Findings Of Fact Appellant owns the property located at 1430 Palmetto Street, Clearwater, Florida. The area is zoned RS-50, a zoning for single family residents. The house located thereon is a three-bedroom, two-bath home with a garage and carport. Appellant proposes to enclose the garage to provide two additional bedrooms and a bath. The lot on which this house is sited contains 13,000 square feet. The minimum lot size for RS-50 zoning is 5,000 square feet. The structure exceeds all setback requirements of the Code. Most of the homes in this neighborhood have driveways to the garages while Appellant's property has a circular drive in front of the house. The structure meets the City of Clearwater's fire code and to be licensed as an Adult Congregate Living Facility (ACLF) must meet all requirements of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Appellant has a housekeeper on the premises at all times to prepare the meals and take care of the residents. Appellant's son manages the property and the son's wife visits the premises daily to do the necessary shopping, take the residents to doctor appointments, shopping, or for outings. Only one automobile remains at the premises on a 24-hour basis. Some residents do not have any family locally and visitors average one every two weeks per resident. Use of this property as an ACLF is reasonably compatible with the neighborhood. Excessive traffic will not be generated by use of this property as requested and the requirements for on-site parking is satisfied. Although an ACLF is a business, it is operated similar to a home in that business hours are not such that any disturbance of the neighborhood will occur and insignificant additional traffic will be generated as a result of granting this special exception. Neighbors generally have no complaints regarding the operation of the existing ACLF with a total of five residents but strongly oppose any increase in the number of residents. As grounds for opposing the increase these witnesses cited expected decrease in property values, anticipated increase in traffic and traffic hazards to the elderly residents of the ACLF who may walk along the street, excessive numbers of vehicles at the premises for which off-street parking is not available, a general dislike for any business activity conducted in the neighborhood, their opinion that an ACLF is incompatible with the neighborhood, and that Appellant will reap a financial bonanza if the special exception is granted. No statistical evidence was presented to support any of these contentions.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, as alleged in the Housing Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on or about October 9, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, since March 2015, has been a resident at Respondent’s facility. Respondent is a private residential condominium association, which operates and maintains three condominiums in Osprey, Florida. Each condominium unit has its own designated parking space. Petitioner’s assigned parking space, number 364, lies between parking spaces 362 and 366. The respective parking spaces are next to each other, with parallel lines dividing the same. Each parking space has a concrete tire-stop that has painted on it the corresponding condominium unit number so that when a vehicle turns into a space the driver is able to discern the corresponding unit number. All parking spaces and road surfaces relevant to this dispute are paved. If one is positioned such that the painted numbers on the tire-stops are visible, then to the left of space 362 is an unassigned space (unassigned space #1) and to the right of space 366 is an area containing shrubbery. From the photographs admitted into evidence, the dimensions of unassigned space #1 appear to be essentially the same as parking spaces 362, 364, and 366. However, unassigned space #1 differs from the others in that on either side of the parallel lines that demark the interior boundaries of the parking space, there are pathways which provide more space for pedestrian traffic. Although neither party offered evidence of the dimensions of the parking spaces, photographs of the area demonstrate that unassigned space #1, when considering the usable pathways, is wide enough to allow for reasonable entry to and exit from a mid-sized sedan while the vehicle’s occupant is being assisted by a walker or wheelchair. In order to access the parking spaces discussed in the preceding paragraph, motorists must use a one-way road which requires them to turn to the right when they are parking their vehicles such that the front tires are closest to the concrete tire-stops. Approximately 20 feet from unassigned space #1, on the other side of the one-way road used to access the parking area, is another unassigned parking space (unassigned space #2). Unassigned space #2 is perpendicular to unassigned space #1 and spaces 362, 364, and 366. Accordingly, motorists parking in unassigned space #2 enter the space by veering to the left off of the one-way road and driving head-on into the parking space (essentially a parallel parking space). There is no evidence of record as to the exact dimensions of unassigned space #2, but in comparing the photographic evidence, this space is comparable in size to the handicapped parking space near the condominium complex clubhouse. Additionally, unassigned space #2 is situated such that no other vehicles can park in front of, behind, or on either side of a vehicle parked in the space, and there is no curbing that would serve as barrier to accessing one’s vehicle while parked in the space. Although each unit is assigned one designated parking space, Petitioner recalls that when she initially moved in, she parked her vehicle by straddling the line between parking spaces 364 and 366. According to Petitioner, she was able to use both spaces because the respective tire-stops for the spaces were each marked “364.” Petitioner stopped parking her vehicle in this manner after the association re-painted all of the tire- stops; which included refreshing the unit numbers painted on the same so as to make it clear that there were not two parking spaces for unit 364. Also, Petitioner testified that her vehicle was vandalized once while parking her car in spot 364. After Petitioner’s car was vandalized and Respondent re-painted the tire-stops, Petitioner, during the weeks leading to June 2015, began occasionally parking her vehicle in the designated handicapped parking space located at the condominium clubhouse parking lot. Petitioner asserts that because of issues related to her physical disability, it is necessary that she be able to park her car, without restriction, in the handicapped parking space designated by Respondent for use by visitors and residents at the condominium complex clubhouse. The handicap parking space is several hundred feet from Petitioner’s condominium unit, and in order to access the handicap parking space, Petitioner utilizes a pathway constructed of dirt and crushed seashells. There is no record evidence indicating that Petitioner has difficulty traversing the seashell pathway or walking from her condominium unit to her car, and vice versa. Petitioner’s designated parking space is considerably closer to her unit (less than one hundred feet) than the handicapped parking space, but, according to Petitioner, her designated parking space is inadequate because it does not provide her with sufficient space to enter and exit her vehicle. Respondent does not dispute this fact. Petitioner suffers from a physical disability which requires her to ambulate with the occasional assistance of either a walker or wheelchair. Petitioner drives a late model, mid-size four-door Mercedes Benz. Petitioner’s vehicle is not equipped with any special assistive devices, such as a ramp, which would add to the amount of space needed for vehicle ingress and egress. When Petitioner is either entering or exiting her vehicle while using her walker or wheelchair, she requires additional space beyond the swing path of her car doors. Petitioner did not offer evidence of the amount of space required for her to enter or exit her vehicle when using either her walker or wheelchair. Petitioner also did not offer evidence regarding the dimensions of her vehicle, or the dimensions of either her designated parking space or any of the other parking spaces at issue. Nevertheless, Respondent concedes that Petitioner’s designated parking space, when cars are parked on either side of her in spaces 362 and 366, does not afford Petitioner adequate space to reasonably access her walker or wheelchair when entering and exiting her vehicle. In June 2015, Petitioner, as she often did, parked her car overnight in the handicapped parking space at the clubhouse. When Petitioner arrived at her vehicle, she noticed that a note from Respondent had been placed on the car, which reads as follows: Overnight parking in this clubhouse lot must have approval of the Pine Run Board of Directors. Approval is normally awarded for stays of no more than one week. In addition, this handicapped space is reserved for residents or visitors to the pool or clubhouse, not for general resident parking. We discourage resident parking in this lot if not for these reasons. However, if on rare occasion, you wish to park a car in this lot during the day when you are not using the pool or clubhouse, please use an unassigned space on the pond side. This minimizes the chance that you will interfere with our maintenance crew, or the delivery of a large quantity of materials. Within a few days of receiving the note, Petitioner explained to Respondent that she has a handicapped parking decal and should therefore be able to park in the handicapped parking space without restriction. Under the circumstances, Petitioner’s statement is reasonably interpreted as a request to Respondent that her physical disability should be accommodated by allowing her to park in the handicapped space. Respondent took no immediate action regarding Petitioner’s request for accommodation. Respondent did, however, allow Petitioner to continue to park in the handicapped space whenever Petitioner desired to do so. On August 27, 2015, Petitioner sent an email to Respondent and stated therein the following: We are formally informing you again, since our encounters with Mrs. and Mr. Foley, that we do indeed, have a disabled tag, and need and expect accommodations for ours and others, disabled individuals, owners, lessees and visitors, with any parking accommodations, walkers, chairs, etc., and their vehicles and equipment and with regards to any and all entrances to, and any and common areas, we should have easy access to. The circumstances leading up to, and including, Petitioner’s correspondence of August 27, 2015, make clear that Petitioner continues to seek a parking accommodation. At 4:51 p.m. on October 5, 2015, a letter from Petitioner’s attorney, Ms. Jennifer Daly, was sent to Respondent’s representative Jim Kraut. The missive from Ms. Daly states: As you are aware, this firm represents Ms. Valerie Collier [Walters] and I am contacting you to notify you and the Association that she will be parking in the handicapped parking spot tomorrow due to a surgery she is having. Please notify the Board of Directors to ensure no threats of towing are made and no notes are left on her car during her recovery. Upon receipt of the email from Ms. Daly, Mr. Kraut immediately conveyed the request to Mrs. Foley, who at the time was president of Respondent’s board of directors. In response to Petitioner’s request, Mrs. Foley, at 5:02 p.m. on October 5, 2015, sent the following email message to Mr. Kraut: Jim, Since the handicapped spot by the Club House is a considerable distance from her unit could you suggest that she just pick a spot in front of her unit that is much closer? We would have no problem identifying a handicapped spot closer to her unit. Mr. Kraut conveyed Mrs. Foley’s suggestion to Petitioner’s attorney Ms. Daly, who at 5:21 p.m. on October 5, 2015, responded via email as follows: Jim, Thank you for your rapid response and Ms. Foley’s suggestion; however, please let her know that choosing a different spot near her unit will not address our client’s needs. Rather, the problem is when the Association repainted the parking lot, the parking spots were made too small. From what we have been advised, all the spaces in close proximity to our client’s unit are only slightly bigger than the width of a sedan and offer no additional space for the opening of doors, much less the further space needed for someone who requires the assistance of a walker or wheelchair in addition to other equipment. Mrs. Foley, in response to Ms. Daly’s email, stated the following: I note your reply concerning Mrs. Valerie Collier [Walters]. Please be advised that the Association has not changed either the size or assignment of any parking spaces in the even 300’s on Pine Run Drive. All of the spaces have been repainted if the numbers were not visible or the curbs required repair in the entire Association. The size of the spaces ha[s] never changed. We would be very willing to accommodate Mrs. Collier’s [Walters] need for a handicapped space closer to her unit if she requested such. My suggestion was the quite large parallel space next to the grass island [unassigned space #2]. There is no curb there and no vehicle could park beside her. Another suggestion would be to swap her space for the adjacent space for #366. This is the same size but an end space, however I think she would have more room with the parallel space just behind her assigned space. Petitioner’s reaction to Respondent’s suggested parking accommodations was to file, on or about October 9, 2015, a charge of housing discrimination. Additionally, Petitioner parked her car in the handicap space without incident following her surgery. As noted in Ms. Daly’s email of October 5, 2015, Petitioner rejected the parking spaces offered by Respondent because the spaces are “too small.” Petitioner offered no standard by which to determine the appropriateness of the offered parking spaces other than her own subjective opinion. Additionally, Petitioner testified that both unassigned spaces are unacceptable because they are too close to the condominium unit of a neighbor she dislikes. Petitioner testified that what she now wants is to park in space 366, if Respondent widens the space by removing the hedges to the immediate right and paving the newly-cleared area. Petitioner offered no credible evidence establishing that this proposed accommodation is equal to, or more reasonable than the accommodations offered by Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding that Respondent, Pine Run Association, Inc., did not commit unlawful housing discrimination as alleged by Petitioner, Valerie Walters, and denying Petitioner’s Housing Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Cindy Hill, Esquire Hill Law Firm, P.A. 456 South Tamiami Trail Osprey, Florida 34229 (eServed) Gary Parker, Esquire Legal Aid of Manasota 1900 Main Street, Suite 302 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Sharon S. Vander Wulp, Esquire Sharon S. Vander Wulp, P.A. 712 Shamrock Boulevard Venice, Florida 34293 (eServed) Scott H. Jackman, Esquire Cole, Scott and Kissane, P.A. Suite 400 4301 West Boy Scout Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33607 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent Department acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally or dishonestly in making a decision to award Central Florida Legal Services, Inc., the Intervenor, a bid concerning a proposed contract to enter into Lease No. 800:0045. Embodied within that general issue are questions involving whether the Petitioner, Robert Allan Weinberg's (Weinberg) response to the Department's Invitation to Bid (ITB) was responsive, was the lowest and best bid and whether the Intervenor's bid was responsive to the ITB and was the lowest and best bid. Finally, it must be determined whether the Department properly evaluated the bid proposals in accordance with legally-acceptable, competitive bidding principles, in an honest and non-arbitrary fashion.
Findings Of Fact This dispute arose upon the Department electing to seek office space for personnel of its District 12, in Daytona Beach, Florida. After considering the type and nature of the facilities it needed, the Department ultimately published a set of specifications for the desired facility in an ITB. The ITB included detailed instructions for preparation and submittal of bids and a relevant form. A pre-bid conference was conducted and thereafter, three vendors submitted bids. One proposal was determined by the Department to be non- responsive because the amount of space contained in the bid proposed by that vendor did not meet the Department's specifications contained in the ITB. That agency decision was not contested. The bid submitted by the Intervenor, as well as the Petitioner, were both determined to be responsive by the Department. After evaluating the proposals based upon criteria contained in the ITB, the Department ultimately determined that the lowest, best and most responsive bid was that submitted by the Intervenor. It notified the bidders of its decision to award the subject bid to the Intervenor, and the Petitioner filed a protest. A formal written protest was timely filed, initiating this proceeding. The issues raised by the parties, concerning the relative responsiveness of the two bids, revolve around the question of adequate parking, the status of existing tenants in the buildings, a consideration required by the terms of the ITB, the question of adequacy of "dry and measurable" space, the question of "location" (including building appearance, appearance of the property, the character of the neighborhood, security issues, design or layout of the proposed space, and provision for future expansion). Petitioner's Responsiveness The Petitioner's response to the ITB is deficient in terms of provisions for parking, as well as concerning the disclosure of the status of existing tenants in the Petitioner's building. The parking facilities offered by the Petitioner do not meet the requirements of the ITB. The ITB requires that 60 parking spaces be available for the exclusive use of the Department. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, Item 21 in evidence (the ITB) provides: For this facility, the Department has determined that a minimum of 60 parking spaces are required to meet its needs. Its parking is to be provided as part of a lease cost to the department. The lessor will grant to the lessee an exclusive right to use 60 parking spaces. Lessor shall submit with this bid submittal a letter certifying that the lessor agrees to the requested number of parking spaces on site, states the number of parking spaces per square foot of space as required by the local zoning jurisdiction and provides a site plan of the parking lot identifying the number of parking spaces assigned to specific other tenants. The purpose of this submittal is to assure parking spaces conform to local jurisdiction requirements of number and size, and that the number of parking spaces requested in this invitation can be achieved without infringing on or combining with the parking requirement of other tenants (emphasis contained in original document). The Petitioner's bid submittal does not show spaces assigned to specific other tenants, as required by the ITB, and does not state the number of parking spaces per square foot of space required by the local zoning jurisdiction, which is the City of Daytona Beach, Florida. The Petitioner proposes to house the Department in two sections of an existing building. Those sections are presently occupied by other tenants. Other space within the building is also presently occupied and will continue to be occupied, even if the Department decides to lease the Petitioner's space at issue. The Petitioner's site plan shows that it has 92 spaces available to serve tenants in that building located on the building site. In addition to those spaces, the Petitioner proposes to use eight (8) additional spaces located off-site. Certain space in the Petitioner's proposed building is presently leased to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). That lease will remain in effect even if the Petitioner leases the space at issue to the Department. Under that HRS lease, 29 spaces are committed to HRS on an exclusive basis, with six (6) other spaces on a non-exclusive basis. There is additional office space in the building presently occupied by private businesses, which totals 4,470 square feet. Under the City of Daytona Beach Code, the parking requirement for 4,470 square feet of commercial office space, in a building the size of the Petitioner's is 16 spaces. The eight (8) parking spaces off the building site, proposed to be used by the Petitioner, are adjacent to and serve an existing building that also houses a private business. That building has 16 total parking spaces, including the eight (8) which the Petitioner is proposing to allocate to the agency, if the bid is awarded. The building contains 3,900 square feet. Under the City of Daytona Beach Code, it must have a minimum of 14 parking spaces for that square footage. If the Petitioner leased space to the Respondent, its total parking space requirement to serve all of its tenants, including the proposed office space, under the City of Daytona Beach Code, would be 125 spaces. Eighty-nine (89) of those spaces would be for the exclusive use of the Respondent and HRS. The Petitioner's site plan, however, reveals that only 108 spaces are available, including the spaces at the off-site location. Additionally, the existing parking spaces of the Petitioner, designed to serve handicapped persons, do not conform to the current City of Daytona Beach Code. Handicapped parking spaces are required by that Code to be 12 feet wide, with an additional five feet provided for access of handicapped persons. In order to meet this dimensional requirement, the Petitioner's need for parking spaces to accommodate all tenants, will increase by four (4) spaces. He will need a total of 129 spaces to accommodate all tenants, including the Department, should the bid be awarded. He has only 108 spaces available. Mr. Weinberg testified on behalf of the Petitioner, to the effect that the parking lot could be re-configured in order to gain 13 more spaces. This did not include the four additional spaces that would be needed to properly accommodate the handicapped parking spaces to the requirements of the City of Daytona Beach Code. The Petitioner's bid submittal plan, however, does not reflect any site plan involving re-configuration of the parking area. Moreover, it was not established that the reconfiguration proposed by the Petitioner can be accomplished under the mandates of the City of Daytona Beach Code. If it could, the Petitioner would still not have sufficient spaces to meet the requirements in the ITB, as well as the requirements of existing tenant leases and code requirements, concerning parking spaces for relevant amounts of building square footage allocated to the various tenants. The Petitioner's bid also does not meet the criteria of the ITB containing the status of existing tenants. The ITB requires that vendors provide information regarding the rights of existing tenants, including written documentation regarding their status, as that relates to the availability and the time of availability of the space proposed in the bid. The ITB provides, in pertinent part: Existing tenants: If the offered space or any portion thereof (including parking areas) is at present occupied or will be covered by an active lease(s) at the stated availability date, written documentation by the tenant indicating acknowledg- ment of the lessor's bid and ability to vacate premises by the proposed date or earlier to allow lessor's renovation work to be completed must be included with the bid submittal. If the existing tenants are on a month-to-month lease, the bidder must provide a letter of explanation of this condition. There are two existing tenants in the space which the Petitioner has proposed to lease to the Department. The Petitioner offered no written documentation from either tenant indicating acknowledgment of the bid and lessee's ability to vacate the premises. The only information which the Petitioner provided was for one of those tenants and that was not signed nor acknowledged by the tenant. No information was provided, as required by the ITB, as to the other tenant. Intervenor's Responsiveness The Petitioner maintains that the Intervenor's proposed office space was not "dry and measurable" at the time the bid was submitted by the Intervenor. The Petitioner also contends that the Intervenor's bid does not meet the parking facility requirements of the ITB. The criteria in the ITB require a definition of "dry and measurable" space available and also contain provisions allowing the vendor time to complete the facility through renovation, etc., subsequent to the bid submittal, but prior to the occupancy time specified in the ITB. The ITB provides, on page 2 in the second paragraph: Space to be made available: 07-01-95 or within 182 days after notification of bid award, whichever occurs last. Under the heading, "Handicap Standards and Alterations", at page 4 of the ITB, the ITB provides: Lessor agrees that the demised premises now conform, or that, prior to lessee's occupancy, said premises shall, at the lessor's expense, be brought into conformance with the require- ments of Section 553.48, F.S., providing requirements for the physical handicapped and the requirement of public law 101-336, July 26, 1990, known as the "American With Disabil- ities Act of 1990.". . . The proposed space must be in an existing building or a building which is to be complete by July 1, 1995, and is 50 percent complete on the bid deadline submission. To be considered as existing, the entire space must be dry, fully enclosed, and capable of being physically measured, to determine net rentable square footage, at the time of bid submittal. Reno- vations to bring the facility into compliance with all applicable federal, state, and local codes and regulations and/or to meet with desired arrangements are permitted, if carried out in accordance with prescribed procedures: Bids offering multi-story or multi-level buildings must have all stories serviced by an elevator which meets the requirements of DCA accessibility manual . . . (emphasis in original). The Intervenor's proposal meets these requirements. The facility proposed by the intervenor is in an existing building. "Dry and measurable" means that the facility has exterior walls and a roof and is at least enclosed enough as to not to become wet or to be wide open to the elements. The Intervenor's proposed building has exterior walls and a roof and is enclosed with windows and doors secured so that it would not get wet or be open. There is ample space within the Intervenor's existing building to determine the net rentable square footage and to ensure that the square footage being offered meets the bid specifications. In fact, measurement was undertaken by the Intervenor's representative, including its architect, and the space and site plans were made available to representatives of the Department, who were in a position to make the same measurements when they conducted a site visit of the premises. The only part of the facility that was not dry and measurable at the time of bid submission was a proposed new elevator, and entrance space related to the elevator, which the Petitioner has proposed to construct in order to meet the "Americans with Disabilities Act" requirements. The elevator and related space needed to accommodate entrances into the second floor of the building by the elevator were not dry and measurable at the time of bid submission and were not required to be by the terms of the ITB. The express provisions of the ITB allow vendors to renovate facilities in order to meet government regulations "prior to lessee's occupancy." The vendor is not required to have the space ready for occupancy until July 1, 1995, or 182 days after notice of award, whichever is later. The Intervenor has committed to complying with these requirements of the ITB and will be subject to a penalty if it does not, should the bid be awarded. Thus, if the vendor is offering a multi-story building, it is not required to have a handicapped accessible elevator already in place and operating at the time of bid submission. It simply must be installed prior to the lessee's occupancy. Therefore, under the terms of the ITB referenced above, the elevator-related space would not be required to be part of the dry and measurable space computation submitted with the bid. The Department agreed at the pre-bid conference that the 60 exclusive parking spaces it would require, as specified in the ITB, would meet the ITB criteria if within 1,000 feet of the building. In response to this criteria, the Intervenor offered most of the required spaces at the site of its building. It also offered to make spaces available at three other locations as alternatives. It offered to make 48 of the 50 spaces it has on its own building site exclusively available to the Department and also offered 21 parking spaces on "Lot B" or "Parcel B", as delineated in its bid. This lot is within 1,000 feet of the Intervenor's building, which was offered in the bid, and is approximately 350 feet away. It can accommodate the 21 parking spaces, but will necessitate a variance from zoning requirements, in order to place 21 spaces on Lot B. The ITB allows bidders 30 days from the date of any award to deal with such zoning issues and resolving any zoning problems. If this lot is used, the Intervenor will seek a variance in order to be able to put the 21 spaces on the lot. The Intervenor does not yet have the variance, but there is no evidence of record that would establish that it cannot be obtained from the City zoning authority. The Intervenor has an option to lease Lot B, where the 21 parking spaces would be located, and, therefore, has sufficient control of it. Another alternative offered by the Intervenor is designated as "Lot A" or "Parcel A" in its bid. This lot is across an existing municipal parking lot from the Intervenor's facility being offered. It includes 69 parking spaces and is within 1,000 feet of the Intervenor's building. The Intervenor has secured this facility through an option to purchase. The only remaining step in order to purchase the lot would be for the Intervenor's board, responsible for the operation of its programs, including the building, to execute the option it has already entered into. This also constitutes sufficient control over the property to comply with the terms of the ITB. This parking lot and the spaces thereon meet the requirements of the ITB. The third nearby lot, available to the Intervenor, is designated as "Parcel D" or "Lot D" on the Intervenor's bid documents. Additional spaces could be made available on this lot. It is 1,070 feet away from the Intervenor's building, however, and thus does not meet the 1,000-foot requirement set by the Department at the bidders' conference, in its interpretation of the specification concerning parking. The demonstrated availability of the other parking areas and spaces, however, establishes that the Intervenor has sufficient parking available, within the required distance, to meet the terms of the ITB. Moreover, the Intervenor's building will house the office of the Intervenor, as well as the office of the Respondent/Department. The Intervenor's building is located directly adjacent to a free municipal parking lot. This lot would be available to employees of the Intervenor, as well as Intervenor's visitors, and as well as to employees of the Department and the Department's visitors, who, for whatever reason, might not use the exclusive dedicated parking spaces. Because it is in a downtown development area, the Intervenor is not required, under the City of Daytona Beach Zoning Code, to provide any parking for its building. Bid Evaluations The Department received bid responses from the two parties and proceeded to evaluate them. The part of the evaluation based upon prices bid by the vendors was conducted by Department personnel in Tallahassee. The part of the evaluation based upon more subjective factors was conducted by three Department employees in Daytona Beach, who ultimately have to work in the facilities that the Department acquires through this procurement process. The price evaluation was undertaken with the assistance of a representative of the Department of Management Services, who is familiar with statutory and rule requirements for a proper evaluation of bids. Price was apportioned 40 of the total 100 points available in the bid evaluation process. The price evaluation resulted in the Petitioner receiving 40 points because it had the lowest price of the two subject bids. The Intervenor received 33 points for the price criterion. The three Department employees designated to evaluate the other aspects of the bid proposals conducted site visits at each of the vendors' facilities. During the site visits, the evaluators walked through the parking lots and counted the spaces, checked the exit door locations, inquired about heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning facilities and equipment, evaluated the condition of the buildings and how they were being maintained, checked security lighting and other security issues, checked on placement of the lobbies and how offices would be positioned, observed the availability of natural lighting and surveyed neighborhood conditions. Each evaluator then conducted evaluations based upon factors other than cost, without consulting each other. They used an evaluation form that relates to various criteria which come directly from the ITB. Upon completion of the evaluations, the completed forms were forwarded to the Tallahassee office of the Department. The evaluation criteria allow three categories of evaluation under the general heading of "location". Ten points are allowed as a maximum in the category of "availability and frequency of public transportation within the proximity of the space being offered." The evaluators gave the Petitioner five, six and five points, respectively, for its response to this category. They gave the Intervenor seven, six and five points. Both facilities have public bus stops near the building which provide good access to public transportation. The Intervenor's facility is located within a few blocks of the transit transfer station, which offers the advantage that bus passengers will be able to get to the Intervenor's facility without the need of a transfer which could save them considerable time. The Department of Juvenile Justice is the type of state agency which has a great deal of business with clients and their family members of a lower-income status, who might frequently have to rely on public transportation. Nine (9) points are allowed in the evaluation criteria for the category of "appearance of the building property and neighborhood of the property being offered," under the general heading of "location". The Petitioner was accorded three, five and four points, respectively, for its response to this category. The Intervenor was given nine, eight and seven points. This is admittedly a subjective criteria. The appearance of a facility and its surrounding area can make a difference in the morale and productivity of the working staff, as well as the attitude of visitors to the facility. The Intervenor's building is in a renovated, historic structure located in the historic preservation section of the downtown area of Daytona Beach. It has a great deal of aesthetic appeal and has been the subject of several newspaper articles noting the attractiveness and functionality of the renovation. The Petitioner's structure, on the other hand, although well-landscaped and maintained, is a metal, prefabricated building, not as aesthetically interesting or pleasing. It is also located adjacent to higher crime areas in the City. The evaluation criteria allow for four points for the category of "security issues posed by the building and surrounding area" under the category of "location". The evaluators scored the Petitioner's response at two, two and one points for this subject. They scored the Intervenor's bid three, three and two points for the same category. It is apparent that the Petitioner's facility is located in an area which is somewhat crime-prone. While the evidence does not reflect any criminal activity on the Petitioner's site itself, at least one evaluator was intimately and personally familiar with the neighborhood and the criminal problems occurring there. This familiarity was confirmed by Department personnel from police reports showing the area to be a high-crime area. Under the "facility" heading, the evaluation criteria and form allows points for four different categories. It allows 15 points for the category of "susceptibility of the design and space being offered to good utilization by differing segments of the Department." The evaluators gave the Petitioner seven, five and six points for their three evaluations of this response. They scored the Intervenor's submittal at 15, 12 and 10 points. The Intervenor's proposal offers a building that has windows on all four sides with abundant natural lighting, good visibility, and contiguous space. The Intervenor's facility can be very easily renovated into appropriate space for the different segments of the Department. The Petitioner's facility, on the other hand, has few windows, offers limited natural lighting and is not easily visible from the street. Additionally, the Petitioner offered divided space within its building so that some segments of the Department's work force would be physically separated from one another, with access between the two divided areas of office space being only obtainable by going outside the building and then in another door of another part of the building. The evaluation form also allows 10 points for the category of "susceptibility of the building parking area and property as a whole for future expansion." The Petitioner received a score of three, five and five points for this category by the evaluators. The Intervenor's response received seven, eight and three points for the same category. The Petitioner's facility offers no opportunity for expansion unless existing lessees leave the building. There is no room for additional parking for expansion purposes. The Intervenor's facility has space on the first floor not being leased at all at the present time and a portion of the third floor could be enclosed to provide additional space. Further, since the only other tenant is the lessor, there is a prospect that the lessor itself might move to other facilities in order to accommodate Department expansion. Lot A offers considerably more parking spaces than the Department or other tenants of the Intervenor's building need. Furthermore, the Intervenor's facility is located adjacent to a free, municipal parking lot which is only moderately used. Under the same general heading of "facility", the evaluation form and criteria allows ten points for the category of "having all the square footage in a single building will earn more points than square footage offered in more than one building." The Petitioner is offering space in a single building. However, the Petitioner's space would be divided so that the Department's office space would not all be contiguous, and personnel would have to go from one side of the building to the offices on the other side of the building only by going outside the building. This is functionally akin to space being in more than one building. Thus, the Petitioner's proposal would have some of the disadvantages of being like a proposal for more than one building. Workers would not be as readily able to assist one another in dealing with work loads or as easily undertaking many of the work activities requiring them to communicate with each other in each other's physical presence as easily as in a contiguous set of offices located in a single building. It is true that the Petitioner is proposing all of its space in one building. Thus, it meets the ITB criteria in this regard. It also can be argued as the Department evaluators found, that because the space functions akin to being in separate buildings, because of the separation of the offered office spaces, it should be evaluated as being somewhat analogous to space located in two separate buildings. Thus, although both bids were responsive to the ITB in terms of offering space physically and technically within a single building, it was not arbitrary for the evaluators to accord more weight to the Intervenor's response, since all of the office offered by the Intervenor is contiguous space in the same building. However, even if the evaluators had or should have ranked both bids equally under this "single building criteria", that alone would not alter the evaluators' result that the Intervenor's bid and facility was the best response to the agency's needs expressed in the ITB. The evaluation criteria and form also allows a maximum of two points to be accorded to the category of "if space is offered in more than one building, are the buildings connected by overhangs and sidewalks," under the heading of "facility". The space offered by both bidders, the Petitioner and the Intervenor, is clearly in a single building. All of the evaluators gave both parties an equal two points for this category which shows a lack of arbitrariness in the bid evaluation process. When the evaluation was complete, the Intervenor was accorded scores of 86, 82 and 72 points by the three evaluators. Two of the evaluators rated the Intervenor significantly higher, and the third favored the Petitioner's proposal by a single point. The total score given the Petitioner, taking into account its lower price, was 67, 71 and 73 points by the three evaluators. The total score accorded the parties by the three evaluators shows that the Intervenor's proposal was accorded a substantial advantage by two of the three evaluators. The evaluator scores were independently determined but were still generally consistent with each other. They were based upon logic and not merely upon a review of plans, figures, and written responses but also upon a detailed view of the two properties, parking spaces, and the like. Thus, it is determined that the scoring was consistent, logical, and not shown to be unreasonable under the circumstances. Based upon the scores by the evaluators, the Department determined that the Intervenor's bid was the lowest, best and most responsive and elected to award the lease to the Intervenor. There has been no preponderant proof offered to show that the decision or any of the evaluation decisions on individual categories, leading up to the ultimate score and decision to award, were fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal, or dishonest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Juvenile Justice dismissing the Petitioner's formal protest because the Petitioner lacks standing to initiate the subject proceeding and because the Petitioner has failed to establish that the determination to award a contract to the Intervenor was fraudulent, arbitrary, illegal or dishonest. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1736BID Respondent's and Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact The proposed findings of fact of these two parties are accepted to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the findings of fact made by the Hearing Officer. Certain proposed findings of fact accepted as true are immaterial to the resolution of the issues presented. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact A-F. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter, and as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record. Accepted. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. J.(1-3) Rejected, as not being entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. K-L. Rejected, as not being entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. M. Accepted, but not itself materially dispositive. N.(1-6- Subparts) Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected, as not entirely in accordance with the preponderant evidence of record, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Mr. Robert Allan Weinberg RW Custom Builders, Inc. 955 Orange Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Scott C. Wright, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 G. Steven Pfeiffer, Esquire APGAR, PELHAM, ET AL. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact In March, 1992, the Department of Labor and Employment Security ("Department") issued a Request for Proposal and Bid Submittal ("RFP") seeking to lease approximately 21,033 square feet of office space in Pinellas Park, Florida. The RFP specifies that "approximately" 130 off-street no charge parking spaces were required for the exclusive use of the employees and clients of the Respondent. The RFP states that "[p]arking space must be under the control of the bidder and be suitably paved, lined, and bumper pads installed." The Department received two bids in response to the RFP; one submitted by Hart-Land Ext., Inc., ("Petitioner") and the other submitted by Resolving, Inc. Both bids were signed by James Hartley, as Vice President of the respective corporations. The Department initially determined that, on the basis of the representations contained in the bids, both bids were responsive. An evaluation committee determined that the bid submitted by the Petitioner was the lowest and best bid. On the basis of the evaluation, the Department awarded the bid to the Petitioner by letter dated May 13, 1992. Subsequent to the bid award, the Petitioner submitted several differing site plans to the Department. The site plans indicated various amendments to the configuration of parking spaces available. None of the plans indicated that there would be less than 130 parking spaces available for use by Department personnel. The Department suggests that the revisions of site plans raised doubts as to whether the property was under the control of the Petitioner, that such information was requested of the Petitioner and that appropriate responses were not forthcoming. Nothing in the site plans would suggest that the property was not under the Petitioner's control. The evidence establishes that sufficient information was provided by the Petitioner in response to Department inquiries related to property ownership. By letter dated August 24, 1992, the Department rescinded its award to the Petitioner. The stated reason for recission was that the Petitioner did not have control over 130 paved and lined parking spaces as the time of the bid opening. At the time the Petitioner submitted the proposal, it had the right, pursuant to an executed Contract for Sale and Purchase, to purchase the property which was identified in the proposal as the site upon which the office space was located. The contract was valid at all times material to this case. The Department accepts the existence of a valid Contract for Sale and Purchase as sufficient evidence of a bidder having control over the property proposed for use. The evidence establishes that at all times material to this case, the Petitioner controlled the property proposed for use in his response to the RFP. As to the parking requirements, the Department offered testimony asserting that the language in the RFP requires that such spaces be paved, lined, and bumper-pads installed, at the time the bid is submitted. The RFP includes no requirement, either express of implied, that the parking area proposed must be paved, lined, and bumpered at the time of bid submission. The Petitioner's response to the RFP met the parking requirements set forth therein. The Department asserts that because the parking spaces were not lined, it was unable to determine the number of spaces available in each area proposed for parking. The Department had ample opportunity to inspect the property proposed in the Petitioner's bid, and in fact, such inspections did occur. The Department reviewed site plans, floor plans, physically inspected the structure and had full access to the property. The fact that the parking spaces were not lined or bumper-padded at the time of bid submittal would have been obvious. Further, the RFP seeks to have "approximately" 130 spaces available. Of the 130 spaces the Petitioner said would be available, 118 spaces were paved at all times material to this case. The remaining 22 parking spaces were located in an unpaved area which would have been paved prior to the date upon which the Respondent would have occupied the building, at which time all 130 spaces would have been lined and bumper-padded also. Therefore, even if the agency's position that the RFP required paved spaces at time of bid submission were supported by evidence, the Petitioner's proposal would meet the requirement. Subsequent to the award of the project, the Petitioner closed the contract for sale in escrow and placed $150,000 in trust to close the sale. The Petitioner employed a general contractor, obtained completed floor plans, mechanical plans, electrical and plumbing plans for the structure, performed roof repairs and purchased new air conditioning equipment. At the request of Department's representatives, the Petitioner also made arrangements for additional parking spaces beyond the 130 spaces previously proposed, with the additional spaces being located off-site and across the street from the office space. The total cost of these actions is approximately $179,600. The purchase of the property and incurrence of related costs was done in good faith and in reliance upon the award of the project.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a Final Order awarding proposed lease 540:0921 to Hart-Land, Ext., Inc. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 24th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 92-5748BID The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected as to reference of difficulty in determining availability of parking spaces, not supported by greater weight of evidence. Measurement would have established whether space was adequate. There is no evidence that it was not. 6-9. Rejected as to inference that submission of amended site plans was inappropriate, not supported by greater weight of evidence. There is no evidence that the agency rejected the proposal based on the amendment of site plans, irrelevant. As to the amendment of site plans being indicative of a lack of 130 paved spaces, rejected immaterial. 11. Rejected as to determination that such spaces were not available on property controlled by the Petitioner, not supported by credible and persuasive evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Acting Secretary Suite 303, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 William H. Walker, Esquire NCNB Bank Building, Suite 403 501 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Edward Dion, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
Findings Of Fact Antonios Markopoulos, Appellant, applied for seven variances on property located at 200 Coronado Drive, Clearwater, Florida, to allow the construction of a 7 to 9 story parking garage covering the property from lot line to lot line. The property in question is a 95 feet x 105 feet parking lot adjacent to a hotel, shops and restaurants owned by Appellant. The first waiver requested was of the minimum lot size of 150 feet on which to build. Since this property was unique in that regard and could never attain the 150 feet minimum dimension, the Board granted that variance. The other six requests for variances involved setbacks and open space requirements. Appellant proposes to build a parking garage with two elevators to lift cars to the various parking levels with the building extending to the lot lines in all four directions. The hotel, restaurants and stores located at this site and owned by Appellant are nonconforming uses. The hotel has 86 rooms and if built today would require a minimum of 86 parking spaces. The stores and restaurants would require additional parking spaces that are now not available. Appellant proposes to construct a garage with approximately 340 parking spaces which he contends are the minimum needed to provide adequate parking for patrons at the hotel, stores and restaurants. At the hearing before the Board, Appellant contended that the parking garage would also serve to relieve parking problems at other establishments in the vicinity. Appellant proposes to have parking customers drive up a ramp through a ticket machine which will dispense a ticket which can be validated at the hotel, restaurants or shops. The car will then be parked by attendants who will drive the car onto an elevator to lift the car to a floor with parking space. This clearly indicates that Appellant is proposing to construct a parking garage which will be open to the general public. Appellant presented testimony that if the setbacks required by the Code were followed on all sides, there would be insufficient square feet per floor to make the parking garage financially feasible. He also presented testimony of the City of Clearwater Traffic Engineer to the effect that construction of a parking garage at this location would not create a traffic problem. Although most, if not all, of the property surrounding Appellant's property are nonconforming with less setbacks than are required by the existing code, none of these properties have been covered lot line to lot line with a structure or structures. The primary emphasis of the evidence submitted by Appellant is that there is insufficient parking at Clearwater Beach, and erection of a parking garage will do much to alleviate this problem.
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the entitlement of the Intervenors, Mr. and Mrs. Mayer, to be granted zoning variances, in keeping with the provisions of Section 131.016(e), City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, to vary from the conditions set forth in Section 131.044, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Regulations, dealing with the area and dimension regulations for RS-50, Single-Family Residents. In particular, the Intervenors would request that the front setback line be reduced from 25 feet to roughly feet and that a variance concerning the area covered by the dwelling be increased from 25 percent to 33.7 percent. 1/
Findings Of Fact On November 12, 1980, the Intervenors requested that they be granted the variances set out in the Issues Statement of this order. The terms and details of that variance application may be found as part of the City's Composite Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. A public hearing was conducted on this request and that hearing was held on January 15, 1981. The taped transcript of that hearing may be found as the City's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Following that hearing, a decision was made by the Board of Adjustment and Appeal for the City of Clearwater, Florida, to grant the variance requests. The Petitioners in this cause were opposed to that grant of variance and requested a hearing. The matter was forwarded from the City of Clearwater to the Division of Administrative Hearings and on March 25, 1981, a hearing de novo was conducted to consider this dispute. At the time of the hearing, the Petitioner, Barbara Beakes, was presented as a witness and identified the claim of the Petitioners as being one of opposition to the project in question which requested variances, for reason that it obscured her view of the water; caused a decrease in the value of her property and in addition to her attorney, expressed opposition to the area of coverage to be involved with the proposed building project of the Intervenors and to the front setback line at issue. The Intervenors, Ray and Christine Mayer, who reside at 940 El Dorado Avenue, Clearwater Beach, Florida, through their project, would desire to construct a garage which would be approximately 15.4 feet from the front property line as opposed to the 25 foot front setback line required of the City of Clearwater. The construction in question would not advance the building line in the direction of the street. Moreover, the distance from the street to the front of the building had originally been 13.1 feet when present front setback lines were not in effect. The Intervenors have also requested what they deemed to be a variance from the requirement of maximum lot coverage by their residence, varying it from 25 percent to the 33.7 percent proposed by their construction. As stated in a preceding footnote, it was determined at the hearing that the new requirement for maximum lot coverage is 42 percent and it having been agreed by the parties that the area coverage in question is only 33.7 percent, the necessity for variance on that issue no longer exists. Intervenors' Exhibits Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8, are photographs depicting the nature of the structure in question in various stages of construction and modification. Notwithstanding the Petitioner Beakes' complaint that her view was obstructed by the construction, there was no specific proof related to the clear space requirement of Section 131.200, City of Clearwater Building and Zoning Requirements, and in fact her view is already obstructed by a fence which now exists on the Mayers' property and the constriction proposed by the Mayers would not materially change that circumstance. The proof on the issue of decreased property value offered by Petitioner Beakes does not seem to be a specific criterion addressed by the variance ordinance.
The Issue : The issue in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has been the victim of a discriminatory housing practice, in alleged violation of Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a physically handicapped person. He resides in a residential unit (Unit 11C) in the Sea Cabins residential complex. The Petitioner is a full-time resident at Sea Cabins and is the owner of unit 11C. The Respondent is a Florida Corporation (not for profit) and is a homeowners association, as defined by Section 720.303, Florida Statutes (2008). Sometime in early May 2007, Nancy Maconi, the Petitioner's wife, placed a number of signs around the Sea Cabins property. The Respondent purports that there were approximately 13 signs. One of the signs was a designated handicap parking space sign for unit 11C. It was erected in close proximity to the Petitioner's Sea Cabins unit 11C. Thereafter, the Petitioner sought reimbursement for the cost of the signs from the homeowners association board of directors, the Respondent. The request was denied at a meeting of the board of May 11, 2007, with the minutes reflecting that the Petitioner had not requested nor been granted permission to install any signs, hence the denial at that point. Ms. Maconi testified at the hearing that she had asked the Respondent's manager for permission to install the signs, which the manager, Willa Merriott, denied. The action of the board at the May 11, 2000 meeting, however, is not in dispute. Thereafter, on approximately June 22, 2007, the attorney for the Respondent wrote the Petitioner requesting that the designated handicap parking sign be removed since it had not been authorized by the board, nor had any formal request for the installation of the sign been made. On June 23, 2007, the Petitioner responded to that letter by requesting that the board formally authorize the handicap parking sign. A letter from the Veterans Administration was attached to that letter to the effect that the Petitioner had a service-connected disability. The specific nature of the disability was not specified, however. In any event, the Respondent association acquiesced in the handicap parking sign at issue remaining in place and use while it investigated whether the Petitioner was actually entitled to a handicap parking space. The Petitioner was advised by letter of October 11, 2007, by the Respondent, that the handicap parking sign could remain in place while his application was pending. A series of letters then passed between the parties or their representatives in October through December 2007. Pursuant to its policy concerning the granting of handicapped parking spaces and the like, the association sought information on the nature of the Petitioner's disability or handicap. The Petitioner countered by taking the position that the association already had enough information upon which to make its decision. In any event, however, through this period, the Petitioner's designated handicapped parking space and sign remained in place in the original location where Ms. Maconi had placed it. The Respondent acquiesced in its presence and in the Petitioner's use of the handicapped space. Counsel for the Respondent received a letter dated January 3, 2008, from Paul E. Brooks, a Podiatrist, revealing for the first time the specifics of the Petitioner's disability. That is, he has an orthopedic condition which limits his ability to walk. This letter was received on January 8, 2008, and considered by the board of directors at a special meeting held January 28, 2008. At that meeting the board formally granted the Petitioner's application for a designated handicap parking space and voted to allow the sign already erected by Ms. Maconi to remain permanently in place. Due to a misunderstanding between the board and its counsel as to who should notify the Petitioner of the decision, the Petitioner was not actually notified of the decision until March. By letter of March 17, 2008, counsel for the homeowners' association wrote the Petitioner of the actions of the board regarding the sign.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 2009.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Todd Voigt, should be terminated from employment with the City of Clearwater (City) for violating City policies as alleged in the City's Termination and Dismissal Notice (Notice) dated August 3, 2016.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board make a determination that the charges in the Notice are sustained, and that Mr. Voigt be terminated as a City employee. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2016.
