Findings Of Fact Prior to February 25, 1986, the Petitioner, Tommie Miller, was employed by the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) at the Brevard Regional Juvenile Detention Center as a detention child care worker I. During the time relevant to this case, June and July, 1987, Ms. Miller's supervisor was Michele McKinley, detention center superintendent. On February 25, 1986, Ms. Miller injured her lower back, injuring two nerves. The injury was job connected, and Ms. Miller was eligible for and received workers compensation benefits. Ms. Miller was receiving workers compensation benefits during the period relevant to this case, July 10 through 27, 1987. With the exception of a brief time during the period of June 22 through 24, 1987, Ms. Miller was absent from work from February 1986 through August 10, 1987, and thereafter, for that matter. On June 24, 1987, she reinjured her back at work. During the months she was out of work, Ms. Miller was treated in various rehabilitation programs. In June and July, 1987, she was receiving treatment from Woods Rehabilitation Services, Inc., and the rehabilitation nurse assigned to her case was Joan Patterson. R. Ex. 5. Ms. Miller lives 25 miles from the detention center, and testified that in June and July of 1987, her back hurt too much to allow her to drive to work at the detention center. Ms. Miller had exhausted her sick leave by July 22, 1987. It is inferred that she was on approved leave without pay by July 22, 1987. This inference is based on the fact that nearly a year and a half had elapsed from the date of the injury, and normal sick, annual, and compensatory leave would have been exhausted. This inference is also based upon the rules concerning the proper way to characterize the absence of an employee due to a job connected disability discussed in the conclusions of law. It is inferred that on July 22, 1987, the period of approved leave without pay was indefinite. This inference is based on the findings of fact which follow and the lack of evidence of a definite period of approved leave without pay. On June 22, 1987, Dr. Stanley Kaplan provided a written statement excusing Ms. Miller from work. On June 29, 1987, Ms. Miller was again seen by Dr. Kaplan for evaluation. Dr. Kaplan performed the normal therapy he was then performing for Ms. Miller, but did not tell her she could return to work. This finding of fact is limited to what Ms. Miller in fact did not hear, and is not a finding concerning Dr. Kaplan's opinion on June 29, 1987. On July 17, 1987, Ms. Miller visited Dr. Stanley Kaplan for rehabilitative treatment. Dr. Kaplan did not tell Ms. Miller at that time that she could go back to work. This finding of fact is limited to what Ms. Miller in fact did not hear, and is not a finding concerning Dr. Kaplan's opinion on July 17, 1987. On July 22, 1987, Ms. McKinley wrote a certified letter to the Petitioner, Tommie Miller. R. Ex. I. The letter in its entirety stated: I've been informed by Ms. Patterson of Woods rehabilitation that Dr. Kaplan released you to return to work as of 7/10/87. She further reported that you stated you didn't understand that you could return to work. In addition, we have had no further contact from you since 6/24/87. I am now going to have to require you to report back to work on 7/27/87, by 9:00 a.m. If you do not report back to work on this date or provide the appropriate medical documentation as to your absence, we will have to assume that you have abandoned your position with HRS. Thus, the letter of July 22, 1987, explicitly gave Ms. Miller two options: report to work at 9:00 a.m. on July 27, 1987, or "provide the appropriate medical documentation as to your absence." From the contents of the letter, it is concluded that when the letter was written, Ms. McKinley thought that Dr. Kaplan had released Ms. Miller to return to work on July 10, 1987. It is also concluded from the contents of the letter and from R. Ex. 5, which Ms. McKinley testified she had in her possession and was aware of when she wrote the July 22, 1987, letter, that Ms. McKinley was aware on July 22, 1987, that Ms. Patterson had said that Ms. Miller had said that she (Ms. Miller) did not understand that Dr. Kaplan had said she could return to work. On July 22, 1987, Ms. Miller was examined by Richard P. Newman, M.D. On July 24, 1987, Ms. Miller received the letter of July 22, 1987. As soon as she received the letter, Ms. Miller called Ms. McKinley on the telephone. Ms. Miller told Ms. McKinley that her current medical problem was an inability to drive to work, but that she could work if she was able to travel to work. Ms. McKinley told Ms. Miller that she had not received a written report from a physician concerning Ms. Miller's condition since June 24, 1987. Ms. McKinley told Ms. Miller that she (Ms. McKinley) still needed medical documentation, and that she could not authorize leave based on her oral report without medical documentation. Ms. Miller then told Ms. McKinley that Ms. Patterson at the Woods Rehabilitation Services was supposed to send the doctor's report to Ms. McKinley. During the telephone call, Ms. McKinley did not ask her (Ms. Miller) to personally deliver the doctor's report, and did not tell Ms. Miller that reliance upon Ms. Patterson was inappropriate. Moreover, Ms. McKinley did not warn Ms. Miller that if Ms. Patterson fi1ed to deliver the report by July 27, 1987, that Ms. Miller would automatically forfeit her job. At the time of the phone call from Ms. Miller, Ms. McKinley was in possession of R. Ex. 5. The top of page two of that document advised Ms. McKinley that Ms. Miller was scheduled for an evaluation by Dr. Newman on July 22, 1987. In the fourth paragraph of page two of R. Ex. 5, Ms. McKinley was advised that Ms. Miller would attend the appointment with Dr. Newman. In the seventh paragraph of page two of R. Ex. 5, Ms. McKinley was advised that Nurse Patterson felt that Dr. Newman's evaluation was important to an assessment of the current status of Ms. Miller's medical condition. These findings are based upon what is in fact stated in R. Ex. 5 and known to Ms. McKinley as what Ms. Patterson had written. No finding is made as to whether what is stated in R. Ex. 5 is true. It is concluded that during the telephone conversation with Ms. Miller on July 24, 1987, Ms. McKinley knew that Ms. Miller was to have been evaluated by Dr. Newman on July 22, 1987. At the time of the phone call on June 24, 1987, Ms. McKinley did not ask Ms. Miller to tell her what Dr. Newman had determined concerning Ms. Miller's medical condition, and did not ask Ms. Miller about Dr. Newman's evaluation two days earlier. As a result, during the July 24, 1987, telephone conversation, inexplicably neither Ms. McKinley nor Ms. Miller mentioned anything about Dr. Newman's evaluation on July 22, 1987. R. Ex. 2A is the report of Dr. Newman with respect to the visit of July 22, 1987. The report indicates on its face that Woods Rehab Services and Ms. Tommie Miller are listed as recipients of the "cc." The report of Dr. Newman of July 22, 1987, R. Ex. 2A, states in part: At this time, my feeling would be that the drive to and from Titusville is causing her more harm than good. Since she works for the state, it would be in the best interest of all parties concerned to move her to a position in the Rockledge area because she will be able to commute a very short drive and would be quite capable of performing this type of sedentary work. On July 24, 1987, Ms. Miller called Dr. Newman to get another written report, and asked Dr. Newman to send that report to Ms. Patterson at Woods Rehabilitation Center. R. Ex. 2B is that report. The report of July 24, 1987, shows that Woods Rehabilitation Services, Inc., but not Ms. Miller, was the recipient of a "cc." The report of July 24, 1987, R. Ex. 2A states in part: It is not the act of driving itself, but it is the riding in the car that is bothering her back and I do not think that she should be having to travel by car 25 miles in either direction to work when she could be doing a similar job virtually around the corner from her house. It is concluded that the report of Dr. Newman, in written form, supported Ms. Miller's oral statement to Ms. McKinley that she was physically unable to drive to the detention center due to the distance. These findings of fact are based upon what in fact is printed on the face of the reports, and is not a finding that the statements contained in the reports are true. Ms. Patterson told Ms. Miller that she would send the report to Ms. McKinley. Ms. Patterson told Ms. Miller that she did communicate with HRS. No finding is made as to the truth of Ms. Patterson's statement, but only that Ms. Miller in fact heard Ms. Patterson make this statement to her. Ms. Miller thought Ms. Patterson would and did send the medical report of July 22, 1987, to Ms. McKinley. Ms. Patterson did not send Dr. Newman's medical report to Ms. McKinley. There was a prior pattern of dealing between the parties such that Ms. Patterson, with reasonable frequency, though not routinely, communicated to Ms. McKinley concerning the current medical status of Ms. Miller with respect to her ability to resume her job with HRS. This finding of fact is based upon the testimony of Ms. Miller, who stated that she relied upon Ms. Patterson to keep Ms. McKinley informed, and the testimony of Ms. Miller that on July 24, 1987, she told Ms. McKinley by telephone that Ms. Patterson would send the medical documentation. It is also based upon the testimony of Ms. McKinley, who testified that Ms. Patterson did, from time to time discuss with her Ms. Miller's medical condition and job alternatives. But most important, this finding is based on the letter of July 22, 1987, itself. The first sentence of that letter stated: "I've been informed by Ms. Patterson of Woods rehabilitation that Dr. Kaplan released you to return to work as of 7/10/87." It is noted that R. Ex. 5, which Ms. McKinley testified was the only information she had on July 22, 1987, was an extensive report prepared by Nurse Patterson, and shows Michele McKinley in the "cc" list, from which it is inferred that Ms. Patterson routinely sent these medical evaluations to Ms. McKinley. In the year between August, 1986, and July, 1987, there is no evidence that Ms. Miller had failed to provide HRS with medical documentation concerning her injury as may have been required by HRS, or that HRS had not been satisfied with the reports received from Nurse Patterson and her predecessors. In particular, there is no evidence that during this twelve month period HRS had discussed with Ms. Miller any problem of receipt of medical documentation, or had occasion to warn her that it was her personal responsibility to provide medical documentation, and that her failure to do so would result in loss of her job. Such a warning, it is inferred, would have been appropriate if Nurse Patterson had failed to send medical documentation that had been previously demanded by HRS. In short, during the period from July, 1986, to July, 1987, it must be concluded that whatever system of medical documentation was then required by HRS, if any, was complied with satisfactorily. On July 28, 1986, Ms. Miller was warned by her supervisor that she had a personal responsibility to keep HRS informed concerning her medical condition. The warning on this date was prompted by the fact that HRS was then not receiving medical documentation that it needed. The relevance of this warning with respect to the period of June and July, 1987, is diminished for several reasons. First, this warning occurred a year before, and there is no evidence of any failure in the intervening 12 months by Ms. Miller to satisfy HRS's needs for medical documentation. Further, the July, 1986, incident occurred because Ms. Miller then did not have a rehabilitation nurse assigned to her case, and thus had no medical representative to send medical information to HRS for her. But more important, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, when Nurse Patterson and her predecessors were assigned to Ms. Miller, Ms. Miller relied upon them to send medical information. The system apparently worked, since there is no evidence of a dissatisfaction by HRS with medical documentation after July, 1986, until the letter of July 22, 1987. The medical documentation was still not received by Ms. McKinley on August 10, 1987. Ms. Miller did not report to work in the period from July 22, 1987, to August 10, 1987. On August 10, 1987, HRS by letter notified Ms. Miller that HRS concluded that Ms. Miller had abandoned her position. Ms. Miller did not learn that Ms. McKinley had not received the medical documentation until she received the letter of August 10, 1987. On August 18, 1987, Ms. Miller requested a formal administrative hearing concerning the conclusion that she had abandoned her position.
Recommendation It is therefore recommended that the Department of Administration enter its final order finding that the Petitioner, Tommie Miller, did not abandon her position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by being absent from her job for three consecutive workdays without authorized leave. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX To Recommended Order in Case No. 87-4136 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used designate the unnumbered paragraphs used by the Petitioner, in sequence. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: Fourth sentence, there is no transcript, and the Hearing Officer's notes do not record the testimony that the medical excuse "indicated that the estimated Date of Return to Duty as unknown." The Hearing Officer has no independent memory of such testimony sufficient to conclude that this proposed finding of fact is true. The same is true with respect to the sentence: "Ms. Miller advised McKinley that she had been to see Dr. Richard P. Newman, M.D. on July 22, 1987." If the record reflected that Ms. Miller so testified, the Hearing Officer would make this finding of fact, since there was no reason to disbelieve Ms. Miller's testimony, and Ms. McKinley testified that she could not remember. Ms. Miller's testimony, as well as Ms. McKinley's testimony, appeared to be honest and straightforward, testifying to the truth both remembered at the time of testifying. The last sentence is not relevant. The first and third sentences are rejected since no one from Woods Rehabilitation Services testified. There is no evidence in the record that Ms. Patterson in writing told Ms. Miller that she advised Ms. McKinley of Ms. Miller's continued disability, and thus that portion of the sixth sentence is rejected. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: None. COPIES FURNISHED: Linoria Anthony AFSCME Council 79 345 South Magnolia Drive Suite F-21 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire District VII Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
The Issue The basic issue in this case is whether the employer, School Board of Alachua County, committed an unlawful employment practice within the meaning of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by discharging or otherwise discriminating against Ms. Bates on the basis of her handicap. At the commencement of the hearing the Petitioner moved for a judgment on the pleadings or a determination that the facts were not in dispute on the basis of the respondent having failed to file an answer in accordance with Rule 22T- 9.008(5)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Hearing Officer reserved ruling on the motion and provided the parties an opportunity to present their evidence. Both parties presented the testimony of witnesses and both parties offered exhibits. On March 17, 1988, a transcript of the hearing was filed and on March 28, 1988, both parties filed proposed recommended orders containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Careful consideration has been given to the parties' post-hearing submissions during the formulation of this Recommended Order. Specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the testimony of the witnesses, and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Ann Bates, began employment with the Respondent, School Board of Alachua County, on August 15, 1983, as a classroom aide assigned to Stephen Foster Elementary School. In August of 1985, she was transferred to the A. Quinn Jones Center and assigned to the classroom of a teacher named Sue Clarey. The Principal at A. Quinn Jones Center had initially contacted the Petitioner and asked her to work at his school. The Petitioner continued to be employed by the Respondent until March 14, 1986. The Petitioner's last job title was Paraprofessional II. On February 28, 1986, the Petitioner saw Dr. W. Alvin McElveen and was given a definite diagnosis of multiple sclerosis. This diagnosis was confirmed by Dr. Richard Cunningham in early March, 1986. Petitioner has been a patient of Dr. Richard Cunningham for approximately four and a half years. In March of 1986, Dr. Richard Cunningham did not place any restrictions on Petitioner's employment. Petitioner's duties as a Paraprofessional II at A. Quinn Jones included feeding and tutoring students, as well as assisting the teacher in general clerical and administrative tasks. At all times the Petitioner was able to satisfactorily complete the job duties of a Paraprofessional II. On March 3, 1986, the Petitioner notified Mr. Jeff Jones, the Principal at A. Quinn Jones Center, that she had been diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis. In March of 1986, the Petitioner took six days off from work on sick leave (March 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11) and returned to work on the morning of Wednesday, March 12, 1986. On March 12, 1986, the school secretary, Ms. Dorothy Emo, placed a handwritten note in the Petitioner's school mailbox, which stated, in substance, "Please see Mr. Jones at your convenience." It was the common practice of the Principal to speak informally with any employee who was returning from more than a day or two of sick leave to ascertain how the employee was doing and to make sure that the employee felt well enough to return to work. On the morning of Wednesday, March 12, 1986, the Petitioner left the classroom, informing the teacher that she was going to see Mr. Jones, and went to the front office. She met with Mr. Jones at about 10:00 a.m. In the Principal's office, the Petitioner expressed her frustration with her medical condition and stated that it was her desire to resign her employment. In response to the Petitioner's expressed desire to resign, Mr. Jones asked the school secretary to bring in a "resignation form," which she did. It was a new form, with which the Principal was not familiar. The Petitioner and Mr. Jones then discussed her leaving employment and the effect it would have on her ability to collect unemployment compensation. Both the Petitioner and Mr. Jones believed that a voluntary resignation would preclude her from being able to receive unemployment compensation. This belief, as it turned out, was erroneous. The Respondent School District had recently revised its separation form to include all three types of separations (voluntary resignation, involuntary termination, and retirement) on one form. Previously, resignation and terminations were processed on separate, different forms. The Principal, Mr. Jones, had never used this particular separation form. Further, the Principal had never used any separation form which indicated that an employee was being involuntarily terminated. He was also unsure what was meant by the term "involuntary termination." The Petitioner and Mr. Jones believed, albeit erroneously, that for the purpose of permitting the Petitioner to separate from employment and also collect unemployment compensation, the "involuntary termination" selection was the appropriate choice. This was by their mutual agreement. Mr. Jones had the form prepared in that manner and then he and the Petitioner signed the form. Mr. Jones gave a copy of the signed form to the Petitioner (which was contrary to the normal procedure) and then forwarded the original of the form to the district office for processing. Mr. Jones also called Will Griffin, the district supervisor of personnel, informed him of Ms. Bates' resignation, and told him that the form was en route. The above-mentioned form was received by Mr. Griffin around noon on March 12, 1986. Upon reviewing the form, he realized that it had been filled out incorrectly and he immediately so advised Mr. Jones by telephone and told Mr. Jones that the Petitioner would have to complete the proper section of the form. The Respondent's School District's procedures are that "involuntary termination" is used for only three types of separation: (a) dismissal of an employee, (b) job abandonment by an employee, or (c) deletion of a position. A school principal does not have the authority to involuntarily terminate an employee or to fill out a form to that effect. The "involuntary termination" form was, therefore, a nullity and of no effect. That form was not processed by the district office staff and was never acted on by the School Board. Principal Jones told his school secretary of the error on the form and asked her to prepare a corrected form. The corrected form indicated that Petitioner was resigning and was not being involuntarily terminated. The corrected form was signed by the Petitioner and the Principal on March 14, 1986, and it was then processed by the district office. At its regularly scheduled meeting on April 15, 1986, the Respondent School Board acted on the Petitioner's resignation and accepted it in a routine manner. At the time the Petitioner signed the second form on March 14, 1986, she did not indicate to the Principal in any way that she had changed her mind about wanting to resign. If the Petitioner had objected and had not signed the resignation form, she would have remained employed by the Respondent. At any time prior to the School Board's formal approval of a resignation, an employee may withdraw a resignation. At no time prior to the School Board's action on April 15, 1986, did the Petitioner withdraw her resignation or notify Mr. Jones or any other representative of the School Board of any change of mind regarding her resignation. At the time of the Petitioner's resignation, no steps had been taken by Principal Jones, or by any other representative of the School District, to dismiss the Petitioner from her employment. At that time the possibility of dismissing the Petitioner had not even been discussed. The Petitioner applied for and was awarded unemployment compensation on the basis that she had resigned her employment for health reasons. It is the policy and practice of the Respondent to provide all employees with a written notice of deficiencies on a job performance warning record before any dismissal action is begun. It is also the Respondent's policy and practice that prior to initiation of dismissal proceedings, an employee's immediate supervisor takes steps to try to resolve any problem before referring the matter to the district supervisor. Employees are normally suspended with pay pending an investigation of the basis for proposed dismissal, and actual dismissal is only carried out by the School Board after the employee has been given an opportunity for a hearing. None of these things took place with regard to the Petitioner, because the School Board was not trying to and did not dismiss her. The Respondent has a policy of providing for grievances by its employees who believe they have been treated unfairly. The Petitioner did not file a grievance with the School Board.
The Issue Whether Respondent should be dismissed from employment with the Sumter County School Board pursuant to Chapter 221, Florida Statutes, as set forth in petition and notice of charges dated July 16, 1979, and amendment to petition, dated November 6, 1979. In this proceeding, Petitioner alleges that Respondent has committed acts rendering him subject to termination of employment as a member of the instructional staff of the School Board of Sumter County, and cancellation of his continuing contract. The alleged acts are willful absence from duty without leave, misconduct in office, and willful neglect of duty in violation of Chapter 231, Florida Statutes. The charges stem from three alleged instances in January and February, 1979, of improper use of sick leave. The petition and charges were filed by the District School Superintendent and were referred by the Petitioner to the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 28, 1979. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the charges with the School Board prior to referral to this Division, alleging that he had not been given an opportunity to appear before the Board when it had considered the charges, and that the charges had been untimely filed. The motion was denied by the Hearing Officer on the merits and because Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes, which governs such disciplinary actions, does not require any specific procedures in processing cases prior to a final determination. On November 6, 1979, Petitioner amended its petition to add an additional allegation of misuse of sick leave on January 12, 1979. Respondent opposed the amendment on the ground the allegation had not been brought before the School Board for action, and therefore should not have been referred to hearing. The Hearing Officer granted Petitioner's motion to amend the petition for the same reasons stated in the preceding paragraph. However, the scheduled date of final hearing was continued from November 29, 1979 to January 9, 1980 to provide Respondent an opportunity to adequately prepare his defense.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Arnold James Constable, holds Florida Teaching Certificate Number 330507, Graduate Rank III, and is a member of the instructional staff of Petitioner School Board of Sumter County. He is employed pursuant to continuing contract as a physical education teacher at the North Sumter Intermediate School, Wildwood, Florida, and has been so employed since the beginning of the 1978-1979 school year. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Case pleadings.) On December 30, 1978, Respondent was arrested in Altamonte Springs and charged with petit theft of merchandise from a department store. Respondent informed the police booking officer that his occupation was "fast order cook" and that he had a twelfth grade education. Respondent was employed as a short- order cook during the Christmas holidays in 1978. On the evening of January 11, 1979, Respondent telephoned a substitute teacher, told her that he had gastro-intestinal flu, and asked if she would substitute for him at the school on the next day. She agreed and did substitute for Respondent at the North Sumter Intermediate School on January 12. Respondent also called the school secretary on the evening of January 11, and told her that he had severe stomach pains and would not be able to be at school the following day, but that he had arranged for a substitute teacher. On January 15th, Respondent told his school principal, Mrs. Josephine Strong, that he had been ill on January 12th and also during the preceding weekend. (Testimony of Davis, Respondent, Winkles, Strong, Petitioner's Exhibit 3.) On January 12, 1979, Respondent was present at the Seminole County Court, Sanford, Florida, for arraignment on the pending charge against him. He pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, he was notified to be present at the County Court on February 5, 1979 with jury trial scheduled to be held during that week. (Testimony of Horneffer, Kugler, Sundvall, Petitioner's Exhibits 8- 9.) On Sunday, February 4, 1979, Respondent asked his mother, Mrs. Elva Constable, to call the secretary at the North Sumter Intermediate School and tell her that he would not be present at the school the following day, but he said not to tell her that he was sick. Mrs. Constable called the school secretary that evening and told her that Respondent was sick and would not be at school the next day, and would need a substitute teacher. Respondent was not at the school on the following day, February 5, and a substitute teacher was obtained. On February 5, Mrs. Constable again called the school secretary and told her that her son was still sick, would not be at school on the following day, and would again need a substitute. Respondent was not present at the school on February 6, and a substitute was again obtained as a result of his absence. Mrs. Constable was aware of the pending criminal charge against her son in Seminole County. She admitted at the hearing that her son was not ill on February 5th and 6th, and that he lied to the school secretary concerning the reason for his absences because she was apprehensive that if school officials learned of such charge, Respondent might be suspended or dismissed from his employment. (Testimony of E. Constable, Winkles, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 4.) On February 5, 1979, Respondent appeared in the Seminole County Court and his trial was scheduled for the following day. On February 6, he represented himself at a jury trial and was acquitted of the pending charge. During the trial, Respondent appeared to be in good health. (Testimony of Horneffer, Kugler, McClug, Cadavid, Petitioner's Exhibit 8.) The standard procedure to record absences for sick leave is for the school secretary to maintain a Sick Leave Compensation Application for the employee each school month. Absences for sick leave are recorded on the form which is signed by the employee and the school principal after the first absence. Subsequent absences are noted on the form but it is not signed again by the applicant. At the end of the month, the number of days absent are totaled, and the sick leave form is submitted to the County School Board office, along with the payroll. In January, 1979, Respondent's sick leave form reflects that he was absent on January 2 and January 12. The date of his signature thereon is January 2. In February, 1979, the form shows that Respondent was absent on February 5 and 6. His signature and that of the principal on the form are dated February 5 although they did not sign the form until some day subsequent to February 6. (Testimony of Winkles, Strong, Petitioner's Exhibits 3-4,190.) The collective bargaining agreement between Petitioner and the Sumter County Educational Association provides that instructional personnel may use up to a maximum of four days per year for personal leave chargeable to accumulated sick leave provided the request submitted for such leave contains a statement setting forth reasons to substantiate the nature of the extenuating circumstances requiring the employee to be absent from his duties. The agreement provides that a request for such leave should be submitted to the county office through the principal at least 2 hours prior to the effective date of leave. The form for such personal leave with pay used in the Sumter County school system provides that application should be submitted to the county office one week prior to the effective date of leave. The teaching association has sought in past years to eliminate the requirement that a reason be stated in an application for personal leave. Discussions between both county officials and teacher representatives during bargaining sessions have included the subject of sick leave abuse by employees in utilizing such leave for personal purposes. However, there is no evidence that such abuse was a common practice by county school board personnel. In January and February, 1979, Respondent had four days of personal eave available for authorized use. (Testimony of Winkles, Strong, Foster, Harner, Edwards, Petitioner's Exhibits 7, 10-11.) In 1976, while Respondent was teaching at Webster Elementary School, Webster, Florida, he received letters of admonition concerning improper paddling of students from Principal R. C. Foote. As a result of another paddling incident in February, 1978, the principal again censured Respondent in a letter, dated February 24, 1978. Further paddling incidents in early May, 1978, wherein Respondent purportedly used excessive force, resulted in a recommendation by the principal to the County School Superintendent, Joe R. Strickland, on May 8, 1978, that Respondent be suspended from teaching. Superintendent Strickland notified Respondent in a letter dated May 9, 1978, that he had requested the State Professional Practices Council to investigate the matter and make a recommendation concerning dismissal based on gross insubordination and conduct unbecoming a public officer. Thereafter, Respondent and a group of other teachers at Webster Elementary School brought allegations of misconduct against Principal Foote to the attention of the Professional Practices Council which ultimately led to an administrative proceeding and consequent disciplinary action against him. On June 15, 1978, Respondent was advised by the Superintendent that the School Board had assigned him to the North Sumter Intermediate School for the 1978-1979 school year. By letter of August 11, 1978, the Superintendent reprimanded Respondent and directed him to adhere to school board policies regarding corporal punishment in the future. (Testimony of Strickland, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibits 14, 16-21) The Foote incident was the subject of wide notoriety in the county and led to controversy within the black-white community. Respondent and the other teachers, who had made charges against the principal and later testified at his administrative hearing, were the subject of much newspaper and television coverage during the period May-December, 1978. Respondent was identified in the media as the leader of the group, based on statements attributed to various individuals including members of the School Board. The group of teachers, including Respondent, was apprehensive concerning possible repercussions against them with respect to their employment as a result of their participation in the matter. Respondent and one of the other teachers received anonymous threatening phone calls at night during this period. (Testimony of Respondent, Stephens, M. Everett, Newell, Rigsby.) Respondent testified at the hearing and admitted that he had requested sick leave for his absences on January 12 and February 5-6, 1979, and that he was not ill on those particular days. His reason for not taking personal leave was to avoid the necessity of disclosing the fact of his arrest for petit theft in Altamonte Springs on a personal leave application. He feared that if his arrest became known, he would have been suspended from his instructional duties without pay, and having been previously suspended in 1977 on charges which later proved to be unfounded, he wished to avoid such a status again. He explained that he planned to have his mother call the school on February 4 and simply say that he would not be in the next day. Then, after his criminal trial, he intended to apply for personal leave for his absences. However, since his mother informed the school authorities that he was ill, Respondent was unable to later request personal leave. He also gave as a reason for taking sick leave for the absences that "he might as well use it" since he had to make court appearances. (Testimony of Respondent.) Respondent was employed as physical education instructor at Webster Elementary School from school year 1973-1974 until the summer of 1978, when he was transferred to North Sumter Intermediate School. During the five year period at Webster, Respondent received satisfactory performance evaluations from Principal Foote, although several evaluations noted that Respondent did not accept constructive criticism in the proper perspective and that he needed to follow instructions in a more satisfactory manner. Respondent testified that he and Foote had opposite views as to the manner in which children should be treated, and that they argued frequently. Several teachers who were among the group who joined in allegations against Foote are of the opinion that Respondent was dedicated, had excellent rapport with children, and was concerned for their welfare. A parent of one of Respondent's students at Webster is of the opinion that he was well liked and respected by his students. (Testimony of Stephens, Everett, Newell, Williams, Lee, Respondent, Respondent's Exhibit 6.) Respondent received a satisfactory evaluation rating at North Sumter Intermediate School during the school year 1978-1979. His principal is of the opinion that the Respondent "involved" the children better than his predecessors and that he had good relations with his students. Several teachers at North Sumter and a parent of students there are of the same opinion concerning Respondent's good relationship with his pupils. (Testimony of Strong, David, Rigsby, Wrigth, Knuth.) Superintendent Strickland considers Respondent to have been an average teacher. Bernard R. Shelnutt, Jr., county school board instructional supervisor, has written performance evaluations concerning Respondent for the past four or five years and has consistently rated Respondent as a fine teacher who works well with children. (Testimony of Strickland, Shelnutt, Respondent's Exhibit 6.) Respondent has been the county coordinator of the Special Olympic Program for handicapped children for a number of years. He has voluntarily spent a great amount of his own time in fund raising and supervision of the program with commendable results. His efforts in this respect were the subject of favorable testimony at the hearing from teachers and parents in the community. (Testimony of Respondent, Small, F. Everett, Smart.)
Recommendation That Petitioner School Board of Sumter County suspend Respondent Arnold James Constable from his employment as a member of the instructional staff for a period of six (6) months without pay, and effect forfeiture of compensation for his unauthorized absences from duty on January 12 and February 5-6, 1979, pursuant to Section 231.36(6) and 231.44, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 27th day of May, 1980. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: C. John Conigilio, Esquire Post Office Box 26 Wildwood, Florida 32785 John F. Wendel, Esquire Post Office Box 5378 Lakeland, Florida 33803 Joseph Egan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2969 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues are whether subject matter jurisdiction exists in this proceeding, and, if so, whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment as an educational support employee.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency responsible for the School District of Hendry County, Florida (the District). Petitioner employed Respondent in the District as a custodian from July 8, 1997, until April 4, 2006. A custodian is an educational support employee as defined in Subsection 1012.40(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2005). The alleged grounds for the termination of Respondent's employment may be fairly summarized as involving two unauthorized absences during the workdays of March 15 and 16, 2006. On March 17, 2006, the principal met with Respondent in the principal's office. The assistant principal and head custodian were also present. Respondent declined the opportunity to have a union representative present. By letter dated April 24, 2006, the District superintendent provided Respondent with written notice that Petitioner had terminated Respondent's employment on April 4, 2006 (written notice of termination). By letter dated April 28, 2006, Respondent's counsel requested an administrative hearing (the request for hearing). Respondent challenges the subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding.1 The facts relevant to Respondent's jurisdictional challenge are undisputed.2 Petitioner did not request the assignment of an ALJ within the statutorily prescribed 15-day time limit. When Petitioner did request DOAH to assign an ALJ, the 60-day time limit for commencing the hearing had already expired.3 Petitioner requested the assignment of an ALJ on August 7, 2006, approximately 101 days after receiving the request for hearing from Respondent.4 Subsection 120.569(2), Florida Statutes (2005), required Petitioner to request the assignment of an ALJ within 15 days of the date Petitioner received the request for hearing. The timeline for conducting the administrative hearing is prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement 2004-2007 between the District School Board of Hendry County and the Hendry County Support Personnel Association (the CBA). Subsection 1012.40(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2005), provides, in relevant part: In the event a district school superintendent seeks termination of an employee, . . . [t]he appeals process shall be determined by the appropriate collective bargaining process . . . . Section 8.074 in the CBA prescribes the procedures for conducting a hearing if one is requested by a terminated employee. The procedures prescribed in the CBA are substantially the same as those in Subsections 1012.33(3)(f)4.a. and b. and 1012.33(6)(a)1. and 2., Florida Statutes (2005). In relevant part, the CBA provides: The Employee shall be entitled to a hearing at the Board's election in accordance with one of the following procedures: A direct hearing conducted by the Board within sixty (60) days of receipt of the Employee request. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of FS. 120.57(1)(a)1. A majority vote of the membership of the Board shall be required to sustain the Superintendent's recommendation. The determination of the Board shall be final as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the grounds for termination of employment. A hearing conducted by a hearing officer assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Management Services. The hearing shall be conducted within sixty (60) days of receipt of the Employee's request in accordance with FS. Chapter 120. The recommendation of the hearing officer shall be made to the Board. A majority vote of the Board shall be required to sustain or change the hearing officer's recommendation. The determination of the Board shall be final as to the sufficiency or insufficiency of the grounds for termination of employment. This is the exclusive procedure for termination, except that the Employee shall have the right for Judicial Appeal under FS. 120.68. The Association shall be notified when any Association member is to be terminated. Petitioner's Exhibit 11. Petitioner elected to refer the request for hearing to DOAH in accordance with Section 8.074b. of the CBA. However, Petitioner did not refer the matter to DOAH until August 7, 2006, approximately 101 days after receiving the request for hearing. By waiting more than 60 days to refer the matter to DOAH, Petitioner prevented DOAH from conducting the hearing within the 60-day time limit prescribed in the CBA and incorporated by reference in Subsection 1012.40(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2005). Respondent did not raise his jurisdictional challenge until the administrative hearing was conducted on September 20, 2006. The sole issue that Respondent included in the Joint Pre-Hearing Stipulation filed with DOAH on September 19, 2006, is whether Petitioner had just cause to terminate the employment of Respondent. If the requirement to conduct the hearing within the 60-day time limit were jurisdictional, judicial authority discussed in the conclusions of law would make it unnecessary for Respondent to raise the issue before the hearing. If the requirement were procedural, judicial authority discussed in the conclusions of law would require Respondent to show that the failure to comply with the 60-day time limit prejudiced Respondent by impairing the fairness of the proceeding or the correctness of the agency action. For reasons stated in the conclusions of law, both the 15-day time limit for referring the matter to DOAH and the 60-day time limit for conducting the hearing are procedural rather than jurisdictional. The untimely referral and hearing did not prejudice Respondent. Petitioner had just cause to terminate the employment of Respondent. Respondent engaged in two unauthorized absences from work on March 15 and 16, 2006. The two absences exceeded 4.5 hours. Respondent worked at LaBelle High School (LaBelle) on March 15 and 16, 2006. Respondent worked during each day from 2:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. The workday included one unpaid meal break for 30 minutes and two 15-minute paid breaks. The breaks could be taken at any time during the workday and could be combined into a single one-hour break. Respondent was required to sign in and out on a form (sign-out sheet) when Respondent left campus during any period of his workday other than the unpaid 30-minute meal break. Respondent was absent from work on March 15, 2006, for a period in excess of three hours and was absent from work the next day for approximately one hour and fifty minutes. The absences were unauthorized because each exceeded one hour and because Respondent did not complete the sign out sheet when he left campus. Rather, Respondent made entries in the sign out sheet indicating he was present from 2:00 p.m. until 10:00 p.m. On March 15, 2006, Respondent left work for a period that exceeded three hours. Respondent borrowed a carpet cleaning machine from LaBelle in accordance with school policy. Respondent took the machine home, as he was authorized to do, but remained absent from work for a period that exceeded three hours. The second unauthorized absence occurred on March 16, 2006, when Respondent was absent from work from approximately 5:30 p.m. until about 7:20 p.m. The principal of LaBelle was attending a baseball game at school that evening and was unable to locate Respondent on campus during three separate searches. The searches included Respondent's work area and bathrooms. The work cart assigned to Respondent was not moved during the three searches. At approximately 7:45 p.m., the principal observed that Respondent's truck had been returned to its parking space. Respondent had a history of leaving campus during the workday. The principal had previously established the sign-out sheet protocol so that others would be able to locate Respondent during the workday. The head custodian also required each custodian to leave a note disclosing when a custodian leaves campus and the reasons for the absence. The head custodian would be able to read the note when he arrived at work the next morning and would be able to explain the circumstances of the absence if asked by a school administrator. Respondent did not comply with the required protocol on March 15 or 16, 2006.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment as an educational support employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th of December, 2006.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this proceeding are whether St. Lucie County School Board (School Board) Rules 6.16 and 6.50*+ are invalid exercises in delegated legislative authority as defined by sections 120.52(8)(c), (d), and (e).
Findings Of Fact Ms. Jones is currently an employee of the St. Lucie County School Board, and has a professional service contract pursuant to section 1012.33, Florida Statutes. Her status with the School Board is “suspended without pay,” for reasons that are not relevant to this proceeding. As a classroom teacher, Ms. Jones is covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board of St. Lucie County and the Classroom Teachers Association. On June 13, 2017, the School Board suspended Ms. Jones without pay and on July 27, 2017, a Petition for Termination in Termination I was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for an evidentiary hearing. At that point, while Ms. Jones remained an employee of the School Board, she received no pay and no benefits from the School District. She began to look for other employment to support herself and her family. Ms. Jones applied to and was offered a job to work as a music teacher by the Somerset Academy St. Lucie (Somerset). Somerset is a charter school in St. Lucie County sponsored by and located within the geographical bounds of the School District and the jurisdictional bounds of the School Board. Ms. Jones did not submit an application for leave and the School Board did not approve a request for leave of absence in order for Ms. Jones to work at Somerset. By letter dated August 28, 2017, Superintendent Gent notified Ms. Jones of his intent to recommended to the School Board that she be terminated for grounds in addition to the already-existing suspension, i.e., for violating the School Board’s Rules 6.16(1); 6.301(2), (3)(b)(i), (3)(b)(xix), and (3)(b)(xxix); and 6.50*+. That letter became the basis for the Termination II proceeding. The factual basis for pursuing the second termination proceeding was that Ms. Jones was working at Somerset without having applied for and received approval for a leave of absence from the School Board. The merits of the School Board’s allegations in this second proceeding are no longer relevant in terms of Ms. Jones’ employment with the School Board, as the School Board, through counsel, has represented that the School Board no longer intends to pursue the allegations in Termination II. The allegations are relevant and informative, however, in establishing the School Board’s interpretation of its rules and establishing Ms. Jones’ standing to challenge the validity of those rules. The evidence presented at hearing established that Ms. Jones has standing to bring this rule challenge. School Board rule 6.16 is entitled “Dual employment,” and provides as follows: No person may be employed to work in more than one position in the school system except upon the recommendation of the Superintendent and approval of the School Board. No employee shall accept other employment that might impair the independence of his or her judgment in the performance of his or her duties. Rule 6.16 lists as its statutory authority sections 1001.41, 1012.22, and 1012.33, Florida Statutes, and lists sections 1001.43 and 1012.22 as the laws implemented. No reference to authority granted by the Florida Constitution is identified. School Board Policy 6.50*+ is entitled “Leave of Absence,” and provides in pertinent part: Leave of absence. A leave of absence is permission granted by the School Board or allowed under its adopted policies for an employee to be absent from duty for a specified period of time with the right to return to employment upon the expiration of leave. Any absence of a member of the staff from duty shall be covered by leave duly authorized and granted. Leave shall be officially granted in advance and shall be used for the purposes set forth in the leave application. Leave for sickness or other emergencies may be deemed to be granted in advance if prompt report is made to the proper authority. Length of Leave and Pay. Generally, no leave or combination of leaves, except military leave or Workers’ Compensation Leave, will be granted for a period in excess of one year. Illness-in-line-of- duty leave may not be extended beyond the maximum medical improvement date or a maximum of two (2) years from the date of injury, whichever is the earliest date. Leave may be with or without pay as provided by law, regulations of the State Board, and these rules. For any absence that is without pay, the deduction for each day of absence shall be determined by dividing the annual salary by the number of days/hours for the employment period. Employment leave. A leave shall not be granted to any employee to accept other employment unless the leave is to accept employment at a charter school as provided in paragraph (5) below. Accepting employment while on a leave of absence cancels the leave automatically. The person on leave will be notified that he or she must return to work with the School Board immediately, resign or be terminated. The Superintendent shall develop procedures to implement leave provisions. Charter School Leave. An employee may be granted leave to accept employment at a charter school in St. Lucie County in accordance with the following provisions: Teachers. Teachers may apply for leave to work at a charter school. The School Board will not require resignation of teachers desiring to work at a charter school. Teachers granted such leave by the School Board are not required to be on a continuing or professional services contract and shall not be subject to the seven (7) continuous years’ service requirement. Should a teacher on leave elect to return to work at the District, the teacher shall return to the teacher’s former position or a comparable position for which the teacher is qualified. * * * Method to Request Leave. An application to request leave to accept employment in a charter school shall be submitted using the procedures specified in Policy 6.501(1). For ten month instructional personnel, an application to request leave to accept employment at a charter school shall be submitted to the principal at least forty-five (45) days prior to the first day of work for the school year . . . . Insurance and Retirement Benefits. It shall be the sole responsibility of the charter school site to provide insurance and retirement benefits to charter school employees . . . . * * * Notice of Intent to Return. Employees on charter school leave shall give the School Board written notice of their intent to return at least sixty (60) days prior to the beginning of the semester they wish to return. Requirement for Annual Renewal. Charter school leave must be renewed annually. It is the sole responsibility of the employee on leave to submit an annual written letter notice of leave to the Superintendent or designee, and a copy of the annual written letter notice of leave to the employee’s school principal or immediate supervisor, as applicable, on or before April 1 of each year if they wish to renew their charter school leave for the following school year. Employees who do not submit the required annual leave form on or before April 1st will be considered to have voluntarily terminated their employment, and will no longer be eligible for any benefits or other consideration under this leave policy. (Emphasis supplied.) 11. Rule 6.50*+ lists sections 1001.41, 1012.22, and 1012.33 as its statutory authority, and lists sections 1001.43, 1002.33(12)(e), 1012.22, 1012.61, 1012.63, and 1012.66 as the laws it implements. No reference to authority granted by the Florida Constitution is identified. Rule 6.50*+ provides that if a teacher working for the School Board wishes to work at a charter school within St. Lucie County, that teacher must apply for permission to do so. However, the definition of a leave of absence in the first paragraph of rule 6.50*+ specifically provides that a leave of absence allowed under the rule is for a specified period of time “with the right to return to employment upon the expiration of leave.” By its terms, the rule does not appear to encompass those employees whose status is “suspended without pay,” given that those employees who are suspended without pay do not necessarily have the right to return to employment upon expiration of leave. Rule 6.50*+ also provides that an application for charter school leave shall be provided to the teacher’s principal at least 45 days before the beginning of the school year. For teachers on suspension without pay or who are not assigned to a particular school, there is no principal to whom the application can be given. The rule does not specify an alternative. Instead, Mr. Clements stated that it would be up to Ms. Jones (and presumably, anyone in her circumstance) to ask where to submit an application for charter school leave. The School Board interprets rule 6.50*+ as applying to all employees, regardless of their status. Rule 6.50*+ does not indicate what criteria would be used for determining if an employee’s application for leave should be granted. Mr. Clements testified that the decision is made on a case-by-case basis. He also testified that had Ms. Jones applied for charter school leave, he would not have recommended that her request be approved, because as a teacher on unpaid suspension, she is not in good standing with the School District. Nothing in rule 6.50*+ alerts Ms. Jones, or any other teacher in her circumstances, that her suspension without pay would be a basis for disapproval of an application for charter school leave. Nothing in the rule alerts any applicant of the criteria to be considered for the grant or denial of a requested leave of absence. The consideration of a staff member’s current disciplinary status is not an unreasonable consideration for the Superintendent or for the School District. It is not, however, included in the rule as a basis for deciding whether a request for charter school leave should be approved or denied.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Barbara Aboushahba, committed the violations as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Orange County School Board, is the governmental entity responsible for the operation, supervision, and control of public schools in Orange County, Florida, including the employment of personnel associated with the educational process. Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a kindergarten teacher pursuant to the terms of a professional services contract with Petitioner. Respondent is a member of the bargaining unit covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the School Board of Orange County and Orange County Classroom Teachers Association. On June 25, 2003, Respondent received a written directive "to provide clarification or guidance" from the principal of the school where she taught that she "must avoid touching students except as is absolutely necessary to effect a reasonable and lawful purpose," and "to avoid even the appearance of verbal intimidation of students." On May 18, 2005, Respondent received a letter of reprimand for misconduct from her principal, because she "grabbed a student to get his attention." In the letter she was warned that "should there be another incident of a similar nature, discipline, up to and including dismissal, may be recommended." On May 31, 2005, Respondent received a letter of reprimand for violating "prior directives and [that you] again placed your hands on a student in a manner that could be interpreted as punitive." In addition, on that date Respondent received a directive that she avoid "touching a student in a manner that serves no educational or lawful purpose" and that she "must exercise care and professional judgment to avoid the appearance of the inappropriate use of physical intimidation." She was urged to "carefully consider when and how to respond to student behaviors." On May 26, 2006, Respondent was suspended without pay for five days as a result of "allegations that you used inappropriate force against a student" and that she "violated two previous directives regarding placing your hands on a student." On March 26, 2007, Respondent executed a Settlement Agreement to resolve an Administrative Complaint that had been filed by the Education Practices Commission in John L. Winn v. Barbara Aboushahba, Case No. 056-0009-V. The Settlement Agreement included a letter of reprimand and a $400.00 fine. On April 22, 2007, E.B., a ten-year-old student in Respondent's computer lab, had not completed his assignment. Respondent grasped E.B.'s hand and placed his hand on the computer keyboard and/or mouse, with her hand superimposed on his hand. This apparently upset E.B., who then pulled his shirt up and over his head. Respondent then pulled E.B.'s shirt down from his face and told him to "stop crying like a baby." E.B. was crying as a result of being upset by Respondent's actions. Respondent's touching of E.B. was minimal, but unnecessary and inappropriate. Her comment to him was callous and insensitive. Given the fact that this incident occurred less than one month after the above-referenced settlement with the Education Practices Commission, it is apparent that Respondent has not responded appropriately to the directives, reprimands, and guidance directed to similar inappropriate conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent, Barbara Aboushahba's, "gross insubordination" constitutes "just cause" under Section 1012.33, Florida Statutes, to dismiss her from her employment as a teacher with Petitioner, Orange County School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian F. Moes, Esquire Orange County School Board 445 West Amelia Street Post Office Box 271 Orlando, Florida 32802-0271 Lindsay N. Oyewale, Esquire deBeaubien, Knight, Simmons, Mantzaris & Neal, LLP 332 North Magnolia Avenue Post Office Box 87 Orlando, Florida 32802-0087 Ronald Blocker, Superintendent Orange County School Board Post Office Box 271 Orlando, Florida 32802-0271 Dr. Eric J. Smith Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent should be dismissed from his employment by the Pinellas County School Board as a painter in the School Board’s Maintenance Department for any or all of the following: excessive absenteeism, failure to report absences according to established procedures, failure to provide required medical documentation for absences, tardiness, insubordination, driving under the influence of alcohol and criminal conviction of driving while intoxicated?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the School Board of Pinellas County, is the authority that operates, controls and supervises all free public schools in the Pinellas County School District. Dwayne Goodrow has been employed as a painter in the Maintenance Department for the Pinellas County School Board since April 18, 1989. His work has always been satisfactory and sometimes better than satisfactory. Over the years of his employment, however, he has had chronic and serious attendance problems. Absenteeism, Attendance and Other Performance Factors On August 2, 1990, Mr. Goodrow received a memorandum the subject of which was "Record of Counseling for Excessive Absenteeism." The memorandum stated that since the beginning of the school year, Mr. Goodrow had been absent an excessive number of times, including 17 hours of leave without pay. It informed Mr. Goodrow that, "[t]his absenteeism is unacceptable and you must make an immediate and permanent correction of this behavior." (Petitioner's Ex. No. 1) It further advised him that the memorandum would be placed in his file as a record that he had been counseled about the matter and that he fully understood that any reoccurrence of excessive absenteeism would result in a letter of reprimand. The memorandum warns: In the event you receive a letter of reprimand and the excessive absenteeism continues, you will become subject to more severe disciplinary action, which could include suspension or dismissal. Id. The memorandum is signed first by Mr. Goodrow and then by school board personnel: Mr. Goodrow's foreman and general foreman as well as the Superintendent of the School District. On October 5, 1990, Mr. Goodrow received a letter of reprimand for excessive absenteeism. The letter informs Mr. Goodrow of his General Foreman's belief that he has not realized the seriousness of his problem with absenteeism because in the interim since the August 2 memorandum he had been absent 29 and ½ additional hours. The letter warns, "if your absenteeism continues, it will be cause to recommend you for suspension or dismissal." Petitioner's Ex. No.2. It concludes, "Your signature below will acknowledge that you have received and understand this letter of reprimand." Id. Just as the August 2, 1990 memorandum, the letter is signed by Mr. Goodrow and school board personnel. On a Supporting Services Personnel Performance Appraisal signed by Mr. Goodrow January 18, 1991, he received a rating of unsatisfactory in the area of attendance and "needs improvement" in the area of punctuality. The remarks section of the appraisal states with regard to attendance, "[h]as received letters warning him of this, must be corrected." Petitioner's Ex. No. 17. The appraisal also states, "Dwayne has good painting abilities and knowledge, can be trusted to complete any job given him." Id. On June 10, 1991, Mr. Goodrow received a memorandum the subject of which was "Record of Counseling for Excessive Absenteeism." With the exception of stating that he had taken 15 hours of leave without pay, the memorandum is identical to the August 2, 1990 memorandum. On a supporting Services Personnel Performance Appraisal dated February 14, 1992, Mr. Goodrow was again rated unsatisfactory under the performance factor of attendance. The remarks section reflects that he received counseling on December 19, 1991, for frequent tardiness but also that "[j]ob knowledge is adequate," "[c]ompletes assigned work on time," "[h]as the ability to be a self-starter," and "[c]an be a good team worker." Petitioner's Ex. No. 16. On September 15, 1994, Mr. Goodrow received an Attendance Deficiency Notification Letter. The letter states "[y]ou are required to bring in doctor's documentation of your illness on all further sick leave absence requests." Petitioner's Ex. No. 4. Although there is a place on the letter for Mr. Goodrow's signature and a notation that signature by the employee does not imply agreement with statements in the letter, the letter reflects that Mr. Goodrow refused to sign it. On October 3, 1994, Mr. Goodrow received a Record of Counseling. It noted deficiencies in his performance in that, INSUBORDINATION - You were told to furnish doctors excuses for any sick leave taken as per letter dated 9/15/94. On 9/26/94 you used 2 hours sick leave and failed to provide Doctor's excuse upon request of your Foreman. Petitioner's Ex. No. 5. To bring his performance to the satisfactory level, Mr. Goodrow was advised he would have to supply a doctor's documentation of illness whenever he took sick leave in the future. On February 17, 1995, Mr. Goodrow was rated as "Needing Improvement," in the area of attendance on his performance appraisal by his supervisor. The remarks section of the appraisal reflects that he was counseled for not following leave policy but also that "Dwayne has shown a more positive attitude recently, he has the potential to progress." Petitioner's Ex. No. 15. Furthermore, Mr. Goodrow was rated "better than satisfactory, in the area of "job knowledge." Consistent with this rating, in the remarks section, the following appears, "Dwayne exhibits his job knowledge by identifying problems and solving them . . . ." Id. The potential for progress noted in February did not last long. On March 24, 1995, Mr. Goodrow received a letter of reprimand for insubordination for failing to provide a doctor's excuse for sick leave absences contrary to previous instructions. The letter warned that failure to provide doctor's excuses in the future to justify sick leave will result in "further disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment." Petitioner's Ex. No. 6. Over the next 6 months, Mr. Goodrow began again to show progress. By early September, 1995, his attendance had "improved considerably," Petitioner's Ex. No. 7, and the requirement for a doctor's excuse for every sick leave absence was lifted. The procedure for reporting absences in the School Board's Maintenance Department is for employees to call in at least one-half hour prior to their normal starting time. There is an answering machine upon which a message can be recorded when there is no person available to take the call. Shortly after the lifting of the requirement for a doctor's excuse to justify sick leave, Mr. Goodrow, on Wednesday, September 13, 1995, was absent from work. He did not call in consistent with the procedure for reporting absences. He was absent again two days later. In addition to the failure to call in on September 13, 1995, Mr. Goodrow was absent without calling in on three other days in the fall of 1995: October 18 and 26, and November 9. Each time he failed to call in, Mr. Goodrow was verbally warned by Trades Foreman Al Myers of the requirement for calling in and was given a review of proper procedure. On December 14, 1995, Mr. Goodrow received a letter of reprimand for failure to follow proper procedure with regard to the four absences in the fall of 1995. The letter was the result of an agreement with Mr. Goodrow that the letter was the appropriate response by the maintenance department for the absences and failure to follow procedure. A stipulation was added, however, to the agreement: "[A]nother attendance incident within one year will result in recommendation for 'Time off without pay' or possible 'Dismissal'.". Petitioner's Ex. No. 7. The letter concludes, "Also, as of this date you are again required to provide medical proof of your [inability to attend work] . . . and you are required to notify your supervisor prior to the start of work shift you are going to be absent." Id. The letter is signed by Mr. Goodrow. On February 26, 1996, Mr. Goodrow and the School Board entered a Stipulation Agreement. The agreement reviewed Mr. Goodrow's performance appraisals for unsatisfactory attendance, and insubordination for taking sick leave without doctor's excuses. Furthermore, it stated that Mr. Goodrow: On December 15, 1995, . . . left work early without proper notification or required medical documentation. On January 3, 1996, Mr. Goodrow failed to report his absence according to established procedures, and on January 17, 1996, he failed to report his absence according to established procedures and requested 3.5 hours of sick leave without providing required medical documentation. Petitioner's Ex. No. 8. As an expression of regret and to affirm his commitment to notify his supervisor in the future regarding absences, Mr. Goodrow agreed to a three day suspension without pay effective March 19, 20 and 21, 1996. The stipulation also states that Mr. Goodrow, once again, understands that further problems could result in more serious disciplinary action, including dismissal. On April 16, 1996, Mr. Goodrow received a performance review finding him to have continued to demonstrate unsatisfactory attendance and judgment in that on March 6, 1996, he was late 3 hours with no explanation, on March 28, 1996, he was late one-half hour with no explanation, on April 3, 1996 he took eight hours sick leave without doctor's justification, on April 9, 1996, he was arrested and charged with DUI, and on April 11, 1996, he took eight hours sick leave without a doctor's justification. Driving While Intoxicated The job description for a painter employed with the Pinellas County School Board includes the requirement that the employee possess a valid State of Florida Class B commercial driver's license ("CDL"), to include "air brake" qualifications, and any other license as may be required by law. On March 30, 1996, while driving a motor vehicle off- duty, Mr. Goodrow was stopped by a law enforcement officer for failing to maintain his vehicle in a single lane of traffic. Deputy Howard Skaggs, a member of the Sheriff Department's DUI unit, was summoned to the scene to conduct filed sobriety tests to determine whether Mr. Goodrow was driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol. Deputy Skaggs smelled a strong odor of alcohol on the breath of Mr. Goodrow, who, in turn, admitted that he had consumed at least six beers at two different taverns. While at the roadside, three field sobriety tests were performed by Deputy Skaggs, all of which Mr. Goodrow failed. Deputy Skaggs concluded that Mr. Goodrow was without doubt impaired. At the jail, Mr. Goodrow was asked to submit to a breathalyzer. He refused with the statement that he had had too much to drink and the test would only incriminate him. Mr. Goodrow was arrested. On September 17, 1996, Mr. Goodrow entered a plea of nolo contendere to the criminal offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. He was adjudicated guilty, placed on probation for 12 months, required to enroll in DUI school, fined $1000.00, and his driver's license was revoked for one year. Without a driver's license and a CDL, Mr. Goodrow no longer meets the job description of a painter in the School Board's Maintenance Department. Notification of Dismissal On June 19, 1996, Mr. Goodrow was notified that Superintendent Hinesley would recommend to the School Board that he be dismissed due to excessive absenteeism and insubordination. The DUI conviction, not having yet occurred, was not, of course, a factor in the superintendent's decision. Comparison with Other Employees Brett Paul, a painter in the Maintenance Department like Mr. Goodrow, also had attendance problems very similar to Mr. Goodrow's. He was suspended for three days without pay on the very same dates as Mr. Goodrow. Since the March suspension, however, unlike Mr. Goodrow, Mr. Paul's attendance has improved with the exception on an isolated instance in which his absence was due to a "major life event," the purchase of a house. He has not been convicted of DUI. Tom Appold was arrested for DUI during a time that he was employed as a painter in the School Board's Maintenance Department. After his conviction for DUI, he requested that he be allowed to transfer to another department, presumably because he could no longer meet the job description requirement that he hold a CDL. The request was honored and he is now employed by the School Board in another section of the Maintenance Department for which a CDL is not required. Mr. Appold, however, unlike Mr. Goodrow, has never been reprimanded or suspended for attendance problems. His attendance has always been found by the School Board's Maintenance Department to be within acceptable limits. Alcoholism and a Change of Heart Mr. Goodrow is an alcoholic. His excessive absenteeism, refusal to follow proper procedures with regard to work absences, insubordination, driving while intoxicated, arrest and conviction for DUI, and virtually every other work problem he had experienced over his seven years of employment with the School Board's maintenance department stems from alcoholism. For example, many of the days he missed at work were days following dart tournaments the night before at local establishments that served alcohol. Until the aftermath of his DUI conviction, Mr. Goodrow was ashamed and embarrassed to admit he suffers alcoholism. Today, with the assistance of professional counseling required as condition of probation for the crime of which he has been convicted, Mr. Goodrow is able to admit and freely did so at hearing that he is an alcoholic. The ability to make this admission is a major step forward for Mr. Goodrow. It is unfortunate that Mr. Goodrow's ability to face up to his problem has come so late. Had he admitted the condition when he was encountering problems with attendance at work, there were a number of options available to him and the School Board short of poor performance appraisals, letters of reprimand and suspension. As Dr. Martha O'Howell , Administrator of the School Board's Office of Professional Standards testified, We would have talked to him about the extent of that drinking problem. We would have referred him to . . . Cigna, the health provider. At that time, there was no formalized EAP [Employee Assistance Program] in place that the employee could go directly to, but there was . . . substance abuse counselling (sic) through Cigna that was available. We would have referred him or put him in contact with our risk management department. We would have encouraged him to take a leave of absence while he was seeking treatment, (Tr. 78). depending on the nature of the treatment, the severity, the length and so forth. We would have worked with him to provide a medical leave of absence if that had become necessary. If Mr. Goodrow's suspension were lifted and his employment was reinstated, the School Board's Employee Assistance Program would be available now to help him cope with his alcoholism. School Board personnel are not willing to make such a recommendation, however, in light of all that has occurred in Mr. Goodrow's case. A supervisor in the Maintenance Department expressed concern over the precedent that would be set if Mr. Goodrow were allowed to return to work, particularly in the minds of employees who might think that conduct like Mr. Goodrow's resulted in no meaningful consequences on the part of the School Board. Contrary to the concern of the Maintenance Department, the action taken to date, a suspension without pay that has been in effect now for more than eight months, has resulted in very definite consequences to Mr. Goodrow. In the main, he has been unemployed. He has made reasonable efforts to gain employment. But the loss of his driver's license has held him back. At the time of hearing, what little money he had been able to earn from the time of his suspension was certainly far below what he would have earned had he not been suspended from the employment he had held for more than seven years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the suspension of Dwayne Goodrow be sustained by the Pinellas County School Board but that he be reinstated without back pay if adequate conditions for his return to work can be agreed-to by the parties. If conditions of reinstatement cannot be agreed-to, Mr. Goodrow should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. J. Howard Hinesley Superintendent Pinellas County Schools 301 4th Street Southwest Largo, Florida 33770-2942 Robert G. Walker, Jr., Esquire Pinellas County School Board Attorney 1421 Court Street, Suite F Clearwater, Florida 34616 John W. Bowen, Esquire Pinellas County School Board Attorney 301 4th Street Southwest Largo, Florida 34649-2942 Elihu H. Berman, Esquire Berman & Hobgood, P.A. 1525 South Belcher Road Clearwater, Florida 34624
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent, Richard P. Rost, was employed by the Board as the principal at Rock Lake Middle School. During the week of October 7 through 11, 1991, the Seminole County School District was to perform an FTE survey in accordance with state-mandated guidelines. The purpose of the survey was to perform a head count of the students enrolled in the public school system and to designate an FTE value according to the type of student. The results of the survey were utilized by the state to appropriately distribute funding among the school districts. Students enrolled in special classes receive a higher weighted FTE than those enrolled in regular classes. Teachers are required to execute rolls and to certify the names of the students enrolled in their classes for each period of the surveyed school day. The pertinent survey date for Rock Lake Middle School (Rock Lake) was October 11, 1991. On that date teachers at Rock Lake filled out FTE forms that listed the students enrolled in their classes for each period of the school day. On the morning of October 11, 1991, Respondent administratively reassigned thirteen students from their regular class assignments to the in- school suspension program at Rock Lake. None of the students so assigned met the criteria for placement into the in-school suspension program. Respondent placed the students into the in-school suspension program so that when the FTE survey was performed, the records would show that thirteen students were enrolled in that section. The FTE weight for a student enrolled in an in-school suspension program is greater than the FTE weight for physical education. Several of the students assigned to the in-school suspension program on October 11, 1991, were pulled from their regular physical education classes. Respondent has admitted that he made the class changes on the survey date but maintains he was authorized to do so since the students would receive an educational benefit from the placement, and since the placement might be considered a resource period for the students. Further, Respondent maintains that Willie Holt, the director of middle school education, had indicated that it was mandatory for Rock Lake to have fifteen students in its tutorial program and thirteen students in the dropout prevention program. In order to be placed in the in-school suspension program, a student must have a referral for misconduct that would normally warrant an out-of-school suspension. Additionally, upon completion of the referral form, the student and his parents must complete an in-school suspension contract acknowledging and accepting the placement. No paperwork was completed for the students administratively assigned by Respondent on October 11, 1991. Because students were erroneously placed in the in-school suspension program, they were surveyed based upon the FTE weighted rate of 1.707. Accordingly, unless caught by the state through an audit, or voluntarily disclosed through an amended FTE report, Seminole County Schools would receive a higher level of funding than it was entitled. While Respondent could not personally gain from the FTE report and increased funding, his actions placed the Board in a position of liability for the improper survey results. More critical to this case, however, is the fact that Respondent has never conceded that he made a mistake in placing the students in the in-school suspension program. Respondent directed his staff to respond to the inquiries about the placements even though he knew, or should have known, that the students placed in the in-school suspension program did not meet the criteria for same. Specifically, Ms. Schalls, the guidance director, wrote a letter explaining the assignments for Respondent's signature as a result of the inquiries related to the placements. Because Respondent directed him to accept the students into the class, Mr. Deyling, the in-school suspension teacher, incorrectly completed the FTE forms on the survey date. Because Respondent directed her to pull students from classes to send them to the in-school suspension class, Ms. Shalls, the guidance department director, executed passes for the thirteen students. To her credit, when questioned regarding the appropriate paperwork to support the assignment, Ms. Shalls would not complete the forms. The guidance staff had never, prior to this incident, placed students in the in-school suspension class. Respondent did not direct any school personnel to falsify school records. There was no drop out prevention program in effect at Rock Lake on October 11, 1991, which would have allowed Respondent to administratively assign the students to in-school suspension. The Respondent disregarded the rights of students by placing them in the in-school suspension class when he knew they did not meet the criteria for that placement. The Respondent failed to exercise good judgment in placing the students in the in-school suspension class when he knew they did not meet the criteria for that placement. The Respondent's effectiveness has been seriously impaired by the acts described above. Such acts constitute misconduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the School Board of Seminole County, Florida enter a final order finding the Respondent guilty of misconduct in office and terminating his employment as a principal at Rock Lake. DONE and ENTERED this 17th day of November, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 92-1353 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: Paragraphs 1 through 10, 12 through 17, 20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30 through 33, 35, 40, 41, and 44 are accepted. Paragraph 11 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 18 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The first sentence of paragraph 19 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to the record. Rost maintained he had the authority to make the placements complained of; in truth, he knew or should have known such placements were inappropriate. Paragraph 21 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 24 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 26 is rejected as hearsay or irrelevant. Paragraph 29 is rejected as argument. With regard to paragraphs 34, 36, and 37, it is accepted that Respondent placed the students in the program inappropriately; otherwise rejected as repetitive, unnecessary or irrelevant. Paragraphs 38 and 39 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Respondent requested that an explanation be drafted, he did not request any employee to falsify records or misrepresent what had occurred. Paragraphs 42 and 43 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the- evidence in that Respondent did not direct employees to violate the law. He directed the guidance team to choose students who might benefit from the decisions film to be placed in the class. That such action constituted error is based upon Respondent's indifference to the criteria for in school suspension and his goal of achieving a number in that program for FTE purposes. With the addition of the phrase "or should have known" after the word "knew" paragraph 45 is accepted. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Paragraphs 1, 24, 25, 41, 70, 71, 74, and 80 are accepted. Paragraphs 2 through 10 are rejected as argument, contrary to the weight of credible evidence, or irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 11, it is accepted that Respondent would not financially gain personally from the FTE survey; however, that he would seek to file a false survey suggests that he perceived some benefit from doing so. Otherwise, when questioned initially about the matter he would have confessed error and acted to correct the problem. Paragraphs 12 and 13 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence except as to the statement that Mr. Evans was absent on the survey date. Paragraph 14 is rejected as recitation of testimony not accepted as an ultimate fact of this case. Paragraphs 15 through 18 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 19 through 23 are accepted only to the extent that they suggest Respondent did not direct employees to after-the-fact fabricate records to justify the placement of the students; otherwise, rejected as recitation of testimony, irrelevant, argument or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraphs 26 through 38 are rejected as irrelevant, contrary to the weight of credible evidence, repetitive, or argument. The first sentence of paragraph 39 is accepted; otherwise rejected as irrelevant or recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 42 through 69 are rejected as irrelevant, recitation of testimony not accepted as ultimate fact, contrary to the weight of credible evidence, argument, or unnecessary to the resolution of the issues of this case. Respondent had, prior to the incident complained of, enjoyed a good reputation in the school community and Rock Lake had had no major problems. Had Respondent acted differently in this instance, these proceedings would not have been required as his judgment would not have been made suspect. Paragraphs 72 and 73 are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraphs 75 through 79 are rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence or irrelevant. Paragraphs 81 through 90 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence or argument. COPIES FURNISHED TO: Ned N. Julian, Jr. STENSTROM, McINTOSH, JULIAN, COLBERT, WHIGHAM & SIMMONS, P.A. Post Office Box 4848 Sanford, Florida 32772-4848 Joseph A. Rosier P.O. Box 95017 Lake Mary, Florida 32795 Dr. Paul Hagerty Superintendent of Schools Seminole County School Board 1211 Mellonville Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner has just cause to place Respondent, a classroom teacher, on administrative leave without pay from November 20, 2013, through the remainder of the 2013- 2014 school year due to Respondent’s excessive absenteeism, as alleged in the December 19, 2013, Statement of Charges.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty of operating, controlling, and supervising all free public schools within St. Lucie County, Florida, pursuant to article IX, section 4(b), Florida Constitution, and section 1001.32, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a teacher at PSLHS, a public school in St. Lucie County, Florida. Respondent has been employed by the District for approximately 20 years. Respondent has a professional services contract pursuant to section 1012.33. As a classroom teacher, Respondent is charged with instructing high school students. Regular attendance is considered by Petitioner to be an essential function of the position of classroom teacher. Pursuant to Board Policy 6.549(1)(a), Respondent was entitled to four days of sick leave as of the first day of employment of each school year and thereafter earned one sick day for each month of employment, for a maximum of ten sick days per school year. 2012-2013 School Year During the 2012-2013 fiscal year, Respondent was assigned to teach intensive math classes to students who struggle to pass required state exams required for graduation. Hargadine, in coordination with Petitioner’s Human Resources Department, directed Assistant Principal April Rogers (Rogers) to meet with Respondent on October 2, 2012, to address Respondent’s pattern of absenteeism and the impact it was having on students, and to explore the possibility of accommodations if his frequent absences were caused by a health condition. At least one student asked to be removed from Respondent’s class due to the frequency of Respondent’s absences. As directed, on October 2, 2012, Rogers met with Respondent and discussed Petitioner’s concerns that Respondent’s absences resulted in his students missing math instruction for 39 percent of their scheduled classes. Respondent was notified that he had already exhausted his available sick leave and he had not properly filled out leave requests in a timely manner. During this meeting, Respondent acknowledged that his absences had a negative impact on students. This conference was memorialized in a Summary of Conference dated October 2, 2012, issued to Respondent from Rogers. After the October 2, 2012, meeting, Respondent was also absent on October 16 through 19, 2012. On October 23, 2012, Rogers issued a Letter of Concern to Respondent detailing his continued excessive absenteeism and failure to timely request leave. The letter advised that Respondent’s absenteeism amounted to 17 of 42 instructional days and equated to 40 percent of lost instructional time for Respondent’s students. This letter reiterated that Respondent’s absences directly affect his students’ educational success. In addition to Respondent disrupting the continuity of the classroom by failing to attend work, Respondent also failed to supply adequate lesson plans and/or provide for student instruction while he took unapproved leave. On several occasions, Hargadine or her assistant principal had to create or add to the lesson plans to enable a substitute to teach Respondent’s classes. Respondent’s absenteeism and lack of proper notice of his absences resulted in his students being “taught” by individuals who did not have a college degree in mathematics, or even education, as some of these individuals were substitutes (who only need a high school diploma), para-educators, and even clerical workers. When staff members were required to provide coverage for Respondent’s classes, it negatively impacted both students and co-workers. For example, if a clerical worker or para-educator was called to provide coverage for Respondent’s classes, their own work would have to wait and they would not be able to complete their own specific job duties in order to ensure coverage for Respondent’s students. After receiving the October 23, 2012, Letter of Concern, Respondent was also absent on October 31, November 1, November 2, November 5, and November 6, 2012. As the assistant superintendent for Human Resources, Ranew assists site-based administrators (principals and assistant principals) concerning staff discipline and adherence to policies and procedures. Rogers requested Ranew’s assistance in addressing Respondent’s absenteeism. On November 6, 2012, Ranew issued a letter to Respondent regarding his excessive absenteeism. This letter from Ranew reminded Respondent of the importance of him submitting leave requests because his school would not know of his absence even if he properly requested a substitute teacher using the AESOP (computerized) system. By this letter, Ranew also attempted to initiate the “interactive process” required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Although Respondent had not identified himself as a “qualified individual with a disability” within the meaning of the ADA, his excessive absenteeism suggested that he might need an accommodation if his absenteeism was being caused by a medical condition. The November 6 letter stated, “to the extent that your absenteeism is being caused by medical condition, the District may be agreeable to allowing you to take a leave [of absence] to accommodate such a condition, if that would help. In the event you realize that you are unable to regularly be at work due to a medical condition, you should consider promptly requesting an extended leave of absence (e.g., for this semester or the school year), and the District would be willing to consider such a request.” To determine Respondent’s potential eligibility for an accommodation pursuant to the ADA, Ranew specifically requested that Respondent’s doctor provide documentation clarifying: “a) any specific condition/impairment that Respondent has, as well as the cause; b) any restrictions/limitations on Respondent’s work duties as a teacher; c) the expected duration for each limitation or whether it is permanent; d) whether the condition is controllable with the use of medication, and if yes: what is the mitigating effect of this medication; and whether Respondent could fully perform his job duties, with the aid of such medication.” In response to Ranew’s letter, Respondent provided the District with a doctor’s note from Dr. Kenneth Palestrant dated November 7, 2012, stating that the majority of Respondent’s visits to the clinics occur between the months of January through May and September through December (effectively during the calendar school year) and speculated that Respondent “may” be exposed to allergens in the school building or in his classroom. Dr. Palestrant explained that Respondent was being treated with antibiotics and allergy medications and recommended Respondent receive an allergy test from an allergist to identify the specific allergens. Dr. Palestrant found that other than the potential environmental exposure to an allergen, he found “no reason [Respondent] cannot perform his full duties as a school teacher as he has no impairment and the medications he has been given have no mitigating effect upon his performance.” After receiving Dr. Palestrant’s November 7, 2012, note, and after receiving an e-mail from Respondent in which he wondered if something in his classroom might be causing his medical condition, Ranew asked Sanders to inspect Respondent’s classroom. Sanders’ job duties would require him to facilitate any remedial action with regard to Respondent’s classroom, should one be needed. In response to this request, Respondent’s classroom was inspected but nothing of concern was discovered within the room. Nonetheless, the classroom was sanitized using two methods: with an ozone machine to kill bacteria and other germs, including mold, and also with a fogger using disinfectant that kills microorganisms, bacteria, and mold, as a precaution. On November 15, 2012, Respondent sent an e-mail to Ranew, informing her that he was “being evaluated by an Allergist, and will be setting up a colonoscopy per doctor’s orders Tuesday, [November 20, 2012].” On November 15, 2012, Ranew sent an e-mail to Respondent requesting that he provide her with an allergist report when complete. On November 16, 2012, Respondent sent an e-mail to Ranew in which he discussed beginning to take a new allergy medicine, and promised to fax the allergist report to her. Ranew issued a letter to Respondent dated December 21, 2012, advising him that she had yet to receive an allergist report, again requesting such a report or medical clarification. Ranew’s December 21, 2012, letter also reminded Respondent that regular, consistent, punctual attendance, and working a full assigned workday are essential functions of his position as a classroom teacher. Although Respondent did not request leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), when he failed to provide the requested allergist report five weeks after Ranew requested it, and Respondent continued his pattern of excessive absenteeism, the District advised that it intended to designate his absences as FMLA-qualifying. Ranew’s December 21, 2012, letter to Respondent again requested clarification from Respondent’s doctor/allergist, with a focus on “whether there is a modification or adjustment to the work environment that will enable you to perform the essential functions of [your] position (classroom teacher).” Respondent was told, “[i]n the event that you believe that something such as trees, grass, or something else near your current classroom/school may be causing your condition, which has resulted in many absences, the [School] District is willing to consider a request to transfer you to another location.” Notably, Respondent did not provide any information from a health care provider which suggested any work modification would enable him to perform the essential functions of his job, nor did he take advantage of Petitioner’s offer of a transfer to another location. In response, Respondent emailed Ranew on December 29, 2012, advising that his allergy test would be conducted on January 3, 2013, and he would provide the results to her as soon as he received them. Respondent also expressed interest in obtaining information regarding short-term disability leave. On January 8, 2013, Ranew advised Respondent that if he desired to take leave in connection with his private insurance company’s short-term disability policy, she requested that he advise her “as soon as possible as the [School] District may be able to accommodate you with an extended leave.” There is no evidence that Respondent pursued Ranew’s offer for an accommodation in connection with short-term disability. By letter dated January 8, 2013, Ranew advised Respondent that she still had not received a copy of his allergist’s report, and she “had been trying to accommodate [Respondent], but it is difficult to do when the information [the School District] need[s] is still not provided.” Ranew again reminded Respondent that his students needed continuity in the classroom and, if he was unable to provide that, other arrangements would need to be made for the upcoming semester. Respondent provided Ranew with an allergist report dated January 18, 2013. The report explained that Respondent tested positive for multiple allergens, and recommended treatments, including immunotherapy (allergy injections), prescribed medications (nasal sprays), and surgery (balloon sinuplasty). Respondent’s allergist identified Respondent being allergic to 42 antigens, including cats, dogs, various grasses, weeds, trees, dust mites and cockroaches, and mold. Respondent’s allergist recommended Respondent undergo surgery, and Petitioner permitted Respondent to take FMLA leave for such surgery. Respondent was also permitted to intermittently use all remaining FMLA leave available to him, which he exhausted and which expired on March 28, 2013, due to the conclusion of his FMLA designated 12-month period. In addition to utilizing all FMLA leave available, the District also provided an additional 21 days of unpaid leave during the remainder of the 2012-2013 school year to Respondent, which was above and beyond his allotted sick leave, as well as above and beyond the 60 days of FMLA leave to which he was entitled. During the 2012-2013 school year, Respondent was absent 89 out of 191 possible work days, which accounts for an absenteeism rate of 48 percent. During the 2012-2013 school year, Respondent only worked 772.50 hours. Although Petitioner designated additional unpaid days as FMLA, Respondent was not eligible for additional FMLA leave beginning in March 2013 through March 2014 because he had not worked the requisite number of hours in the preceding 12- month period to be eligible for FMLA leave. 2013-2014 School Year On August 9, 2013, prior to the beginning of the 2013- 2014 school year, Ranew sent a letter to Respondent regarding his excessive absenteeism; explaining that his regular attendance was expected during the upcoming 2013-2014 school year; that his students need continuity in the classroom and if he was unable to provide that continuity, that other arrangements needed to be made for the next school year; that he should not expect to be automatically extended any additional unpaid leave during the 2013-2014 school year; and he would only receive the sick leave to which he was already entitled. Ranew advised Respondent that when he returned for work at the beginning of the 2013-2014 school year he would have four days of permitted sick leave advanced to him, and would accrue one additional day at the end of each month from August through February. In this letter, Ranew also told Respondent that it was her understanding that the sinus surgery that he underwent was part of his treatment plan to resolve the sinus and allergy issues which seriously impacted his attendance (during the 2012- 2013 school year) and that his chronic sinusitis was expected to improve post operatively. Respondent did not challenge or correct Ranew’s understanding on these issues and did not indicate that additional absences were anticipated. Ranew had serious concerns about the lack of consistent instruction for Respondent’s students due to Respondent’s absenteeism. Only 11 of Respondent’s 94 students passed the standardized math examination required for graduation in the 2012-2013 school year, which is approximately a 12 percent pass rate. This was significantly lower than the 50 percent pass rate of Respondent’s colleagues who also taught the same type of “struggling” math students. In order to minimize the potential disruption to students caused by excessive absenteeism, Respondent was assigned to teach accounting classes for the new school year which are not courses required for graduation. Respondent was also assigned to a different classroom, in a different building, for the 2013-2014 school year. As of October 3, 2013, Respondent was absent on August 27, 28, 29, 30, and September 5, 9, 20, 23, 25, 26, and October 2, 2013, well in excess of the sick leave that he was permitted to take in accordance with Board policy. By letter dated October 3, 2013, Ms. Ranew wrote to Respondent advising him that his pattern of absenteeism has a direct negative impact on an orderly learning environment and referring to her August 9 correspondence wherein she directed Respondent to advise the District if he needed leave above and beyond the sick days that he was permitted to take. Ranew advised Respondent that he had not provided the requested medical documentation that would support that he had a medical condition necessitating leave from his job, but that the District was continuing its attempt to engage Respondent in an interactive process concerning his medical condition, and again requested documentation from Respondent’s doctor addressing his recent absences and his current condition. In response to Ranew’s October 3, 2013, letter, Respondent submitted a doctor’s note dated October 9, 2013, which advised that Respondent’s condition “can be treated with nasal sprays and intermittent antibiotics” but raised the potential for future treatment to include additional surgical procedure(s). Importantly, the doctor’s note clearly explained that Respondent “can perform as a teacher with [his medical conditions], though he may notice hearing loss changes whenever he has middle ear fluid.” The October 9, 2013, doctor’s note Respondent submitted accounted for four of his absences in August and two of his absences in September, but failed to address the other eight absences which he incurred during September and October 2013. Even after receiving Ms. Ranew’s October 3, 2013, letter, Respondent was absent on October 9, 21, and 22, 2013. As of October 24, 2013, Respondent was absent 14 days out of 46 instructional days for the 2013-2014 school year. Ranew worked with Yost in the decision to recommend to the Board that Respondent be placed on administrative leave without pay. The basis for that recommendation was Respondent’s excessive absenteeism and failure to follow protocol for sick leave. By letter dated October 24, 2013, Yost advised Respondent that she was recommending his placement on a leave of absence specifically because of his continual excessive absenteeism, which had been a constant disruption to the classroom and directly impacted an orderly, continuous learning environment for his students. Yost believed that recommending Respondent be placed on leave without pay was not disciplinary in nature, but rather done to provide him an accommodation to resolve any issues which had caused his excessive absenteeism. On October 24, 2013, Yost placed Respondent on “home assignment” with pay through November 19, 2013, at which time the Board voted to accept Yost’s recommendation to place Respondent on leave without pay for the remainder of the school year. The Charges Against Respondent In its Statement of Charges in Support of the Placement on Administrative Leave Without Pay filed on December 19, 2013, the District advanced four theories for Respondent’s leave without pay: incompetency, gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, and misconduct in office. “Incompetency” is defined in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-5.056(3) as, “the inability, failure or lack of fitness to discharge the required duty as a result of inefficiency or incapacity.” “Gross insubordination” is defined in rule 6A-5.056(4) as “the intentional refusal to obey a direct order, reasonable in nature, and given by and with proper authority; misfeasance, or malfeasance as to involve failure in the performance of the required duties.” See Fla. Admin. Code R. 6A-5.056(2)(c). “Willful neglect of duty” is defined in rule 6A-5.056(5) as the “intentional or reckless failure to carry out required duties.” “Misconduct in Office,” according to rule 6A-5.056(2), is satisfied by a showing of one or more of the following: a violation of the adopted school board rules, a violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida (as adopted in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.001), or behavior that disrupts the student’s learning environment. The Board’s Policy 6.301(3)(b) identifies a variety of terminable offenses including: Insubordination * * * (x) Failure to follow a direct order in normal performance of employee’s job * * * Failure to notify supervisor and receive permission for one or more consecutive workdays’ absence Unsatisfactory work performance Excessive absences or tardiness Neglect of duty Unauthorized absences * * * (xix) Violation of any rule, policy, regulation, or established procedure * * * (xxix) Any violation of the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession, the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession, the Standards of Competent and Professional Performance, or the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees * * * (xxxiv) Failure to correct performance deficiencies The finding that Respondent violated one and/or multiple Board policies relating to his excessive absenteeism necessarily shows that he is guilty of “misconduct in office.” Respondent’s Defenses Reason for Absences Respondent does not dispute his record of absenteeism or the District’s record of communicating its concern regarding his chronic absenteeism and its effect on his students. Rather, Respondent asserts that his absenteeism was related to the environmental conditions at PSLHS. Respondent believes that he suffered from chronic sinus problems, headaches, and repeated scratchy throats due to possible exposure to mold or other allergens at the school which caused many of his absences. According to Respondent, PSLHS suffered storm damage in 2008 that resulted in mold growing around his classroom door. After school authorities were notified by Respondent of the mold issue, the door and mold was removed. Respondent has not worked in that classroom in more than three years. Respondent admitted that some of his absences during the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years were not related to sinus problems. For example, Respondent missed work when he stayed up late with a new puppy. Respondent also missed work to get massage therapy on several occasions. Several of Respondent’s absences were attributed to stomach issues. None of Respondent’s doctors identified any need for Respondent to be extensively absent from work due to any medical condition, other than his recommended sinus surgery which occurred in early 2013 and was covered by FMLA. No evidence was introduced at the hearing that any of Respondent’s doctors actually determined that anything either at PSLHS or within Respondent’s classroom caused Respondent’s excessive absenteeism, or that Respondent could not work at PSLHS due any medical reason. To the contrary, during the 2012-2013 school year, Respondent provided 30 doctor’s notes returning him to work with no restrictions. During the 2013-2014 school year, Respondent provided four doctor’s notes returning him to work with no restrictions. Respondent admitted he was allergic to various grasses and trees common to Florida, and even admitted he was allergic to the grass in his own yard. When Respondent was asked if anything changed in his home environment between the 2011-2012 and 2012- 2013 school years where his absences skyrocketed, he testified that he had just gotten a puppy. During the relevant time period, approximately 70 percent of Respondent’s absences occurred on days when the proceeding day was not a school day, which suggests it was unlikely that Respondent’s absences were due to the environment at his work site. Although Respondent claimed his school environment exacerbated his allergies, his absences at issue are full-day absences where he called in sick for the entire day rather than leaving work during the workday. At no time did Respondent or his healthcare providers suggest that PSLHS or Respondent’s classroom should have air quality testing. Respondent admitted, on the days he was absent, he felt worse when he woke up at home than when he was at work in his classroom and when he was too sick to come to work he would wake up “hacking.” Further, while on administrative leave without pay, Respondent showed up to PSLHS in January 2014 to oversee a wrestling tournament that he previously helped organize. It is illogical that Respondent would voluntarily return to the very place which he now suggests made him so sick that he needed to continuously take days off without available leave or sick time. No credible evidence was presented to suggest that Respondent’s chronic absenteeism was as a result of the District’s failure “to provide a suitable working environment,” as alleged by Respondent.1/ Use of Administrative Leave Rather Than Discipline The Board asserts that Respondent’s chronic pattern of absences during the 2012-2013 school year and the first few months of the 2013-2014 school year resulted in “just cause” for termination. However, in lieu of termination, Ranew proposed, and the Board accepted, her recommendation for administrative leave without pay. Ranew credibly testified that she believed this would give Respondent the opportunity to take care of any problems that were causing his absenteeism and allow him to successfully return to the classroom in the 2014-2015 school year. There is no provision under any statute, rule, or policy specifically providing the Board with the authority to place an employee on administrative leave without pay instead of a suspension without pay or termination.2/ Because of this, Respondent argues that he was deprived of due process by the Board and that the Board’s action constitutes the improper use of an unpromulgated rule. A “rule” is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as an: agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits any information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal of rule. § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. No evidence was presented regarding any alleged Board “statement of general applicability” regarding the use of administrative leave without pay as a substitute for disciplinary action. Further, it is clear from the record that Respondent received all the process to which he was entitled--notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the implementation of the leave without pay. Respondent was provided a letter by hand delivery on October 24, 2013, from Yost in which he was advised that he was being placed on temporary duty assignment until the next Board meeting and that she intended to recommend he be placed on administrative leave without pay through the remainder of the school year due to his excessive absenteeism. He was notified that he had exhausted all paid leave yet continued to be absent. It was also noted that Respondent’s physician indicated he could perform as a teacher but may have a hearing loss when middle ear fluid is present. Notably, his physician’s letter accounted for four of his absences in August and two of his absences in September 2013, but did not address the other eight absences which he incurred during September and October 2013. This letter advised Respondent that if he had any information to provide regarding why this action should not be taken, he could do so in a meeting or in writing. Accordingly, Respondent had notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the implementation of the leave without pay. Additionally, the Statement of Charges issued on December 19, 2013, and the formal administrative hearing before DOAH constituted notice and an evidentiary hearing-–the post adverse employment action due process to which Respondent was entitled. The undersigned has no doubt about the sincerity of the Board’s desire to see Respondent take time to address whatever was resulting in his absences and return to work successfully. However, to call Respondent’s “administrative leave without pay” a non-disciplinary action is an exercise in form over substance. While on leave, Respondent was not receiving his normal wages for teaching. He was not allowed to return to the school to teach for the balance of the school year.3/ Understandably, Respondent does not perceive his leave as beneficent. For all intents and purposes it is, in fact, a “suspension” without pay which, pursuant to the Board’s policies, applicable rules, and statutes, can only be imposed for “just cause.”4/ Determinations of Ultimate Fact The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Respondent engaged in a pattern of excessive and chronic unexcused absenteeism during the 2012-2013 and 2013-2014 school years, despite the District’s repeated reminders regarding the disruption caused by Respondent’s absences and its multiple attempts to accommodate any medical condition that might have been causing the absences.5/ This pattern resulted in a variety of terminable offenses as described in Board Policy 6.301(3)(b). It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of incompetency, as defined by rule 6A- 5.056(3)(a)5. by virtue of his excessive absenteeism--a pattern which was not resolved after FMLA leave, 21 additional days of leave without pay during the 2012-2013 school year, and which continued into the new school year of 2013-2014. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent is guilty of gross insubordination by virtue of his failure to perform his required duties, excessive absenteeism despite having no paid leave available, and failing to return to work on a consistent and regular basis after repeated and extensive counseling by the District regarding the consequences of his actions. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent engaged in willful neglect of duty by failing to regularly report to work or to properly request time off from work or make arrangements to have lesson plans available for substitute teachers. It is determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Respondent engaged in misconduct in office by virtue of his violation of School Board policies and disrupting his students’ learning environment by his chronic absenteeism.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, St. Lucie County School Board, enter a final order upholding Respondent’s suspension without pay from November 20, 2013, through the end of the 2013- 2014 school year; denying back pay for the full period of his suspension; and reinstating Respondent’s employment as a teacher at the start of the 2014-2015 school year. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of June, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 2014.
The Issue Whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of disability, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Section 760.10 et seq., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Mr. Rivero was first employed by Miami-Dade County in November 1984, apparently as a security guard with the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department. He took a physical examination and informed the doctor conducting the examination that he suffered from cluster migraine headaches and that they occurred about six to eight times each month. Mr. Rivero subsequently left his employment with Miami-Dade County, but was re-hired in September 1986. At the time he was re-hired, he advised the recruiting officer that he suffered from migraine headaches. Mr. Rivero was employed by the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department from September 1986 until August 10, 1999. From January 1996 through May 1999, Mr. Rivero was employed as a park ranger by the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department, and he worked at the Metrozoo. His job responsibilities included patrolling areas of the zoo, assisting in emergencies, providing information to patrons, and providing for the safety of patrons and security for Miami-Dade County property. Because of his migraine headaches, Mr. Rivero often was absent from work, and he was advised several times by his supervisors, in documents entitled Record of Counseling, that the frequency of his absences was unacceptable. The most recent Record of Counseling submitted at the hearing by Mr. Rivero was dated November 24, 1997. On January 10, 1995, Mr. Rivero consulted with Ray Lopez, M.D., a neurologist, about his recurring migraine headaches, which had become more intense and frequent after Mr. Rivero was involved in an automobile accident in November 1994. Dr. Lopez diagnosed Mr. Rivero with migraine headaches, with post-traumatic, likely cervicogenic, intensification. Dr. Lopez treated Mr. Rivero for his headaches from January 1995 until at least December 1999. During this time, Mr. Rivero was seen by Dr. Lopez approximately twice a month. Between 1995 and 1999, Mr. Rivero's migraine headaches continued to intensify in severity and frequency. By January 1999, Mr. Rivero found it increasingly more difficult to carry out his duties as a park ranger at Miami-Dade County's Metrozoo when he had a headache, and his headaches were occurring almost daily. Between January 1999 and March 1, 1999, Dr. Lopez wrote several notes documenting Mr. Rivero's inability to work on specified days because of the headaches. Effective March 29, 1999, Mr. Rivero's work schedule was cut from 39 hours per week to 16 hours per week. Mr. Rivero had previously worked Saturdays through Wednesdays, with Thursdays and Fridays off. As a result of the change, Mr. Rivero was assigned to work on Saturdays and Sundays from 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Mr. Rivero last reported for work at the Metrozoo on or about May 22, 1999. Mr. Rivero was unable to continue working because of the frequency and severity of his headaches. Nonetheless, Mr. Rivero called the Metrozoo office regularly between May 22, 1999, and July 18, 1999, to report that he was absent because of illness. He did not, however, have any intention of returning to work after May 1999 because he believed he could no longer perform the duties required of a park ranger.3 In July 1999, Diane Condon, the personnel manager for Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department, was told by Mr. Rivero's supervisor at the Metrozoo that Mr. Rivero had been absent for quite some time, that he had exhausted his paid leave time, and that the reason for his absences was medical. It was suggested to Ms. Congdon that Mr. Rivero be offered leave under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993. In a letter dated July 12, 1999, from John Aligood, Chief of the Human Resources Division of the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department, Mr. Rivero was notified that he had been preliminarily granted family/medical leave but that he would have to present a certification from his doctor within 15 days of the date he received the letter in order for his eligibility for such leave to be finally determined. Mr. Rivero was advised in the July 12, 1999, letter that continuation of the leave was contingent on receipt of medical certification from his doctor; that he must furnish the certification within 15 days after he received the letter; and that "[f]ailure to do so will result in relinquishing FMLA leave; you will then be required to return to the full duties of your job or resign, or you will be terminated for abandonment of position." The July 12, 1999, letter was sent to Mr. Rivero via certified mail, and he picked it up on July 22, 1999. Mr. Rivero contacted Ms. Congdon on July 22, 1999, and told her that Dr. Lopez was unavailable at that time to complete the medical certification. Ms. Congdon advised him that the medical certification was required for the family/medical leave to continue.4 In a letter dated August 10, 1999, which was prepared by Ms. Congdon, Mr. Rivero was advised that his employment had been terminated for abandonment of position because he had failed to provide the medical certification required for continuation of family/medical leave by July 26, 1999, which was 15 days after July 12, 1999.5 Summary The evidence presented by Mr. Rivero is insufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that his employment as a park ranger with the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department was terminated because of his medical condition. Mr. Rivero himself testified that he believed he was unable to perform the duties required by his job as of May 1999 because of his migraine headaches and that he had no intention of returning to work subsequent to May 1999. The evidence presented by Mr. Rivero is sufficient to support the inference that, prior to July 12, 1999, Mr. Rivero did not advise his supervisor at the Metrozoo or anyone else in the Metropolitan Dade County Park and Recreation Department that he did not intend to return to work after the end of May 1999. His being placed preliminarily on family/medical leave as of July 12, 1999, did not harm Mr. Rivero but, rather, resulted in his health benefits being continued until his termination on August 10, 1999.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief of Ruben Rivero. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of November, 2002.
