The Issue Whether Respondent, John H. Woods, d/b/a Woods Construction, conducted operations in the State of Florida without obtaining workers’ compensation coverage which meets the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2008)1, in violation of Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. If so, what penalty should be assessed by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the requirement of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure the payment of workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Workers’ compensation coverage is required if a business entity is engaged in the construction industry in Florida. Securing the payment of workers’ compensation coverage can be achieved via three different methods: purchase a workers’ compensation insurance policy; ensure that workers are paid and workers’ compensation coverage is provided by a third party entity called a Professional Employment Organization (PEO); or apply for a Certificate of Exemption from Workers’ Compensation Coverage (Exemption Certificate) assuming certain statutorily mandated criteria are met. These methods are not mutually exclusive of each other. On August 14, 2008, a workers’ compensation compliance investigator employed by Petitioner, visited a construction site in Lee County, Florida. On the site, she observed several groups of men conducting various construction activities including the laying of a sidewalk along Lexington Street in Fort Myers. The work performed involved construction activities as contemplated under the applicable agency rule. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.021. By a preponderance of evidence, it is determined that among the entities on the worksite was a group of three laborers who worked for Woods Construction. There was no proof of coverage for workers’ compensation for the Woods Construction Company, neither an insurance policy, nor any exemption certificate for the individuals encountered on the worksite. Woods Construction assumed that the three laborers were covered by Able Body Labor, a PEO. The evidence confirmed that two of the three laborers were covered. However, the third laborer, Filberto Castro, was unable to be included on the work roster due to his lack of corresponding documentation necessary for employment in the United States. Therefore, Castro was working without coverage. An SWO was issued and a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Calculation (BRR) was served on J. Woods Construction, Corp. [sic] on August 14, 2008. The SWO was later amended to conform to the correct name of the company, which is not a corporation. The amended SWO was served on John H. Woods on August 22, 2008, via certified mail. Pursuant to the BRR, Respondent provided business records to Petitioner. Petitioner’s Penalty Calculator’s duties are to receive records from the employer, and organize, identify, and audit those records which indicate payroll activities, while delineating other business activities, which may be related to the non-payroll activities of the business such as purchasing supplies, maintaining a place of business, etc. The characterization of the voluminous records received from Respondent were categorized into three distinct categories: reliable, somewhat reliable, and unreliable records. The records were characterized as “reliable” if they were records from an independent third party or the bank with whom Respondent conducted business, and were thus extremely difficult to alter without a high level of expertise. They are considered “source documentation.” The bank records capture the transactions as they occurred, to whom money was paid, and for what amount. The next category of records deemed “somewhat reliable” were those records which, on their face appear to be legitimate records, such as copies of the checks with corresponding amounts and dates to those in the “reliable” category. However, certain inconsistencies in these records demonstrated that they were less than reliable. These records were only used in select instances when there was corresponding source documentation supporting their veracity. A prime example, among many, is check number 1078 for $100.00 indicating a payment for a credit card; the corresponding checkstub indicates that the payment went to “Whitney,” a grand-child of John H. Woods. In toto, the documents illustrated that Respondent failed to follow generally accepted accounting principles by mislabeling or mischaracterizing funds on a regular basis. The third category of records were records which were considered “unreliable” as these records lacked any corresponding source documentation and they could not be considered in assessing the payroll activities of the firm. In the construction industry, there are instruments called “draw requests.” The draw request is an item that a subcontractor or builder will utilize to show partial completion of a project and concurrently request more funds (the draw) to complete the remaining portion of the project. The draw requests are often utilized at pre-measured stages of the project, e.g.: 25 percent completion, 50 percent completion, etc. The draw requests would have attached source documentation such as receipts from suppliers, servicers, and other miscellanea to show that the project is worked upon as opposed to the funds being siphoned off elsewhere. Nowhere, in the box full of records produced, was a proper draw request found with attached receipts. Therefore, none of the records produced could be considered as reliable documents. Many irregularities in Respondent’s methodology of accounting were also noted; as an example, there were numerous times that company checks from Respondent were deposited by an entity known as “Hendry Contracting,” without explanation. Respondent personally held the license as a General Contractor, and would utilize Hendry Contracting as a subcontractor. Hendry Contracting did not have any license whatsoever. It utilized Respondent’s license while performing construction activities. Brad Hendry, the principal of Hendry Contracting, is married to Janice Hendry, the daughter of John H. Woods, the owner of Respondent, Woods Construction. Janice Hendry administered Respondent’s company account and the company account of Hendry Contracting. The evidence is clear that no separation of duties was attempted. Furthermore, Hendry admitted that she did not exercise any sense of separation between the two different accounts (Woods Construction and/or Hendry Contracting). The two businesses were “commingled,” and the ability to retain any form of standard accounting requirement of checks and balances has been nullified. Numerous irregularities that defied “generally accepted accounting principles” appeared, including personal loans to family members, wholesale transfers of monies from Respondent to Hendry Contracting without explanation, and checks drafted to Brad Hendry (personally). Further, Woods testified that he exercised little or no control over his company in the last ten years. Hendry also confirmed the haphazard method of managing the two firms’ different accounts by writing checks from one firm to another, when the other firm’s account was running low. Hendry’s testimony regarding the financial cooperation of Respondent and Hendry Contracting is indicative of the commingling of accounts, as well. Hendry testified that each entity would draw on each other’s accounts depending on the cash levels within each respective account. Hendry also testified that Hendry Contracting was utilized for obtaining bank loans and utilizing Hendry’s name to purchase materials when the other accounts were depleted. By utilizing only the bank records, a general ledger for Respondent was constructed which derived the amounts that came into the business and the amounts paid out for labor. The fact that Respondent had no general ledger meant that some items would never be accounted for, such as building supply costs. Based on that caveat, Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.035(i) was applied to the total payroll derived from the bank records. This had the effect of reducing total payroll by twenty percent to account for building supplies (which were never accounted for due to the non-existent business ledger of Respondent). The amount of money flowing and commingling between the two firms (Respondent and Hendry Contracting) and among family members, numbered in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. The commingled money was utilized for all manners of payments: loans (not expected to be paid back) to family members, inflated wages to family members for de minimis services, or payment for services/goods for family members’ personal residences. A proposed penalty in the amount of $365,876.82 was originally assessed, as reflected in the AOPA, and served on Respondent on August 26, 2008. Based on further records produced and the understanding that Respondent was a construction firm but was unable to show any receipts of building supplies, the proposed penalty, utilizing Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.035(i), decreased the payroll by 20 percent to account for building supplies that were not documented. After consideration of the documents provided and application of the rule, a Second AOPA was prepared showing an assessment in the amount of $306,876.82. With Hendry as the sole financial officer of Respondent, approximately $351,632.43 of payroll was allocated to various family members. There was unambiguous testimony from Woods and Hendry that family members were employed in various roles, most notably the grand-daughters who were earning wages while conducting secretarial duties. A further $472,292.94 was paid to Hendry Contracting during the three-year audit time- period. Hendry Contracting never had any discernible workers’ compensation coverage for this amount of payroll, rendering Respondent liable for failure to secure workers’ compensation coverage for the monies paid. The remainder of the unsecured payroll assessed to Respondent was for various non-family workers for whom no proof of workers’ compensation coverage could be ascertained. The Second AOPA was computed by calculating Respondent’s payroll for the past three years using the business records Respondent provided. The payroll was then divided for each year by 100 and that figure was multiplied by an approved manual rate assigned to the classification codes (class codes) found in the National Council on Compensation Insurance’s Scope of Trade Manual (Scopes Manual). Class codes were assigned to the individuals listed on the penalty worksheet according to their historical duties. The grand-daughters and other female employees of Respondent were listed as clerical employees (classification code 8810), while the remaining names were listed as general carpentry workers (classification code 5645). Next, the product of the approved manual rate and the payroll for each year divided by 100 was then multiplied by 1.5, pursuant to statute, to derive the penalty for each year or part of a year. The penalties for each employee and year or part of a year were then added together to come up with a total penalty of $306,213.78. Based on the assessment of the financial records in conjunction with the documents admitted into evidence, the grand total of $306,213.78 is a true and correct penalty amount for Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order: Finding that Respondent failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees in violation of Subsections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes; and Assessing a penalty against Respondent in the amount of $306,213.78, which is equal to 1.5 times the evaded premium based on the payroll records provided by Respondent and on the applicable approved manual rates and classification codes for the period extending from August 15, 2005, through August 14, 2008, as provided in Subsection 440.107(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2009.
The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent, Wilby’s Home Repairs, LLC, failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation coverage for its employees, and if so, what penalty is owed.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, is the state agency charged with the enforcement of the requirement in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees as required by section 440.107(3). At all times relevant to this case, Respondent was a company engaged in the construction industry. Its principal office was located at 2641 University Boulevard North, H115, Jacksonville, Florida 32211. On or about October 2, 2014, Ann Johnson, a compliance investigator for the Division, observed two people doing patch/repair work using a ladder on the outside of a home at 2322 Myra Street in Jacksonville, Florida. She approached and spoke to both men, who identified themselves as Michael Wilbur and Robert Nelson and stated that they worked for Wilby’s Home Repairs. When Ms. Johnson asked for proof of workers’ compensation coverage, Mr. Wilbur could not provide it but thought both gentlemen had exemptions. Mr. Wilbur thought that his accountant who had prepared the paperwork for filing with the Division of Corporations for his company had also completed the applications for exemptions for workers’ compensation coverage. However, no applications for exemptions had been filed. Investigator Johnson consulted the Division of Corporations website to determine the identity of Respondent’s corporate officers and found that Mr. Wilbur and Mr. Nelson were the listed officers. She then consulted the Division’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”) for proof of workers’ compensation coverage and for any exemptions associated with Respondent. Investigator Johnson’s research revealed that Respondent did not have a workers’ compensation policy or an employee-leasing policy, and further, there were no exemptions for its corporate officers on file. Based on this information, Investigator Johnson consulted with her supervisor, who provided authorization for the issuance of a Stop-Work Order. She then issued a Stop-Work Order and personally served it on Mr. Wilbur on October 2, 2014. At the same time, she issued and served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation (BRR). The requested documents were for the purpose of determining Respondent’s payroll from May 16, 2014 (the date the company was formed according to the Division of Corporations website) to October 2, 2014 (the date of the random inspection). They consisted of payroll documents, such as time sheets or cards, attendance records, check stubs, and payroll summaries; account documents, such as check journals and statements; disbursements records; workers’ compensation coverage documents, such as copies of policies, declaration pages, and certificates of workers’ compensation; documents related to any exemptions held; documents reflecting the identity of each subcontractor and the relationship thereto, including any and all payments to subcontractors; and documentation of subcontractors’ workers’ compensation coverage. On October 3, 2014, Mr. Wilbur came into the Division office in Jacksonville and filled out the applications for exemptions, and those were processed. Mr. Wilbur submitted a cashier’s check for $1,000 and Respondent was released from the Stop-Work Order. He also brought in some records in response to the BRR. Those records consisted of letters, notations, and copies of checks made out to Robert Nelson or Mike Wilbur from Grant-Dooley Rental. The records were scanned and provided to the penalty auditing team to calculate an appropriate penalty according to the statutory formula. Penalty audit supervisor Anita Proano reviewed the business records provided by Respondent, but could not, from those records, properly identify the amount of gross payroll paid to Respondent’s employees on which workers’ compensation premiums had not been paid. Ms. Proano determined that Respondent had not been in compliance with coverage requirements from May 16, 2014, to October 2, 2014. The business records provided by Respondent were not sufficient for the Department to calculate a penalty for Respondent’s period of noncompliance with the coverage requirements of chapter 440. The auditor assigned to the case then calculated a penalty based upon imputed payroll pursuant to the procedures required by section 440.107(7)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.208. Had the documents submitted by Respondent been adequate, then the Division would have used those documents to calculate Respondent’s payroll. The checks provided by Respondent to the Division consisted of checks made out to Robert Nelson and Michael Wilbur, individually, spanning from approximately May 9, 2014, through October 2014, from Grant- Dooley Rental. Mr. Wilbur testified that the only job Respondent handled during this period was the family home on Myra Street, and he and Mr. Nelson were paid directly by the homeowner rather than having payments made to Wilby’s Home Repair as an entity. Unfortunately, these direct payments are not the type of records contemplated by the Division’s rules regarding appropriate documentation of payroll. On October 17, 2014, the Division issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent, which was served on Respondent on October 20, 2014. The penalty assessed for noncompliance was $21,583.48. The penalty assessment calculation is based upon the classification codes listed in the Scopes® Manual, which have been adopted through the rulemaking process through rules 68L- 6.021 and 69L-6.031. Classification codes are codes assigned to different occupations by the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI), to assist in the calculation of workers’ compensation insurance premiums. Auditor Proano used classification code 5645 (carpentry) for both employees. Code 5645 is the correct code for the type of work observed by Ms. Johnson during her inspection. Using this classification code, Ms. Proano used the corresponding approved manual rates for that classification and the period of non-compliance. The average weekly wage as established by the Department of Economic Opportunity for the relevant period is $827.08. Ms. Proano used that amount and multiplied it by 2 for the number of days of noncompliance. Based on that calculation, she came up with a gross payroll amount of $66,166.40, which she divided by 100. Ms. Proano then multiplied that amount by the manual approved rate ($16.31), times two to reach the amount of penalty to be imposed. All of the penalty calculations are in accordance with the Division’s Penalty Calculation Worksheet. The Department has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent employed Robert Nelson and Michael Wilbur on October 2, 2014, and that Respondent was engaged in the construction business for the period of May 16, 2014, through October 2, 2014, without proper workers’ compensation coverage for that period. The Department also demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the documents submitted by Respondent, which may indeed be all of the documentation Respondent possessed, were not sufficient to establish Respondent’s payroll, thus necessitating imputation of payroll. Finally, the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that the required penalty for the period of noncompliance is $21,583.48.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order finding that Wilby’s Home Repairs, LLC, failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees with respect to Robert Nelson and Michael Wilbur, in violation of section 440.107, Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty of $21,583.48. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Mike Wilbur 5376 Shirley Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by obtaining funds from Orange County in the form of a severance payment while remaining employed as General Counsel for the Orange County Clerk of Courts; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Stephan Carter, served as General Counsel for the Orange County Clerk of Courts (the “Clerk’s Office”) from June 2003 through April 1, 2014. Respondent was a public employee at all times material to this action. Respondent was personally hired by Lydia Gardner, the Orange County Clerk of Courts. In January 2005, Respondent and Ms. Gardner executed an employment contract (the “Employment Agreement”). The Employment Agreement was signed by Respondent and Ms. Gardner, in her capacity as the Clerk of Courts, on January 10, 2005, and January 13, 2005, respectively. The Employment Agreement, paragraph 6, entitled “Termination of Employment,” established that the Clerk would pay Respondent a fee should the Clerk terminate the Employment Agreement prior to its expiration date (the “Severance Payment”). Paragraph 6 specifically provided: The Clerk may declare this agreement terminated at any time. . . . The Clerk shall promptly pay to the General Counsel a sum equal to i) the salary and deferred compensation that is accrued but unpaid as of the date of the termination, plus ii) an amount equal to the pro rata portion of his salary for all accrued but unused leave time, plus, iii) an amount equal to the salary and deferred compensation that the General Counsel would have received during the 180 days immediately following the date such termination takes effect, as if this agreement had not been terminated. At the final hearing, Respondent explained that when he accepted the position of General Counsel (then titled “Legal Counsel”) with the Clerk’s Office in June 2003, he informed Ms. Gardner that he would only agree to work for the Clerk’s Office if he could be protected from losing his position. Therefore, Respondent sought and obtained the Severance Payment provision should he be terminated for any reason other than his voluntary resignation. The Employment Agreement provided that Respondent’s term of employment continued until January 6, 2009. On January 7, 2009, Respondent and Ms. Gardner entered a signed agreement wherein the Employment Agreement was “extended indefinitely.” On February 5, 2013, Respondent and Ms. Gardner signed a second amendment to the Employment Agreement.2/ This “clarification of terms” stated: [A]s to the definition of termination in paragraph 6, for the purposes of the contract, termination by the Clerk includes the ending of the employment relationship for any reason other than General Counsel’s voluntary resignation. The amendment also provided that an $11,000 annual payment into Respondent’s deferred compensation plan contained in the original Employment Agreement be considered compensation under Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(15)(relating to pensions) and not a fringe benefit. In February 2013, Ms. Gardner became gravely ill. Ms. Gardner’s illness caused her to be absent from the Clerk’s Office. In Ms. Gardner’s absence, Colleen Reilly, the Chief Administrative Officer for the Clerk’s Office, assumed Ms. Gardner’s responsibilities. Ms. Reilly was hired in 2009. At that time, Respondent prepared an employment contract for Ms. Reilly modelled on his own Employment Agreement. In April 2013, Ms. Reilly approached Respondent to talk about their future employment with the Clerk’s Office. Ms. Gardner’s health was deteriorating. Respondent and Ms. Reilly discussed the impact of Ms. Gardner’s death on their positions. Ms. Reilly was also concerned whether the new Clerk of Courts would honor their Employment Agreements. Respondent and Ms. Reilly’s conversation led to a discussion regarding how they could protect the Severance Payments under their respective Employment Agreements. Respondent and Ms. Reilly considered several possibilities. One position was that their Employment Agreements would remain in effect upon Ms. Gardner's death, and they could ask the new Clerk of Courts to honor the payout terms. Respondent, however, determined that the Employment Agreements were not clear on whether he and Ms. Reilly were entitled to the Severance Payments following a change of administration. Therefore, they became concerned whether the new Clerk of Courts would be legally bound to honor the Severance Payments should he or she decide not to retain their services. Respondent, without seeking legal guidance or consulting with outside counsel for the Clerk’s Office, concluded that the Employment Agreements would terminate upon Ms. Gardner’s death. At the final hearing, Respondent explained that he considered his employment to be tied specifically to Ms. Gardner and not the Clerk's Office. Therefore, Respondent reasoned that because both he and Ms. Reilly were hired by and worked directly for Ms. Gardner, her death would terminate their contracts. This termination, of course, would also entitle Respondent (and Ms. Reilly) to the Severance Payment because his employment would have ended for a reason other than his voluntary resignation. Respondent and Ms. Reilly also discussed their plans once their Employment Agreements were terminated. Respondent informed Ms. Reilly that he believed that after the Employment Agreement was terminated, they could continue to work for the Clerk’s Office as “at-will” employees without employment contracts. Respondent encouraged Ms. Reilly to take her Severance Payment then stay in her position with the Clerk’s Office. He intended to do the same. Late in April 2013, Ms. Reilly informed Respondent that she was planning to visit Ms. Gardner, who was on convalescent leave at her home, to ask her to formally terminate the Employment Agreements and make them at-will employees of the Clerk’s Office. Respondent encouraged Ms. Reilly’s endeavor. Respondent then drafted two versions of a memorandum Ms. Gardner could sign to effectuate the termination of their contracts. Ms. Gardner, however, did not agree to terminate the Employment Agreements or sign the paperwork Respondent had prepared. Consequently, the Employment Agreements remained in effect. When Ms. Reilly was not able to obtain Ms. Gardner’s consent to terminate the Employment Agreements, Respondent began to consider Ms. Reilly’s authority to terminate his Employment Agreement. Respondent determined that Ms. Reilly could terminate his contract under section 28.09, Florida Statutes, and they could still receive the Severance Payments. Section 28.09 describes the appointment of a clerk ad interim in the case of a vacancy occurring in the office of a clerk by death. Section 28.09 states that the clerk ad interim “shall assume all the responsibilities [and] perform all the duties” of the clerk. Therefore, because Ms. Reilly would assume all the powers of Ms. Gardner, she would be authorized the terminate his Employment Agreement. Ms. Gardner passed away on May 8, 2013. On May 9, 2013, Ms. Reilly was officially appointed as Clerk Ad Interim for the Clerk’s Office. Also on May 9, 2013, Respondent and Ms. Reilly immediately took steps to obtain their respective Severance Payments. To effectuate their plan, Ms. Reilly promptly terminated both their Employment Agreements using her newfound authority as the interim Clerk. Respondent hoped that this step would remove any questions of their entitlement to the Severance Payment that might be raised by the new Clerk of Courts. Respondent then went directly to the Clerk’s Payroll office. There, he approached Tracy Gasinski, the payroll administrator for the Clerk’s Office. Respondent informed her that Ms. Reilly had approved him to receive a payout. Respondent declared that his payout was authorized because his Employment Agreement was terminated. Respondent also instructed Ms. Gasinski to pay Ms. Reilly’s payout under her Employment Agreement. Respondent stressed that he wanted both payouts processed immediately. Finally, Respondent advised Ms. Gasinski that nobody needed to know about the payout. Ms. Gasinski felt pressured by Respondent. However, based on his representation that Ms. Reilly had approved the payout, she immediately processed a final paycheck for Respondent (and Ms. Reilly), which included the Severance Payment provided in his Employment Agreement. Ms. Gasinski calculated a payout for Respondent in the gross amount of $110,290.61. This figure included a Severance Payment of $76,844.00. In addition, per his request, Respondent was also paid $27,822.10 for all his unused vacation leave (405.57 hours times a rate of $68.60), as well as $5,624.51 for his unused sick leave (327.96 hours times a rate of $17.15). Ms. Gasinski paid 25 percent of Respondent’s sick leave per Clerk’s Office policy. The next day, on May 10, 2013, Ms. Gasinski issued Respondent a check in the amount of $58,400.00 which was deposited directly into Respondent's personal bank account. Ms. Gasinski also deposited a final paycheck into Ms. Reilly's bank account. On or about May 20, 2013, however, Respondent returned to see Ms. Gasinski. He was not happy with his payout. Respondent told Ms. Gasinski that the amount she deposited was incorrect, and he was due more money. Respondent demanded several adjustments which would maximize his Severance Payment. First, referencing the February 5, 2013, amendment to his Employment Agreement, Respondent wanted the $11,000 he received as deferred compensation to be incorporated into his base salary thereby increasing his rate of pay. Second, Ms. Gasinski, in calculating Respondent’s Severance Payment, computed the final payout based on six month’s salary in accordance with the standard practice of the Clerk's Office. Respondent, however, insisted that his Severance Payment be calculated based on “180 days” as specifically stated in his Employment Agreement at paragraph 6. This mathematical adjustment increased Respondent's payout by including payment for all Saturdays and Sundays.3/ Third, Respondent demanded that he receive 100 percent payout for his remaining sick leave instead of just 25 percent as was the Clerk’s Office policy. Fourth, Respondent requested that 56 hours (7 days) be reserved in his vacation leave account and not paid out.4/ Following their meeting, Ms. Gasinski voided the initial payout check. However, she was not comfortable with Respondent’s request based on her understanding of employment contracts. Respondent's and Ms. Reilly's transactions were out of the ordinary course of business for the Clerk's Office. In her experience, final paychecks to Clerk’s Office employees were always accompanied by paperwork from the Clerk’s Office’s Talent Management division. This paperwork came in the form of an Employee Change Notice (“ECN”). However, Respondent did not produce, nor had Ms. Gasinski received, an ECN supporting Respondent’s payout. In Clerk’s Office accounting practices, Talent Management and the Payroll office act as a check and balance for each other. Typically, Talent Management initiates the paperwork, and then Payroll issues the checks. The normal process for a payout when a Clerk's Office employee leaves employment is for Talent Management to notify Ms. Gasinski who then processes the final payout. Respondent did not have the authority to direct Ms. Gasinski to issue the checks. Similarly, Ms. Gasinski did not have the authority to write checks to either Respondent or Ms. Reilly. Furthermore, a final payout upon termination is always via a paper check. Direct deposit to a personal bank account is never an option. The terminated employee picks up the paper check from Talent Management who verifies that the employee's garage pass and badge have been returned. Because of her discomfort with issuing Respondent’s payout check, Ms. Gasinski sought advice from her supervisor, Mike Murphy, the Chief Financial Officer for the Clerk’s Office. Mr. Murphy suggested that Ms. Gasinski contact Talent Management. On May 21, 2013, Ms. Gasinski spoke to Joann Gammichia, the Director of Talent Management, about Respondent’s request for a payout. When Ms. Gammichia learned of the situation, she had immediate concerns. First, Ms. Gammichia wondered why Payroll was issuing a check without any documentation from Talent Management such as an ECN. Ms. Gammichia testified that each employment activity requires completion of an ECN which acts as a recordkeeping system for the Clerk's Office. Because Respondent approached Ms. Gasinski in the Payroll office directly, no ECN or other written record was generated explaining why the Clerk’s Office was issuing the payout to Respondent. Ms. Gammichia explained that the policy of the Clerk’s Office is that payouts, severance checks, termination, or any kind of position change should only occur with an ECN in order to maintain and track the complete history of an employee's tenure with the Clerk's office. Ms. Gammichia also wondered why Respondent went directly to Ms. Gasinski with his demands. The normal starting point for employee changes begins with Talent Management, and the end of the line is financial services and Payroll. The fact that Respondent was attempting to verbally change his employment status in the Payroll office was “highly irregular.” Ms. Gammichia was also puzzled why the Clerk’s Office was issuing a severance payout on an employment contract when the employment was not ending. Consequently, Ms. Gammichia told Ms. Gasinski not to issue the adjusted payout check. Ms. Gasinski then notified Respondent via e-mail dated May 21, 2013, that she could not process the final payout until she received the proper documentation from Ms. Gammichia in Talent Management. Shortly thereafter, Respondent visited Ms. Gammichia’s office to inquire why she was involved in his payout matter. According to Ms. Gammichia, Respondent became “pretty aggressive.” Respondent told Ms. Gammichia that she had no authority or business being involved. It was a personal matter. Respondent warned Ms. Gammichia that she was directly violating an order from Ms. Reilly to make the Severance Payments. Ms. Gammichia informed Respondent that not only was she involved, but she was not authorizing the payout check to go through. Ms. Gammichia further advised Respondent not to contact Ms. Gasinski regarding the payout. Later that day, Ms. Gammichia contacted her supervisor, Cathi Balboa, the Director of Administrative Services for the Clerk’s Office, to discuss Respondent’s payout request. Ms. Gammichia relayed to Ms. Balboa that Ms. Gasinski was upset because she was being asked to prepare a large payout based only on verbal instructions without any supporting paperwork. At the final hearing, Ms. Balboa recalled that Respondent’s urgent request for a payout was highly irregular. Ms. Balboa relayed that the Clerk’s Office should not issue a final payout unless an employee was truly terminated from his or her position. Based on their concerns, Ms. Gammichia and Ms. Balboa called Ms. Reilly, who was sick at home, to confirm whether Ms. Reilly was aware of the payouts that Respondent said she had authorized. Ms. Gammichia also wanted to report the fact that Ms. Gasinski felt that she was being coerced and harassed by Respondent. Ms. Gammichia described Ms. Reilly’s reaction as hostile and negative. Ms. Reilly did not seem happy that others were involved. Ms. Reilly asked Ms. Balboa, “How did you get involved in this?" The next morning, on May 22, 2013, Ms. Reilly returned to the Clerk’s Office and called a meeting with Mr. Murphy, Ms. Balboa, and Respondent. Ms. Reilly opened the meeting by asking Mr. Murphy and Ms. Balboa "what do you think your role is in this organization," and "where do your loyalties lay?" Ms. Reilly then announced that “it was a private matter, it was their personal business, [and] to stay out of it." Ms. Balboa testified at the final hearing that Ms. Reilly intimidated her in their meeting. Mr. Murphy conveyed that he understood that they were not to get involved in the severance payout matter. After the meeting, Ms. Gasinski was told to proceed with the payouts for Respondent and Ms. Reilly. On May 23, 2013, Ms. Gasinski processed a second severance payout check for Respondent and Ms. Reilly. Ms. Gasinski prepared for Respondent a revised final paycheck in the total amount of $156,443.11. This amount included a Severance Payment of $106,387.20. Respondent was also paid $25,826.23 for his vacation leave (349.57 hours times a rate of $73.88), as well as $24,229.68 for all his unused sick leave (327.96 hours times a rate of $73.88). A check in the net amount of $99,125.45 was deposited in Respondent’s personal bank account. On May 23, 2013, Respondent repaid the initial payout of $58,400.00 to the Clerk’s Office by personal check. After Ms. Reilly terminated his Employment Agreement on May 9, 2013, Respondent never left his position with the Clerk’s Office. Respondent considered himself an at-will employee and continued to report to work as General Counsel. There was never any break in his employment. At no time did Respondent (or the Clerk’s Office) initiate or complete any paperwork to rehire Respondent after either Ms. Gardner’s death or Ms. Reilly terminated his Employment Agreement. No documentation was prepared transitioning Respondent from a contract employee to an at-will employee. Respondent continued to perform the same duties under the same terms, conditions, and compensation contained in the Employment Agreement as if he never left office.5/ At the final hearing, Respondent testified why his interpretation of his Employment Agreement justified his actions and motives. Respondent first remarked that his Employment Agreement was not typical for a Clerk’s Office employee. It contained certain provisions which were not to be “exposed generally,” such as the termination clause and the contact termination fee. Therefore, he desired to keep his employment terms quiet. Respondent further disclosed that he did not initiate an ECN because his Severance Payment was not a human resources issue, it was a matter of contract. Respondent also explained that at the end of 2008, when his Employment Agreement was nearing its initial termination date, Respondent became concerned with his future at the Clerk’s Office. He began to wonder what would happen if Ms. Gardner left her position as Clerk. Therefore, he prepared, then executed, the 2009 amendment to the Employment Agreement extending it “indefinitely.” In 2013, Respondent prepared, then executed, the second amendment clarifying the term “termination.” Regarding collecting his Severance Payment without leaving his position with the Clerk’s Office, Respondent contended that just because his Employment Agreement was terminated (thus, entitling him to the Severance Payment) did not mean he had to leave employment with the Clerk’s Office. Respondent characterized the payment as a “contract termination fee.” Therefore, he asserted that the Clerk could terminate his Employment Agreement without actually terminating him from his position as General Counsel. Consequently, nothing prevented him from becoming an at-will employee. Accordingly, when Ms. Reilly terminated the Employment Agreements on May 9, 2013, by exercising her prerogative as the interim Clerk, she also decided that both Respondent and she would stay on with the Clerk’s Office as at-will employees until the new Clerk of Courts determined what to do with them. In February 2014, the new Clerk of Courts, Eddie Fernandez, determined to initiate an investigation to review the propriety of the 2013 Severance Payments to Respondent and Ms. Reilly. On March 28, 2014, Respondent was placed on administrative leave with pay. On April 1, 2014, after the investigation recommended that Respondent’s employment be terminated, Respondent resigned from his position with the Clerk’s Office. As a condition of his resignation, Respondent was not eligible for rehire by the Clerk’s Office. Respondent reimbursed the full amount of the money that he received as the Severance Payment from the Clerk’s Office. Commenting on the circumstances of his resignation and restitution, at the final hearing, Respondent urged that he did not act dishonestly, but, maybe he exercised bad judgment. Respondent also proclaimed that he received his Severance Payment because the interim Clerk ordered it, not by reason of his actions or conduct. Therefore, he personally never violated any duty of his office. Based on the evidence and testimony presented during the final hearing, the competent substantial evidence in the record establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent acted corruptly, with a wrongful intent, in seeking and obtaining the Severance Payment when he never intended to leave his public employment with the Clerk’s Office. Accordingly, the Advocate proved that Respondent violated section 112.313(6).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Steven Carter, violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes; and that Respondent be subject to public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2017.
The Issue Whether Royal Roofing and Restoration, Inc. (Respondent or Royal Roofing), failed to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees; and, if so, whether the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Petitioner or Department), correctly calculated the penalty to be assessed against Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement of chapter 440, that Florida employers secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Respondent is a Florida for-profit corporation organized on July 28, 2015, and engaged in the business of roofing and storm damage restoration. The company was formed, and initially conducted business, in Tallahassee, Florida, but expanded to the Panama City area in 2016. Traci Fisher is Respondent’s President and Registered Agent, with a mailing address of 1004 Kenilworth, Tallahassee, Florida 32312. DOAH Case No. 17-0879 On May 4, 2016, Department Compliance Investigator Jesse Holman, conducted a routine workers’ compensation compliance inspection at 374 Brown Place in Crestview, Florida. Mr. Holman observed four men removing shingles from the roof of a residential structure at that address. Mr. Holman first interviewed a worker who identified himself as Dustin Hansel and reported that he and the other three workers on site were a new crew for Respondent, the permit for the job had not yet been pulled, and the workers were not aware of the rate of pay for the job. Mr. Hansel telephoned Respondent’s sales manager, Dillon Robinson, who then spoke directly with Mr. Holman via telephone. Mr. Robinson informed Mr. Holman that Respondent obtained workers’ compensation coverage through Payroll Management Inc. (PMI), an employee-leasing company. Mr. Holman identified the three remaining workers at the jobsite as Milton Trice, Winston Perrotta, and Kerrigan Ireland. Mr. Holman contacted PMI and secured a copy of Respondent’s then-active employee roster. None of the workers at the jobsite, including Mr. Hansel, were included on Respondent’s employee roster. Upon inquiry, Mr. Holman was informed that PMI had no pending employee applications for Respondent. Mr. Holman consulted the Department’s Coverage Compliance Automated System (CCAS) and found Respondent had no workers’ compensation insurance policy and no active exemptions. During Mr. Holman’s onsite investigation, the workers left the jobsite. Mr. Holman could not immediately reach Ms. Fisher, but did speak with her husband, Tim Fisher. Mr. Fisher informed Mr. Holman that the crew was on their way to the PMI Fort Walton office to be enrolled on Respondent’s employee roster. On May 5, 2016, based on his investigation, and after consultation with his supervisor, Mr. Holman issued Respondent Stop-Work Order (SWO) 16-148-1A, along with a Business Records Request (BRR) for records covering the audit period of July 27, 2015 through May 4, 2016. Later that day, Mr. Holman spoke to Ms. Fisher, who informed him the crew did not have permission to begin the work on that date, as she had not yet pulled the permit for the reroof. Ms. Fisher further explained that the crewmembers had been instructed to complete applications with PMI prior to departing Tallahassee for Crestview. Ms. Fisher confirmed the crewmembers were completing applications at PMI Fort Walton that same day. Mr. Holman met with Ms. Fisher the following day and personally served SWO 16-148-1A. Ms. Fisher delivered to Mr. Holman an updated employee roster from PMI which included Mr. Hansel, Mr. Perrotta, and Mr. Ireland; a letter documenting Mr. Trice was not employed by Respondent; and a $1000 check as downpayment on the penalty. Respondent initially submitted business records in response to the BRR on May 23 and 25, 2017. DOAH Case No. 17-1558 On June 8, 2016, Mr. Holman conducted a random workers’ compensation compliance inspection at 532 Rising Star Drive in Crestview. The single-family home at that address was undergoing renovations and Mr. Holman observed three men on the roof removing shingles. None of the men on the roof spoke English, but a fourth man, who identified himself as Jose Manuel Mejia, appeared and stated he worked for Respondent, and that all the workers onsite were paid through PMI at a rate of $10.00 per hour. Mr. Mejia admitted that one of the worker’s onsite, Emelio Lopez, was not enrolled with PMI and explained that Mr. Mejia brought him to the worksite that day because he knew Mr. Lopez to be a good worker. The remaining workers onsite were identified as Juan Mencho and Ramon Gonzalez, both from Atlanta, Georgia. Mr. Mejia produced some PMI paystubs for himself and Mr. Mencho. Mr. Mejia stated that he and his crews also received reimbursement checks directly from Respondent for gas, rentals, materials, and the like. Mr. Holman contacted PMI, who produced Respondent’s then-active employee roster. Mr. Mejia and Mr. Mencho were on the roster, but neither Mr. Gonzalez nor Mr. Lopez was included. Mr. Holman next contacted Ms. Fisher, who identified Mr. Mejia as a subcontractor, but was not familiar with any of the other men Mr. Holman encountered at the worksite. Mr. Holman consulted via telephone with his supervisor, who instructed him to issue an SWO to Respondent for failing to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its employees. Mr. Holman issued SWO 16-198-1A by posting the worksite on June 8, 2016. Department Facilitator Don Hurst, personally served Ms. Fisher with SWO 16-198-1A in Tallahassee that same day. SWO 16-148-1A Penalty Calculation1/ Department Penalty Auditor Eunika Jackson, was assigned to calculate the penalties associated with the SWOs issued to Respondent. On June 8, 2016, Ms. Jackson began calculating the penalty associated with SWO 16-148-1A. Ms. Jackson reviewed the documents submitted by Respondent in response to the BRR. The documents included Respondent’s Wells Fargo bank statements, check images, and PMI payroll register for the audit period.2/ Based on a review of the records, Ms. Jackson identified the following individuals as Respondent’s employees because they received direct payment from Respondent at times during the audit period: David Rosinsky, Dylan Robinson, Jarod Bell, Tommy Miller, and David Shields. Ms. Jackson determined periods of non-compliance for these employees based on the dates they received payments from Respondent and were not covered for workers’ compensation via PMI employment roster, separate policy, or corporate officer exemption. Ms. Jackson deemed payments to each of the individuals as gross payroll for purposes of calculating the penalty. Based upon Ms. Fisher’s deposition testimony, Ms. Jackson assigned National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) class code 5551, Roofing, to Mr. Miller; NCCI class code 5474, Painting, to Mr. Rosinsky; NCCI class code 8742, Sales, to Mr. Bell and Mr. Robinson; and NCCI class code 8810, clerical office employee, to Mr. Shields. Utilizing the statutory formula for penalty calculation, Ms. Jackson calculated a total penalty of $191.28 associated with these five “employees.” Ms. Jackson next calculated the penalty for Dustin Hansel, Kerrigan Ireland, Milton Trice, and Winston Perrotta, the workers identified at the jobsite as employees on May 4, 2016. The Department maintains that the business records submitted by Respondent were insufficient to determine Respondent’s payroll to these “employees,” thus, Ms. Jackson used the statutory formula to impute payroll to these workers. Ms. Jackson calculated a penalty of $14,970.12 against Respondent for failure to secure payment of workers’ compensation insurance for each of these four “employees” during the audit period. The total penalty associated with these four “employees” is $59,880.48. Ms. Jackson calculated a total penalty of $60,072.96 to be imposed against Respondent in connection with SWO 16-148- 1A. Business Records In compliance with the Department’s BRR, Respondent submitted additional business records on several occasions-- March 21, May 3 and 31, June 7, and August 15 and 24, 2017--in order to establish its complete payroll for the audit period. While the Department admits that the final documents submitted do establish Respondent’s complete payroll, the Department did not issue amended penalty assessment based on those records in either case. The Department maintains Respondent did not timely submit records, pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028(4), which allows an employer 20 business days after service of the first amended order of penalty assessment to submit sufficient records to establish payroll. All business records submitted by Respondent were admitted in evidence and included as part of the record. The undersigned is not limited to the record before the Department at the time the amended penalty assessments were imposed, but must determine a recommendation in a de novo proceeding. The undersigned has relied upon the complete record in arriving at the decision in this case. Penalty Calculation for Ireland, Trice, and Perrotta For purposes of workers’ compensation insurance coverage, an “employee” is “any person who receives remuneration from an employer” for work or services performed under a contract. § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. Stat. Respondent did not issue a single check to Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, or Mr. Perrotta during the audit period. Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, and Mr. Perrotta are not included on any PMI leasing roster included in the record for the audit period. The uncontroverted evidence, including the credible and unrefuted testimony of each person with knowledge, established that Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, and Mr. Perrotta were newly hired for the job in Crestview on May 4, 2016, and began working that day prior to submitting applications at PMI, despite Ms. Fisher’s directions otherwise. Petitioner did not prove that either Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, or Mr. Perrotta was Respondent’s employee at any time during the audit period. Petitioner did not correctly calculate the penalty of $44,911.26 against Respondent for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance for Mr. Ireland, Mr. Trice, and Mr. Perrotta during the audit period. Penalty Calculation for Hansel Ms. Fisher testified that Mr. Hansel has owned several businesses with which Respondent has conducted business over the years. Originally, Mr. Hansel owned a dumpster rental business, now owned by his father. Mr. Hansel also owned an independent landscaping company with which Respondent occasionally transacted business. When Respondent expanded business into the Panama City area, Ms. Fisher hired Mr. Hansel as a crew chief to supervise new crews in the area. The job on May 4, 2016, was his first roofing job. A review of Respondent’s records reveals Respondent issued the following checks to Mr. Hansel during the audit period: December 4, 2015, in the amount of $360, $300 of which was for “dumpster rental” and the remaining $60 for “sod”; May 4, 2016, in the amount of $200 for “sod repair”; May 6, 2016, in the amount of $925 as reimbursement for travel expenses; May 9, 2016, in the amount of $1,011.50 (with no memo); and May 21, 2016, in the amount of $100 for “7845 Preservation.” Mr. Hansel was included on Respondent’s PMI leasing roster beginning on May 13, 2016. Petitioner proved that Mr. Hansel was Respondent’s employee at times during the audit period. Petitioner did not prove that Respondent’s records were insufficient to determine payroll to Mr. Hansel during the audit period, which would have required an imputed penalty. Petitioner did not correctly calculate the penalty of $14,970.42 against Respondent for failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage for Mr. Hansel during the audit period. Sod repair by Mr. Hansel is a service performed for Respondent during the audit period. Reimbursement of travel expenses is specifically included in the definition of payroll for purposes of calculating the penalty. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L- 6.035(1)(f) (“Expense reimbursements, including reimbursements for travel” are included as remuneration to employees “to the extent that the employer’s business records and receipts do not confirm that the expense incurred as a valid business expense.”). Dumpster rental is neither work performed on behalf of, nor service provided to, Respondent during the audit period. The correct uninsured payroll amount attributable to Mr. Hansel is $2,296.50. Petitioner correctly applied NCCI class code 5551, Roofing, to work performed by Mr. Hansel based on the observation of Mr. Holman at the worksite on May 4, 2016. With respect to Mr. Hansel’s services for sod and sod repair, Petitioner did not correctly apply NCCI class code 5551. Petitioner did not introduce competent substantial evidence of the applicable NCCI class code and premium amount for landscaping services performed during the audit period.3/ Uninsured payroll attributable to Mr. Hansel for roofing services during the audit period is $2,036.50. The approved manual rate for workers’ compensation insurance for NCCI class code 5551 during the period of non- compliance--May 9 and 21, 2016--is $18.60. The premium amount Respondent would have paid to provide workers’ compensation insurance for Mr. Hansel is $378.79 (One percent of Mr. Hansel’s gross payroll during the non-compliance period--$20.36--multiplied by $18.60). The penalty for Respondent’s failure to secure worker’s compensation coverage insurance for Mr. Hansel during the period of non-compliance is calculated as two times the amount Respondent would have paid in premium for the non- compliance period. The correct penalty for Respondent’s failure to maintain workers’ compensation coverage for Mr. Hansel during the period of non-compliance is $757.58. Penalty Calculation for Salesmen Independent contractors not engaged in the construction industry are not employees for purposes of enforcing workers’ compensation insurance requirements. See § 440.02(15)(d)1., Fla. Stat. Sales is a non-construction industry occupation. The Department calculated a penalty associated with payroll attributable to the following persons identified by Ms. Fisher as independent salesmen: Dylan Robinson, Kevin Miller, Marc Medley, Mike Rucker, Colby Fisher, David Jones, Jarod Bell, Matt Flynn, and Todd Zulauf. Section 440.02(15)(d)1. provides that an individual may be an independent contractor, rather than an employee, as follows: In order to meet the definition of independent contractor, at least four of the following criteria must be met: The independent contractor maintains a separate business with his or her own work facility, truck, equipment, materials, or similar accommodations; The independent contractor holds or has applied for a federal employer identification number, unless the independent contractor is a sole proprietor who is not required to obtain a federal employer identification number under state or federal regulations; The independent contractor receives compensation for services rendered or work performed and such compensation is paid to a business rather than to an individual; The independent contractor holds one or more bank accounts in the name of the business entity for purposes of paying business expenses or other expenses related to services rendered or work performed for compensation; The independent contractor performs work or is able to perform work for any entity in addition to or besides the employer at his or her own election without the necessity of completing an employment application or process; or The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services rendered on a competitive-bid basis or completion of a task or a set of tasks as defined by a contractual agreement, unless such contractual agreement expressly states that an employment relationship exists. If four of the criteria listed in sub- subparagraph a. do not exist, an individual may still be presumed to be an independent contractor and not an employee based on full consideration of the nature of the individual situation with regard to satisfying any of the following conditions: The independent contractor performs or agrees to perform specific services or work for a specific amount of money and controls the means of performing the services or work. The independent contractor incurs the principal expenses related to the service or work that he or she performs or agrees to perform. The independent contractor is responsible for the satisfactory completion of the work or services that he or she performs or agrees to perform. The independent contractor receives compensation for work or services performed for a commission or on a per-job basis and not on any other basis. The independent contractor may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing work or services. The independent contractor has continuing or recurring business liabilities or obligations. The success or failure of the independent contractor’s business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures. Ms. Fisher testified that each of the above-named salesmen sold roofing jobs for her at various times during the audit period on a commission-only basis. The contractors inspect homeowner roofs, draft schematics, use their own equipment (e.g., drones), incur all of their own expenses, and handle the insurance filing for the homeowner’s insurance to pay on the claim. Ms. Fisher further testified that each of the salesmen also sells for other roofing contractors in the Tallahassee area. She pays the salesmen on a per-job basis. Ms. Fisher does not compensate the salesmen for the time involved in inspecting a roof, preparing schematics, or making the sale. Nor does Ms. Fisher reimburse the salesmen for travel to sales jobsites. Ms. Fisher’s testimony was credible, persuasive, and uncontroverted. Respondent introduced in evidence four “Independent Contractor Checklists” allegedly completed by Mr. Robinson, Mr. Medley, Mr. Fisher, and Mr. Flynn. Each form checklist follows the format of section 440.02(15)(d)1., listing the criteria set forth in subparagraphs a. and b. The forms indicate that they each meet all the criteria listed in subparagraph b.: they perform, or agree to perform services for a specific amount of money and control the means of performing the service; they incur the principal expenses related to the service performed; they are responsible for satisfactory completion of the services performed; they receive compensation for the services performed on a per-job or commission basis; they may realize a profit or suffer a loss in connection with performing the services; they have continuing and recurring business liabilities or obligations; and the success or failure of their business depends on the relationship of business receipts to expenditures.4/ In its Proposed Recommended Order, Petitioner conceded the nine men identified by Respondent as independent sales contractors “would not be considered employees of Respondent” because the “salesmen would seem to meet the majority of [the] requirements [of section 440.02(15)(d)1.b.].” Respondent issued Dylan Robinson, Mark Medley, Colby Fisher, Matt Flynn, Kevin Miller, Mike Rucker, Jarod Bell, David Jones, and Todd Zulauf an IRS FORM 1099-MISC for income paid during the 2016 tax year. Respondent did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the above-named salesmen were Respondent’s employees during the audit period. For SWO 16-148-1A, Respondent did not correctly calculate the penalty because Respondent included a penalty associated with Petitioner’s failure to provide workers’ compensation insurance coverage for Dylan Robinson and Jarod Bell. Penalty in the amount of $20.70 associated with Dylan Robinson and Jarod Bell should not be included in the total penalty. The correct penalty amount for SWO 16-148-1A, based on records submitted by Respondent on or before March 20, 2016, is $929.16. Draft Revised Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment The additional records submitted by Respondent revealed payments made to persons during the audit period who were not included in the Department’s Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The Department and Respondent disagreed at hearing whether the payments qualified as payroll. At hearing, Petitioner submitted a draft revised second amended penalty calculation for SWO 16-148-1A based on all records received from Respondent. The revised penalty is in the amount of $61,453.50. Ms. Jackson populated the spreadsheet with the name of every individual to whom a check was written on Respondent’s business bank account during the audit period, removing only those payments to individuals and entities which, to Petitioner’s knowledge, were not Respondent’s employees. Respondent’s calculations in the revised penalty suffer from some of the same errors as in the second amended penalty calculation--they include individuals Petitioner did not prove were Respondent’s employees, as well as payments which were not uninsured payroll. For the reasons explained herein, Petitioner did not prove that salesmen David Jones, Dylan Robinson, Jarod Bell, Kevin Miller, Mark Medley, Matt Flynn, Mike Rucker, Tim Fischer, and Colby Fisher were Respondent’s employees during the audit period. Respondent did not accurately calculate the penalty associated with those persons. Respondent made payments to David Shields during the audit period, which the Department argues should be included as payroll. The Department included payments to Mr. Shields in its draft revised second amended order of penalty assessment and assigned NCCI class code “8810” for clerical work. Mr. Shields is a licensed professional roofing contractor who acts as “qualifier” for Respondent’s business. A qualifier is a licensed professional who certifies plans for permit applications submitted by another business. Respondent pays Mr. Shields a flat fee per permit application qualified by him. The record evidence does not support a finding that Mr. Shields provides clerical services to Respondent. Mr. Shields provides some sort of professional services to Respondent, and is likely an independent contractor providing his own materials and supplies, maintaining his own business accounts, and liable for his own business success. Assuming Mr. Shields were Respondent’s employee, the Department introduced no evidence of an appropriate NCCI class code for Mr. Shields’ services. The Department did not prove that payments to Mr. Shields should be included as Respondent’s uninsured payroll during the audit period. Respondent paid Susan Swain a total of $258 during the audit period for clerical work. Ms. Fisher maintained Ms. Swain’s work was casual at first, and the payments reflect a time when she worked on-again, off-again, handling the paperwork for restoration insurance claims. Later, Ms. Swain came to work for Respondent full-time and was added to the PMI leasing roster. Section 440.02(15)(d)5. provides that a person “whose employment is both casual and not in the course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the employer” is not an employee. The statute defines “casual” employment as work that is anticipated to be completed in 10 working days or less and at a total labor cost of less than $500. See § 440.02(5), Fla. Stat. In its Proposed Recommended Order, the Department argues Ms. Swain’s wages should be included as payroll because the “testimony regarding Ms. Swain does not suggest that she was employed for less than 10 days[.]” However, it was the Department’s burden to prove that Ms. Swain was a statutory employee. The Department did not prove that Ms. Swain’s wages should be included within Respondent’s uninsured payroll. The largest portion of the penalty assessed by the Department, as well as in the draft revised second amended penalty assessment, against Respondent is in connection with various roofers who were employed by Respondent at times during the audit period. Each of the roofers was included on Respondent’s PMI leasing roster, but received checks directly from Respondent in addition to PMI payroll checks. The Department included all the direct payments to those roofers as payroll for purposes of calculating a penalty in this case. As Ms. Fisher explained, the company bids a reroof on a per job basis--usually a per square foot price. Ms. Fisher adds each roofing contractor’s name to the PMI leasing roster to ensure that each roofer is covered by workers’ compensation insurance for the duration of the job. When the job is completed (which is a matter of just a few days), the contractor reports to Ms. Fisher what amount of the contract price was spent on materials, supplies, or other non-labor costs. Ms. Fisher cuts a check to the contractor for that amount and authorizes PMI to issue payroll checks for the “labor cost” (the difference between the contract price and the non-labor costs). Ms. Fisher refers to this process as “back-charging” the contractors for their materials, maintenance, tools, and other non-labor costs. The Department is correct that the direct payments are payroll to the roofing contractors. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.035(1)(b) and (h) (remuneration includes “payments, including cash payments, made to employees by or on behalf of the employer” and “payments or allowances made by or on behalf of the employer for tools or equipment used by employees in their work or operations for the employer.”). The Department would be correct to include these payments in the penalty calculation if they represented uninsured payroll. However, the evidence supports a finding that the direct payments to the roofing contractors were made for the same jobs on which Respondent secured workers’ compensation coverage through PMI. The roofing contractors were covered for workers’ compensation throughout the job, even though they may have received partial payment for the job outside of the PMI payroll checks.5/ The direct payments were not for separate reroofs on which the roofers were not otherwise insured. The Department did not correctly calculate penalties associated with the following roofing contractors: Donald Tontigh, Joseph Howard, Keith Mills, Aaron Kilpatrick, Gustavo Tobias, Jose Mejia, and Tommy Miller. Ms. Fisher also received cash payments from Respondent during the audit period. These payments were made in addition to her payroll through PMI. Ms. Fisher described these payments as “cash tickets,” which were paid outside of her PMI payroll to reimburse her for investments made in the company. For purposes of calculating the penalty in this case, these “cash tickets” are clearly payroll, as that term is to be calculated pursuant to rule 69L-6.035. Similar to the issue with the roofing contractors, the question is whether the payments represent uninsured payroll. Ms. Fisher did not hold a corporate officer exemption at any time relevant hereto. Ms. Fisher testified that she was covered through PMI payroll leasing. In contrast to the roofing contractors, Ms. Fisher’s direct payments do not directly coincide with any particular job or specific time frame during which Ms. Fisher was covered for workers’ compensation insurance through PMI. The evidence was insufficient to determine that the amounts were insured payroll. The Department properly calculated a penalty associated with payroll attributable to Ms. Fisher. Respondent made one payment of $75 to Donald Martin during the audit period. The Department calculated a penalty of $27.90 associated with this payment to Mr. Martin. Ms. Fisher explained that Mr. Martin was a down-on-his-luck guy who came by the office one day complaining that Mr. Hansel owed him some money. Ms. Fisher offered to put him on a roofing crew and wrote him the $75 check to help him out. Ms. Fisher’s testimony was both credible and unrefuted. Mr. Martin was never hired by Respondent, put on any roofing crew, or added to the PMI leasing roster. Mr. Martin was not Respondent’s employee because he did not receive remuneration for the “performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract for hire” with Respondent. § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. Stat. Cale Dierking works for Respondent full-time in a clerical position. During the audit period, Respondent paid Mr. Dierking directly by check for $1,306.14. This payment was made outside of Mr. Dierking’s PMI payroll checks. Ms. Fisher testified that she paid Mr. Dierking directly on one occasion when “PMI’s payroll got stuck in Memphis, I believe it was a snow-in situation where payroll checks didn’t come.” Rather than ask her employee to go without a timely paycheck, she advanced his payroll. Ms. Fisher’s testimony was both credible and unrefuted. The payment to Mr. Dierking is clearly payroll. However, Mr. Dierking was covered for workers’ compensation through PMI for the period during which the check was issued. Thus, there is no evidence that it was uninsured payroll. The Department did not correctly calculate a penalty associated with payments to Mr. Dierking. The correct penalty to be assessed against Respondent for failure to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its employees during the audit period in connection with SWO 16-148- 1A is $770.60. Penalty Calculation for SWO 16-198-1A Ms. Jackson calculated a total penalty against Respondent in connection with SWO 16-198-1A in the amount of $19,115.84, as reflected in the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The Department correctly imputed penalty against Respondent in the amount of $91.68 each for uninsured payroll to Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Lopez. The evidence supported a finding that these workers were Respondent’s statutory employees on June 8, 2016, and were not enrolled on the PMI leasing roster. The Department did not correctly calculate the penalty associated with salesmen Dylan Robinson, Jarod Bell, Kevin Miller, Mark Medley, Matt Flynn, and Todd Zulauf. The Department did not correctly calculate the penalty associated with roofing contractors Abraham Martinez- Antonio, Edwin Kinsey, Dustin Hansel, Efrian Molina-Agustin, Jose Mejia, Joseph Howard, Keith Mills, Samuel Pedro, and Tommy Miller. The Department did not correctly calculate the penalty against Respondent associated with Mr. Shields, Respondent’s qualifier. Based on a review of Respondent’s complete “untimely” records, the Department discovered direct payments made to additional employees not included on the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. Respondent made a direct payment to Ethan Burch in the amount of $602.50 during the audit period. Ethan Burch is one of Respondent’s full-time clerical employees. The evidence is insufficient to determine whether the payment of $602.50 was insured or uninsured payroll. As such, the Department did not prove it correctly calculated the penalty associated with Mr. Burch. Respondent also made a direct payment to Chelsea Hansel in the amount of $965 during the audit period. Ms. Hansel is another clerical employee. Ms. Hansel’s PMI enrollment was delayed due to some background investigation. Respondent paid Ms. Hansel for work she completed prior to enrollment. The direct payment to Ms. Hansel constitutes uninsured payroll. The Department correctly calculated the penalty associated with the payment to Chelsea Hansel. The correct penalty amount to be imposed against Respondent for failure to secure payment of workers’ compensation coverage for its employees (Gonzalez, Lopez, and Chelsea Hansel) during the audit period in connection with SWO 16-198-1A is $187.80.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, finding that Royal Roofing and Restoration, Inc., violated the workers’ compensation insurance law and, in DOAH Case No. 17-0879, assessing a penalty of $770.60; and in DOAH Case No. 17-1558, assessing a penalty of $187.80. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent was required and failed to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage for his employees during the period from March 7, 1997 through March 7, 2000, and, if so, what penalty should be assessed, pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with enforcing the requirement that employers secure workers' compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees. On March 7, 2001, one of Petitioner's investigators observed two individuals, Worker 1 and Worker 2,3 painting a sidewalk, curb stops, and lines in the parking lot of a 7-Eleven store in Lake Worth, Florida. At that time, the investigator performed an on-site inspection. The investigator interviewed the two workers and completed a worksheet to determine if they were independent contractors. Worker 1 and Worker 2, among other things, worked for and were paid weekly by Respondent as painters, did not maintain a separate business from Respondent, did not control the means of performing their work, did not incur the expenses of their work, and did not incur the principal expenses related to their work. The investigator determined that the two workers were not independent contractors but were employees of Respondent. Neither Worker 1 nor Worker 2 was granted a workers' compensation exemption. Both workers were unprotected by workers' compensation insurance. Respondent provided to Petitioner's investigator federal tax Form 1099s for the years 1998 and 1999, pertaining to Worker 1 and Worker 2 and a handwritten note indicating the compensation paid to them during the year 2000. The documents indicated that Respondent paid the workers for the years 1998 through 2000 the following: Worker 1--$9,685 for 1998, $19,180 for 1999, and $3,330 for 2000; and Worker 2--$2,790 for 1999, and $240 for 2000. A compilation of approved classifications that groups employers according to their operations is published by the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI). The publication is Scopes Manual, Scopes of Basic Manual Classifications (Scopes Manual). NCCI is a rating organization in Florida, which represents workers' compensation carriers. NCCI seeks approval from Florida's Department of Insurance of rates charged by workers' compensation carriers. NCCI and Professional Insurance Associates, as well as other sources, publish tables of approved rates for each classification code. It is undisputed that NCCI's publication of class codes and rates is relied upon and used by Petitioner to determine an employer's class code and the workers' compensation insurance rate. On March 7, 2000, Petitioner's investigator issued a SWO to Respondent. On March 8, 2000, Petitioner issued a NPAO to Respondent, indicating an assessment and penalty of $18,824. The investigator determined that, based upon what he had observed and the information that he had obtained, the work being performed by Worker 1 and Worker 2 was painting and was classified under Scopes Manual Code 5474. The investigator determined the evaded premium, or the premium that Respondent would have paid had he secured workers’ compensation insurance, by multiplying the gross compensation to employees each year by the premium rate for that Code for that year. The statutory penalty on the evaded premium is twice the evaded premium. The calculated penalty was $18,724. Added to the $18,724 was $100, which represented the penalty for the one day, March 7, 2000, that Respondent was not in compliance with the workers’ compensation requirement. On October 20, 2000, Petitioner issued a Second Amended Notice and Penalty Assessment Order, which was the final assessment, against Respondent assessing a penalty of $69,569, which included the $100 penalty. Pursuant to an agreement, Respondent performs general maintenance and preventative maintenance (GMPM) for Southland Corporation at 100 or more 7-Eleven stores in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties. Petitioner was able to interview 13 of Respondent's employees, Worker 1 through Worker 13.4 As not a part of the GMPM agreement, Respondent's employees paint curbs, bumpers, and lines in the parking lot of each 7-Eleven store once each year. Respondent’s employees also engaged in the following: painting of buildings’ exterior and interior, parking lots, and loading docks; hanging drywall; setting of tile; paving of parking lots; repairing stucco and concrete; minor plumbing; carpentry, including trim, installation of doors and locks; filling potholes; and installing walls and cabinets. For example, Worker 10, who was employed with Respondent between June 1996 and January 1998, initially performed a daily activity of painting lines and curbs in parking lots at 7-Eleven stores. He could be assigned three stores in one day performing this activity. Later, Worker 10 performed under the GMPM agreement doing the following: painting the exterior and interior of stores, which could be the entire outside or a storeroom; tiling floors and ceilings; patching blacktop and repairing asphalt; and engaging in carpentry work, including putting up wooden shelves in storage rooms, cutting, nailing and screwing boards, and operating saws. Worker 10 also assisted Worker 6, who was a carpenter, repairing enclosures for dumpsters. The repairs consisted of sinking four-by-four posts into the ground, replacing slats, and occasionally replacing the entire enclosure due to damage caused by a truck backing into the enclosure. As another example, Worker 11 was employed with Respondent during 1998 and 1999 for 14 months and worked under the GMPM agreement. Worker 11 performed all activities under the agreement in maintaining the 7-Eleven stores, except for electrical and internal plumbing. The work to which he was assigned generally lasted four days a week, but for one day a week, he was assigned to handling service calls or performing line striping. Worker 11 performed the following: resurfacing asphalt; painting the entire parking lot, including lines for parking spaces and curbs; replacing or repairing ceiling and floor tile; laying tar on the roof; performing carpentry, including building shelves in storing rooms, reinforcing shelving, hanging new doors, replacing door hardware, and performing carpentry alongside Worker 6; and repairing enclosures for dumpsters by re-hanging doors, replacing slats, and replacing four-by-four posts. Even though Respondent stated that he subcontracted the repair of roofs and dumpsters, the installation of doors and electrical and plumbing work, he failed to present evidence showing to whom and when the work was subcontracted.5 Petitioner presented evidence demonstrating that Respondent’s employees performed all of the work described, except for electrical work. The work performed by Respondent’s employees included multiple class codes. NCCI requires the assignment of the highest rated classification under such circumstances. Carpentry is the highest-rated classification for all the work performed by Respondent’s employees, and the Scopes Manual Code for carpentry is 5403. Scopes Manual Code 5403 is also the code for the enclosure of a dumpster and the installation of a pre-hung door. The corresponding rate per $100 of payroll assigned to Scopes Manual Code 5403 is different for the applicable years 1997 through 2000. The rate for 1997 was 29.77; for 1998 was 29.09; for 1999 was 26.66; and 2000 was 27.96. Worker 1 through Worker 13 did not maintain a separate business from Respondent, did not control the means of performing their work, did not incur the expenses of their work, and did not incur the principal expenses related to their work. None of Respondent’s 13 employees had a valid workers’ compensation exemption. None of them were protected by workers’ compensation insurance. Respondent’s usual and customary practice was to pay his employees on a weekly basis. His usual and customary practice was to employ four or more employees during a weekly pay period. Respondent’s usual and customary practice was to employ four or more employees during any payroll period. Respondent asserts that he relied upon subcontractors for some of the work. The identity of the subcontractors, the service performed, and the frequency of their work are unknown. Whether the subcontractors had workers’ compensation insurance is also unknown. As a result, a determination cannot be made as to what Respondent’s responsibility, if any, was to the subcontractors as to workers’ compensation insurance, which in turn would affect an assessed penalty under worker’s compensation. To establish what his payroll was for the three years preceding the issuance of the SWO on March 7, 2000, Respondent used federal tax Form 1099s and cancelled business checks. For the years 1997 through 2000, Respondent’s payroll was as follows: Worker 1--1998 was $9,685, 1999 was $19,180, and 2000 was $3,330; Worker 2--1999 was $2,790, and 2000 was $240; Worker 3--1997 was $2,100, 1999 was $2,035, and 2000 was $3,045; Worker 4--1999 was $2,100; Worker 5--1997 was $1,900; Worker 6--1997 was $4,620, 1998 was $15,965, 1999 was $5,100, and 2000 was $3,303; Worker 7- -1999 was $610; Worker 8--1997 was $1,380, 1998 was $5,640, 1999 was $7,640, and 2000 was $350; Worker 9--1997 was $3,120; Worker 10--1997 was $8,450, and 1998 was $960; Worker 11--1998 was $7,095, and 1999 was $7,225; Worker 12--1998 was $2,883; and Worker 13--1999 was $2,675. Consequently, Respondent’s total payroll for 1997 was $21,570, for 1998 was $42,228, for 1999 was $49,355, and for 2000 was $10,268. Respondent’s payroll of $21,570 for 1997, was for the entire year. Petitioner made no reduction for the time period in the year 1997 prior to March 8, 1997, which would have been three years prior to the SWO on March 7, 2000. The statutory penalty assessed by Petitioner in its Second Amended Notice and Assessment Order against Respondent was $69,569, which included the penalty of $100. Petitioner’s assessment should be reduced to compensate for the Respondent’s payroll during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 7, 1997.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Compliance enter a final order against Gregory Dennis Nelly: Sustaining the Stop Work Order. Sustaining the penalty assessed in the Second Amended Notice and Penalty Assessment Order minus the calculation for the payroll during the period of January 1, 1997 through March 7, 1997. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 2001.
The Issue Whether Millenium Homes, Inc. (Petitioner) conducted operations in the State of Florida without obtaining workers’ compensation coverage which meets the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2008), in violation of Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2008)1, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Order and Penalty Assessment and the Fifth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. If so, what penalty should be assessed by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Respondent), pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure the payment of workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Workers’ compensation coverage is required if a business entity has one or more employees and is engaged in the construction industry in Florida. The payment of workers’ compensation coverage may be secured via three non-mutually exclusive methods: 1) the purchase of a workers’ compensation insurance policy; 2) arranging for the payment of wages and workers’ compensation coverage through an employee leasing company; and 3) applying for and receiving a certificate of exemption from workers’ compensation coverage if certain statutorily mandated criteria are met. On September 4, 2008, Maria Seidler, a compliance investigator employed by Respondent, was making random site visits at the Bella Vida development in North Fort Myers. Seidler observed eight workers unloading a truck, taking measurements, and performing various tasks on new homes under construction. All eight of the men were engaged in some type of activity on the job site. None were merely standing around, sitting in a truck, or otherwise idle. Seidler had all eight men stand in front of her, spoke to them in Spanish, and recorded their names on her field interview worksheet. All eight men advised Seidler, in Spanish, that they worked for Millenium Homes. None of the men advised Seidler that they did not work for Petitioner, nor that they were present in hopes of applying for a job. The individual apparently in charge at the job site, did not advise Seidler that not all of the men present were working for Petitioner. The evidence demonstrated that D.R. Horton was the general contractor for the project, and that D.R. Horton had contracted with Petitioner to frame out the housing units at the project. The eight men, who were present on the job site and who identified themselves as employees of Petitioner, confirmed that they were present on September 4, 2008, to perform framing. Framing is a construction activity as contemplated by Subsection 440.02(8), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021. James Loubert, president and sole shareholder of Petitioner, was not on the job site at the time of Seidler’s arrival, and she initially spoke with him by telephone. Loubert arrived at the job site a short time later. Loubert advised Seidler that Petitioner had secured workers’ compensation coverage for its employees through an employee leasing arrangement with Employee Leasing Solutions (ELS). This coverage was later confirmed by Seidler. However, of the eight workers found on the job site, three workers, Alejandro Osorio, Josue Sanchez Bautista, and Luis Aguilar, were not named on the ELS list of Petitioner’s active, covered employees. Seidler was very definite and precise in her testimony that she observed Alejandro Osorio, Josue Sanchez Bautista, and Luis Aguilar wearing hard hats and engaging in work activities upon her arrival at the job site. Her testimony is found to be credible. When Loubert arrived at the job site, he informed Seidler that two of the workers, not listed on Petitioner’s active employee roster, were to have been sent home to pick up their Social Security cards, and that he had called in the third worker, Josue Sanchez Bautista, to ELS. Loubert did not inform Seidler that Osorio, Bautista, and Aguilar were not employees of Petitioner and were merely present at the job site in hopes of applying for a job. The Pre-hearing Stipulation signed by counsel for the parties and filed with the DOAH clerk on December 8, 2009, contained the following statements of admitted facts in section E: Respondent’s [sic] employees Josue Sanchez Bautista, Luis Aguilar, and Juan Perez had not been called into and accepted as employees by ELS as of September 4, 2008. Respondent [sic] was not in compliance with the coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, as of September 4, 2008.2 At the hearing, both Javier Perez and Loubert testified that Osorio, Bautista, and Aguilar were not employees of Petitioner, but rather were waiting on site for Loubert to arrive, so that they could ask for jobs. However, they were all wearing hard hats. The testimony of Perez and Loubert is inconsistent with the observations of Seidler, as well as the statements made to Seidler by Loubert at the job site on September 8, 2008, and is, therefore, not credible. Petitioner had no workers’ compensation coverage other than that provided though ELS, and no active exemptions. James Loubert is the only officer of Petitioner, and did not have an exemption from coverage as of September 4, 2008. At the work-site, a Stop-Work Order 08-234-D7 was issued and personally served upon James Loubert based upon Petitioner’s failure to secure the payment of workers’ compensation for its employees Josue Sanchez Bautista, Luis Aguilar, and Alejandro Osorio. A business records request was also served on Loubert in order to obtain the records necessary to calculate and assess a penalty on Petitioner based upon its failure to comply with the coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 440.107(5), Florida Statutes, Petitioner’s business records were requested back to September 5, 2005, or three years prior to the issuance of the Stop-Work Order. Petitioner produced the register for its primary checking account to Respondent on September 4, 2008, in response to Respondent’s request for business records. Lynne Murcia is a compliance specialist for Respondent. She reviews business records produced by employers to determine the amount of payroll on which workers’ compensation premium was not paid, in order to calculate an appropriate penalty for violations of the coverage requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. Upon review of the business records initially produced by Petitioner, it was determined that the register from one of Petitioner’s two business checking accounts was missing. The records initially produced by Petitioner were, therefore, insufficient for the calculation of an appropriate penalty. It was requested that Petitioner produce the register for the second checking account, and those records were quickly produced. Thereafter, a 45-page summary of all transactions potentially meeting the definitions of payroll set forth in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035 (the Rule), was prepared and an Order of Penalty Assessment issued. In determining which payments should potentially be considered payroll, pursuant to the Rule, all payments made by Petitioner directly to its employees that did not pass through ELS were included. To the extent that those direct payments meet the definition of payroll, they were subject to workers’ compensation premium and would be properly included in an assessed penalty. Petitioner also made direct “per diem” payments to reimburse its employees for the cost of meals and lodging which they incurred during the times that they were required to travel away from home to perform their jobs. The per diem rates were calculated pursuant to Internal Revenue Service guidelines, and were deducted as a business expense on Petitioner’s income tax returns for the years 2005-2007. The Rule requires that expense reimbursements by an employer to employees be included as payroll subject to workers’ compensation premium to the extent that the business records of the employer do not confirm that the expenses were incurred as valid business expenses. All per diem payments made by Petitioner to its employees were included in the calculations, because Petitioner did not produce the receipts reflecting that its employees had actually incurred meal and lodging expenses in those amounts. However, following the December 15, 2009, hearing, Respondent examined the issue further and concluded that Petitioner’s per diem payments to its employees were properly documented as business expenses on Petitioner’s income tax returns. Respondent thereafter sought leave to file its Fifth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment deleting all per diem payments from the assessed penalty. Petitioner made numerous payments to third parties who provided construction, maintenance, or janitorial services at the homes of James Loubert, his father, Adrian Loubert, and his wife, April White, or who provided child care services for the Loubert family. For example, Petitioner paid $1,500.00 for tile work performed at James Loubert’s residence; $478.00 to Alex Ortiz, Antonio Elias, and Candy Ortiz for pressure-washing the homes of James Loubert and April White; $2,548.14 to Pedro Delgano for building cabinets for the homes of James Loubert and his father; $11,326.40 to Rick Wilson for painting the houses of James and Adrian Loubert; and beginning August 23, 2007, through December 20, 2007, $1,433.66 to Diane Berger for cleaning James Loubert’s home. Petitioner also paid $3,402.00 to Cinta Smollis for babysitting services provided to Loubert. These individuals do not appear on the penalty work sheet of the Fifth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, since they do not meet the statutory definition of employees. Petitioner also paid large sums of money to Adrian Loubert for the purchase of a farm in Canada. In addition, James Loubert testified that some of the payments to his father represented expense reimbursements, suggesting that, at some point, Adrian Loubert had been an employee of Petitioner. Petitioner did not introduce any exhibits into evidence reflecting the nature or amount of the reimbursements allegedly being made to Adrian Loubert. James Loubert was actively involved in the carpentry work performed by Petitioner, on the project on which the stop- work order was issued as well as on prior projects. Nevertheless, he received only a minimal salary through Petitioner’s employee leasing company, ELS. In 2007, Loubert received a total salary of $11,000.00 through ELS. In 2008, he received a total salary through ELS of only $7,200.00. Any payments that James Loubert received directly from Petitioner, that meet the definition of payroll set forth in the Rule, were subject to workers’ compensation premium, and are therefore subject to penalty. During the three-year penalty period specified by the statute, Petitioner made many cash payments to, or for the benefit of, James Loubert. The business records produced by Petitioner indicate that these cash payments were made to payees such as Blockbuster Video, Toys-R-Us, and PetsMart, as well as for vacation expenses. In addition, James Loubert took large amounts of cash from Petitioner to facilitate his hobby of racing cars. Throughout the penalty period, Petitioner also made numerous payments to Loubert’s wife, April White, and to his daughter, Alexa Seagate. Petitioner also made numerous payments to Gary White, his father-in-law and one of Petitioner’s employees. James Loubert testified that the payments made to, or on behalf of, family members, the payments made to third- party payees, and the cash payments which he took from Petitioner reflected shareholder distributions. However, the memo lines on those payment entries do not indicate that those payments were intended to be shareholder distributions. Petitioner’s business records reflect that the memo line on a check would indicate that it was a shareholder distribution, if that was what it was intended to be. This was the practice on other transactions. In addition, James Loubert testified that the memos for his Quick Books entries reflect “exactly what” each payment was for. Presumably those memo entries are the same as the memo entries on the corresponding checks. The payments made by Petitioner to third parties from which it appears that Petitioner did not receive services or a benefit, including but not limited to the payments made to family members of James Loubert, and the cash payments made by Petitioner to finance James Loubert’s auto racing hobby, do not constitute legitimate business expenses. Petitioner frequently made loans or wage advances to its employees. Although Loubert testified that those loans were repaid to him, he later acknowledged that a $2,000.00 loan to employee Rachel Broulet was never paid back, and that a $975.00 loan to Nicholas Susa was never repaid. Petitioner did not produce business records or documentary evidence at the hearing that indicates that any of the loans which it made to employees were repaid. The State of Florida has adopted a classification code developed by the National Council of Compensation Insurance (NCCI), which assigns individual four digit codes to various classes of labor. This classification code is utilized to segregate different categories of labor by risk and to determine appropriate workers’ compensation premiums for those classes of labor in Florida. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.021. As noted above, Petitioner was performing framing work at the time of the September 4, 2008, inspection. Because Petitioner’s employees were observed at work constructing residential homes, classification code 5645, detached one or two family dwellings, was correctly applied to Petitioner’s employees directly engaged in construction activities. This includes Javier Perez, as he was working along with and directly supervising the other seven carpenters who were working on site when the inspection took place. Classification code 8742, outside sales, has been applied to James Loubert, as he was not observed working on September 4, 2008. However, Loubert did testify at his deposition that he usually performed construction work along side Petitioner’s other employees, but Respondent did not apply the construction code to him in the Fifth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. Classification code 8810 was correctly applied to those employees of Petitioner who performed clerical work in the office. The appropriate manual rates for each year of the penalty period of September 5, 2005, through September 4, 2008, was applied for each classification code assigned to Petitioner’s employees. In preparing the Fifth Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, the amount of unsecured payroll attributable to each employee of Petitioner listed on the penalty worksheet was correctly calculated. From the evidence, Luis Aguilar and Alejandro Osorio were to be paid $10.00 per hour. There was no evidence that Aguilar and Osorio had worked prior to the issuance of the Stop-Work Order, and therefore, earnings of $80.00 assigned, reflecting eight hours at $10.00 per hour for September 4, 2008, was correct. Petitioner failed to provide any business records or other information concerning the rate of pay for Josue Sanchez Bautista, the third non-compliant worker. Bautista’s wages for September 4, 2008, can be imputed utilizing the statewide average wage pursuant to Subsection 440.107(7)(e), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding that Millenium Homes, Inc., failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees, in violation of Section 440.38(1), Florida Statutes, and that a penalty in the amount of $66,099.37 should be imposed for the failure to provide the required workers’ compensation insurance coverage. DONE AND ORDERED this 28th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2010.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent had a sufficient amount of workers’ compensation coverage during the time period in question; and, if not, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement in chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2015),1/ that employers in Florida secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. While an exemption can be obtained for up to three corporate officers, any employer in the construction industry with at least one employee must have workers’ compensation coverage. § 440.02(15), Fla. Stat. Kent Howe works for the Division as a compliance investigator based in Orlando, Florida. As part of his job responsibilities, Mr. Howe visits construction sites in order to verify that employers in the construction industry have obtained workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. Mr. Kehr was the owner and sole corporate officer of JNK. Mr. Howe visited a construction site in Port Orange, Florida, on the morning of December 10, 2015, and saw Mr. Kehr and two other men building the interior walls/frames of a house. Mr. Howe talked to the two men (James Hicks and James Garthwait) working with Mr. Kehr, and they reported that Mr. Kehr was paying them approximately $8.00 an hour. Mr. Kehr told Mr. Howe that Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait had been working for him for approximately two hours that morning. Mr. Kehr also stated that he had not obtained workers’ compensation coverage for Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait. Following those conversations, Mr. Howe returned to his car and accessed the Division’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”) and learned that JNK had no workers’ compensation coverage. Mr. Howe also determined from CCAS that Mr. Kehr had obtained an exemption from workers’ compensation coverage that had been in effect from November 18, 2014, through November of 2016.2/ After relaying that information to his supervisor, Mr. Howe received authorization to serve Mr. Kehr with a Stop- Work Order, and he did so on December 10, 2015. That Stop-Work Order required JNK to “cease all business operations for all worksites in the State” based on the Division’s determination that JNK had failed to obtain workers’ compensation coverage. In addition, the Stop-Work Order stated that JNK would be penalized an amount “[e]qual to 2 times the amount [JNK] would have paid in premium when applying approved manual rates to the employer’s payroll during periods for which it [had] failed to secure the payment of compensation within the preceding 2-year period.” Along with the Stop-Work Order, Mr. Howe also served a “Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation” (“the BRR”) on Mr. Kehr. In order to ascertain JNK’s payroll disbursements during the relevant time period and the resulting penalty for JNK’s failure to obtain workers’ compensation coverage, the BRR requested that JNK remit several different types of business records covering the period from November 10, 2014, through December 10, 2015. Mr. Howe explained during the final hearing that the Division usually reviews business records pertaining to the two years preceding the Stop Work Order.3/ Because JNK came into existence on November 10, 2014, the Division’s review was limited to examining the period between November 10, 2014, and December 10, 2015. The business records sought by the Division included items such as time sheets, payroll summaries, check journals, certificates of exemption, and evidence that any JNK subcontractors had obtained workers’ compensation coverage. Section 440.107(7)(e) provides that if an employer fails to provide business records sufficient to enable the Department to ascertain the employer’s actual payroll for the time period in question, then the Division will estimate the employer’s actual payroll for that time period by imputing the employer’s payroll based on the statewide average weekly wage. The Division then multiplies that amount by two. JNK did not provide business records typically sought by the Division. Instead, JNK responded to the BRR by producing a written statement from Mr. Kehr indicating that he founded JNK in November of 2014, but did no work until July of 2015. That initial job involved fixing a set of stairs for $200. Afterwards, Mr. Kehr performed three separate small jobs between July and November of 2015, earning approximately $550. Because the Division could not ascertain JNK’s actual payroll from the documentation provided by JNK, the Division imputed JNK’s payroll for the time period in question and issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on January 19, 2016, seeking to impose a penalty of $61,424.04. Phillip Sley calculated the aforementioned penalty amount by filling out a worksheet that has been adopted by the Division through Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.027. The first step in completing the worksheet required Mr. Sley to assign a classification code to the type of work that Mr. Howe witnessed Messrs. Kehr, Hicks and Garthwait performing at the Port Orange worksite on December 10, 2015. Classification codes come from the Scopes® Manual, which has been adopted by the Department through rule 69L-6.021. Each code within the Scopes® Manual pertains to an occupation or type of work, and each code has an approved manual rate used by insurance companies to assist in the calculation of workers’ compensation insurance premiums. The imputed weekly payroll for each employee and corporate officer “shall be assigned to the highest rated workers’ compensation classification code for an employee based upon records or the investigator’s physical observation of that employee’s activities.” See Fla. Admin. Code. R. 69L-6.028(3)(d). In the instant case, Mr. Sley determined “5645” was the appropriate classification code. According to the Scopes Manual, [w]hen all of the carpentry work in connection with the construction of residential dwellings not exceeding three stories in height is performed by employees of the same carpentry contractor or general contractor responsible for the entire dwelling construction project, the work is assigned to Code 5645. This includes the construction of the sill, rough framework, rough floor, wood or light-gauge steel studs, wood or lighted-gauge steel joists, rafters, roof deck, all types of roofing materials, sidewall sheathing, siding, doors, wallboard installation, lathing, windows, stairs, finished flooring, cabinet installation, fencing, detached structures, and all interior wood trim. Mr. Sley’s next step in calculating the penalty amount was to determine the period of non-compliance. With regard to Mr. Kehr, the Department asserted that JNK failed to have workers’ compensation coverage between the date of JNK’s inception (November 10, 2014) and the date that Mr. Kehr received an exemption from the workers’ compensation coverage requirement (November 18, 2014). Despite having no evidence that Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait worked for JNK on any day other than December 10, 2015, the Division’s penalty calculation was based on an assumption that Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait worked for JNK from November 10, 2014, through December 10, 2015. Mr. Sley’s next step was to calculate JNK’s gross payroll for the time period in question. Because JNK did not provide the Division with business records that would have enabled the Division to calculate JNK’s actual payroll, Mr. Sley based JNK’s payroll on the statewide average weekly wage determined by the Department of Economic Opportunity for the time period in question.4/ Mr. Sley then multiplied that amount by two.5/ After converting the payroll numbers into a percentage, Mr. Sley multiplied the payroll amounts by the approved manual rate. As noted above, every classification code is associated with a particular manual rate determined by the Office of Insurance Regulation, and a manual rate corresponds to the risk associated with a particular occupation or type of work. Manual rates associated with potentially dangerous activities will have higher manual rates than activities with little or no potential danger. Mr. Sley’s next step was to calculate a premium for obtaining workers compensation coverage for Messrs. Kehr, Hicks, and Garthwait. Mr. Sley then multiplied that premium by two in order to calculate the individual penalties resulting from JNK not having workers’ compensation coverage for Messrs. Kehr, Hicks, and Garthwait. The sum of those amounts was $61,424.04. The evidence produced at the final hearing established that Mr. Sley utilized the correct class code, average weekly wage, and manual rates in his calculation of the penalty set forth in the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. The Division has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that JNK was in violation of the workers’ compensation coverage requirements of chapter 440. In particular, the Division proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Kehr had no workers’ compensation coverage for himself and no exemption from November 10, 2014, through November 17, 2014. However, the Division did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait were employees of JNK on any day other than December 10, 2015. Mr. Kehr testified during the final hearing that Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait were working for him on December 10, 2015. He also testified that he was paying them at a rate of $8.00 an hour. However, Mr. Kehr persuasively testified that Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait had not worked for him at any other time between November 10, 2014, and December 10, 2015. The undersigned finds Mr. Kehr’s testimony on this point to be credible. Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait did not testify during the final hearing in this matter. There is no evidence that Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait worked for JNK at any time other than December 10, 2015. Because there is no evidence indicating that Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait were employees of JNK at any time other than December 10, 2015, during the time period in question, the undersigned finds that the Department failed to carry its burden of proving that $61,424.04 is the appropriate penalty. Based on the above findings, the undersigned finds that the correct penalty resulting from Mr. Kehr’s lack of coverage is $627.48. The worksheet completed by Mr. Sley indicates that is the amount of the $61,424.04 penalty associated with Mr. Kehr’s lack of coverage. As for the penalties associated with the lack of coverage for Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait on December 10, 2015, the undersigned multiplied the average weekly wage utilized by the Division ($841.57) by two. That results in a weekly gross payroll amount of $1,683.14. Dividing $1,683.14 by five results in a daily gross payroll amount of $336.63. Dividing $336.63 by 100 and then multiplying the result by 15.91 (the approved manual rate utilized by the Division for the period from January 1, 2015, through December 10, 2015) yields a daily premium of $53.62. Multiplying $53.62 by two results in a penalty of $107.23. Multiplying $107.23 by two yields $214.46, JNK’s penalty for not having workers’ compensation coverage for Messrs. Hicks and Garthwait on December 10, 2015. JNK’s total penalty is $841.94. Because section 440.107(7)(d)1. mandates a minimum penalty of $1,000, the undersigned finds that $1,000 is the correct penalty for the instant case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order imposing impose a $1,000 penalty on Donald Kehr, d/b/a JNK Framing Inc., a Dissolved Florida Corporation. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 2016.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is liable for a penalty of $265,604.81 based on payroll records for the period from October 28, 2008, through October 27, 2008, pursuant to Subsection 440.107(7), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance for the benefit of their employees in accordance with Section 440.107. Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the construction business. On October 27, 2008, a compensation compliance investigator and other investigators for Petitioner conducted a targeted investigation of Respondent’s business based on reports from a confidential informant that Respondent was not in compliance with Chapter 440 and the Insurance Code. The compliance investigator met two relatives of the sole shareholder of the company, who identified themselves as employees. The compliance investigator also identified construction work being conducted by two workers, who, it is undisputed, were not in compliance with Chapter 440. The disputed issues of fact are comprised of two issues. The first issue is whether payments to relatives of the sole shareholder are compensation or loans. The second issue is whether cash payments to the sole shareholder are compensation or business expenses. None of the loans to family members were repaid to the employer at the time of the hearing. Loans that have not been repaid to the employer are defined as payroll by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035, and Respondent owes that portion of the penalty assessment allocable to the first issue. Respondent provided ample evidence to demonstrate that the disputed transactions were loans rather than compensation for employment. One relative is disabled and unable to work at the level for which he is allegedly compensated. He will repay the loans out of the sale proceeds of his home upon his death. Other family members have less tragic but similarly sad stories. However, deviation from Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.035 would merely invite remand pursuant to Section 120.69. The remaining issue is whether cash payments by Respondent to its sole shareholder are properly characterized as compensation or business expenses. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(1)(f) defines payroll to include expense reimbursements to the extent the business records do not confirm the expense was incurred as a valid business expense. For the reasons stated hereinafter, it is less than clear and convincing that the disputed cash payments are payroll within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(1)(f). The sole shareholder explained under oath at the hearing that the cash payments at issue were for business expenses, including the payment of construction materials. He does not give workers charge cards to buy construction materials. He gives them cash. They do not always bring him receipts. The witness submitted detailed tabulations of approximately $77,002.46 in such expenses during the audit period, and the trier of fact found the testimony and supporting documentation to be credible and persuasive. The sole shareholder also testified that he incurred cash office expenses during the audit period of approximately $22,500.00 and submitted documentation to support that testimony. He also purchased three trucks for the business and made cash down payments on each truck with documentation to support the cash payments. The trier of fact finds that testimony and supporting documentation to be credible and persuasive. Based on the evidence through the date of the hearing, it is less than clear and convincing that the disputed cash payments to the sole shareholder were not incurred as valid business expenses within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(f). The testimony of the sole shareholder and the supporting documentary evidence also shows that the disputed amounts were not cash payments to the sole shareholder in his capacity as an employee within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.035(1)(b).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order imposing a fine consistent with the amount attributable to unpaid loans. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of November, 2009.
