Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs WESTSIDE MASONRY CONTRACTORS, INC., 09-004936 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Sep. 10, 2009 Number: 09-004936 Latest Update: Aug. 26, 2010

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is liable for a penalty of $286,400.01 for the alleged failure to maintain workers’ compensation insurance for its employees in violation of Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes (2008).1

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation for the benefit of their employees in accordance with the requirements of Section 440.107. Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the construction business. On May 19, 2009, Petitioner's investigator inspected one of Respondent's job sites located at 6665 Mirabella Lane, Naples, Florida. The purpose of the inspection was to determine whether Respondent was in compliance with workers' compensation requirements. The investigator observed workers laying concrete block in a residential development under construction. The investigator interviewed the workers and learned the identity of the individual owner of Respondent. The investigator determined through the Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) that Respondent had secured workers' compensation coverage. However, Respondent maintained minimum coverage identified in the record as an "if any" policy. An "if any" policy imposes a premium based on zero employees and zero payroll and requires Respondent to notify the insurer of any new employees within three days of being hired. Respondent had reported no workers to his workers' compensation carrier, but had reported 54 employees for purposes of unemployment compensation taxes.2 None of the individuals reported for unemployment compensation taxes had secured workers' compensation coverage for themselves. Respondent is liable for workers' compensation for the 54 workers described in the preceding paragraph, which the trier of fact finds are employees of Respondent. None of the workers has an exemption from workers' compensation coverage. Petitioner correctly calculated the amount owed by Respondent, which is $286,400.01.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order imposing a penalty assessment in the amount of $286,400.01. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2010.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57440.10440.107440.38
# 1
FLORIDA SOCIETY OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS AND ROBERT A. GUSKIEWICZ vs DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF WORKERS` COMPENSATION, 97-000693RP (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 10, 1997 Number: 97-000693RP Latest Update: Jun. 24, 1997

The Issue Whether the Department's proposed amendment of Rule 38F- 7.020, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of its delegated legislative authority under Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, [1996 Supp.], or whether the authority specified in the proposed rule is sufficient for the Department to adopt the proposed rule?

Findings Of Fact The Florida Society of Anesthesiologists is a voluntary, nonprofit association comprised of individual members, each of whom is licensed in the State of Florida to practice medicine. Petitioner, Robert A. Guskiewicz, M.D., is a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida specializing in anesthesia. Pursuant to Section 440.13(12), Florida Statutes, a three-member panel is charged with the responsibility of determining the schedules of maximum reimbursement for physician treatment of workers' compensation patients. In March 1996, the three-member panel convened and adopted a resource-based relative value scale ("RBRVS") reimbursement system, which, on or about January 3, 1997, the Department published notice of its intent to embody in proposed Rule 38F-7.020, in Vol. 23, No. 1 of the Florida Administrative Law Weekly. A copy is attached and incorporated herein by reference. The proposed Rule lists Sections 440.13(7), 440.13(8), 440.13(11), 440.13(12), 440.13(13), 440.13(14), and 440.591, Florida Statutes, as specific authority. The proposed Rule implements Sections 440.13(6), 440.13(7), 440.13(8), 440.13(11), 440.13(12), 440.13(13), and 440.13(14), Florida Statutes. There are no other facts necessary for determination of the matter.

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.54120.56120.68440.13440.59190.201 Florida Administrative Code (16) 58A-2.00258A-2.00358A-2.00458A-2.00558A-2.00958A-2.01058A-2.01258A-2.01458A-2.014158A-2.01558A-2.01658A-2.01758A-2.01858A-2.01958A-2.023258A-2.0236
# 2
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs WILLIAM F. FURR, 06-003639 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Sep. 21, 2006 Number: 06-003639 Latest Update: May 29, 2007

The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation's (Department's) Stop Work Order and Second Amended Penalty Assessment and if so, what penalty should be imposed?

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with enforcement of the laws related to workers' compensation pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. On August 15, 2006, Katina Johnson, a workers' compensation compliance investigator for the Division, observed two men painting the exterior of a home at 318 First Street, in Jacksonville. The two men were identified as William Furr and his son, Corey Furr. Upon inquiry, Mr. Furr stated that he held a lifetime exemption from workers' compensation requirements. He provided to Ms. Johnson a copy of his exemption card, which was issued April 30, 1995, in the name of Arby's Painting & Decorating. The exemption card had no apparent expiration date. 4. In 1998, Sections 440.05(3) and 440.05(6), Florida Statutes, were amended, effective January 1, 1999, to limit the duration of construction workers' compensation exemptions to a period of two years. Express language in the amended statute provided that previously held "lifetime exemptions" from workers' compensation requirements would expire on the last day of the birth month of the exemption holder in the year 1999. Ms. Johnson researched Respondent's status on the Department's Compliance and Coverage System (CCAS) database that contains all workers compensation insurance policy information from the carrier to an insured, and determined that Respondent did not have a State of Florida workers' compensation insurance policy. The CCAS database indicated that Respondent previously held an exemption as a partner for Arby's Painting and Decorating, and that the exemption expired December 31, 1999. Ms. Johnson also checked the National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") database which confirmed that Respondent did not have a current workers' compensation insurance policy in the State of Florida. After conferring with her supervisor, Ms. Johnson issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent on August 15, 2006. She also made a request for business records for the purpose of calculating a penalty for lack of coverage. Respondent submitted a written payroll record for his son, Corey Furr, along with a summary of what Respondent had earned on various jobs he performed from 2004 through 2006 and a Miscellaneous Income Tax Form 1099 for himself. On August 30, 2006, he also provided to the Department a copy of his occupational license with the City of Jacksonville. Based on the financial records supplied by Respondent, Ms. Johnson calculated a penalty for a single day, August 15, 2006, for Corey Furr. She calculated a penalty from January 1, 2005, through August 15, 2006, for William Furr. Ms. Johnson assigned a class code to the type of work performed by Respondent using the SCOPES Manual, multiplied the class code's assigned approved manual rate with the payroll per one hundred dollars, and then multiplied the result by 1.5. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a penalty of $5,296.37. A Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was issued November 1, 2006, with a penalty of $5,592.95. This Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was issued because Ms. Johnson used the incorrect period of violation for Respondent when she initially calculated the penalty. On August 25, 2006, Respondent entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for periodic payment of the penalty, and was issued an Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order by the Department. Respondent paid ten percent of the assessed penalty, provided proof of compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by forming a new company and securing workers' compensation exemptions for both himself and his son, Corey Furr, and agreed to pay the remaining penalty in sixty equal monthly payments. Respondent claims that he was not aware of the change in the law and continued to operate under the belief that his "lifetime exemption" remained valid. Although under no statutory obligation to do so, the Department sent a form letter to persons on record as holding exemptions to inform them of the change in the law and the process to be followed to obtain a new exemption.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Workers' Compensation enter a Final Order affirming the Stop Work Order issued August 15, 2006, and the Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued to Respondent on November 1, 2006. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2007.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57296.37440.02440.05440.10440.107440.38 Florida Administrative Code (1) 69L-6.021
# 3
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs BRAVO CONSTRUCTION, INC.,, 04-004569 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Dec. 21, 2004 Number: 04-004569 Latest Update: Jun. 27, 2005

The Issue The issues are: (1) Whether Respondent, Bravo Construction, Inc. ("Respondent"), was in violation of the workers’ compensation requirements of Chapter 440.107, Florida Statutes (2003),1/ by failing to secure workers’ compensation coverage for its workers; (2) Whether such individuals possessed current valid workers’ compensation exemptions; and (3) Whether Respondent paid its workers remuneration outside of Respondent’s employee leasing company.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, which requires that employers secure the payment of workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. Respondent is a company engaged in the construction industry. Specifically, Respondent's business is framing houses. At all time relevant to this proceeding, Elias Bravo was president of the company. On May 26, 2004, the Department’s investigators, Carol Porter and Kelley Dunning, conducted a random visit of a work site in Grassy Point, a gated community in Port Charlotte, Florida, and discovered Mr. Bravo and his workers on site as the house-framers. When the investigators arrived at the site, they spoke with Mr. Bravo, who advised the investigators that Respondent utilized a personnel leasing company, Time Management, which was actually a brokerage firm for Southeast Personnel Leasing, Inc. ("SEPL"), to secure workers’ compensation coverage. On May 26, 2005, Mr. Bravo was the only person in his crew who had coverage with SEPL. At the time of the site visit, the other men were not listed with SEPL because Mr. Bravo still had their applications in his car. After Respondent was unable to provide proof that the men had workers' compensation coverage pursuant to Subsections 440.107(3) and (7)(a), Florida Statutes, the investigators issued a Stop Work Order to Respondent while at the work site on May 26, 2004. On the same day that the Stop Work Order was issued, Investigator Dunning served Mr. Bravo with a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation ("Request for Production of Business Records"). The Department requested copies of Respondent's business records in order to determine whether Respondent had secured workers' compensation coverage; whether Mr. Bravo or Respondent's employees had workers' compensation exemptions; and, if not, to determine the penalty assessment. In response to the Request for Production of Business Records, Mr. Bravo provided certificates of insurance, Respondent's check stubs written to various entities or individuals on behalf of Respondent, payroll records, and Form 1099s for the year ending 2003. Many of the documents provided by Mr. Bravo indicated that Respondent made payments directly to the entities and individuals. The Department maintains records regarding the workers' compensation coverage of individuals and entities in a statewide database called Compliance and Coverage Automated System ("CCAS"). The CCAS database is utilized by the Department to verify if an individual or entity has workers' compensation coverage or a valid exemption from coverage. As part of the Department's investigation, Investigator Porter conducted a CCAS search for Respondent's workers’ compensation insurance coverage records. This search verified that Mr. Bravo had workers' compensation coverage. However, many of the workers or entities to whom Respondent made direct payments did not have workers’ compensation coverage or current valid workers’ compensation exemptions. Based on a review of the payroll records, check stubs, and the Form 1099s that Respondent provided to the Department, Investigator Porter determined that Respondent was an "employer" as that term is defined in Subsection 440.02(16), Florida Statutes. Subsequently, the Department reassessed the original penalty and issued the Amended Order with the attached penalty worksheet which detailed the basis of the penalty assessment. In determining the amended penalty assessment, Investigator Porter disregarded and did not include Respondent's payments to any individual or entity that had workers’ compensation coverage or an exemption from such coverage. The Amended Order, which reflected a penalty assessment of $97,416.68, was issued to Respondent on May 28, 2004.2/ Respondent paid remuneration to the individuals listed on the penalty worksheet of the Amended Order for work they performed. Nonetheless, during the period covered by the penalty assessment, Respondent did not secure workers' compensation coverage for the individuals listed on the penalty worksheet, and none of them had workers' compensation coverage or exemptions from such coverage. The individuals listed on the penalty worksheet of the Amended Order were Respondent's employees during the relevant period, in that they were paid by Respondent, a construction contractor, and did not have workers’ compensation coverage or an exemption from such coverage. Mr. Bravo had workers' compensation coverage through SEPL. However, none of the employees listed on the Amended Order had workers' compensation coverage through SEPL, because they were paid directly by Respondent. A personnel leasing company provides workers' compensation coverage and payroll services to its clients, then leases those employees back to the clients for a fee. Respondent was a client of SEPL, and based on that relationship, Mr. Bravo believed that he and his workers received workers' compensation coverage through that personnel leasing company. However, the workers' compensation coverage provided by SEPL applied only to those employees SEPL leased to Respondent. In the case of leased employees, Respondent would have to make payments to the leasing company and not directly to his workers. The leasing company would then, in turn, pay the leased employees. When, as in this case, the construction company makes direct payments to individuals performing construction work, those workers are not leased employees and, thus, are not secured by the workers’ compensation coverage provided by the personnel leasing company. See § 468.520, Fla. Stat. Some of the individuals listed on the penalty worksheet may have been "dually employed"; that is, sometimes they were employed by Respondent and at other times, they were employees of SEPL and were leased to Respondent. However, during the periods in which individuals worked for Respondent and were paid by Respondent, and were not paid by SEPL, they were without workers’ compensation coverage unless Respondent provided such coverage. With regard to the individuals listed on the penalty worksheet, Respondent provided no such coverage. Respondent, through Mr. Bravo, paid its employees directly, thus, circumventing SEPL and losing the coverage that the employees may have had through it. The Department assessed the penalty against Respondent based on the remuneration Respondent gave directly to the employees outside of SEPL, the class code assigned to each employee utilizing the SCOPES Manual adopted by the Department in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021, and the guidelines in Subsection 440.107(7)(d), Florida Statutes.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order that affirms the Stop Work Order and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, which imposes a penalty of $97,416.68. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2005.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57440.02440.10440.107440.38468.520468.529 Florida Administrative Code (1) 69L-6.021
# 4
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs JOHN H. WOODS, D/B/A WOODS CONSTRUCTION, 08-005348 (2008)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Oct. 22, 2008 Number: 08-005348 Latest Update: Sep. 01, 2009

The Issue Whether Respondent, John H. Woods, d/b/a Woods Construction, conducted operations in the State of Florida without obtaining workers’ compensation coverage which meets the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2008)1, in violation of Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and Second Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. If so, what penalty should be assessed by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, pursuant to Section 440.107, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the requirement of Section 440.107, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure the payment of workers’ compensation coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. Workers’ compensation coverage is required if a business entity is engaged in the construction industry in Florida. Securing the payment of workers’ compensation coverage can be achieved via three different methods: purchase a workers’ compensation insurance policy; ensure that workers are paid and workers’ compensation coverage is provided by a third party entity called a Professional Employment Organization (PEO); or apply for a Certificate of Exemption from Workers’ Compensation Coverage (Exemption Certificate) assuming certain statutorily mandated criteria are met. These methods are not mutually exclusive of each other. On August 14, 2008, a workers’ compensation compliance investigator employed by Petitioner, visited a construction site in Lee County, Florida. On the site, she observed several groups of men conducting various construction activities including the laying of a sidewalk along Lexington Street in Fort Myers. The work performed involved construction activities as contemplated under the applicable agency rule. Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.021. By a preponderance of evidence, it is determined that among the entities on the worksite was a group of three laborers who worked for Woods Construction. There was no proof of coverage for workers’ compensation for the Woods Construction Company, neither an insurance policy, nor any exemption certificate for the individuals encountered on the worksite. Woods Construction assumed that the three laborers were covered by Able Body Labor, a PEO. The evidence confirmed that two of the three laborers were covered. However, the third laborer, Filberto Castro, was unable to be included on the work roster due to his lack of corresponding documentation necessary for employment in the United States. Therefore, Castro was working without coverage. An SWO was issued and a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Calculation (BRR) was served on J. Woods Construction, Corp. [sic] on August 14, 2008. The SWO was later amended to conform to the correct name of the company, which is not a corporation. The amended SWO was served on John H. Woods on August 22, 2008, via certified mail. Pursuant to the BRR, Respondent provided business records to Petitioner. Petitioner’s Penalty Calculator’s duties are to receive records from the employer, and organize, identify, and audit those records which indicate payroll activities, while delineating other business activities, which may be related to the non-payroll activities of the business such as purchasing supplies, maintaining a place of business, etc. The characterization of the voluminous records received from Respondent were categorized into three distinct categories: reliable, somewhat reliable, and unreliable records. The records were characterized as “reliable” if they were records from an independent third party or the bank with whom Respondent conducted business, and were thus extremely difficult to alter without a high level of expertise. They are considered “source documentation.” The bank records capture the transactions as they occurred, to whom money was paid, and for what amount. The next category of records deemed “somewhat reliable” were those records which, on their face appear to be legitimate records, such as copies of the checks with corresponding amounts and dates to those in the “reliable” category. However, certain inconsistencies in these records demonstrated that they were less than reliable. These records were only used in select instances when there was corresponding source documentation supporting their veracity. A prime example, among many, is check number 1078 for $100.00 indicating a payment for a credit card; the corresponding checkstub indicates that the payment went to “Whitney,” a grand-child of John H. Woods. In toto, the documents illustrated that Respondent failed to follow generally accepted accounting principles by mislabeling or mischaracterizing funds on a regular basis. The third category of records were records which were considered “unreliable” as these records lacked any corresponding source documentation and they could not be considered in assessing the payroll activities of the firm. In the construction industry, there are instruments called “draw requests.” The draw request is an item that a subcontractor or builder will utilize to show partial completion of a project and concurrently request more funds (the draw) to complete the remaining portion of the project. The draw requests are often utilized at pre-measured stages of the project, e.g.: 25 percent completion, 50 percent completion, etc. The draw requests would have attached source documentation such as receipts from suppliers, servicers, and other miscellanea to show that the project is worked upon as opposed to the funds being siphoned off elsewhere. Nowhere, in the box full of records produced, was a proper draw request found with attached receipts. Therefore, none of the records produced could be considered as reliable documents. Many irregularities in Respondent’s methodology of accounting were also noted; as an example, there were numerous times that company checks from Respondent were deposited by an entity known as “Hendry Contracting,” without explanation. Respondent personally held the license as a General Contractor, and would utilize Hendry Contracting as a subcontractor. Hendry Contracting did not have any license whatsoever. It utilized Respondent’s license while performing construction activities. Brad Hendry, the principal of Hendry Contracting, is married to Janice Hendry, the daughter of John H. Woods, the owner of Respondent, Woods Construction. Janice Hendry administered Respondent’s company account and the company account of Hendry Contracting. The evidence is clear that no separation of duties was attempted. Furthermore, Hendry admitted that she did not exercise any sense of separation between the two different accounts (Woods Construction and/or Hendry Contracting). The two businesses were “commingled,” and the ability to retain any form of standard accounting requirement of checks and balances has been nullified. Numerous irregularities that defied “generally accepted accounting principles” appeared, including personal loans to family members, wholesale transfers of monies from Respondent to Hendry Contracting without explanation, and checks drafted to Brad Hendry (personally). Further, Woods testified that he exercised little or no control over his company in the last ten years. Hendry also confirmed the haphazard method of managing the two firms’ different accounts by writing checks from one firm to another, when the other firm’s account was running low. Hendry’s testimony regarding the financial cooperation of Respondent and Hendry Contracting is indicative of the commingling of accounts, as well. Hendry testified that each entity would draw on each other’s accounts depending on the cash levels within each respective account. Hendry also testified that Hendry Contracting was utilized for obtaining bank loans and utilizing Hendry’s name to purchase materials when the other accounts were depleted. By utilizing only the bank records, a general ledger for Respondent was constructed which derived the amounts that came into the business and the amounts paid out for labor. The fact that Respondent had no general ledger meant that some items would never be accounted for, such as building supply costs. Based on that caveat, Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.035(i) was applied to the total payroll derived from the bank records. This had the effect of reducing total payroll by twenty percent to account for building supplies (which were never accounted for due to the non-existent business ledger of Respondent). The amount of money flowing and commingling between the two firms (Respondent and Hendry Contracting) and among family members, numbered in the hundreds of thousands of dollars. The commingled money was utilized for all manners of payments: loans (not expected to be paid back) to family members, inflated wages to family members for de minimis services, or payment for services/goods for family members’ personal residences. A proposed penalty in the amount of $365,876.82 was originally assessed, as reflected in the AOPA, and served on Respondent on August 26, 2008. Based on further records produced and the understanding that Respondent was a construction firm but was unable to show any receipts of building supplies, the proposed penalty, utilizing Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L- 6.035(i), decreased the payroll by 20 percent to account for building supplies that were not documented. After consideration of the documents provided and application of the rule, a Second AOPA was prepared showing an assessment in the amount of $306,876.82. With Hendry as the sole financial officer of Respondent, approximately $351,632.43 of payroll was allocated to various family members. There was unambiguous testimony from Woods and Hendry that family members were employed in various roles, most notably the grand-daughters who were earning wages while conducting secretarial duties. A further $472,292.94 was paid to Hendry Contracting during the three-year audit time- period. Hendry Contracting never had any discernible workers’ compensation coverage for this amount of payroll, rendering Respondent liable for failure to secure workers’ compensation coverage for the monies paid. The remainder of the unsecured payroll assessed to Respondent was for various non-family workers for whom no proof of workers’ compensation coverage could be ascertained. The Second AOPA was computed by calculating Respondent’s payroll for the past three years using the business records Respondent provided. The payroll was then divided for each year by 100 and that figure was multiplied by an approved manual rate assigned to the classification codes (class codes) found in the National Council on Compensation Insurance’s Scope of Trade Manual (Scopes Manual). Class codes were assigned to the individuals listed on the penalty worksheet according to their historical duties. The grand-daughters and other female employees of Respondent were listed as clerical employees (classification code 8810), while the remaining names were listed as general carpentry workers (classification code 5645). Next, the product of the approved manual rate and the payroll for each year divided by 100 was then multiplied by 1.5, pursuant to statute, to derive the penalty for each year or part of a year. The penalties for each employee and year or part of a year were then added together to come up with a total penalty of $306,213.78. Based on the assessment of the financial records in conjunction with the documents admitted into evidence, the grand total of $306,213.78 is a true and correct penalty amount for Respondent.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order: Finding that Respondent failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees in violation of Subsections 440.10(1)(a) and 440.38(1), Florida Statutes; and Assessing a penalty against Respondent in the amount of $306,213.78, which is equal to 1.5 times the evaded premium based on the payroll records provided by Respondent and on the applicable approved manual rates and classification codes for the period extending from August 15, 2005, through August 14, 2008, as provided in Subsection 440.107(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2009.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57440.02440.10440.107440.38 Florida Administrative Code (3) 69L-6.02169L-6.02769L-6.035
# 5
IIEANA TOLEDO vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 13-003708 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 25, 2013 Number: 13-003708 Latest Update: Feb. 05, 2014

The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
# 6
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs WILBYS HOME REPAIRS, LLC, 15-000661 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Feb. 09, 2015 Number: 15-000661 Latest Update: Sep. 09, 2015

The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent, Wilby’s Home Repairs, LLC, failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation coverage for its employees, and if so, what penalty is owed.

Findings Of Fact The Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, is the state agency charged with the enforcement of the requirement in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, that employers in Florida secure workers’ compensation coverage for their employees as required by section 440.107(3). At all times relevant to this case, Respondent was a company engaged in the construction industry. Its principal office was located at 2641 University Boulevard North, H115, Jacksonville, Florida 32211. On or about October 2, 2014, Ann Johnson, a compliance investigator for the Division, observed two people doing patch/repair work using a ladder on the outside of a home at 2322 Myra Street in Jacksonville, Florida. She approached and spoke to both men, who identified themselves as Michael Wilbur and Robert Nelson and stated that they worked for Wilby’s Home Repairs. When Ms. Johnson asked for proof of workers’ compensation coverage, Mr. Wilbur could not provide it but thought both gentlemen had exemptions. Mr. Wilbur thought that his accountant who had prepared the paperwork for filing with the Division of Corporations for his company had also completed the applications for exemptions for workers’ compensation coverage. However, no applications for exemptions had been filed. Investigator Johnson consulted the Division of Corporations website to determine the identity of Respondent’s corporate officers and found that Mr. Wilbur and Mr. Nelson were the listed officers. She then consulted the Division’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (“CCAS”) for proof of workers’ compensation coverage and for any exemptions associated with Respondent. Investigator Johnson’s research revealed that Respondent did not have a workers’ compensation policy or an employee-leasing policy, and further, there were no exemptions for its corporate officers on file. Based on this information, Investigator Johnson consulted with her supervisor, who provided authorization for the issuance of a Stop-Work Order. She then issued a Stop-Work Order and personally served it on Mr. Wilbur on October 2, 2014. At the same time, she issued and served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation (BRR). The requested documents were for the purpose of determining Respondent’s payroll from May 16, 2014 (the date the company was formed according to the Division of Corporations website) to October 2, 2014 (the date of the random inspection). They consisted of payroll documents, such as time sheets or cards, attendance records, check stubs, and payroll summaries; account documents, such as check journals and statements; disbursements records; workers’ compensation coverage documents, such as copies of policies, declaration pages, and certificates of workers’ compensation; documents related to any exemptions held; documents reflecting the identity of each subcontractor and the relationship thereto, including any and all payments to subcontractors; and documentation of subcontractors’ workers’ compensation coverage. On October 3, 2014, Mr. Wilbur came into the Division office in Jacksonville and filled out the applications for exemptions, and those were processed. Mr. Wilbur submitted a cashier’s check for $1,000 and Respondent was released from the Stop-Work Order. He also brought in some records in response to the BRR. Those records consisted of letters, notations, and copies of checks made out to Robert Nelson or Mike Wilbur from Grant-Dooley Rental. The records were scanned and provided to the penalty auditing team to calculate an appropriate penalty according to the statutory formula. Penalty audit supervisor Anita Proano reviewed the business records provided by Respondent, but could not, from those records, properly identify the amount of gross payroll paid to Respondent’s employees on which workers’ compensation premiums had not been paid. Ms. Proano determined that Respondent had not been in compliance with coverage requirements from May 16, 2014, to October 2, 2014. The business records provided by Respondent were not sufficient for the Department to calculate a penalty for Respondent’s period of noncompliance with the coverage requirements of chapter 440. The auditor assigned to the case then calculated a penalty based upon imputed payroll pursuant to the procedures required by section 440.107(7)(e) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.208. Had the documents submitted by Respondent been adequate, then the Division would have used those documents to calculate Respondent’s payroll. The checks provided by Respondent to the Division consisted of checks made out to Robert Nelson and Michael Wilbur, individually, spanning from approximately May 9, 2014, through October 2014, from Grant- Dooley Rental. Mr. Wilbur testified that the only job Respondent handled during this period was the family home on Myra Street, and he and Mr. Nelson were paid directly by the homeowner rather than having payments made to Wilby’s Home Repair as an entity. Unfortunately, these direct payments are not the type of records contemplated by the Division’s rules regarding appropriate documentation of payroll. On October 17, 2014, the Division issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Respondent, which was served on Respondent on October 20, 2014. The penalty assessed for noncompliance was $21,583.48. The penalty assessment calculation is based upon the classification codes listed in the Scopes® Manual, which have been adopted through the rulemaking process through rules 68L- 6.021 and 69L-6.031. Classification codes are codes assigned to different occupations by the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc. (NCCI), to assist in the calculation of workers’ compensation insurance premiums. Auditor Proano used classification code 5645 (carpentry) for both employees. Code 5645 is the correct code for the type of work observed by Ms. Johnson during her inspection. Using this classification code, Ms. Proano used the corresponding approved manual rates for that classification and the period of non-compliance. The average weekly wage as established by the Department of Economic Opportunity for the relevant period is $827.08. Ms. Proano used that amount and multiplied it by 2 for the number of days of noncompliance. Based on that calculation, she came up with a gross payroll amount of $66,166.40, which she divided by 100. Ms. Proano then multiplied that amount by the manual approved rate ($16.31), times two to reach the amount of penalty to be imposed. All of the penalty calculations are in accordance with the Division’s Penalty Calculation Worksheet. The Department has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent employed Robert Nelson and Michael Wilbur on October 2, 2014, and that Respondent was engaged in the construction business for the period of May 16, 2014, through October 2, 2014, without proper workers’ compensation coverage for that period. The Department also demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the documents submitted by Respondent, which may indeed be all of the documentation Respondent possessed, were not sufficient to establish Respondent’s payroll, thus necessitating imputation of payroll. Finally, the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that the required penalty for the period of noncompliance is $21,583.48.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order finding that Wilby’s Home Repairs, LLC, failed to secure the payment of workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees with respect to Robert Nelson and Michael Wilbur, in violation of section 440.107, Florida Statutes, and imposing a penalty of $21,583.48. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Trevor S. Suter, Esquire Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 (eServed) Mike Wilbur 5376 Shirley Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 (eServed)

Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57120.68440.01440.02440.107440.12
# 7
IN RE: STEPHAN CARTER vs *, 16-003637EC (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jun. 28, 2016 Number: 16-003637EC Latest Update: Mar. 19, 2018

The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Respondent violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2013),1/ by obtaining funds from Orange County in the form of a severance payment while remaining employed as General Counsel for the Orange County Clerk of Courts; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Stephan Carter, served as General Counsel for the Orange County Clerk of Courts (the “Clerk’s Office”) from June 2003 through April 1, 2014. Respondent was a public employee at all times material to this action. Respondent was personally hired by Lydia Gardner, the Orange County Clerk of Courts. In January 2005, Respondent and Ms. Gardner executed an employment contract (the “Employment Agreement”). The Employment Agreement was signed by Respondent and Ms. Gardner, in her capacity as the Clerk of Courts, on January 10, 2005, and January 13, 2005, respectively. The Employment Agreement, paragraph 6, entitled “Termination of Employment,” established that the Clerk would pay Respondent a fee should the Clerk terminate the Employment Agreement prior to its expiration date (the “Severance Payment”). Paragraph 6 specifically provided: The Clerk may declare this agreement terminated at any time. . . . The Clerk shall promptly pay to the General Counsel a sum equal to i) the salary and deferred compensation that is accrued but unpaid as of the date of the termination, plus ii) an amount equal to the pro rata portion of his salary for all accrued but unused leave time, plus, iii) an amount equal to the salary and deferred compensation that the General Counsel would have received during the 180 days immediately following the date such termination takes effect, as if this agreement had not been terminated. At the final hearing, Respondent explained that when he accepted the position of General Counsel (then titled “Legal Counsel”) with the Clerk’s Office in June 2003, he informed Ms. Gardner that he would only agree to work for the Clerk’s Office if he could be protected from losing his position. Therefore, Respondent sought and obtained the Severance Payment provision should he be terminated for any reason other than his voluntary resignation. The Employment Agreement provided that Respondent’s term of employment continued until January 6, 2009. On January 7, 2009, Respondent and Ms. Gardner entered a signed agreement wherein the Employment Agreement was “extended indefinitely.” On February 5, 2013, Respondent and Ms. Gardner signed a second amendment to the Employment Agreement.2/ This “clarification of terms” stated: [A]s to the definition of termination in paragraph 6, for the purposes of the contract, termination by the Clerk includes the ending of the employment relationship for any reason other than General Counsel’s voluntary resignation. The amendment also provided that an $11,000 annual payment into Respondent’s deferred compensation plan contained in the original Employment Agreement be considered compensation under Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(15)(relating to pensions) and not a fringe benefit. In February 2013, Ms. Gardner became gravely ill. Ms. Gardner’s illness caused her to be absent from the Clerk’s Office. In Ms. Gardner’s absence, Colleen Reilly, the Chief Administrative Officer for the Clerk’s Office, assumed Ms. Gardner’s responsibilities. Ms. Reilly was hired in 2009. At that time, Respondent prepared an employment contract for Ms. Reilly modelled on his own Employment Agreement. In April 2013, Ms. Reilly approached Respondent to talk about their future employment with the Clerk’s Office. Ms. Gardner’s health was deteriorating. Respondent and Ms. Reilly discussed the impact of Ms. Gardner’s death on their positions. Ms. Reilly was also concerned whether the new Clerk of Courts would honor their Employment Agreements. Respondent and Ms. Reilly’s conversation led to a discussion regarding how they could protect the Severance Payments under their respective Employment Agreements. Respondent and Ms. Reilly considered several possibilities. One position was that their Employment Agreements would remain in effect upon Ms. Gardner's death, and they could ask the new Clerk of Courts to honor the payout terms. Respondent, however, determined that the Employment Agreements were not clear on whether he and Ms. Reilly were entitled to the Severance Payments following a change of administration. Therefore, they became concerned whether the new Clerk of Courts would be legally bound to honor the Severance Payments should he or she decide not to retain their services. Respondent, without seeking legal guidance or consulting with outside counsel for the Clerk’s Office, concluded that the Employment Agreements would terminate upon Ms. Gardner’s death. At the final hearing, Respondent explained that he considered his employment to be tied specifically to Ms. Gardner and not the Clerk's Office. Therefore, Respondent reasoned that because both he and Ms. Reilly were hired by and worked directly for Ms. Gardner, her death would terminate their contracts. This termination, of course, would also entitle Respondent (and Ms. Reilly) to the Severance Payment because his employment would have ended for a reason other than his voluntary resignation. Respondent and Ms. Reilly also discussed their plans once their Employment Agreements were terminated. Respondent informed Ms. Reilly that he believed that after the Employment Agreement was terminated, they could continue to work for the Clerk’s Office as “at-will” employees without employment contracts. Respondent encouraged Ms. Reilly to take her Severance Payment then stay in her position with the Clerk’s Office. He intended to do the same. Late in April 2013, Ms. Reilly informed Respondent that she was planning to visit Ms. Gardner, who was on convalescent leave at her home, to ask her to formally terminate the Employment Agreements and make them at-will employees of the Clerk’s Office. Respondent encouraged Ms. Reilly’s endeavor. Respondent then drafted two versions of a memorandum Ms. Gardner could sign to effectuate the termination of their contracts. Ms. Gardner, however, did not agree to terminate the Employment Agreements or sign the paperwork Respondent had prepared. Consequently, the Employment Agreements remained in effect. When Ms. Reilly was not able to obtain Ms. Gardner’s consent to terminate the Employment Agreements, Respondent began to consider Ms. Reilly’s authority to terminate his Employment Agreement. Respondent determined that Ms. Reilly could terminate his contract under section 28.09, Florida Statutes, and they could still receive the Severance Payments. Section 28.09 describes the appointment of a clerk ad interim in the case of a vacancy occurring in the office of a clerk by death. Section 28.09 states that the clerk ad interim “shall assume all the responsibilities [and] perform all the duties” of the clerk. Therefore, because Ms. Reilly would assume all the powers of Ms. Gardner, she would be authorized the terminate his Employment Agreement. Ms. Gardner passed away on May 8, 2013. On May 9, 2013, Ms. Reilly was officially appointed as Clerk Ad Interim for the Clerk’s Office. Also on May 9, 2013, Respondent and Ms. Reilly immediately took steps to obtain their respective Severance Payments. To effectuate their plan, Ms. Reilly promptly terminated both their Employment Agreements using her newfound authority as the interim Clerk. Respondent hoped that this step would remove any questions of their entitlement to the Severance Payment that might be raised by the new Clerk of Courts. Respondent then went directly to the Clerk’s Payroll office. There, he approached Tracy Gasinski, the payroll administrator for the Clerk’s Office. Respondent informed her that Ms. Reilly had approved him to receive a payout. Respondent declared that his payout was authorized because his Employment Agreement was terminated. Respondent also instructed Ms. Gasinski to pay Ms. Reilly’s payout under her Employment Agreement. Respondent stressed that he wanted both payouts processed immediately. Finally, Respondent advised Ms. Gasinski that nobody needed to know about the payout. Ms. Gasinski felt pressured by Respondent. However, based on his representation that Ms. Reilly had approved the payout, she immediately processed a final paycheck for Respondent (and Ms. Reilly), which included the Severance Payment provided in his Employment Agreement. Ms. Gasinski calculated a payout for Respondent in the gross amount of $110,290.61. This figure included a Severance Payment of $76,844.00. In addition, per his request, Respondent was also paid $27,822.10 for all his unused vacation leave (405.57 hours times a rate of $68.60), as well as $5,624.51 for his unused sick leave (327.96 hours times a rate of $17.15). Ms. Gasinski paid 25 percent of Respondent’s sick leave per Clerk’s Office policy. The next day, on May 10, 2013, Ms. Gasinski issued Respondent a check in the amount of $58,400.00 which was deposited directly into Respondent's personal bank account. Ms. Gasinski also deposited a final paycheck into Ms. Reilly's bank account. On or about May 20, 2013, however, Respondent returned to see Ms. Gasinski. He was not happy with his payout. Respondent told Ms. Gasinski that the amount she deposited was incorrect, and he was due more money. Respondent demanded several adjustments which would maximize his Severance Payment. First, referencing the February 5, 2013, amendment to his Employment Agreement, Respondent wanted the $11,000 he received as deferred compensation to be incorporated into his base salary thereby increasing his rate of pay. Second, Ms. Gasinski, in calculating Respondent’s Severance Payment, computed the final payout based on six month’s salary in accordance with the standard practice of the Clerk's Office. Respondent, however, insisted that his Severance Payment be calculated based on “180 days” as specifically stated in his Employment Agreement at paragraph 6. This mathematical adjustment increased Respondent's payout by including payment for all Saturdays and Sundays.3/ Third, Respondent demanded that he receive 100 percent payout for his remaining sick leave instead of just 25 percent as was the Clerk’s Office policy. Fourth, Respondent requested that 56 hours (7 days) be reserved in his vacation leave account and not paid out.4/ Following their meeting, Ms. Gasinski voided the initial payout check. However, she was not comfortable with Respondent’s request based on her understanding of employment contracts. Respondent's and Ms. Reilly's transactions were out of the ordinary course of business for the Clerk's Office. In her experience, final paychecks to Clerk’s Office employees were always accompanied by paperwork from the Clerk’s Office’s Talent Management division. This paperwork came in the form of an Employee Change Notice (“ECN”). However, Respondent did not produce, nor had Ms. Gasinski received, an ECN supporting Respondent’s payout. In Clerk’s Office accounting practices, Talent Management and the Payroll office act as a check and balance for each other. Typically, Talent Management initiates the paperwork, and then Payroll issues the checks. The normal process for a payout when a Clerk's Office employee leaves employment is for Talent Management to notify Ms. Gasinski who then processes the final payout. Respondent did not have the authority to direct Ms. Gasinski to issue the checks. Similarly, Ms. Gasinski did not have the authority to write checks to either Respondent or Ms. Reilly. Furthermore, a final payout upon termination is always via a paper check. Direct deposit to a personal bank account is never an option. The terminated employee picks up the paper check from Talent Management who verifies that the employee's garage pass and badge have been returned. Because of her discomfort with issuing Respondent’s payout check, Ms. Gasinski sought advice from her supervisor, Mike Murphy, the Chief Financial Officer for the Clerk’s Office. Mr. Murphy suggested that Ms. Gasinski contact Talent Management. On May 21, 2013, Ms. Gasinski spoke to Joann Gammichia, the Director of Talent Management, about Respondent’s request for a payout. When Ms. Gammichia learned of the situation, she had immediate concerns. First, Ms. Gammichia wondered why Payroll was issuing a check without any documentation from Talent Management such as an ECN. Ms. Gammichia testified that each employment activity requires completion of an ECN which acts as a recordkeeping system for the Clerk's Office. Because Respondent approached Ms. Gasinski in the Payroll office directly, no ECN or other written record was generated explaining why the Clerk’s Office was issuing the payout to Respondent. Ms. Gammichia explained that the policy of the Clerk’s Office is that payouts, severance checks, termination, or any kind of position change should only occur with an ECN in order to maintain and track the complete history of an employee's tenure with the Clerk's office. Ms. Gammichia also wondered why Respondent went directly to Ms. Gasinski with his demands. The normal starting point for employee changes begins with Talent Management, and the end of the line is financial services and Payroll. The fact that Respondent was attempting to verbally change his employment status in the Payroll office was “highly irregular.” Ms. Gammichia was also puzzled why the Clerk’s Office was issuing a severance payout on an employment contract when the employment was not ending. Consequently, Ms. Gammichia told Ms. Gasinski not to issue the adjusted payout check. Ms. Gasinski then notified Respondent via e-mail dated May 21, 2013, that she could not process the final payout until she received the proper documentation from Ms. Gammichia in Talent Management. Shortly thereafter, Respondent visited Ms. Gammichia’s office to inquire why she was involved in his payout matter. According to Ms. Gammichia, Respondent became “pretty aggressive.” Respondent told Ms. Gammichia that she had no authority or business being involved. It was a personal matter. Respondent warned Ms. Gammichia that she was directly violating an order from Ms. Reilly to make the Severance Payments. Ms. Gammichia informed Respondent that not only was she involved, but she was not authorizing the payout check to go through. Ms. Gammichia further advised Respondent not to contact Ms. Gasinski regarding the payout. Later that day, Ms. Gammichia contacted her supervisor, Cathi Balboa, the Director of Administrative Services for the Clerk’s Office, to discuss Respondent’s payout request. Ms. Gammichia relayed to Ms. Balboa that Ms. Gasinski was upset because she was being asked to prepare a large payout based only on verbal instructions without any supporting paperwork. At the final hearing, Ms. Balboa recalled that Respondent’s urgent request for a payout was highly irregular. Ms. Balboa relayed that the Clerk’s Office should not issue a final payout unless an employee was truly terminated from his or her position. Based on their concerns, Ms. Gammichia and Ms. Balboa called Ms. Reilly, who was sick at home, to confirm whether Ms. Reilly was aware of the payouts that Respondent said she had authorized. Ms. Gammichia also wanted to report the fact that Ms. Gasinski felt that she was being coerced and harassed by Respondent. Ms. Gammichia described Ms. Reilly’s reaction as hostile and negative. Ms. Reilly did not seem happy that others were involved. Ms. Reilly asked Ms. Balboa, “How did you get involved in this?" The next morning, on May 22, 2013, Ms. Reilly returned to the Clerk’s Office and called a meeting with Mr. Murphy, Ms. Balboa, and Respondent. Ms. Reilly opened the meeting by asking Mr. Murphy and Ms. Balboa "what do you think your role is in this organization," and "where do your loyalties lay?" Ms. Reilly then announced that “it was a private matter, it was their personal business, [and] to stay out of it." Ms. Balboa testified at the final hearing that Ms. Reilly intimidated her in their meeting. Mr. Murphy conveyed that he understood that they were not to get involved in the severance payout matter. After the meeting, Ms. Gasinski was told to proceed with the payouts for Respondent and Ms. Reilly. On May 23, 2013, Ms. Gasinski processed a second severance payout check for Respondent and Ms. Reilly. Ms. Gasinski prepared for Respondent a revised final paycheck in the total amount of $156,443.11. This amount included a Severance Payment of $106,387.20. Respondent was also paid $25,826.23 for his vacation leave (349.57 hours times a rate of $73.88), as well as $24,229.68 for all his unused sick leave (327.96 hours times a rate of $73.88). A check in the net amount of $99,125.45 was deposited in Respondent’s personal bank account. On May 23, 2013, Respondent repaid the initial payout of $58,400.00 to the Clerk’s Office by personal check. After Ms. Reilly terminated his Employment Agreement on May 9, 2013, Respondent never left his position with the Clerk’s Office. Respondent considered himself an at-will employee and continued to report to work as General Counsel. There was never any break in his employment. At no time did Respondent (or the Clerk’s Office) initiate or complete any paperwork to rehire Respondent after either Ms. Gardner’s death or Ms. Reilly terminated his Employment Agreement. No documentation was prepared transitioning Respondent from a contract employee to an at-will employee. Respondent continued to perform the same duties under the same terms, conditions, and compensation contained in the Employment Agreement as if he never left office.5/ At the final hearing, Respondent testified why his interpretation of his Employment Agreement justified his actions and motives. Respondent first remarked that his Employment Agreement was not typical for a Clerk’s Office employee. It contained certain provisions which were not to be “exposed generally,” such as the termination clause and the contact termination fee. Therefore, he desired to keep his employment terms quiet. Respondent further disclosed that he did not initiate an ECN because his Severance Payment was not a human resources issue, it was a matter of contract. Respondent also explained that at the end of 2008, when his Employment Agreement was nearing its initial termination date, Respondent became concerned with his future at the Clerk’s Office. He began to wonder what would happen if Ms. Gardner left her position as Clerk. Therefore, he prepared, then executed, the 2009 amendment to the Employment Agreement extending it “indefinitely.” In 2013, Respondent prepared, then executed, the second amendment clarifying the term “termination.” Regarding collecting his Severance Payment without leaving his position with the Clerk’s Office, Respondent contended that just because his Employment Agreement was terminated (thus, entitling him to the Severance Payment) did not mean he had to leave employment with the Clerk’s Office. Respondent characterized the payment as a “contract termination fee.” Therefore, he asserted that the Clerk could terminate his Employment Agreement without actually terminating him from his position as General Counsel. Consequently, nothing prevented him from becoming an at-will employee. Accordingly, when Ms. Reilly terminated the Employment Agreements on May 9, 2013, by exercising her prerogative as the interim Clerk, she also decided that both Respondent and she would stay on with the Clerk’s Office as at-will employees until the new Clerk of Courts determined what to do with them. In February 2014, the new Clerk of Courts, Eddie Fernandez, determined to initiate an investigation to review the propriety of the 2013 Severance Payments to Respondent and Ms. Reilly. On March 28, 2014, Respondent was placed on administrative leave with pay. On April 1, 2014, after the investigation recommended that Respondent’s employment be terminated, Respondent resigned from his position with the Clerk’s Office. As a condition of his resignation, Respondent was not eligible for rehire by the Clerk’s Office. Respondent reimbursed the full amount of the money that he received as the Severance Payment from the Clerk’s Office. Commenting on the circumstances of his resignation and restitution, at the final hearing, Respondent urged that he did not act dishonestly, but, maybe he exercised bad judgment. Respondent also proclaimed that he received his Severance Payment because the interim Clerk ordered it, not by reason of his actions or conduct. Therefore, he personally never violated any duty of his office. Based on the evidence and testimony presented during the final hearing, the competent substantial evidence in the record establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent acted corruptly, with a wrongful intent, in seeking and obtaining the Severance Payment when he never intended to leave his public employment with the Clerk’s Office. Accordingly, the Advocate proved that Respondent violated section 112.313(6).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order finding that Respondent, Steven Carter, violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes; and that Respondent be subject to public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2017.

Florida Laws (12) 104.31112.311112.312112.313112.317112.322112.324112.3241120.569120.57120.6828.09
# 8
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION vs THOMPSON ENTERPRISES OF JACKSONVILLE, LLC, 16-005085 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Sep. 06, 2016 Number: 16-005085 Latest Update: Aug. 29, 2017

The Issue Whether Thompson Enterprises of Jacksonville, LLC (Respondent), violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes,1/ by failing to secure the payment of workers' compensation, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment; and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing workers' compensation coverage requirements applicable to employers under Florida law. Respondent is a Florida limited-liability company organized on October 25, 2011. The managing members listed on Respondent’s State of Florida Articles of Organization are Thomas Thompson, Michael Thompson, and Vicky Thompson. In May 2016, Department Compliance Investigator Ann Johnson was assigned to conduct a job site visit on Respondent’s business because its name appeared on the Department’s Bureau of Compliance’s “lead list.” The “lead list” is one of the Department’s databases listing employers that are potentially out of compliance with Florida's workers' compensation insurance requirements. Prior to the job site visit, Investigator Johnson reviewed the Division of Corporations website, www.sunbiz.org, and confirmed Respondent's address, managing members' names, and that Respondent was a current, active Florida company. Respondent’s website advertised towing, wrecker, mechanic, and body shop services. On May 6, 2016, Investigator Johnson visited Respondent's principal address located at 7600 Bailey Body Road, Jacksonville, Florida 32216. She noted a large commercial sign near Respondent’s address that advertised towing and wrecker services. During her visit, Investigator Johnson spoke with Vicky Thompson and Michael Thompson, both of whom advised that they were owners of Respondent. The Thompsons informed Investigator Johnson that Respondent had six employees, including the three listed as managers on Respondent’s Articles of Organization. When Investigator Johnson asked for proof of workers’ compensation coverage, Michael Thompson admitted that Respondent had no such coverage. Under Florida law, employers in the non-construction industry, such as Respondent, must secure workers' compensation insurance if "four or more employees are employed by the same employer." §§ 440.02(17)(b) and 440.107, Fla. Stat. On the same day as her site visit, Investigator Johnson confirmed Respondent’s lack of insurance with a search of the Department's internal database, Coverage and Compliance Automated System. At the time, Respondent had no active exemptions from the requirements of obtaining workers’ compensation for its three managing members. Based on her investigation, Investigator Johnson served Respondent with the Stop-Work Order and a Request for Production on May 6, 2016. Upon serving the documents, Investigator Johnson explained the effect and purpose of the documents and how Respondent could come into compliance. Respondent came into compliance that same day by paying a $1,000 down payment, reducing Respondent's workforce to three employees, applying for exemptions for its three managing members, and executing an agreed Order of conditional release with the Department. Respondent subsequently complied with the Department’s Request for Production. In June 2016, the Department assigned Penalty Auditor Eunika Jackson to review records obtained from Respondent and calculate the penalty to be assessed against Respondent. In accordance with applicable law, the Department's audit spanned the preceding two-year period, starting from the date of the Stop-Work Order. See § 440.107(7)(d)1., Fla. Stat. The audit period in this case was from May 7, 2014, through May 6, 2016. Based on information obtained during the investigation, Auditor Jackson assigned classification codes 7219, 8380, and 8810 to those identified as employees working for Respondent during the audit period. Classification codes are four-digit codes assigned to various occupations by the National Council on Compensation Insurance ("NCCI") to assist in the calculation of workers' compensation insurance premiums. Classification code 8810 applies to clerical office employees, code 7219 applies to trucking and "towing companies," and code 8380 applies to automobile service or repair centers. According to Respondent, it was out of compliance with the coverage requirements of chapter 440 for only "368 days" during the two-year audit period. Respondent's records, however, do not support this contention. Respondent provided a detailed "Employee Earnings Summary" for each employee stating the employee’s name, pay rate, and pay period. Respondent's payroll records reflect that Respondent employed "four or more employees" during the audit period. Throughout the two-year audit period, Respondent employed four or more employees with the following duties: Anna Lee, mechanic/bodywork; Cedric Blake, mechanic/bodywork; David Raynor, mechanic/bodywork; James Budner, mechanic/bodywork; Jason Leighty, mechanic; Kevin Croker, Jr., porter/detailer; Nicholas Conway, bodywork; Ralph Tenity, bodywork; Rebecca Thompson, secretary/office help; Stephen Collins, shop helper/porter; Todd Gatshore, tow truck driver/shop helper; and Williams Reeves, tow truck driver/shop helper. Evidence further demonstrated that, during the audit period, managing member Michael Thompson worked as a wrecker truckdriver, and worked with the Sheriff's Office to clear traffic accidents. He was assigned class code 7219 — tow truck driver. Managing member Vicky Thompson was given the clerical class code 8810 because she was observed working in the office during Investigator Johnson's site visit. Managing member Thomas Thompson was assigned the clerical class code 8810 based upon the fact that he occasionally does office work for the business. The corresponding approved manual rates for classification codes 8810, 7219, and 8380 were correctly applied to each employee for the related periods of non-compliance to determine the final penalty. In accordance with the Request for Production, Respondent provided the Department payroll summary reports, tax reports, and unemployment tax reports. The payroll summary reports and records provided by Respondent listed the payroll and duties for each employee. The gross payroll amounts for each employee reflected in the penalty in this case were derived from those documents. Upon receiving those reports and records, the Department correctly determined the gross payroll for Respondent's employees. On June 13, 2016, the Department served the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent, assessing a penalty of $33,788.90. A portion of the first penalty was based on imputed payroll for Respondent’s three managing members. After service of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, Respondent provided additional records showing the payroll of its three managing members, and the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was calculated after removing the imputed payroll. On August 22, 2016, the Department served the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on Respondent, assessing a penalty of $33,112.44, which was correctly calculated in accordance with section 440.107(7)(d)1. and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.027(1). In sum, the clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that Respondent was a tow truck company engaged in the wrecker/tow truck and body shop mechanic industries in Florida during the periods of noncompliance; that Respondent failed to secure the payment of workers' compensation for its employees in violation of Florida's Workers' Compensation Law; and that the Department correctly utilized the methodology specified in section 440.107(7)(d)1. and rule 69L-6.027(1) to determine the appropriate penalty of $33,112.44.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order, consistent with this Recommended Order, upholding the Stop-Work Order and imposing the penalty set forth in the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment against Thompson Enterprises of Jacksonville, LLC. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2017.

Florida Laws (10) 112.44120.569120.57120.68440.01440.02440.05440.10440.107440.38
# 9
MARTIN MEMORIAL HEALTH SYSTEMS vs DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, 10-001172 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port St. Lucie, Florida Mar. 10, 2010 Number: 10-001172 Latest Update: Aug. 23, 2010

The Issue Whether the Florida Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Respondent) should enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement (Petition for Resolution) filed by Martin Memorial Health Systems (Petitioner). If the Petition for Resolution should not be dismissed, whether Guarantee Insurance Company (the Carrier) improperly disallowed reimbursement owed to Petitioner for services Petitioner rendered to an injured employee/claimant and the amount thereof.

Findings Of Fact Paragraphs 1–38 of the Agreed Facts and Conclusions of Law set forth in the Joint Pre-Hearing Statement and Filing of Exhibits are hereby incorporated by reference. The Notice of Deficiency issued by Respondent should not have been issued because the Petition for Reimbursement was complete when filed. Respondent has no basis to dismiss the Petition for Reimbursement. Petitioner provided medical services to an employee that had workers' compensation insurance coverage from the Carrier. The usual and customary charges for the services at issue in this proceeding totaled $61,111.09. The Carrier paid Petitioner the sum of $9,135.52 based on the Carrier’s determination that the charges should be based on inpatient treatment on a per diem basis. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the services to the injured employee should be billed under the category “outpatient surgery” pursuant to the pre-admission authorization provided to Petitioner. Respondent has duly adopted rules that govern billing limitations. The parties agree that outpatient surgery, such as the services at issue in this proceeding should be reimbursed at 60 percent of the usual and customary charges. Petitioner is entitled to reimbursement from the Carrier in the amount of $36,666.65, which is 60 percent of $61,111.09. The Carrier should be credited with having paid the sum of $9,135.52, so the additional amount of the reimbursement due to Petitioner from the Carrier is $27,531.13 ($36,666.65 less $9,135.52) plus any applicable interest.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order ordering the Carrier to reimburse Petitioner, Martin Memorial Hospital, in the additional amount of $27,531.13 plus any applicable interest. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen Kennedy Martin Memorial Health Systems Post Office Box 9010 Stuart, Florida 34995 Mari H. McCully, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Workers` Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4229 Brian F. LaBovick, Esquire LaBovick & LaBovick, P.A. 5220 Hood Road, Second Floor Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33418 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Honorable Alex Sink Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57440.13
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer