nana's encompassing the months of February 1990 through June 1990 wherein Nana's reported tax due in the total amount of $74,284.50 but failed to pay that amount to the Department, together with the statutory penalty and interest on that amount through date of payment. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of May, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioners' six un-numbered paragraphs in that portion of its proposed recommended order entitled "Factual Findings" have been adopted to the extent that they include any findings of fact which were intermingled with Petitioners' conclusions of law and argument of counsel contained within those un-numbered paragraphs. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-6, 8, 9, 12, 21, and 34 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 10, 13-18, 20, 22- 27, 29, 39-47, 49, and 50 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 11 has been rejected as being irrelevant. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 19, 28, 30-33, 35-38, and 48 have been rejected as being subordinate to the issues in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrew Helgesen, Esquire Harris, Kukey, and Helgesen 11380 Prosperity Farms Road, Suite 201 Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410 Dean L. Willbur, Jr., Esquire 319 Clematis Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 6917 West Palm Beach, Florida 33405-0917 Lealand L. McCharen, Esquire Francisco M. Negron, Jr., Esquire Office of the Attorney General Capitol Building - Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable to Respondent for fuel taxes, and, if so, whether Respondent's levy on Petitioner's bank deposits is warranted and proper.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was at all times relevant to this proceeding an active corporation in the State of Florida. Petitioner operated as a motor fuel dealer from its inception in 1984, but in 1996, its application for licensure as a motor fuel dealer was not renewed by Respondent due to the existence of fuel tax delinquencies. Respondent is the state agency responsible for collecting taxes paid by motor fuel dealers. On July 3, 1996, Respondent issued a Notice of Final Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $74,423.25; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On July 3, 1996, Respondent issued another Notice of Final Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $12,625.64; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On July 3, 1996, Respondent issued another Notice of Final Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $15,245.84; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On June 28, 1996, Respondent issued a Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $90,317.87; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On June 28, 1996, Respondent issued another Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $57,864.24; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. On November 27, 1996, Respondent issued a Notice of Final Assessment and Jeopardy Finding to Petitioner indicating taxes, penalties, and interest due to Respondent in the sum of $81,094.54; a Warrant was issued in that amount and filed with the Pasco County Clerk's Office. Another Warrant was filed in the Pasco County Clerk's Office on May 24, 1996, reflecting delinquent taxes, penalties, and interest owed Respondent due to failure of an electronic transfer by Petitioner because of insufficient funds. The amount of that Warrant was $9,918.92. (A filing fee of $32.00 was assessed for each of the filed Warrants.) The time for challenging the assessments set forth in the notices and Warrants has passed. No credible evidence was presented at final hearing to suggest the assessed amounts were incorrect. Petitioner made some payments on the assessed amounts from time to time. Payments were applied to the outstanding balance in accordance with governing statutes: Filing fees, then accrued interest, then penalties, and then the tax liabilities. After applying the payments and taking into account accruing interest, Petitioner owes Respondent $377,074.29 as of the date of the final hearing. On September 13, 1996, Petitioner wrote a letter to Respondent asking that all penalties and interest on the outstanding balance be waived. The basis of the request was that only one officer of the corporation had actual knowledge of the unpaid fuel taxes. Once the other two officers were made aware, they immediately paid the current taxes and discontinued operation of the business. All assets of the business were sold, and the proceeds provided to Respondent to apply against the outstanding balance. Some revenue was being held by the corporation to provide for orderly termination of the business and upkeep of the real property owned by the corporation. Respondent denied Petitioner's request for compromise of the outstanding debt by letter dated December 19, 1996. Respondent requested from Petitioner evidence that Petitioner had exercised "ordinary care and prudence" in complying with state revenue laws. No evidence of a response by Petitioner was identified at final hearing. On August 27, 2009, Respondent, in recognition that the Warrants would expire after a period of time, notified Petitioner of the need to satisfy all the Warrants immediately. Upon Petitioner's failure to pay, Respondent issued a Notice of Freeze on October 8, 2009, to Synovus Bank where Petitioner's funds were being held. At that time there was $52,990.21 being held by the bank for Petitioner. On November 3, 2009, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Levy, advising Petitioner of its intent to seize the money being held at Synovus Bank. Petitioner timely filed a contest to the Notice of Intent to Levy. Respondent notified Synovus Bank of the contest. Petitioner was formed by three individuals: Earl Radcliff, president; Robert Spence; and R. Michal Marston. Spence and Marston were merely investors; Radcliff operated and controlled the business. Neither Spence, nor Marston was involved in the payment of fuel taxes during the period the business was operating. That duty was left entirely up to Radcliff. Upon Radcliff's failure to pay the taxes that were due, Respondent began issuing notices. Finally, in 1996, Respondent refused to renew Petitioner's motor fuel dealer's license, effectively terminating the business. Spence and Marston were not immediately made aware of this fact, but upon learning that the license had not been renewed, they began attempting to make the appropriate tax payments. When it became obvious there was not enough money available to pay the tax liabilities, Spence began taking steps to protect the real estate owned by Petitioner so that it could be sold to meet the tax liabilities. The funds held by Synovus Bank are being used solely to protect the existing real property. Neither Spence, nor Marston, was ever repaid for their initial investment to the corporation. The real property has not been sold due to many reasons, including the downturn in the economy, the existence of environmental problems on the site, and general deterioration of the property. The property is in two parcels: one is an empty lot and the other is being used as an automobile dealership.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Respondent, Department of Revenue, upholding the Notice of Intent to Levy issued by Respondent as to property owned by Petitioner, Fuel Mart, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Echeverri, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Robert Spence Fuel Mart, Inc. 250 North Belcher Road, No. 100 Clearwater, Florida 33765-2622
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the taxpayer owes use tax, penalty and interest on the purchase of tangible personal property under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Iseaseal, LLC, a Delaware corporation, has its principal place of business at 695 East Main Street, Suite 103, Stamford, Connecticut. Its federal employer identification number is 06-1600000. On November 22, 2000, the taxpayer purchased a 1982, 72-foot, Hatteras CPMY yacht, named “Windcrest,” with hull number HATBN3270182 and 60 net tons of admeasurement. The purchase was made through a registered yacht broker. The yacht’s sales price was $725,000. On November 21, 2000, at the closing for the yacht, the taxpayer’s managing member, Paul Bakker, signed an Affidavit for Exemption of Boat Sold for Removal from the State of Florida by a Nonresident Purchaser. The yacht was also registered with the Coast Guard. However, to date, the yacht has not been registered or titled in Florida or any other U.S. state or territory. The taxpayer took possession of the yacht at Pier 66, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on November 22, 2000. Also, on November 22, 2000, the taxpayer was issued a 90-day decal known as a “cruising decal.” A cruising decal, with certain restrictions, exempts the purchase of a yacht from sales tax if the purchaser agrees to remove the yacht from Florida within 90 days after the date of purchase and does remove the purchased yacht. On December 28, 2000, the taxpayer removed the yacht from Florida to the Bahamas. The removal occurred within 90 days after the purchase date. As a result, the sale became exempt from Florida sales tax and the Petitioner did not pay Florida sales tax on the purchase of the yacht. On January 15, 2001, the taxpayer returned the yacht to Florida for repairs. A repair bill shows that the yacht remained at the repair facility for four and a half hours on January 16, 2001. The repair visit was within six months after the departure date of December 28, 2000. There was no evidence that the repair facility was registered with the Department of Revenue or how long the boat remained in Florida waters. The yacht also returned to Florida for repairs on May 21, 2001. Again there was no evidence that the repair facility was registered or how long the boat remained in Florida waters. The evidence did not establish that the tax exemption related to use of Florida waters for 20 days or repairing a boat in Florida apply. Since the purchase date, the Petitioner has leased mooring space in Florida. The Petitioner’s insurance policy also indicates that the yacht was moored in Florida and includes a Florida endorsement for such mooring. Additionally, the Petitioner reported to Connecticut’s Department of Revenue that the yacht was exempt from Connecticut sales tax because the yacht was purchased and berthed in the State of Florida. Based on copies of the bill of sale, closing statement, banking statements, credit card statements, mortgage documents, insurance agreements, mooring agreements, repair and parts receipts and a chronological listing of the yacht’s whereabouts since the date of purchase, the yacht has operated, and continues to operate, in Florida waters. Indeed, the yacht remained in Florida for more than 183 days from July 1, 2002 through December 31, 2002. Moreover, since September 11, 2002, the yacht has been moored or stored in Florida the majority of the time because the main users of the yacht lost interest in sailing the yacht and travel after the terrorist attack on the twin towers in New York City. The Department found that the Petitioner was liable for use tax on its use and storage of the yacht here in Florida. On May 5, 2004, the Department issued an enforcement billing to the Petitioner for use tax, penalty and interest, pursuant to Sections 212.05(1)(a)2 and 212.06(8), Florida Statutes. The Department assessed the Petitioner use tax and interest based on the sales price of the yacht. The Department also assessed the Petitioner a mandatory penalty equal to the tax because it returned the yacht to Florida within six months of the departure date. The Petitioner admitted that, through ignorance of Florida’s tax exemption law, he violated Chapter 212, but argues that the assessment of tax, interest and mandatory penalty is excessive. On May 24, 2004, the Department issued the Petitioner a Notice of Final Assessment for Sales and Use Tax, Penalty and Interest Due. The Notice set forth the basis for the assessment of tax, in the sum of $43,500, penalty, in the sum of $43,500, and interest, in the sum of $14,759.84, plus additional interest that accrues at the rate of $10.73 per day. The Department issued the Petitioner the Final Assessment because it returned the yacht to Florida within six months of the departure date and the yacht remained in Florida for more than 183 days in a calendar year. Since the Petitioner returned the yacht to Florida within 6 months of the purchase date and allowed the yacht to remain in Florida for more than 183 days in a calendar year, the Petitioner is liable for use tax, penalty and interest in the use and storage of the yacht in Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order upholding the assessment of use tax, penalty and interest against the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Bakker Iseaseal, LLC 695 East Main Street Stamford, Connecticut 06901 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litigation Section Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffman, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. (Petitioner) is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of retail sales of marine vessels. Also, Petitioner is a registered retail dealer in the State of Florida. The President of Petitioner is its only corporate officer. On or about September 2, 1993, Petitioner, in the capacity of a broker, sold a motor yacht at retail to Regency Group, Inc. (purchaser), through its representative, for $78,000. The motor yacht is described as a 1988, 41' Amerosport Chris Craft, hull Number CCHEU075E788, and called the "Motivator". At the closing of the sale, on or about September 2, 1993, the purchaser refused to pay the sales tax on the purchase, which was $4,680. However, the purchaser agreed to pay the sales tax after being informed by Petitioner that, without the payment of the sales tax, there could be no closing. The purchaser's representative submitted, at closing, a personal check in the amount of $4,680 for the sales tax. All of the necessary documents were completed for ownership and registration to be transferred to the purchaser. Subsequently, Petitioner received notice from its bank that the check for the sales tax had been dishonored by the purchaser's bank. The purchaser's representative had stopped payment on the check. In October 1993, Petitioner submitted its sales and use tax return for the month of September 1993 to Respondent in which the sale of the yacht was reported. Respondent automatically reviews sales and use tax returns. Respondent's review of Petitioner's return revealed a shortage of sales tax collected in the amount of $4,680.. In January 1994, Respondent issued a notice of tax action for assessment of additional tax in the amount of $4,710, plus interest and penalty, to Petitioner. The $4,710 included the loss of Petitioner's collection allowance of $30, which loss resulted from Petitioner's failure to timely remit all taxes due. Having received the notice of tax action, by letter dated January 20, 1994, Petitioner generally informed Respondent of the circumstances regarding the sales tax shortage, including the dishonored check. Petitioner pointed out, among other things, that Respondent had the authority and the means to collect the tax, while it (Petitioner) had limited means, and suggested, among other things, that Respondent cancel the purchaser's Florida registration of the yacht. On or about January 31, 1994, approximately three months after the check for sales tax was dishonored, Petitioner issued a notice of dishonored check to the purchaser, in which Petitioner requested payment of the sales tax. The notice provided, among other things, that Petitioner could seek criminal prosecution and civil action if the monies were not paid to Petitioner. Having not received the $4,680, Petitioner contacted the local law enforcement agency. After investigation, the law enforcement agency informed Petitioner that a civil action would have to be instituted because the purchaser, through its representative, had indicated that it was not satisfied with the yacht. Although Petitioner engaged the services of an attorney for civil action, no civil action was commenced. Additionally, Petitioner did not engage the services of a collection agency for assistance in collecting the sales tax. Subsequent to its notice of tax action, on or about March 12, 1994, Respondent issued a notice of assessment to Petitioner. The notice of assessment provided, among other things, that Petitioner was being assessed taxes in the amount of $4,710, plus penalty and interest in the amount of $2,342.61, totalling $7,052.61. Petitioner protested the assessment. On February 8, 1995, Respondent issued its notice of reconsideration in which Respondent determined, among other things, that the assessment was appropriate and affirmed the assessment of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. The interest accrues at the rate of $1.55 per day. Petitioner has not remitted any of the assessed tax, including interest and penalty, to Respondent. Petitioner has not identified on its federal tax return the noncollection of the sales tax from the purchaser as a bad debt. Sales tax is part of the total sale price for an item. Respondent considers the sales tax as collectable by a seller in the same manner as any other debt owed by a purchaser to a seller. A retail dealer, who is also a seller, is considered to be an agent for the State in the collection of sales tax. The burden of collecting the sales tax is placed upon the retail dealer by Respondent. Some of Respondent's employees have been sympathetic to Petitioner's tax assessment matter. However, none of the employees indicated to or advised Petitioner that Respondent was or is in error.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment of sales tax against High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. in the amount of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August 1996.
Findings Of Fact On August 27, 1976, the Respondent, State of Florida Department of Revenue, notified the Petitioner of its intention to assess sales tax, penalties and interest against the Respondent for business transactions in the period August 1, 1973 through July 31, 1976. This Notice of Proposed Assessment was revised on May 27, 1977, and the Petitioner was notified of that revision. By his letter of June 19, 1977, the Petitioner has challenged the assessment, as revised. Upon receipt of the June 19, 1977 petition, the Respondent moved for a more definite statement and the Petitioner was afforded fifteen (15) days from the date of the Order within which time to amend his petition. Petitioner took advantage of that opportunity to amend and by an undated document did make such an amendment. The Respondent subsequently moved to strike certain portions of the amended petition and filed its answer to the petition. A pre-hearing conference was held to consider the Motion To Strike and after that pre-hearing conference was concluded an Order was issued which struck certain portions of the amended Petition and allowed copies of the proposed notices of assessments of August 27, 1976 and the revision of May 27, 1977 to be made a part of the complaint/petition as Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively. After the pre-hearing Order had been issued by the undersigned, the case was noticed for hearing for December 5, 1977. At the December 5, 1977 hearing date a Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest Under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes was tendered. This revision dated from December 5, 1977, was allowed to be introduced as the final position of the Respondent on the question of the assessment. It was also allowed to be attached as Exhibit 3 to the amended petition. (Under cover of a separate correspondence the original petition, amended petition, exhibits to the amended petition, an Order which was entered after consideration of the Motion To Strike, are being submitted as a part of the record herein). In the ordinary course of his duties a tax examiner employed by the Respondent went to the business premises of the Petitioner to perform an audit to determine whether or not the Petitioner was collecting and remitting sales tax for the category of sales which the Petitioner was making, that required the payment of sales tax. These requirements spoken of are those set forth in Chapter 212, F.S. Mr. DeCico, the tax examiner, allowed Mr. Farhud to pick three (3) months in the year 1976 as being the period to be audited. DeCico then returned to Farhud's place of business and showed him the details of the three (3) month audit. Farhud was dissatisfied wish this audit and indicated that he preferred to have the audit sample expended for a full three (3) years. DeCico replied that he would be willing to expand the audit period. but cautioned Farhud that expansion of the audit period might promote an increased liability. Nonetheless, at Farhud's request, the audit period was expanded to one for thirty-six (36) months. The new audit period dated from August 1, 1973, through July 1, 1976. The work papers on that audit may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. This audit which is depicted in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, left out invoices pertaining to stamps, electric bills, wrapping paper, grocery bags, etc., since they were not retail items for sale. The audit was rendered on August 27, 1976. Before the Notice of Assessment was filed, Farhud had expressed his displeasure with the outcome of the second audit process because he felt that certain amounts depicted in the gross sales were not accurate; to wit, the inclusion of certain so-called "service fees", namely income tax preparation, notary fees, etc. DeCico tried to get a reasonable statement of the amounts of the categories which Farhud desired to have excluded. Farhud did not have records of the matters and was unable to provide an estimate as to the amount of income which had been derived from the aforementioned "service fees". The August 27, 1976, proposed assessment was computed on the basis of the proposition that the gross sales are equivalent to actual sales and are subject to sales tax in the taxable categories. As indicated before, this audit did not take into consideration any "service fees", nor did it grant any allowance for pilferage. No allowance was made for the latter category, because Farhud had not provided any estimate and/or police records to indicate the amount which would be lost to pilferage, and cause a reduction of the sales tax liability. Farhud formally challenged the audit of August 27, 1976, by his correspondence of September 8, 1976 in which he rejects the amount claimed and asks for a hearing. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. An informal conference was held between the parties on October 12, 1976 to see if a resolution of the dispute could be achieved. Mr. Farhud was represented at the informal conference by Michael J. Burman, Esquire, an attorney in Jacksonville, Florida. By a letter of October 14, 1976, Farhud's attorney requested the Respondent to utilize the figures for the three (3) month audit period, as opposed to the thirty-six (36) month period. The letter concluded by stating that Mr. Burman was unaware of any intention Mr. Farhud had to appeal the assessment of August 27, 1976. This letter was followed by a series of letters in which the various parties were indicating the desire to determine whether or not Mr. Farhud intended to accept the August 27, 1976 assessment or to appeal it. In the course of his correspondence Mr. Farhud continued to insist that he did not accept the amount of assessment as accurate. Mr. Farhud failed to indicate to Mr. Burman whether he was going to appeal the assessment or not and Mr. Burman withdrew as his attorney, as shown in the January 31, 1977 correspondence addressed to one of the employees of the Respondent. This correspondence is Respondent's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. On February 2, 1977, the audit supervisor in the Jacksonville district of the Respondent wrote Mr. Farhud indicating the intention of the Respondent to collect the taxes pursuant to the August 27, 1976 audit. A copy of this correspondence is Respondent's Exhibit No. 8 admitted into evidence. It should be indicated at this point, that the Respondent's representative had continued to request documentation from Farhud on the items requested for exemption which have been referred to as "service fee". The subject of pilferage had also been discussed at the October 12, 1976 informal conference and a request made for some form of records of police reports which would verify pilferage allowances. No documentation had been provided at the time the February 2, 1977 letter was written to Farhud. Subsequent to the February 2, 1977 letter another informal conference was held on April 4, 1977. As a result of that conference it was determined that certain items would be deleted from the audit assessment of August 27, 1976. This is evidenced in Respondents Exhibit No. 9 which is a copy of a letter dated May 27, 1977, from the audit supervisor, Mr. McCrone, to Mr. Farhud. At the April 4, 1977, discussion the subject of pilferage allowance as brought up in the deletion of 4 percent of the purchase price of taxable goods, as to soft drinks, paper and said products, pet foods and miscellaneous sundries were allowed. No allowance was given for beer, wine and tobacco products because these were felt to be out of reach of prospective pilferers. Again, this deletion is found in the Respondent's Exhibit No. 9. The 4 percent figure was arrived at as an industry estimate. Farhud still was not satisfied after the April 4, 1977, conference had been held and adjustments to the assessment had been mode. In view of this dissatisfaction, the Respondent elected to make a new type of audit, which was performed and was premised upon an analysis of the taxable purchases by the Petitioner for the three (3) year period. These purchases were divided into taxable categories and these categories were then marked up in price using an industry average to arrive at the actual taxable sales. The industry average was based upon an examination of the United Food Stores, Inc.'s sales catalog, which had suggested retail prices for low volume and high volume stores. The Respondent gave the Petitioner the benefit of the range of high volume stores, although the Petitioner's store was a neighborhood convenience store and therefore a low volume operation. The effect of allowing the average retail price for the high volume stores was that it made the differential between his purchase price and the retail price less than that for a low volume neighborhood store, causing lesser tax liability. As stated before, this alternative method was elected for the reason that the Respondent had objected that the gross sales figures reported in the monthly tax returns were incorrect, due to the fact that the Petitioner was unable to document his claim for entitlement to certain exemptions due to pilferage and "service fees", and due to the belief that the more correct approach to the audit was the second method. The work sheet on the alternative method may be found on Respondent's Exhibit No. 10 admitted into evidence. The utilization of this method led to the revised assessment of May 27, 1977, which is the subject of the appeal by petition, and amended petition of the Petitioner. This revision was superceded by the second revision of December 5, 1977, which was allowed to be entered without objection from the Petitioner. The second revision reduces the amount of tax liability claimed by the Respondent. An analysis of the documents offered in this cause and the testimony, leads to the conclusion that the Petitioner/taxpayer owed sales tax during the audit period August 1, 1973 through July 31, 1976. Furthermore, the more correct form of audit procedure under the circumstances, was the alternate method employed in arriving at the May 27, 1977 revised Notice of Assessment as further revised by the December 5, 1977 Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment. This conclusion is grounded on the requirements of Section 212.05(1), F.S., which requires persons in the Petitioner's category for the exercise of the privilege of doing business, to assist in levying a tax in the amount of 4 percent in the categories covered. Furthermore, Sections 212.06(3) and 212.07(2), F.S., places the duty on the Petitioner to collect this 4 percent sales tax. The Petitioner failed to act in accordance with the provision of Chapter 212, F.S. and the Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment is correct and in keeping with the authority of Section 212.12(6), F.S.
Recommendation Therefore, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Second Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest found as Exhibit 3 to the amended petition which total is $2,238.92 be allowed with such adjustments as may be necessary for a computation of interest prior to the rendition of a final order. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Nathan Weil, Esquire 203 Washington Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Patricia Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Attorney, Division of Administration Department of Revenue Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue There is little controversy as to the facts in this cause. The issue is essentially a legal issue and is stated as follows: When parties act in reliance and in conformity to a prior construction by an agency of a statute or rule, should the rights gained and positions taken by said parties be impaired by a different construction of said statute by the agency? Both parties submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders filed March 17 and 18, 1983. To the extent the proposed findings of fact have not been included in the factual findings in this order, they are specifically rejected as being irrelevant, not being based on the most credible evidence, or not being a finding of fact.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Vanguard Investment Company, is a Florida corporation with its principal offices at 440 Northeast 92nd Street, Miami Shores, Florida 33138. On or about March 3, 1981, Vanguard purchased an aircraft described as a Turbo Commander, serial number N9RN, from Thunderbird Aviation, Inc., for a purchase price of $120,000 plus $4,800 in sales tax. The sale price plus the sales tax was paid by Vanguard to Thunderbird, which remitted the $4,800 in sales tax to the Department of Revenue (DOR) less a three percent discount as authorized by law. On February 27, 1981, Vanguard had executed a lease of said aircraft to General Development Corporation for a term of two years commencing on March 1, 1981, contingent upon Vanguard's purchase of said aircraft from Thunderbird. Prior to March 1, 1981, General Development had leased said aircraft from Thunderbird, and the least terminated on February 28, 1981. Vanguard purchased said aircraft for the sole purpose and in anticipation of continuing its lease to General Development. Vanguard never took possession or control of said aircraft, which remained in General Development's possession at Opa-locka Airport in Dade County, Florida. No controversy exists that all sales tax payable under General Development's lease of the aircraft, both with Thunderbird and subsequently with Vanguard, had been remitted to DOR with no break in continuity of the lease as a result of the change in ownership of the aircraft on or about March 1, 1981. At the time Vanguard purchased the aircraft from Thunderbird, Vanguard had not applied for or received a sales and use tax registration number pursuant to Rule 12A-1.38, Florida Administrative Code. Vanguard applied for said sales and use tax registration number on or about April 2, 1981, approximately 30 days after the purchase of said aircraft. The sales and use tax registration number was granted by DOR on or about April 23, 1981. Shortly thereafter, Vanguard inquired of DOR concerning a refund of the $4,800 in sales tax paid on the aircraft plus the three percent discount taken by Thunderbird. In lieu of Vanguard's providing Thunderbird a resale certificate and having Thunderbird apply for the sales tax refund, it was suggested that Vanguard obtain an assignment of rights from Thunderbird and apply directly for the refund because Thunderbird had been dissolved immediately after the sale of the aircraft to Vanguard. Acquisition of the assignment of rights from Thunderbird by Vanguard was delayed by the dissolution of Thunderbird and the death of Thunderbird's principal officer. Vanguard received the assignment of rights from Thunderbird on or about July 1, 1982, and immediately applied for a refund of the sales tax. Said application for refund was well within the three years permitted by Florida law to apply for a sales tax refund. On November 22, 1982, the Office of Comptroller (OOC) notified Vanguard of its intent to deny Vanguard's application for the sales tax refund because Vanguard had failed to obtain a sales and use tax registration number prior to purchasing the aircraft from Thunderbird. At the time of the purchase, it was the policy of DOR to permit individuals to apply late for a sales and use tax registration number and not to deny refunds on the basis that the applicant did not have the sales and use tax registration number at the time of the taxable purchase. On or about July 1, 1982, this policy of DOR was altered to conform with the decision of the Florida Supreme Court in State Department of Revenue v. Robert N. Anderson, 403 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1981). Vanguard was aware of the DOR policy at the time of the sale, relied on that policy, and conformed to that policy. It was clearly stated that had Vanguard applied for its refund even a month earlier, in June of 1982, the refund would have been approved under the then-existing policy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the application of Vanguard Investment Company for refund of sales tax be approved, and that said refund be paid by the Office of Comptroller. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward S. Kaplan, Esquire 907 DuPont Plaza Center Miami, Florida 33131 William G. Capko, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 203 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas L. Barnhart, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Office of Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented is whether the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, is subject to Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. STIPULATED FACTS Petitioner is a for-profit Florida corporation that sells perchloroethylene and other dry-cleaning supplies to the dry-cleaning industry. It is a "wholesale supply facility" as that term is defined in Section 376.301(17), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a member of the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition, a state-wide trade association whose members consist of the owners/operators of dry-cleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities. In 1993 and prior to and during the 1994 Florida legislative session, the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition employed lawyers-lobbyists to suggest and seek passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Florida Dry-Cleaning Solvents Cleanup Program. In 1994, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 94- 355, Laws of Florida, which amended Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Chapter 94-355 created Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that: All penalties, judgments, recoveries, reimbursements, loans, and other fees and charges related to the implementation of this section and the tax revenues levied, collected, and credited pursuant to ss. 376.70 and 376.75, and registration fees collected pursuant to s. 376.303(1)(d), shall be deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, to be used upon appropriation as provided in this section. Charges against the funds for dry-cleaning facility or wholesale supply site rehabilitation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this section. Chapter 94-355, Laws of Florida, also created Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, which provides, in part, as follows: Beginning October 1, 1994, a tax is levied on the privilege of producing in, importing into, or causing to be imported into the state perchloroethylene (tetrachloroethylene). A tax of $5.00 per gallon is levied on each gallon of perchloroethylene when first imported into or produced in the state. The tax is imposed when transfer of title or possession, or both, of the product occurs in this state or when the product commingles with the general mass of this state. Petitioner's corporate secretary and 50 percent shareholder is David J. Pilger. He contributed financially to the employment by the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition of lawyers- lobbyists charged with seeking passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and met several times with those lawyers- lobbyists in Tallahassee. He was assured during those meetings that it was the opinion of those lawyers-lobbyists that there was no danger of Florida sales tax being applied to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department conducted an audit of Petitioner for the period of January 1, 1993, through January 31, 1998. At no time prior to the Department's audit of Petitioner's financial records did Petitioner receive from the Department materials of any kind indicating that Florida sales and use tax would apply to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department had, however, adopted emergency Rule 12BER94-2, effective October 1, 1994, and Rule 12B-12.003(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 19, 1995. The 1998 Florida Legislature amended Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, by enacting Chapter 98-189, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1998, which added a sentence regarding the $5.00 per gallon tax, as follows: "This tax is not subject to sales and use tax pursuant to ch. 212." The Department has assessed and/or collected from certain taxpayers Florida sales and use tax on the sales price of perchloroethylene and the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The sales and use taxes are deposited into the general revenue fund pursuant to Section 212.20(1), Florida Statutes. The $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene is deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, pursuant to Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing sales and use tax of $39,098.66, penalties of $19,549.64, and interest of $11,184.10 through October 22, 1998, with interest of $12.85 to accrue per day. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing indigent care surtax of $2,128.98, penalties of $1,064.48, and interest of $611.97 through October 22, 1998, and interest of $.70 to accrue per day. Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, but neither collected from the customer nor remitted to the Department sales and use tax on this $5.00 per gallon tax. The $5.00 per gallon tax collected by Petitioner from its customers was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "the ENVRN TAX." Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the excise tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes, but neither collected from its customers nor remitted to the Department sales and use taxes or indigent care surtax on this excise tax. This tax was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "PERC TAX." Petitioner does not contest the Department's assessment of sales and use taxes and indigent care surtax on the water quality tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not dispute that its sales to its customers during the audit period were paid for by its customers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered sustaining the assessment against Petitioner, together with interest, but compromising the entire penalty amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire John Mika, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Fred McCormack, Esquire Landers & Parsons, P.A. 310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
