The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of age for the reasons stated in the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was born in 1953. At the time of the events which form the basis for his claim, he was more than forty years old. The Petitioner was born in Cuba and spent most of his life in Cuba. The Petitioner came to the United States of America approximately two years before the events which form the basis for his claim. The Petitioner speaks fluent Spanish, but does not speak English. In October of 1999, the Petitioner was hired by the City of Hialeah Gardens as a laborer in the Parks Department at a pay rate of $6.50 per hour. The Petitioner is still employed by the City of Hialeah Gardens as a laborer in the Parks Department at a pay rate of $6.50 per hour. The Petitioner's pay rate has never been changed during his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens. During his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens, the Petitioner has never held either the position of "Maintenance Supervisor" or the position of "Assistant Parks Director." During his employment with the City of Hialeah Gardens, the Petitioner has never been demoted from either the position of "Maintenance Supervisor" or the position of "Assistant Parks Director." The Mayor of the City of Hialeah Gardens has the sole authority and responsibility to make employment decisions. The Mayor appointed Nivaldo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to the position of Assistant Parks Director. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez was in his late twenties. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez spoke fluent English and Spanish. At the time of the appointment, Rodriguez was a friend of the Mayor and the Mayor was aware of his qualifications for the position. The Mayor appointed Rodriguez to the position of "Assistant Parks Director" because he thought he was qualified for the position. The Mayor also thought that the Petitioner was not qualified for the position because, among other things, the Petitioner did not speak English. It is necessary to be able to speak English in order to fulfill all of the duties of the position of "Assistant Parks Director." The Mayor had credible non-discriminatory reasons to appoint Rodriguez as "Assistant Park Director," and not to appoint the Petitioner to that position. There is no credible evidence that the Mayor's reasons for appointing Rodriguez were pretextual. Age was not a factor in the decision to appoint Rodriguez rather than the Petitioner. The evidence regarding the Respondent's hiring and termination practices does not establish any pattern of age based discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the petition in this case and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2002.
The Issue The issues are (1) whether the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner was timely under Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, and (2) whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 when it terminated Petitioner's employment as a retail sales associate in May 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Parties Petitioner is an African American female. During the period of time at issue in this proceeding (i.e., January through May 1998), Petitioner was 49 years old. Respondent is a retail department store chain with stores located throughout Florida, including a store in Oviedo, Florida. Respondent is an employer subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner's Employment With Respondent On or about January 30, 1998, Petitioner was hired by Respondent to work as a retail sales associate in Respondent's Oviedo store. She was originally assigned to work in the women's clothing department. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by Heidi Jensen, a white female. Ms. Jensen was the assistant sales manager responsible for the women's clothing department, and was Petitioner's direct supervisor throughout the course of Petitioner's employment. Petitioner was hired as a part-time employee at a rate of $9.00 per hour. As a part-time employee, she worked approximately 20 hours per week. Petitioner's schedule was flexible; she worked eight hours on some days and four hours or less on others. She was typically scheduled on the closing shift (i.e., nights), rather than the opening shift. On February 7, 1998, Petitioner signed a certification indicating that she had read and agreed to abide by Respondent's work rules and policies. Those rules include the following directive, hereafter referred to as "Work Rule 10": Associates must exhibit positive behavior toward their job, Management, supervisors, and co-associates in all of their actions and speech. Customers must always be treated courteously. Anything to the contrary will not be tolerated. On February 8, 1998, Petitioner attended a general orientation at which the work rules and policies were discussed. That orientation was also attended by other recently-hired employees, including non-African American employees. Petitioner received additional training from Respondent throughout her employment, including customer service and sales training and direction for handling merchandise returns. That training was also provided to other employees, including non- African American employees. Petitioner never received formal training on how to "open" the store. However, as noted above, Petitioner typically worked during the closing shift rather than the opening shift. Slightly more than a month into her employment, Petitioner's co-workers began complaining about her unprofessional behavior. The complaints alleged that Petitioner yelled at co-workers; that she initiated arguments with co- workers in front of customers regarding who should get credit for the customer's purchases; that she referred to the customers in the woman's department (which caters to larger women) as "fat pigs"; that she stole customers from her co-workers; that she referred to some of her co-workers as "vultures" and others as "bitches" or "wolves," often in front of or within "earshot" of customers; and that she generally upset or harassed co-workers through her attitude and derogatory comments. The complaints came from eight different co-workers, at least one of whom was an African American female. The complaints were made in writing by the co-workers, typically through signed, hand-written statements given to Ms. Jensen or the store manager. Petitioner denied making any of the statements or engaging in any of the conduct alleged in the complaints. In response to the complaints, she took the position that she was being "singled out" by her co-workers because her aggressive tactics made her a more successful salesperson than most of her co-workers. Despite Petitioner's denials, Ms. Jensen determined that disciplinary action was appropriate based upon her investigation of the complaints. Ms. Jensen gave Petitioner a verbal warning "concerning using a positive attitude towards merchandise and customers" on March 7, 1998, and she gave Petitioner a formal written warning for her lack of positive attitude towards customers and co-workers on March 19, 1998. Both warnings cited Work Rule 10 as having been violated. Despite the warnings, Petitioner's conduct continued to generate complaints from her co-workers. She received another verbal warning from Ms. Jensen on April 17, 1998, and she received a formal written warning from the store manager on April 22, 1998. Again, the warnings cited Work Rule 10 as having been violated. Petitioner continued to deny any wrongdoing. She again claimed that she was being "targeted" by her co-workers because of their "jealousy and envy" over her success as a salesperson. The April 22, 1998, written warning stated that "[i]f there is one more report of negativity or verbal abuse of customers or associates, [Petitioner] will be terminated." It also enumerated Respondent's "expectations" with respect to Petitioner's conduct, including a requirement that Petitioner "never confront an associate in front of a customer" (emphasis in original). At some point after the April 22, 1998, written warning, Petitioner was transferred from the women's department to the casual department to give her a "clean slate" with her co-workers. Despite the transfer, Petitioner's co-workers continued to complain about her behavior. The complaints were of the same nature as the complaints discussed above, e.g., stealing sales from other co-workers and initiating confrontations with co-workers over customers in the customer's presence. On May 22, 1998, Petitioner and a co-worker, Brenda Ross, "had words" over a customer. When confronted about the incident by Ms. Jensen, Petitioner "was loud and aggressive" towards her. As a result of this incident and the prior warnings, Ms. Jensen recommended that Petitioner's employment be terminated. The store manager accepted Ms. Jensen's recommendation, and, Petitioner was terminated on May 22, 1998. Thus, the term of Petitioner's employment with Respondent was less than four months. After she was fired, Petitioner returned to her work station to retrieve her belongings. While doing so, she confronted Ms. Ross and called her a "lying bitch" (according to Petitioner's own testimony at the hearing) or something similarly derogatory.1 There are no videotapes of the incidents described above. None of the co-workers who reported the incidents testified at the hearing. Nevertheless, the co-worker's contemporaneous hand-written reports of the incidents which were received into evidence (Respondent's Exhibits 21-30) are found to be credible based upon their general consistency and the corroborating testimony of Ms. Jensen at the hearing. By contrast, Petitioner's testimony regarding the incidents was not credible. There is no credible evidence to support Petitioner's allegations that she was denied the opportunity to file complaints against her co-workers. Nor is there any credible evidence that Petitioner did file complaints (alleging discrimination or anything else) which were ignored by Respondent's management. By all accounts, Petitioner was a good salesperson; her sales per hour were high and, on several occasions, they were the highest in the department where she was working. Ms. Jensen complemented Petitioner on at least one occasion for her high level of sales. Petitioner was also punctual and had a good attendance record. She was on track to receive a pay increase at her next review. However, as a result of the unprofessional behavior detailed above, she was fired prior that review. Petitioner is currently unemployed. She has not held a job since she was fired by Respondent in May 1998. However, she has only applied for four or five other jobs since that time. Petitioner's Discrimination Claim Petitioner first contacted the Commission regarding her allegation that Respondent discriminated against her on or about June 29, 1998. On that date, she filled out the Commission's "intake questionnaire." On the questionnaire, she indicated that she had sought assistance from attorney Anthony Gonzales, Jr. (Attorney Gonzales) regarding the alleged discrimination by Respondent. Petitioner also listed Attorney Gonzales as her representative on the "intake inquiry form and complaint log" completed on or about July 10, 1998. Petitioner consulted with Attorney Gonzales in April 1998, prior to her termination. Although Petitioner claimed at the hearing that Attorney Gonzales did not agree to represent her beyond the initial consultation, Petitioner provided the Commission a copy of Attorney Gonzales' business card and a copy of the check by which Petitioner paid Attorney Gonzales' consultation fee with the Commission's intake documents. Based upon those documents, the Commission apparently (and reasonably) assumed that Attorney Gonzales was Petitioner's attorney because it subsequently directed various letters to Petitioner "c/o Anthony Gonzales, Jr., Esq." at Attorney Gonzales' address. Petitioner filed her formal charge of discrimination on November 9, 1998. The charge did not reference Attorney Gonzales. Nevertheless, on December 7, 1998, the Commission sent a letter to Petitioner "c/o Anthony Gonzales, Jr., Esq." at Attorney Gonzales' address confirming receipt of the charge of discrimination. The record does not include any correspondence from Attorney Gonzales to the Commission in response to the December 7, 1998, confirmation letter. However, Attorney Gonzales continued to receive correspondence from the Commission regarding Petitioner's charge of discrimination after that date. On February 2, 1999, the Commission sent a letter to Petitioner "c/o Anthony Gonzales, Esq." at Attorney Gonzales' address indicating that Petitioner's charge of discrimination had been pending for over 180 days and identifying the options available to Petitioner. The letter was accompanied by an "election of rights" form which was to be completed and returned to the Commission. Attorney Gonzales apparently forwarded the form to Petitioner because Petitioner completed and signed the form and returned it to the Commission on June 17, 1999. This strongly suggests that there was an attorney-client relationship between Attorney Gonzales and Petitioner at the time. Indeed, if there was no attorney-client relationship, either Petitioner or Attorney Gonzales would have informed the Commission in connection with the return of the form that Attorney Gonzales was not representing here. However, neither did. The record does not include any additional communications between the Commission and Petitioner and/or Attorney Gonzales between June 1999 and August 2001. Notably absent from the record is any notice to the Commission that Attorney Gonzales was no longer representing Petitioner. On August 31, 2001, the Executive Director of the Commission issued a "no cause" determination on Petitioner's charge of discrimination. On that same date, the Clerk of the Commission sent notice of the determination to Petitioner "c/o Anthony Gonzales, Jr., Esq." at Attorney Gonzales' address. The notice stated that "[c]omplainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE" (emphasis supplied and capitalization in original), and further stated that the claim "will be dismissed" if not filed within that time. Attorney Gonzales contacted Petitioner by telephone after he received the notice of determination. The record does not reflect the date of that contact. However, Petitioner testified at the hearing that Attorney Gonzales informed her during the telephone call that the deadline for requesting a hearing had not yet expired. Accordingly, the contact must have occurred prior to October 5, 2001, which is 35 days after August 31, 2001. Despite the notice from Attorney Gonzales, Petitioner did not immediately file a Petition or contact the Commission. She did not contact the Commission until October 16, 2001. On that date, she spoke with Commission employee Gerardo Rivera and advised Mr. Rivera that Attorney Gonzales was not representing her. Mr. Rivera indicated that the Commission would send an "amended" notice directly to her. An "amended" determination of no cause was issued by the Executive Director of the Commission on October 26, 2001. On that same date, an "amended" notice of determination was mailed to Petitioner. Included with the "amended" notice was a blank petition for relief form. Petitioner completed the form and mailed it to the Commission. The Petition was received by the Commission on November 28, 2001,2 which is 33 days after the date of the "amended" determination, but 89 days after the date of the original August 31, 2001 determination. Mr. Rivera's affidavit (Exhibit P1) characterized the mailing of the original determination to Attorney Gonzales as "our [the Commission's] error" and a "mistake." The preponderance of the evidence does not support that characterization. Specifically, the record reflects that it was Petitioner who gave the Commission the impression that Attorney Gonzales was representing her, and neither Petitioner nor Attorney Gonzales did anything to advise the Commission otherwise during the two and one-half years that the Commission investigated Petitioner's charge of discrimination and sent letters to Attorney Gonzales on Petitioner's behalf. Indeed, Petitioner testified at the hearing that the October 16, 2001, conversation with Mr. Rivera was the first (and only) time that she informed the Commission that Attorney Gonzales was not representing her.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2002.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act, as amended, as alleged in Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this discrimination case, Petitioner, Sandra Jackson, who is an African-American, has alleged that on April 8, 1996, she was unlawfully terminated from employment with Respondent, Halifax Medical Center, on account of her race. Although the record does not specifically address the issue of whether Respondent is an "employer," it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least 15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current calendar year, and is thus subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Halifax Medical Center, located in Daytona Beach, is a part of the Halifax Community Health Systems network serving East and Central Florida. Petitioner was first hired by Halifax Medical Center on February 13, 1989, as a pharmacy technician. She remained in that position until April 16, 1990, when she transferred to a position of Social Worker I at the Hospice of Volusia/Flagler (Hospice), which performs hospice services for the Halifax network in Volusia and Flagler Counties. In that position, Petitioner's duties included assisting the various supervisors, taking care of patient requests, and filling out financial assistance forms for Medicaid or Medicare patients. She was also required to fill out memorial fund requests. Because of a change in the federal law in 1992, which required that all Hospice social workers have a master's degree, Petitioner was no longer qualified to work as a social worker since she held only a bachelor's degree. In order to allow Petitioner (and several other affected social workers) to remain with the organization, the Hospice created the position of Resource Specialist. Petitioner transferred to that position on November 1, 1992. Petitioner's contention that her transfer was actually a demotion and confirms that she was treated differently from other employees has been rejected. This is because the evidence clearly shows that her transfer, and that of several similarly situated employees, was caused by a change in the federal law, and not by discriminatory animus on the part of her employer. Although the duties of a Resource Specialist were similar to that of a Social Worker I, and included providing assistance to other Social Workers, a Resource Specialist was not allowed to perform patient assessments or give supportive counseling. However, Petitioner's paperwork duties remained the same. From 1992 until 1994, Karen Grimm was Petitioner's supervisor. Grimm served as the Hospice's Psychosocial Bereavement Coordinator. When Grimm's position was split in two on January 17, 1994, Kathleen Moore became Petitioner's new supervisor. Both Grimm and Moore were required to prepare performance evaluations for all employees under their supervision, including Petitioner. Grimm's first evaluation of Petitioner was made on April 16, 1993. On that evaluation, Petitioner scored a 7.2 out of a possible 10 points, or an average evaluation. However, the evaluation noted that Petitioner needed to improve in following through on assignments and having an increased awareness of resources. These criticisms were based on complaints Grimm had received from other employees that Petitioner would not finish jobs she was required to do. Grimm discussed these criticisms with Petitioner after the evaluation was prepared. In August 1993, Pamela Toal, a nurse at Halifax Medical Hospital, met with Petitioner and Grimm regarding Petitioner's care of certain patients. In one case, Petitioner had taken two weeks to get a patient a pill box, which would have assisted the patient in ensuring that he took his prescribed medicine on time. In another case, Petitioner had been asked to assist a patient in signing up for Community Medicaid. However, she signed him up for Hospice Medicaid twice, a program in which he was already enrolled. These events were documented by Grimm. In January 1994, or shortly before her position was split, and she would no longer be Petitioner's supervisor, Grimm met with Petitioner to discuss complaints Grimm had received from a patient care coordinator (Cherrie Chester) regarding how difficult it was to find Petitioner when she was needed. Petitioner was instructed to meet with Chester to resolve the difficulty. On April 7, 1994, Kathleen Moore, Petitioner's new supervisor, met with Petitioner regarding Petitioner's work performance. At that time, Petitioner agreed to a number of performance-related changes in her work habits, which are formalized in Respondent's Exhibit 8. That document notes that "[i]f there is no improvement by the time for review [mid-May 1994], you will then be placed on a probationary period for an additional month." On her next evaluation prepared by Moore on May 22, 1994, Petitioner scored a 7.6 out of 10 points, which is considered an average evaluation. In the job responsibility category, however, she received a score of 5, which is below average. The next evaluation was prepared by Moore on April 22, 1995. Petitioner's average score was only 6.35, and her job responsibility score dropped from a 5 to a 4, indicating that she was performing her job below expectations. During this period, a number of complaints were made about Petitioner's job performance by co-workers, supervisors, families, and patients. Based on this continuing pattern of poor performance, Petitioner was placed on written notice by the Hospice Executive Director that she needed to make "immediate improvement in some areas of her work." Moore and Petitioner discussed a performance improvement plan, and Moore requested another review of Petitioner in three months to see if she had improved. In June 1995, a social worker who worked with Petitioner documented a number of incidents in which Petitioner failed to perform necessary responsibilities for patients. This required the social worker to follow up and perform the tasks that should have been completed by Petitioner. Moore conducted a follow-up evaluation of Petitioner on September 4, 1995. Her score dropped to 5.725, and her job responsibility rating dropped to a 3, which is unsatisfactory. This latter decline in rating was caused primarily because Petitioner had not been meeting in person with other social workers and counselors with whom she worked, as required by her job position. The evaluation noted that Petitioner was not improving in other areas and was still having problems filling out financial forms. In response to Petitioner's poor performance, Moore drafted a "Corrective Action Counseling Memo" on September 5, 1995. The memorandum addressed each of Petitioner's deficiencies and required certain corrective action. In addition, it warned her that any "future complaints or violations will result in termination." On September 12, 1995, Moore and Petitioner met concerning Petitioner's inability to meet the job standards. Petitioner was also put on notice that she must start looking for a different position in the Halifax Community Health Systems network as her employment as a Resource Specialist at the Hospice would end in three months. Two days later, Petitioner told Moore that it was Moore's responsibility to find her a new job. In an effort to assist Petitioner, Moore advised her to contact all of the entities under the Halifax umbrella. On September 1995, Petitioner continued to have performance problems, including a failure to report to work until noon one day, filling out incomplete and incorrect billing status forms, and failing to provide documentation to Moore in a timely manner. She also failed to timely meet with other Hospice social workers, as instructed by Moore on September 12. Although Petitioner was told in September that she had three months to find another position, she was allowed to remain in her Hospice job for several additional months because of her lack of success in finding a new job. Finally, on January 8, 1996, Petitioner was told her last day would be April 8, 1996. A Termination Voucher prepared on April 8 lists unsatisfactory ratings in the areas of job knowledge, quantity of work, and quality of work. It also relies upon "extensive notes in Personnel files" as a basis for discharge. There was no discriminatory animus on the part of Respondent in the termination decision, and it was based wholly on Petitioner's poor job performance. Notwithstanding the above, Petitioner points out that she received overall "satisfactory" job evaluations in the October 1990, April 1991, April 1992, and June 1993. While this may be true, beginning at least in April 1993, Petitioner's evaluations contained deficiencies, which persisted for several years until her termination. Petitioner also contends that beginning in 1994, when Moore became her supervisor, she suffered racial abuse in the workplace through comments made by other workers, and that she was assigned "dirty jobs" that other white employees were not required to do. Aside from the lack of corroborating evidence from any other witness to support these contentions, Petitioner never complained about the comments until the hearing. Moreover, none of the alleged statements were made by supervisors or managers who were decisionmakers at the Hospice. Petitioner also asserted that she was treated differently from other Resource Specialists when she was terminated. Besides Petitioner, Moore supervised only one other Resource Specialist, Carole Pope, a white employee, at the time of termination. During Moore's tenure as supervisor, Pope and Petitioner had the same responsibilities, and their assignments were divided by geographic area, not racial lines. Both Resource Specialist positions were apparently eliminated through a corporate "restructuring" in the spring of 1996, with Pope being transferred to a financial position in the psychosocial department and Petitioner being terminated for cause. However, there was no evidence that Pope suffered from the same job deficiencies as did Petitioner, or that Pope was given preferential treatment over Petitioner. A contention that other unnamed "white employees received favorable evaluations" during this same time period so that they would be placed in "related job openings" lacks credible evidentiary support. Another assertion that Petitioner's poor evaluations were attributable solely to Moore is not accurate. The record shows that even when Grimm was supervisor, Petitioner's performance was criticized by Grimm in several respects. The date on which the original complaint was filed is a source of confusion. In an amended letter of transmittal of the case to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) dated April 26, 2000, the then Commission Agency Clerk indicated that "[o]n April 14, 1996, Petitioner filed a Charged [sic] of Discrimination with the Commission[,]" and that the complaint had been assigned a 1997 case number (97- 0063). However, the Charge of Discrimination referred to DOAH was executed by Petitioner on February 26, 1998, or almost two years after she was discharged from employment, and Petitioner testified that this was the only paper she filed with the Commission. She also acknowledges this fact in her Proposed Recommended Order. Whether Petitioner filed a similar charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 365 days after the alleged discriminatory act, and if so, intended that filing to be a "dual filing" with the Commission, is not of record. It is also unknown whether the Commission and EEOC had a work- sharing agreement in 1996 and 1997.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sandra F. Jackson 828 White Court Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 John W. Bencivenga, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzales, P.A. Post Office Box 639 Tampa, Florida 33601-0639
The Issue Whether Petitioner was terminated from his position with Respondent as a warehouse supervisor on or about August 9, 2002, on the basis of his race (African-American), in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following Findings of Fact are determined: Respondent, Heritage Paper Company, Inc. (Respondent), is an employer as that term is defined under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Respondent is a wholesale distributor of paper and plastic products. Petitioner, Alonzo C. Brown, is an African-American male and is a member of a protected class. Petitioner was employed in the warehouse at Respondent's Orlando facility from 1998 until he was terminated on or about August 9, 2002. Dan Patterson ("Patterson"), who was the general manager at the Orlando facility during the relevant time period, supervised Petitioner throughout his employment with Respondent. Patterson made the decision to hire Petitioner, made the decision to promote Petitioner to warehouse supervisor, and made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment. In November 1999, Petitioner was officially promoted from warehouseman to warehouse supervisor. Petitioner's job duties as warehouse supervisor included supervising the drivers, receiving inventory, putting away inventory, pulling orders, and ensuring that the trucks were loaded. Petitioner was responsible for assigning work to his assistants, ensuring that the runs were pulled, and ensuring that the merchandise ordered by customers was actually on the trucks for delivery. He was also responsible for the overall condition of the warehouse. Petitioner's performance deteriorated during approximately the last five months of his employment. When Petitioner got behind in the warehouse, Patterson assisted him and even hired an assistant to help Petitioner in the warehouse with inventory control and other assistance, where necessary. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that he was discriminated against based on his race in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and for disagreeing with his supervisor's instruction to put matches on a truck during a fire inspection. Petitioner was responsible for ensuring that the trucks left on time in the morning and for pulling the runs the previous afternoon. Even though an assistant was hired to help Petitioner in the warehouse at times, Petitioner refused to assign tasks to his assistant. Patterson wrote a note to Petitioner on May 1, 2002, telling Petitioner that he could not send items to the customer, NSC Northport, without matching up purchase order numbers. NCS Northport had very strict delivery requirements and would refuse delivery if Respondent did not comply with their delivery procedures. The evidence demonstrates that Patterson notified Petitioner on May 1, 2002, that Respondent's procedure with regard to NSC Northport was not followed. Although Petitioner introduced testimony that he did not write the information on the NSC Northport invoice, Patterson reasonably believed that it was Petitioner's handwriting and testified that Petitioner never informed him that he did not write the information on that invoice. Further, Marissa Moore, Petitioner's own witness, identified the handwriting as Petitioner's. When problems in the warehouse first arose, Patterson spoke with Petitioner regarding Respondent's policies and procedures for the warehouse. Patterson wrote another note to Petitioner on May 13, 2002, regarding excessive overtime and the importance of having runs pulled the previous afternoon to prevent overtime. Patterson wrote a third note to Petitioner and his assistant, Keynon Turner, on June 27, 2002, reiterating the importance of having the runs pulled in the afternoon and reminding them that the runs must be pulled by 4:00 p.m. Petitioner's explanation for the overall condition of the warehouse from May through August 2002 is not credible. Bob Purser, Sr., Respondent's chairman, CEO, and founder testified that in a conversation with Patterson, he told him that if Petitioner was unable to keep the warehouse organized, minimize the overtime, and get the trucks out on time, then they would have to get someone in the warehouse who would be able to do so. When Purser found out that incorrect merchandise was delivered to customers, he told Patterson to personally review the orders before the trucks were loaded. Purser visited the warehouse where Petitioner was employed prior to his termination and found that the warehouse was in disarray. He observed the aisles were blocked with merchandise and that the forklifts were unable to move up and down the aisles. Denis Nieves, the current warehouse supervisor for Respondent's Orlando facility, was hired on August 12, 2002, three days after Petitioner's employment was terminated. When he was hired, the warehouse was disorganized and cluttered, inventory blocked some of the aisles, the bay doors, and the exits and that it was sometimes difficult to locate inventory. It took him approximately six to eight weeks to reorganize the warehouse, unblock the aisles, put the inventory on racks, and unblock the bay doors and the exits. Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity policy states that Respondent will provide equal employment opportunity to all qualified employees and applicants for employment regardless of race, color, sex, age, religion, national origin, handicap, marital status, and status as a disabled veteran or veterans of the Vietnam era. This policy was in effect when Petitioner was hired, and he received a copy of Respondent's employee handbook at the time of his hire, which contained the Equal Employment Opportunity policy prohibiting all types of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner knew of Respondent's Equal Employment Opportunity policy. He was aware of the procedures for mailing a complaint about racial discrimination and/or harassment. Respondent also maintained an open-door policy where employees could speak with Purser regarding any perceived problems. Petitioner was aware of this open-door policy. Other employees took advantage of Respondent's open-door policy to address their concerns with Patterson and/or Purser. Petitioner never complained to Purser about Patterson's alleged discriminatory treatment. Purser confirmed that Petitioner never addressed any concerns about race discrimination or any retaliatory actions by Patterson with him. Petitioner testified that he did not feel that he was ever discriminated against at any time during his employment with Respondent, except when Patterson terminated his employment. Although Petitioner raised various instances of perceived unfairness throughout his employment with Respondent, such as being paged to the front office and having his uniform "stripped" from him, he testified that the only point he believed he was discriminated against because of his race was when Patterson terminated his employment. Petitioner's witnesses, Ralph McDaniel and Ricky Vaughn, admitted that they never noticed any discriminatory acts or racial inequalities against anyone while they were employed with Respondent. Moore testified that she never heard any discriminatory comments about Petitioner. Andrew Mitchell testified that he never noticed any discriminatory acts during his employment with Respondent. Petitioner's only other witness, Kenyon Turner, testified that the only perceived discriminatory actions he experienced while employed at Respondent was Patterson's "getting mad and cursing [him] out every once in a while." When asked if Patterson cursed at others as well, Turner answered affirmatively stating, "[o]f course he cursed out the other people that was there," meaning all employees, regardless of race. This does not constitute evidence of racial discrimination. Purser testified that his company does not discriminate against its employees on the basis of race and Patterson testified that he did not consider Petitioner's race in making the decision to terminate his employment. Through Mitchell's testimony, Petitioner attempted to establish that he was a "good employee" and that he was a "capable and knowledgeable" warehouse supervisor, but offered no additional evidence demonstrating that he was doing a good job. The greater weight of evidence supports the fact that Patterson made the decision to terminate Petitioner's employment based on the continuing problems in the warehouse and a load factor decline of approximately 22 percent. The load factor is a percentage used to determine how many customer orders are being accurately filled. At the time of Petitioner's termination, he was earning $11.72 per hour. Petitioner testified that he did not begin looking for work until the first part of 2003. Petitioner worked sporadically for Florida Courier and that he earned approximately $11,000.00 in 2003. Petitioner did not work many hours and did not seek alternative employment during the summer months. Petitioner is also a full-time pastor, and his church pays his mortgage payment, which is approximately $1,000.00 per month. Petitioner testified that he has submitted "a couple of applications" to prospective employers, but has not really been interested in working for someone else.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of January, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of January, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Alonzo C. Brown 7230 Plantain Drive Orlando, Florida 32818 Robert T. Devine, Esquire Alva L. Cross, Esquire Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A. Post Office Box 40089 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent is guilty of unlawful employment practices as alleged in the Petition for Relief. AUTHORITY Chapters 120 and 760, Florida Statutes, and Rule 60Q, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, D. Paul Sondel, was born August 13, 1928, and was, at the time of final hearing, 65 years of age. On April 11, 1993, Petitioner saw a newspaper advertisement for the position of Analyst I with the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (FBOBE). On April 12, 1993, Petitioner went to the office of the employment agency which the FBOBE was using to locate and screen applicants. Petitioner was told that he would not be allowed to apply or take the pre- employment test for the position because he had a graduate degree and only persons who have a Bachelor's degree but no graduate degree(s) were allowed to apply. On June 1, 1993, Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, in which he alleged that the FBOBE requirement that no one would be considered for the position of Analyst I who had a higher level degree than the minimum required Bachelor's degree, served the "intended purpose" of eliminating older applicants, especially those over Petitioner further alleged that the existence and implementation of such FBOBE policy was in violation of the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Respondent hired two persons to fill the April 1993 advertised position of Analyst I. One of the persons hired was 24 and the other was 23 years of age. The FBOBE is an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Florida and charged by the court with the responsibility of evaluating the character, fitness and competence of each applicant for admission to the Florida Bar. Petitioner has established that he is a person in a protected group; that adverse employment action was taken against him; that the persons hired for the position in question were outside the protected group; and that, but for his graduate degree, he was qualified for the position in question. The FBOBE has a current staff of 29 full time employees. As of March 30, 1994, of those employees, three were 40 years or older at the time of employment. Nine of these employees are currently 40 or older. The employment application used by the FBOBE does not request any information regarding an applicant's age. The FBOBE have hired individuals in the past who were 40 years of age or older. The FBOBE uses the American Employment Agency, Inc. to advertise vacancies and to conduct preliminary screening. Kathryn E. Ressel has been employed by the Respondent for over 22 years and is currently the Deputy Executive Director of the FBOBE. Ms. Ressel is responsible for the instructions given to the employment agency concerning the qualifications for the position of Analyst I. Ms. Ressel testified that the reason for the FBOBE policy of excluding applicants with post graduate college or university degrees is not intended to restrict employment opportunities to younger persons and is not related to the age of any applicant. Ms. Ressel's testimony is that past experience in hiring persons with graduate degrees has indicated that such persons tend to stay in the Analyst positions for short periods of time and leave when an employment opportunity presents itself in the field for which the person is educated. Ms. Ressel testified that the Analyst I position is an entry level position and that the Analyst receives extensive on-the-job training to enable the newly hired employee to perform assigned duties and meet job related responsibilities in an effective and efficient manner. Therefore, according to Ms. Ressel, when Analyst I's leave the employment of the FBOBE after a short time on the job, the Respondent is unable to recoup the time, energy and expense involved in training such individuals. Ms. Ressel's testimony articulates a reasonable nondiscriminatory basis for the employment practice at issue. Ms. Ressel's testimony indicates that the employment policy at issue is age neutral in that it is applied to all individuals who apply for the position of Analyst I, regardless of age. Ms. Ressel's testimony in this regard is unrefuted. Official notice is taken that a given individual is generally older at the time such person receives a graduate degree than when the same individual receives a Bachelor's degree. It does not follow, however, and Petitioner has failed to prove (statistically or otherwise), that in any specific job applicant pool available to the Respondent to fill Analyst I positions, potential applicants with graduate degrees are older than potential applicants who possess only Bachelor's degrees. Petitioner has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence (statistical or otherwise) that the employment policy at issue has a disparate impact on persons 40 years of age or older. Petitioner has failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the FBOBE as the basis for rejecting Petitioner's application is in fact a pretext and/or that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition for relief filed in this case be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 1994.
The Issue Whether Respondent failed or refused to provide the legal representation to which Petitioner was entitled because of Petitioner’s race or in retaliation for Petitioner’s prior charges against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner, a black male, was employed by Miami-Dade County as a correctional officer. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a public employees bargaining unit established pursuant Chapter 447, Florida Statutes (2004).1 At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was a dues-paying member of Respondent and was entitled to all rights and benefits of such membership. Prior to March 1, 2002, Petitioner filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that Respondent had discriminated against him in an unrelated matter. That complaint was resolved in Respondent’s favor. Petitioner was notified by his employer on March 1, 2002, that his employment was being terminated for reasons that are irrelevant to this proceeding. Petitioner immediately requested legal representation from Respondent. On March 4, 2002, Respondent, through Tyrone W. Williams (Respondent’s then general counsel), advised Petitioner as follows: We have completed our review of your request for legal assistance of March 4, 2002. Based upon the information provided, it has been determined that a conflict in representation has arisen. Accordingly, this matter has been assigned to the Law Offices of Slesnick & Casey. . . . . We have provided the Law Office of Slesnick & Casey with a copy of your file for their immediate reference. Please contact the Law Office of Slesnick & Casey upon receipt of this correspondence. At the times relevant to this proceeding, the Law Offices of Slesnick & Casey was a private law firm that had contracted with Respondent to provide conflict representation to its members. Thereafter, the Law Office of Slesnick & Casey undertook Petitioner’s representation at Respondent’s expense. The procedures followed by Respondent in determining that a conflict existed and in assigning the Law Office of Slesnick & Casey to this representation were consistent with Respondent’s bylaws and written policies. Petitioner was not satisfied with the representation of Slesnick & Casey and asked Respondent for other counsel. On June 24, 2002, Blanca Greenwood (Respondent’s then general counsel) notified Petitioner that if he did not want the assigned representation, Respondent would give him $500.00 towards his legal fees and he could retain any lawyer he wished. Petitioner was also told he would have to absolve Respondent of any liability regarding his representation by private counsel, which Petitioner refused to do. Petitioner thereafter filed the complaint with EEOC and, following its dismissal, the Petition for Relief that underpins this proceeding. The evidence presented by Petitioner failed to establish that Respondent discriminated against him by assigning the Law Office of Slesnick & Casey to represent him or by offering to pay $500.00 towards his legal fees for a private lawyer. There was no evidence that Mr. Williams (who is a black male) or any other representative of Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his race. There was no evidence that Mr. Williams or any other representative of Respondent discriminated against Petitioner because he had filed an unrelated EEOC against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 2005.
The Issue The issue is whether the claim of employment discrimination contained in the Petition for Relief must be dismissed due to Petitioner's execution of a release of all claims.
Findings Of Fact On June 29, 2012, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated. On July 24, 2012, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination alleging that he was subjected to discrimination. On August 18, 2012, Petitioner signed an agreement. Under the agreement, Respondent agreed to pay Petitioner $5,000.00, net several items, provided Petitioner did not exercise his right to revoke the agreement within the seven days following execution, as provided in the agreement. Petitioner did not revoke the agreement, and Respondent discharged all obligations under the agreement. In exchange, Petitioner agreed to release Respondent from all claims, damages, suits, complaints, damages, losses and expenses, of every nature, legal or equitable, whether known or unknown, which Olascoaga ever had, now has, or may claim to have, upon or by reason of the occurrence of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever . . . . This release specifically includes, but is not limited to, a release of any and all claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act . . . . There is no contention that Petitioner was not acting knowingly or voluntarily when he executed a release of claims.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Carlos Olascoaga's Petition for Relief from employment discrimination for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April 2014.
The Issue The issue is whether Grand Boulevard Health and Rehabilitation, d/b/a FL HUD Destin, LLC (“Grand Boulevard”), committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Angela D. Jones based on her race.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the entire record of this proceeding, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Ms. Jones is a 49-year-old African American female. She has a high school degree and earned certifications or licenses enabling her to work as a certified nursing assistant (“CNA”), a home-health aide, a cosmetologist, and a security guard. However, healthcare has been her primary field of work. 2 Ms. Jones stated during the final hearing that she had transmitted to DOAH an audio recording made by Mr. Manning and that she had intended to move that audio recording into evidence. The audio recording was not received by DOAH. Nonetheless, the undersigned has determined that no prejudice resulted to Ms. Jones because there was no dispute regarding the event described by Mr. Manning’s affidavit. In May of 2019, Ms. Jones was working in a nursing home and heard from a coworker about the substantial benefits and signing bonus that Grand Boulevard was offering new hires. Grand Boulevard’s employment application contained a question asking each applicant to respond “yes” or “no” as to whether he or she had “ever pled guilty, pled no contest, had adjudication withheld, or been placed in a pre- trial intervention program as a result of being charged with a crime.” Ms. Jones left that portion of her application blank.3 Ms. Jones responded “no” in response to a question asking if she had “ever been convicted of any criminal violation of law, or [if she was] now under pending investigation or charges of violation of criminal law.”4 The employment application contained a provision requiring Ms. Jones to certify that: the information provided in this employment application (and accompanying resume, if any) is true and complete. I understand that any false, incomplete, or misleading information given by me on this form, regardless of when it is discovered, may disqualify me from further consideration for employment, and may be justification for my 3 Ms. Jones testified that she told Shakara Mayberry, Grand Boulevard’s Director of Staff Development at the time, that she had a criminal background and that she left that portion of the application blank because she could not remember specific details about the charges. Ms. Jones also testified that she offered to supplement her application with precise information after she had an opportunity to consult documentation in her possession. According to Ms. Jones, Ms. Mayberry accepted her application and told her to not worry about disclosing her criminal background. Ms. Mayberry also testified during the final hearing and denied telling Ms. Jones that she could leave that portion of her application blank. During the final hearing, Grand Boulevard provided no satisfactory explanation as to why Ms. Jones was hired without completing that portion of her application. 4 Respondent’s Exhibit 3 was Ms. Jones’s responses to interrogatories from Grand Boulevard. Via her responses, Ms. Jones provided documentation regarding her criminal history. However, Grand Boulevard did not request that Respondent’s Exhibit 3 be accepted into evidence. When being questioned about Respondent’s Exhibit 3, Ms. Jones acknowledged that she has: (1) pled no contest to a battery charge; (2) been charged or arrested for resisting an officer; (3) been arrested for criminal mischief; and (4) entered a plea on a different criminal mischief charge. dismissal from employment, if discovered at a later date. After conducting a background check through the Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) indicating Ms. Jones had no disqualifying offenses, Grand Boulevard hired Ms. Jones.5 Ms. Jones began working for Grand Boulevard on May 15, 2019, as a CNA helping nursing home residents with activities of daily living such as dental hygiene, grooming, and eating. On June 16, 2019, a resident in Ms. Jones’s care suffered injuries after he rolled out of his bed while Ms. Jones was cleaning him. Pursuant to its policy, Grand Boulevard suspended Ms. Jones while the Walton County Police Department investigated the incident. Ms. Jones returned to work at Grand Boulevard three days later but was suspended again on June 20, 2019, because she had allowed her CNA certificate to expire. Ms. Jones paid her delinquency fee, and her certificate was reinstated. During the course of the investigation of the June 16, 2019, incident, an investigator from the Walton County Sheriff’s Office asked Heather Hanna, Grand Boulevard’s Director of Nursing at the time, why Grand Boulevard would hire someone such as Ms. Jones with a criminal history. Ms. Hanna then had Ms. Jones’s application pulled and noticed that Ms. Jones did not 5 Section 400.9065, Florida Statutes, mandates that AHCA “shall require level 2 background screening for personnel as required in s. 408.809(1)(e) pursuant to chapter 435 and s. 408.809.” Section 408.809(1)(e), Florida Statutes, requires level 2 background screening of any person who is expected to provide personal care services directly to nursing home residents. Section 435.04(2), Florida Statutes, lists many specific offenses that disqualify someone from working in a nursing home. Accordingly, the background screening conducted through AHCA is narrower in scope than Grand Boulevard’s employment application, which asks applicants if they have “ever pled guilty, pled no contest, had adjudication withheld, or been placed in a pre-trial intervention program as a result of being charged with a crime.” For example, while Ms. Jones acknowledged that she has pled no contest to a battery charge, that charge would not necessarily have been a disqualifying offense because section 435.04(2) only encompasses felony battery, battery on a minor, sexual battery, and battery on a vulnerable adult. Likewise, resisting an officer and criminal mischief are not disqualifying offenses. respond to the question asking if she had ever been charged with a crime. Ms. Hanna sent the following report to Connie Zuraff on June 28, 2019: I received a visit from Investigator Donna Armstrong with Walton County PD and Julianne Dalton APS investigator. The investigator questioned why we would have an employee who had a recent arrest record, she stated that she knew Angela Jones from the community and that she was concerned that she was employed here. We reviewed her application and found that she had not checked the boxes related to history of arrests.[6] I called Ms. Jones with Tuwanna RN Risk Manager and [Shakara] Mayberry LPN SDC present in the room. I placed Ms. Jones on speaker phone and asked if she had been arrested for any recent criminal activity and she confirmed that she was arrested for battery, petty theft and fighting. I notified the employee that failure to disclose this information could lead to termination and suspended her at that time. The DCS did pull her background through the AHCA clearing house and we confirmed that she still showed eligible for employment. Grand Boulevard then suspended Ms. Jones and ultimately terminated her on June 27, 2019, on the basis that she “knowingly falsified [her] employment application.” There was no persuasive evidence of Grand Boulevard giving more favorable treatment to nonminority employees who neglected to fully disclose whether they had “ever pled guilty, pled no contest, had adjudication withheld, or been placed in a pre-trial intervention program as a result of being charged with a crime.” Any testimony from Ms. Jones on that point was 6 The pertinent question on the application does not require applicants to disclose arrests. The question asks applicants if they have “ever pled guilty, pled no contest, had adjudication withheld, or been placed in a pre-trial intervention program as a result of being charged with a crime.” either unpersuasive, unsubstantiated, or insufficiently specific. Accordingly, the greater weight of the evidence does not demonstrate that Grand Boulevard committed an unlawful employment practice.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Angela D. Jones, pro se 115 Christie Lane Panama City, Florida 32404 For Respondent: David Sydney Harvey, Esquire Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 3400 Tampa, Florida 33602
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Ms. Jones’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Angela D. Jones 115 Christie Lane Panama City, Florida 32404 David Sydney Harvey, Esquire Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard and Smith 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 3400 Tampa, Florida 33602 Stanley Gorsica, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
