The Issue Whether the application of the Biscayne Bay Pilots' Association for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Miami should be granted in whole or in part or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: In their Prehearing Stipulation, the parties stipulated to the following facts, which are deemed admitted: The Cargo Carriers Association is a Florida not-for- profit corporation with its principal office in Miami, Florida. The purpose of the Cargo Carriers Association is to promote, advance, and secure laws, rules, and regulations concerning vessels utilizing the navigable waters of the State of Florida, in particular the Port of Miami and Port Everglades, in order that the waters, harbors, and ports of the state and the environment and property of all persons be protected to the fullest possible extent consistent with sound financial principles. A substantial number of the members of the Cargo Carriers Association are affected by the rates of pilotage currently set for the Port of Miami, inasmuch as they are required by Florida law, Chapter 310, Florida Statutes, to utilize and compensate the Port of Miami pilots whose rates are established by the Board, and they are, in fact, utilizing and compensating pilots in accordance with the rates established for the Port of Miami. Accordingly, the Cargo Carriers Association is substantially affected by and has standing to maintain this challenge to the Board's Decision dated March 9, 2000. The Board is an agency of the State of Florida created pursuant to Section 310.151, Florida Statutes, which is invested with the authority and responsibility to determine the rates of pilotage at the various ports of Florida, including the Port of Miami. Section 310.151, Florida Statutes (2000). The Pilots' Association is an association of harbor pilots that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes and that performs the pilotage services at the Port of Miami. The offices of the Pilots' Association and its affiliate, Biscayne Bay Pilots, Inc., are located in Miami, Florida. In October 1999, the Pilots' Association submitted to the Board an application for an increase in the pilotage rates for the Port of Miami. On October 28, 1999, the Investigative Committee for the Board convened a fact-finding public hearing on the Pilots' Association's application in Miami, Florida, at which numerous interested persons provided comments and testimony, both for and against the Pilots' Association's requested rate increase. On November 29, 1999, the Pilots' Association submitted to the Board a version of its application that, in its words, "has been edited to correct scrivener's errors." On December 9, 1999, the Investigative Committee for the Board completed its review and investigation of the Pilots' Association's application and presented its written findings to the Board as required by Rule 61E13-2.007(4), Florida Administrative Code. On January 21, 2000, the Board met in Miami, Florida, to review the rate increase application of the Pilots' Association and heard comments and testimony from persons who supported or opposed the application in whole or in part. At the conclusion of this meeting, the Board preliminarily determined to grant the Pilots' Association's application in part with a phased-in increase in rates. The Board's written decision was filed with the agency's clerk on March 9, 2000. The Cargo Carriers Association timely filed its petition for a proceeding under Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1999). The Pilots' Association requested in its application a 10 percent increase in the rate for draft charges, for tonnage charges, for shifting or anchoring charges, and for minimum fees, effective immediately, with an additional increase of 5 percent in these rates and fees six months after the effective date of the initial increase. The requested increase would result in a total 15.5 percent increase in pilotage rates and minimum fees at the Port of Miami. The Board hired an Investigative Committee composed of two consultants, one a Certified Public Accountant and the other a retired Coast Guard officer, to examine the Pilots' Association's application in light of the statutory factors set forth in Section 310.151(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1999). The Investigative Committee held a public hearing in which it received testimony from interested parties. The Investigative Committee Report was presented to the Board at the public hearing on January 21, 2000. The Board included in its written Decision findings of fact and comments with respect to each of the criteria set forth in Section 310.151(5), Florida Statutes (1999), 3/ an analysis and statement of its decision to approve an increase in the pilotage rates at the Port of Miami, and an order specifying the approved increases. The Board stated its intention to grant the Pilots' Association's application in part and to increase the rates of pilotage at the Port of Miami 3 1/2 percent for draft charges, tonnage charges, shifting or anchoring charges, and the minimum fees, effective on the date of its order, 4/ with an additional 3 percent rate increase in each of the charges effective 12 months from the effective date of the first increase and another 3 percent increase in each of the charges effective 24 months after the effective date of the first increase. This increase is 63.16 percent of the increase requested by the Pilots' Association. The public interest in having qualified pilots available to respond promptly to vessels needing their service. Section 310.151(5)(b)1., Florida Statutes (2000). 5/ In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 11 of the report. 6/ The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. 7/ A determination of the average net income of pilots in the port, including the value of all benefits derived from service as a pilot. For the purposes of this subparagraph, "net income of pilots" refers to total pilotage fees collected in the port, minus reasonable operating expenses, divided by the number of licensed and active state pilots within the ports. Section 310.151(5)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 12 and 13 of the report, with the following modification to the depreciation adjustment included in the calculation of the pilots' total compensation if the requested rate increase were approved in toto and the resulting modification in the projected "adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot": The depreciation adjustment projected for the year 2000 was decreased from $6500.00 to $1600.00, resulting in an adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot for the year 2000 of $340,800.00; the depreciation adjustment projected for the year 2001 was decreased from $6500.00 to $4800.00, resulting in an adjusted (all inclusive) income per pilot for the year 2001 of $340,000.00. The Investigative Committee Report included in the computation of average net pilot income the value of health and retirement benefits, pension valuation, and discretionary costs such as political contributions, lobbying expenses, and business promotion expenses. The Investigative Committee identified the actual total pilot compensation for pilots at the Port of Miami, including adjustments for pension valuation and discretionary costs but not for depreciation, as $308,200.00 for 1998, and it projected the total pilot compensation for 1999, 2000, and 2001, without a rate increase, as $288,200.00, $296,200.00, and $290,200.00, respectively. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. Since 1993, the Pilots' Association has tried to maintain a roster of 18 active pilots at the Port of Miami, although this number has fluctuated from time to time. Currently, there are 17 pilots and one deputy at the Port of Miami. Excluding adjustments for pension valuation and discretionary costs, compensation in 1997 and 1998 for pilots at the Port of Miami was $281,000.00 and $278,000.00, respectively; compensation at Port Everglades was $329,000.00 and $344,000.00, respectively; compensation at the Port of Palm Beach was $154,000.00 and $230,000.00, respectively; and compensation at the Port of Jacksonville was $250,000.00 and $254,000.00, respectively. Because of the exclusions noted above, these amounts understate actual compensation. Compensation for the Port of Miami pilots increased 38.4 percent between 1989 and 1996. In 1989, pilot income at the Port of Miami was $203,000.00, and, in 1990, it was $181,000.00. The pilots received an effective 32 percent rate increase as a result of a 26 percent rate increase in 1992 and a 5 percent rate increase in 1993, and gross pilotage revenue increased 72 percent between 1989 and 1996, an increase primarily attributable to an increase in the number of larger vessels using the port. As a result of the revenue increase, pilot income rose to over $281,000.00 in 1997. In addition to piloting, the pilots at the Port of Miami carry out the duties of Harbor Master, which involve coordinating all of the ship traffic in the port. The pilots receive no additional compensation for this service. Reasonable operating expenses of pilots. Section 310.151(5)(b)3., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 13 through 16 of the report. In the report, the Investigative Committee found that, with the exception of the costs associated with the Pilots' Association's retirement plan, the operating expenses included in the Pilots' Association's application were reasonable. The Investigative Committee Report included a detailed discussion of the Pilots' Association's retirement plan. The retirement plan of the Pilots' Association is a non-qualified plan under the Internal Revenue Code and is unfunded and, therefore, contingent on the future operations at the Port of Miami. The plan is in the form of a consulting agreement between the Pilots' Association and its retirees, pursuant to which each pilot who reaches 55 years of age and completes 20 years of service as a full-time active pilot, and who agrees to act in the best interests of the Pilots' Association, is eligible to be paid up to 50 percent of an active pilot's income, provided that the aggregate amount paid to retirees may not exceed 20 percent of the annual total gross pilotage revenue. The payments are to be made from future pilotage revenue. The total costs associated with retired pilot compensation and benefits (equity buy-outs, surviving spouse accrual, and health insurance) included in the Investigative Committee Report for 1998 were $2,093,086.00, of which $1.4 million was attributable to payments to 11 retirees for consulting services. The Investigative Committee questioned the reasonableness of this operating expense at page 16 of its report, although it noted that there are similar plans in other Florida ports. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. In 1998, payments to the five retired pilots at Port Everglades totaled $962,714.00. The retirement plan for the Port Everglades pilots has the same limits as the plan for the pilots at the Port of Miami: A Port Everglades retiree's benefit is limited to 50 percent of the income of an active pilot, and the aggregate benefits paid to Port Everglades retirees may not exceed 20 percent of the pilots' annual gross revenue. The plan at Port Canaveral limits the aggregate benefits paid to retirees to 33 1/3 percent of gross annual revenue; the limitation at the Port of Jacksonville for current retirees is 28 percent of gross annual revenue and 22 percent for new retirees. There are no aggregate limits on the amounts paid to retirees at the ports in Charleston, South Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia. Pilotage rates in other ports. Section 310.151(5)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings of the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 16 and 17 of the report, and stated its intention to confine its comparative rate analysis to ports in Florida and the southeastern seaboard. It was noted in the Investigative Committee Report that, in 1998, the Port of Miami was ranked the seventh highest of 12 Florida ports with respect to the cost for piloting both a standard large and a standard small vessel and the eighth highest out of the 12 Florida ports in the amount of revenue per handle. 8/ As part of its comparison of pilotage rates in other ports, the Investigative Committee included in its report a chart based on 1998 data setting out the number of handles in each of the 12 Florida ports surveyed, together with 1998 revenue, average handle time, number of pilots, revenue per handle, and revenue per handle hour for each of the 12 ports. In 1998, the Port of Miami had 8,909 handles, revenue of $8,433.539.00, average handle time of 2.0 hours, 18 pilots, revenue per handle of $947.00, and revenue per handle hour of $473.00. Based on 1998 data, Port Everglades, the port closest geographically to the Port of Miami, had 10,168 handles, revenue of $6,899,006.00, average handle time of 1.9 hours, 16 pilots, revenue per handle of $679.00, and revenue per handle hour of $357.00. In its Decision, the Board recognized that pilotage rates cannot be considered in a vacuum and that a rate increase or decrease is not justified simply because a rate is comparatively low or high. Rather, the Board found that consideration must be given to the size and number of vessels using the port, the time required to service the vessels, and the characteristics of the port that impact positively or negatively on the gross revenue and net income derived from the rate structure. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. The Investigative Committee determined that Port Everglades was the closest and most relevant competitive port to the Port of Miami. The Port of Miami handles primarily cruise ships, excluding daily cruise ships, and container cargo vessels. Port Everglades handles both container cargo vessels and vessels containing bulk and neo-bulk products such as petroleum, cement, steel, and lumber, as well as a mix of large cruise ships and smaller, daily cruise ships. Port Everglades is one of the largest petroleum ports in the southeastern United States. The Port of Miami handles fewer but generally larger vessels than Port Everglades. The distance between the sea buoy 9/ and the turning basin where the pilots turn and dock cruise ships in the Port of Miami is approximately six miles; the distance between the sea buoy and the turning basin where the pilots turn and dock cruise ships in Port Everglades is approximately two miles. In Port Everglades, the distance from the sea buoy to the channel is short, so that there is little room to position the vessel properly for entry into the channel. The channel is, however, straight. In the Port of Miami, there is a 40-degree turn mid- channel. Currently, Port Everglades has 16 pilots and two deputies. A comparison of the pilotage rates in the Port of Miami and in Port Everglades shows that, without considering the rate increase proposed by the Board, the current draft rate in the Port of Miami is 38 percent higher than that in Port Everglades and the current tonnage rate is 7.5 percent higher in the Port of Miami than in Port Everglades. With the Board's proposed rate increase, the draft rate at the Port of Miami is roughly 40 percent higher than that at Port Everglades, and the tonnage rate is roughly 16 percent higher. Without a rate increase, total pilotage fees at the Port of Miami are 18 percent higher for small vessels and 14 percent higher for large vessels than the total pilotage fees at Port Everglades. Using the cruise ship Enchantment of the Seas as an example, without the rate increase, pilotage fees are $5,700.00 per trip in and out of the Port of Miami, or $260,000.00 annually; with the Board's proposed rate increase, pilotage fees are $6,270.00 per trip, or $326,000.00 annually. In contrast, the pilotage fees for the Enchantment of the Seas at Port Everglades are $5,150.00 per trip in and out of the port, or $268,000.00 annually. 10/ The amount of time each pilot spends on actual piloting duty and the amount of time spent on other essential support services. Section 310.151(5)(b)5., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 18 of the report. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. The prevailing compensation available to individuals in other maritime services of comparable professional skill and standing as that sought in pilots, it being recognized that in order to attract to the profession of piloting, and to hold the best and most qualified individuals as pilots, the overall compensation accorded pilots should be equal to or greater than that available to such individuals in comparable maritime employment. Section 310.151(5)(b)6., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 18 and 19 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee recognized that the Board, in the Port Everglades case, concluded in its Final Order that the profession most comparable to that of a port pilot is that of a captain of a large United States-flagged vessel. The Investigative Committee further recognized that the Board, in the Port Everglades case, concluded that pilot compensation should be equal to or greater than $203,000.00, represented by the Investigative Committee in its report as the annualized compensation of a "U.S. master." The Investigative Committee found, further, that the skills, risks, and working conditions of a ship's captain and a pilot are considerably different in that a pilot must have a wider range of technical skills to pilot a variety of vessels of different sizes; a pilot assumes more physical risks because of the need to board and disembark each vessel; a pilot is constantly in a stressful situation while piloting a vessel into port; and a pilot is a private businessman rather than an employee and must face all of the attendant risks and obligations. In its Decision, the Board established the "floor" compensation for pilots at approximately $200,000.00 to $220,000.00, which represents the wage of the highest-paid ship's master on a United States-flagged ship. 11/ The Investigative Committee found in its report that the amount of compensation above the floor established by the Board depends on several factors, including the size of the ships calling on the port, the difficulty of the port, the cost of living in the surrounding community, and pilot compensation in other United States ports. Finally, the Board expressly recognized in its Decision that, unlike ships' masters, pilots are not employees of a corporation but are independent businessmen, with all of the financial risks that status implies. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. 12/ The education and training of a pilot and a ship's master is, in many cases, the same. A ship's master operating on the high seas, however, has the responsibility for the ship's well-being 24 hours a day, seven days a week during the course of the voyage. The scope of responsibility of a ship's master requires a wider array of skills than those of a pilot; he or she must make judgments regarding matters extending beyond the navigation of the ship. The ship's master is responsible for the ship's crew and, if the ship is a cruise ship, for the welfare of the passengers, and he or she must deal with the hazards of the ship catching fire, disease onboard, and a variety of other matters requiring non-technical skills. A ship's master must have navigational skills and must be knowledgeable about many ports throughout the world and many weather systems. Even when a ship is being piloted into port, the ship's master retains the ultimate responsibility for the ship, and the ship's master will sometimes dock the ship once the pilot has brought it to the docking area. Pilots are licensed to operate in a particular port, and they must have an intimate knowledge of that port. Because pilots must handle almost every vessel calling at the Port of Miami, they must be familiar with the peculiarities of numerous types and sizes of vessels, and they must continually take courses to keep up with the changing technology used on new vessels. Consequently, the knowledge and skills required of a pilot are more specialized and more narrowly focused than those required of a ship's master. When a vessel is ready to come into the Port of Miami, the pilot is taken to the vessel, which, depending on its size, may be located two-to-three miles east of the sea buoy. The pilot must, therefore, board and disembark from a vessel in open water. A pilot at the Port of Miami must guide vessels, sometimes exceeding 1,000 feet in length, through a 500-foot wide channel cut in rock, make a 40-degree turn, and guide the vessel into the port's turning basin and, ultimately, to its berth. There is little maneuvering room, and the pilot must deal with the ever-changing winds, currents, and tides that affect a vessel's passage to the berthing area. For ships of 1,000 feet or longer, there is adequate but not generous room for maneuvering in the turning basin. The number of large vessels using the Port of Miami has increased since 1989. Piloting large vessels increases the complexity of the pilot's job and increases the potential for an accident, necessarily increasing the amount of stress experienced by pilots routinely bringing such vessels into the Port of Miami. A pilot must direct the crew of a vessel when bringing the vessel into and through the channels leading to the turning basin and from the turning basin to the berths, and his or her success depends on his ability to communicate instructions to crewmembers. This communication is becoming more difficult because crewmembers are recruited from many different countries, including those from Eastern Europe, and they may or may not understand English. The stress experienced by a pilot is significantly increased when he must depend on crewmembers who do not understand English, because disaster could result if the pilot's instructions are not followed precisely. The stress experienced by pilots when they are on the job is much more intense, though of shorter duration, than that experienced by ship's masters. A pilot at the Port of Miami will pilot between six and 18 ships each week and is on-call 24 hours each day while on piloting duty, under conditions that are physically and mentally stressful. The pilots at the Port of Miami are not employees of the Pilots' Association. Rather, the Pilots' Association is operated as a partnership of the pilots, and it is funded from the pilotage revenue at the Port of Miami. There are significant operating expenses deducted from gross pilotage revenue before the pilots are paid. The Pilots' Association owns and maintains a building at the far eastern end of the Port of Miami that houses the pilots' business office and also contains bedrooms, restrooms, a lounge, and a chart room for use by the pilots. The Pilots' Association employs office staff to handle billing and accounting functions. The Pilots' Association owns and operates four pilot boats used to transport pilots to and from vessels arriving at and departing from the Port of Miami, and it employs six full- time boat operators. Replacement costs for the pilot boats exceed $2 million. The pilots must absorb rising fuel costs, which cannot be passed on as a surcharge to those using the port and are also responsible for the costs of maintaining the boats. The pilots provide communications services to the vessels entering the Port of Miami, and the Pilots' Association maintains three Federal Communications Commission licenses, a marine coastal station, a high power UHF repeater, and VHF radios in all of the pilot boats. The pilots have invested approximately $50,000.00 in communications equipment that they make available to the Port of Miami, including a 100-watt VHF long range radio and tower, as well as the UHF repeater, and they also maintain the equipment. In addition, the pilots employ dispatchers who handle the radios. The pilot's income is a function of the volume and size of traffic in and out of the port, and they are, consequently, affected by decisions made by the Port of Miami authorities with respect to services to be provided vessels using the port and with respect to port charges. The financial risks faced by the pilots at the Port of Miami are, for the most part, shared by all independent business owners. However, even though pilots of the Pilots' Association are the only pilots allowed to provide services in the Port of Miami and even though pilotage rates are highly regulated and, to an extent, non-competitive, pilots, unlike most private independent business owners, cannot pass on increases in operating expenses; rather, the pilots must absorb these increases until, and unless, an application for a rate increase is approved. 13/ The impact rate change may have in individual pilot compensation and whether such change will lead to a shortage of licensed state pilots, certificated deputy pilots, or qualified pilot applicants. Section 310.151(5)(b)7., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at page 19 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee found that all-inclusive pilot compensation for the pilots at the Port of Miami would increase 8.76 percent if the increase requested by the Pilots' Association were approved by the Board. As a result, the compensation of pilots at the Port of Miami would still be lower than that of the pilots at Port Everglades, but only slightly. The Investigative Committee noted that an opening at any of the four major Florida ports, the Port of Miami, Port Everglades, Tampa, and Jacksonville, draws 20 to 30 applicants from all over the United States. The Investigative Committee observed that, with or without a rate increase, any of these four ports would attract qualified pilots because they are likely to find more attractive compensation and working and living environments than provided by their present situations. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Projected changes in vessel traffic. Section 310.151(5)(b)8., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 20 and 21 of the report. The Investigative Committee accepted the estimated handles provided by the Pilots' Association in its application, which reflects an increase from 8,909 handles in 1998, to an estimated 9,200 handles in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Investigative Committee noted in its report that the number of cruise passengers at the Port of Miami has remained steady since 1991 and that, although the number of handles decreased between 1992 and 1995, there was steady growth in cargo tonnage between 1988 and 1998. Even with the decrease in the number of handles, the average revenue per handle increased from $545.00 in 1990 to $978.00 in 1998, accounting for a 73 percent increase in the gross annual revenue and a 79 percent increase in the average revenue per handle. The Investigative Committee found that the data suggests that the increase in the pilots' average revenue per handle, and, therefore, its gross annual revenue, is more a function of the increase in the size of the vessels calling at the Port of Miami than a function of the 32 percent rate increase in 1992 and 1993. The Investigative Committee found in its report, and the Board recognized in its Decision, that Port Everglades and the Port of Miami have a strong competitive relationship and that a large increase in pilotage rates at the Port of Miami might result in a decision by Maersk Shipping, a large shipping company currently calling at the Port of Miami and at Port Everglades, to consolidate its operations and use Port Everglades rather than the Port of Miami, resulting in a material decrease in the revenue of the Port of Miami pilots. Prior to the rate increase proposed by the Board, Maersk Shipping paid the pilots at the Port of Miami $1.08 million each year in pilotage fees. A change in operations to Port Everglades would result in a decrease in each pilot's annual income of approximately $48,000.00, with a $24,000.00 decrease in each retiree's benefits. 14/ The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except as specifically set forth in the following paragraphs. In choosing ports of call, ship owners, particularly cargo lines, consider many factors, including marketing factors, the availability of berths, the availability of terminal space, the availability of inland transportation, and port congestion, as well as port costs. Port costs, also known as port call expenses, at the Port of Miami are composed of many elements in addition to pilotage fees, such as terminal fees ($8,800.00) 15/ , dockage fees ($3,349.00), wharfage fees ($3,400.00), tug boat fees ($3,009.00), agent fees ($1,500.00), custom and agriculture entry fees ($1,995.00), and harbor fees ($162.00), for a total of $5,570.00; pilotage fees at the Port of Miami for a standard large vessel, according to 1998 data, were $1,085.40, or approximately 15-to-20 percent of port call expenses for a standard large vessel. Therefore, while pilotage fees are a significant part of the mix of port call expenses considered by ship owners in determining whether to call at the Port of Miami, pilots have no control over most of the fees and tariffs comprising port call expenses or over the many other factors that might influence the competitive posture of the Port of Miami vis-à-vis Port Everglades or changes in vessel traffic in the Port of Miami. The Port of Miami consists of Lummus and Dodge Islands, and it is run by the Miami-Dade County Seaport Department. The port rates at the Port of Miami increased approximately 30 percent between 1991 and 1998, generating a revenue increase of approximately 76 percent. Operating expenses increased approximately 44 percent during that time period, but, in general, the port's rate increases have gone primarily to finance improvements in the port's infrastructure and to provide its customers with facilities to accommodate their larger vessels. The port has also received a number of federal and state grants to fund construction programs to improve the port, as well as federal funds for the Port of Miami's dredging program. POMTOC, the Port of Miami Terminal Operating Company, recently received approval to raise its gate fee and empty container storage fee 2.7 percent. The Miami-Dade County Seaport Department also increased its harbor fee for large vessels from $195.00 in 1999 to $235.00 in 2000. In addition, the majority of the port's tariff items increased between 1999 and 2000. Competition is very aggressive among the ports along the eastern seaboard of the United States and along the Gulf of Mexico. As one response to the competitive nature of the market, the Port of Miami has, since 1998, entered into volume incentive agreements with several of its largest customers. The purpose of these agreements is to increase the level of activity at the port by offering a reduction in the port's tariff rate, while at the same time having a guaranteed minimum level of revenue for the port. The Port of Miami has entered into volume incentive agreements with Carnival Cruise Lines, Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Seaboard Marine, Maersk, Columbus Lines, and Chilean, and it is in the process of negotiating other such agreements. As a result of the agreements, these lines have brought additional business to the port or have brought new lines to the port. Cost of retirement and medical plans. Section 310.151(5)(b)9., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 22 through 25 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee determined that the estimated cost of the medical plan available to active and retired pilots for 1999, 2000, and 2001 was $8,125.00, $8,235.00, and $8,400.00, respectively, for each active pilot (or a gross for active pilots of $143,000.00, $140,000.00, and $148,000.00, respectively), and $4,636.00, $5,083.00, and $5,083, respectively, for each retiree (or a gross for retirees of $51,000.00, $61,000.00, and $61,000.00, respectively). The Pilots' Association funds both a money purchase pension plan and a 401k plan for all of its employees, after they have completed one year's service. The total annual contribution averages $6,000.00 per employee. Because the pilots are members of a partnership, they are not considered Pilots' Association employees. Their retirement plan is unfunded, and, as noted above, is in the form of a lifetime consulting agreement pursuant to which eligible pilots receive income that is limited to 50 percent of an active pilot's income, with the aggregate payments to retirees capped at 20 percent of the pilots' gross annual revenue. A surviving spouse of a retired pilot is entitled to receive 25 percent of an active pilot's income for life. The equity interests of retiring pilots in the Pilots' Association are also purchased by the Pilots' Association. These benefits result in an aggregate cost to the Pilots' Association of $2,093,086.00 per year. The Investigative Committee valued the pension plan at a conservative $30,000.00 per year, a figure that the Board accepted over objections by the Pilots' Association. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Physical risks inherent in piloting. Section 310.151(5)(b)10., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 25 and 26 of the report. The Investigative Committee found that boarding a vessel at sea is the most difficult and dangerous aspect of a pilot's job, and that several pilots were injured between 1996 and 1999. Pilots board vessels in the open sea under many different conditions, with considerable risk, and the pilot often receives minimal support from a vessel's crew. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except to the extent specifically set forth in the immediately following paragraphs. Even though they may refuse if conditions are unsafe, as a general rule pilots board and disembark from vessels in the open sea, in all kinds of weather, day and night, on rope ladders that are not fixed, that are sometimes not consistent with standards established by the International Maritime Organization, and that are sometimes in poor repair. Whenever possible, the vessels turn to create a lee, or sheltered side, where the pilot can board and disembark from the vessel with less risk, although it is always possible, even in a calm sea, for a cross swell to hit the vessel during boarding or disembarking. Another point at which a pilot is physically at risk is upon moving from the ladder to the deck of the vessel. Many cruise ships have pilot doors low on the side of the vessel to shorten the distance a pilot must ascend or descend a ladder to board and disembark from the ship. Once the pilot is on board the vessel, he is escorted to the bridge, which is accessible only by stairs, sometimes totaling 100 steps in many modern cargo ships. Special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the particular port. Section 310.151(5)(b)11., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 26 and 27 of the report. In its report, the Investigative Committee identified several special characteristics, dangers, and risks of the Port of Miami. It recognized that, due to the velocity and direction of the currents, the proximity of the Gulf Stream presents a variety of challenges to pilots as vessels approach the Outer Bar Channel and that the Gulf Stream, together with northerly winds and a flooding current, make transiting the jetties especially difficult. Because the channel bottom is hard coral from the sea buoy to the berths, it is extremely difficult to handle large, deep-draft vessels to and from the gantry berths, and the current and wind conditions require special handling of these vessels when they dock or turn. In addition, reefs lining the approaches to the Port of Miami are unmarked, and the background light from Miami-Dade County makes it difficult to identify land and navigational marks. Weather can cause hazards to navigation in the Port of Miami, with rapidly changing wind conditions resulting from thunderstorms and with changing tidal conditions resulting from heavy rains. In addition, northwesterly and northeasterly winds cause heavy sets on a flood tide for vessels passing through the jetties. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion, except to the extent specifically set forth in the immediately following paragraphs. 16/ The complexity of the waterway poses a high risk to vessels being piloted into the Port of Miami. Waterway complexity at the Port of Miami includes the amount of crossing traffic, turns in the channel, converging traffic from different channels, background lighting, and the large number of small pleasure craft in and around the channels. The hard rock bottom of the channels poses a high risk to vessels being piloted into the Port of Miami. The channel is dredged in a "U" shape, forming a narrow underwater trench through which vessels must pass, and vessels can be seriously damaged if they come into contact with the sides of the trench. Any other factors the board deems relevant in determining a just and reasonable rate. Section 310.151(5)(b)12., Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board determined that there were no such factors. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the Board's finding. The board may take into consideration the consumer price index or any other comparable economic indicator when fixing rates of pilotage; however, because the consumer price index or such other comparable economic indicator is primarily related to net income rather than rates, the board shall not use it as the sole factor in fixing rates of pilotage. Section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2000). In its Decision, the Board accepted the findings in the Investigative Committee Report with regard to this statutory criterion, which facts are found at pages 28 and 29 of the report and in the attachments thereto. In its report, the Investigative Committee found that the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") had increased 17.8 percent since January 1, 1993, the date of the last pilotage rate increase, and 22.9 percent since October 1991, the date of the Pilots' Association's last application for a rate increase. In reaching its conclusion that some increase in pilotage rates at the Port of Miami is justified, the Board noted in its Decision that it considered it compelling that the CPI had increased 17.8 percent since the last rate increase and that pilotage rates at the Port of Miami had not increased for seven years. The record of the hearing held before the Division of Administrative Hearings does not contain any evidence sufficient to form a basis for findings of fact different from, or in addition to, the facts relied on by the Board in its Decision with respect to this criterion. Taken in its entirety, the evidence presented by the Cargo Carriers Association and the Pilots' Association in this proceeding with respect to the statutory factors set forth in Section 310.1151(5)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (2000), yielded findings of fact in addition to those found by the Board in its Decision. There was not sufficient credible and persuasive evidence presented by the Cargo Carriers Association to support a finding of fact contrary to the findings of the Board in its Decision.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Pilotage Rate Review Board consider the additional facts established by the evidence presented at the hearing before the Division of Administrative Hearings in determining, in accordance with its interpretation of its statutory mandate, its expertise, and the appropriate policy considerations, whether the Decision on the Biscayne Bay Pilots' Association Pilotage Rate Increase Application in the Port of Miami, filed March 9, 2000, will result in fair, just, and reasonable pilotage rates at the Port of Miami. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2001.
The Issue Whether Respondent, while acting as pilot aboard the M/V Itanage in the St. John's River, Jacksonville, Florida on August 29, 1990, engaged in a practice which did not met acceptable standards of safe piloting. (F.S.A. s. 310.101(1)(k))
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed pilot in the State of Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 1) Respondent has been issued license number SP0000032. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 2) On or about August 29, 1990, Respondent was piloting the M/V Itanage outbound in Jacksonville, Florida. (Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 4) The Itanage is a 12,000 gross ton, Brazilian registered diesel powered container vessel. (Transcript p. 164) From May 1988 to August 1990 the Itanage entered and exited the port of Jacksonville under pilotage fifteen times without navigational incident. (Transcript pp. 21, 22) The same crew abroad the Itanage at the time of the allision was on the Itanage on its previous voyage of the Itanage. (Transcript p. 22) Respondent has piloted the Itanage or similar vessels many times previously. (Transcript p. 355) The Itanage was equipped with an overhead rudder angle indicator which is visible from the bridge wing. The rudder angle indicator exhibits the degree angle of the rudder and is color coded red for port and green for starboard so the pilot can glance up and see whether port or starboard rudder is applied. 2/ (Transcript pp. 166, 167) Each bridge wing of the Itanage was equipped with an RPM indicator which shows whether the engine was going ahead or astern and the number of revolutions per minute. (Transcript p. 168) The Itanage was equipped with an engine room telegraph which was operated by the second mate to communicate engine commands to the engine room. 3/ On August 29, 1990, the docking master, Captain Meers, undocked the vessel from Jacksonville Port Authority berths 3 and 4, turned, headed down the river on slow ahead, and disembarked around Coastal Petroleum. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 2) Respondent assumed responsibility for directing the ship at 1454 hours with the vessel parallel to and favoring the west bank of the river. (Statement of Captain Steele; DPR Report, p. 8; engine bell book, Transcript p. 175) It was a clear day, the ride was at or near slack water, the weather was perfect. (Transcript pp. 92. 169, 170, 198) Respondent gave commands to the second mate who remained positioned by the engineroom telegraph on the bridge. The second mate repeated the commands in English then repeated the commands to the helmsman in Portuguese. (Transcript pp. 195, 337); Statement of Second Mate) The second mate spoke very little English and the helmsman did not speak any English. (Transcript p. 331) At 1454 the Respondent ordered course 320 degrees and slow ahead, which was executed. At approximately 1456, Respondent ordered a course of 310 degrees and full speed ahead. (Transcript pp. 82, 83, 191, 192; DPR Report p. 8; engine bell book; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mate; Statement of Captain Steele) Respondent's orders issued at 1456 were executed, and the engine speed was set at full ahead and the Helmsman steered 310 degrees. (Transcript p. 186; DPR Report p. 8; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman, Master, and Chief Mater; engine bell book; Statement of Captain Steele; Petitioner's Request for Admissions paragraph 8) Respondent was in the wheelhouse and observed the master-gyro-compass. (Transcript p. 331; Statement of Captain Steele) Because the view forward was blocked by the deck cargo, Respondent went to the starboard wing to observe Buoy 71. (Statement of Captain Steele) At 1455 Respondent ordered "10 degrees port" from the starboard wing. (Transcript pp. 337, 338; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) The helmsman steered 10 degrees to port (left). (Transcript p. 192; Statements of the Second Mate, Helmsman) After the order of "10 degrees port", Respondent remained on the starboard wing and had a radio conversation using a hand held marine radio with the master of the tug "Ann Moran" which took approximately 45 seconds about a ship they had handled the previous day. (Transcript pp. 338, 340, 247) At 1456 as Itanage approached Buoy 71, at point "D" on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1, from the starboard bridge wing, Respondent ordered hard right (starboard) rudder and engine ahead full. (Transcript p. 343) This was to start the turn around Buoy 71. (Transcript p. 384) Captain Steele did not at that time, however, go to the pilot house. Captain Steele remained on the wing to observe the response of the vessel. (Transcript p. 395) After a few seconds, Captain Steele observed the bow of the vessel swinging to port (left) not to starboard (right). (Transcript p. 345) He immediately rushed to the pilot house, repeating his hard starboard (right) rudder order as he did so. (Transcript p. 345) The rudder angle indicator in the pilot house, however, indicated the actual position of the rudder was passing from port (left) 20 degrees to starboard when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. (Transcript p. 345) Captain Steele did not alter the prior order for ahead full. Captain Steele reached the helm console and grabbed the helm. By that time, the helm was already in the hard starboard position. The only explanation as to how the rudder got to 20 degrees port (left) was that when Captain Steele gave the command hard to starboard, the helmsman actually went hard to port (left), then the helmsman realized his error and was correcting it when Captain Steele entered the pilot house. No one suggests that any other command was given which would account for the port swing of the vessel. (Transcript p. 235) Captain Steele again went to the wing to observe the response of the vessel. When it became apparent the vessel would not make the turn, Steele ordered full astern and ordered both anchors dropped. The vessel continued to make way in a sweeping curve alliding with the Shell Oil Terminal on the western edge of the Chaseville turn at approximately 1459 hours. The allision was not caused by a mechanical failure, weather, or tide. (Transcript p. 69). The allision was set up by the helmsman's turning the ship to port (left) instead of starboard (right). However, the Respondent contributed to this error by failing to give the steering command, "Right, full rudder," as required by the Rules of Road. See 33 USC 232. The Coast Guard conducted an investigation and prepared a report (Petitioner's Exhibit 1), the second page of which is a data sheet taken from the ship's bridge. This data sheet contains a diagram of the ship's turning circle to both port (left) and starboard (right) at half and full speeds. An overlay in proper scale was prepared and attached to Hearing Officer Exhibit 1 at the point where the turn was executed, Point D. The scaled extract of the Coast Guard report is attached to the back of Hearing Officer Exhibit 1. The overlay reveals that the vessel could not make the turn at full speed from Point D because the vessel's course takes it almost exactly to the point of allision. If the vessel's course is offset slightly to the left due to the helmsman's mistake and the vessel's turning circle adjusted for less speed, as would have occurred if the vessel went from half speed to full speed when the order for the turn was given, the vessel's projected track would again place the vessel at the point of the allision. The primary cause of the allision was Respondent's use of full speed in the turn. Although there was controversy about whether the vessel proceeded north the entire way at full speed or whether full speed was ordered as the turn was ordered approaching Buoy 71 (Point D on Hearing Officer Exhibit 1), there is no controversy that Captain Steele intended to execute the turn at full speed. The distance from where Captain Steele assumed control of the ship to where it came to rest is approximately 1 and 1/8 nautical miles. According to the logs, the vessel covered this distance in between four and five minutes. In order to cover that distance in that time, the ship was at or close to its full speed, adjusted for a dirty hull, of 15 knots. The advance and transfer of the ship was extended at full speed in such a way that the vessel could not make the turn in the sea room available. Referring again to the overlay, the vessel could have turned within the searoom available from Point D at half speed. The ship might have completed the turn at half speed from a point left of and forward of Point D, its track as the result of the helmsman's error, particularly with the reserve of thrust available to assist in turning after the emergency developed. The Chaseville turn is a tight turn without a great amount of sea room, and requires care to be exercised by pilots. (Transcript pp. 354, 362, 170, 171). The Respondent's failure to maintain proper speed caused the allision with the Shell Oil Terminal.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Pilot commissioners issue a final order suspending Captain Henry A. Steele for three (3) months and levying a civil penalty of $5,000 against him. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Respondent, Thomas A. Baggett has been licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot in Tampa Bay for fifteen (15) years and at all times pertinent to this proceeding was licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot. On February 5, 1984, at about 0620 hours, while Captain Baggett was piloting M/V Triton C outbound from the Gardinier Wharf in Hillsborough County, Florida, the M/V Triton C ran aground outside the prescribed limits of CUT D in Tampa Bay on the east side. The M/V Triton C is a Liberian bulk carrier with an approximate length and width of 576.7 feet and 81 feet, respectively, with a gross tonnage of 17,823 tons. At the time of grounding, the M/V Triton C had a forward draft of 29 feet, 11 inches and an aft draft of 30 feet and 1 inch. The M/V Triton C was experiencing no engine or navigational equipment problem before it ran aground. All aids to navigation, including ranges and buoys, were in place and working properly at the time of the grounding. The M/V Triton was travelling at a speed of 11.7 knots. Range lights, when properly aligned, provide a way for the pilot or anyone navigating a vessel to know the vessel is in the center of the channel. On the morning of February 5, 1985, shortly before the grounding of the M/V Triton C, Captain Baggett gave orders for the turn from CUT E into CUT D, or from a heading of 198 degrees to a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett ordered the wheel 20 degrees to starboard and then eased to 10 degrees. Captain Baggett then ordered the quartermaster to midship the wheel and steady the vessel on 213 degrees. He gave no instructions to the quartermaster concerning the use of the range lights for navigating the center of the channel. At this point the confusion begins. Captain Baggett testified that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees, an appropriate course for the transit of CUT D, while he was present and he observed the M/V Triton C as being on the ranges for about 2 minutes before going into the chart room. As he stepped back into the chart room, he glanced at the compass and observed that the vessel was on a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett gave no further instructions or orders other than "hard to starboard" when he came out of the chart room 15-20 seconds later and noticed the bow swinging to port, the rudder indicator showing 20 degrees rudder and the ranges being already opened. Captain Baggett testified that upon giving the order "hard to starboard" the quartermaster pulled the wheel and went "hard to port" and the vessel almost immediately went aground. The mate and quartermaster tell a different story. The master was below and not present on the bridge at the time of grounding. The mate testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees, and that Captain Baggett remained in the chart room for 40 seconds to 1 minute and came out as the vessel went aground. The quartermaster testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room immediately upon the vessel steadying up on 213 degrees, and did not stay to watch the course or range for 2 minutes. He further testified that Captain Baggett was in the chart room for 5-6 minutes; that he came out of the chart room as the vessel went aground; and, Captain Baggett gave no order of "hard to starboard". The quartermaster at the time of the grounding was Maheswaran Gnanasundran and the mate was Siburs Ioannas. As evidenced by the depositions, both were foreign; neither spoke English and each required an interpreter at the deposition. The master of the M/V Triton C on the day of grounding was Stamatios Stanou, a citizen of Greece, and required an interpreter for his deposition. Captain Baggett experienced a communication problem with quartermaster Gnanasundran in the beginning of the turn out of CUT E to CUT D, and earlier with another quartermaster at the beginning of the turn out of Hilisborough A CUT into Hillsborougn C CUT who was on duty just prior to quartermaster Gnanasundran. The M/V Triton C was at a heading of 206 degrees immediately after grounding and did not move significantly from that heading while grounded. Both the mate and the quartermaster testified that the M/V Triton C, after steadying up, stayed on the course heading of 213 degrees during the entire time and was on the same course heading when the vessel went aground. The mate testified that as the M/V Triton C began to run aground it began to list to the right, and its heading as it finally came to rest aground was 206 degrees. The master of the M/V Triton C testified that the wind was out of the northwest at 15 knots, with full tide, and the current being with M/V Triton C at about 2 knots. Captain John C. Hanson, an investigator for petitioner, testified that at the time of grounding, based on tidal information and weather reports, the wind was out of the northwest and there was an ebb tide running in a southerly direction which would tend to set the M/V Triton C in a southerly direction to the east of CUT D. Captain Hanson further testified that these conditions would have an effect on navigation. Captain Baggett testified that there was an ebb tide in a southwest direction and that it would tend to set to the southwest but at that point in time, it would have had very little effect on the M/V Triton C. Therefore, he did not make any allowances for the tide, wind, or a combination of them. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 shows the mean lower low water depth outside of the confines of the channel in the area of grounding to be 24 feet to 25 feet. Captain Hanson testified that the chart was current but that the depth of the water in a Particular area could be deeper, depending upon tides and winds. Captain Baggett testified that soundings taken on February 5, 1985, during the morning of grounding, put the depth of the water at the bow (point of grounding) and stern to be 25 feet and 37 feet, respectively and, that he visually observed, after daylight the stern of the vessel as being located in the ship channel of CUT D. The ship channel in CUT D has an approximate width of 400 feet with shoaling on both sides. Captain Hanson boarded the M/V Triton C 3 days after the grounding and testified that he plotted the position where the vessel went aground by taking "crossbearings of fixed structures, (no floating aids) and one radar range to one of the radar structures." Captain Hanson plotted the position of the M/V Triton C to be on the east side of CUT D, at a point 450 feet from the centerline of the CUT D approximately 1325 yards from a midpoint between buoys 1E and 2E. For an exact position see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The crossbearings used to locate the exact position of the M/V Triton C are shown on the chart on the right side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The left side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 is an enlargement of CUT D prepared by Captain Hanson showing the various courses the M/V Triton C could have taken from a point abeam of buoys 1E and 2E to the position of grounding based on the speed of the M/V Triton C at 11.7 knots. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates that if the point of grounding was 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, as Captain Hanson testified, and, the M/V Triton C grounded on the heading of 206 degrees, then, at that heading, the stern of a vessel 576.7 feet long could not have reached the channel. Captain Hanson's testimony concerning his method of locating the position of the M/V Triton C, the crossbearing used and the calculations went unrebutted. With a vessel drafting 29 feet 11 inches forward and the point of grounding being 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, the depth of the water outside the confines of the channel along the heading taken by the M/V Triton C was deeper than 25 feet or the grounding would have occurred sooner and at a point closer to the east bank of CUT D. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the quartermaster that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees after making the turn from CUT E to CUT D and steered that course for five to six minutes while Captain Baggett was in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room, because the vessel would have travelled beyond the point of grounding in 5 to 6 minutes. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the mate that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees and that the vessel went aground within 40 seconds to 1 minute while Captain Baggett was still in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room because the vessel could not have travelled to the point of grounding in 40 seconds to 1 minute from the time it made the turn out of CUT E into CUT D. As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of Captain Baggett that the vessel steadied up on a heading of 213 degrees in the center of CUT D and that he viewed the ranges in line for 2 minutes before going to the chart room and that "almost immediately" upon coming out of the chart room 15 to 20 seconds later the vessel went aground was incorrect as to how long he stayed after the vessel steadied up before going into the chart room because in that time frame the turn, causing the vessel to go aground would have been so sharp the vessel would have gone aground at a heading significantly less than 206 degrees. The most believable evidence demonstrates that Captain Baggett was in the chart room 2-3 minutes prior to grounding. Captain Baggett went into the chart room to make his time and distance calculations because light was more readily available. Captain Baggett could have made the time and distance calculations without going into the chart room. While Captain Baggett was in the chart room, he was facing away from the chart room entrance and did not look at the rudder indicator, the ranges, or otherwise determine if his orders were being properly carried out. Captain Baggett's expertise as a pilot was available to the mate and quartermaster while he was in the chart room had either of them been aware of a problem and requested his assistance. But, his expertise as a pilot was not totally available to the vessel due to his position in the chart room. Where the crew is unfamiliar with the harbor and its lights and there is a language problem, courses are usually given on compass rather than instructions on the range lights.
Findings Of Fact The tug TUSKER is a 120-foot LOA, 396 DWT riveted and steel hull motor vessel, single screw, single deck design with two Polar Atlas diesel engines each rated at 800 BP at 375 RPM. The TUSKER was built in Scotland in 1956, is registered in Canada and was designed and equipped for ocean towing. On February 6, 1981, her draft was 14'6". The propeller is 11'4" in diameter with an 11'3" pitch righthand and turns in a fixed Kort nozzle. The Kort nozzle can be described as an open-end cylinder or ring around the propeller one of whose functions is to keep towlines from becoming fouled in the propeller. The nozzle increases the propeller's thrust but reduces somewhat the effectiveness of the rudder. The TUSKER is equipped with a single rudder, conventional type, mounted on centerline, aft of propeller and Kort nozzle. She is also equipped with a Donkin steering engine on which is superimposed a Sperry automatic pilot and remote controlled steering mechanism. The steering system is hydraulic and can be actuated electrically or mechanically. Normal mechanical operation is effected using the steering wheel on the bridge. Electric power is used to actuate the hydraulic system (which moves the rams which in turn move the rudder right or left) in the three other systems by which the vessel may be steered. One is automatic pilot. Another works off the automatic pilot system with the automatic pilot disengaged and the hydraulic system actuated by a remote control dial attached to a flexible cable. With this system the helmsman can move around the bridge carrying his steering mechanism in one hand. This mode operates on a self-synchronous follow-up system where the operator moves the dial on the remote control and a self-synchronous motor causes the hydraulic system to actuate the rudder to follow the dial. This is the system that was in operation at all times here relevant. The third system of steering, which is also electrically actuated, is a toggle switch, or joy stick, near the wheel which the helmsman moves left or right as he wants the rudder to go. When the lever is held to the right, that hydraulic system is actuated to move the rudder to the right until the lever is returned to neutral or a stop is reached. To move the rudder back to midships the lever is held left (if the rudder is right) until the rudder angle indicator shows the rudder to be back where desired. The barge LIQUILASSIE is a converted tanker 307 feet long with a 60- foot beam and a cargo capacity of 5000 tons. This tank barge can be towed or pushed and is equipped with a notch in her stern to facilitate pushing. Upon entering Tampa Bay on the evening of 5 February 1981 the LIQUILASSIE was in ballast and was drawing six feet forward and nine feet aft. Saltwater was used for ballast. The tug TUSKER and the tank barge LIQUILASSIE had departed Halifax, Nova Scotia, for Tampa and the trip was uneventful until arrival off Tampa on the evening of 5 February 1981. Shortly before reaching the sea buoy the tug changed position from towing the LIQUILASSIE on a 1200-foot line to the pushing mode with the tug's bow secured in the notch in the stern of the LIQUILASSIE. Warwick G. Cahill, Respondent, a licensed Tampa Bay deputy pilot, boarded the TUSKER in Egmont Channel around 10:00 p.m. the evening of 5 February 1981 to pilot the tug and barge to Misener's Marine, a shipyard immediately south of Gandy Bridge on the east side of Tampa Bay. At this time the weather was clear, the tide was rising, winds were southerly at ten knots or less and the seas were light. No significant change occurred in the weather from the time the pilot boarded the TUSKER until the LIQUILASSIE made contact with Gandy Bridge. Pilot Cahill assumed the conn of the TUSKER with Captain Sanderson, the master of the tug, steering using the remote control hand-held dial. The engines were controlled directly from the bridge telegraphs. General discussion with Captain Sanderson revealed that the tug was single screw and that the flotilla combination TUSKER-LIQUILASSIE was slow to turn. At this time the rudder angle indicator was inoperative due to a burned out coil and no spare coil was on board. As a result the pilot could not look at the rudder angle indicator to ascertain the position of the rudder at any given moment. The pilot requested a steering light be installed on the bow of the barge so its rate of movement in a turn could be seen against the background lighting ashore. This was done. Respondent was born in Australia and sailed on foreign flag ships from 1966 until 1970 when he came ashore in the United States and subsequently acquired American citizenship. He resumed maritime employment in 1976 sailing as an ordinary seaman on tugs operated by Gulf Coast Transit Company. He worked his way up from ordinary seaman to master, acquiring his master's license 25 June 1979. From this time until he was appointed a deputy pilot in Tampa Bay in November 1980, he served as master on five tugs operated by Gulf Coast Transit Company. All of these tugs are twin screw vessels varying from 175 gross tons to 435 gross tons. Respondent's master's license authorizes him to sail as master on U.S. vessels up to 1000 gross tons. When he was appointed deputy pilot Respondent was required, as were all other such appointees, to sail as an apprentice with a certified pilot for at least thirty days and thereafter be approved by the Tampa Bay Pilots Association to pilot vessels of not more than 23 feet draft and 500 feet length. After sixty days of piloting this class vessel, a deputy pilot, after approval by the Tampa Bay Pilots Association, is authorized to pilot vessels of not more than 23 feet draft and of unlimited length. Respondent was at this stage as a deputy pilot on 6 February 1981. During the transit of the lower half of Tampa Bay the tug with 14 feet 6 inch draft and barge with the maximum draft of nine feet were navigated outside the channel and did not enter a cut channel until they reached Cut E channel. From the time the pilot came aboard, the tug was running at full speed with shaft RPM at about 110. At this propeller speed and draft of LIQUILASSIE, Captain Sanderson estimated the speed through the water at eight knots. Because of the stiff and slow handling of the tug and barge combination Captain Sanderson suggested to Pilot Cahill before reaching Cut F that at the sharp turns in the channels ahead it might be necessary to slow the tug in order to negotiate these turns. Respondent replied that there was plenty of water outside the channel going into Cut G from Cut F and that they would try that turn without slowing. The turn from Cut F to Cut G is a left turn slightly less than 90 degrees. As he passed between buoys 5F and 6F the pilot directed the helmsman into a left turn which was negotiated without difficulty. The tug and barge settled on Cut G range. The turn into Cut J from Cut G is a turn to the right of about 90 degrees. Here, the depth of the water outside the channel is sufficiently shallow that the TUSKER could ground if she got too far out of the channel. Upon approaching this turn Respondent had someone proceed to the bow of the LIQUILASSIE to stand by the anchors. He reduced speed to slow ahead approximately 1400 yards before reaching turn buoys 5G and 6G (Tr. p. 449) and ordered the helmsman to bring the flotilla to the right. The turn started a little too soon or the flotilla turned too fast, and the helmsman was ordered to slow the rate of turn. As the flotilla straightened the pilot directed more right rudder as the barge and tug were moving into buoy 9J. The flotilla did not respond to the right rudder and the engines were kicked ahead to increase the turning moment. Buoy 9J passed down the side of the flotilla (or was run over by the tug) before the flotilla finally was straightened out in Cut J channel (Tr. p. 451). While proceeding up Cut J channel at slow speed immediately following this incident, the captain directed the steering gear be checked to see if the rudder was answering the commands given through the remote control steering dial. This was the second time since the tug had assumed the pushing position off Tampa Bay that the steering was checked. The first time was shortly after the tug entered the notch when the captain directed the chief engineer to observe the rams on the rudder stock to see if the rudder was moving right and left as directed. On both occasions the rudder was observed by the chief engineer to move from full left to full right to amidships without apparent difficulty. On both occasions the chief engineer so reported to the captain. After straightening out in Cut J the flotilla resumed full speed. At this time, and during most of the transit of Tampa Bay, the current was flooding, i.e., was pushing the vessel northward in the general direction of travel. Misener's Marine is located north of Port Tampa on the east side of Tampa Bay and immediately south of the Causeway approach to Gandy Bridge. To enter Misener's Marine from the south, the preferred course, according to the unrebutted testimony of Respondent, is to continue past Cut K on the same course until the vessel is aligned with the draw span of Gandy Bridge, at which point course is changed to head for the draw span. Before reaching the draw span, course is changed to the right approximately 70 degrees to parallel the bridge as the channel into Misener's Marine is entered. The intended course, after making this turn, as indicated by Respondent on Exhibit 7, is parallel to and 200 yards south of Gandy Bridge. As the flotilla passed Port Tampa the captain remarked that they were moving at a lively clip. Respondent responded that he would slow down before starting the turn. No effort was made to ensure a crew member was standing by to let go the anchors as had been done when approaching Cut J. When one-half mile from the bridge, as observed on the radar screen, the pilot ordered speed reduced to slow and the captain moved the telegraphs to dead slow. At this time the flotilla was moving through the water at eight knots and over the ground at approximately 8.5 knots. The current in this part of the bay was setting northerly towards the bridge about 0.5 knots and it was approximately 40 minutes before high tide and slack water. High tide at Gandy Bridge on 6 February 1981 occurred at 3:07 a.m. (Exhibit 13). When the radar range to the bridge was just over one-quarter mile Respondent directed the helmsman to bring the flotilla to the right. When the response to this command appeared slow and the flotilla was one-quarter mile from the bridge Respondent ordered hard right rudder. Although Respondent testified that at one-quarter mile distance from the' bridge he didn't believe the flotilla would make the turn without hitting the bridge, he ordered the engines ahead full to increase the turning force (Tr. p. 459). When the captain exclaimed they were going to hit the bridge the pilot ordered engines stopped, then full astern. The captain moved the engine controls as directed. As the engines were ordered reversed the pilot left the rudder right full until most of the way had been taken off the flotilla. During this time the bow of the barge continued to move right slowly. As the barge closed on the bridge the pilot shifted the rudder to left full shortly before the bow of the LIQUILASSIE made contact with the third and fourth bridge supports to the east of the center span. At the time of contact at approximately 2:25 a.m., February 6, 1981, the flotilla was making an estimated speed over the ground of approximately one knot. The bow of the barge went under the road span and fetched up on the third and fourth bridge supports to the east of the center span. Continued backing for a few minutes failed to free the barge from the bridge supports. Respondent's witness, Captain John Graham, predicated his opinion that Respondent committed no error on the assumption that he commenced the turn into Misener's Marine at a distance of one-half mile from Gandy Bridge. His testimony (Tr. p. 337) was that "He [Respondent] ran out of options at a quarter-mile except for what he did: full astern. He was already hard starboard. There was no time--his other option was drop the anchor. That's too late." This assumption of distances from the bridge at which certain events occurred is not supported by the evidence and is in conflict with the findings made above, that the tug reduced speed when one-half mile from Gandy Bridge and the command to change course to the right was given to him just over one-quarter mile from the bridge. This finding is consistent with Respondent's testimony that he started the commencement of the turn approaching Gandy Bridge just before he reached the one-quarter mile point and increased to right full rudder at one-quarter mile. In his report of the accident, CG-2692 (Exhibit 15), Respondent also says that rudder was ordered hard right at a distance of one- quarter mile from the bridge. Had Respondent ordered the engine full astern one-quarter mile from the bridge when he realized collision with the bridge was likely, the flotilla would have been stopped before hitting the bridge. Instead of ordering the engines full astern Respondent first ordered full ahead to increase the turning force. Only after he realized this added force would not turn the barge fast enough did he order the engines stopped, then full astern. Local authorities were notified of the collision and ultimately the Highway Patrol regulated vehicular traffic over the damaged bridge. The damage to the bridge supports and barge was stipulated to be approximately $250,000. Shortly after the collision, high tide at Gandy Bridge occurred and thereafter the tide began falling. The bow of the LIQUILASSIE was caught on the piling and it was feared that additional damage to the piling would result as the tide receded and more of the weight of the barge was placed on the piling. The LIQUILASSIE collided with the bridge on a course approximately 30 degrees to the right of normal to the bridge and remained in that position until freed with the assistance of a passing tug at 5:15 a.m. After being freed from the bridge the tug was put on the port bow of the barge to help turn the LIQUILASSIE to the right some 90 degrees to enter Misener's Marine where the flotilla was moored. Immediately after mooring, Coast Guard investigators, in company with the chief engineer and Respondent, checked the steering gear and found the rudder responded fully to the right and left in response to electrically generated commands from the bridge. The time to go from full left to full right was measured and found to be 25 seconds (Exhibit l) On February 12, 1981, while moored at Misener's Marine, the steering gear was again checked for operation from full right to full left and vise versa (approximately 35 degrees rudder angle) for four cycles and the average time from full right to full left was 24.25 seconds (Exhibit 3). The radar on the TUSKER is mounted directly over the wheelhouse. While in the notch of the LIQUILASSIE the distance from the radar to the bow of the LIQUILASSIE would be approximately 110 yards. (307 feet, length of the LIQUILASSIE, plus the distance from the bow of the TUSKER to the radar. No evidence of this latter distance was presented.) Accordingly, when hard right rudder was ordered at a radar range from the bridge of one-quarter mile (500 yards) the bow of the LIQUILASSIE was less than 400 yards from the bridge. If the speed of the flotilla was six knots over the ground and the flotilla remained on course towards the bridge at this speed, 400 yards would be traversed in two minutes. For the bow of the flotilla to reach the intended tract 200 yards south of Gandy Bridge at this same speed over the ground would take just under one minute. Respondent presented an expert witness who testified generally regarding hydraulic steering systems. He had never been aboard the TUSKER to observe the steering mechanism but opined that a leak between the high pressure and low pressure lines could cause what he termed hydraulic stall. This could occur if debris under the valve seat prevented a valve from seating properly and allowed some of the pressure to bleed off from high pressure to low pressure lines. This could reduce the pressure in the high pressure lines, reducing the pressure being applied to the ram to turn the rudder and thereby decrease the force available to turn the rudder. This could result in a rudder not reaching the full right position while the tug was underway when maximum force opposing a rudder turn exists, but allow the rudder to turn to full right or left when dockside in still water. Other witnesses had testified to movement of the large wheel in the wheelhouse while the ship was being steered with the portable steering dial. The expert opined that this movement of the wheel was indicative that oil was leaking from the high pressure lines through the wheel and could cause hydraulic stall. The chief engineer by deposition (Exhibit 16a) testified that in his experience a hydraulic steering system either worked or it didn't and he was unaware of any such system that would one time allow the rudder to go full right or left position and the next time, under the same command, the rudder would go only part way. In the instructions for the Donkin steering mechanism attached to Chief Engineer Michael Ingham's deposition, which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 16a-e, the Donkin manual, listed as Exhibit 13 to Ingham's deposition, states in part as follows: Under the heading STARTING: 2. Put the change-over cock "B" on the bridge in power position. (When moving gear by local power control the change-over cock should always be in power otherwise the bridge hand wheel will be driven round by the power pump as soon as the control valve is moved.) Under the list of possible faults which may develop in the steering gear and How to locate them and their remedy, the same Exhibit 13 states: Steering gear will not work in either Power, Hand or Local Control. Shortage of oil causing air locks. (See Charging Instructions) Non-return valves (shuttle valves) on the telemotor side of the bridge unit not operating through being fouled with foreign matter or faulty. Drain oil out of bridge unit and examine valve. Steering Gear works in power but not in hand. Non return valves on hand pump side of bridge not seating through foreign matter or otherwise faulty. Remove oil from bridge unit, dismantle and clean thoroughly. Steering gear working erratically. Some- times going hardover, sometimes stopping short and sometimes moving on its own without the hand wheel being moved. 1. Buffer spring connecting the tiller to the hunting gear levers seized or wrongly adjusted. Dismantle spring, clean the stays and make sure they are free to work in the guide plates, assemble and adjust so that all the nuts just come up to the plates as the shoulders on the stays touch the plates. These instructions for the Donkin steering mechanism tend to support the testimony of the chief engineer that the steering mechanism doesn't work fully on one rudder change and only partly on another. No evidence was presented that the change-over cock on the bridge was in power position. On the other hand, no evidence was presented that someone had moved this lever from the position in which it was supposed to be set when the steering was placed in the power mode. Prior to departure from Halifax the Canadian Coast Guard inspected the steering system, particularly the emergency steering, and found it working properly. For the purpose of determining if the Respondent exercised prudence in piloting the TUSKER as the flotilla approached the Gandy Bridge, it is not essential that the steering be found to be operating correctly or erratically. If the latter, the Respondent was, or should have been, made aware of possible difficulties in making a sharp turn to the right as he had recently experienced that very problem while, making the turn from Cut G into Cut J.
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1982, Petitioner applied to Respondent to take the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination for the Port of Miami. Prior to that time, Petitioner had served as an apprentice pilot in the Port of Miami from January 1, 1967, through January 1, 1971. Petitioner was terminated from his position as an apprentice pilot with the Port of Miami in 1971, and has not piloted any ships in the Port of Miami or any other port in the state since that time. At the time of his application to take the pilot's examination, Petitioner was over 18 years of age, had been awarded a high school diploma, and was in good physical and mental health. Petitioner had also obtained a valid first class unlimited pilot's license issued by the United States Coast Guard in 1971. In addition to Petitioner, three other persons, William A. Arata, Stephen E. Nadeau, and Robert K. Brownell, also applied to take the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination for the Port of Miami. Arata submitted his application to sit for the examination on November 19, 1982. At that time, Arata had been licensed as a deputy pilot for the Port of Miami since January 28, 1980. In addition, he possessed an unlimited first class pilot'S license for the Port of Miami and had successfully completed the deputy pilot training program for that port. On November 24, 1982, Nadeau submitted his application to sit for the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination. Nadeau had been licensed as a deputy pilot in the Port of Miami since July 23, 1980, possessed an unlimited first class pilot's license for the Port of Miami, and had successfully completed the Port of Miami deputy pilot training program. Brownell applied on November 29, 1982, to sit for the same pilot's examination. At that time, Brownell had been licensed as a deputy pilot for the Port of Miami since July 31, 1980, also possessed an unlimited first class pilot's license for the Port of Miami, and had successfully completed the Port of Miami deputy pilot training program. In accordance with the provisions of Section 310.071, Florida Statutes, the applications of Petitioner, Arata, Nadeau, and Brownell were submitted to the Department of Professional Regulation which, in turn, submitted those applications to Respondent for a determination of eligibility to sit for the licensing examination. Respondent ultimately determined and advised the Department of Professional Regulation that all four applicants were qualified to sit for the licensing examination. All four applicants took the examination on January 31, 1983, and each of them received a passing grade. In accordance with Rule 21-8.09, Florida Administrative Code, the Department of Professional Regulation ranked the grades received by the applicants from highest to lowest. Petitioner received the lowest grade of the four applicants. Accordingly, since Respondent had certified three openings to be filled for licensed state pilots in the Port of Miami, the Department of Professional Regulation, act some time between February 1, 1983, and May 6, 1983, issued state pilot licenses for the Port of Miami to Captains Arata, Nadeau, and Brownell. There is in force in the Port of Miami a Deputy Pilot Training Program which has been approved by Respondent. The minimum time required for completion of the program, which is a prerequisite for applying for a state pilot's license, is two years. One of the requirements of the program is that participants obtain a first class unlimited pilot's license from the United States Coast Guard. This license allows the holder to pilot coastwise vessels which sail under the American flag. A state pilot's license standing alone permits the holder only to pilot ships sailing under foreign flags. In order to acquire a first class unlimited pilot's license, an applicant must possess another maritime license, such as a master's or male's license, must meet age and sea experience requirements, and must pass an examination prepared and administered by the United States Coast Guard. In addition, a condition to obtaining a first class unlimited pilot's license is that the applicant must possess a radar observer's certificate. The Florida State Pilot's Association, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation composed of 59 licensed state pilots from every port in Florida with the exception of Jacksonville and Fort Pierce. Captains Arata, Nadeau, and Brornell are members of that organization. The purpose of the organization is to represent the interests of its members at local, state, and federal levels.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Respondent, David Hirshberg acted as a yacht salesman without being licensed in accordance with Chapter 326, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was not licensed as a yacht broker or as a yacht salesman in accordance with Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, commonly referred to as the "Yacht and Ship Broker's Act". The Division is the state agency statutorily authorized to regulate yacht and ship brokers and salesmen. At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent was employed by Tampa Bay Marine Repossession Center (Center). Respondent's main responsibility was the sale of new Chris Craft boats and occasionally used boats. However, other than giving directions or explaining procedures at the boat show as set out in Finding of Fact 11 the Respondent was not involved with the sale of yachts. The Center is a division of Hirsh Marine, Inc., and acts as the showing agent between banks owning the repossessed boats and the boat buyer. At all times material to this proceeding, Center was not licensed as a yacht broker in accordance with Chapter 326, Florida Statutes, but was licensed as a boat dealer. On Sunday, March 10, 1991, the Center maintained a display booth at the Ninth Annual Suncoast Boat Show (Show) at Sarasota, Florida. The Center's display booth at the Show on March 10, 1991 contained listings offering boats for sale which had been repossessed by banks. One of those listings was for a 34-foot Mainship Trawler (Trawler). Listing of boats on a display board at boat shows is a common method of offering brokerage boats for sale. At the time Center was offering the Trawler for sale on March 10, 1991, the Center did not own, hold title to or have a secured interest in the Trawler. On March 10, 1992, the Trawler was owned by a lending institution that had foreclosed its security interest in the Trawler. The Trawler had been delivered to the Center by the lending institution to be offered for sale. The Trawler was held for sale by the Center for the owner in expectation of compensation for the sale. Ron Hirshberg testified that after the Center negotiated the sale of a repossessed boat with a buyer, the Center paid the lending institution off and title to the boat was transferred to the Center which in turn transferred title to the buyer. Based on material available at Center's display booth, this does not appear to be the procedure used by the Center in handling a sale. The material available at the Center's display booth advises the potential buyer, among other things, that: (a) Center acts as the showing agent between the boat owner (bank) and buyer; (b) certain guidelines are imposed by the bank; (c) no offers will be submitted to the bank without a 10% refundable deposit on initial offer; (d) offers are subject to bank's acceptance; and (e) if repairs are needed, this will be negotiated between bank and buyer. Respondent had his business cards on the table at the display booth which indicated he was associated with the Center. Also, on the display board was a notice that read "Any questions, come out to Chris Craft in-water display and ask for Dave". Dave is the Respondent herein. Upon inquiry, Respondent would direct the person to the marina where the repossessed boats were stored and explain the procedure on how to make an offer or purchase a repossessed boat. There was insufficient competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that the Respondent was employed by the Center as a yacht salesman or that the Respondent acted as a yacht salesman on behalf of Center as the term "salesman" is defined in Section 326.082(4), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the order to show cause. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in the case. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 8. - 5. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 3 and 11. Rejected as not being supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 and 5. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance as modified in Finding of Fact 9. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent The Respondent did not submit any Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Henderson, Esquire Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 David R. Hirshberg 6035 30th Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34209 Henry M. Solares, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Donald D. Conn, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
