The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Frank T. Henderson, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Deportment of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 5, 1981. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until March 3, 1981, to allow Petitioner to secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf. The Respondent called as witnesses Michael Denny, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital and Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital. Respondent's two exhibits were admitted as evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with that order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Beginning July 28, 1978, through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the tart of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period. His condition has been diagnosed as (1) passive aggressive personality, passive type, (2) inadequate personality and (3) sexual deviation, incest. Henderson has been placed in this program as a result of incestuous activity with his daughter. His present condition is best described as a personality disorder with passive aggressive features. Metaphorically, an individual suffering from this form of personality disorder, if asked to mow the lawn and in doing so becomes confronted with flowers he would mow the flowers down rather than go around then. Typically, this type of disorder carries with it certain coping mechanisms such as problems with employment, substance abuse, and sexual deviation. Of these mechanisms, Henderson suffers from the latter two and in particular still has a propensity to act out in a sexually deviant manner. Group therapy has been described as the primary treatment form in the sex offender programs of the Respondent and the petitioner has advanced through the initial levels of the program and is now involved in the final level offered through group therapy. In that connection, his group meets one to one and one half hours, two or three times a week. The majority of his treatment while involved in Level III has been under the control of psychologist Michael Denny. This commenced in June, 1979, and ran through January, 1981. In the first five (5) months of the group work, Denny attempted to establish a rapport with the Petitioner and to discuss the Petitioner's marriage and personality style and from November, 1979, through January, 1981, attempted to treat this personality style and propensity to commit sexually deviant acts. Success in this effort was limited due to the Petitioner's failure to heed advice concerning his problems and personality style and problems with sexual deviancy. Henderson is aware of the dynamics of what lead him to commit sexual battery on his daughter and of his problems with his marriage which lead him to seek out alcoholism as a defense mechanism, to inappropriately keep people at a distance, and the ensuing problems. Nonetheless, the Petitioner has failed to alter his problem state and his present posture in such that the group therapy sessions will not assist in rehabilitation, and in view of the fact that the group therapy sessions are the means of ameliorating his sexual problems, treatment has been exhausted. The Petitioner is still likely to act out in a sexually deviant manner. The attempt of trying to get Henderson to be more assertive with other males and females has met resistence by Henderson through his internalization of feeling, and he would be prone to abuse substances to assist in this internalization, with the result being that the utilization of those substances would cause him to be abusive with others. Henderson continues to blame others for his problems and is superficial in interaction with others and lacks the depth of a close relationship. Only one time in the period of one and one half years that psychologist Denny dealt with Petitioner did the Petitioner express his inner feelings. Henderson also has problems following small rules or agreements with other persons. Finally Henderson has a tendency to use religion as a foil to discussing his disorder. Although asked not to use that defense mechanism in the course of the group sessions, Henderson has used religion as an unsatisfactory explanation for his deviancy. The clinical summary and report of the staff of the Florida State Hospital, rising from the November 12, 1980, staffing, may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence, and this summary expresses the staff's opinion that treatment has been exhausted and the recommendation that the Petitioner be returned to the committing court. This determination was followed by an interdepartmental discussion of the Petitioner's case which was held by the various unit directors of the sex offender programs within the Department's control and it was the opinion of those unit directors that treatment of the Petitioner's condition has been exhausted. Petitioner has progressed in areas outside of the group therapy sessions to include participation in an alcoholics anonymous program in which he graduated and vocational participation in small engine repair and office education, wood therapy and leather therapy, participation with the Jaycees at the hospital and attendence at religious services. The quality of his performance in the adjunctive therapies is not sufficient to cause a change in the basic nature of the Petitioner's condition for which he was committed as a sex offender and is not such that it would cause a change in the determination that the Respondent has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner. Henderson states that he realizes what caused his crime in the sense that he was not assertive and was rejected and hurt to the extent that he was not performing normally and held hatred in his heart for his stepmother and wife. He said that he has enjoyed using hatred as a defense mechanism and was wrong and should take those problems to God and people. He feels that he has friends on the ward in his area and has had close relationships with the staff until he had problems with his back requiring surgery. (The staff feels that some of these problems are "psychosomatic.") He wanted to be removed from Denny's group and this was accomplished but he still feels bitter and hurt. He has expressed a willingness to work on his problems, but he conditions this on the fact that his willingness depends on the consensus of the staff of the Hospital that he needs further assistance, having determined in his own mind that his problem is under control.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Frank T. Henderson, and that said Frank T. Henderson be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Craig Williams, Esquire 335 East Bay Street Jacksonville, Florida 32201 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes, by allowing Petitioner to be sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes, Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended. Respondent manufactures rubber parts for housewares, aircraft, and the automotive industry. Respondent typically employs an untrained workforce then provides its employees with on-the-job training. Respondent experiences a high turnover in entry level jobs. Petitioner began working for Respondent on or about November 15, 1995. Her immediate supervisor was Walter Tate. Part of Mr. Tate's job was to train Petitioner how to operate a rubber injection machine. There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Tate ever touched Petitioner or spoke to her in a sexually inappropriate manner. On December 6, 1995, Petitioner's hand was injured at work. This injury occurred when another employee drove a forklift into the platform where Petitioner was working. Mr. Tate did not blame Petitioner for the accident. He did not use the accident as a means to sexually discriminate against Petitioner. On or about February 16, 1996, Petitioner's machine caused a shut down in production. The machine broke down when someone placed a metal bar in the feed hole. The metal bar broke off between the machine's feed hole and its extruder, preventing the rubber from passing through. The machine was a silicon extruder; this type of machine is usually turned off when the designated operator takes a break. Based on a good faith belief that Petitioner was responsible for damage to her machine, Mr. Tate gave Petitioner a verbal warning for using the metal bar instead of a plastic one. Mr. Tate advised Petitioner that the next time she would be given a written warning. There is no credible evidence that Mr. Tate had any hidden agenda when he reprimanded Petitioner. Petitioner became visibly upset about the verbal reprimand and cursed Mr. Tate. Subsequently, Petitioner signed an employee warning report, indicating that she disagreed with the verbal warning but gave no reasons for her disagreement. Shortly thereafter, Petitioner met with Respondent's plant manager, Steve Wieczorek, and second-shift plant superintendent, Robbie Misenheimer. Petitioner complained that she did not like Mr. Tate telling her what to do because she already knew her job. Petitioner also complained that she did not like Mr. Tate's use of profanity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Petitioner never complained to Respondent about any form of sexual harassment or discrimination by Mr. Tate during this or any other meeting. During the meeting, Mr. Wieczorek took handwritten notes of Petitioner's complaints. According to Petitioner, she signed these notes before she left the meeting. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Wieczorek typed the notes in accordance with his customary procedure. Mr. Wieczorek and Mr. Misenheimer signed the typed notes before placing them in Petitioner's personnel file. Petitioner did not sign the typed notes. The location of the handwritten notes was not established during the hearing. After the meeting, Mr. Wieczorek directed Mr. Misenheimer to investigate Petitioner's complaints. In accordance with that directive, Mr. Misenheimer talked to Mr. Tate and several of Petitioner's co-workers. Mr. Misenheimer concluded that there was no merit to Petitioner's complaints that Mr. Tate was treating her unfairly. Nevertheless, Mr. Misenheimer continued to check with Petitioner personally and to observe Mr. Tate for several days to ensure that Petitioner was not being mistreated. On February 27, 1996, Petitioner walked out of the plant, voluntarily leaving her workstation in the middle of her shift. Petitioner did not advise Mr. Tate or any other supervisor of her reason for leaving the work site. There is no persuasive evidence that Mr. Tate threatened Petitioner for turning him in before she abandoned her workstation. After leaving the plant, Petitioner did not call Respondent for three days to explain why she had not returned to work. Respondent did not attempt to contact Petitioner during this time. In accordance with the company's personnel policies, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment on March 1, 1996. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent's policy was that sexual harassment was not to be tolerated. This policy was communicated to employees in group meetings. Petitioner admits that she received instruction on the procedure for complaining about sexual discrimination when she began working for Respondent. However, she could not remember whether she received the information in a training session or in a printed form. Respondent posted information in the employee break room about state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committe, Esquire 17 South Palafox Place, Suite 322 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Heather Fischer Lindsay, Esquire Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs 1400 South Trust Tower Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence that he is of good moral character so as to receive an exemption from disqualification from employment with children or adults who are developmentally disabled, under Section 397.451, Florida Statutes (1995).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks an exemption for employment in a position of special trust for which a security background check is required under Florida law. In 1977, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor sexual assault for fondling an adolescent. He was sentenced to probation. Petitioner was 22 years old at the time. In 1986, Petitioner pled guilty to a felony sexual assault of a 15 year old boy, in the state of New Hampshire. Petitioner was 31 years old at the time. After serving 2 years of a 3~ to 7 year sentence, Petitioner was released from prison in 1989. Petitioner successfully completed parole and was released in March, 1993. Petitioner has not been arrested for any crime since 1986. Petitioner stated he received therapy in prison in a sexual offender program. However, Petitioner presented no evidence of attending a sexual offender program while in prison or afterwards, nor did he submit records of his treatment while in prison. Petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the 1986 conviction for sexual assault. While working as an athletic trainer, Petitioner took advantage of a situation while he was performing massage therapy on a fifteen year old boy, he fondled and performed oral sex on the boy. Petitioner stated the victim consented, as much as a 15 year old can consent. Petitioner did not explain the circumstances surrounding the 1977 incident. Petitioner did not express remorse for any sexual misconduct that he committed other than the 1986 offense. He addressed his 1977 charge only to say that had he received more than a slap on the wrist, the 1986 sexual assault might not have occurred. Petitioner stated he was sexually abused as a child. In 1993, Petitioner received a Masters Degree in social work from Salem State College in Massachusetts. Petitioner explained he studied for his masters in social work because he would no longer be eligible for licensure as an athletic trainer. Petitioner stated it would not be appropriate for him to put his hands on adults or children, which is necessary as an athletic trainer. He feels it wouldn't be appropriate for him to be in a position where he could possibly be aroused by an adult, an adolescent or a child. Although Petitioner states he has never been aroused or interested in anyone other than what would be considered a mature adolescent or an adult. Petitioner is licensed as an independent clinical social worker in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In 1994, Petitioner moved to Florida to work for the Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach in the psychiatric unit of the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. Petitioner has been denied a license as a clinical social worker in Florida based on his history of sexual misconduct. As a result of his denial of a license, Petitioner must perform his duties under the supervision of another licensed clinical social worker. Working under someone else's supervision means he may continue to work with clients in group or individual therapy. Kathy Palezuelos, a licensed clinical social worker, has known Petitioner for two and a half years. They worked together at the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. She was qualified as an expert in the area of clinical social work. Ms. Palezuelos performed a mental health status examination on Petitioner on May 2, 1996. She discussed his homosexuality and the sexual offense at the time she did the mental status exam. Ms. Palezuelos described herself as more a friend than a colleague. They only worked together about six months. She was sometimes present while he did therapy if they were doing group therapy. He trained her when she first came on the job. Petitioner did not inform her of his past criminal history while they worked together. At the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health supervision was structured loosely where the therapists would give each other feedback after presenting cases. Sara Billings is a licensed clinical social worker. She was qualified as an expert in the area of clinical social work. Ms. Billings met Petitioner in January, 1994, at the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. She has supervised Petitioner since that time. Ms. Billings worked with Petitioner for two years before he disclosed his criminal history involving sexual assaults. During those two years Petitioner did therapy on children as well as adults. In January, 1995, she asked Petitioner to join her in her private practice in Melbourne, Florida. Ms. Billings is not present while Petitioner does therapy. She did not feel the children being treated and their parents should be told about Petitioner's criminal history. A child is anyone under the age of 18. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM IV) is an accepted textbook for practicing psychologists. DSM IV states that guidelines for pedophilia are an age difference of 5 plus years between the offender and the victim. Ms. Billings admitted Petitioner meets the criteria for a pedophile as set forth in the DSM IV. However, she does not believe he is a pedophile because the child Respondent molested was as physically mature as an adult. She bases this opinion on what Petitioner has related to her about his case. Dr. Deborah Day is a licensed clinical psychologist, licensed mental health counselor and a certified family mediator. Her specialty is clinical and forensic psychology specializing in physical and sexual abuse. She was the consultant for the Child Protection Team and the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program. She is presently on the Board of the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program. She has dealt with approximately 1000 cases involving sexual abuse. She was qualified as an expert in the area of sex offenders and sexual abuse. Dr. Day reviewed a file provided by the Respondent that included the mental health status exam and copies of the Petitioner's criminal records. The issues presented in the file are issues she commonly deals with in her practice. Petitioner has not provided sufficient information to make an assessment on whether he is a risk to re-offend. The Mental Status Exam only addresses current levels of functioning. Full responsibility in the course of treatment for a sex offender means getting past the defense mechanisms offenders use initially in treatment in order to keep their ego safe. Full responsibility for a person's conduct is saying the child or adolescent had nothing to do the adult's conduct. The offenders' responsibility was solely to say "no". Most homosexuals are not pedophiles. Homosexuals generally either withhold their sexuality or they hide it from the general public. A sex offender with a history of being molested as a child is common. A convicted sexual offender who has applied to work with children in a therapeutic relationship is a risk to the offender and the child. It sets up a trusting relationship where boundaries have to be closely monitored. Petitioner's statement that he was confused about his homosexuality in 1986, when he sexually assaulted the 15-year old boy, is minimization, rationalization and demonstrates a superficial understanding of what really happened. It is denial for a convicted sexual offender to say he is not aroused by children. There has to be sexual attraction if you sexually abuse a child. Petitioner will be able to continue to work as a social worker and a therapist as long as his clients are adults. Whether or not he discloses his past to adult patients is an ethical matter and not one for the present case. Petitioner has not testified with candor as to his past conduct. Moreover, Petitioner made conflicting statements and rationalizations with respect to the circumstances surrounding the crimes. He has not produced treatment records to support his claim that he received treatment in a sexual offender program. Petitioner has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is rehabilitated and will not present a danger to children or disabled adults.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's request for an exemption be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Paul 537 Wilson Avenue Satellite Beach, Florida 32937 Carmen Muniz Sierra, Esquire District 7 Legal Office Department of Children and Families 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204-X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Did Respondent, Jennifer Abadie, R.R.T., violate sections 468.365(1)(q), 468.365(1)(x), 456.072(1)(v), or 456.063(1), Florida Statutes (2018),1/ by committing sexual misconduct?
Findings Of Fact Section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 468, Florida Statutes, charge the Board with regulating the practice of respiratory care in Florida. Ms. Abadie is a licensed registered respiratory therapist in Florida. Ms. Abadie worked for Comprehensive Healthcare of Clearwater (Comprehensive) from October 24, 2017, through February 4, 2018, at its Pinellas County, Florida, location. Comprehensive is a residential rehabilitation and nursing facility. Ms. Abadies’s 89-year-old father was a patient at Comprehensive from before she started working there until his death. He suffered from dementia. Ms. Abadie visited her father frequently, before and after her shifts and when she was not working. G.B. was a severely ill patient at Comprehensive trying to recover from multiple strokes. G.B. was only 56 years old. However, he had extensive medical conditions. They included hypertension, congestive heart failure, fibromyalgia, diabetes, blindness and end-stage renal (kidney) disease. G.B. received dialysis three times a week for his kidney disorder. He took dozens of medications daily. G.B. also had a tracheostomy. A tracheostomy is a tube that goes into the trachea to help people with impaired breathing breathe. The heavy treatment load weighed on G.B. psychologically and caused him anxiety and depression. Ms. Abadie provided respiratory therapy services to G.B. G.B. recognized Ms. Abadie from an earlier time when she worked at Florida Hospital where he had been a patient. He reminded her of that time and established a friendship with her. Over time, the friendship grew closer. As a result of their friendship and Ms. Abadie's compassion for G.B., Ms. Abadie and G.B. spoke regularly. When Ms. Abadie visited her father, she usually checked on G.B. He and Ms. Abadie talked about the range of subjects that acquaintances talk about including families, children, marital status, holiday plans, and day-to-day lives. They spoke regularly by telephone as well as in person. Although they spoke regularly, Ms. Abadie and G.B. did not always speak at length. Sometimes she just waved and poked her head in to say hello. At G.B.'s request, Ms. Abadie brought him items from outside the facility, such as toiletries and a blanket. G.B. grew very fond of Ms. Abadie and wanted her as his girlfriend and eventually his wife. Ms. Abadie did not encourage or reciprocate these feelings or intentions. Lisa Isabelle was G.B.'s only other visitor. G.B. was a friend of her husband. She had known G.B. for most of their lives. Ms. Isabelle rented G.B. a residence on her property. Ms. Isabelle described her relationship with G.B. as "love-hate." Ms. Isabelle held a durable power of attorney for G.B. His family lived out of town and decided it would be good for somebody local to hold the power of attorney. On Sunday, February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie came to Comprehensive to visit her father. She wanted to watch the Eagles play in the Super Bowl with him. Their family is from Philadelphia. Ms. Abadie stopped at G.B.'s room first. Charity Forest, L.P.N., was on-duty that day. G.B. was one of her patients. Towards the end of the first of her two shifts, Ms. Forest noticed that the curtain by G.B.’s bed was pulled halfway around his bed, which was unusual. The door was open. Ms. Forest entered G.B.’s room and looked around the curtain. She saw G.B. and Ms. Abadie sitting on the bed, on top of the covers. The head of the bed was raised about 45 degrees to provide a backrest. G.B. was wearing long pajama pants but not wearing a shirt. Ms. Abadie was wearing jean shorts, a T-shirt, and Keds®. Ms. Abadie was resting her feet on her iPad® so she would not dirty the covers. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were not touching each other. They were talking, watching television, and looking at pictures on Ms. Abadie's telephone. The room was a two-bed room. There was a patient in the other bed. Ms. Forest thought that the two sitting on the bed was inappropriate and left in search of her supervisor. Ms. Forest could not locate her supervisor. But she met another L.P.N., Ruth Schneck. Ms. Forest told Ms. Schneck what she had observed. Ms. Schneck went to G.B.'s room. The door was open. Ms. Schneck briefly entered the room. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Ms. Schneck left immediately, closing the door behind her. She joined the search for the supervisor. Neither Ms. Schneck nor Ms. Forest could locate the supervisor. While looking for the supervisor, Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck encountered Sean Flynn, L.P.N. They told him what they had seen. Mr. Flynn was a licensed practical nurse and a case manager at Comprehensive. He had come to the facility briefly that day in order to take care of some paperwork. After talking to Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck, Mr. Flynn went to G.B.’s room and opened the door. Ms. Abadie and G.B. were sitting on the edge of the bed facing the door. Mr. Flynn asked them if anything was going on. They said no. Mr. Flynn left the room and called Nicole Lawlor, Comprehensive's Chief Executive Officer. Ms. Lawlor told Mr. Flynn to return to G.B.'s room, instruct Ms. Abadie to leave, and tell her that she would be suspended pending an investigation. He returned to G.B.'s room with Ms. Forest and Ms. Schneck. G.B. and Ms. Abadie were still sitting on the bed. Mr. Flynn asked Ms. Abadie to step outside. She did. G.B. soon followed in his wheelchair. Mr. Flynn told Ms. Abadie that she was suspended and had to leave. G.B. overheard this and became very upset and aggressive. He insisted that Ms. Abadie was his girlfriend and that he wanted her to stay. Ms. Abadie asked to visit her father before she left. Mr. Flynn agreed. Ms. Abadie visited her father for a couple of hours. Ms. Abadie also called Ms. Isabelle to tell her that Mr. Flynn asked her to leave and that G.B. was very upset. After Ms. Abadie's departure, G.B. became increasingly upset and loud. His behavior escalated to slamming doors and throwing objects. Comprehensive employees decided G.B. was a danger to himself and others and had him involuntarily committed under Florida's Baker Act at Mease Dunedin Hospital. On her way home, Ms. Abadie received a telephone call offering her full-time employment at Lakeland Regional Hospital. February 4, 2018, at 6:08 p.m., Ms. Abadie submitted her resignation from Comprehensive in an e-mail to Ms. Lawlor. Ms. Abadie's only patient/caregiver relationship with G.B. was through her employment with Comprehensive. As of 6:08 p.m. on February 4, 2018, G.B. was not a patient of Ms. Abadie. She no longer had a professional relationship with him. Ms. Lawlor suspended Ms. Abadie on February 4, 2018. She based her decision on the information that Ms. Forest, Ms. Schneck, and Mr. Flynn told her, not all of which is persuasively established or found as fact in this proceeding. Still, Ms. Lawlor's memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie reveals that the nature of G.B.'s relationship with Ms. Abadie and the events of February 4, 2018, were not sexual. Ms. Lawlor's Employee Memorandum suspending Ms. Abadie does not identify a state or institution rule violated in the part of the form calling for one. She wrote "Flagrant violation of code of conduct." The description in the "Nature of Infraction" section of the form reads, "Employee was found cuddling in bed with a resident during her time off." There is no mention of sex, breasts, genitalia, or sexual language. None of the varying and sometimes inconsistent accounts of the day mention touching or exposure of breasts, buttocks, or genitalia. None of the accounts describes or even alludes to sex acts or statements about sex. The only kiss reported is a kiss on the cheek that G.B. reportedly forced upon Ms. Abadie as she was leaving. The deposition testimony of the Board's "expert," offers many statements showing that what the Board complains of might be called "inappropriate" or a "boundary violation" but does not amount to sexual misconduct. He testified about the strain a patient expressing romantic feelings toward a therapist puts on the professional relationship. He says the professional should tell the patient that the statements are inappropriate. The witness says that if the patient starts expressing the romantic feelings by touching the therapist, the therapist must tell the patient that his behavior is inappropriate and begin recording the events for the therapist's protection so that "no inappropriate allegations are made later." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 3). Asked his opinion about allegations that Ms. Abadie was laying on G.B.'s bed, the witness says the behavior "crossed a professional boundary" and that he was not aware of the "behavior being appropriate in any situation." (Jt. Ex. 3, p. 16). The witness acknowledged that a hug is not inherently sexual. (Jt. Ex. 3, pp. 24 & 30). In addition, the training and experience of the witness do not qualify him as someone whose opinion should be entitled to significant weight. Among other things, he has never written about, lectured about, or testified to an opinion about sexual misconduct. Had the deposition not been offered without objection, whether the testimony would have been admissible is a fair question. § 90.702, Fla. Stat. After February 4, 2018, Ms. Abadie attempted to continue her friendship with G.B. by telephone calls and visits. However, Comprehensive refused for several weeks, against G.B.'s wishes, to allow Ms. Abadie to visit G.B. and would only permit Ms. Abadie brief, supervised visits with her father. G.B. was very upset by Comprehensive's prohibition of visits from Ms. Abadie. He began refusing food and treatment, including medications and dialysis. G.B.'s condition deteriorated to the point that he was admitted to hospice care. At that point, on February 24, 2018, Comprehensive contacted Ms. Abadie and gave her permission to visit G.B and lifted restrictions on visiting her father. A February 27, 2018, e-mail from Shelly Wise, Director of Nursing, confirmed this and admitted that the Agency for Health Care Administration had advised that G.B.'s right as a resident to visitors trumped Comprehensive's concerns. Ms. Abadie resumed visiting her friend, G.B. On May 21, 2018, G.B. passed away. G.B. was a lonely, mortally ill man. He initiated a friendship with Ms. Abadie that she reciprocated. Ultimately, he developed unfounded feelings about her being his girlfriend and them having a future together. The clear and convincing evidence does not prove that the relationship was more than a friendship or that it was sexual in any way.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Mary A. Iglehart, Esquire Christina Arzillo Shideler, Esquire Florida Department of Health Prosecution Services Unit 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Kennan George Dandar, Esquire Dandar & Dandar, P.A. Post Office Box 24597 Tampa, Florida 33623
Recommendation Based on the preceding Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Respiratory Care, dismiss the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2019.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent held Class "D" Security Officer License Number D00-26960 and Class "DI" Security Officer Instructor License Number DI89-00304. Both licenses were duly issued by Petitioner pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Respondent has held his Class "D" license since 1976 and has held his Class "DI" license since 1989. Respondent has no previous record of a felony or misdemeanor offense and was, at the time of the formal hearing, working at an adult community condominium complex as a security guard. Officer Charles Wharton is a detective with the Fort Pierce Police Department who was, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, assigned to the juvenile division. T.G. is a female who was eleven years of age as of July 1993. F.S. 1/ is a female who was fourteen years of age as of July 1993. Both F.S. and T.G. were described by Officer Wharton as appearing their stated ages. Both of these girls were from what Officer Wharton referred to as "Fort Pierce's ghetto" and both were described by Officer Wharton as being "street wise". On or about July 1, 1993, Respondent paid T.G. and F.S. to have sexual relations with him at his house in Fort Pierce. The sex with F.S. included the penetration of her vagina with his penis. The sex with T.G. included her having oral contact with his penis. Officer Wharton questioned Respondent and read to him his Miranda rights. Respondent waived his Miranda rights and admitted to Officer Wharton that he had paid these two girls to have sex with him as described above. Officer Wharton referred this matter to the State Attorney's Office, which subsequently dismissed all charges against Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained herein, imposes an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000, suspends Respondent's licensure for a period of three months, and thereafter places Respondent's licensure on probation for a period of one year. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 1994.
The Issue Does the Department of Corrections' Sexual Harassment Policy, as contained in the Pamphlet "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities", in a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy", and Chapter 7 of the Department's Personnel Procedures Manual, constitute umpromulgated rules, pursuant to Section 120.535 F.S.? Are existing Department of Corrections Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4), and 33-4.003(22) and (24), F.A.C. invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority due to vagueness, pursuant to Section 120.56 F.S.?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner has been a career-service employee working as a Parole Officer I for DOC. He has earned a master's degree in criminology. At all times material, DOC has had in effect a one-page document entitled "Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment Policy" (P-5), a Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities" (P-3), and a Personnel Procedures Manual. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual is entitled "Sexual Harassment Complaints" (P-6). DOC has not adopted these documents as rules, and Petitioner here challenges them as unpromulgated rules. On February 22, 1996, Petitioner received written notice that he would be suspended without pay for ten days as a result of his violation of DOC Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4) and 33- 4.003(23)(25), F.A.C., (since renumbered) and the DOC's Policy on Sexual Harassment. The letter did not rely on Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual or its Pamphlet entitled "Sexual Harassment, Your Rights and Responsibilities". Petitioner appealed this action to PERC, which subsequently entered a recommended order upholding DOC's disciplinary action. Language from PERC's recommended order, which is pertinent to this instant rule challenge is: Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.001(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, that 'No . . . employee shall knowingly . . . commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any state statute, rule, directive or policy statement.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.002(4) states, in pertinent part, that 'Each employee . . . shall perform his duties fairly and impartially and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public.' Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4,.003(23) states that a first offense of conduct unbecoming a public employee is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-4.003(25) states that a first offense of willful violation of rules, regulations, directives or policy statements is punishable by a written reprimand, up to a thirty day suspension or dismissal. The DOC pamphlet entitled 'Florida Department of Corrections Sexual Harassment: Your Rights and Responsibilities,' provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual Harassment requires two elements: The alleged conduct must be of a sexual nature, must be unwelcome and unwanted. Sexual harassment may be any of, but not limited to, the following: * * * continued suggestions regarding invi- tations to social events outside the work place, after being told such suggestions are unwelcome; * * * prolonged staring or leering to [sic] a person; * * * 32. State of Florida, Department of Corrections, Personnel Procedures Manual, Chapter 7, Sexual Harassment, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * O. Sexual Harassment - Sexual Harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature from or involving an employee's supervisors, peers, subordinates or any other persons in contact with an employee or applicant during the course of the conduct of the employee's or applicant's business when: Submission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of employment; or Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual; or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. 33. The DOC Sexual Harassment Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Sexual harassment may result from unwelcome sexual advances or a hostile environment created by conduct offensive to the victim such as suggestive or lewd comments, dirty jokes, offensive pictures or physical touching. Accordingly, all employees are being placed on notice that any employee found guilty of having engaged in sexual harassment will be severely disciplined, up to and including dismissal. * * * The charge of conduct unbecoming a public employee is a general charge that is subsumed if the Agency has a more specific charge that fully describes the alleged misconduct. Ford v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 FCSR Para. 148 (1993); Mathis v. Department of Corrections, 6 FCSR Para. 122 (1991). In this case, I conclude that the charge of unbecoming conduct is subsumed within the charge of sexual harassment and should be dismissed. PERC's recommended order also applied the foregoing provisions. At the date of formal hearing in the instant rule challenge, PERC had issued no final order. Before this instant Division of Administrative Hearings final order could be entered, PERC had extended the time for the parties to file exceptions to its hearing officer's recommended order, and ultimately, on August 13, 1996, PERC adopted its hearing officer's recommended order, thereby rendering Petitioner subject to future disciplinary action at the second occurrence level under Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C. The final order of PERC is now under appeal by Petitioner. These facts are officially recognized, sua sponte. Petitioner received copies of the Pamphlet, the Sexual Harassment Policy, and a copy of Chapter 33-4, F.A.C., on July 16, 1993, when he began employment with the agency. He did not receive a copy of Chapter 7 of the Personnel Manual and was unaware of it until his PERC proceeding. DOC imposes disciplinary action against its employees for conduct which constitutes sexual harassment. Petitioner received periodic training in agency seminars on the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, including annual film presentations. He did not receive similar training regarding "conduct unbecoming a public employee", which is a term utilized in Section 110.227(1), F.S., and for which an employee may be disciplined. Section 110.227(1), F.S., also permits discipline of employees for "willful violation of the provisions of law or agency rules". Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., provides, in pertinent part: Responsibility for Conduct of Employees, Inmates and Others. No Administrator, Superintendent, Officer-In-Charge, Supervisor, or other employee shall knowingly permit any subordinate, inmate or other person to, nor shall he, commit any act or engage in any conduct which would violate any statute, rule, directive or policy statement . . . . Petitioner claims that Rule 33-4.001(4)(a), F.A.C., is vague as applied to him because he is not an administrator, superintendent, officer-in-charge, or a supervisor. According to Petitioner, this rule in only applicable to those who supervise subordinates. Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C., provides in pertinent part: (4) Each employee shall keep himself physically fit, mentally alert, personally neat and clean and shall perform his duties fairly and impartially, and otherwise conduct himself both on-duty and off-duty so as to command the respect of fellow employees, persons on parole, probation or otherwise under his supervision, inmates and the general public . . . . Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., is entitled "Range of Disciplinary Actions" and lists a number of violations. Item (22) is "Conduct Unbecoming a Public Employee"; Item (24) is "Willful Violation of Rules, Regulations, Directives, or Policy Statements". The range of disciplinary penalties is increased at the second occurrence level under the rule. The agency Policy Statement, Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the agency Personnel Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming a public employee and contain definitions of sexual harassment, including hostile work place sexual harassment. The first sentence of the Pamphlet states that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and is conduct unbecoming a public employee, as provided in Sections 110.105, 110.227 and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. (Rules of the Department). The first page of the Pamphlet states EEOC guidelines defining sexual harassment, as recognized by the agency: Unwelcome sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a person's employment, or Submission to, or rejection of, such conduct by [sic] decisions affecting an individual, or Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a person's work [sic] hostile or offensive working environment. The Pamphlet goes on to advise that sexual harassment requires two elements: conduct of a sexual nature/that is unwelcome and unwanted. It lists examples of harassing behavior, advises of the need to report such behavior, and explains the agency's internal complaint procedure and the procedure's protections against retaliation. It gives references for legal remedies outside the agency. Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual states basically the same information as the Pamphlet, lists the same legal authorities and details the internal complaint procedure. It specifically provides, If there is a determination that there is cause to believe sexual harassment occurred, disciplinary action shall be taken in accordance with Chapter 33-4 Department of Corrections Rules. Chapter 7 was first effective on January 25, 1989 and last amended on March 5, 1993. It derives its authority from Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sections 110.105, 110.227, and 110.233, F.S., and Chapter 33-4, F.A.C. Both the agency Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual state that sexual harassment is conduct unbecoming an employee. Petitioner's position with regard to whether or not the Pamphlet and Chapter 7 of the Manual constitute unpromulgated rules appears to center on his belief that without them, employees are not on notice as to exactly what behavior constitutes sexual harassment, that they contain a subtext of what types of sexual harassment, i.e. hostile work environment, will be disciplined, or that they alone reveal that sexual harassment constitutes "conduct unbecoming". Petitioner testified that he understood blatant sexual harassment, such as unconsented physical contact, to be conduct unbecoming a public employee, but he did not have a clear understanding about the "gray areas", such as complimenting co- workers, socializing outside work, or what acts constituted hostile work place sexual harassment. However, Petitioner testified that he was on notice that the agency had an Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy and that at all times material, he knew that if he committed sexual harassment, he would be subject to discipline, up to and including termination. Petitioner admitted that if any employee engaged in actual sexual harassment against another employee, the offending employee would not command the respect of fellow employees, as described in Rule 33-4.002(4), F.A.C. He also was on notice through Rule 33-4.003, F.A.C., that he could be disciplined for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violations of law or policy statements". He is charged at law with knowledge of Section 110.227(1) requiring discipline for "conduct unbecoming" or "willful violation" and Chapter 760 F.S., which implements Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The agency routinely disciplines its employees for sexual harassment and has a long history of application of its Anti-Sexual Harassment Policy. Petitioner did not submit any evidence as to how Chapter 7 of the agency's Personnel Procedures Manual, the Pamphlet, or the one- page Policy Statement had any affect on him, beyond the discipline described, supra. Furthermore, there was no evidence presented to show that the agency's Sexual Harassment Policy, the Pamphlet, or Chapter 7 of the Personnel Procedures Manual have any affect on any person not employed by Respondent. There was no evidence that any of the provisions in these documents were self-executing.
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Gerald R. Straw, through sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 30, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department had requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Final hearing in this cause was conducted on February 25, 1982. In the course of the final hearing, the Petitioner testified and offered as witnesses: Lois Turner, his mother; Alva Martin, R.N.; Larry Annis, Clinical Psychologist, and Kenneth Edwards, Vocational Education Instructor. The Respondent offered as witnesses: Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at Florida State Hospital, and Larry Annis, Clinical Psychologist. The Respondent presented one (1) composite exhibit which was received into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner has been in the custody of Respondent, in keeping with orders of court. His commitment has been on the basis of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977), involving a breaking and entering criminal offense with related assault charges. In addition, the Petitioner has a past history in New York State for the criminal offense of sexual mischief. The arrest for the offenses in Florida occurred on July 22, 1977, and the Petitioner was committed to the Sexual Offender Program at North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center on March 9, 1978. On August 3, 1978, a recommendation was made by staff of that facility to return the Petitioner to court for further disposition, based upon the belief that treatment had been exhausted. On September 13, 1978, he was released from that hospital program. That facility had not contacted other sex offender programs in the State of Florida prior to the release of the Petitioner and as a consequence, the Petitioner was recommitted to the Respondent by order of court dated October 31, 1978. He was placed in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, on January 27, 1979, and has resided in that program since that time. During his stay at Florida State Hospital, the Petitioner has undergone treatment in the program for the benefit of sex offenders. Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities, his progress in dealing with the underlying disorder which caused his placement has reached a juncture where improvement is no longer expected in the patient. In the face of these circumstances, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. These opinions were made known to the Petitioner and when confronted with this information, the Petitioner requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. The program at Florida State Hospital has as its main focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs in recreation and occupational therapy, and this treatment regimen relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. Respondent's Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence, is constituted of a series of clinical summaries related to the patient's performance during the course of his treatment at Florida State Hospital. In sum, the opinions stated in the clinical summaries accurately indicate that the Florida State Hospital has exhausted all available treatment for the Petitioner's underlying condition. Moreover, the presentation of the Petitioner's case to the Intra-Departmental Screening Committee, which is constituted of the administrative personnel of the various sex offender programs in the State of Florida, brought a correct perception that the Respondent has exhausted all available treatment for the Petitioner. Finally, the testimony given in the course of the hearing was in accord with those opinions expressed in the clinical summaries and the attitude of the Intra-Departmental Screening Committee. Petitioner's primary therapist, beginning in August, 1981, and continuing until the time of hearing, gave testimony in the course of the hearing. The therapist is Larry Annis, Clinical Psychologist. Annis shared the responsibility with a co-therapist until November, 1981, when he became the sole therapist for the Petitioner. Annis' testimony established that the Petitioner has been given a full and complete opportunity for participation in group therapy and in addition has been exposed to individual therapy sessions, and adjunctive therapy; to include, school, occupation and vocational training, ward government and participation in the ward milieu. The observed pattern of the Petitioner's participation in group therapy, on the part of Annis, is one of noting that the Petitioner talked to other persons in the group about their problems, but avoided talking about himself. In the group therapy sessions, Straw has denied having sexual problems and denied any guilt in connection with the underlying criminal offenses for which he stands convicted. (This was a similar attitude during the course of his stay at North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center.) Annis indicated that the Petitioner has done well in adjunctive therapy, in particular, electrical wiring in which his performance has been exemplary. The Petitioner has not been found to be a management problem in terms of his conduct, according to Annis. The comments by Annis are correct. From Annis' observations, the Petitioner presents himself as attentative and having the ability to verbalize his feelings; however, his progress in the group therapy sessions has not been significant. In the therapy sessions, Annis has correctly identified that Straw is not interested in emotional discussions involving topics such as personal feelings, likes and dislikes, depression and anger. Petitioner is more interested in data collection and inquiring about why something is required, which is a more superficial concern. In the group sessions, Annis has found Petitioner to be truthful, if unwilling to explore personal areas such as those mentioned above, and in addition, sexual concerns. In the latter course of treatment, Annis has indicated that the matters of concern on the subject of the Petitioner's progress in the program relate to the Petitioner's ability to admit to negative feelings, anger and to explore antecedents to this type of emotion in order to arrive at alternative responses to he made to those emotions. Other specific concerns are as outlined in the fourteen (14) problem areas discussed in the August 13, 1981, clinical summary which is part of Respondent's Exhibit 1. Annis further indicated at the point where the determination was made that the treatment had been exhausted, that he, as therapist, has nonetheless continued to treat the Petitioner's condition and has undertaken a new method of dealing with the problem, to include the removal of bimonthly reports in trying to see how Petitioner would perform in a less structured environment. This technique has not been one leading to progress on the part of the Petitioner. In summary, Annis has correctly concluded that the Petitioner has reached maximum benefits from the program at Chattahoochee, and having exhausted available treatment, there would be no benefit to be derived by the Petitioner's continued participation in the program. The Unit Director at Florida State, Robert H. Alcorn, testified that the Petitioner's stay in the program was about average in terms of duration. Alcorn has observed no significant progress in the Petitioner in dealing with the underlying sexual problem. Alcorn finds the Petitioner to be socially isolated, and a person who refuses to discuss emotional matters and issues central to himself. Alcorn notes that the Petitioner deals in universal terms when dealing with the matters of daily life, to include other members of the sex offender program. Alcorn's observations are valid, and in the face of these observations, Alcorn presented the Petitioner's case to the Intra-Departmental Screening Committee and no further placement could be found for the Petitioner. In other words, it was correctly concluded that the Department, as well as Florida State Hospital had exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner. Petitioner's mother, Lois Turner, gave testimony. She has seen progress in the Petitioner's emotional demeanor and that opinion is borne out by observations of persons in the treatment program. In particular, HRS. Turner notes that her son does not now have periods in which his thinking seems to be disassociative. This is as contrasted with her observations of her son five (5) years ago when she found him to be very disoriented. HRS. Turner also observed that the Petitioner has been truthful with her in her discussions with him. Alva Martin, R.N. and therapist in the Sex Offender Program at Chattahoochee, indicated that she had treated the Petitioner from November, 1979, through May, 1980. During the course of her treatment, she observed that the Petitioner had improved in that he did not appear as withdrawn and became more involved in activities with other persons within the program. The goals in this entry level into the Sex Offender Program, which were set out by Martin for the benefit of the Petitioner, were to try to get Straw to converse more with other people about his problems and to have general conversations with individuals in the ward milieu. It was not the intention of this element of the therapy to question the Petitioner about the underlying charges for which he was placed in the program. Martin noted some progress on the part of the Petitioner in his dealing with his angry feelings and improvement in his ability to verbalize. Again, from her observations, the Petitioner was always truthful in his discussions. Kenneth Edwards, a Vocational Instructor at Florida State Hospital, first met the Petitioner in April of 1980. At that time, Edwards noted that the Petitioner lacked self-confidence and an ability to relate to others. Petitioner tended to stay by himself. There has been a dramatic improvement in this circumstance to the extent that the Petitioner now serves as an instructor for other program participants, in the field of television repair. Edwards feels that he has a good relationship with Straw and feels that Straw has improved in his relationship with other persons. Petitioner, in his testimony, indicated that he feels that he is not guilty of the offenses as charged. In addition, he feels that he has progressed while being treated in the program at Florida State Hospital, and although he feels that he still has an underlying problem with sexual acting out, he feels that he has completed the program successfully and could control any temptations of a sexual nature. He also feels that he has discussed his underlying sexual problems in the past and would be willing to in the future. He feels that he is being removed from the program because he refuses to admit that he is guilty of committing the offenses which caused him to be placed in the program. He also takes issue with the fourteen (14) problem areas set forth in the August 13, 1981, clinical summary. He thinks that any human being would have problems similar to that nature and that those are problems which are not unique to Gerald Straw. In summary, the Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner's sexual deviance, but that treatment has not been totally successful and the patient continues to suffer with an underlying sexual disorder.
The Issue This order concerns the Respondent's motion to dismiss this action with prejudice premised upon lack of jurisdiction of this forum specifically, it is alleged that the Petitioner does not have standing to bring an action under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, in view of the fact that he is not considered to be a party within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(10)(d) Florida Statutes. The Respondent also asserts that the Petitioner has no legally recognizable substantial interest to be determined in this action, as would be required to establish standing to proceed under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 17, 1980, the Petitioner, David W. Cochran, was convicted and sentenced for the offense of lewd assault on a child, a violation of Section 800.04, Florida Statutes. This conviction and sentence was entered by the Circuit Court, Criminal Division, Polk County, Florida, in Case No. CF79-1761. The Petitioner was given a ten year sentence in the State prison for that offense, with the recommendation that the Petitioner be treated as a mentally disordered sex offender. In keeping with the terms and conditions of Section 917.012, Florida Statutes (1979), the Petitioner was evaluated by the State of Florida, Department of Corrections and the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, and was placed in the mentally disordered sex offender program at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, by process of transfer from his confinement in the prison to the stated placement as an offender. At the time of the motion hearing in this cause, the Petitioner was residing at Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, in the sex offender program, awaiting transport by the State of Florida, Department of Corrections, back to an appropriate corrections facility, it having been determined by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that it had exhausted all appropriate treatment for the said offender. The motion to dismiss had been occasioned in face of a petition for administrative determination which had been filed by the Petitioner with the Respondent and referred by the Respondent to the Division of Administrative Hearings for disposition. That petition calls for a determination on the question of exhaustion of treatment of the Petitioner in the aforementioned sex offender program and as stated in the Issues provision of this Recommended Order, the Respondent took the position that the hearing which the Petitioner requested pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, could not be granted to the Petitioner for the reasons set forth in the issues statement.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue Whether Rule 33ER91-3, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority? Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-6.0045(2), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, David Ansgar Nyberg, is an inmate in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections, at Marion Correctional Institution. The Petitioner is subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules at issue in this proceeding. The Petitioner is not currently eligible for minimum custody classification even if the rules at issue did not apply to the Petitioner. Nor was the Petitioner eligible for minimum custody during the period of time that the policy challenged in case number 91-6699RX was in effect or the period of time during which the Emergency Rule applied. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Emergency Rule and Rule 33-6.0045(2)(g), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.0045, Florida Administrative Code, establishes custody classifications for inmates. Custody classifications determine, among other things, the facility to which an inmate may be assigned and the degree of security an inmate is subjected to. Inmates are classified as minimum, medium, close or maximum custody, with minimum being the least restrictive and maximum being the most restrictive. The procedure to be followed in classifying each inmate is provided in Rule 33-6.0045(2), Florida Administrative Code. The Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule amend Rule 33-6.0045(2), Florida Administrative Code, by adding three paragraphs, including the following pertinent paragraph challenged by the Petitioner: (g) Any inmate who has been certified as a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to ch. 917, FS shall not be assigned to minimum custody status unless they have successfully completed the mentally disordered sex offender program. The Emergency Rule and the proposed amendment to Rule 33-6.0045, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Proposed Rule"), include the same substantive amendments to Rule 33-6.0045, Florida Administrative Code. The Emergency Rule was only effective during part of 1991, prior to promulgating the Proposed Rule. Relevant Effect of the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule. Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975), which is titled "mentally disordered sex offenders" provided, in pertinent part, the following: 917.14 Certifying defendant for hearing.-- The court may suspend the sentence and certify a defendant for a hearing and examination in the circuit court to determine whether the person is a mentally disordered sex offender if: The person is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor for which he is currently being prosecuted, whether or not the crime is a sex offense; There is a probable cause to believe that the person is a mentally disordered sex offender; and The mental disorder has existed for at least the immediately preceding 4 months. The court may certify a person under subsection (1) on its own motion, on motion by the State Attorney, or on application by affidavit of the defendant. A "mentally disordered sex offender" is defined in Section 917.13, Florida Statutes (1975), as follows: "Mentally disordered sex offender" means a person who is not insane but who has a mental disorder and is considered dangerous to others because of a propensity to commit sex offenses. Any person determined to be a mentally disordered sex offender was to be committed "to the custody of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation for care, treatment, and rehabilitation." Section 917.19, Florida Statutes (1975). The definition of a "mentally disordered sex offender" was modified in 1977. Pursuant to Section 917.13, Florida Statutes (1977), a "mentally disordered sex offender" was defined as follows: A "mentally disordered sex offender" or "offender is a person who: Has been convicted of or pleaded guilty or no contest to a sex offense or attempted sex offense in a current prosecution; Suffers from a nonpsychotic mental or emotional disorder, yet is competent; and Is likely to commit further sex offenses if permitted to remain at liberty. Subsequent to 1977, the classification of an offender as a mentally disordered sex offender was repealed. Pursuant to the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule, any person who has been determined to be a mentally disordered sex offender who has NOT successfully completed the mentally disordered sex offender program may not be classified as minimum custody. The Statutory Authority for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule. The specific authority for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule is Sections 20.315, 944.09 and 958.11, Florida Statutes. The specific laws implemented by the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule is Sections 20.315, 921.20, 944.09 and 958.11, Florida Statutes. The Respondent intends to add by technical amendment the following additional statutory authority for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule: Sections 944.17 and 944.1905, Florida Statutes. The Rationale for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule. The immediate danger to the public health, safety and welfare which the Respondent indicated justified promulgating the Emergency Rule pursuant to Section 120.54(9), Florida Statutes, was set out in the Notice of Emergency Rulemaking: The rule is necessary in order to prevent convicted sex offenders, inmates certified as mentally disordered sex offenders, and aliens who are subject to deportation from being assigned minimum custody status. The department's current classification policy permits the classification of minimum custody for these inmates who, by their nature, present an extraordinary threat to public safety should they escape, or, in the case of aliens, present an inordinate escape risk because of the threat to deportation. The sex offenders being addressed are those who are or have been previously convicted of sex offenses listed in s.944.277(1), which are those sex offenses which exclude inmates from awards of provisional credits, and therefore identify them as a category of offenders who present a threat to public safety. The rule also addresses those persons certified as mentally disordered sex offenders under ch. 917 FS, who are considered dangerous to others because of a propensity to commit sex offenses. Experience has shown that one of the categories of inmates that are the greatest risk of escape are those subject to deportation, which in certain cases, would subject them to severe penalties in their native countries. Without an emergency rule, these categories of offenders could be reduced to minimum custody and permitted placement on public work squads or other outside work assignments with little or no supervision. The emergency rule presents a mechanism to ensure that these inmates are retained in a secure perimeter or under direct supervision. Although the Notice of Emergency Rulemaking indicates that there are only two inmates who are classified as mentally disordered sex offenders under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, there may be more. The number referenced in the Notice does not include former inmates who have been released, with or without further supervision, who may commit offenses in the future which could result in their return to prison. Additionally, it is possible that Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, or a similar statute, could be enacted in the future resulting in the classification of additional inmates as mentally disordered sex offenders. In fact, Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, has been repealed and then reenacted in the past. Even if there are only two inmates classified as mentally disordered sex offenders, the evidence failed to prove that the potential threat from a single inmate classified as a mentally disordered sex offender is not sufficient justification for the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule. Although the Respondent was aware at the time of promulgating the challenged rules that the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule would apply to the Petitioner, who is one of the inmates currently in prison who is classified as a mentally disordered sex offender, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Respondent was "out to get the Petitioner." The Petitioner failed to prove that the Petitioner adopted the Emergency Rule or the Proposed Rule only because they apply to the Petitioner. The purpose for promulgating the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule was to protect the public. By the very definition of a mentally disordered sex offender under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, persons determined to be mentally disordered sex offenders are considered likely to constitute a continuing threat. Pursuant to the definition of a mentally disordered sex offender contained in the 1975 statutes, such a person "is considered dangerous to others because of a propensity to commit sex offenses." Section 917.13, Florida Statutes (1975). As defined in the 1977 statutes, such a person "[i]s likely to commit further sex offenses if permitted to remain at liberty." Section 917.13(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1977). Persons classified as minimum custody are subject to less security. They may be placed on work programs which take them out of the institution. Allowing a person who has been determined by the courts of Florida to be likely to commit further sex offenses or to have a propensity to commit sex offenses and who have not completed programs intended to correct such tendencies, has the potential of placing the public at unnecessary risk. The Impact of the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule on the Petitioner and the Petitioner's Challenge. The Petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, first degree murder in 1975. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and was required to serve a minimum of 25 years. The Petitioner was not charged with any sex offense. Subsequent to the Petitioner's conviction, his defense attorney suggested that the Petitioner request that he be classified as a mentally disordered sex offender pursuant to Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975). The Petitioner did in fact request that he be classified as a mentally disordered sex offender. Pursuant to Section 917.14(2), Florida Statutes (1975), such a request was required to be made by "affidavit of the defendant." The Petitioner's request to be classified as a mentally disordered sex offender was granted on December 19, 1975, by then Circuit Court Judge Charles Scruggs, III. There was no requirement that a person classified as a mentally disordered sex offender in 1975 actually be convicted of having committed a sex offense. There was, however, a requirement that the sentencing judge determine that the person being classified as a mentally disordered sex offender: Have a mental disorder; and Be considered dangerous to others because of a propensity to commit sex offenses. It was not necessary under Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1975), that it be shown that the person ever actually committed a sex offense. It was only necessary that the person show a propensity or inclination to commit a sex offense in the future. On April 1, 1976, the Petitioner was transferred from a correctional institution to the state mental hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida. In March, 1980, the Petitioner was resentenced and returned to a correctional institution. Judge Scruggs recommended that the Petitioner be placed in minimum custody. The Petitioner is currently classified as medium custody. Even without the Emergency Rule or the Proposed Rule, the Petitioner has not been eligible for classification as minimum custody. Nor is the Petitioner currently eligible for minimum custody. Should the Petitioner, who has had no disciplinary reports during his seventeen years incarceration by the Respondent, otherwise become eligible for minimum custody in the future, he will not be so classified because of the Proposed Rule. In light of the fact that the Petitioner was not eligible for minimum custody during the period of time that the Emergency Rule was effective, the Emergency Rule had no impact on the Petitioner and he lacks standing to challenge the Emergency Rule. The Petitioner failed to prove that he has successfully completed the mentally disordered sex offender program. The Petitioner was involved in a sex offense committed against him when he was a child. Pursuant to the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule the Petitioner will not be eligible for minimum custody because he was classified as a mentally disordered sex offender and has apparently not successfully completed the mentally disordered sex offender. Nor can the Petitioner successfully complete the program since it is no longer provided. The Petitioner has alleged that the Emergency Rule and the Proposed Rule are invalid because they are arbitrary and capricious. The Petitioner has also alleged that the Emergency Rule is invalid because no emergency existed when it was promulgated.
