Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this cause, Robert W. Pope has been the holder of license no. 62-600, series 4-COP, SRX, held with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage to trade as The Wedgewood Inn, located at 1701, 4th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida. When the Respondent, Pope, began to operate the licensed premises he was given a registration sales tax number by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This number was provided in accordance with 212, F.S. That law required the remittance of the collected sales tax on a month to month basis, the period beginning with the first day of the month and ending with the last day of the month. The remittance was due on the first day of the following month and payable by the 20th day of the following month. Failure to pay by the 20th would result in a 5 percent penalty and 1 percent interest per month. The sales tax remittance due from the licensed premises for December, 1975 through August, 1976 was not made, and a lien was filed to aid collection of the tax. In mid 1976, the Respondent, contacted the State of Florida, Department of Revenue to discuss term payments of the sales tax remittance. The Respondent in October, 1976 tried to effect a partial release of the tax claim by paying $2,900. In keeping with their policy the Department of Revenue rejected these efforts. Subsequently, in February, 1977, the Respondent made a $10,000 initial payment and three monthly installments to satisfy the lien on this licensed premises and another licensed premises which the Respondent owned. At present all taxes due and owing under 212, F.S. are current. The above facts establish that the Respondent failed to comply with the provisions of 212, F.S. pertaining to the remittance of sales tax from the Respondent to the State of Florida, Department of Revenue. This violation, thereby subjects the Respondent to the possible penalties of 561.29, F.S.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, Robert W. Pope, be required to pay a civil penalty in the amount of $250.00 or have the license no. 62-600, series 4- COP, SRX, suspended for a period of 10 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert W. Pope, Esquire 611 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701
Findings Of Fact Petitioner purchased a used car in Florida in May of 1983 and paid 5 percent sales tax. Petitioner did not title said car in the State of Florida. When Petitioner returned to Maryland, his state of residence, Maryland imposed a 5 percent tax on said car when Petitioner titled said car. Petitioner applied for a sales tax refund to the Department of Revenue in the amount of $225.00. Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to deny said refund application on December 1, 1983. From the exhibits to which the parties stipulated, additional facts are found by the Hearing Officer. A bill of sale indicates that Petitioner purchased a 1979 Buick Regal from Eddy Auto Sales on May 14, 1983. A temporary registration and receipt issued by the State of Maryland on June 17, 1983, shows that Petitioner paid a "title tax" of $222.50 to the State of Maryland. By letter dated January 27, 1984, Agnes Stoicos of the Maryland Department of Transportation indicates that the Maryland tax is a 5 percent excise tax upon the issuance of all original and subsequent certificates of title, and the tax is used primarily for the construction and the maintenance of the Maryland highway system.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Nick Farah, Sr., is liable for the taxes assessed under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, for the March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994 audit period, and to what degree, if any, the audit debt may be compromised as uncollectible.
Findings Of Fact This case involves an assessment of sales taxes and charter transit system surtaxes associated with audit number 9501539, and covering the audit period of March 1, 1989, to February 28, 1994 (audit period), for Farah's Gazebo Restaurant (the restaurant) located at 3541 University Boulevard, North, Jacksonville, Florida. Sales of food and alcoholic beverages were made at the restaurant during the audit period. Sales tax was collected and remitted to the Department on the sales of alcoholic beverages during the audit period, but not on the sales of prepared food. The assessment relates to the sale of food during the audit period. The restaurant was first opened as a sandwich shop in 1974 by both Petitioners, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah, who at all times material have been husband and wife. Mrs. Farah's middle initial is "N." Mr. Farah is now 74 years old. Mrs. Farah is 63. When the restaurant was opened in 1974, Nick Farah, Sr., opened a utility account with the City of Jacksonville in his name alone. At all times material, that same account in Nick Farah, Sr.'s name has been used by the restaurant. At all times material, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah had a checking account (number 467835202-01), in the name "Nick Farah d/b/a Farah's Gazebo Cafe, Restaurant & Lounge" with American National Bank of Florida (American National checking account). During the audit period, this account was used by Petitioners as both the restaurant's checking account and their personal checking account. During the audit period, all proceeds from sales at the restaurant were deposited into the American National checking account. All of the Petitioners' personal living expenses were paid from monies deposited into the American National checking account. During the audit period, Nick Farah, Sr., ran banking and shopping errands for the restaurant at his wife's direction, and considered it appropriate to write checks on behalf of the restaurant in his wife's absence. When their restaurant was first opened, Petitioners obtained a sales tax registration certificate from the Department of Revenue. This certificate was issued in the names of both Petitioners. In 1986, Petitioners refurbished and expanded their sandwich shop to a full restaurant serving dinner along with alcoholic beverages. During the several months in which the restaurant was being expanded, the restaurant was closed for business. Petitioners have a son, Nick Farah, Jr., who has a restaurant and lounge in Gainesville, Florida. Nick Farah, Jr., helped his parents expand their restaurant and donated certain restaurant equipment for the expansion. In 1986, Nick Farah, Jr., obtained alcoholic beverage license 26-02438SRX solely in his name for the restaurant. In 1988, Petitioners' other son, John Farah, became actively involved with the operation of the restaurant, in order to allow his father, Nick Farah, Sr., to retire. John Farah's involvement with the restaurant lasted approximately six or seven months, after which he was no longer involved. In 1988, due to numerous medical problems, including high blood pressure, prostate cancer, diabetes, and weak eyes, Nick Farah, Sr., "retired." He advised the social security office in 1988 of his retirement and filed all necessary papers in order to begin to receive his social security benefits. His social security income was "direct deposited" to a Barnett Bank account set up solely for that purpose. Nick Farah, Sr., listed himself as "retired" on the couple's joint 1989-1994 federal income tax returns. These returns include Schedule C, "Profit or Loss from Business," and listed the restaurant as solely owned by Sue Farah, as proprietor. On these returns, Sue Farah stated that she was sole owner of the business known as Farah's Gazebo Restaurant. When Nick Farah, Sr., retired, Sue Farah began paying bills and making all executive decisions concerning employees, doing the ordering, deciding on the menu, and pricing. However, since 1988, the restaurant also has had a manager who has dealt with the employees and food ordering as well. Although he considers himself retired, Nick Farah, Sr., consistently has gone to the restaurant to eat, talk with friends, and play rummy. He has also performed errands and written checks for the restaurant. (See Finding of Fact 8) In testimony, he referred to the American National account as "our Gazebo account." (TR-111) Sales Tax Registration Certificate No. 26-08-093045- 08/1 was issued in the name of Nick Farah, Sr., Sue N. Farah, and Nick Farah, Jr., until June 1, 1992. On June 1, 1992, Sales Tax Registration Certificate No. 26-08-126824-08/1 was issued in the names of Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue N. Farah. This was done to separate the restaurant from Nick Farah, Jr.'s, Gainesville restaurant. The type of business organization listed on the certificate is "partnership." On each of the sales tax registration certificates, Nick Farah, Sr.'s social security number was used as the federal identification number. In 1993, the Alcoholic Beverage License was renewed in the names of Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah. Petitioners' personal residence is held jointly in their names. During the audit period, Petitioners refinanced their personal residence and obtained a home equity loan through American National Bank. The proceeds from this loan were used to pay expenses related to the restaurant. (See Finding of Fact 52). On March 24, 1994, the Department issued its DR-840 Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records to "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Notices of Intent are usually issued in the name(s) on the current Sales Tax Registration Certificate. On April 14, 1994, the Farahs both executed a Power of Attorney appointing their attorney to represent them in matters relating to the audit. Subsequent to the audit, the Department issued its "Notice of Intent to Make Sales & Use Tax Audit Changes," under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, on November 4, 1994, in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Taxes for the audit period March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994, were assessed in the amount of $65,093.44. Penalties were assessed up to that point in time in the amount of $20,679.43. Interest was assessed up to that point in time in the amount of $22,678.86. The total was $108,451.73. Interest would continue to run. Also on November 4, 1994, the Department issued its "Notice of Intent to Make Charter County Transit System Surtax Changes" in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." Taxes were assessed in the amount of $5,424.46; penalties were assessed in the amount of $1,723.27; and interest was assessed in the amount of $1,889.92 for a total of $9,037.65. The Department revised its audit on January 17, 1995. Two revised Notices of Intent were issued, each in the names of "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant," with assessment in the following amounts: $62,974.40 (sales and use taxes), $19,839.95 (penalties), and $28,373.14 (interest); and $5,247.86 (charter county surtaxes), $1,653.29 (penalties), and $2,367.18 (interest). These revised notices were issued to reflect the deduction of certain non-revenue items from the gross deposits reflected on the Petitioners' bank statement. They also show accruing interest. By their attorney's letter dated February 6, 1995, Petitioners raised the issue of Nick Farah, Sr.'s liability for the assessment, arguing that his involvement with the restaurant during the audit period was insufficient to render him a "taxpayer" as contemplated by the applicable statutes and rules, and insufficient to create such a tax liability for him. The letter from Petitioners' counsel stated that Petitioner Sue Farah "considered the restaurant to be hers, and has filed her federal income tax returns accordingly. She is willing to sign the Notice of Intent and enter into a payment arrangement." Donald Ritchie, the Department's Jacksonville tax auditor who had initiated the audit, subsequently issued a "Memo to File," dated February 7, 1995, stating, Auditor contacted atty. Jeff Dollinger in response to his letter of 2-6-95 in which he states TP's claim that Sue Farah is sole proprietor of restaurant and Nick is not a "dealer" in connection with the restaurant operation. He stated in a telephone conversation that Sue Farah wished to sign NOI indicating agreement with the proposed audit changes "with the exception of penalty" and obtain a stipulated payment schedule but only if registration and audit were changed to eliminate Nick's name. On February 7 and 8, 1995, Peggy Bowen, a Departmental superior of Mr. Ritchie, directed two memoranda by electronic mail (e-mail) to another Departmental employee, Allen Adams, located in Tallahassee. These memoranda requested guidance on how to proceed with the questions raised by Petitioners' counsel. In response to these requests, a series of e-mail memoranda were exchanged within the Tallahassee office of the Department. The first, on February 8, 1995, from George Stinson, stated, in part: What advantage would we have if we assessed "Nick's Partnership"? . . . from what Peggy said, "Nick's Partnership" doesn't even exist, but "Sue's Sole Proprietorship" does. It seems to me that it would be absurd to assess an entity ("Nick's Partnership") that, by the taxpayer's own admission, doesn't exist. Just because the registration social data on the database is erroneous doesn't mean we should issue an erroneous assessment. The second February 8, 1995, electronic mail memorandum from Allen Adams to Peggy Bowen, stated, "OK, I take this as an approval to change our NOI and get an agreed case." The final electronic mail memorandum dated February 9, 1995, from George Stinson to Allen Adams provides: Allen...While mulling this all over in my brain, it occurred to me it would not be unwise for Peggy to prepare (but hold on to for the time being) an NOI under "Nick's Partnership" in case the other one somehow goes awry. If "Sue's Sole Proprietership" [sic] tries to pull a "fast one" and reneg on their agreement and stip because they claim they weren't the "registered" or "840'd" entity, we can file off the other one to make sure all bases are covered. If the TP seems to be dragging their feet and we're getting into a jeopardy situation, we could even have both NOI's (and assessments) in existence concurrently to keep us protected. Donald Ritchie testified that he did not know of the existence of a "Nick's Partnership" or where such a term came from. However, see Findings of Fact 21, 25, and 46. A memo to file was subsequently produced by Peggy Bowen, dated February 10, 1995, which stated in part: I spoke to Allen Adams on the telephone regarding the memo from George Stinson dated 2/9/95. We agreed that our procedure would be to revise the existing NOI which is in the name Nick and Sue Farah to Sue Farah, and correct the SSN, under the existing audit number. We issued the existing NOI as a sole proprietorship, as Nick & Sue Farah, and we are only clarifying the name of the sole proprietorship to Sue Farah. There were not any partnership federal tax returns filed only joint 1040. Neither Petitioner was privy to the internal e-mail memoranda of the Department. The parties have stipulated that the Department agreed to remove Nick Farah, Sr.'s name from the Notices of Intent in exchange for Sue Farah's agreement to sign the notices as "agreed" liabilities. Accordingly, the Department's Second Revised Notices of Intent were issued on February 13, 1995. The Second Revised Notices of Intent were issued in the name "Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant." These were issued by Donald Ritchie.1 The Second Revised Notice of Intent to make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes (also referred to as "the second NOI") states in paragraph #1, "The Department of Revenue presents you with a Notice of Intent to make Sales and Use Tax Audit Changes for the period of time which you have been found to be liable on various transactions subject to the tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, during the period 03/01/89 Through 02/28/94." It further states on the bottom of the first page, "NOTE: The execution and filing of this waiver will expedite adjustment of the tax liability as indicated above. . . . If you now agree with the tax audit changes, please sign this form and return it to the audit office indicated above." Petitioner Sue Farah signed the Second Revised Notices of Intent on March 10, 1995. Also on March 10, 1995, Petitioner Sue Farah submitted a request for compromise of taxes, penalties, and interest. The Department's representative in Jacksonville agreed to waive the penalties on the assessment. Subsequently, the Department's auditor forwarded the audit file to Tallahassee for further consideration of the Request for Compromise of Taxes and Interest. Donald Ritchie testified that during the course of the audit, it was apparent to him that it was an operation that was owned and operated by a husband and wife, Nick Farah, Sr., and Sue Farah, but that a Notice of Intent is issued in the name of the taxpayer as it is listed on the sales tax registration. It is noted, however, that the audit period covered a period in which there were two sales tax registration numbers for the restaurant in the name(s) first of Nick, Sr., Sue and Nick, Jr., until June 1, 1992, and thereafter as Nick Farah, Sr. and Sue Farah, a partnership. (See Findings of Fact 20-21.) After the audit was conducted, the audit file was forwarded to Tallahassee for review. Included within the audit file was the Standard Audit Program & Report for Sales and Use Tax form. Donald Ritchie testified that he filled out the Standard Audit Program & Report for Sales and Use Tax form listing the taxpayers as "Nick & Sue Farah d/b/a Farah's Gazebo Restaurant," and indicating that the entity was a "sole proprietorship" because he understood that a business entity run by a husband and wife did not constitute a partnership but rather a sole proprietorship in the absence of the formal procedures of organizing a partnership. Donald Ritchie further testified that he forwarded the file to Tallahassee as an "unagreed audit," because after signing the second NOI the Petitioners had asked for "additional conditions," including a request by Sue Farah for compromise of the taxes, penalties, and interest, that had not been specified at the time Sue Farah signed. However, he conceded that anyone signing an NOI could request such compromise. It is also clear that Sue Farah had always retained the right to compromise the penalties. (See Findings of Fact 30, 32 and 44-45) The Department subsequently issued its Notices of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) on September 6, 1995, in the names of both husband and wife, as "Nick & Sue Farah/Farah Gazebo Restaurant." By letter dated November 3, 1995, Petitioner Sue Farah d/b/a Farah Gazebo Restaurant protested the entire proposed assessments, on the ground of "doubt as to collectability." By letter dated January 15, 1996, Petitioner Sue Farah submitted her financial information in support of her protest. Petitioners had borrowed additional monies in order to pay off general debts and debt associated with the restaurant involved in this proceeding. They then borrowed again in order to open a second restaurant on "Mandarin" in Jacksonville. This new venture was to be run by a newly created corporation, of which Sue Farah is sole stockholder. Petitioners are agreed that if the restaurant which is at issue in this cause were sold, Sue Farah would get all the proceeds. By letter dated March 15, 1996, Kathleen Marsh, CPA and Tax Law Specialist for the Department, requested certain financial information from both Petitioners in order to consider the issues raised in the letter of protest, including but not limited to, audit papers, bank statements for the years 1995 and 1996, and various information relating to the operation and financial position of the second restaurant. By letter dated April 8, 1996, Kathleen Marsh notified Petitioners that she had not yet received the information she had requested, and was going to issue the Notice of Decision. By letter dated April 17, 1996, Petitioners' CPA responded in part to the Department's request for additional financial information, but it does not amount to a certification or audit of the Farahs' financial statements. Also on April 17, 1996, the Department issued its Notice of Decision, sustaining the assessment in its entirety, determining that doubt as to collectability had not been established by the Petitioners. The Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Department's determination, raising the additional argument that Nick Farah, Sr., was not sufficiently involved in the operation of the restaurant during the audit period so as to be liable for the tax assessment. The following information had been requested by the Department but was never received from the Petitioners: a copy of an IRS audit, bank statements for all accounts for the years 1995 and 1996, information relating to ownership of stock in the new restaurant corporation, and information relating to sales tax registration for the new restaurant. The Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration on November 5, 1996, again sustaining the assessment in its entirety and determining that doubt as to collectability still had not been established. It further determined that Nick Farah, Sr., was a registered dealer under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and was otherwise sufficiently involved in the operation of the restaurant so as to be liable for the assessment. Petitioners timely filed their Petition for this administrative hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Petitioners agreed that the amount of the tax assessed by the Department is correct. Since the offer of compromise, several properties owned either jointly by husband and wife or owned solely by Nick Farah, Sr., have been foreclosed. Otherwise, the sworn financial statements in the audit file have been adopted by the Petitioners' testimony as still accurate. None of these financial statements bear a certification by a certified public accountant. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Farah's financial situation has remained static in the ensuing two years. Sue Farah still desires to compromise the total tax bill with small monthly payments, but she could not articulate an amount she can currently pay and relied on her earlier offer.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue that: Assesses the entire liability for the March 1, 1989 - February 28, 1994, audit period against Sue Farah for the taxes, penalties, and accruing interest; Absolves Nick Farah, Sr., of any liability for the same audit period; and Denies all compromise of the amount(s) assessed. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1998.
Findings Of Fact The stipulated facts are as follows: The petitioner is GJPR Two Corporation, formerly Employers Insurance Management Corporation, a Florida Corporation, and its address is c/o W. L. Adams, Esquire, Pyszka, Kessler, Adams and Solomon, 2699 South Bayshore Drive, Miami, Florida 33133. Said petitioner has a substantial interest in these proceedings and has proper standing herein. The agencies affected are the Department of Revenue, Tallahassee, Florida, and the Office of the Comptroller of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida; no other agencies are affected. These proceedings have been properly initiated and are now properly before the Division of Administrative Hearings of the Department of Administration of the State of Florida. The parties are not in dispute as to any issues of fact, and agree to the following findings of fact: On or about June 1, 1977, petitioner sold all of its assets of every kind and type in a single transaction to Arthur J. Gallagher and Company. The assets sold included two aircraft. When the registration documents of such aircraft were presented to the State of Florida for transfer, payment of sales tax was required in the sum of $4,056.00. Said sum was paid under protest on or about June 10, 1977. Until the sale of its assets, the business of petitioner had always been the sale of insurance and the administration of self-insurance programs for insureds and self-insureds throughout Florida and other states. The aircraft had been used in the business of petitioner, but petitioner had never engaged in the sale or leasing of aircraft as all or any part of its business. Since the sale of its assets, petitioner has not been engaged in business and petitioner has adopted and filed with the Internal Revenue Service of the United States a Resolution requiring that petitioner conduct no further business and that petitioner be liquidated. The sale of the two aircraft upon which the tax in question was paid under protest is an occasional or isolated sale. Petitioner filed a Claim for Refund upon the ground that the sale was an isolated sale. The Claim for Refund was denied by letter of August 11, 1977 from the Office of the Comptroller of the State of Florida, a copy of which is appended hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit "A."
Recommendation That the denial of tax refund to the petitioner by the State Comptroller be affirmed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard J. Horwich, Esquire Suite 302 University Federal Building 2222 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Cecil Davis, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue This issue is whether proposed amendments to Rules 12A-1.094(1) and 12A-1.094(4), Florida Administrative Code, constitute a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners Florida Home Builders Association, Inc. (FHBA), and Florida A.G.C. Council (FAGC) are trade associations. A substantial number of their members contract with governmental entities for construction services and related sales of tangible personal property. FHBA and FAGC were organized, in part, to represent their members on matters relating to the construction industry, including proceedings involving agency rules. Petitioner Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (Wackenhut) frequently contracts with governmental entities. The proposed rule amendments will result in greater tax liability for Wackenhut in its performance of governmental contracts. Intervenor Florida School Board Association, Inc. (FSBA) represents all 67 local school boards in the State of Florida. FSBA's purpose is to represent its members before governmental agencies, in part to ensure cost containment in the construction, maintenance, and improvement of school facilities. Petitioners and Intervenor will be substantially affected if Respondent adopts the proposed rule amendments. They all have standing in this case. Section 212.05, Florida Statutes, imposes a tax on "retail sales" or "sales at retail." The statute also imposes a companion "use tax" when a retail sale does not occur in this state but the items sold are used here. Section 212.02(14), Florida Statutes, defines "retail sale" or "sale at retail" as a "sale to a consumer or to any person for any purpose other than resale in the form of tangible personal property." Section 212.02(20), Florida Statutes, defines "use" as the "exercise of any right or power over tangible personal property incident to ownership thereof, or interest therein, except it does not include the sale at retail of that property in the regular course of business." Therefore, when tangible personal property is purchased and resold while still tangible personal property, the individual or company that resells the property is a dealer and has an obligation to collect, but not to pay, sales tax. See Sections 212.06(2) and 212.07(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The obligation to pay the tax rests on the final purchaser of the items while they are still tangible personal property. Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, creates a sales tax exemption for direct sales to governmental entities. The statute also creates an exception to that exemption for sales to contractors who purchase or manufacture items for the purpose of installing them in a governmental project. At one time, governmental contractors benefited from the same sales tax exemption that governmental entities enjoyed, even when the contractor was the ultimate consumer. Section 212.08(7), Florida Statutes (1957), stated as follows in relevant part: (7) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS, INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.--There shall also be exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States government, the state or any county, municipality or political subdivision of this state, including sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed by any such government or political subdivision thereof where such tangible personal property goes into and becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof. (Emphasis added) Chapter 59-402, Section 2, Laws of Florida, amended this provision by deleting the word "including" and substituting "provided, this exemption shall not include." Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes (1991), provided as follows in relevant part: (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-- There are also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity. This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof, except public works in progress or for which bonds or revenue certificates have been validated on or before August 1, 1959. Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, which implements Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, was last amended on August 10, 1992. The existing rule currently provides, as follows, in relevant part: 12A-1.094 Public Works Contracts. This rule shall govern the taxability of transactions in which contractors manufacture or purchase supplies and materials for use in public works, as that term is referred to in Section 212.08(6), This rule shall not apply to non- public works contracts as those contracts are governed under the provisions of Rule 12A-1.051, F.A.C. . . . In applying this rule, the following definitions are used. "Contractor" is one who is engaged in the repair, alteration, improvement or construction of real property. Contractors include, but are not limited to, persons engaged in building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier or billboard work. This definition includes subcontractors. "Public works" are defined as construction projects for public use or enjoyment, financed and owned by the government, in which private persons undertake the obligation to do a specific piece of work. The term "public works" is not restricted to the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property and fixed works where the sale of tangible personal property is made to or by contractors involved in public works contracts. Such contracts shall include, but not be limited to, building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier or billboard contracts. "Real property" within the meaning of this rule includes all fixtures and improvements to real property. The status of a project as an improvement or affixture to real property is determined by the objective and presumed intent of the parties, based on the nature and use of the project and the degree of affixation to realty. Mobile homes and other mobile buildings are deemed fixtures if they (1) bear RP license tags, or (2) have the mobile features (such as wheels and/or axles) removed, and are placed on blocks or footings and permanently secured with anchors, tie-down straps or similar devices. * * * (4) The exemption in subsection (3)(a) is a general exemption for sales made to the government. The exception in subsection (2)(a) is a specific exception for sales to contractors. A determination of whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction, rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will determine whether the substance of a particular transaction is governed by subsection (2)(a) or is a sale to a governmental body as provided by subsection (3) of this rule based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will give special consideration to factors which govern the status of the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property. Such factors include provisions which govern bidding, indemnification, inspection, acceptance, delivery, payment, storage, and assumption of the risk of damage or loss for the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property. Assumption of the risk of damage or loss is a paramount consideration. A party may be deemed to have assumed the risk of loss if the party either: bears the economic burden of posting a bond or obtaining insurance covering damage or loss; or enjoys the economic benefit of the proceeds of such bond or insurance. Other factors that may be considered by the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program include whether: the contractor is authorized to make purchases in its own name; the contractor is jointly or severally liable to the vendor for payment: purchases are not subject to prior approval by the government; vendors are not informed that the government is the only party with an independent interest in the purchase; and whether the contractors are formally denominated as purchasing agents for the government. Sales made pursuant to so called "cost-plus", "fixed-fee", "lump sum", and "guaranteed price" contracts are taxable sales to the contractor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program that such sales are, in substance, tax exempt sales to the government. Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes, was last amended by Chapter 98-144, Laws of Florida. The statute currently states, as follows, in pertinent part: (6) EXEMPTIONS; POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS.-- There are also exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity. This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision. A determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The department shall adopt rules that give special consideration to factors that govern the status of the tangible personal property before its affixation to real property. In developing these rules, assumption of the risk of damage or loss is of paramount consideration in the determination. Chapter 98-144, Laws of Florida, was the result of Respondent's "map-tracking" exercise to ensure that its rules were supported by appropriate legislation. Proposed amendments to Rules 12A-1.094(1) and 12A-1.094(4), Florida Administrative Code, are at issue here. Those rules, as revised by the proposed amendments, read as follows: This rule shall govern the taxability of transactions in which contractors manufacture or purchase supplies and material for use in public works contracts, as that term is referred to in Section 212.08(6), F.S. This rule shall not apply to non-public works contracts for the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property, as those contracts are governed under the provisions of Rule 12A-1,051, F.A.C. In applying this rule, the following definitions are used. 1. "Contractor" is one that supplies and installs tangible personal property that is incorporated into or becomes a part of a public facility pursuant to a public works contract with a governmental entity exercising its authority in regard to the public property or facility. Contractors include, but are not limited to, persons engaged in building, electrical, plumbing, heating, painting, decorating, ventilating, paperhanging, sheet metal, roofing, bridge, road, waterworks, landscape, pier, or billboard work. This definition includes subcontractors. "Contractor" does not include a person that furnishes tangible personal property that is not affixed or appended in such a manner that it is incorporated into or becomes a part of the public property or public facility to which a public works contract relates. A person that provides and installs tangible personal property that is freestanding and can be relocated with no tools, equipment, or need for adaptation for use elsewhere is not a contractor within the scope of this rule. "Contractor" does not include a person that provides tangible personal property that will be incorporated into or becomes part of a public facility if such property will be installed by another party. Examples. A vendor sells a desk, sofas, chairs, tables, lamps, and art prints for the reception area in a new public building. The sales agreement requires the vendor to place the furniture according to a floor plan, set up the lamps, and hang the art prints. The vendor is not a contractor within the scope of this rule, because the vendor is not installing the property being sold in such a way that it is attached or affixed to the facility. A security system vendor furnishes and install low voltage wiring behind walls, motion detectors, smoke alarms, other sensors, control pads, alarm sirens, and other components of a security system for a new county courthouse. The components are direct wired, fit into recesses cut into the walls or other structural elements of the building, and are held in place by screws. The vendor is a contractor within the scope of this rule. The security system is installed and affixed in such a manner that it ha been incorporated into the courthouse. A vendor enters an agreement to provide and install the shelving system for a new public library. The shelves are built to bear the weight of books. The shelf configuration in each unit maximizes the number of books the shelves can hold. The number and size of the units ordered is based on the design for the library space. The units will run floor to ceiling and will be anchored in place by bolts or screws. The vendor is a contractor within the scope of this rule. The shelving system will be affixed in such a manner that it becomes a part of the public library. e. A manufacturer agrees to provide the prestressed concrete forms for a public parking garage. A construction company is awarded the bid to install those forms and build the garage. The manufacturer is not a contractor within the scope of this rule, because the manufacturer will not install any tangible personal property that becomes part of the garage. The construction company is a contractor within the scope of this rule. "Governmental entity" includes any agency or branch of the United States government, a state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision of a state. The term includes authorities created by statute to operate public facilities using public funds, such as public port authorities or public-use airport authorities. "Public works" are defined as construction projects for public use or enjoyment, financed and owned by the government, in which private persons undertake the obligation to do a specific piece of work that involves installing tangible personal property in such a manner that it becomes a part of a public facility. For purposes of this rule, a public facility includes any land, improvement to land, building, structure, or other fixed site and related infrastructure thereon owned or operated by a governmental entity where governmental or public activities are conducted. The term "public works" is not restricted to the repair, alteration, improvement, or construction of real property and fixed works, although such projects are included within the term. "Real property" within the meaning of this rule includes all fixtures and improvements to real property. The status of a project as an improvement or fixture to real property will be determined by reference to the definitions contained in Rule 12A-1.051(2), F.A.C. * * * (4)(a) The exemption in s. 212.08(6), F.S., is a general exemption for sales made directly to the government. A determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a governmental entity or a taxable sale to or use by a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction, rather than the form in which the transaction is cast. The Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible program will determine whether the substance of a particular transaction is a taxable sale to or use by a contractor or an exempt direct sale to a governmental entity based on all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction as a whole. The following criteria that govern the status of the tangible personal property prior to its affixation to real property will be considered in determining whether a governmental entity rather than a contractor is the purchaser of materials: Direct Purchase Order. The governmental entity must issue its purchase order directly to the vendor supplying the materials the contractor will use and provide the vendor with a copy of the governmental entity's Florida Consumer's Certification of Exemption. Direct Invoice. The vendor's invoice must be issued to the governmental entity, rather than to the contractor. Passage of Title. The governmental entity must take title to the tangible personal property from the vendor at the time of purchase or delivery by the vendor. 5. Assumption of the Risk of Loss. Assumption of the risk of damage or loss by the governmental entity at the time of purchase is a paramount consideration. A governmental entity will be deemed to have assumed the risk of loss if the governmental entity bears the economic burden of obtaining insurance covering damage or loss or directly enjoys the economic benefit of the proceeds of such insurance. Sales are taxable sales to the contractor unless it can be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Executive Director or the Executive Director's designee in the responsible division that such sales are, in substance, tax-exempt direct sales to the government. Respondent's staff assisted various industry groups in drafting proposed legislation for the 2001 and 2002 legislative sessions that would expand the sales tax exemption for public works contracts. The Legislature did not enact any of these proposals. The proposed rule amendments reflect Respondent's current practice regarding tax exemptions for public works contracts. The proposed amendments detail all factors, criteria, and standards that Respondent considers in determining whether transactions qualify for the exemption set forth in Section 212.08(6), Florida Statutes. The existing version of Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, as revised in 1992, does not reflect these factors. In drafting the proposed revisions to Rule 12A-1.094, Florida Administrative Code, Respondent's staff considered statutory language, questions asked by taxpayers, and cases involving protests of audit assessments. Respondent's staff also considered areas that it believed failed to provide clear guidance as to how taxpayers could structure transactions to avoid the tax. Finally, Respondent's staff considered the decisions in Housing by Vogue, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 403 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), and Housing by Vogue, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 422 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1982). As a general rule, a for-profit corporation instead of the contractor is liable to pay sales tax when the contractor agrees to purchase items and to resell the items to the corporation such that the corporation takes possession and ownership thereof. This would be true regardless of whether the contractor or some other individual eventually installs the items on the for-profit corporation's property or in its facility. In either instance, the contractor, as a reseller of tangible personal property, is a dealer who has the obligation to collect the sales tax from the for-profit corporation. The for-profit corporation would be the ultimate consumer of the items. If a contractor resells items to a non-governmental customer, who enjoys tax-exempt status, while the items are still tangible personal property, no sales tax is due. In such a case, it makes no difference whether the contractor or some other individual later installs the items. The taxability of sales to or by contractors who repair, alter, improve and construct real property pursuant to non-public works contracts is governed by Rule 12A-1.051, Florida Administrative Code, which states as follows in relevant part: Scope of the rule. This rule governs the taxability of the purchase, sale, or use of tangible personal property by contractors and subcontractors who purchase, acquire, or manufacture materials and supplies for use in the performance of real property contracts other than public works contracts performed for governmental entities, which are governed by the provisions of Rule 12A-1.094, F.A.C. . . . Definitions. For purposes of this rule, the following terms have the following meanings: * * * (c)1. "Fixture" means an item that is an accessory to a building, other structure, or to land, that retains its separate identity upon installation, but that is permanently attached to the realty. Fixtures include such items as wired lighting, kitchen or bathroom sinks, furnaces, central air conditioning units, elevators or escalators, or built-in cabinets, counters, or lockers. 2. In order for an item to be considered a fixture, it is not necessary that the owner of the item also own the real property to which the item is attached. . . . * * * (g) "Real property" means land, improvements to land, and fixtures. It is synonymous with the terms "realty" and "real estate." Pursuant to the statute and the proposed rule amendments, contractors who purchase tangible personal property that goes into or becomes a part of a public works are not entitled to an exemption from paying sales tax. Such a contractor would be the ultimate consumer of the tangible personal property and not a dealer. The statute and the rule at issue here require Respondent to look at the substance instead of the form of each transaction to determine when sales tax is due. To say that no tax is due anytime a contractor agrees to purchase and resell items to a governmental customer, such that the governmental customer takes possession and ownership thereof before the same contractor installs the items, would be contrary to the statute. To find otherwise would place form over substance, allowing the contractor and the governmental entity to avoid the statutorily imposed tax by casting the transaction as a resale. The proposed rule amendments do not expand the sales and/or use tax imposed by Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Instead, they implement the statutory provision requiring governmental contractors to pay sales tax when they supply and install items in a governmental project pursuant to a public works contract. Depending on the circumstances, "public works" include a construction project on a job site where the governmental entity owns the real property. It also includes a construction project on a job site where the governmental entity owns a public facility located on real property owned by a private individual. The term "public works" includes a public facility which is owned and operated by a governmental entity for the purpose of conducting governmental activities regardless of who owns the real property on which it is located. According to the statute, Respondent's rules must give special consideration to the status of tangible personal property "before its affixation to real property." This provision does not mean that a transaction is not taxable unless the tangible personal property becomes a "fixture" or "appurtenance" to real property. Instead, Respondent's proposed rule amendments properly implement the broader legislative intent to tax any sale to a contractor who supplies and installs tangible personal property in public works. Respondent looks first to see whether the tangible personal property will be a fixture or improvement to real property. Next, Respondent must determine whether the tangible personal property will be permanently attached and function as a part of a public works project that does not fit the definition of real property. For example, a port authority may operate an office out of a permanently docked ship. The statute directs Respondent to consider the assumption of risk of damage or loss to be most important but not the only factor in determining whether the sale of tangible personal property is taxable. In addition to the assumption of risk of loss, the proposed rule amendments require a nontaxable sale to show the following: (a) a direct purchase order to the vendor who will supply materials to the contractor; (b) a direct invoice from the vendor rather than the contractor; (c) direct payment to the vendor; and (d) passage of title at time of purchase or delivery. The five factors are inclusive of the elements that Respondent will consider when determining whether of a sale is, in substance, a direct nontaxable sale to a governmental entity.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner publishes the Fort Lauderdale News and Sun Sentinel. The firm has forty departments, of which one is a letter shop on the premises that prints forms, stationery, and other such needs of the company. About ten percent of the work done in the letter shop is for outside customers. Materials used in processing the in-house work include stock paper, binders, glue, and cardboard. The shop makes letterhead stationery for each department of the company and prints "run" sheets which are forms for reporting news stories and advertisements. It pays State sales tax on the supplies that it purchases from outside firms and collects such tax on the sales made to outside customers. The purpose of the print shop operation is to ensure that the newspaper has an ample supply of forms and printed stationery and it is also cheaper than contracting the work to an outside firm, Many of the forms are used once and then destroyed and stationery is consumed in due course of time. Some of the printed items become permanent files of the petitioner. (Testimony of Hatfield) In January, 1976, respondent's tax examiner conducted an audit of respondent's accounts and thereafter respondent, by notice of assessment dated April 8, 1976, demanded, inter alia, payment of tax, penalty and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the total amount of $11,222.48 based on the fabricated cost of the items produced in petitioner's letter shop for its own use. The total cost of the aforesaid items was placed at $208,596.37. This cost was arrived at by the amounts petitioner internally "charged" its various departments for the printed material. Respondent's audit supervisor testified at the hearing that the assessment was laid under Section 212.06(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12A-1.34, Florida Administrative Code. After receipt of the assessment, representatives of both parties discussed the matter in May and certain erroneous charges were deleted from the assessment. However, these deletions had reference to taxable transactions other than those involving petitioner's print shop which appeared in Schedule C of the assessment. Additionally, the original assessed penalty was abated to a flat 5 percent of the tax. A second revised notice of proposed assessment dated December 14, 1977, placed the petitioner's tax liability with regard to its print shop operations at $7,338.02. This was corrected after the hearing to show a total of $7,701.00 based on additional interest assessed as to Schedule C items. The assessment period is February 1, 1973 to January 31, 1976. (Testimony of Harris, George, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3) Dealers such as the petitioner are required to submit a monthly sales and use tax report on Form DR-15 to remit any required tax. This is the only form sent on a monthly basis to dealers such as petitioner. Column B thereof is described in the form as "Purchases not for resale but for use or consumption which are subject to the 4 percent tax rate and not taxed by suppliers." (Stipulation, Petitioner's Exhibit 2) Respondent does not collect the particular tax in question from non- business entities and is unable to determine how much tax has been paid in this regard in cases of voluntary payment by taxpayers. Respondent has records as to only ten (10) cases during the period 1968-1977 in which audits were performed and taxes imposed pursuant thereto under Rule 12A-1.34(3), F.A.C. Only one of these cases involved a print shop in the Fort Lauderdale area. However, there are approximately 150 such commercial enterprises in that area. (Stipulation, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-2)
Recommendation That the proposed tax assessment against petitioner under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, be upheld and enforced by appropriate action. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division Post Office Box 5377 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Groendyke, Esquire Post Office Drawer 7028 1415 East Sunrise Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33338
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent failed to remit taxes, interest, penalties and fees pursuant to a Compliance Agreement between Respondent and Petitioner; and if so, whether Petitioner should revoke Respondent’s sales tax registration certificate in consequence thereof.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Revenue (Department) is the agency of state government authorized to administer the sales and use tax laws of the State of Florida. Squid is a Florida corporation whose principal place of business is located in Alachua County, Florida. At all pertinent times, Squid sold tangible personal property at retail and consequently was required to collect from its customers, and remit to the Department, sales tax on every transaction which is taxable under chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In connection with this responsibility, Squid is an authorized “dealer,” holding sales tax Certificate of Registration No. 11-801-3974145-0 (Certificate), which the Department issued in February 2008. Squid has no other outstanding certificate of registration with the Department. By November 2009, Squid had a history of repeatedly writing checks to the Department that were dishonored due to insufficient funds. Squid also had a history of failing to consistently remit sales and use tax to the Department. As a result of Squid’s delinquencies, the Department began to issue warrants on the official records. On May 6, 2010, the Department issued a notice to Squid, which initiated a proceeding to revoke Squid’s Certificate for failure to remit taxes. Squid was invited to appear at an informal conference with the Department on June 22, 2010. At the informal conference, Squid would have the opportunity to avoid revocation either by presenting evidence refuting the charges regarding unpaid taxes, or by entering into a compliance agreement pursuant to which the outstanding liability would be satisfied. The informal conference took place as scheduled. Janet Hobson, Squid’s president, appeared on behalf of the corporation. At the conference, the Department and Squid entered into a written compliance agreement (Agreement). Under the Agreement, Squid admitted that it owed the State of Florida a grand total of $8,625.51, which is comprised of $6,842.64 tax, $265.23 interest, $625.22 penalty and $892.42 fees. Squid agreed to pay its debt in installments, in exchange for the Department’s promise to forbear from revoking Squid’s Certificate. The Agreement called for Squid to make a down payment of $800 on or before June 22, 2010, followed by eleven installment payments ranging in amount from $400 to $600, and culminating in a twelfth payment for the balance, in a balloon. The Agreement further provided that interest would continue to accrue on the outstanding tax balance at the rate of 7% per year, and that pursuant to section 213.75, payments would be applied to the outstanding balance in the following order: fees; interest; penalty; and tax. Squid successfully made the $800 down payment as required by the Agreement. At the same time, Squid notified the Department that it would soon be relocating to a new address, but within the same county, to wit: 3709 SW 42nd Avenue, Suite 10, Gainesville, Florida 32608. The Department made note of this address change, and consistent with its normal practices and procedures, did not require Squid to obtain a separate registration number for the new location. Although the Department does require dealers who open a second retail location or who move across county lines to apply for a new registration number, this has not been required for relocations within a single county. Those types of relocations are handled by updating the address of record pertaining to the existing certificate of registration. The Agreement did not specifically provide that time was of the essence concerning Squid’s duty to make the installment payments, nor state any grace period applicable to the payment deadlines. However, the Agreement did state: E. If the certificate holder fails to comply with any obligation under this agreement, the Department has the right to pursue revocation of the certificate holder’s certificate of registration by filing an Administrative Complaint pursuant to section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes. If a revocation proceeding is pursued, the certificate holder stipulates to the admission of this agreement in any jurisdiction as proof of all matters recited herein. G. If the certificate holder fails to perform any of the obligations under this agreement, including the timely filing of returns and payment of all taxes, penalties and interest as they become due, all amounts of the tax, interest and penalty settled under this agreement and any unpaid balance shall be immediately due, payable and collectible by all legal means. In addition to and including the promise to pay the outstanding indebtedness, the Agreement also required Squid: To accurately complete all past due sales tax returns and file them no later than 08/01/2010. To remit all past due payments to the Department as stated in the attached payment agreement. To accurately complete and timely file all required sales tax returns for the next 12 months, beginning with the return due on 6/1/2010 and ending on 05/31/2011. To timely remit all sales tax collections due for the next 12 months, associated with the periods stated in paragraph “C” above. To comply with all provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. On June 17, 2011, the Department served its "First Interlocking Discovery Request" on Respondent. The discovery request included a series of requests for admissions (RFA), interrogatories, and document requests. On July 14, 2011, Janet Hobson, as authorized representative of Squid, served responses to the Department' discovery request. At final hearing, those responses were received in evidence at the request of the Department. In response to requests for admissions, Squid admitted the following: -Squid failed to make the complete schedule of payments outlined in the payment schedule that appears in the Payment Agreement Schedule of the Compliance Agreement. (RFA No. 14). -Squid failed to timely remit payment for the sales tax due for the months July through November of 2009. (RFA No. 4). -Squid filed less than all past due sales tax returns by August 1, 2010. (RFA No. 6). -Squid remitted less than all past due payments. (RFA No. 7). -Squid timely filed less than all required sales tax returns for the time period of June 1, 2010, through May 31, 2011. (RFA No. 8). -Squid remitted less than all required sales tax collections for the time period of June 1, 2010, through May 31, 2011. (RFA No. 9). -Squid failed to timely remit payment for the sales tax due for the months of February through April and August through September of 2010. (RFA No. 11). -Squid has been delinquent with past tax remittances and interest payable to the Department. (RFA No. 12). -Squid failed to abide by the terms of the Agreement, within the meaning of the acceleration clause contained in the Agreement, at paragraph “G.” (RFA No. 13). On August 2, 2011, the Department served a Notice of Taking Corporate Deposition Duces Tecum of Squid, pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(b)(6). That deposition took place on September 13, 2011, in Gainesville, Florida. Ms. Hobson appeared at the deposition as the authorized corporate representative of Squid. During the course of the deposition, Squid admitted that it used some of the sales tax moneys that it had collected in order to pay its own business operating expenses. Squid also acknowledged that it owed approximately $9,500 in overdue sales tax as of that date. The day before the final hearing, at 4:45 p.m., Petitioner delivered additional moneys to the Department, together with additional tax returns, which are used to report additional tax due. The Department’s witness testified that Squid still owed a balance but she had not yet had an opportunity to update the revolving balance. Ms. Sevez estimated that several thousand dollars remained due, but she was uncertain as to the amount. The determination of the precise amount due would be a material fact in a tax assessment challenge under sections 72.011, and 120.80, Florida Statutes, but this is a license revocation proceeding, not a tax assessment challenge. The totality of the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that Squid defaulted under the Agreement (and that Squid remains in arrears in an undetermined amount, even to this date). It is not necessary for the undersigned to quantify the precise amount due on any given date1/, or even to determine whether an amount remains due, but only to determine whether Squid, at any pertinent time, fell into default under the compliance agreement. The Department has met its burden to clearly and convincingly prove that Squid materially failed to comply with the terms of the Agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order revoking sales tax certificate of registration numbered 11-801- 3974145-0, which the Department issued in February 2008. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 2012.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner owes sales tax of $15,230.15 plus interest from October 15, 1993.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a sole proprietorship organized in this state and doing business at 851 Monterey Road, Stuart, Florida. Respondent is the governmental agency responsible for administering the state sales tax in accordance with Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.1 In 1992, other businesses located at Petitioner's address reported to Respondent that they paid rent to Petitioner. However, Petitioner did not collect and remit sales tax on the rental income and was not registered as a dealer. On February 3, 1992, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Audit Petitioner's books and records ("Notice of Intent to Audit") for the tax period February 1, 1987, through January 31, 1992. The Notice of Intent to Audit included a detailed list of the books and records needed for Respondent to conduct a detailed audit. The Notice also requested that Petitioner provide Respondent with a date on which it would be convenient to begin the audit. On February 11, 1992, Respondent had not heard from Petitioner. The auditor contacted Petitioner to schedule a date on which the audit could begin. At that time, Petitioner stated that he would not provide the auditor with any books and records. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1990 through 1992 because Petitioner incorrectly suspected that Respondent maintained a secret "blacklist." Petitioner based his suspicion, in part, on the fact that he had refused to respond to a questionnaire Respondent had mailed to taxpayers throughout the state prior to the Notice of Intent to Audit. Petitioner also based his suspicion on the erroneous assumption that Respondent's audit was part of a criminal investigation by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") into Petitioner's federal taxes for 1987 and 1988. Petitioner refused to make available the books and records for 1987 through 1989 because those records were in the possession of the IRS. Petitioner maintained that the proposed audit was illegal. Respondent sent Petitioner copies of its statutory authority to audit Petitioner and made numerous attempts to arrange a mutually convenient time to begin the audit. Respondent did not commence the audit until March 10, 1993. On March 10, 1993, the auditor and audit group supervisor met with Petitioner and Mr. Eugene Nail, Petitioner's paralegal. Petitioner stated that he did not have the books and records Respondent needed to conduct a detailed audit because the IRS had confiscated them in connection with the pending criminal case. Respondent conducted the audit using the information Petitioner made available to the auditor. Petitioner made available: sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992 grouped together by calendar month; sales and use tax return booklets; resale and exemption certificates; and commercial lease agreements. No journals and ledgers were available. Respondent determined Petitioner's tax deficiency by sampling the available information. Pursuant to Petitioner's request, the auditor used a six month sample period. The auditor explained to Petitioner that she would use Petitioner's invoices during the sample period to determine tax- exempt sales. She compared the invoices to resale certificates and calculated an error ratio based on discrepancies between the sales invoices and the resale certificates. Respondent determined the actual deficiency in sales tax during the six month sample period based on actual invoices that did not have a resale certificate and for which no sales tax was remitted. Respondent estimated the additional deficiency in sales tax by applying the error ratio to the balance of the audit period. Respondent examined only those invoices provided by Petitioner and previous sales tax returns filed by Petitioner. On April 9, 1993, the auditor conducted a meeting with Petitioner and discussed the audit procedures, results, applicable law, and abatement rules. On June 15, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $45,469.05 ("Notice of Intent"). The Notice of Intent included a copy of all audit exhibits and workpapers. On August 30, 1993, Petitioner provided additional invoices to Respondent in a meeting with the auditor and audit group supervisor. On October 15, 1993, the auditor adjusted certain items in the audit file, reduced the proposed assessment, and issued a Revised Notice of Intent to Make Sales and Use Tax Changes in the amount of $37,417.45 ("Revised Notice of Intent"). Petitioner requested additional time to provide more information, including additional resale certificates. However, Petitioner failed to provide the additional information. By letter dated December 9, 1993, the audit group supervisor notified Petitioner that she was closing the case and sending it to the Tallahassee office as a contested case. On December 23, 1993, Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner assessing Petitioner for $37,417.45 in tax, penalty, and interest through October 15, 1993. On February 21, 1994, Respondent received Petitioner's written protest dated February 10, 1994. Respondent revised the audit figures again. On January 20, 1995, Respondent issued its Notice of Decision reducing the assessment against Petitioner to $15,230.15. The Notice of Decision assessed Petitioner for taxes of $8,900.55, penalties of $2,225.14, and interest of $4,104.46 through October 15, 1993. Interest accrues at the per diem rate of $2.93 until paid. On March 16, 1995, Petitioner timely appealed the Notice of Decision by filing a Petition for Formal Hearing with Respondent. Inadequate Records Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records within the meaning of Sections 212.12(6), 212.13(2), 212.35, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 12A-1.093(2) and (5).2 Petitioner failed to maintain adequate books and records for the five year audit period prescribed in Section 213.34(2). Petitioner failed to maintain general ledgers and journals for the five year audit period. The only records Petitioner maintained were sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Petitioner was unable to produce adequate records for 1987 through 1989. Petitioner asserted that the IRS had those records and that Petitioner could not obtain the records required by Florida law. The federal tax case has been pending against Petitioner since 1990.3 During those seven years, Petitioner was unable to obtain copies of any records in the possession of the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1987 and 1988 were maintained on computer floppy disks. Petitioner asserts that the floppy disks were lost. Petitioner asserts that his attorney kept the books and records for 1989 in an out-of-state location to avoid producing those records for the IRS. The journals and ledgers for 1990 though 1992 are in the possession of Petitioner's accountants. Petitioner did not produce those records during the audit or at the administrative hearing. Petitioner could have requested the journals and ledgers for 1989 through 1991 from his attorney and accountants, respectively, but chose not to do so. Petitioner made available to Respondent only sales invoices for 1990 and 1991 and one month in 1992. Without the general ledgers and cash journals to cross- reference the sales invoices, Respondent could not corroborate the financial records available for audit. Respondent was required by applicable law to conduct the audit by sampling Petitioner's available records. Exempt Sales: Resale Certificates Certain exempt sales claimed by Petitioner during the six month sample period were not supported by resale certificates. Respondent disallowed the exempt sales that were not supported by resale certificates and allowed the invoices that were supported by resale certificates. For the six month sample period, Respondent assessed an actual sales tax deficiency for those sales that did not have a corresponding resale certificate.4 Respondent prepared audit schedules for the six month sample period that listed the invoices with a sales tax deficiency due to the lack of a resale certificate. Based on the audit schedules, Respondent determined an error ratio and applied the error ratio over the five year audit period to determine the estimated tax deficiency.5 Respondent conducted the audit in accordance with generally accepted audit procedures and with applicable state law. Disallowed exempt sales were listed individually by invoice, name of vendor, and the date and amount of the sale. Disallowed exempt sales were listed for each of the six months in the sample period. Additional Taxable Sales Sales invoices for the six month sample period showed that Petitioner collected more sales tax than he reported to Respondent on his monthly sales tax returns. Respondent treated the collected, but unremitted, sales tax as "additional taxable sales" rather than as an unremitted sales tax. Respondent assessed Petitioner for the sales tax paid on Petitioner's invoices but not remitted to Respondent by Petitioner. The deficiency existed for May and June, 1990, and for January and February, 1991. Taxable Rent Respondent reviewed lease agreements relating to property rented by Petitioner at his business address. Respondent determined that Petitioner failed to collect and remit sales tax on the rental of his property. Respondent assessed Petitioner for sales tax Petitioner failed to collect and remit on taxable rent. Petitioner does not contest that portion of the assessment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order and therein UPHOLD Respondent's assessment of $15,230.15 plus interest statutorily due from October 15, 1993, until paid.RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Out Island Charters, Inc., Miami, Florida is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of selling, leasing, repairing and chartering yachts in South Florida. Robert H. Anderson is president of the firm. During the tax period in question, i.e., December 1, 1973 to November 30, 1976, Petitioner sold various sailing vessels and made repairs thereon. The purchasers individually entered into a "Yacht Charter Management Agreement" with Petitioner under which the latter agreed to act as the owners' agent to obtain charters of the boats from third parties, and to maintain, repair, and dock the vessels at the owners expense. The agreement provided that Petitioner would receive a percentage of the gross bareboat charter fee. It also contained a provision that the owner could use his vessel at any time without cost provided that no charters had been booked for the particular time period. Although this was a standard provision in all of the contracts, some of the owners deleted it prior to execution of the agreement. In most cases, the owners used their vessels occasionally for the purpose of testing equipment and performing routine maintenance and repairs. At such times, some of them were accompanied by their wives, mechanics, or friends who assisted in handling the vessels or performing the routine maintenance functions. They did not use the vessels for purely personal pleasure trips. When the vessels were purchased, sales tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, was neither collected from the buyers by the Petitioner nor otherwise paid to the state. Sales tax was not paid on various equipment purchases, repair parts, dockage, or other expenses incident to the management and maintenance of the vessels. However, sales tax was collected by Petitioner from the third parties who rented the vessels except for a few inadvertent omissions. At the time Petitioner sold the vessels, none of the purchasers had applied for nor received from Respondent a certificate of registration to engage in or conduct business as a "dealer" in yacht chartering under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, nor had they provided Petitioner with a certificate of resale. Anderson believed the transactions to be exempt from sales tax because the vessels were purchased for rental purposes, and he was unaware that registration as a dealer and submission of a resale certificate were required to establish such an exemption. (Exhibits 5-7, 9, Testimony of Wolin, Witmer, Gay, Harrill, Krapf, Purdy, Anderson, McLean (Exhibit 1), Bennett (Exhibit 2)) Pursuant to an audit of Petitioner's business by Respondent's tax examiner, a proposed assessment of sales tax, penalties, and interest was issued to Petitioner in the total amount of $28,790.76. The parties met at an informal conference on March 29, 1977, and, as a result of adjustments at that time, a revised Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued on May 19, 1977, showing a total sum due of $26,646.91. Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing in the matter. (Exhibit 3) In March, 1977, Petitioner's counsel advised the various purchasers of the pending tax audit and requested that they either pay the sales tax if they had used the boats for personal business, or, if the boats had been exclusively used for chartering purposes, that they execute affidavits to that effect, together with applications for certificate of registration as dealers and blanket certificates of resale. Most of the purchasers returned the executed documents and were later registered with the Respondent as dealers in the chartering business. (Testimony of Anderson, Gay, Wolin, Witmer, Harrill, Krapf, Purdy, McLean, Bennett, Exhibits 1 - 2, 4 - 14) In one particular transaction wherein James Morgan purchased a vessel from Petitioner, Anderson testified that the vessel was removed from Florida to Tennessee where Morgan lived on the day after full payment had been made under the contract. Anderson, however, did not know if Morgan provided him with an affidavit for exemption of the boat by removal from the state, and no documentary evidence concerning the transaction was presented by Petitioner at the hearing. (Testimony of Anderson, Exhibit 15) In another transaction, Anderson purchased a vessel in 1973 from Coastal Sailing Services, Inc., of Tallahassee, Florida, and paid sales tax in the amount of $1,027.40. Later, Anderson believed that he was exempt from the payment of tax because he had purchased the vessel solely for rental purposes. He communicated with Respondent's sales tax bureau through his accountant for information concerning refund procedures. Remus O. Cook, Jr., an examiner in the state sales tax bureau, advised in a letter of August 14, 1974, that a refund from Coastal Sailing Service could be secured if the vessel had been purchased solely for rental purposes, and that such request to the seller should be accompanied by a certificate of sales tax exemption utilizing a form enclosed with the letter. Although the vessel had been purchased by Anderson, the letter made reference to Out Island Charters, Inc. as the buyer and cited its sales tax registration number. Cook testified that it was departmental policy to grant an exemption if tangible personal property was purchased exclusively for rental purposes, even if the purchaser was not registered as a dealer at the time of sale. However, Henry Coe, Jr., Respondent's Executive Director, testified that registration at or a few days after the time of sale was a prerequisite to exemption in such cases. Anderson proceeded to request the refund from the seller, but the exemption form was executed in the name of Out Island Charters, Inc. He received the refund in 1975. Respondent's tax examiner assessed this sale in the current proposed tax assessment because he found no documentary evidence that Anderson intended to use the boat for charter purposes when he purchased it, and there was no evidence that Anderson was registered as a dealer at that time or furnished a resale certificate to the seller when it was purchased. No evidence was presented that Anderson had used the boat for personal purposes and he testified that he purchased it solely for rental, but conceded that he had no dealer's registration number at the time of purchase. (Testimony of Anderson, Lloyd, Exhibit 18, Depositions of Cook, Coe (Exhibits 19, 20)) Petitioner conceded at the hearing that the tax computations were correct, but contested liability therefor except for the several instances where sales tax had not been collected on boat rentals. (Testimony of Anderson)
Recommendation That the proposed tax assessment be enforced against Petitioner herein. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Howard Hochman, Esquire 2121 Biscayne Boulevard Suite 201 Miami, Florida 33137 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida, Department of Revenue issued to the Petitioners a tax warrant dated May 12, 1986, for sales and use tax alleged to be due and delinquent, interest, penalties, and filing fees in the total sum of $8,269.95. Susan R. Bayer is the owner of a parcel of property located in Hillsborough County, Florida, commonly known as 3001 East Hillsborough Avenue, having become the owner of that property on February 29, 1984. Lloyd W. Bayer owned the property in finding 2 above prior to February 29, 1984. When Susan Bayer became the owner of the property, she became the successor in interest to a lease between Brown Bayer, Inc., and Creech Produce, Inc., wherein a portion of the property was leased to Creech Produce, Inc., for use by Creech Produce, Inc., to let sellers of produce use a space to park a vehicle to sell produce out of the vehicle. This business of Creech was licensed by the City of Tampa as a parking lot. The spaces in the lot were rented on a nightly basis and rent was collected on a nightly basis. There were no terms of rentals for periods longer than a nightly basis. The persons parking vehicles in the spaces generally sold wholesale produce out of the vehicles but not all of them did so, and there was no requirement the vehicles occupying these spaces be used for any specific purpose. In 1985, Susan Bayer filed proceedings against Creech Produce, Inc., seeking to revoke the lease to Creech. One ground alleged in this complaint (Exhibit 8) was that Creech was using the property in violation of state laws and regulations in failing to collect sales taxes on the parking fees and remit same to the Department of Revenue. The court not only ruled against Bayer on the eviction proceedings but extended the lease for an additional year. The lease to Creech (Exhibit 5) provided, inter alia, that the lessee would pay 1/2 of the sanitation expense paid by the lessor and that portion of electricity used for the portion of the building used and the lights for the outside of the property." The electricity was billed to the lessor and, pursuant to this lease provision, Creech remitted its share of the bill to the lessor. This payment for electricity by Creech was included by Respondent as rent on which the sales tax was levied. Exhibit 3 clearly conveys the intent of the parties to lease the property to be used by the lessee as a parking lot for the vehicles from which produce was to be sold and that the lessee could collect the fees for the use of these parking spaces. On February 1, 1984, Bayer entered into an Agreement for Purchase and Sale (Exhibit 2) with Bobby Lee McGilvery and Adella Fisher to sell the business known as Farmer Jahn's Ice to the latter. This business consisted of two icemaking machines on the premises of 3001 East Hillsborough Avenue, storage- disposing facilities at about 60 locations in Tampa, a pickup truck, step-van, ice baggers, bags, etc. McGilvery had worked for Bayer in this business of making and selling ice cubes for 15 years and purchased the business with no money down for a total price of $125,000 to be paid at the rate of $1,275 per month at 10 percent interest until the total of $125,000 is paid. Exhibit 2 provided that a separate lease agreement for the property occupied by the business would be executed providing for payment of $500 per month. A promissory note in the amount of $125,000 payable to Bayer was executed by McGilvery and Fisher (Exhibit 3) which provided for payment of $1,725 per month with interest at 10 percent until the total of $125,000 was paid. There appears to have been a scrivener's error in the preparation of the note so far as the monthly payment is concerned. Since the sale agreement provided for the business to be paid for at $1,275 per month and a rental price of $500 per month the monthly payments should have been $1,775. The Business Lease executed February 1, 1984, (Exhibit 4) provided "consideration for this lease is the note on the sale of the business." The auditor for Respondent based his sales tax calculation solely on the Business Lease (Exhibit 4) and the promissory note and calculated the tax on a rental of $1,725 per month. McGilvery and Fisher defaulted on the payments on the note and the business was recaptured by Petitioner. Having no lien on the personal property sold to the buyers Petitioner was able to recover only a small portion of those items enumerated in Finding 9 above.
