The Issue Whether petitioner should be removed from the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979, on grounds of ineligibility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a licensed attorney, practices law in Clewiston, Hendry County, Florida. Since at least September 1, 1970, he has continuously engaged in the private practice of law in Clewiston. On September 1, 1970, the Glades County School Board ("School Board" or "Board") hired him as the School Board attorney, a position which he continues to hold. This is a part-time position, since the Board has no need for a full-time attorney. The School Board is headquartered at Moore Haven, 16 miles northwest of Clewiston, in neighboring Glades County. The terms and conditions of petitioner's employment with the School Board have remained virtually unchanged since he was originally hired. Each year, the School Board sets his salary consisting of a monthly retainer or salary, plus a fixed amount per hour for any additional professional services or litigation required by the School Board. For the 1979-80 school year, the Board set his salary or retainer--terms which the School Board used interchangeably-- as shown by the Minutes of the July 11, 1979, meeting: 3. SALARY/SCHOOL BOARD ATTORNEY - 1979-80 Chairman Hilliard opened the floor for discussion on the salary for the school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. After some discussion between the board and Mr. Potter, the board proposed a retainer of $750.00 per month. (annual salary of $9,000.00) plus $50.00 per hour for additional pro fessional services or litigation required by the board. ON MOTION by Sapp, seconded by Johnson, the board approved this pro- posal for school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. (Vote: Arnold, yes; Johnson, yes; Taylor, yes; Sapp, yes; Hilliard, yes.) His salary is paid from the School Board's regular employee salary account. But as the School Board's attorney, unlike other School Board employees, he does not accrue annual leave, sick leave, or pay during vacations, holidays or illness, though when he is sick or on vacation, there is no adjustment to his salary. He is reimbursed for work-related travel and meals at the rates provided by Section 112.061, Florida Statutes (1983), and is covered by the School Board's group health and life insurance, and Workers' Compensation. Since 1970, the Board has withheld his Social Security contributions from his fixed monthly salary payments; has paid the employer's Social Security contributions on his salary payments; and has annually reported his monthly salary payments on Internal Revenue Service Form W-2. To this extent, the School Board considered him an employee and treated him the same as it treated its other employees. The legal services which he furnished the School Board are described in his employment agreement and the School Board's job description for the position: TYPICAL DUTIES: Attend all regular Board meetings and such special meetings as deemed advisable by Board Chairman or Superintendent. Be available for routine telephone or personal consultations with Board Chairman, Superintendent and Staff members. Perform legal research. Prepare or approve leases or agreements prior to execution by Board. Prepare and prosecute law suits in behalf of Board and defend law suits against Board, including any actions against Superintendent, Staff or other school district employees allegedly arising etc., unless special counsel is deemed necessary by Board Attorney with Board's concurrence. Attend the quarterly seminars/meetings of Florida School Board Attorneys Association; and any other approved by Board. Represent Board and/or Superintendent in personnel matters where appropriate, as well as student discipline matters. School Board meetings, held monthly, last approximately one and one-half hours. Litigation, although described as a typical duty, is considered extra work, and an hourly rate is charged over and above the monthly salary. Petitioner agrees that he would not knowingly accept any new clients which would cause a conflict of interest with his School Board employment. Although he has been free to turn down work assigned by the School Board, he never has--at least through 1976. As explained by Mr. Strope, Superintendent of Schools from 1968 to 1976, although petitioner was free to turn down work, he "shouldn't have." Petitioner is not required to maintain any set office hours, and his monthly salary does not vary with the number of hours' work. He is not furnished office space by the School Board. The majority of his legal work for the Board is performed at his private law office, in Clewiston. The cost of operating his law office is not a budget item in the School Board's budget. Under his employment arrangement with the School Board, he furnishes all personnel, equipment, and facilities needed to perform his services. He is responsible for supervising the secretaries who work in his private office. Occasionally, when he is at School Board headquarters in Moore Haven he will ask a School Board employee to type a document. At his request, however, the School Board will furnish him pencils, legal pads, legal periodicals and stationery. It also pays for his travel; for per diem expenses incurred while attending legal seminars or meetings; and for long distance telephone calls made in connection with his School Board employment. He is neither responsible for, nor supervises, any employee of the School Board. The School Board does not furnish him any legal secretaries or part-time attorney assistants. He has not shown what percentage, or amount, of his working hours are devoted to performing legal services for the School Board, as opposed to legal services which he performs for his other clients. Other than assigning specific legal tasks, the School Board exercises no more control over the means, methods, and manner by which petitioner performs the legal work given him than is ordinarily exercised by any client over an attorney. Because of ethical constraints and the nature of legal work, petitioner must exercise independent professional judgment. Since September 1, 1970 2/, petitioner has been enrolled in the FRS. This was accomplished by his filling out a prescribed form which the School Board then filed with the Division. The Board then began reporting him on its employee rolls. There is no evidence that the initial FRS entry form, filed with the Division, described petitioner's work duties or the nature of his employment with the School Board. Both the Board and the Division enrolled him in the FRS, believing that he was eligible for membership. The Division did not question or investigate the nature of his employment relationship with the Board until 1983. From his initial enrollment until January 1, 1975, when FRS became a non-contributory system, petitioner contributed one-half of the the required FRS contribution, while the School Board contributed the other half. Since January 1, 1975, the School Board has contributed 100 percent of his contributions to FRS. During the 1970s petitioner's membership in the FRS prevented him from participating in any other tax sheltered retirement plan. 3/ Since July 1, 1979, the Division has, by rule, given notice that consultants and other professional persons contracting with public employers are, ordinarily, ineligible for membership in the FRS. All public employers, including the School Board, have been asked to remove such persons from their retirement payrolls. Since at least July 8, 1981, petitioner was on notice that his status as an employee, and his eligibility for continued membership in the FRS, were in question. Both the parties stipulate that part-time electricians, plumbers, painters, combustion engine mechanics, air conditioning mechanics, janitors or sewage plant operators (and even other occupations) employed in 1983 by the Glades County School Board on a year-round salary basis (i.e., at least 10 consecutive months), and paid out of the School Board's regular salary and wage account, would be mandatory members of FRS by statute. (Prehearing Stip., para. E. 6)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter an order removing petitioner from membership in the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979; and That the Division return to petitioner and the School Board their respective FRS contributions, mistakenly made to his account. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1984.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Erin R. McGuire, is entitled to purchase retirement service credit for the 1980-1981 school year based upon the determination of whether she was on a properly authorized leave of absence for that school year or, conversely, had actually resigned for that year before returning as a full- time employee of the Bay County School System the following year.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a regular class member of the FRS, with some 28 years of service credit. Her entire FRS career has been with the Bay County School District. On October 8, 1980, the Petitioner resigned her employment with the Bay County School System to re-locate her residence to Alabama. She wanted to be closer to her family in Alabama and at the time did not intend to return to Bay County. She changed her mind, however, and on September 9, 1981, was re-hired by the Bay County School System. She has continued her employment with Bay County schools from that time until the present. The Petitioner maintains that she spoke to her school principal after tendering her resignation in 1980, and he persuaded her to rescind her resignation and instead take a leave of absence. No school board record of such a decision or denomination of her absence from employment as a leave of absence, was produced at hearing. The Petitioner did admit that when she left her employment with Bay County in 1980, she had no intention of ever returning at that point. She did, however, return for the following school year and has been employed by Bay County Schools ever since. When a member, such as the Petitioner, seeks to purchase a leave of absence from the FRS, they, and their employer, must verify the leave of absence on the FRS form FR That form is provided by the Division and must be executed by both the employer and the employee. The leave of absence must have been approved by the employer, the school board, either prior to or during the time period of the leave of absence, according to the rule cited herein. When Ms. McGuire submitted her form FR 28 to the school board, the board completed the form indicating that she had resigned on October 8, 1980 (not a leave of absence), and was re-hired as a "new hire" on September 9, 1981. It is also the case that the school board approved amending her record to show the time period in question as a leave of absence. That amendment of her record was approved by the school board on January 14, 2004, however, long after the time period of the purported leave of absence itself.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, denying the Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit for the period October 1980 through September 1981. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Erin McGuire 1507 Rhode Island Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444
The Issue Whether respondent's rules of conduct contained in Department of Law Enforcement Directive #200.08 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority on the ground that they were not promulgated in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (1979)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Maggie L. Allen was a Career Service employee (with permanent status) of the Department of Law Enforcement until she was terminated from her position or about June 15, 1981. She has appealed her termination to the Florida Career Service Commission. (Prehearing Stipulation, p. 2; Respondent's Admissions.) The reason given for her termination was, in part, her alleged violation of Department Directive #200.08(5), Rules of Conduct ("Directive") . More specifically, the Department charged her with violating specific rules of conduct contained in the Directive: Rule 10, entitled, "Insubordination"; Rule 22, entitled, "Departmental Reports"; Rule 23, entitled, "Performance of Lawful Duty"; and Rule 34, entitled, "Truthfulness." (Prehearing Stipulation, p. 2; Respondent's Admissions; Exhibit No. 3.) The Directive, effective November 27, 1978, is an official statement of Department policy and is generally applicable to all employees of the Department. Its stated purpose is "to provide each Departmental employee with clear examples of acts which would violate the above personnel rules or statutes." (Emphasis supplied.) (Exhibit No. 1.) Essentially, the Directive defines acceptable conduct for Department employees by specifically enumerating 35 standards of conduct. By its terms, breach of one or more of those standards constitutes employee misconduct and may result in disciplinary action against an employee ranging from oral reprimand to discharge. However, these standards are not intended to be an exclusive, or exhaustive listing of impermissible conduct. (Respondent's Admissions; Exhibit No. 1.) The Directive is part of the Department's Duty Manual, a volume containing directives on personnel, administrative, training, and fiscal matters as well as the operations of the Department's divisions. The stated purpose of the Duty Manual is to "inform and guide . . . [Department] officers and employees in the performance of their official duties." (Exhibit No. 2.) The Duty Manual recites that it is "promulgated" pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, that copies are disseminated to all employees and that employees must obey, comply with, and follow the Manual's directives. The Manual has been incorporated, by reference, in Department Rule 11-1.12, Florida Administrative Code. All formalities concerning publication of Rule 11-1.12 were complied with prior to its publication in the Florida Administrative Code. (Prehearing Stipulation; Exhibit No. 2.) Department Rule 11-1.12, incorporating--by reference--the Duty Manual, was adopted on March 20, 1979, for the purpose of validating those portions (unspecified) of the Manual which constituted "rules" under the APA. At the time, the Department anticipated that adopting the Manual, by rule, would "lead to greater efficiency." (Exhibit No. 2.)
The Issue Whether there are sufficient grounds for the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against Respondent?s teaching certificate, and if so, the nature of the sanctions.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Education Practices Commission is the state agency charged with the duty and responsibility to revoke or suspend, or take other appropriate action with regard to teaching certificates as provided in sections 1012.795 and 1012.796. § 1012.79(7), Fla. Stat. Petitioner, as Commissioner of Education, is charged with the duty to file and prosecute administrative complaints against individuals who hold Florida teaching certificates and who are alleged to have violated standards of teacher conduct. § 1012.796(6), Fla. Stat. Respondent holds a teaching certificate issued by the Florida Department of Education, No. 608837, covering the areas of pre-kindergarten and primary education. Respondent?s current teaching certificate was issued as a result of the entry of a September 18, 2007, Settlement Agreement that resolved an initial denial of the teaching certificate for a series of pleas or convictions for financial crimes, including Public Assistance Fraud. The Settlement Agreement authorized the issuance of Respondent?s teaching certificate subject to a letter of reprimand and a two-year period of probation. The Settlement Agreement was adopted by the Education Practices Commission by Final Order entered on January 25, 2008. Respondent was employed by the Gadsden County School Board in various positions since 2005, most of them being as a teacher at the elementary school and kindergarten level. Respondent received instructional employee evaluation ratings of “very effective” for the 2006-2007 school year, and of “effective” for the 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009-2010 school years. Respondent was suspended from teaching by the Gadsden County School Board on January 3, 2011 for issues relating to her December 21, 2010, arrest for drug-related offenses. The suspension was upheld at a meeting of the Gadsden County School Board on January 25, 2011. Respondent was rehired as a Gadsden County substitute teacher in February, 2011, and worked in that capacity at two schools until December 2012. The decision to rehire was made to accommodate Respondent with lawful employment so as to meet the terms of her probation. Administrative Complaint On November 30, 2012, Petitioner issued the Administrative Complaint that forms the basis for this proceeding. The Administrative Complaint identified the offenses that underlie the five specified counts. Resisting an Officer - September 29, 2007 On September 29, 2007, Officer Clark was in the process of effectuating an arrest of Respondent?s son at a convenience store located near Respondent?s home. According to Officer Clark, Respondent?s son was resisting efforts to place him in handcuffs. While Officer Clark was attempting to take Respondent?s son into custody, Respondent appeared on the scene and attempted to intervene in the incident. The nature of the intervention is disputed. When a back-up officer arrived, Officer Clark instructed him to take Respondent into custody. The only evidence of the disposition of the charge of resisting an officer was a printout of the case docket from the website of the Leon County, Florida Clerk of Court. The printout is hearsay, and comes within no exception to the hearsay rule set forth in section 90.803, Florida Statutes. Disposition of the charge of resisting an officer was not supported by competent, substantial, and non-hearsay evidence. Thus, no finding can be made to substantiate that charge. Driving Without a Valid License - January 2, 2010 On January 2, 2010, Respondent was driving her vehicle in Tallahassee. She was stopped by Officer Hurlbut for a traffic infraction. Respondent presented Officer Hurlbut with a Florida driver?s license. When Officer Hurlbut ran the driver?s license through his onboard computer, he discovered that the driver?s license produced by Respondent was not current, and that Respondent?s driver?s license had been suspended. Officer Hurlbut issued a citation and notice to appear to Respondent, and seized her expired driver?s license and her automobile tag. On April 14, 2010, Respondent entered a plea of no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver?s license, a second-degree misdemeanor, was adjudged guilty, and was placed on probation for a period of six months. Driving Without a Valid License/Violation of Probation - September 26, 2010 On September 26, 2010, Respondent was stopped by Highway Patrol Sergeant Teslo for driving without a seatbelt. Respondent had no identification. Sergeant Teslo asked Respondent to write her name and date of birth on a sheet of paper so that he could run it through his onboard computer. The name and birthdate provided by Respondent were not those of Respondent. When Sergeant Teslo determined that the name and birthdate were not those of Respondent, he returned to her car, whereupon Respondent provided him with her real name and birthdate. When Sergeant Teslo ran Respondent?s name and birthdate, he discovered that Respondent was operating her vehicle while her driver?s license was suspended. He issued a traffic citation, and waited for a licensed driver to come and pick up Respondent. As a matter of discretion, Sergeant Teslo did not charge Respondent with providing false information. On September 30, 2010, an affidavit of probation violation was executed which alleged that Respondent violated her April 14, 2010, sentence of probation by driving with a suspended license. A warrant was issued, and Respondent was taken into custody. Respondent entered a plea of no contest to a reduced charge of operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver?s license. Adjudication was withheld. Drug Offenses - December 9, 2010 On December 9, 2010, after a period of investigation and surveillance of Respondent?s home, the Tallahassee Police Department executed a search warrant for the home. Respondent was not at the home when the search was conducted. Respondent arrived at her home while the search warrant was being executed. There were numerous police cars around the house. Respondent asked a neighbor to watch the house and retrieve the keys when the search was done while she took her pit bulldog, which had been Tasered during the execution of the warrant, to the veterinarian. The neighbor later called Respondent to advise her that drugs were found during the search. Thus, the search and its results were openly known in the area. During the execution of the search warrant, two of Respondent?s sons were taken into custody. The search of the home uncovered a significant quantity of powdered and crack cocaine, cannabis, and various articles of paraphernalia located in rooms throughout the home, including the kitchen and Respondent?s bedroom. On December 21, 2010, Respondent was arrested for a number of drug-related offenses. On February 11, 2011, an Information was filed charging Respondent with trafficking in controlled substances, a felony of the first degree; sale or possession of controlled substances with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a convenience store, a felony of the first degree; sale or possession of controlled substances with intent to sell within 1000 feet of a convenience store, a felony of the second degree; and possession of paraphernalia, a misdemeanor of the first degree. On November 15, 2011, Respondent entered into a deferred prosecution agreement for the charged offenses subject to Respondent?s compliance with various terms of the agreement. Public Assistance Fraud - July 25, 2012 On July 6, 2012, an affidavit was executed by Department of Economic Opportunity Investigator Marshall, in which it was alleged that Respondent made false statements that she was unemployed and not receiving wages or benefits from June 19, 2010 through February 26, 2011, so as to qualify for reemployment assistance benefits for which she was otherwise not eligible. Respondent asserted that she was, in fact, unemployed during the summer of 2010, since her annual contract expired at the conclusion of the 2009-2010 school year, and was not renewed until the commencement of the 2010-2011 school year. She further asserted that she was suspended without pay commencing on January 26, 2011. However, the evidence is undisputed that Respondent was employed and receiving wages for, at a minimum, the start of the 2010-2011 school year1/ until January 26, 2011. On July 25, 2012, an Information was filed charging Respondent with Unemployment Compensation Fraud, a felony of the third degree, for making false statements to obtain or increase benefits under Florida unemployment compensation laws. On November 2, 2012, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the felony charge of unemployment compensation fraud, was adjudicated guilty, was placed on probation for a period of five years, and was ordered to pay restitution to the Florida Reemployment Compensation Trust Fund in the amount of $7,972.00 and to pay an additional $750 in court costs.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order permanently revoking Respondent?s teaching certificate, No. 608837. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 2013.
The Issue Whether Petitioner forfeits his rights to benefits under the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact On May 5, 2011, Petitioner was mayor of North Miami Beach, Florida. During Petitioner’s employment as mayor with North Miami Beach, he was a member of the Florida Retirement System. On or about October 17, 2012, Petitioner was charged by Information with nine criminal counts in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. On February 24, 2016, pursuant to a written Plea Agreement, Rosner entered a plea of guilty to Count 11/ Unlawful Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behavior, in violation of section 838.016(2), in Eleventh Circuit case F12023663. That same day in the Eleventh Circuit case F12023663, Judge Martin Bidwill issued the following orders: an Order Ratifying Terms of Plea Agreement; a Disposition Order specifying Rosner’s plea to Count 1 Unlawful Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behavior; and a Finding of Guilt Order to Count 1 Compensation [or] Reward for Official Behav[ior]/Influence. The October 17, 2012, Information detailed the factual basis of Rosner’s plea and conviction in Count 1.2/ Petitioner illegally received unpaid campaign advertising from Martin Outdoor Media, which had a continuing contract with the City of North Miami Beach while Petitioner served as mayor. Count 1 provides in relevant part, the following: COUNT 1 MYRON JOEL ROSNER, on or about May 5, 2011, in the County and State aforesaid, being a public servant to wit: MAYOR OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH did unlawfully, feloniously, and corruptly request, solicit, accept, or agree to accept any pecuniary or other benefit not authorized by law, to wit; UNPAID CAMPAIGN ADS, for the past, future, or future exertion of any influence upon or with any other public servant regarding any act or omission which said public servant represented as being within the official discretion of a public servant, to wit: CONTINUE ALL MARTIN OUTDOOR MEDIA CONTRACTS WITH THE CITY OF NORTH MIAMI BEACH, in violation of s. 838.016(2), Fla. Stat., contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Florida.3/ Rosner was notified by certified letter dated April 20, 2016, of the Division's proposed action to forfeit his Florida Retirement System rights and benefits pursuant to sections 112.3173 and 121.091(5)(f). The notice provided the following basis for the proposed action: . . . . as a result of your guilty plea in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, for acts committed in connection with your employment with the City of North Miami Beach. Specifically, on or about October 18, 2012, in Case Number F12-023663 (2012-CF_023663), you were charged by information, in relevant part, with unlawful compensation or award for official behavior, a second degree felony in violation of section 838.016(2), Florida Statutes, based on conduct which occurred on or about May 5, 2011. On or about February 24, 2016, you entered a guilty plea for one count of unlawful compensation or award for official behavior, a second degree felony in violation of section 838.016(2), Florida Statutes, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. By Petition dated May 9, 2016, Rosner contested the Notice and challenged the forfeiture.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order finding that Petitioner was a public employee convicted of a specified offense committed prior to retirement pursuant to section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his Florida Retirement System rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2017.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System (FRS), pursuant to sections 112.3173 and 121.091(5)(f), Florida Statutes, because of his conviction for official misconduct, a third degree felony under section 838.022(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The FRS is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. In January 1987, Petitioner began employment with the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT"), an FRS-participating employer. By reason of this employment, Petitioner was enrolled in the FRS, and DOT made contributions to the FRS on his behalf. In March 2001 and March 2005, Petitioner was elected to separate four-year terms as a Commissioner on the City Commission of the City of Deerfield Beach, Florida ("City"), an FRS-participating employer. By reason of his public office as a City Commissioner, Petitioner was enrolled in the FRS, and the City made contributions to the FRS on his behalf. Before entering upon the duties of his public office, pursuant to Florida law and the City Charter, Petitioner was required to take and subscribe substantially to the following oath: I do solemnly swear or affirm that I am a citizen of the State of Florida and of the United States of America and a registered voter and resident of the City of Deerfield Beach, as shown by the public records of Broward County, Florida. I am being employed as a Commissioner of the City of Deerfield Beach and will be a recipient of public funds. As such Commissioner I further swear or affirm that I will support the Charter of the City of Deerfield Beach, the Constitution of the State of Florida, and the Constitution of the United States, and that I will well and faithfully perform the duties of my office upon which I am about to enter. All elected officials of the City were subject to the standards of ethical conduct for public officers set by Florida law and the City Charter. Effective December 11, 2008, Petitioner resigned his position as City Commissioner. On or about December 29, 2008, Petitioner was charged, by information, with one count of grand theft, a third degree felony, in violation of sections 812.014(1)(a) and (b) and (2)(c)2., Florida Statutes; one count of official misconduct, a third degree felony, in violation of section 838.022(1), Florida Statutes; and one count of falsifying records, a first degree misdemeanor, in violation of section 839.13, Florida Statutes. The crimes with which Petitioner was charged were alleged to have occurred between October 6, 2007 and January 10, 2008. The basis for the official misconduct charge was that Petitioner falsified a campaign treasurer's report as part of his campaign for mayor of the City. The campaign treasurer's report is an official record or document belonging to the office of the City Clerk and/or the Florida Department of State, Division of Elections. Petitioner is no longer employed by DOT or the City. Petitioner is not retired from the FRS, and he has not received FRS retirement benefits. On or about May 7, 2010, Petitioner filed with the Division a completed FRS Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement (Form FR-11). By letter dated May 11, 2010, the Division advised Petitioner in relevant part as follows: This letter is to advise you of the status of your application for Florida Retirement System benefits. Our Legal office is reviewing your current legal situation for a determination of whether a forfeiture of benefits has occurred. If the determination is that forfeiture occurred, you will be notified and given information if you wish to appeal that determination. Your retirement application is pending until this review is complete. On May 10, 2011, a jury rendered a verdict which found Petitioner guilty as charged in the information. On July 29, 2011, the court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of the crimes. On or about August 3, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal. On May 1, 2013, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner's convictions for grand theft, official misconduct, and falsifying records, and authored an opinion which addressed Petitioner's contention that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the count of official misconduct. The Court wrote in relevant part: Section 838.022(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), makes it "unlawful for a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for any person or to cause harm to another, to ... [f]alsify, or cause another person to falsify, any official record or official document." In this case, the basis for the official misconduct charge was that appellant falsified a campaign report as part of his campaign for mayor of Deerfield Beach. On appeal, appellant focuses on section 838.022(2)(a), which defines "public servant" as not "includ[ing] a candidate who does not otherwise qualify as a public servant," for the argument that "he was not a public servant at the time of the alleged offense" but was "merely a candidate for public office." However, as the State argues, at the time appellant was a candidate for mayor, he "otherwise qualif[ied] as a public servant" by virtue of his status as a city commissioner. Chapter 838 defines "public servant" as including "[a]ny officer or employee of a state, county, municipal, or special district agency or entity." § 838.014 (6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007). The statute distinguishes a mere candidate from a public job or office holder in order to reach the evil of public servants misusing their office. Here, appellant was not just a candidate at the time of the offense; it was his dual status as a candidate and an incumbent commissioner that brought him within the ambit of the statute. ... Gonot v. State, 112 So. 3d 679, 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)(emphasis in original). ULTIMATE FACTUAL FINDINGS Petitioner forfeited his rights and benefits under the FRS pursuant to sections 112.3173 and 121.091(5)(f), Florida Statutes, because he was convicted of official misconduct, a third degree felony, in violation of section 838.022(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that the Petitioner was convicted of a felony under section 838.022(1), Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his FRS retirement rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Florida State University during the 1979- 1980 academic year as a tenured professor of chemistry at an annual salary of $22,819.00. Petitioner submitted an Application for Service Retirement Benefits dated May 2, 1980, to Respondent, which application reflected Petitioner's intention to terminate his employment at Florida State University effective May 30, 1980. Previously, Petitioner had advised the Chairman of the Chemistry Department of Petitioner's intention to retire effective June 5, 1980. However, in submitting the aforesaid application dated May 2, 1980, Petitioner determined to relinquish four days of employment salary in June in order to become eligible for retirement benefits begin to accrue on the first day of the first month following termination of employment. Petitioner's request to terminate his employment effective May 30, 1980, was approved by both his department chairman and by the Retirement Coordinator at Florida State University. As a result of his notification of intent to terminate his employment effective May 30, 1980, Petitioner was removed from the payroll of Florida State University effective May 30, 1980. However, Petitioner continued to perform his duties as a professor of chemistry at Florida State University until the end of the academic school year on June 16, 1980. Petitioner continued actual classroom and laboratory instruction until the end of classes on June 6, 1980. Petitioner continued actual classroom and laboratory instruction until the end of classes on June 6, 1980, and, following the end of classes, he conducted final exams, graded examinations, issued grades and, on June 16, 1980, briefly attended a faculty meeting. Although Petitioner's contract of employment provides for a faculty appointment from September 7, 1979 through June 5, 1980, these dates relate only to pay periods, since a faculty member's contractual duties and responsibilities, unless specifically altered by mutual agreement between the contracting parties, extend through the end of the academic school year in this case, June 16, 1980. The academic school year at Florida State University is nine months long and is comprised of three academic quarters, during which approximately one-third of a faculty member's annual salary is paid in each of the three academic quarters. Petitioner was paid through May 30, 1980, by Florida State University, and received no payment for services rendered during the month of June, 1980. However, when Florida State University officials were advised by respondent's personnel that Petitioner's request to establish May 30, 1980 as his termination date for retirement purposes would not be honored, Petitioner was advised that the University stood ready to pay him the $468.08 which he would have received for his work in June, 1980, had he not chosen the May 30, 1980 employment termination date. The record reflects that Petitioner made the decision to choose May 30, 1980, as his employment termination date, rather than the later date of June 5, 1980, during counseling sessions with representatives of Respondent, when it became apparent to them that he could receive $1,554.64 in retirement benefits for the month of June, as opposed to the $468.08 he would receive in June in salary had he chosen to continue to receive his salary for services performed at Florida State University. Petitioner was correctly advised by Respondent's personnel that by working through June 5, 1980, and earning salary for that time period, he would be ineligible to begin accruing retirement benefits until the end of June, 1980.
