Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by James H. Peterson, III, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to the Parties’ Settlement Stipulation and Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. Filed May 29, 2013 9:29 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this ag day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Buréau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this at. day of May, 2013. Vows te Dealer Kicense Administra" ~ NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS ).. 4-. > Nalini Vinzyak, Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jdc Copies furnished: Micahel Khanjahanbakhsh, President Car Store of Altamonte, Inc. 425 Devon Place Heathrow, Florida 32746 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety 2900 Apalachee Parkway, MS61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 William F. Quattlebaum Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS? Fr (™ fer Bf 0° MAY 20 2013 Daot. of Higitsay Sa: Orcs DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner, Case No.: 13-1185 v. CAR STORE OF ALTAMONTE, INC., Respondent. / SETTLEMENT STIPULATION AND MOTION TO RELINQUISH JURISDICTION Petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, and Respondent, Car Store of Altamonte, Inc., stipulate and agree to a settlement of this matter and move for relinquishment of jurisdiction for the purpose of entering a Final Order of the Department incorporating this Settlement Stipulation in the above-styled matter, as follows: 1. Respondent agrees to pay an administrative fine of five hundred dollars ($500). 2. If Respondent pays the amount specified in paragraph one above within the specified time, the Department will impose no further penalties or sanctions against Respondent. However, if Respondent fails to pay the amount specified in paragraph one above on or before the date provided in the Final Order, on the day following the payment date specified, Respondent’s motor vehicle dealer license will be automatically suspended and Respondent will cease to do business as a motor vehicle dealer. 3. If after suspension Respondent pays the amount specified in paragraph one above within 30 days following the date of suspension, its motor vehicle dealer license will : 3 a : : : a a aH ro 7 S ‘ : : : i “ & = . . : : x 7 . . . a “ immediately be reinstated without further penalties or sanctions. However, if Respondent fails to pay the amount due by the 30" day following the date of suspension, on the 31 day following the date of suspension Respondent’s motor vehicle dealer license shall be revoked by the Department without further notice. 4. If the Department suspends or revokes Respondent’s motor vehicle dealer license for non-payment as specified in paragraphs two and three above, said suspension or revocation shall be without recourse to the Respondent and Respondent hereby expressly waives any right to appeal or otherwise contest the suspension and revocation. 5. It is expressly understood that this Settlement Stipulation has no force and effect until the Department enters a Final Order adopting same. 6. Respondent and the Department fully understand that this Settlement Stipulation, and the subsequent Final Order incorporating same, will not in any way preclude additional proceedings by the Department against Respondent for acts or omissions not specifically detailed in the Administrative Complaint filed in this matter. 7. Respondent and the Department expressly waive all further procedural steps and Respondent expressly waives all rights to seek judicial review of or otherwise challenge or contest the validity of this Settlement Stipulation and the Final Order of the Department. 8. Respondent waives the right to seek any attorney’s fees or costs from the Department in connection with this administrative proceeding. WHEREFORE, the parties move the Administrative Law Judge for the entry of an order returning jurisdiction of this matter to the Department. NYS o Signed this 22 214. of, 2013 Signed this 16 day of Nan , 2013. Vudu BAELLLEAE Mehaal FT. levine Michael Khanjahanbakhsh, President AssistantGeneral Counsel Car Store of Altamonte, Inc. Department of Highway Safety 1380 East Altamonte Drive and Motor Vehicles Altamonte Springs, Florida 32701 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida, 32399 Attorney for Petitioner w ue. STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, DIVISION OF MOTORIST SERVICES, ) ) ) ) Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 13-1185 ) CAR STORE OF ALTAMONTE, INC., ) ) Respondent. ) ) ORDER CLOSING FILE AND RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION This cause having come before the undersigned on the Settlement Stipulation and Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, and the undersigned being fully advised, it is, therefore, ORDERED that: 1. The final hearing scheduled for June 7, 2013, is canceled. 2. The file of the Division of Administrative Hearings is closed. Jurisdiction is relinquished to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. DONE AND ORDERED this 21st day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Witton Fo Quatteban WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Clark, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-430 2900 Apalachee Parkway, Mail Stop 61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 dennisvalente@flhsmv.gov Michael Khanjahanbakhsh Car Store of Altamonte, Inc. 425 Devon Place Heathrow, Florida 32746
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order pursuant to an order closing the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The record reflects that the parties have settled their dispute and entered into a Settlement Stipulation, which Settlement Stipulation is hereby adopted by reference. Having reviewed the stipulation and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 1. Respondent has admitted the allegations of the administrative complaint in this matter. 2. Respondent has agreed to pay and has paid a civil fine of $2,000.00 by certified cashier’s check, receipt of which is acknowledged by the Department. 3. Each party will bear its own costs and attorney fees. 4. In order to prevent similar violations occurring in the future, Respondent shall abide by the following in operating its dealership: Respondent shall refrain from advertisements utilizing descriptions for vehicle condition such as mint condition, flawless, perfect and any other statements that may be deceptive and unfair if it is likely to mislead a consumer who is acting reasonably under the circumstances. Failure to abide by these procedures will constitute grounds for suspending or revoking Respondent’s license or imposing 4... fine. DONE AND ORDERED this YA day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ) L A. FORD, Dire Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division 9% Motor Vehicles this £27 day of July, 2009. Copies furnished: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Senior Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Rm. A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Craig Hallman Executive Auto Leasing of South Florida, Inc. 2912 South Ocean Bivd. Highland Beach, Florida 33431 Errol H. Powell _Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Diane Buck Regional Administrator, DMV Region IX William Camper Hearing Officer Division of Motor Vehicles Billy Rankin Chief, Bureau of Field Operations Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by James H. Peterson, III, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to the Parties’ Settlement Stipulation and Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. Filed May 24, 2013 12:32 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this at day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Pudon.. Baker, Chief Biireau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Florida. Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this ay day of May, 2013. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer Kicense Adisiet-= NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jdc Copies furnished: Richard M. Nye Nyes Auto Sales Post Office Box 217 Callahan, Florida 32011 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety 2900 Apalachee Parkway, MS61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 James H. Peterson, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in violation of Sections 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Beard Equipment Company, Inc., sells and maintains heavy equipment in Panama City, Florida. The Petitioner, Robert G. Harrison began employment with the Respondent in Panama City, Florida, in September, 1988. The Petitioner was employed as a janitor. Petitioner's duties included running numerous and varied errands which required driving of a motor vehicle. In April of 1989, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication for what he indicated was a bipolar disorder. However, at the hearing, Petitioner produced no expert testimony to establish that he was mentally handicapped or had bipolar disorder. At that time, Respondent became aware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Later, Petitioner was hospitalized in order to adjust his medication on two more occasions in 1989, and twice in 1992. On each occasion the Respondent accommodated Petitioner by making arrangements to hire temporary employees or readjust other employees' duties so that they could perform Petitioner's duties while he was hospitalized. In early 1992, the Respondent's liability insurance company conducted a random audit of employee driving records. The Respondent was notified by its insurance company that no coverage would be provided for any accident where the employee/driver had a DUI conviction. This random audit prompted Respondent to conduct a complete company- wide internal audit of driving records of all employees. The driving record audit resulted in some transfers for those employees for whom driving was an essential part of their job duties, but whose driving records would prohibit them from being covered under Respondent's liability policy. Employees who could not fulfill the duties of a non-driving position were terminated. Respondent could not afford to allow employees to drive who could not be insured by Respondent's liability carrier. The in-house driving record audit revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction on his record. Respondent had no other non-driving positions for which the Petitioner was qualified. Respondent was therefore forced to discharge the Petitioner since he could no longer fulfill the duties of his employment. Petitioner was discharged in November of 1992. When Petitioner was terminated, Petitioner was advised by Mark Veal, his supervisor, that the driving record audit had revealed that Petitioner had a DUI conviction, and because he would not be covered under the company insurance policy, they had no alternative but to discharge him. Within a day or so, Petitioner's wife called and requested his discharge letter in writing. Veal prepared the letter, indicating that due to Petitioner's medical history, his operating a motor vehicle would be too much of a liability. Although the real reason for Petitioner's discharge and the reason given him at the time was the DUI conviction, Veal tried to write the discharge letter in such a way as to minimize any embarrassment for the Petitioner due to his DUI conviction. Therefore, the termination letter does not support the conclusion that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on a mental handicap. In fact, there was no substantial evidence that Respondent terminated Petitioner based on a mental handicap. The evidence clearly showed Respondent was terminated for his driving record and his lack of qualifications to fill any other non-driving position. Moreover, Petitioner failed to establish that his position was filled by a person not in a protected class or that Respondent is an employer employing more than 15 employees. Given these facts, Petitioner has not established a prima facie case that Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his alleged handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act and that the petition be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has committed unlawful housing discrimination against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Waterford Crossing is a development comprising 80 townhomes in Broward County, Florida. Respondent is a homeowners' association consisting of the owners of the 80 townhomes. Respondent is governed by the homeowners and their elected Board of Directors and the officers appointed by the Board. At all relevant times, William Shaw has been the Vice President of Respondent. Diana Arguinzoni del Toro is a female who purchased a townhome at Waterford Crossing in 1997 and has lived there continuously since that time. At all relevant times, Mr. Shaw resided in a townhome across the street from the townhome of Ms. del Toro. Parking is limited at Waterford Crossing. Illegally parked cars, which may consist of vehicles parked outside of marked parking areas or vehicles in marked parking areas, but without the appropriate permit, pose a serious problem. At times, emergency vehicles have been unable to access parts of Waterford Crossing due to illegally parked vehicles. From time to time, Respondent hires a towing company to tow illegally parked vehicles from Waterford Crossing. Immediately after so-called "towing nights," residents and guests tend to comply with applicable parking rules, but, over time, compliance lessens. When the number of parking complaints rises sufficiently, Respondent hires a towing company to conduct another "towing night." It is unnecessary to consider in detail the parking rules of Waterford Crossing. On the evening of March 24, 2004, Ms. del Toro's car was legally parked, as the parking rules have been applied, in a guest space near her townhome. This happened to be a "towing night," although this fact was unknown to Ms. del Toro. As is its practice, Respondent's Board of Directors advised an employee of its property manager to conduct a towing night, and the property manager requested the towing company to tow illegally parked vehicles from Waterford Crossing that night. The diligence and care exercised by the towing company in conducting towing nights left something to be desired. Routinely, the company would tow fewer than all of the vehicles illegally parked at Waterford Crossing, as it proceeded to other sites to serve the towing needs of more profitable customers. From time to time, the company would tow a legally parked vehicle, such as a vehicle parked in a marked space and bearing a suitable parking permit. On the evening in question, towing company's lack of diligence and care combined to result in the towing of Ms. del Toro's car, despite the fact that it bore a suitable parking permit and was legally parked, and in the failure to tow other vehicles that were illegally parked. The removal of Ms. del Toro's car resulted from the failure of the tow truck operator to notice her parking sticker. The failure to remove illegally parked vehicles resulted from the operator's decision to begin and end towing night with the removal of Ms. del Toro's car. Ms. del Toro attributed the improper towing of her car to Mr. Shaw because, in the summer of 2002, he had made an unwelcome sexual advance to her while in her home. At that time, while they were alone, Mr. Shaw twice pulled the front of her blouse, in the vicinity of her breasts, in an apparent attempt to embrace or kiss her. Ms. del Toro firmly rebuffed him, and she and Mr. Shaw, who had previously maintained a neighborly relationship, no longer spoke to each other. Ms. del Toro subsequently perceived another instance of discriminatory treatment in the maintenance of her landscaping, but the evidence provides no basis to attribute this to Mr. Shaw. The evidence does not link Mr. Shaw to any shortcomings in the maintenance of vegetation on Ms. del Toro's lot, as compared to the maintenance of vegetation on the lots of other owners. Similarly, there is no more basis to attribute the towing incident to Mr. Shaw than to the incompetence of the tow truck operator, which was later fired by the property manager due to its inability to tow sufficient vehicles on "towing nights." Mr. Shaw was at work at Miami International Airport on the night of the towing incident. Additionally, the passing of nearly two years between the unwelcome sexual advance and the claimed retribution--without earlier proved instances of retribution by Mr. Shaw--militates strongly against the interpretation of the towing incident offered by Ms. del Toro and shared by Petitioner. However, Mr. Shaw's longtime status as an officer of Respondent, his unwelcome sexual advance, and his personal involvement in at least one previous "towing night," coupled with the incompetence of the towing company in improperly removing Ms. del Toro's car, constitute a reasonable basis in law and fact supporting the theory of Ms. del Toro and Petitioner that Mr. Shaw had discriminated against Ms. del Toro, Although their theory proved unsupported by the evidence, Petitioner's commencement of this proceeding was substantially justified, so as to preclude the award of attorney's fees against Petitioner.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Vicki Denise Johnson Attorney for Petitioner Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas F. Luken Attorney and Counselor at Law 1290 East Oakland Park Boulevard Suite 200 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33334
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order pursuant to submission of an Order Closing File by Lawrence P. Stevenson, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings,. The record reflects that the parties have settled their dispute and entered into a Settlement Stipulation. Having reviewed the stipulation and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 1. On or about May 6, 2011, Respondent paid a civil fine of $500.00 by certified cashier’s check. 2. The Settlement Stipulation of Petitioner and Respondent is adopted and incorporated into this Final Order of the Department in accordance with its terms. Respondent shall comply with all terms and conditions herein. Filed May 24, 2011 2:46 PM Division of Administrative Hearings DONE AND ORDERED this at day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Copies furnished: Carl Broglin Post Office Box 3683 Ocala, Florida 34478 Lawrence P. Stevenson Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dwight Davis, Bureau Chief Division of Motor Vehicles Wayne Jordan, Program Manager License Installer Program Ubld . Lambert, Interim Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this aeeaay of May, 2011. Nalini Vinayak, Dealer weconse Administrator
The Issue The Petitioner appeals the disapproval of its license transfer application by the Respondent. Hence the issue posed is whether or not the Respondent unlawfully disapproved the application for transfer on the grounds that "the location failed to qualify for zoning approval" within the meaning of Section 561.18, F.S. The premises sought to be licensed is located at 1480 South Ocean Boulevard, Pompano Beach, Florida. The former name of the business was Paddock International, Inc., d/b/a Paddock International. The proposed name of the new business is Jacob's Ladder, Inc., d/b/a Jacob's Ladder. When the application for transfer was submitted to the Division of Beverage for approval, it was rejected on May 19, 1976, for, as previously stated, the reason that it "failed to qualify for zoning approval", citing Section 561.18, F.S., as amended. The disapproval was appealed and the matter is now before the undersigned to determine whether or not the applicants and the premises met all of the qualifications required in the beverage law. The Petitioner takes the position that the Respondent's and County Zoning Board's action amounts to arbitrary and capricious conduct and that in no instance, has zoning approval been required in license approval situations. C. Lloyd, Respondent's representative and employee for approximately eight years, testified that he processes approximately 600 license applications yearly of which approximately 40 to 50 percent represent transfer applications. Based on his experience, the Petitioner's application is the only transfer application requiring zoning approval. He was advised during his investigation by a Mr. Kauth that the Broward County Zoning Board acted on a previous mix-up in the type of license which was previously issued and the county was misinformed in giving zoning approval to the prior licensee. He testified further that in almost all cases no inspection is made as to whether or not the particular premises meets the zoning requirements in transfer application situations. By way of background, the record evidence reveals that the license was initially issued to the owners of the premises sought to be licensed here on or about January 4, 1960. Since that time, approximately 21 licenses have been issued and/or renewed and at no time has zoning ever surfaced as a problem. The most recent zoning certificate was dated December 4, 1974 and the zoning was satisfactory at that time. George Maurer, Chief of Zoning Inspection for Broward County and who has served as the Zoning Chief for the past three years testified that he supervises personnel in the zoning department and is charged with maintaining records; overseeing and enforcing zoning procedures. He recalled being asked to sign the zoning approval form for the subject premises and he refused in that there was no certificate on file and according to his testimony, such must be current with the present owner's name contained thereon. He admitted that the prior zoning approval certificate had not been revoked either administratively or otherwise and that there was no hearing as to any proposed revocation or notice of any intent to revoke the current zoning approval certificate. The zoning approval was withheld here due to the inadequate parking spaces and for violations of the South Florida Building Code and numerous other code violations. To the best of his knowledge, the code violations had been corrected with the exception of a sign which was erected on the premises sought to be licensed. When Petitioner filed its application for transfer of license from the previous owners, he was advised that there existed 47 parking spaces, however, based on a field examination conducted by him on August, 1976, his inspection revealed that there were only 38 parking spaces. On cross examination he testified that there has been no change in the zoning regulations from the time of issuance of the prior zoning certificate through the time that the disapproval was given for the license application in question. Robert R. Krauth, Deputy County Administrator of Broward County, testified he mailed a mailgram to beverage agent Joseph J. Scozzafava and advised that the zoning certificate had been improperly granted for the premises sought to be licensed under the previous ownership. The testimony is that he had no knowledge that zoning certificates were required in transfers and that to his knowledge no steps had been taken to close the restaurant due to these alleged inadequacies. On cross examination he testified that he had some knowledge that the use of the premises had changed however he had no evidence on that point. He received no complaints from Jacobs Ladder and to his knowledge the sole problem centered around the inadequate parking spaces. George C. Gatterer, 2/ an employee of Broward County Board of County Commissioners and the Assistant Director of General Services for the zoning department, testified that the area is located in a R-6 zoning area. The zoning certificate could not be approved for the subject premises based on the "improper parking spaces". He was aware of no regulation which required that new zoning certificates be changed based solely on a name change. He knew the former compliance officer, Smith, who certified that the property had been in compliance during the prior periods in which the zoning approval had been certified. Other evidence revealed that the parking lot had not changed nor had the use changed and that prior licensees had no problem getting licenses transferred. Petitioner's agents attempted to obtain parking in contiguous areas but were unable to obtain such.
Findings Of Fact Based on the record evidence, it is clear that the request for a new zoning certificate was a new procedure utilized by the Division of Beverage in the subject case. Respondent's own witness testified that he was in charge of processing most license transfers and that he was aware of no other application in which a zoning certificate was required in order to gain transfer approval from the Respondent. The evidence further revealed that the same number of parking spaces, at least in terms of footage, now exist as has existed when zoning approval was given in the earlier situations. This situation has existed for more than 16 years and the county's witness who is in charge of the zoning approval testified that there has been no change in the zoning regulations since the issuance of the most recent zoning certificate in 1974. Evidence further reveals that at no time did the Petitioner receive and notification that the prior zoning approval was being withdrawn either administratively or otherwise, nor was any notice given of an intent to revoke the prior zoning approval. Based on these facts, the undersigned concludes that the requirement that a zoning approval be submitted along with the transfer application in this case represented a marked departure from the existing rules, regulations and procedures of the Division of Beverage, and amounted to a denial of due process. Based thereon I shall recommend that the transfer application be approved since, in my opinion, based on the evidence presented, the premises possess the requisite qualifications as required by the beverage law. It thus appears that Respondent's failure to approve the application for reasons advanced cannot stand and I shall recommend that the approval be issued forthwith.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions of law, I recommend that the Department of Business Regulations, Division of Beverage, approve the application submitted in the subject case. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Columbia Motor Sales, is a motor vehicle dealer licensed under Section 320.27, Florida Statutes. Respondent is owned solely by Jose B. Menna. In order to obtain the license, Menna completed an application for licensure on behalf of Respondent and filed it with DMV on July 5, 1991. The license was issued the same day. On the application, which was signed by Menna under oath, Menna answered "NO" to the following questions: Has the applicant or any partner or corporate officer or director: Been arrested on a felony or equivalent charge anywhere? Been convicted of a felony or equivalent charge anywhere? As required by Section 320.37(3), Florida Statutes, DMV obtained fingerprints from Menna and submitted them to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for confirmation of Menna's criminal record. The FBI's criminal history report shows that Menna was arrested for the felonies of receiving stolen property and assault with a deadly weapon and was convicted of the felony assault charge. If an applicant shows an arrest or conviction on his dealer license application, DMV's policy does not require an automatic denial. If only an arrest is shown, DMV conducts a further investigation to determine the applicant's fitness for licensure. If a conviction is shown, DMV would also investigate the seriousness and nature of the offense, whether the applicant's civil rights had been restored, and the surrounding circumstances before DMV would make a determination on the application. When an applicant does not reveal prior arrests or convictions on his application and DMV discovers their existence, DMV notifies the licensee and gives him an opportunity to submit documentation to clear the matter up informally. DMV did send Menna a letter advising him that there was a problem with his criminal record. The letter required Menna to provide information and documents regarding these criminal events within 20 days. It further stated that "Failure to respond to this letter will result in an administrative proceeding to revoke you license." Menna acknowledges that he received the letter, but he went to Guatemala for five weeks to sell cars and did not respond to the letter. After he returned, he says that he tried to call DMV, but at no time did he ever provide documents regarding these arrests and conviction. In fact, even at the hearing, he had no such documents with him. DMV's policy and position is that an applicant's failure to disclose and truthfully answer the questions on the application raises serious questions as to the applicant's honesty and integrity in dealing with the public. Menna testified that if he'd known that there were records showing the arrests and conviction, he would have answered the questions on the application "YES." He admits knowing that he had been arrested and convicted as the records show, but believed the records no longer existed. It is found that Menna was not honest when he denied having been arrested or convicted, because he knew of the existence of the arrests and conviction at the time he denied them. The question was simple and straightforward. Menna believed that his denial would not be a lie as long as no records existed to show the arrest and conviction. Menna was wrong in this belief.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of Motor Vehicles, enter a Final Order and therein revoke the motor vehicle dealer license of Columbia Motor Sales. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1788 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Division of Motor Vehicles Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-7(1-7), 8 & 9(7), and 10- 13(8-11). Proposed finding of fact 14 is unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman Assistant General Counsel Division of Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, A-432 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0504 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Room B439, Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 Stephen M. Witt Attorney at Law Post Office Box 2064 Lake City, FL 32056
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Florida Fair Housing Act by discriminating against Petitioner based on her sex, national origin, and/or handicap by the manner it enforced its vehicle parking rules.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an 81-year-old female who is a native of Peru. Petitioner does not speak, write, or read English. Petitioner and her late husband were owners and residents of a condominium unit managed by Respondent. Petitioner continued to own and reside in the unit after her husband's death in September 2009. Petitioner and her husband had ten children, two of whom are Patricia Ramirez and Gloria Silva. At the time of his death, Petitioner's husband owned an automobile that he had properly registered with Respondent. Following her husband's death, Petitioner inherited the automobile he had owned. Petitioner does not drive and does not have a driver's license. On September 17, 2009, the title to the car was changed into the names of Petitioner and Gloria Silva. Gloria Silva has not been recognized by Respondent as a "resident" of Petitioner's unit.2 Respondent's rules and policies are set forth in a "Handbook of Rules and Regulations" (the Handbook). Respondent's vehicle parking policies begin on page 28 of the Handbook. Respondent's parking policies for a "Resident Parking Decal" provide, in relevant part, as follows: A "Resident" as set forth in these regulations is a person who has been registered at the Management Office and has been approved by the Association to live in the Unit whether it is an owner or a tenant. All vehicles of Residents parked in the Condominium Property must have a "Resident PARKING DECAL" [sic]. This permit consists of a decal containing a number that is placed on the outside top or bottom left- side corner of the rear glass of the vehicle. For your protection, this decal shall be applied to the glass by an Association Representative only. Only Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. . . .. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Residents' name. There will be a $25.00 refundable deposit for every Resident Parking Decal issued. Failure to return the Decal to the Management Office upon selling and/or disposing of his/her vehicle (including total loss due to an automobile accident) or moving out of the Property, such $25.00 shall be forfeited. . . . If the Resident sells or in any other way disposes of a vehicle to which a Resident Parking Decal was previously issued, that Resident must remove and bring to the Management Office such Resident Parking Decal before a new Resident Parking Decal is issued for a new vehicle. Gary Mars, an attorney representing Respondent, advised Petitioner by letter dated September 10, 2009, that she was in violation of Respondent's vehicle parking policy and its occupancy policy. As to the parking policy, the letter provided, in relevant part, as follows: The Rules and Regulations state that "[o]nly Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. Absentee owners who lease their units are not entitled to having a Resident Parking Decal. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Resident's name. " . . . This correspondence serves as . . . demand that any and all guests of your Unit cease and desist utilizing a resident parking decal immediately upon receipt of this communication and secure the appropriate parking decals from the Property Management Office. Mr. Mars wrote a second letter to Petitioner on November 9, 2009, containing the following demand: This letter is being provided in order to notify you as to a recently recognized violation of the Declaration of Condominium which requires your immediate attention. Specifically, the Association has recognized that the vehicle registered to your deceased husband continues to maintain a residents [sic] parking decal even though the vehicle is utilized by your daughter, Ms. Gloria Silva, who is not a resident of the Condominium. Therefore, this use of a decal is improper and in violation of the Association's controlling documents. The Rules and Regulations state that "[o]nly Residents actually living all year round in the Condominium Property and owning a valid driver's license will be issued a Resident Parking Decal. Absentee owners who lease their units are not entitled to having a Resident Parking Decal. Only one vehicle is allowed per Resident with a valid driver's license and a Vehicle Registration to such vehicle issued in the Resident's name. " Notice is hereby provided of this violation. Specifically, the Association is demanding that your guest permanently cease and desist utilizing a resident parking decal, and remove and return the decal within seventy-two hours of this communication to the Property Management Office. In the event you and your guests fail to comply with the request as set forth herein, the Association may have no alternative but to enforce the Rules and Regulations which may include the towing and removal of the vehicle . . . By letter dated December 31, 2009, Mr. Mars wrote to Petitioner a third and final letter, styled "Final Demand," repeating his notice that the vehicle would be towed if she did not comply with the resident parking policy. On the following dates Respondent had Petitioner's vehicle towed from the condominium property: January 19, January 22, and February 9, 2010. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was out-of-compliance with Respondent's resident parking policy. There was no evidence that Petitioner ever surrendered the Resident Parking Decal that remained on the vehicle after her husband died. There was no evidence that Petitioner filed an application reflecting the change of ownership of the vehicle following her husband's death or paid the application fee for a new decal.3 There was no evidence that Respondent knew or should have known that Petitioner was handicapped or disabled.4 There was no evidence that Respondent's enforcement of its parking policies was motivated by Petitioner's sex, national origin, or handicap.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2011.
