The Issue Did Respondent Mary Jane Nilsen violate the policies of Petitioner School Board of Highlands County (Board) and thereby justify a five-day suspension without pay?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings are made: The Board is the county agency responsible for operating the public schools within the Highlands County School District as established in Chapter 228, Florida Statutes, including the hiring of, among other personnel, school bus drivers. Respondent has been employed in the Polk County School System as a school bus driver since 1991. Respondent is employed pursuant to an annual contract. Dr. Calvin Smith testified that if an employee such as Respondent has been employed by the Board for 3 continuous years, then that employee would be eligible for a continuing contract. Although Respondent had been employed continuously by the Board for more than 3 years, there was no evidence that Respondent had been granted a continuing contract by the Board which would require the Board to show just cause for disciplining Respondent. By letter dated June 11, 1996, Superintendent Farmer advised Respondent that he was recommending to the Board that she be suspended for five days without pay based on information submitted to him "by Mr. Roy Wright, Coordinator of Transportation, Mr. Calvin Smith, Director of Operations, and the recommendation of Dr. John Martin, Deputy Superintendent." By letter dated June 11, 1996, Dr. John Martin, Deputy Superintendent, advised Superintendent Farmer, based on the information submitted to him by Mr. Roy Wright and Calvin Smith, that he was recommending a five-day suspension without pay for Respondent. By letter dated June 6, 1996, Mr. Roy Wright advised Dr. Calvin Smith that he recommended a five-day suspension for Respondent. The letter in pertinent part provides: I am recommending that Mrs. Mary Jane Nilsen, a bus driver, be suspended from work without pay for five days. Mrs. Nilsen was involved in a confrontation with several other bus drivers in the Lake Placid compound on the morning of May 31. * * * Mrs. Nilsen has had several previous episodes of angry and belligerent behavior which have resulted in actions with the progressive discipline practice. The first such incident was October 21, 1994, when Mrs. Nilsen was given a verbal warning for a "loud, rude and very discourteous" exchange with her supervisor. . . . Also, in February of this year, I gave Mrs. Nilsen a written letter of reprimand for "belligerent, hostile and insubordinate" behavior toward the Area Transportation Manager and the Transportation Operations Supervisor. These actions took place during a conference with Mrs. Nilsen and several other drivers in the Lake Placid Transportation office. . . You will note that in my letter of February 28, I warned Mrs. Nilsen that a future incident could result in a five day suspension without pay. * * * Therefore, I am recommending her suspension without pay for five days consistent with the progressive discipline Provision of the negotiated agreement. (Emphasis furnished). A copy of this letter was forwarded to Dr. John Martin, Deputy Superintendent, by Dr. Calvin Smith with a note that Dr. Smith concurred in Mr. Wright's recommendation. The letter of February 28, 1996, from Roy Wright to Respondent provides in pertinent part as follows: This letter is in reference to the meeting and discussion that you and several drivers had with Mrs. Carlene Varnes, Area Transportation Manager and Mrs. Shirley Higgins, Transportation Operations Manager on Monday morning February 26. You will consider that the outcome of Mrs. Hiagins and Mrs. Varnes discussion with you stands as a verbal warning. I am writing to you in order to emphasize the position of the department regarding your conduct. Your will refrain from the use of profanity at any time you are in the uniform of a Highlands County School Bus Driver, particularly when you are in the presence of other School Bus Drivers and School Board Employees. The incident at a local restaurant on Friday, February 23, occurred while you and other school bus drivers were in uniform. Other drivers present asked you to quiet down and stop the vulgar language. Your failure to do so created an intimidating, hostile and offensive situation which has a direct bearing on the work environment. . . The language and actions on your part also presented an unfavorable and unacceptable image which undermines the public's perception of school bus drivers as professionals. In addition, your reaction to the management staff when this matter was brought to your attention can only be described as belligerent, hostile and insubordinate. . . Your response to your immediate supervisor when she was investigating the matter and warning you of inappropriate conduct while in uniform was completely out of line. You may consider this a written reprimand for that action. You have now received a verbal warning and a written reprimand. The next incident may result in a five day suspension without pay. (Emphasis furnished). It appears that the verbal warning and written reprimand were based on the same incident. This letter does not mention the October 21, 1994, verbal warning. Respondent did not challenge the verbal warning given to her for the infraction observed on October 21, 1994. Likewise, Respondent did not challenge Mr. Wright's decision to issue a verbal warning and written reprimand for the infraction observed on February 26, 1996. Carlene Varnes, Area Transportation Manager at Lake Placid, gave Kala Barfield and two other bus drivers permission to wash their buses in the wash area of the bus compound at Lake Placid on May 31, 1966. The record is not clear, but apparently Barfield and the other bus drivers were allowed to wash their buses during the busy time of other bus drivers coming into the compound to park. On May 31, 1996, Barfield backed her bus into the wash area of the bus compound at Lake Placid. However, Barfield could not get her bus entirely into the wash area due to a vehicle (van) being parked in the wash area. Barfield made no attempt to have the owner move the vehicle. Also, at this same time Brenda Sullivan was fueling her bus which, along with Barfield washing her bus, created a situation where other bus drivers would have to carefully navigate between the two buses in order to park their buses. While Barfield was washing her bus and Sullivan was fueling her bus, Respondent entered the compound and pulled her bus "nose-to-nose" with Barfield's bus, leaving approximately 15 to 20 feet between the buses. Respondent testified that she made no attempt to navigate between Barfield's and Sullivan's buses while Sullivan was fueling her bus because Respondent had determined that her bus could not be navigated between the two buses without incident. With Respondent's bus parked as it was, all other buses entering the compound were unable to navigate around Respondent's bus and park. Therefore, once the area of the compound behind Respondent's bus was filled, other buses were forced to park on the road outside the compound. Respondent's action in this regard violated Board policy of not blocking buses in the compound and created a hazardous condition for those buses parked on the road. . Respondent was aware that buses entering the compound after her were unable to navigate past her bus and that bus traffic was "piling up" behind Respondent, creating a problem out in the road. Respondent was also aware of those bus drivers behind her attempting to get Respondent to move. Although Respondent may have believed that she could not navigate her bus around Barfield's and Sullivan's buses, she made no attempt to alleviate this hazardous situation by requesting another available bus driver or anyone else for assistance in navigating her bus around Barfield's and Sullivan's bus. The incident lasted approximately 10 to 20 minutes. Varnes was advised immediately of the situation, but due to an emergency with another bus driver, Varnes was unable to address this problem immediately. By the time Varnes was able to address the problem, Sullivan had finished fueling her bus and moved it. Upon Varnes coming on the scene, she told Respondent to move her bus and Respondent did so. However, Respondent parked her bus in backwards which created a problem for other buses attempting to get by. Upon being advised that her bus was incorrectly parked, Respondent corrected the situation. It is clear that Respondent did not like the idea of Barfield being allowed to wash her bus while other buses were attempting to park, and so expressed that view on May 31, 1996. As a result, Barfield attempted to discuss this matter with Respondent in a somewhat heated fashion, but Respondent boarded her bus and closed the door preventing any further conversation on the matter with Barfield.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, accordingly, Recommended that Respondent be suspended without pay for a period of 5 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 1997, in Leon County, Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Richard R. Farmer Superintendent of Schools Post Office Box 9300 Sebring, Florida 33870-4098 James F. McCollum, Esquire Clay Oberhausen, Esquire 129 South Commerce Avenue Sebring, Florida 33870 Mark Herdman, Esquire 34650 U.S. Highway 19 North Suite 308 Palm Harbor, Florida 34684
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses alleged in the Notice of Specific Charges (NSC) filed by Petitioner and the penalties, if any, that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times, Petitioner has been a duly constituted School Board pursuant to Article IX, Florida Constitution, and Section 1001.32, Florida Statutes (2005).1 At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been a member of AFSCME and, as such, has been entitled to the benefits of the AFSCME Contract. Since November 15, 2002, Respondent has been employed by Petitioner as a school bus driver and assigned to the North Regional Transportation Center (NRTC). Until this incident, Respondent had not been disciplined by Petitioner. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Carter was a school bus attendant assigned to the NRTC. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Cone was a Field Operations Specialist assigned to the NRTC and had supervisory authority over Ms. Carter and Respondent. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Sweeting was the Director of Petitioner’s NRTC and had supervisory authority over Ms. Cone. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Moss was a District Director in the Office of Professional Standards and assisted with performance and discipline of employees. She ensured that Petitioner complied with applicable due process requirements during a disciplinary proceeding. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21 states in pertinent part that: All persons employed by The School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida are representatives of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools. As such, they are expected to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system. School Board Rule 6Gx13-E-1.10 incorporates by reference Petitioner’s Handbook for School Bus Drivers, Aides, and Operations Staff (Handbook). Section 3 of the Handbook is captioned “School Bus Driver Guidelines and Procedures.” Section 3.4 of the Handbook, captioned “Duties,” imposes the following duties on a school bus driver: . . . Drivers must report defective equipment to their Dispatch Office in writing on the “Driver’s Request for Repair (DRR)” form. The report must be made as soon as possible after the problem is detected. . . . If the driver encounters a problem while operating the vehicle, the Dispatch Office must be notified immediately and the driver must wait for instructions from the garage. Section 3.3 of the Handbook, captioned “Regulations,” imposes the following responsibilities on a school bus driver: “. . . Prepare immediately an accident report after every accident involving the bus or bus passenger. This report must be completed with the driver’s supervisor. Section 10 of the Handbook is captioned “Operating Procedures and Safe Driving Principles.” Section 10.1 of the Handbook, captioned “School Bus Operation,” provides as follows: Drivers must perform a complete pre-trip inspection of their assigned buses at least twice daily. The pre-trip inspection must be accomplished before the driver departs the compound with the bus. Pre-trip inspection results must be documented on the form provided for this purpose. . . . On August 20, 2004, Respondent was assigned to drive the bus along school bus Route 22. There is a bridge on Northwest 42nd Avenue between Northwest 179 and 183 Streets (the 42nd Avenue Bridge). On August 20, 2004, the 42nd Avenue Bridge was undergoing construction work. There were barricades, construction cones, and other warning devices that were visible to approaching drivers. Because of the construction, the NRTC had informed school bus drivers not to cross the 42nd Avenue Bridge. Respondent testified that he did not hear that warning, but that he knew the bridge was undergoing construction work. On the morning of August 20, 2004, Ms. Carter was the bus attendant on the bus driven by Respondent. At the time of the accident described below, there were four students on the bus. On the morning of August 20, 2004, Respondent drove the bus across the 42nd Avenue Bridge. There was a dispute between the parties as to what, if anything, occurred while Respondent was driving the bus across the 42nd Avenue Bridge. The greater weight of the competent evidence established that the bus collided with an object on the 42nd Avenue Bridge or with the 42nd Avenue Bridge itself. This accident caused minor damage to the bus.2 Respondent did not immediately stop to inspect the bus. After Respondent crossed the 42nd Avenue, he continued on his route, picked up students, and stopped at North Dade Middle School (NDMS) to drop off students. While stopped at NDMS, Respondent inspected the bus and noticed that the outer tire on the right rear of the bus was flat. Respondent testified that the inner tire on the right rear of the bus did not appear to be damaged. Respondent did not contact or make any report to the transportation dispatch office at that time. Respondent drove the bus with the damaged tire to the NRTC bus parking area. Respondent made the determination that it was safe to drive the bus with the damaged tire without consulting anyone.3 After Respondent returned to the NRTC bus compound, he completed a Driver’s Request for Repair (DRR) form, which indicated that the right rear outer tire needed repair. Because of Respondent’s DRR, the bus was taken from the bus parking area to the garage. After Ms. Carter returned to the bus compound with Respondent, she reported to Ms. Cone that the bus had had an accident as it crossed the 42nd Avenue Bridge. The report was in the form of a message left for Ms. Cone on her voicemail. Ms. Cone received Ms. Carter’s message on August 20, 2004, and promptly went to the parking area and then to the garage. She inspected the bus at the garage. Ms. Cone, who has had extensive experience and training in accident investigation, observed that bus’ right rear tire rim was bent and disfigured and that the bus’ door was damaged. After inspecting the bus, Ms. Cone informed Ms. Sweeting of Ms. Carter’s report and of her own observations. Ms. Sweeting and Ms. Cone immediately thereafter went to the 42nd Avenue Bridge, where they observed markings on the bridge that were consistent with a vehicle coming in contact with the bridge. The white stony color of the damaged area of the bridge was consistent with the white stony color Ms. Cone had observed on the damaged tire rim. Although the markings on the bus and on the bridge were consistent with one another, there was no conclusive proof that the markings observed on the bridge were caused by the bus. Ms. Cone took photographs of the bus and the bridge on August 20, 2004. Ms. Cone subsequently delivered the photographs and a report of the accident to Ms. Sweeting. Prior to the final hearing in this matter, Ms. Sweeting was reassigned to the East Regional Transportation Center. When she left the NRTC, Ms. Sweeting left the photographs in a file on her desk. The photographs were subsequently lost or misplaced. Respondent’s qualified representative made a public record’s request for the photographs and was informed that they had been lost.4 A Conference for the Record (CFR) was conducted on August 23, 2004, with Ms. Sweeting presiding. Also present were Respondent and an AFSCME representative. Ms. Sweeting recommended further disciplinary action. A second CFR was conducted October 29, 2004, with Ms. Moss presiding. Also present were Jerry Klein (Petitioner’s Director of Transportation), Ms. Sweeting, two AFSCME representatives, and Respondent. Following the second CFR, Respondent was required to submit to a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Thereafter, Petitioner’s staff made the disciplinary recommendation that was subsequently adopted by Petitioner. The photographs taken by Ms. Cone were available for review at both CFRs. The Handbook does not define the term “accident.” School bus drivers employed by Petitioner are required to undergo training when they are first hired. During training, a driver is taught to immediately report to the transportation dispatcher if his or her bus hits an object and damage to the bus results. A driver is taught that such an incident is an accident. Despite that training, Respondent denied that there had been an accident and explained that he defined an accident as being when someone gets hurt on the bus, when he hits or kills someone, or when he damages the property of another. He would not acknowledge that an accident also includes damaging the bus by hitting a bridge or an object on a bridge. It is undisputed that Respondent failed to document pre-trip inspections on August 18, 19 and 20, 2004. Respondent testified that he actually performed the pre-trip inspections, but that he did no documentation because he could not find the pencil he usually kept on the bus after he returned from sick leave. Respondent’s testimony that he completed the pre-trip inspection but failed to complete the required paperwork, although self-serving, was not refuted. Consequently, it is found that Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent did not conduct a pre-trip inspection, but it did prove that Respondent failed to complete the pre-trip inspection report.5 The parties agree that Petitioner has the authority to discipline Respondent for just cause consistent with the principles of progressive discipline. Article XI, Section 1A of the AFSCME Contract provides, under the caption “Due Process”, in relevant part, as follows: . . . Progressive discipline steps should be followed, however in administering discipline, the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employees [sic] record. Therefore, disciplinary steps may include: verbal warning; written warning (acknowledged); letter of reprimand; suspension/demotion; dismissal. Article XI, Section 1B of the AFSCME Contract provides, in part, as follows: . . . [I]t is agreed that disciplinary action(s) taken against AFSCME . . . members shall be consistent with the concept and practice of progressive or corrective discipline and that in all instances the degree of discipline shall be reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and the employee’s record. Article XI, Section 4C of the AFSCME Contract provides that termination of employment may occur if a member is guilty of non-performance of job responsibilities. Article XI, Section 3 of the AFSCME Contract provides as follows: If those cases where any employee has not complied with Board Policies and/or department regulations, but the infraction is not deemed serious enough to recommend dismissal, the department head may recommend suspension up to 30 calendar days without pay. All suspensions must be approved by the Superintendent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth in this Recommended Order and sustains the suspension of Respondent's employment for 30 calendar days without pay. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2005.
Findings Of Fact Exception No. 1 - That portion of Findings of Fact No. 15, which finds that "(t)he Division has consistently denied Petitioners the right to purchase their service with the Pawley companies", is clearly erroneous and not substantiated by the evidence of record. Petitioners are correct in that the Division has advised them by letter (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, #17B) that they were able to buy their prior service with Pawley at full actuarial cost. However, that was not an issue nor the subject of this proceeding, and the finding of fact must be considered in the context of the ultimate issue in this case, that being whether or not the Petitioners were entitled to purchase their prior service at the reduced rates provided in Section 121.081(1)(g), Florida Statutes. ,with respect to that issue, the Division has consistently denied Petitioners the right to purchase their prior service. The Report of Proceedings of the Dade County Independent Review Panel (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, #10) contains a similar statement. That statement appears to be based on statements of Mr. Stone and Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, #17B, above. The Report of Proceedings is hearsay and duplicates the facts and exhibits presented at the hearing. In the context of the issue in this case, the Proposed Finding of Fact No. 15 is correct, and Petitioners' exception is rejected being without factual basis in the record. Exception No. 2 - That portion of Findings of Fact No. 17, which finds that "the IRP de- termined what the "Cut-Off" date of March 27, 1962, was a "reasonable decision" to end the "period of solicitation", is irrelevant and immaterial, unless it is considered together with whether the Petitioners were given ade- cuate notice of that "reasonable decision". Petitioners claim that the above finding is irrelevant and immaterial unless considered together with the "issue" of adequate notice. The only question the Division may consider is whether or not the finding of fact was based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Since there is no evidence in record to contradict the proposed finding of fact, it is the only finding that the Hearing Officer or the Division could have reached. It is based on competent, substantial evidence in the record. The proposed finding of fact was made based on the finding of the Independent Review Panel in its Report of Proceedings. Petitioners accepted the report of the Panel and placed the Report into evidence at the hearing. They are not attempting a collateral attack on the report. Such an attack should not be a-lowed In the absence of good and sufficient reason. The question of relevancy and materiality raised by Petitioners is an appropriate objection at the time the evidence is introduced at the hearing but is inappropriate in attacking a finding of fact In a recommended order. Petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No. 3 - That portion of Findings of Faction 20 which finds that "(i)t is under- standable that Dade County gassed a resolution simply supporting Petitioners in their claims, rather than placing Petitioners in their claims situation as any other Pawley employee who came to work for Dade County before 3/27/62, since the latter position would cost Dade County $104,696 for retroactive benefits. Petitioners claim the above finding 15 clearly erroneous and misleading, and not supported by substantial and competent evidence In the record. Petitioners discuss certain amounts necessary to purchase employee benefits and other amounts needed to purchase creditable service in the Florida Retirement System. By discussing the two amounts as if they were one amount, Petitioners clearly show their understanding of the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing. The Division advised Petitioners that it would cost Petitioner Stone $18,997.12 and Petitioner Wilson $11,657.23 to purchase their prior service should they prevail in the case at bar. In the event Dade County had considered all three petitioners to be continuously employed from the date of the strike to the respective dates of their reemployment the cost to the County to pay retroactive benefits would have been 5104.E95. Since the County and not consider Petitioners to be employees during this period, it did not pay for the normal employees fringe benefits. The payment of those benefits (albeit, retroactively) is represented by the $104,695 amount. Thus, the two amounts discussed by Petitioners represent two different funds; one to be paid by Petitioners for prior service, and one to be paid by Dade County for fringe benefits, but not including Petitioners' prior service. Contrary to Petitioners' assertion that their employment percentent and payroll status from the date of the strike to the respective dates of reemployment was not the issue in this case, the Division believes that that issue is at the very heart of this case. In order to purchase their prior service at the rates permitted by Section 121.081(1)(g) , Florida Statutes, Petitioners had to be employees of the County on March 2, 1962. If they were employees, then they are due the appropriate employee benefits for that period of time. However, since the County did not pay those benefits, then Petitioners were obviously not employees during the period at issue and, therefore, not eligible to purchase the creditable service under Section 121.06.1(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No. 4 - That portion of Findings or Fact No. 22 which finds that "/i/n addition to the obvious fact that petitioners were par- ticipating in an illegal strike and were in violation of the restraining order of the cir- cuit court, they voluntarily abandoned their right to employment by not commencing their jobs by March 27, 1962", is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. In reviewing this proceeding to determine the legality vel non of the strike, It seems obvious that the strike was illegal under one or both of two principles (see Finding of Fact No. 4). First, it was illegal under existing state law; and second, it was illegal for being in violation of the injunction issued by the circuit court. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, pg. 271. The union in which Petitioners ware members, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric, Railway and Motor Coach Employee of America ("Union") was involved in labor negotiations concerning the future status of the Union after the transfer. The County filed a declaratory judgment action in circuit court (Respondent's Exhibits 4 against the Union. In its final decree, the circuit court stated in part that: "2. plaintiffs are not require by law to offer employment to members of the defendant union, . . . plaintiffs are not authorized by law to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with defendants and would not be authorized to do so upon consummation of the contractual transaction evidenced by the record in this cause. plaintiffs are not authorized to recog- nized as lawful any strike directed against them and would not be authorized to do so upon consummation of the con- tractual transaction evidenced by-the record in this cause." (Respondent's Exhibit 4, numbered pages 199-200) Notwithstanding the above provisions the Union went on strike on January 29, 1962 (Respondent's Exhibit.4, numbered pg. 256); the Court, after issuing an order to show cause (id. numbered pg. 259), ordered that the Union was "enjoined and restrained from striking or continuing any strike for the purpose of covering the plaintiffs (county) or any other governmental agency to engage in collective bargaining". (Id, numbered pg. 271) However, the Union continued on strike. The case was appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal. The illegality of the strike under state law was affirmed by that court in Dade County v. Amalgamated Assn. of S.E.R. of M.C. Employees, et al, 157 So.2d 176, 183 (Fla. 3rd DC. 1963). The second issue concerning the violation of the injunction was never appealed, and the Union and its members were in continued violation of the injunction by remaining on strike. Accordingly, petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No. 5 - That portion of Findings of Fact No. 23, which finds that "/p/etitioners claim that any returning strikers employed more than "one day" after the takeover, had a in service", is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Petitioners claim that absence from employment of "one calendar month" constitutes a "break in continuous service". In reviewing the exhibits, we note that petitioners' Exhibit No. 2, 12, listed 33 individuals who were prior employees of the Pawley companies, went on strike and returned to work by March 27, 1962. These individuals were given retroactive benefits by Dade County and, therefore, the right to purchase the prior service under Section 121.081(1), Florida Statutes. Some of those individuals were hired by the County before the end of "one calendar month" (that is to say, before March 9, 1962) and others were hired after that date. Petitioners originally argued that an absence of one day constituted a break in service. Apparently, they have changed their position since the hearing and now argue that "one calendar month" constitutes a "break in continuous service". However, based on the facts shown and the arguments bade at the hearing the Hearing Officer's finding of fact is correct and is based on competent substantial evidence. Even if Petitioners were correct, the change from "one day" to "one calendar month" would not change the fact that they did not become employees of the County as a result of the transfer or merger of the private bus company. Petitioners' objection is rejected. EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Exception No. E - Conclusion of Law No. 4. Petitioners' claim that Dade County recognized and credited them with their past service with Pawley. The evidence and testimony given at the hearing does not substantiate their claim. While the transmittal letter of Mr. Talbert (Petitioners' Exhibit No.2,#14) states that the "County Commission instructed the County Manager that the above subject employees shall be considered by Dade County to have an original employment date reflecting their employment with the Pawley companies", the actual motion by Commissioner Shack was "that Hodowud, Stone and Wilson be permitted to purchase their past services from the Satate of Florida at the reduced rate." Further, the testimony of Mr. Richard Jay Weiss, Assistant Dade County Attorney, and his exhibit (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) do not support Petitioners' position. The Exhibit states in part as follows: ". . .the County Commission has gone on record by motion to urge the State Retirement System to allow the three present claimants to receive their back time at the reduced rate". Thus, the County merely urged the Division to allow Petitioners to purchase their prior service and did not itself credit them with their past service with retroactive fringe benefits. The bearing Officer's conclusion of law is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No.7 - Conclusion of Law No. 5 Petitioners' claim that the Hearing Officers' conclusion that they did not enjoy an employee/employer relationship at the time of takeover is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Section 11 of Ordinance 60-23 of Dade County (petitioners' Exhibit 2, item 1) states that: "whenever the County acquires existing transit systems or facilities from a publicly or pri- vately owned public utility, to the extent necessary or feasible for the economical opera- tion of such facilities, all of the employees of such acquired transit system whose duties pertain to the facilities acquired shall be employed In comparable positions in the County service and the pay status, seniority, vacation and sick leave rights shall be preserved and maintained to the fullest possible extent. All employees of the Authority shall be deemed, con- sidered or construed as County employees and shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and benefits of County employees." Since the County cannot force any person to work or it the words "all of the employees" and "shall be employed" can logically only refer to those employees who decide to go to work for the County and conversely do not include those employees who voluntarily decide not to work for the County. In addition to the fact that the Hearing Officer found that Petitioners were participating in an illegal strike and were in violation of the restraining order of the circuit court, Petitioners voluntarily abandoned their right to employment by not returning to their jobs by March 27, 1962. Later, when they finally did commence employment with MTA, they were hired as new employees rather than previous employees who were being given reemployment. The hearing officer's conclusion of law is supported by competent, substantial evidence, and Petitioners' objection is rejected. Exception No. 8 - Conclusion of Law No. 7 Petitioners argue that the met their burden of proving that they were entitled to purchase their service under Section 121.081(1)(g), Florida Statutes; however, they offer no basis in law or fact would allow the Division to conclude the Hearing Officer was in error. In the absence of an adequate legal basis or contrary evidence in the record, the Division rejects Petitioners' objection. By motion prior to the hearing, Petitioners Wilson and Stone moved to add Metropolitan Dade County as a art Respondent. The motion was denied by the bearing Officer, and the Division hereby adopts that ruling as part of this final order. The Recommended Order is corrected at page 8, paragraph 20, line 6, wherein the month of "January" is changed to read "February". WHEREFORE based upon the foregoing findings, holdings and rulings or the Division as to Petitioners' exceptions to the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order, it is, ORDERED AND DIRECTED that each and every exception of the Petitioners' to the Recommended Order be and the same are OVERRULED and REJECTED. It is further, ORDERED AND DIRECTED that copy of said Recommended Order is attached hereto and incorporated as part of this final order. It is further, ORDERED AND DIRECTED that Petitioners' requests to purchase in the Florida Retirement System their prior service with the Pawley companies at the rates allowed in Section 121.081(1)(g), Florida Statutes, are denied. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of October, 1983. J. MULLIAN, III State Retirement Director Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Retirement this 21st day of October, 1983. Edna E. Canino, Esquire 1609 NW 14th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 Edward F. Hodowud 8874 Emerson Avenue Surfside, Florida 33154 Linda M. Rigot, Hearing Officer Dan Brown, Esquire Division of Administrative Hearings John Finney, Esquire The Oakland Building Paul McMahon 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioners' requests to purchase in the Florida Retirement System their prior service with the Pawley companies at a reduced rate pursuant to Section 121.081(1)(g), Florida Statutes. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Edna E Canino, Esquire 1609 NW 14th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 Mr. Edward F. Hodowud 8874 Emerson Avenue Surfside, Florida 33154 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C - Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION DIVISION OF RETIREMENT NORMA WILSON, EDWARD F. HODOWUD, and, WESLEY E. STONE, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 81-3192 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner employed Respondent as a school bus driver pursuant to an annual contract. Said annual contract may be terminated for probable cause as set forth in Petitioner's local rule 3.27 (Exhibit P4). Respondent's employment was also subject to a union contract between the Petitioner and the International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers, Local 1227. Article 39 of said union contract provides for a formal hearing under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, when the Superintendent recommends termination of employment for any member of the bargaining unit. Upon employment, Respondent received training in the safe operation of school buses. As part of this training, Petitioner advised Respondent to exercise great caution at railroad crossings. Petitioner instructed Respondent on the correct procedures to follow when approaching and crossing a railroad track. During training, Petitioner provided Respondent with a copy of the Florida School Bus Drivers Handbook (Exhibit 4) which contains written procedures for bus drivers at railroad crossings. This handbook provides that the driver has the ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of the bus. It also contains a mirror provision of Section 316.1575, Florida Statutes, prohibiting anyone from driving through a railroad crossing when the crossing gate is closed or being opened or closed. Respondent's primary responsibility as a bus driver is to transport children to and from school. In the scope of his employment, he drives a bus through a railroad crossing on Forest Hill Boulevard near Interstate Highway 95 (I-95) everyday. On the morning of February 3, 1994, Respondent transported approximately sixty (60) children and two (2) teachers in a school bus on a field trip. Respondent exited I-95 and proceeded in a westerly direction along Forest Hill Boulevard. Respondent approached the railroad crossing on Forest Hill Boulevard near I-95 and stopped. After the bus came to a halt, the crossing lights started flashing and the crossing gate began to descend. Before Respondent proceeded across the railroad tracks, he did not: (a) open the school bus door to listen for the approaching train; (b) observe the signal lights as they started flashing; (c) observe the descent of the crossing gate; or (d) ensure that the passengers were quiet enough for him to hear the approaching train. As Respondent proceeded across the railroad track, the front of the bus struck the crossing gate, shattering it into several pieces. Respondent drove the bus to the other side of the crossing and stopped again before proceeding with the field trip. Two witnesses, concerned for the safety of the school bus passengers, immediately reported the incident to Petitioner's Transportation Department. Petitioner's employees must comply with school board policies and local rules which have been adopted in conformity with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Respondent failed to comply with those policies on February 3, 1994, by: (a) failing to open the school bus door before crossing the track; (b) failing to heed the warnings of the flashing lights and descending crossing gate; (c) failing to maintain silence on the bus until it crossed the tracks; and (d) proceeding across the tracks before it was safe to do so. On July 20, 1994, the Superintendent recommended that Petitioner suspend Respondent without pay and terminate his employment for failure to adhere to state law and school board policies governing the safe operation of school buses. On July 20, 1994, Petitioner voted to suspend Respondent without pay and to terminate his employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner enter a Final Order suspending Respondent without pay and terminating his employment due to willful neglect of duty and misconduct in office by failing to follow proper procedures while operating a school bus at a railroad crossing. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of December, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-4679 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statues, on the parties' proposed findings of facts. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in substance but modified in Finding of Fact (FOF) Number 1. Accepted in FOF Number 2. Accepted as modified in FOF Number 3 & Number 4. The Prehearing Stipulation references Article 39 of the Union Contract; however, there is no record evidence concerning a grievance procedure. Accepted in substance in FOF Number 5. Accepted in FOF Number 6. Accepted in FOF Number 6. Accepted in substance in FOF Number 7-Number 12. Respondent's testimony that he did not see flashing red warning lights while he was stopped at the crossing is not persuasive competent substantial evidence. Accepted in FOF Number 12. Accepted in FOF Number 12. Accepted; See FOF Number 13 and Conclusions of Law Number 24-27. Accepted in FOF Number 2. Accepted in FOF Number 15-16. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Respondent did not file proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Lee M. Rosenberg, Esquire Palm Beach County School District 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, FL 33406-5813 Wanda Stimpson, Business Agent Fireman & Oilers Local 1227 Post Office Box 449 Boynton Beach, FL 33435 Dr. Monica Uhlhorn Superintendant of Palm Beach County School District 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, FL 33406-5813
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Sarasota County School Board (Petitioner) has cause for terminating the employment of Virgil Mae (Respondent).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was employed by the Petitioner as a school bus driver. The Respondent was subject to the provisions for "classified" employees as identified in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Petitioner and the "Sarasota Classified/Teachers Association." Under the terms of the CBA, the Petitioner's school bus drivers must comply with various requirements including: possession of a commercial driver's license (CDL) and automobile insurance, passage of an annual health physical, passage of a "reflex" or dexterity test, and completion of in-service training. In May of each year, the Petitioner makes physicians available to provide health physicals for school bus drivers at no charge. In the alternative, the Petitioner pays the insurance co-payment for drivers who choose to obtain physicals from their personal physicians. School board policy requires that the reflex test be conducted within 30 days of the physical. Accordingly, the Petitioner provides reflex testing in May, so that it may be completed in conjunction with physicals. The reflex testing is also at the Petitioner's expense. Prior to May of each year, the Petitioner posts flyers at the school bus compounds to remind bus drivers of the requirements and advise of the dates of the tests. The Transportation Department also broadcasts the information through a radio dispatch system that provides communications links to all drivers. Written notices are also sent to the drivers. Most drivers complete both tests during May, but drivers may complete the tests in their own time. If a driver chooses to obtain a physical through a private physician, the Transportation Department will schedule the reflex test to accommodate the driver's physical, so that both are completed within 30 days. The Respondent asserted that he was unaware of the requirement that the reflex test be conducted within 30 days of the physical, but the greater weight of the evidence establishes that he has been a bus driver for the Petitioner since October 2003, that he has complied with the annual requirement in previous years, and that the policy has not changed during the term of his employment. The evidence further establishes that the Respondent had not completed the physical even by the time of the administrative hearing. Each fall, during the week preceding the commencement of school, the Petitioner's Transportation Department conducts a "Safety School," during which the school bus drivers receive in- service training sufficient to meet the relevant requirements applicable to drivers. School bus drivers are paid their regular wages to attend Safety School. On the second day of Safety School, the Petitioner conducts a "bid day," through which drivers bid on routes based on their employment seniority. Under the terms of the CBA, school bus drivers must have the valid CDL and have completed the health physical and in-service training no later than the time of the initial bid. Article XXI, Section M, of the CBA provides as follows: An employee who fails to return to duty for each of the first three work days of a new school year and who fails to notify his/her cost center head of his/her intentions will be considered to have abandoned his/her job and may be terminated. At the hearing, the Respondent asserted that he did not return to work because he believed his insurance had lapsed and that his driver's license was suspended and that he was trying to resolve the matter so that he could return to work. He further asserted that he contacted his supervisor and advised him of the matter, by leaving the information with the receptionist who answered the calls. At the hearing, the receptionist acknowledged that the Respondent had called, but stated that he declined to leave a message or a telephone number to which the supervisor could have returned the calls. She testified that according to the "Caller ID" telephone number information, the Respondent was calling from a storage company. The evidence establishes that the Respondent did not appear for the first three work days of the 2008-2009 school year and, in fact, was absent through the first eight days of the school year, extending over a two-week period. The Respondent's explanation for his failure to return to work lacks sufficient credibility and is rejected. Additionally, the evidence establishes that the Respondent failed to obtain the required annual health physical or to complete the in-service training prior to bid day and, accordingly, was not in compliance with the requirements of the CBA. During his employment by the Petitioner, the Respondent has been cited for excessive absences on several occasions. At the hearing, the Respondent asserted that the absences were related to health matters. The evidence establishes that the Respondent failed to supply medical documentation for some of the absences, and they were deemed to be "unexcused."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner enter a final order terminating the employment of Virgil Mae. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Virgil Mae 1575 20th Street Sarasota, Florida 34234 Hunter W. Carroll, Esquire Matthews, Eastmoore, Hardy Crauwels & Garcia, P.A. 1777 Main Street, Suite 500 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Mrs. Lori White, Superintendent Sarasota County School Board 1960 Landings Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34231-3365 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Petitioner School Board had just cause to reprimand Respondent Christopher O'Brien and suspend him for five days without pay. Whether Petitioner School Board had just cause to reprimand Respondent Angelo DiPaolo and suspend him for three days without pay.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Christopher O'Brien was employed by Petitioner Hernando County School Board as a school bus driver. Mr. O'Brien was first hired by Petitioner as a school bus driver in 2001. Prior to the events of this case, he had never been disciplined by his employer, and he had received a number of commendations. At all times material, Angelo DiPaolo was employed by Petitioner as a school bus attendant. Mr. DiPaolo was first employed and trained by Petitioner as a school bus driver for about one year, but he had been employed by Petitioner as a school bus attendant for the last six years preceding the incident in this case. Respondents are members of the Hernando United School Workers Union (HUSW). For the 2007-2008, school year, both men were assigned by the School Board's Transportation Department to Bus 473, Route 22. During that school year, the bus carried between 50 and 60 children, ages kindergarten through eighth grade, to and from J.D. Floyd Elementary School. Student A.R. was one of these students. On October 5, 2007, A.R. was a three-year-old, female, pre-kindergarten, Exceptional Student Education (ESE) student. She was a special needs child, whose 2007-2008, Individualized Education Plan (IEP) called for her to have adult supervision while riding the bus. The School Board had implemented A.R.'s IEP for the 2007-2008, school year by placing Mr. DiPaolo on Mr. O'Brien's bus. Steve Daniels, Petitioner's ESE Driver Coordinator Specialist, provided Mr. DiPaolo with written confirmation of his assignment, which included information on A.R.'s grade level, bus stop, and need for a special seat restraint. Mr. DiPaolo first met A.R. at the beginning of the 2007-2008, school year. Mr. DiPaolo's assigned first and primary responsibility was the safety of A.R., which included buckling her into her child safety seat, but his second and subordinate responsibility was to maintain order on the bus and manage the safety of the other 50-60 children. Mr. O'Brien had met A.R. during the second semester of the 2006-2007, school year, when she was initially placed on his school bus route. During that school year, A.R. had ridden the bus driven by Mr. O'Brien without having a school bus attendant specifically devoted to her safety and exceptionalities. During that school year, Mr. O'Brien had been instrumental in getting a particular type of safety seat for A.R. to ride in, due to her small size. This type of seat is called "a C. E. White" or "CEW" child's safety seat, and has an integrated five-point harness. During the 2006-2007, school year, Mr. O'Brien's bus had no bus attendant. Therefore, during that period of time, he had ultimate responsibility for all the children on his bus, including A.R. During the 2006-2007, school year, A.R. was sometimes buckled into her bus safety seat by older siblings who rode the same bus, but Mr. O'Brien had a good rapport with A.R. and often also helped buckle her into her seat. To do so, he had to leave the bus driver's compartment of the bus. During the 2007-2008, school year, A.R. and one sister, R.R., who was then approximately nine years old, continued to ride Mr. O'Brien's bus. Mr. O'Brien was advised at the start of the 2007-2008, school year that A.R. would be riding with the adult supervision of Mr. DiPaolo. Mr. O'Brien was not made privy to the reasons why the decision had been made to require a bus attendant specifically for A.R., but he understood he was supposed to comply with this requirement, regardless of the reason. There also was testimony that any three-year-old attending kindergarten with a special bus attendant would be an ESE student. In assessing the relative credibility and weighing the testimony of all the witnesses, as well as hearing the comments made by R.R. on the videotape of the October 5, 2007, incident, it is found that A.R. was not a usually compliant and accepting bus passenger, but was frequently what any parent would recognize as difficult or oppositional. (See Finding of Fact 23.) Indeed, during the 2007-2008, school year prior to October 5, 2007, Mr. DiPaolo had twice sought direction from Mr. Daniels, who had told him to do the best he could with A.R., but if Mr. DiPaolo's "best" did not work out, something else might have to be done about A.R. A.R.'s father usually brought her to the bus stop. On the morning of October 5, 2007, a neighbor brought the two siblings to the bus stop. A.R. was already upset when boarding began. On October 5, 2007, A.R. did not want to get on the bus. Mr. DiPaolo had to go down to the first step of the bus to get A.R. from the neighbor who was supervising the sisters at the bus stop. Once A.R. made it to the top step of the bus entrance, she still did not want to move. Mr. DiPaolo had to lift her up and place her in her C.E. White seat, which was strapped-into the window-side of the first row seat, immediately inside the door on the side of the bus opposite the driver's side. Once there, A.R. deliberately slumped off the car seat onto the floor of the bus. When lifted up again, A.R. repeated the behavior. This "battle of wills" between the three-year-old and the bus attendant continued for a little while. Fairly quickly, however, Mr. DiPaolo retired from the field of battle to speak to some students in the back of the bus. At this point, A.R. was either sliding herself onto the floor or was on the floor between the first row of seats and the stairwell barricade. Despite some testimony to the effect that the older students in the back of the bus were rowdy and needed to be settled down, the video tape does not corroborate that "take" on the chain of events. While it might have been good strategy for Mr. DiPaolo to let A.R. cool off a little before again trying to buckle her into her seat, there does not appear to have been any pressing reason for Mr. DiPaolo to absent himself from her vicinity to address issues in the back of the bus. Moreover, A.R. was his first and prime responsibility, and he abandoned that responsibility by saying to A.R.'s sister, R.R., who was still standing and not in her own seat, that she should try to get A.R. buckled in, and he did not alert Mr. O'Brien that A.R. was not yet buckled-in. Mr. DiPaolo's superior, Mr. Daniels, would have sanctioned Mr. DiPaolo's enlisting the aid of the older sibling if Mr. DiPaolo also had not simply abandoned the situation and walked to the back of the bus. Mr. DiPaolo also could have, and did not, attempt to enlist the aid of the adult neighbor who had delivered A.R. to the bus stop, or he could have returned A.R. back to that adult neighbor and suggested the neighbor take A.R. to school separately, both of which were options his superiors testified they would have sanctioned. He could also have requested that Mr. O'Brien radio the dispatcher for help. He chose none of these options. As Mr. DiPaolo gave instructions to A.R.'s sister and walked to the back of the bus, Mr. O'Brien, not realizing that A.R. was not secured into her seat, pulled the bus away from the stop. Although Mr. O'Brien testified to several reasons that he believed A.R. was secured in her seat before he pulled the bus away from its stop, Mr. DiPaolo clearly had not orally advised him that she was buckled-in, and Mr. O'Brien did not, in fact, make sure that A.R. was secure before he pulled the bus into four-lane traffic. Moreover, the sister, R.R., was up and down while all this was going on. She was not always in her seat as the bus was moving, either. R.R. was not able to secure A.R. in her seat, so she approached the driver's compartment and stated to Mr. O'Brien that they were going to have to do things "the hard way." R.R.'s choice of words suggests that R.R. and Mr. O'Brien had previously had to buckle A.R. into her car seat by sheer force. Approximately 25 seconds after he started the bus, during which time the bus entered the flow of four lanes of traffic and proceeded through an intersection, Mr. O'Brien pulled the bus over to the side of the road and stopped. During the whole of this period, A.R. was not in her seat or buckled- in. When Mr. O'Brien pulled over, he put on the emergency brake and put the transmission in neutral. He intentionally left the bus engine running, because the doors on that type of bus are controlled by air pressure. Once the engine is turned off, the doors will open with just the touch of a hand from either inside or outside the door. For safety reasons, he wanted the door to remain secure. Under the circumstances, pulling over the bus was probably a wise move, but Mr. O'Brien went further. He could have summoned Mr. DiPaolo to come back and do his job as A.R.'s bus attendant, and he could have called dispatch to alert the administration to a problem requiring their help, but instead, Mr. O'Brien left the driver's compartment to check on A.R. When Mr. O'Brien reached her, A.R. was not in her seat. He lifted her up from the floor of the bus and attempted to buckle her into her seat. At first, Mr. O'Brien was not successful getting A.R. into her seat and asked her if she knew she was about to get "a spanking." Mr. O'Brien admitted to threatening to spank A.R. to "snap her out of it," and to emphasize the importance of complying with his demands, even though he knew that "corporal punishment" was against Petitioner's policies. His voice was firm in making the statement and more matter-of-fact than threatening. However, his threat was loud enough to be heard over the general commotion on the bus, the idling engine, and the sound of traffic. R.R. and at least a few nearby children must have heard the threat. When A.R. continued to physically resist Mr. O'Brien's efforts to get her into her seat, he administered a single, swift slap to her right buttocks/thigh area. A.R. did not cry out specifically at that point, although later she began to cry. After spanking A.R., Mr. O'Brien was able, unassisted, to wrestle her into her seat and buckle her in. At some point in Mr. O'Brien's struggle, Mr. DiPaolo returned and stood in the aisle, level with the back of A.R.'s seat, observing Mr. O'Brien interacting with A.R. and A.R. crying. The "driver's compartment" on Mr. O'Brien's bus does not show up well in the video and there was no testimony concerning how it is configured. However, it does not appear to be separated from the students' seats by a door or partition. The diagrams in the Operations Handbook show clear access to the driver's seat and controls from the student seats on the driver's side immediately behind the driver's seat, if the driver is not in his seat, regardless of whether anyone is blocking the aisle. During the entire period of time Mr. O'Brien was dealing with A.R., he had his back turned towards the driver's seat and controls, which he had left unattended. During this entire period of time, the bus engine continued running and the doors remained closed. However, Mr. O'Brien's bus has just a knob for an emergency brake and anyone could have hit the knob so that the bus would begin rolling forward. After securing A.R. and being sure R.R. also was safely seated, Mr. O'Brien returned to the driver's compartment and drove the bus to school. A.R.'s screaming, crying, and fussing seems to have escalated after Mr. O'Brien resumed the driver's seat, when Mr. DiPaolo said something to A.R. about his not being willing to sit with her. However, Mr. DiPaolo eventually sat next to A.R. and interacted with A.R. to keep her amused, and apparently happy, until the bus stopped again and the passengers debarked at J.D. Floyd Elementary School. Mr. O'Brien described the incident to A.R.'s classroom teacher when he delivered A.R. into her care at the school on October 5, 2007. He did not report it to Petitioner's Transportation Department, because it was, in his mind, a minor bit of misbehavior by a student. Mr. DiPaolo also made no report. The undersigned is not persuaded that either Mr. O'Brien or Mr. DiPaolo tried to keep the incident secret. One of Petitioner's own training manuals provides: Minor incidents of misbehavior such as getting out of the seat, standing, or speaking loudly are usually better handled on the bus. If every incident of misbehavior is reported to the principal, the operator will lose credibility. However, on the following Monday morning, A.R.'s mother boarded Mr. O'Brien's bus and made a scene, accusing Mr. O'Brien of spanking A.R. on her bottom. The mother then proceeded to Petitioner's administrative offices, where she lodged a complaint, and finally went on to the Sheriff's Office to do the same. Ultimately, because they are required to do so when there is an accusation of corporal punishment, Petitioner's administration notified the Department of Children and Family Services of the mother's allegations. After receiving the complaint, Linda Smith, Petitioner's Director of Transportation, requested a copy of the October 5, 2007, surveillance video from the front of Bus 473. That surveillance film was admitted in evidence and has been heavily relied-upon in this Recommended Order. The surveillance film from the back of the bus was not offered or admitted. Ms. Smith, and Ms. Rucell Nesmith, Petitioner's Operator Trainer/Safety Coordinator for Transportation, have each been involved in school bus transportation for over 30 years and both have served as drivers and as transportation administrators. They testified that Mr. O'Brien's conduct on October 5, 2007, violated Petitioner's policy on two basic levels: he left the driver's compartment while the bus was still running and still loaded with students, and he administered corporal punishment to a student. While bus attendants and drivers have some discretion in handling disruptive students or students like A.R., who are not following directions, they are not supposed to permit, or cause, a bus to leave a stop until every student is properly secured, and they are forbidden to use corporal punishment. Bus drivers/operators receive training, including training on Petitioner's Operations Handbook as well as training on the State-approved driver curriculum. Mr. O'Brien was certified as having completed the bus driver training on July 20, 2001. Mr. O'Brien attended annual in-service trainings thereafter in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007. In-service trainings include, among other things, any updates to the Operations Handbook. General statements were also made during in-service trainings about not touching students. Mr. DiPaolo received his initial training as a bus driver from Ms. Nesmith and a copy of the Operations Handbook in 2001, when he first was hired by Petitioner. Mr. DiPaolo, and all bus attendants, receive initial training as bus attendants, including a review of Petitioner's Operations Handbook. Mr. DiPaolo also received in-service trainings thereafter in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007. In-service training included any updates to the Operations Handbook. Ms. Smith recommended discipline for Messrs. O'Brien and DiPaolo. She recommended a five-day suspension for Mr. O'Brien and a three-day suspension for Mr. DiPaolo. Petitioner scheduled a pre-disciplinary meeting concerning the incident for October 17, 2007. The meeting was postponed because Messrs. O'Brien and DiPaolo had obtained legal counsel. The meeting was eventually rescheduled for November 2007. Messrs. O'Brien and DiPaolo attended that meeting with their respective legal counsel, and it resulted in the November 7, 2007, charges addressed below and in the Conclusions of Law. In accord with Ms. Smith's recommendation, Petitioner's Superintendent issued a letter dated November 7, 2007, to Mr. O'Brien, reprimanding him and issuing a five-day suspension without pay for leaving the driver's compartment; leaving the bus running while attending to A.R.; orally threatening to spank a student while attempting to put her into her seat; swatting the student on her posterior; and failing to immediately report to the Transportation Department the incident as a student safety issue. Mr. O'Brien was cited in the letter for violations of Petitioner's policies, namely Policy 6.37, Group III, Section (10)- On or off the job conduct which adversely affects the ability of the employee to perform his duties and/or the duties of other employees and/or adversely affects the efficient operation of the school system or any department, division, or area of the School Board; Policy 6.301, Ethics: Section (3) (a) failure to make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental and/or physical health and/or safety; and (3) (e) not intentionally expose a student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement; and provisions in Petitioner's 2007 Staff Handbook prohibiting touching students except to protect their health, safety and/or welfare. Policy 6.38 was cited as a disciplinary guideline. In accord with Ms. Smith's recommendation, the Superintendent issued a letter dated November 7, 2007, to Mr. DiPaolo, reprimanding him and issuing a three-day suspension without pay, for failing to place a student assigned specifically to him for supervision and assistance in her seat; walking to the back of the bus while the bus driver had to secure the student in her seat; and failing to immediately report the incident to the Transportation Department as a student safety issue. Mr. DiPaolo was cited in the letter for violations of Petitioner's policies, namely Policy 6.37, Group II, Section (13), Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duties; Policy 6.37, Group III, Section (4), Interfering with the work of other employees or refusal to perform assigned work; and Policy 6.301: Ethics, Section (3) (a) failure to make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental and/or physical health and/or safety. Again, Policy 6.38 was cited as a disciplinary guideline. The School Board's Operations Handbook, at page 37, states, in pertinent part: Bus Aides 5. Drivers are to remain in the driver's compartment. The School Board's Operations Handbook, at page 59-Y, states, in pertinent part: Responsibilities of a School Bus Aide To load and unload students and assist driver as needed. * * * 3. To ensure that all students are secured and when appropriate, secure restraining devices, i.e. seat belts, safety vest, infant seats, and toddler seats. * * * 6. To recognize individual student capabilities and exceptionalities while maintaining order on the bus and administer to their individual needs as required. At page 59-D, the Operations Handbook provides, in pertinent part: Operating Procedure No. 27, Responsibilities of the School Bus Driver Related to Board of Education Rules 6A-3 25. To report immediately to the director or supervisor of transportation, school principal or other designated officials: a. Misconduct on the part of any student while on bus or under the driver's immediate supervision, The Department of Education Bureau of Professional Practices Services' handout, provided during training of bus drivers, provides, in pertinent part: INTERACTION WITH STUDENTS: Keep hands and other parts of your body to yourself. TIPS FOR STAFF WITH AGGRESSIVE STUDENTS: DON'TS: Do not physically handle the student. Do not react aggressively in return. * * * 5. Do not create punitive consequences to "get even" with the student. Department of Education Recommendation: Discipline The bus driver has no authority to slap, spank or abuse any child. By School Board policy, Petitioner has made the standards for educators applicable to even its non-educational personnel, such as bus attendants and bus drivers. Policy 6.301 concerns employee ethics and provides in pertinent part: (2) All employees shall familiarize themselves with the 'Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida,' located in the State Board of Education Rules. All employees shall abide by the Code at all times and shall be held to the standards of the Code in all matters related to their employment with the Hernando County School Board. Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006, which is provided to Petitioner's employees with their copy of Petitioner's Policy 6.301, provides in pertinent part: Obligation to the student requires that the individual: Shall make reasonable effort to protect the student from conditions harmful to learning and/or to the student's mental and/or physical health and/or safety. * * * e. Shall not intentionally expose a student to unnecessary embarrassment or disparagement. Petitioner's Policy 6.301 (3), reads: The School Board of Hernando County supports strong internal control in its procedures and practices. All incidents of suspected improprieties should be reported using the Board approved Compliant [sic] Policy. Petitioner's 2007-2008 Staff Handbook provides, in pertinent part: TOUCHING STUDENTS Employees are advised that they should not touch students in any way except for the protection of the health, safety, and/or welfare of a student or for protection of themselves. School Board Policy 6.37 -- Group (II) provides, in pertinent part: GROUP II OFFENSES (13) Incompetency or inefficiency in the performance of duties. School Board Policy 6.37 - Group (III) provides, in pertinent part: GROUP III OFFENSES (4) Interfering with the work of other employees or refusal to perform assigned work. (10) On or off the job conduct which adversely affects the ability of the employee to perform his duties and/or the duties of other employees and/or adversely affects the efficient operation of the school system or any department, division, or area of the School Board. The parties stipulated that this case does not present a situation of progressive discipline, and accordingly, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to quote or discuss the levels of discipline permissible under Groups II and III of Policy 6.37 or Policy 6.38. It further appears that combinations of the penalties of written reprimand and suspension, with or without pay, are authorized, and each offense is looked at on a case-by-case basis. Also, it appears that all penalties listed in any School Board Policy are recommended, but not mandatory, to apply to specific offenses and that the penalty utilized is to be discretionary with management, per Policies 6.37, and 6.38. Policy 6.38, authorizes the Superintendent to suspend employees without pay for up to 10 days as a disciplinary measure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner: Enter a Final Order sustaining Respondent O'Brien's reprimand and suspension without pay for five days; and Enter a Final Order sustaining Respondent DiPaolo's reprimand and suspension without pay for three days. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Paul Carland, II, Esquire Hernando County School Board 919 North Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34601 Mary F. Aspros, Esquire Meyer and Brooks, P.A. 2544 Blairstone Pines Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Herdman, Esquire Herdman & Sakellarides, P.A. 29605 U.S. Hwy. 19 North, Ste. 110 Clearwater, FL 33761 Dr. Wayne Alexander, Superintendent Hernando County School Board 919 North Broad Street Brooksville, Florida 34601
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner was reemployed as a substitute or hourly teacher on a noncontractual basis after he was retired for one month.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the Board for several years as a driver's education teacher prior to his retirement. This position is a certificated teaching position under the rules of the State Department of Education. The operation of school buses in Duval County was and is done primarily by private companies, who are independent contractors and who, in turn, hire the bus drivers. Several years ago, the State of Florida required by law that all school bus drivers be certified as school bus drivers at the time of their initial employment. The Superintendent of Schools of Duval County instituted a program to certify its school bus drivers using Board personnel. Certificated driver's education teachers were asked to become qualified with the State to evaluate and test school bus drivers to insure that the drivers were in compliance with State law. Rule 6A-3.0141, et seq., Florida Administrative Code. All of the bus driver evaluators were driver's education instructors. Petitioner was one of the driver's education teachers who qualified and was employed to evaluate and test school bus drivers. The job of the Petitioner and other evaluators was to educate and test the drivers about the bus safety rules, to include "check" rides with drivers before certifying them. The school bus driver certification program is operated by the Board on a full-time basis, 5 days a week, 8 hours a day. There is a written job description for the position of driver's education teacher which was not changed or amended to reflect the additional duties of bus driver evaluation. Prior to retiring, Petitioner worked as a driver's education teacher on a full-time basis (7 hours, 20 minutes per day) and performed the duties as evaluator and tester of the drivers after school and on Saturdays. He was paid a salary for his teaching duties and an additional amount for his services as bus driver evaluator. Although Petitioner received one compensation check, the payroll stub indicated regular and overtime pay. His additional compensation was calculated on the basis of hours actually worked and from the salary schedule for part-time teachers. Funding for regular work and overtime was charged to the same cost account, "1850", and all his pay was based upon his duties as a certified teacher in pay classification "0610." The payroll code for a driver's education teacher is "0610". The Board did not have a pay code for a bus driver evaluator. Evaluating bus drivers is an additional duty performed by driver's education teachers. Pay classification code "0610" is applicable to all driver's education teachers; and the Petitioner, as well as all of the driver's education teachers, was compensated from the instructional salary account of the Board. Although all bus driver evaluators were driver's education teachers, not all driver's education teachers were bus driver evaluators. Additional duty as a bus driver evaluator was voluntary, and driver's education teachers were paid additional compensation for performing these duties. Their entire pay, including the additional compensation, was charged to Responsibility Center No. 1850 - Driver's Education. Cost center code "1850" is a cost code associated with academic programs. Petitioner was rehired as a teacher after retirement and placed in pay category "0610". This was done because the only persons performing bus driver evaluations in Duval County are driver's education teachers, and no other classification or pay code is applicable. Petitioner was placed in salary code "0610", driver's education teacher. Messrs. Richard and Boney were Petitioner's supervisors and they did the administrative portion of certifying the drivers. Richard and Boney are "administrators" with the Board and not certificated or instructional personnel. A person is classified as a teacher on the basis of (a) the union collective bargaining agreement and (b) the rules of the Public Employees' Relation Commission. It is up to the supervisor to assign the person's duties. Those duties would determine the salary code from which the person would be paid. Petitioner retired under the FRS, effective July 1, 1989, and was placed on the FRS payroll on that date. In July of 1989, he completed a Board form by which he made himself available for reemployment. Petitioner was rehired in August as a driver's education teacher, pay classification "0610", cost center "1850". His supervisor assigned him duties as a bus driver evaluator and tester beginning on August 21, 1990. Petitioner worked part of the months of August, September and October of 1989 and was paid at the rate of $15.85 per hour, the same rate and from the same account as other hourly teachers, "1850". (Exhibit No. 6). While so employed, he could have taught the classroom phase of the evaluation program or could have been assigned to teach driver's education; however, Petitioner only did the road test and evaluation of bus drivers. Petitioner had the same duties relative to the bus drivers' evaluations and testing both before and after retirement. After retirement, the Petitioner had the same pay code and cost center he had had before his retirement. Although his assigned duties after retirement did not include driver's education, Petitioner did some of the same work that he had done before his retirement and was subject to being assigned student teaching duties. Inadvertently, the Board deducted retirement contributions from Petitioner's pay and reported the contributions to the Division of Retirement. (Exhibit No. 5). This precipitated an audit of the account; and the Division of Retirement concluded, based upon the data, that Petitioner was not employed as a teacher by the local school district.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that Division of Retirement take no action to collect the benefits paid to the retiree during the period of his reemployment by the Duval County School Board between August, September, and October 1989. DONE AND ENTERED this 28 day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-2424 The Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-8. Adopted. First portion adopted; last two sentences rejected as irrelevant. Adopted. First portion adopted; last sentence rejected as irrelevant. Adopted. Adopted, except first sentence, which was rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted, except last two sentences, which were rejected as statement of issues. Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Albert A. Moss, Pro Se 111 Inwood Terrace Jacksonville, FL 32207 Stanley M. Danek, Esq. Department of Administration Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
The Issue The issue is whether First Transit, Inc. (“Escambia County Area Transit” or “ECAT”)1/ committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner (“Addie L. McMillan”) by subjecting her to disparate treatment and/or by retaliating against her.
Findings Of Fact Ms. McMillan is a 55-year-old, African-American female who had worked at ECAT for 22 years. She began as a part-time beach trolley operator and progressed to becoming a full-time bus driver. The Union and ECAT had a labor agreement in place between October 23, 2013, and September 30, 2016 (“the labor agreement”). Article 52 of the labor agreement had a policy regarding the use of cell phones by ECAT employees and provided as follows: While on duty the use of cellular phone or any other personal communication device is limited as follows: SECTION 1: The use by an employee of a cellular phone or any other personal communication device while behind the wheel of a transit vehicle, or any other Company motor vehicle is prohibited while the vehicle is not secured. Push to talk communication devices issued by the Company may be used for work related purposes only where authorized by the Company and permitted by law, but must be used in a manner, which would not create an unsafe situation. Note – Secured definition: Vehicle must be in neutral/park position and emergency brake on. SECTION 2: If it becomes necessary to use a cellular phone, employees must be at the end of the line/trip (on layover, if applicable) or in a safe location with the bus secure. At no time is it permissible to use a cellular phone if the use will cause the trip to be late at its next scheduled time point. SECTION 3: The use of a cellular phone or other communication device by an employee while on the shop floor or during work time (unless previously approved) is prohibited, other than a Push to Talk communication device issued by the Company for work related purposes, and only where authorized by the Company and permitted by law. Federal and State law supersede the above policy. SECTION 4: Disciplinary Action: Failure to comply with any portion of this policy may result in disciplinary action as follows: Violation of Section 2 or Section 3 of this Article: 1st offense: 3-day suspension 2nd offense: Termination Violation of Section 1 of this Article: 1st offense: Termination On June 19, 2012, Ms. McMillan signed a document entitled “Escambia County Area Transit Cellular Phone Policy” which provided that: While on duty the use of a cellular phone or any other personal communication device is limited as follows: Employees on Company Business: The use by an employee of a cellular phone or any other personal communication device while behind the wheel of a transit vehicle, or any other company motor vehicle is prohibited. Push- to-talk communication devices issued by the Company may be used for work-related purposes only where authorized by the Company and permitted by law, but must be used in a manner, which would not create an unsafe situation. If it becomes necessary to use a cellular phone, employees must be at the end of the line/trip (on layover, if applicable), request a 10-7, and exit the driver’s seat prior to using the cellular phone. At no time is it permissible to use a cellular phone if the use will cause the trip to be late at its next scheduled time point. The use of a cellular phone or other communications device by an employee while on the shop floor is prohibited, other than a Push-to-Talk communications device issued by the Company for work-related purposes, and only where authorized by the Company and permitted by law. Federal and State law supersede the above policy. On the morning of July 29, 2015, Ms. McMillan was driving a route that went through the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, Florida. At that time, the navy base had been on alert status for approximately one month. As a result, every vehicle entering the navy base had to be searched, and that caused Ms. McMillan’s bus to run behind schedule. At approximately 10:30 that morning, Ms. McMillan needed to use a bathroom and called a dispatcher via a radio provided by ECAT. The dispatcher contacted by Ms. McMillan was not receptive to her request for a bathroom break and cut off communications. Because Ms. McMillan was unsuccessful in re- establishing contact with the dispatcher over the radio, she used her personal cell phone to call a coworker, Elaine Wiggins. Ms. McMillan was hoping that Ms. Wiggins could assist her with contacting an ECAT general manager. At this point in time, the bus driven by Ms. McMillan was in traffic and moving. In other words, it was not “secured” by being in the neutral/park position with the emergency brake on. Diane Hall was an assistant general manager for ECAT during the time period at issue, and Ms. Hall talked to Ms. McMillan via Ms. Wiggins’ cell phone. Ms. Hall stated to Ms. McMillan that the route she was driving had a pre-arranged break point at a bowling alley and that Ms. McMillan could use a bathroom there. It is possible that Ms. McMillan would not have suffered any consequences for her violation of the cell phone policy but for a customer complaint provided to ECAT on July 28, 2015. Roberta Millender has been a customer service representative at ECAT for the last four years. On July 28, 2015, at 12:25 p.m., Ms. Millender received a phone call from a customer who reported that the bus driver for Route 57 left the bus at approximately 11:00 a.m. in order to smoke a cigarette, even though the bus was 25 minutes behind schedule. Ms. McMillan also drives that route. ECAT’s buses are equipped with video cameras. Therefore, ECAT reviewed the videotape from the Route 57 bus in order to investigate the complaint. Because the videotapes are on a continuous loop, ECAT had to pull video corresponding to days before and after July 28, 2015. While looking for the incident on July 28, 2015, that led to the customer complaint, an ECAT employee noticed that Ms. McMillan was using her cell phone on July 29, 2015. There is no dispute that Ms. McMillan is not the bus driver who took the cigarette break on July 28, 2015.3/ On July 30, 2015, ECAT began an investigation of Ms. McMillan’s cell phone use. ECAT notified Ms. McMillan that she would continue to work during the investigation. Via a letter dated August 3, 2015, Mike Crittenden, ECAT’s General Manager, notified Ms. McMillan that she was being terminated for violating Article 52 of the labor agreement. Mr. Crittenden’s letter deemed Ms. McMillan’s cell phone use to be a violation of section 1 which prohibited cell phone use while a transit vehicle is not secured. In addition, Mr. Crittenden’s letter noted that the termination was effective immediately. During the final hearing in this matter, Ms. McMillan was unable to present any evidence that any other similarly- situated bus drivers had not been terminated for using a cell phone while the buses they were driving were unsecured. Mr. Crittenden testified that 4 drivers have been terminated for violating section 1 of Article 52 since the labor agreement has been in place. Three of those drivers were African-American (two females and one male), and one was a Caucasian female. Mr. Crittenden was unaware of any driver being retained by ECAT after violating the cell phone policy.4/ In addition to Mr. Crittenden, Ms. McMillan called three other ECAT employees, none of whom were aware of any bus driver being retained after violating the cell phone policy. The greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that Ms. McMillan was not discharged because of her race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Addie L. McMillan’s Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 31th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31th day of May, 2017.
The Issue The issue addressed in this proceeding is whether Respondents committed any acts which would subject them to termination of employment or disciplinary action.
Findings Of Fact Bettye Gates has been employed by the Bay County School Board since 1983. Ms. Gates was employed as a bus driver from 1983 through 1984. In 1985, Ms. Gates was promoted to District Route Specialist and worked in the Transportation Department's office. In that capacity, She supervised the bus drivers. However, she did not have any responsibility for travel vouchers and their reimbursement. In 1987, because Ms. Gates did not like her new job, she elected to transfer back to being a bus driver. Ms. Gates has maintained her position as a bus driver through the present time. Since 1983, Ms. Gates has had only two or three overnight field trips in her capacity as a bus driver. None of these trips were similar enough to the overnight field trip in this case to permit any inferences as to Ms. Gates' knowledge or intent in regards to her alleged attempts to improperly seek reimbursement for travel expenses she did not incur. Shelby Finch has been employed by the Bay County School Board since 1987. She was employed as a bus driver. Ms. Finch has maintained that position through the present time. She had not participated in any overnight field trips prior to the overnight field trip involved in this case. She, therefore, had no experience regarding reimbursement procedures for such trips. /1 Ms. Gates' employment extended back to a time period during which Malcolm Murphy was the Supervisor of Transportation and supervised the bus drivers. During that time period, several bus drivers slept in their buses on overnight field trips. Mr. Murphy did not like bus drivers sleeping on their buses and instituted a policy that bus drivers had to stay in motel rooms or with friends when on overnight trips. In order to insure compliance with his policy, Mr. Murphy required that bus drivers bring back a receipt or some type of evidence that they had in fact stayed in a motel room and the time period during which they had stayed. This new policy and its requirements were communicated to all the bus drivers in a meeting held in early 1980. Since the time of Mr. Murphy's policy, other administrators have come and gone in the Bay County School System. The current supervisor is Leonard Conway. Mr. Conway never instituted a policy similar to Mr. Murphy's. He was never even aware of such a policy. More importantly, however, for purposes of examining the intent of Respondents, Mr. Murphy's policy was never rescinded during any of the later administrations, including Mr. Conway's administration. As far as the bus drivers were concerned and these particular Respondents were concerned, Mr. Murphy's policy was still in full force and effect. The Bay County School Board maintains a system of employee reimbursement for expenses incurred by an employee on behalf of the school system. There are two types of reimbursement plans which can be requested. The two plans are known as per diem reimbursement and expenses reimbursements. Per diem reimbursement reimburses the employee at a flat per day rate. The rate varies according to the amount of time the employee is away from his or her base of employment. Expenses reimbursement reimburses the employee for the actual expenses incurred while away from his or her base of employment. Per diem reimbursement does not require receipts to be submitted to obtain the reimbursement. 2 Expenses reimbursement does generally require receipts to be submitted for reimbursement. The reimbursement plan which nets the employee the most money is the one which the School Board follows for payment of the employee. In order to claim reimbursement for travel expenses, each bus driver, prior to going on an out of town field trip, fills out a Temporary Duty Assignment (TDY) form. Each driver fills out only a portion of the TDY form. The portion the driver completes includes a decision as to whether the driver intends to claim reimbursement for actual expenses or per diem expenses. When the driver returns from the out of town trip, the driver fills out a travel reimbursement voucher. Again the driver only fills out a portion of the reimbursement voucher. In essence, the driver fills in the dates, times and destination of travel and signs the form essentially in blank. These forms are physically located in the hallway outside the Transportation office. The directions for filling out these forms are also located in this hallway. However, because there is a general belief in the Transpotation Department's office that the bus drivers are incapable of understanding the expense forms or the travel policies, the Transportation Department has essentially remove the bus drivers from direct responsibility for properly filling out these travel forms and has placed that responsibility in an overworked confidential secretary named Amber Bullard. If the driver brings in receipts then Ms. Bullard will determine the best method of reimbursement for the bus driver, regardless of whether the bus driver has indicated a method of reimbursement on the TDY form. In fact, if the driver has indicated a certain method of reimbursement on the TDY form and Ms. Bullard determines that the driver would receive more money under the other method of reimbursement she will change the drivers TDY form to request the method she believes is more appropriate and submit the altered paperwork to the finance office for payment to the driver. Ms. Bullard makes the decision to alter the driver's forms without consultation with the driver. On April 25, 1990, Ms. Finch and Ms. Gates drove two buses to Orlando, Florida for a Latin Club field trip. The trip lasted from April 25, to April 28, 1990. Prior to leaving on the field trip, Ms. Finch and Ms. Gates filled out Temporary Duty Assignment forms requesting reimbursement for overnight expenses. The portion of the form they filled out gave the date and time that they would be gone, the number of nights they expected to be out and the type of reimbursement they were requesting. Both Respondents requested per diem reimbursement. They did not request reimbursement for actual expenses. Also, prior to the field trip, another driver warned Ms. Finch to be careful because the administration would be watching Ms. Gates. Ms. Finch informed Ms. Gates about the warning and Ms. Gates told Ms. Finch that she had felt the administration had been watching her closely ever since she returned to being a bus driver after being Route Supervisor. The two women determined to be sure that all of their paperwork was accurate regarding the field trip, including compliance with Mr. Murphy's policy. While in Orlando, Ms. Hazard, the teacher in charge of the field trip, allowed the bus drivers to lodge in the teachers rooms during the field trip. Ms. Gates stayed with Ms. Hazard and Ms. Finch stayed with Ms. Marks. Ms. Gates attempted to get a receipt from the hotel in order to comply with Mr. Murphy's rule. The hotel changed the name on the room from Ms. Hazard to Ms. Gates. The evidence did not disclose whether Ms. Gates requested the name change or whether the hotel took it upon itself to change the name given Ms. Gates' request for a receipt. Ms. Hazard discovered the name change and had the hotel change the name back. Ms. Hazard informed Ms. Gates of her action. Ms. Gates then told Ms. Hazard about Mr. Murphy's policy and requested that Ms. Hazard obtain a receipt for her. Ms. Hazard asked the hotel desk clerk to prepare a statement showing that Ms. Gates had stayed in the room. The hotel prepared a receipt with Ms. Gates' name on it but with no room charges on it. The second receipt only reflected one nights stay. Although Ms. Hazard had no authority to determine the sufficiency of the second receipt, Ms. Hazard believed this document to be sufficient and delivered it to Ms. Gates. Ms. Gates believed she needed a document which showed she had stayed in the room for the three nights she was in Orlando and resolved to obtain the type of receipt she believed she needed herself. The same evening, Ms. Gates again approached the hotel's desk clerk and discovered that a receipt for all three nights could not be generated by the hotel until the final bills were posted. She was told she could pick up such a receipt the next morning when all the receipts would be placed on a table for pickup. At the conclusion of the field trip, Ms. Gates picked up the both her receipt and Ms. Finch's receipt from the table set up by the hotel. They were in envelopes and she did not immediately ascertain the information that was on them. Ms. Gates took Ms. Finch's envelope and delivered it to her at her bus. Ms. Finch never reviewed the receipt for accuracy but accepted it from Ms. Gates believing it was what she needed to comply with Mr. Murphy's policy. The receipts reflected the Respondents' names, the hotel rooms in which they stayed and the number of nights they had stayed in the hotel rooms. The receipt also reflected the charges for the room in which the Respondents stayed. The evidence was clear that Ms. Finch did not have any input into obtaining the receipts nor into the information that was placed on the receipts. Again the evidence did not disclose whether Ms. Gates told the hotel to prepare room receipts with room charges on them or whether the hotel placed such information on the receipts through its own volition. Without such crucial evidence it is impossible to determine whether Respondents had a fraudulent intent in obtaining these receipts. Certainly, no such intent was demonstrated in regards to Ms. Finch since she never attempted to obtain any of these receipts from the hotel but left it up to the more senior Ms. Gates to obtain the proper documentation for her. Upon their return, the Respondents filled out a reimbursement voucher. Each of them filled out the left side of the form indicating the dates of travel, places of travel and times of travel. They then signed these forms leaving the remainder of the forms blank. Along with these forms both Respondents submitted the receipt for their room along with other miscellaneous receipts. Ms. Bullard decided, without informing the Respondents, that they should be reimbursed under the expenses reimbursement method. She marked out both Respondents requests for reimbursement under the per diem method and substituted her judgment that they be reimbursed under the expenses method. Ms. Bullard took this course of action because she assumed that because Respondents had turned in their hotel receipts, they were requesting reimbursement for the same. The evidence regarding the precise course of events and the precise conversations held between Ms. Bullard and Respondents is in conflict. This conflict is most likely due to the relative parties point of view and ability to remember portions of these events which were more important to that individual, as well as, that protagonists interpretation of what someone else meant during some conversation. Suffice it to say, that neither version or a combination thereof demonstrates with any probability that Respondents intended to bilk some money out of the School Board. All of the evidence was highly equivocal. Therefore, the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Respondents are guilty of any conduct which would subject them to discipline or termination from employment. The Respondents should be reinstated with backpay.
Recommendation It is accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That the School Board of Bay County enter a Final Order reinstating Respondents with backpay. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1991.
