The Issue The issue in Count I is whether Section 475.42(1)(j) absolutely prohibits a broker or salesman from filing a lien or other encumberance against real property to collect a commission. The issue in Count II is whether the Respondents violated a lawful order of the Commission by failing to remove the motion of lis pendens contrary to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Conclusions Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: "No real estate broker or salesman shall place, or cause to be placed, upon the public records of any county, any contract, assignment, deed, will, mortgage, lien, affidavit, or other writing which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, any real property, if the same is known to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property, maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce the payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person, or for any unlawful purpose." Clearly the Respondents placed or caused to be placed the notice of lis pendens in question. A notice of lis pendens is clearly an "other writing which purports to effect the title of, or encumber, any real property." The Florida Real Estate Commission argues that this provision is an absolute bar to the filing of any lien for the purpose of collecting a commission. The Respondents argue that this provision is not an absolute bar and there are circumstances when a broker may file a notice of lis pendens. They also assert that the notice of lis pendens falls within the exception because the Circuit Court refused to remove the notice of lis pendens upon motion of the property owner. Lastly, it is argued that the notice was filed by counsel for the Respondents in good faith on an action at law and that this mitigates their action even if there was a violation. The language of Section 475.42(1)(j) cannot be read to absolutely prohibit a broker from obtaining a lis pendens. When given this construction, it effectively denies brokers and salesmen access to the courts for redress of injury as provided in Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Section 475.42(1)(j) is a complex provision which is subject to two interpretations. One interpretation would prohibit a broker or salesman from filing an encumberance if the same were known to him to be false, void or not authorized by law; if not authorized to be upon the public records; if not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded; if the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property; if maliciously (filed); if for the purpose of collecting a commission, if to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person; or if for any other unlawful purpose. This first interpretation would consider each clause a separate limitation on filing an encumberance. The facts analyzed under this interpretation do not show any knowledge by Respondents that the lis pendens was false, void or not authorized to be filed or not on a form entitling it to be recorded. The facts do not show that Respondents filed the lis pendens maliciously, for the purpose of collecting a commission, or for the purpose of coercing payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. The nature of lis pendens would not require the owner's authorization of execution for recording. The facts show that the lis pendens was filed by Respondent's attorney in conjunction with a suit brought by the Respondents against Perrin. The record also shows that the circuit court determined that the lis pendens was recordable when it denied the motion to remove it. The notice of lis pendens was neither malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting the commission. The notice was for the purpose of perfecting the claim against the property for execution of the judgment if the Respondents prevailed in the suit. Executing on a judgment is different from collecting the commission or coercing payment. Under this interpretation the Respondents have not been shown to violate Section 475.42(1)(j). A second interpretation would read the clause, ". . . if the same is known to to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been authorized by the owner of the property. . ." as the first of two criteria to be met to establish a violation. The second criteria would consist of proof that the encumberance was recorded maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. Again the facts do not show there was knowledge by the Respondents of the falsity, or impropriety of the notice of lis pendens, as stated above. Again the facts show that the lis pendens was filed in conjunction with a law suit pending between the Respondent and the property owner, and that the court before which the action was pending refused to remove it. The file of the notice by Respondent's counsel was a legitimate method of perfecting the Respondent's claim should they prevail and obtain judgment. The facts do not indicate that the filing of the notice was malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting a commission. Under either interpretation, Respondents did not violate the statute. COUNT II The Respondents are charged in Count II with violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that the registration of a registrant may be suspended for up to two years for violation of a lawful order of the Commission. Clearly, the facts reveal that the Respondents had a substantial interest involved in the litigation with Perrin. The order, of the Florida Real Estate Commission to remove the notice of lis pendens substantially affected their rights in this litigation. Therefore, any final order directing Kay to remove the notice of lis pendens should have issued after an opportunity for hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The evidence reveals that the Florida Real Estate Commission did not notice a hearing under Section 120.57, and therefore its order cannot be "lawful." The provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d) require that registrants not violate lawful orders. The Respondents have not violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by not removing the notice of lis pendens as directed by the order of the Florida Real Estate Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the Respondent, Sam Kaye and Sam Kaye, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 William E. Boyes, Esquire Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, P.A. Post Office Box 3466 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter its final order directing Capitol Rental and Realty, Inc. and Lawrence D. Van Ore cease and desist from using non-registrants as real estate salesmen and further from failing to use the full name of the registrant and the term "Broker" or "Realtor" within its classified advertisements. The Hearing Officer further recommends that the registration of the registrant be suspended until the corporate broker and associate broker Lawrence D. Van Ore have complied with said order of the Commission. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of October, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Gough, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Don Scarlet, Esquire 801 Magnolia - Suite 317 Orlando, Florida 32803
Findings Of Fact Respondent Sheldon Greene & Associates, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker having been issued license number 0133685. The Respondent Sheldon Greene is the licensed real estate broker of record for Sheldon Greene & Associates, Inc., and holds license number 0033812. Henry Berman, a registered real estate salesman was employed as an associate by the Respondents between July 10, 1980 and July 2, 1982. Shortly after commencing his employment, Berman entered into a written agreement with the Respondents which set forth the division of real estate commissions earned by Berman and the firm on future sales. The agreement covered three distinct categories and included: When Berman listed and sold property entirely by his efforts, the commission split would be 60 percent to Berman and 40 percent to the firm; When Berman either had the listing or the buyer and the firm had the other, the commission split would be 50 percent to Berman and 50 percent to the firm; When Berman listed and sold property and the firm was involved in the sale through participation in negotiations, preparation of the submittal and the like, the commission split would be 50 percent to Berman and 50 percent to the firm. During the period of Berman's employment by the Respondents, a Memorandum was circulated among all of the salespersons of Associates covering the division of commissions earned by Associates in situations in which more than one salesperson employed by Associates was involved in a single transaction. Berman was furnished a copy of this Memorandum and was aware of its contents. While in the employ of Respondents, Berman obtained a verbal open listing from Seymour Deutsch to sell the Metropole Hotel at 635 Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida. Thereafter, on or about November 4, 1980, Berman procured a written sales contract for the purchase of the Metropole Hotel by Andres Herrada upon terms and conditions satisfactory to Deutsch. The sales contract between Deutsch and Herrada failed to provide, however, for the amount of the commission payable to Associates as compensation for its services as the broker in the transaction. Following unsuccessful negotiations between Greene and Deutsch, Associates commenced suit against Deutsch in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Florida, Case No. 81-5133, claiming a commission in the amount of $40,000 based upon the verbal agreement of Berman and Deutsch, which action resulted in the entry of a Final Judgment in favor of Associates and against Deutsch in the amount of $40,000 plus interest. As a result of a post-judgment settlement entered into under threat of an appeal by Deutsch, Associates agreed to accept the sum of $25,000 in cash and the sum of $17,455.28 plus interest at the rate of 14 percent per annum in 35 monthly installments of $596.59 each, commencing on July 15, 1982 and ending on May 15, 1985. Prior to instituting suit against Deutsch, Associates, through its President, Greene, entered into a verbal agreement for the purpose of rearranging the terms of the letter agreement dated July 14, 1980, for the purpose of imposing upon Associates the obligation of bearing all legal fees and litigation expenses in the event the outcome of the suit against Deutsch were unsuccessful. In consideration thereof, Berman agreed that in the event of a successful outcome (i.e., a judgment in the amount of $40,000), Associates would be entitled to retain 75 percent and Berman only 25 percent of the net commission after deducting legal fees and litigation expenses. During the pendency of the litigation involving Deutsch, on or about October 16, 1981, Berman obtained a written exclusive listing from Herrada authorizing Associates to sell the Metropole Hotel once again. Pursuant to this listing, Berman procured a written contract on behalf of Donald Mitchell to purchase the Metropole Hotel subject, however, to certain contingencies, primarily, the sale by Mitchell of another property as part of a multi-party, multi-property, tax-free exchange. Thereafter, Berman failed to participate further in performing the duties normally incumbent upon a real estate salesman between the date of contract and date of closing. During this period, it became necessary for Bernard Bastacky, another salesman employed by Associates, to perform those duties normally incumbent upon Berman in such transaction, which services proved to be instrumental in bringing the transaction to a successful conclusion. In addition, Greene, personally performed services in the preparation of the listing brochure and with respect to subsequent negotiations between the parties which led to substantial modifications in the terms of the original sales contract procured by Berman. On or about April 30, 1982, the sale from Herrada to Mitchell was closed. On or about May 15, 1982, Associates received its share of the commission from the Herrada/Mitchell sale in the approximate amount of $27,000. Thereafter, Greene asked Berman and Bastacky to meet, personally, for the purpose of reaching an amicable arrangement as to the division of the salesman's share of the commission. When Berman and Bastacky were unable to resolve their dispute, Greene deposited their share in an interest-bearing account to await a resolution of the dispute between them. Shortly thereafter, the $25,000 portion of the commission earned from the Deutsch/Herrada transaction became available as a result of the entry of the Final Judgment and post-judgment Stipulation between Associates and Deutsch, and Associates began to receive the monthly installments of the deferred portion of the commission. These sums were initially deposited to the Associates operating account from which were disbursed legal fees and litigation expenses totaling approximately $12,400. When efforts to resolve Berman's proper share of the Deutsch/Herrada commission failed, Berman instituted suit against Associates in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Case No. 82-15570, claiming 60 percent of the commissions received by Associates on each of the two sales of the Metropole Hotel. In its Answer, Associates alleged that Berman was entitled to 25 percent of the Deutsch/Herrada commission in accordance with the verbal agreement between Greene and Berman, and to 25 percent of the Herrada/Mitchell commission, based upon the involvements of Greene and Bastacky in that transaction. Associates has deposited the disputed portions of each of the commissions in controversy in special interest-bearing accounts pending a resolution of the pending civil action and has listed the amount of Berman's claim as a liability on its books. In reliance upon his attorney's advice and interpretation of the statute under which Respondents have been charged in these proceedings, Respondents did not seek to obtain a disbursement order from the Florida Real Estate Commission as to the funds in dispute between Berman and the Respondents. The civil action instituted by Berman against Associates is still pending and has not yet been scheduled for trial. Berman acknowledges that he instructed his attorney to allow that action to become temporarily inactive while the administrative action was prosecuted in hopes that it would compel Associates to enter into a favorable settlement in his favor. All issues in dispute between Associates and Berman are capable of being finally resolved in the pending civil action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Real Estate Commission dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondents. DONE and ENTERED this day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Donald M. Klein, Esquire KLINE MOORE & KLEIN, P.A. 407 Lincoln Road Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Harold Huff, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Although the parties to this case stipulated that the contract between the LaPointes and the Crowes was a valid contract for the purchase and sale of real estate, a genuine dispute arose between the LaPointes and the Crowes in that regard. Respondents became involved in this matter by showing the Crowes' property to the LaPointes on or before May 9, 1983, and thereby becoming a "co-operating broker'. with Deltona's Marco Island Realty Co. under an Exclusive Right To Sell agreement between Deltona and the Crowes dated January 13, 1983. Under the Exclusive Right To Sell, the Crowes agreed to pay Deltona a fee of 6% of the sales price for brokerage services and agreed, if a buyer failed to close a sales contract and forfeited a deposit to the Crowes, that Deltona could retain one- half of the deposit, but not exceeding the total amount of Deltona's fee, as compensation. The Exclusive Right To Sell also provided that Deltona was responsible to promptly pay any cooperating broker who sells the property for his services as soon as possible after receipt by Deltona of its real estate broker fee as provided in the Exclusive Right To Sell. By May 10, 1983, the LaPointes had made an offer to buy the property and the Crowes, by May 10, 1983, telegram to Deltona, agreed to sell the property for "$165,000, $500 in escrow with balance of $15,500 additional deposit after acceptance with balance at closing . . . sales commission $8,650. On May 11, 1983, Respondent Mary S. Davey, signed the sales contract for the LaPointes' purchase of the Crowes' property as "Agent (authorized by Buyer)." The sales contract also recited: "Buyer acknowledges that Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc/Deltona Marco Island Realty is the procuring real estate broker(s) in this transaction, and that the Broker is the agent for the Seller, and is being paid by the Seller." Respondent. Davey notified the LaPointes of the requirement for a $500 initial deposit and submitted the signed sales contract for the Crowes' signature. By letter dated May 12, 1983, Respondents confirmed "that the total commission to be paid on the sale of the [Crowes'] property is $8,650.00." It also confirmed: said commission is to be split 50/50 between MARCO BEACH ENTERPRISES, INC. and Deltona's Marco Island Realty." Also on May 12, 1983, the LaPointes sent Respondents a check for the $500 initial deposit with a note asking for a complete inventory of the contents of the condominium the LaPointes had inspected and a list of renters. The Crowes signed the Sales Contract on May 16, 1983. By May 24, 1983, Respondents still had not complied with the request for a complete inventory of the condominium's furnishings and for a list of renters. On that date, Respondents sent the LaPointes a copy of the signed Sales Contract with a letter requesting them to sign the Sales Contract under Respondent Davey's signature. Before they arrived, the LaPointes' May 25, 1983, letter to Respondents crossed in the mail. It requested that Respondents put something in the contract concerning pro-ration of water bills and taxes and payment of a water damage bill by the Crowes. The LaPointes repeated their request for an accurate inventory of the furnishings of the condominium and stated that they were placing their trust in Respondents to represent the LaPointes' interests. Some time between the LaPointes' receipt of Respondents' May 24 letter with a copy of the Sales Contract and June 13, 1893, the LaPointes decided to ask for cancellation of the purchase. The LaPointes cited circumstances involving their financing and their disappointment that Respondents had not furnished an inventory of the furnishings. By June 16, 1983, Respondents had responded to the request for cancellation, vigorously contending that a valid and binding contract existed between the LaPointes and the Crowes. By June 24, 1983, the Crowes, through an attorney, echoed their agreement with the position taken by the Respondents that there was a valid and binding contract. By letter dated June 29, 1983, from the LaPointes attorney, the LaPointes questioned the validity of the contract, saying that Respondent Davey had no authority to sign the Sales Contract on behalf of the LaPointes, who never did sign. The Respondents got a copy of this June 29 letter. On July 11, 1983, the LaPointes, through a Florida attorney, demanded of Respondents that their deposit be, returned. Respondents tried to extricate themselves by referring the LaPointes to the Crowes' attorney. The Crowes and the LaPointes remained at a stalemate until after May 7, 1984, when the Crowes sold their property to another purchaser for $162,500. Thereafter, by about June 19, 1984, the LaPointes, the Crowes and Deltona had negotiated their proposed resolution of the matter by disbursement of $3,000.00 to the Crowes and $13,500.00, plus all accrued interest, to the LaPointes. Respondents had not been included in any of these negotiations, and they refused to sign the agreement. As stipulated by the parties to this case, the matter remains unresolved. The Florida Real Estate Commission Handbook states in pertinent part: "But, what are the rights of the seller and the broker? In the absence of a specific agreement or custom, when a purchaser refuses to sign a contract after the offer has been accepted, the broker is only entitled to the agreed or usual commission percentage of the deposit. Where the purchaser refuses to go through with a contract by which he is bound and which can be enforced against him by the seller, the broker may, in the absence of a contract or custom, appropriate the deposit up to the amount of the earned commission."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint that has been filed by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, against Respondents, Mary S.·Davey and Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 7 day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7 day of August, 1986. APPENDIX The following are rulings on proposed findings of fact to the extent required by Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985): Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as substantially factually accurate and are incorporated in the Findings Of Fact to the extent necessary. Paragraphs 8 and 10 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact would be included in paragraph 1 above except that they are unnecessary. Paragraph 7 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Paragraph 9 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and/or Findings Of Fact. It ignores the Exclusive Right To Sell which must be read together with the Sales Contract. Respondents submitted no proposed findings of fact designated as such or in a form which entitles them to specific rulings. However, their proposed findings of fact were carefully considered. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Arthur V. Woodward, Esquire 940 North Collier Blvd. P. O. Box 1 Marco Island, Florida 33937 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent hereto Respondent O'Connor was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license lumber 0065137. Respondent Berg was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued license number 0391098. At all pertinent times alleged in the Administrative Complaint Respondent Berg was licensed and operated as a real estate salesman in the employ of broker Respondent Edward M. O Connor. On or about February 15, 1953, Respondent Berg entered into a contract as purchaser seeking to purchase certain real property in Charlotte County, Florida, described as: Lot 26, Block 1, Charlotte Harbour Subdivision, also known as 201 Cortex Street, Charlotte County, Florida. The property was owned by Louis J. Knetter. Mr. Knetter, as seller, was represented by Emanuel Consalvo, a licensed real estate salesman or broker. This proposed contract, contrary to the allegations of Petitioner, made no mention in its terms of any $500 binder or earnest money deposit. Rather, the contract, instead of mentioning a cash deposit, had the words "commission" clearly written on the top, being Berg's pledge to pay $300 of the real estate commission he would be entitled to on the transaction to the buyer at closing. The proposed contract was tendered to Emanuel Consalvo , the seller's agent, who examined it thoroughly with his client Louis Knetter. Mr. Knetter subsequently refused to enter into that proposed contract. Respondent Berg then made a second offer to purchase the same property which was accepted by the seller. This offer was made on April 18, 1983. The contract regarding the second offer was prepared from a rough draft which Respondent Berg had handwritten. He handwrote the word "commission" precisely as on the original offer of February 15, 1983. On the final typed copy of the contract the abbreviated word "comm.," was typed into the contract to indicate (and it was Respondent Berg's intent) that the commission to be earned by Berg would be used as a down payment at closing rather than any proposal by Berg (or O'Connor) to post $500 or other amount of cash earnest money deposit upon the offering of the contract. Respondent Berg genuinely believed that anything of value could be inserted into a contract to provide consideration and could serve as sufficient consideration therefor including his offer to pay to the buyer a part of the real estate commission he would be entitled to with regard to that transaction Neither Respondents Berg nor O'Connor made any representations or statements, verbally or written, to Louis Knetter or Emanuel Consalvo to the effect that there ever was an earnest money deposit in any amount posted by the purchaser Berg, or on account at O'Connor Realty. Kevin O'Connor, the son of Respondent O'Connor, is also a licensed real estate broker who holds a degree in the field of real estate. He established that the textbook practice and indeed, the general real estate industry custom or practice in the Charlotte County area allows for anything of value to be used as consideration for a real estate contract and that a cash earnest money deposit is not necessary. He established the industry practice with regard to the posting of earnest money deposits for real estate sales contracts and demonstrated that unless a contract, by its terms, clearly indicates that an earnest money deposit has been posted, there is no basis for a seller or his agent to assume that to be the case. Kevin O'Connor, a witness for the Respondents, had personal contact with the seller's agent, Emanuel Consalvo, regarding the transaction and established that the Respondent Edward M. O'Connor was not even in his office or in the area during the time of the contract proposal or offer. Kevin O'Connor was operating the office in the Respondent Edward O'Connor's absence. Kevin 0'Connor established that the question of an earnest money deposit was never discussed with Consalvo and that neither Consalvo nor Knetter ever raised a question during the pendency of the transaction concerning the existence of an earnest money deposit. Kevin O'Connor never told Consalvo that any money was in escrow nor did Respondent Berg or Edward O'Connor. No representation was ever made to Consalvo or Knetter, singly or jointly, to the effect that any money had been placed on deposit or in escrow with regard to either of the two offers. Indeed, Mr. Consalvo acknowledged that no one at 0'Connor Realty ever told him of any money being placed in an escrow account. The transaction ultimately failed to close because the seller failed to include all the furniture with the home as required by the contract. At that juncture, the seller demanded the supposed $500 earnest money deposit to be paid him as a forfeiture on the mistaken belief that an earnest money deposit had been posted with regard to the transaction. Such was not the case however, nor was it ever represented to be the case.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the complaint filed by Petitioner against Respondents William Berg and Edward M. 0'Connor t/a O'Connor Realty, be DISMISSED in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of February, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-0180 PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial, credible evidence presented. Accepted, but not in itself dispositive of the material issues presented. Rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial, credible evidence presented. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented in itself. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented. RESPONDENT EDWARD O'CONNOR'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Accepted. Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. RESPONDENT WILLIAM BERG'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Elwood P. Safron, Esquire SAFRON, RODNEY & DZUPAK 306 E. Olympia Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Jesus Hevia, Esquire WOTITZKY, WOTITZKY, WILKINS, FROHLICH & JONES 201 West Marion Avenue Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
