Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gloria Ann Ellwood, is currently licensed and eligible for licensure in the State of Florida as a general lines agent. Ellwood purchased in January 1985 from Pasqualey "Pat" Caliguiri what they both believed to be were shares in two franchises to operate a nonstandard automobile insurance business, Cash Register Auto Insurance of Escambia County and Cash Register Auto Insurance of Okaloosa County. Ellwood paid Caliguiri $10,000 as a down payment and financed $35,000 for 500 of 1,000 shares in the Escambia County agency and approximately $25,000 for 500 of 1,000 shares in the Okaloosa County agency. Ellwood paid Caliguiri approximately one-half the amount financed before the events occurred which are the basis for this case. These two franchises Caliguiri had purchased in 1983, along with another franchise, for nonstandard auto insurance sales offices from Lloyd Register for $5,000 apiece, as evidenced by 500 shares of 1,000 shares common stock in each of the three corporations. Through this purchase, Caliguiri received a reduction in the amount of commission paid on the franchise and the ability to realize a profit from his efforts in building the business. He executed a consulting agreement with Register and had to sign an employment contract with the various corporations. Register provided accounting and similar services, and Caliguiri had to repay to Register all capital expenditures made on the agencies. Register was present at the closing of the sale between Caliguiri and Ellwood. Register was silent at the closing between Ellwood and Caliguiri regarding Ellwood's rights. He was aware of the transfer of Caliguiri's stock to Ellwood for valuable consideration. After the transfer, Ellwood executed a consulting agreement with Register and signed an employment contract with the two corporations which she had purchased. Ellwood was entitled to $500 per week salary from `the corporation. In the case of both Caliguiri and Ellwood, when receipts from the business were low, Register suggested that they take some lesser sum as a salary payment than what they were entitled to under their employment contract. Register demanded payment of all moneys due to Register, although he did extend the time for payment for Caliguiri at one point when business was particularly bad. Both Caliguiri and Ellwood thought that they owned the stores which they had purchased. Ellwood served as general manager, president and director of Cash Register Auto Insurance of Escambia County at all times material to the complaint. Cash Register of Escambia was a Florida corporation engaged in the operation of a nonstandard insurance agency at all times material to the complaint. During 1985 and 1986, Ellwood paid for rent, improvements to property, telephone service, and similar business expenses from her personal account when there insufficient funds in the operating account to cover these expenditures. The total of these loans to the corporation was $14,930.37. Ellwood was charged by Register for the annual state corporate filings with the State of Florida. The Escambia agency had two checking accounts; one for payroll and the other for bills and refunds. The latter account was called the operating account into which deposits and premiums were deposited. Checks for insurance companies, insureds, beneficiaries and all business expenses, except salary, were written on this account. Ellwood wrote or caused to be written all checks for the agency from both accounts. Starting in January 1987 and continuing to June 1988, Ellwood wrote a series of 14 checks on the operating account to fictitious payees which were designated as refund checks to insureds; however, the payees had never paid a deposit to the company. Between January 1987 and July 1988, Ellwood endorsed and cashed these checks keeping $1,897.44. Ellwood described these checks as repayment of the money which she had advanced to the business. Ellwood explained that she wrote these checks to fictitious payees to prevent questions from Register's accountant and from fear Register would want commissions from non-franchise agencies which she owned. During all times material to this complaint, Register provided accounting services as part of his consulting agreement. Register or his accountant was aware that checks had not been drawn on the operating account for payment of rent, advertising, and telephone services and he knew the agency was still in business at the same locale. Register or his accountant was aware of the checks for refunds which ran from $21.89 to $398.99, no two of which were for the same amount. These checks do not appear on their face to be refunds for special high risk automobile insurance although they are annotated as such. Register suggested and was aware that Ellwood and Caliguiri took less salary than they were entitled to take under their employment contracts. Although money received from a client or company for a client or beneficiary is held in a fiduciary capacity, the operating account is not an escrow account and agents are not required to maintain deposits in an escrow account pending transfer of the premiums to an insurer. No evidence was received that Ellwood impaired these accounts by issuing these checks to fictitious clients and cashing them. Ellwood did not question her ownership of the business until late summer 1988 when Register advised Brian Fisher, a potential buyer, that Fisher would not have the rights of ownership if he purchased Ellwood's shares of stock because she held only common stock and control of the corporation was vested in those persons holding preferred stock all of which was owned by Register and his wife.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the charges be dismissed against the Respondent DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX A TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 89-4903 The following is a list of the proposed findings which were adopted and those which were rejected and why. Petitioner's Proposed Findings: Paragraph 1 Adopted. Paragraph 2 Adopted. Paragraph 3 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 4 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 5 Rejected as contrary to the facts. Paragraph 6 Rejected as contrary to the facts. Paragraph 7 Respondent admitted she used the money for another agency; however, that does not establish that taking the money was fraudulent. Paragraph 8 Rejected as contrary to the facts. Respondent's Proposed Findings: Paragraph 1 Adopted. Paragraph 2 Adopted. Paragraph 3 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 4 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 5 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 6 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 7 Adopted, but reworded & renumbered. Paragraph 8 Rejected as contrary to the facts. Paragraph 9 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Roy Schmidt, Esq. Office of the Treasurer Department of Insurance and Treasurer 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Fletcher Fleming, Esq. Shell, Fleming, Davis & Merige Seventh Floor, Seville Tower P.O. Box 1831 Pensacola, FL 32595
The Issue Should Petitioner impose discipline against the licenses held by Respondent as a Life (2-16), Life and Health (2-18), General Lines, Property and Casualty Insurance (2-20), Health (2-40) and Legal Expense (2-56) agent pursuant to provisions within Chapter 626, Florida Statutes?
Recommendation Based on the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding Respondent in violation of Counts I through V pertaining to his obligations as a fiduciary set forth in Section 626.561(1), Florida Statutes, his violation of Section 626.611(7), (9) and (10), Florida Statutes, and his violation of Section 626.621(4), Florida Statutes, in effect when the violations transpired and that the various licenses held by Respondent be suspended for six months as suggested by counsel for Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 William Franklin Outland, III 10840 Northwest 100th Street Reddick, Florida 32686 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Lower Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, John Morris Ale, hereinafter Mr. Ale, was licensed as a general lines agent in the State of Florida. On or about December 5, 1994, Mr. Ale telephoned Ms. Kristen Stryker informing her that he had started his own insurance business, Doctors Insurance Agency, and inquiring if she wanted to obtain her automobile insurance coverage from him. Mr. Ale was acquainted with Ms. Stryker due to his having obtained her present coverage for her. It was almost time for renewal of her present coverage. Ms. Stryker agreed to obtain her automobile coverage from Mr. Ale. Further, Mr. Ale inquired if Ms. Stryker would allow his son, James Ale, to come to her home and write the coverage. Mr. Ale indicated that his son was learning the insurance business, but assured her that he, Mr. Ale, would review all documents prepared by his son. Relying on that assurance and believing that Mr. Ale's son was a licensed agent, Ms. Stryker agreed for Mr. Ale's son to write her automobile coverage. On the evening of December 5, 1994, James Ale came to Ms. Stryker's home. He completed an automobile insurance application for coverage on her 1993 Jeep Cherokee and explained the coverage to her. Ms. Stryker presented to James Ale a check for $222, made payable to Doctors Insurance, as down payment for the insurance premium. Additionally, James Ale presented to Ms. Stryker an E.T.I. Financial Corporation premium finance agreement to sign. She signed the premium finance agreement. E.T.I. is a premium finance company. The premium finance agreement is dated December 6, 1994. It is signed by Respondent and indicates, among other things, Ms. Stryker's down payment, the total premium, and coverage effective on December 6, 1994, by two insurance companies, Fortune and New Alliance. Ms. Stryker's down payment check for $222 was endorsed and deposited by Doctors Insurance Agency. At no time material hereto was James Ale licensed by the State of Florida to transact insurance. At all times material hereto, Mr. Ale knew or should have known that his son, James Ale, was not licensed by the State of Florida to transact insurance. Subsequently, James Ale forwarded to Ms. Stryker an undated letter, together with additional applications for insurance coverage with insurance companies other than Fortune and New Alliance. In the letter, James Ale requested, among other things, that Ms. Stryker sign the applications and return them to him so that he could forward the applications to the insurance companies. Also, included with the undated letter was a copy of an automobile insurance binder, which indicated, among other things, that her vehicle coverage was with two insurance companies, Armor Insurance and Service Insurance, and that the binder period was from March 10, 1995 through March 10, 1996. The binder, according to the undated letter, could be used for proof of insurance. E.T.I. Financial Corporation authorized Doctors Insurance Agency, by and through Mr. Ale, to finance insurance premiums through E.T.I. Mr. Ale was the licensed agent for Doctors Insurance Agency. As an authorized insurance premium finance agent for E.T.I., Doctors Insurance Agency had possession of blank bank drafts from E.T.I. The process and procedure utilized in financing insurance premiums through an insurance company authorized by E.T.I. to represent it included forwarding blank bank drafts, bearing E.T.I.'s name, to the authorized insurance company. The bank draft is completed by the authorized insurance company, which includes making the drafts payable for the entire premium to the insurance company providing the coverage and is signed by the licensed agent of the authorized insurance company. The completed bank draft is forwarded, along with the premium finance agreement and any down payment, to E.T.I. which forwards the draft to the specified insurance company providing the coverage. If a draft is not signed by the licensed agent, the draft is not honored by E.T.I. and, therefore, is not issued to the insurance company providing the coverage. Consequently, no coverage is provided for a vehicle. No premium finance agreement from Doctors Insurance Agency was received by E.T.I. on behalf of Ms. Stryker. No premium finance agreement was ever received by E.T.I. from Doctors Insurance Agency. No down payment for the insurance premium on behalf of Ms. Stryker was received by E.T.I. from Doctors Insurance Agency. No bank draft from Doctors Insurance Agency was received by E.T.I. on behalf of Ms. Stryker and payable to Fortune or New Alliance. No bank draft from Doctors Insurance Agency was received by E.T.I. on behalf of Ms. Stryker and payable to Armor Insurance or Service Insurance. No bank drafts were ever received by E.T.I. from Doctors Insurance Agency. Due to the failure of Doctors Insurance Agency to submit the proper documents to E.T.I., including the bank drafts, no insurance company, which was to provide automobile insurance coverage to Ms. Stryker, received a premium from E.T.I. Therefore, none of the insurance companies provided Ms. Stryker with coverage for her vehicle. Even though Ms. Stryker had a binder for insurance coverage, unbeknownst to her, she had no automobile insurance coverage in effect. On or about May 24, 1995, Ms. Stryker was involved in an automobile accident. Believing that she had automobile insurance coverage in effect, Ms. Stryker contacted Mr. Ale regarding the accident. Mr. Ale informed her that she did not have insurance coverage with his insurance company and never did. Shortly afterwards, Ms. Stryker spoke with James Ale who informed her that he would attempt to locate her documents. She was not contacted again by James Ale. Because she had no automobile insurance coverage, Ms. Stryker was personally liable for the damages resulting from her accident, which exceeded $3,000. Also, she was exposed to potential personal liability for claims of injuries or damages suffered by the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident. Neither Doctors Insurance Agency nor Mr. Ale paid any monies to Ms. Stryker for the damages that she suffered. On or about June 7, 1995, Ms. Stryker filed a consumer's assistance request with the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, hereinafter the Department. On or about October 18, 1995, almost 5 months after her automobile accident, Doctors Insurance Company issued a refund to Ms. Stryker of her $222 down payment on the insurance premium. Ms. Stryker had paid the down payment more than 10 months earlier.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order: Finding that John Morris Ale violated Subsections 626.611(4), (7), (8), and (13), and 626.621(2) and (12), Florida Statutes (1993), in Count I and violated Subsections 626.561(1), 626.611(7), (8), and (13), and 626.621(2), Florida Statutes (1993), in Count II. Imposing a 21-month suspension of the license of John Morris Ale. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1997.
The Issue Whether Respondent has violated Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Capital National Financial Corporation (Capital), is transacting the business of insurance premium financing pursuant to a certificate of authority issued by the Petitioner, Florida Department of Insurance (Department). The Department is responsible for regulating the premium finance business affairs of Capital. On August 30, 1994, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Non- renew Capital's certificate of authority to transact premium financing in Florida pursuant to Section 627.829, Florida Statutes. As authority for issuing the Notice of Intent to Non-renew, the Department cited two grounds. First, the Department alleged that Capital was illegally financing the purchase of automobile club memberships in conjunction with an insurance transaction, a violation of Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes. Second, the Department alleged that Capital was utilizing a form in conjunction with the premium financing transaction without the requisite Departmental approval, a violation of Section 627.838, Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that the only issue to be determined is whether there was a violation of Section 627.8405. Capital finances insurance premiums and has agreed to collect installment payments for automobile club memberships which the insurance agent sells to the customer when the customer is buying automobile insurance. The customer makes a down payment on the automobile club membership. Capital does not advance the remainder of the membership cost to the insurance agent. The customer executes a billing service disclosure form. The billing service disclosure form contains the following language: In conjunction with your insurance, you have purchased through your insurance agent the supplemental service disclosed above. The amount which you are charged for this supplemental service, after deduction of any down payment which you have paid, will be divided equally into monthly installments payable to Capital National Financial Corporation due at the same time, and in addition to, your monthly installment payable to Capital National for the financing of the purchase of your insurance. Capital National is acting as a collection agent for your insurance agent and is not charging any interest or other fee for collecting and processing the amount due for your purchase of this supplemental service. The monthly installment you will pay for the supplemental service will be added to the payment amount for your insurance and this aggregate amount will be reflected on your payment coupon. However, your insurance can not be cancelled by reason of your failure to pay the amount of the monthly installment attributable to the purchase of the supplemental service. The billing service disclosure form used by Capital is executed by the customer on the same day the premium finance agreement is executed. The billing disclosure form is a separate document from the premium finance agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Capital National Financial Corporation did not violate Section 627.8405, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1944 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-19: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 20: Rejected as not supported by the record. Capital disputes that they are "financing" the automobile club fees. Paragraphs 21-23: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 24-29: Rejected as unnecessary. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraphs 1-4: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-6: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 7-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-13: Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Alan J. Leifer, Esquire Department of Insurance/Legal Services East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Alberto R. Cardenas, Esquire Matias R. Dorta, Esquire Tew & Garcia-Pedrosa South Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33131-4336 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Insurance, is an agency of the State of Florida. Respondent, Bill Gunter, as Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida, is the agency head of the Department of Insurance. Petitioner, Insurance Services Office, is a rating organization qualified to transact, and is transacting, specified rate-making services in Florida pursuant to a certificate of authority issued by Respondent. The other petitioners are foreign corporations authorized to do business in the State of Florida. They are licensed as automobile casualty insurers by Respondent and transact automobile and casualty insurance business in the State of Florida. The Department has adopted Rule 4-43.03, Florida Administrative Code which provides: 4-43.03 Unfair discrimination in private passenger motor vehicle insur- ance rates - based on sex, marital status and scholastic achievement. No insurer authorized to engage in the business of insurance in the State of Florida shall establish classi- fications or premium rates for any policy, contract or certificate of private pas- senger motor vehicle insurance based upon the sex, marital status or scholastic achievement of the person or persons insured. This rule shall become effective on March 1, 1980. The purpose of the proposed rule is to eliminate the use of sex, marital status and scholastic achievement criteria in the formulation of private passenger automobile insurance premium rates. Tile business which Petitioners conduct in the State of Florida involves, in some direct manner, the setting of private passenger automobile insurance premium rates. In the formulation of these rates Petitioners use, in part, sex, marital status or scholastic achievement criteria, or some combination thereof. Petitioners, with the exception of Petitioner Insurance Services Office, are insurance companies competing with one another in the private passenger automobile insurance market in Florida. They represent a very significant portion of the private passenger automobile insurance business in Florida. All of their premium rates for such insurance are formulated using sex, marital status, or scholastic achievement, or some combination thereof, along with other factors. The rule would apparently invalidate all of the rate classification plans by which Petitioners set premium rates Presently in force in Florida. To comply with the rule the Petitioners will have to devise and implement new rate classification plans. Such an action is a major undertaking by an insurance company. Prior to the adoption of the rule the Department's historic interpretation of the Florida Insurance Code and specifically Section 626.9541(15)(h), Florida Statutes, has allowed rate classification plans using sex, marital status and scholastic achievement criteria in their formulation. Such criteria have historically been part of rate classification plans and, prior to adoption of the rule, have never been disapproved by the Department. It should be noted that Florida is a "use and file" state wherein an insurer files its rate classification plan with the responsibility then shifting to the Department to challenge the validity of that plan. The Respondent did not offer evidence or testimony sufficient to establish that factual changes of any nature have occurred, or that the Department has become aware of new factual information, which would support a deviation from their historic interpretation of the Florida Insurance Code. Historically the Department has not considered rate classification plans which use sex, marital status and scholastic achievement, along with other criteria in their formulation to be "unfairly discriminatory as that term is used in the Florida Insurance Code. As confirmed by the testimony of the Chief Actuary and Director of the Division of Insurance Rating for the Department, as well as expert actuaries testifying on behalf of Petitioners, the best way to equitably reflect differences in expected losses among insureds is to reflect those differences as accurately as possible. From an actuarial standpoint the most equitable classification factors are those that are the most actuarially sound. The classification factors of sex, marital status and scholastic achievement, in light of the present state of the art in the industry, enhances the actuarial soundness of a rate classification for automobile insurance. The Chief Actuary and Director of the Division of Insurance Rating for the Department did not know of any classification plan that eliminated sex, marital status and scholastic achievement as classification factors that is as actuarially accurate as Petitioner State Farm's present classification plan which uses some or all of those classification factors. Respondents have admitted that Section 626.9541 (15)(h), Florida Statutes, (which reads No insurer shall, with respect to premiums charged for automobile insurance, unfairly discriminate solely on the basis of age, sex, marital status or scholastic achievement) does not absolutely prohibit all discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, or scholastic achievement. In the insurance industry rate classifications necessarily discriminate between different classes of individuals with different levels of expected losses and exposure. Such discrimination is not necessarily unfair. The Economic Impact Statement promulgated by the Department in the adoption of the rule was prepared by Mark Trafton III, Chief Actuary and Director of the Division of Insurance Rating for the Department. The elimination of the subject criteria by the Rule will require insurance companies writing automobile insurance in Florida to devise and file new rate classification plans. Such action on the part of the insurance companies will cause them to incur expenses, possibly substantial in nature. The Economic Impact Statement contains no estimate of, nor reflects any inquiry into, the expense to the industry or individual insurance companies of devising new rate classification plans for use in Florida. In Paragraph 1 of the Economic Impact Statement it is estimated that the cost to the Department of implementing the Rule will be approximately $6,000.00. The evidence establishes that this estimate, at best, reflects only the cost to the Department of the adoption process. It is not intended to reflect any cost to the Department of the actual implementation of the Rule. It is reasonable to assume that because of the Rule there will be a significant increase in the number of rate filings with the Department which the Department will be required to review. The Economic Impact Statement reflects no assessment of any kind, of this potential cost to the Department. There is a class of individuals in Florida presently receiving the benefit of discounted premiums through "good student discounts" offered by one or more insurance companies. This class of individuals will be adversely affected by the Rule in that they may no longer receive the discount they are now receiving. No estimate of this cost to that class of individuals is reflected in the Economic Impact Statement and, in fact, no such estimate was made. Further, the testimony establishes that there was no reason why such an estimate could not have been included in the Economic Impact Statement and its omission was probably an oversight by the preparer of the statement. The evidence establishes that the Department has changed its interpretation of the word "equitably" as used in Section 627.0651(6), Florida Statutes (1979), as well as its interpretation of the phrase "unfair discrimination" as contained in the Florida Insurance Code relevant to this proceeding.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner on October 6, 1997, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Insurance is the state agency responsible for regulating the business of insurance in the State of Florida. Section 624.307, Florida Statutes. This power extends to the licensing and discipline of insurance agents. Sections 626.291, .611, and .621, Florida Statutes. Howard Irvin Vogel ("Respondent") is, and was at all times material to this action, licensed as a general lines agent (2-20) and a health insurance agent (2-40); Respondent is also currently licensed as a Florida Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association representative (0-17). Respondent is, and was at the times material to this action, the president of Federal Auto Ins., Inc., 1/ ("Federal Insurance"), an incorporated general lines insurance agency located in Lake Worth, Florida. He is, and was at the times material to this action, the only officer of the corporation who is a licensed insurance agent. In 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, Respondent was a director of the corporation and its designated primary agent. Respondent is, and was at the times material to this action, also the only licensed insurance agent who has the authority to sign checks drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account. At the times material to this action, Federal Insurance employed at least two licensed insurance agents in addition to the Respondent. The Respondent regularly worked full-time in the Federal Insurance office during 1993, 1994, and 1995, and he was aware of the way in which the agents he employed sold insurance. All monies received by the agents were turned over to the agency, and the Respondent approved all refunds and signed all refund checks. The Respondent ran the day-to-day operations of the insurance agency and supervised the agents who worked there. At the times material to this action, it was the practice at Federal Insurance to impose a service charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance 2/ if a customer indicated he or she would need certificates prepared throughout the year. It was also the practice not to charge customers for the preparation of the first three certificates, but the agents employed there had the option, depending on the person and on the amount of the premium, of charging $5 for each certificate prepared in excess of the three free ones or of charging a flat fee of $100 per year. The charge was imposed to cover the costs of preparing the certificates. The agents employed by Federal Insurance were expected to explain the charge to the customer and to make it clear that the $100 was an additional charge and not part of the insurance premium. The fees received for the preparation of certificates of insurance were deposited in Federal Insurance's trust account. Some insurance agencies do not charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance on behalf of their customers. At the times material to this action, Federal Insurance sold automobile towing coverage provided by L.N.V., Inc., a Florida corporation whose directors since its incorporation in 1987 have been Howard and Alicia Vogel. L.N.V., Inc., reimburses its members for the expense of towing an insured vehicle if an accident occurs during the period the customer's automobile insurance policy is in effect. Federal Insurance had, at the times material to this action, a separate application for the towing coverage, which applicants for the coverage were required to sign. The agents employed by Federal Insurance were expected to explain the nature of the coverage and to make it clear to the customer that the charge for the towing coverage was separate from the premium charged for the underlying automobile insurance policy. The membership fees received for the towing coverage were deposited into a separate account for L.N.V., Inc. The Respondent is the only licensed insurance agent authorized to sign checks on this account. Michael Clark On December 19, 1993, Michael J. Clark went to the office of Federal Insurance to purchase a commercial general liability insurance policy and to renew his commercial automobile insurance policy. He met with Lee Vogel, who was a licensed general lines agent employed by Federal Insurance. Lee Vogel quoted Mr. Clark an annual premium of $776 for the renewal of his commercial automobile insurance policy for a vehicle used in his business, Eastern Electric. Mr. Clark applied for the policy, which was written by the Granada Insurance Company ("Granada"); $776 was the correct premium for the coverage Mr. Clark requested. Mr. Clark paid Federal Insurance a down payment of $330 and signed a Premium Finance Agreement and Disclosure Statement in order to obtain financing for the balance of the premium. When Mr. Clark signed the premium finance agreement, the portion identified as the Federal Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement had not been completed by Lee Vogel, so the form did not reflect the amount of the down payment. Mr. Clark and Lee Vogel used a worksheet when they were discussing the coverage and the cost of the policy. The worksheet Lee Vogel prepared during these discussions shows that he added $100 to the $776 premium for the commercial automobile insurance policy and stated a total of $876 on the worksheet. Mr. Clark signed the worksheet on which the $100 charge is shown, and he apparently did not question at that time the purpose of the additional $100 charge. Several weeks after he purchased the commercial automobile insurance policy, Mr. Clark received the documents and payment book from the premium finance company. These documents reflected that he had been credited with a down payment of only $230 rather than the $330 down payment Mr. Clark thought he had made on the policy. At the same time he purchased the commercial automobile insurance policy, Mr. Clark purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy. Lee Vogel quoted Mr. Clark a premium of $281 for a policy which would be written by the American Surety and Casualty Insurance Company ("American Surety"). Mr. Clark applied for this policy and paid Federal Insurance $381 as payment in full for the general liability policy. The worksheet prepared by Lee Vogel shows a $100 charge added to the $281 premium quoted to Mr. Clark. Although Mr. Clark claims that Lee Vogel did not explain the $100 charge to him, Mr. Clark did not question Lee Vogel about the additional $100 charge. He signed the worksheet and paid Federal Insurance $381 for the general liability coverage even though he was quoted $281 as the premium for the coverage. Lee Vogel added the $100 charge to the $776 and $281 premiums for the automobile and general liability policies as a service charge to cover the costs of preparing any certificates of insurance Mr. Clark might request during the policy year. According to Lee Vogel, customers are not charged for the preparation of certificates for commercial automobile insurance policies because certificates of insurance are not usually prepared for such policies. If they are, it is in conjunction with certificates of insurance prepared to confirm commercial general liability coverage. At the time he purchased the policy, Mr. Clark requested that four certificates of insurance be prepared, and, on December 20, 1993, Howard Vogel signed four certificates of insurance verifying that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety. During the 1993-94 policy year, Federal Insurance prepared a total of seventeen certificates of insurance on behalf of Eastern Electric, which certified that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety. Five of the seventeen certificates of insurance confirmed both that Eastern Electric had general liability coverage with American Surety and that Eastern Electric had automobile insurance coverage with Granada Insurance Company. No separate certificates of insurance were prepared by Federal Insurance for the commercial automobile insurance policy written by Granada Insurance Company. Mr. Clark testified that he was not informed of the $100 service charge added to the premiums for the commercial automobile insurance policy and the commercial general liability insurance policy. He was in a hurry when he purchased these policies, and, when Lee Vogel gave him two or three papers to sign, he signed the papers without really reading them. Except for his signature appearing on several of the certificates of insurance prepared by Federal Insurance for Eastern Electric, the Respondent's only direct involvement with Mr. Clark's case was a letter the Respondent wrote to the Department, dated June 20, 1994, in which he complained about the way in which the investigation of Mr. Clark's complaint was being handled. Cheryl Lee Andrews On February 23, 1994, Cheryl Andrews purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy for her husband's lawn care business, Tropic Green Lawn Care, through Federal Insurance. After having spoken with him on the telephone, Ms. Andrews met with Bryan Sanders, a licensed general lines insurance agent employed by Federal Insurance, who quoted Ms. Andrews a premium of $673 for a policy written by American Surety. The wholesale broker in this transaction, with whom Federal Insurance had a contract, was Amelia Underwriters, Inc. Ms. Andrews made a down payment of $271 on the policy, and she was given a receipt which indicated that she had paid a $271 payment on a "GL" policy with "Amelia." When she paid the down payment on the policy, Ms. Andrews also signed a Premium Finance Agreement to finance the remainder of the premium through Del Rio Discount Corp. When Ms. Andrews signed the premium finance agreement, the portion identified as the Federal Truth-in-Lending Disclosure Statement had not been completed by Mr. Sanders; the premium finance agreement contained only the number of payments, the amount of each payment, and the date the first payment was due. Soon after, Ms. Andrews spoke with the Respondent on the telephone and requested a copy of the premium finance agreement with a completed disclosure statement. The Respondent sent her a copy of the agreement by facsimile transmittal, but it was not legible. Ms. Andrews telephoned the Respondent again and requested that he send her a copy by mail. When she did not receive another copy from Federal Insurance, she contacted American Surety, which contacted Amelia Underwriters, and the underwriters provided a completed copy of the Premium Finance Agreement. The down payment identified in the agreement was $171. On the day she purchased the insurance policy, Mr. Sanders asked if she wanted any certificates of insurance. At that time, Ms. Andrews did not know what this was, and Mr. Sanders told her it was proof of insurance. She asked that he prepare one certificate of insurance for Tropic Green Lawn Care on February 23, 1994. A second certificate of insurance was prepared by Federal Insurance for Tropic Green Lawn Care on March 28, 1994. Mr. Sanders did not discuss with Ms. Andrews at any time a charge for preparation of certificates of insurance. When she questioned the Respondent during a telephone conversation about the additional $100 she had paid Federal Insurance, he told her that it was a charge for certificates of insurance and other service charges and that, if she wanted any information, she should ask in writing. She then wrote a letter to the Respondent, dated June 10, 1994, requesting a breakdown of these charges, but she did not receive a response. In a letter dated July 26, 1996, written to the Department, Mr. Sanders confirmed that Federal Insurance charged $100 Ms. Andrews for preparation of certificates of insurance. Tropic Green was reimbursed $100 by Federal Insurance by a check drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account and dated January 8, 1996. Virginia Davidson On August 17, 1994, Virginia Davidson applied for personal automobile insurance through Federal Insurance. She dealt with a woman whose name she does not remember and who has not been identified in these proceedings. The policy was to cover a 1985 Chrysler, and she told the woman that she wanted insurance only for a short time because she intended to sell the car in the near future. At the time of this transaction, Ms. Davidson was in her late sixties. Ms. Davidson was told she needed to buy a one-year policy, and she recalled being quoted a price of $386 for an automobile insurance policy written by Armor Insurance Company ("Armor"). She paid the $386 by check dated August 17, 1994, and made payable to Federal Insurance; she was given a receipt that indicated that she had paid in full the premium on the Armor automobile insurance policy for one year. In fact, the premium for this policy was initially computed as $281 on the Brokerage Auto Application form. Although Ms. Davidson signed the application form on which this quote appeared, her signature appeared only on the reverse of the application form, while the quote appeared on the front. Ms. Davidson does not recall that anyone on August 17, 1994, explained that the $386 quoted to her included a separate $100 charge for towing coverage to be provided by L.N.V., Inc. At the time she purchased the insurance policy, Ms. Davidson was a member of AAA and would not have knowingly purchased towing coverage. Ms. Davidson's signature appears on a separate application form which clearly displayed the terms "Towing Coverage" and "LNV Corp." The "membership fee" for this coverage was shown on the form as $100. Ms. Davidson was asked to sign a number of documents when she applied for the automobile insurance policy, and she does not recall signing the application form for towing coverage. In a notice from Armor dated September 16, 1994, Ms. Davidson was notified that she owed an additional premium of $116 on her automobile insurance policy. The additional premium was due as a result of Armor's investigation of Ms. Davidson's driving history. In a letter to Armor dated October 11, 1994, Ms. Davidson requested that the policy be cancelled and that she receive a refund of unearned premium. Armor sent Federal Insurance a check dated October 31, 1994, in the amount of $163.70, representing the unearned premium on Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy. Mr. Vogel signed a check to Ms. Davidson on the Federal Insurance trust account, dated November 11, 1994, for $163.70. Ms. Davidson did not receive this check, and a replacement check was prepared, dated December 5, 1994. Ms. Davidson does not recall receiving this check, and neither of these checks has cleared Federal Insurance's account. The Respondent refused to issue another replacement check unless Ms. Davidson waited six months for the checks to clear the bank or paid Federal Insurance the $25.00 fee charged by the bank to stop payment on the replacement check. During December 1994, the Respondent recalculated the amount of the refund owing Ms. Davidson, including for the first time the agency's unearned commission and a pro rata refund of the $100 fee for the towing coverage. The Respondent issued a check to Ms. Davidson, drawn on the Federal Insurance trust account and dated December 26, 1994, in the amount of $117.20. The check specified that it was for "cancellation in full" of Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy. Ms. Davidson did not cash this check because she disputed that it was the full amount of the refund owed to her. Armor subsequently issued a check to Ms. Davidson in the amount of $184.80, which included the $163.70 and an additional amount of unearned premium which Armor had neglected to include in its calculations. Ms. Davidson does not recall receiving this check. All of the checks were sent to Ms. Davidson at her correct address in West Palm Beach, Florida. The Respondent was involved in the transaction involving Ms. Davidson only after she cancelled her automobile insurance policy. The Respondent signed the refund checks issued in her name, and, after Ms. Davidson filed a complaint with the Department, he responded to the Department's inquiry regarding the refund due to her. After having reviewed the files of Mr. Clark, Ms. Andrews, and Ms. Davidson, the Respondent was satisfied with the way the agents employed by Federal Insurance transacted business with these individuals. Summary The evidence is uncontroverted that the employees of Federal Insurance are supervised on a daily basis by and are under the direct control of the Respondent. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish with the requisite degree of certainty that Michael Clark was unaware that he was charged $100 in addition to the premiums quoted on the commercial automobile insurance policy and commercial general liability insurance policy he purchased through Federal Insurance. Although he may not have been told the purpose of the extra charge, Mr. Clark was quoted premiums of $776 and $281, respectively, for the insurance policies. The worksheet he signed clearly shows that $100 was added to each of these premiums; in fact, Mr. Clark paid $381 as payment in full for the commercial general liability insurance policy when he knew that the premium for the policy was $281. On the other hand, the evidence presented is sufficient to establish that Lee Vogel deducted a $100 service charge for certificates of insurance from Mr. Clark's down payment of $330 on the commercial automobile insurance policy even though this charge was not imposed on commercial automobile insurance policies because separate certificates of insurance are not prepared for such coverage. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that Bryan Sanders did not inform Cheryl Andrews of the $100 service charge added to the premium for the general liability insurance policy she purchased for Tropic Green Lawn Care and to establish that Ms. Andrews could reasonably believe that the entire down payment of $271 would be applied to the insurance premium. However, the evidence is uncontroverted that, when she spoke to the Respondent by telephone, he told her that the charge was for preparation of certificates of insurance and other services. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that, even though she signed an application form for towing coverage to be provided by L.N.V. Corp., Ms. Davidson was not told of the purpose of the application, the nature of the coverage, or the $100 fee for the coverage. In fact, the receipt for $386 that she received from Federal Insurance did not make any reference at all to the towing coverage or to L.N.V. Corp. The evidence presented by the Department is, however, not sufficient to establish that the Respondent refused to refund the monies owing to Ms. Davidson; under the circumstances presented, it was not unreasonable for Federal Insurance to refuse to issue a second replacement check. The evidence presented by the Department is sufficient to establish that the Respondent instituted the practice of charging a $100 service fee for the preparation of certificates of insurance for commercial general liability insurance purchased through Federal Insurance. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that Federal Insurance was prohibited by agreement or contract from imposing a service charge for the preparation of certificates of insurance. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish that the Respondent instituted a policy at Federal Insurance requiring customers to purchase towing coverage from L.N.V., Inc., as a condition of purchasing an automobile insurance policy or that the Respondent developed a sales scheme whereby the application for and explanation of the towing coverage was hidden. The evidence is sufficient to establish only one instance in which an unidentified person employed at Federal Insurance failed to disclose the particulars of the towing coverage. The evidence presented by the Department is not sufficient to establish a pattern at Federal Insurance of agents failing to disclose the $100 service charge for preparing certificates of insurance, of agents imposing the service charge to policies for which no certificates of insurance are prepared in the normal course of business, or of failing to inform customers of the nature of and charge for ancillary coverage such as towing coverage. Finally, the evidence presented by the Department does not establish that the Respondent or the agents involved in the transactions at issue in this proceeding failed to remit any portion of the premiums owing to the insurance companies for the policies sold to Mr. Clark, Ms. Andrews, or Ms. Davidson. In the case of Mr. Clark and Ms. Andrews, the premiums quoted to them were correct and the premiums set forth on the premium finance agreements were correct; it is irrelevant in this respect that Mr. Clark and Ms. Andrews may have believed that their $330 and $271 down payments were to be applied solely to the premiums owed on the policies. Likewise, the full amount of the premium initially calculated for Ms. Davidson's automobile insurance policy was paid to the insurance company by Federal Insurance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a final order dismissing all three counts of the Amended Administrative Complaint filed against Howard Irvin Vogel. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1998.
The Issue Should discipline be imposed by Petitioner against Respondent's license as a life, health, and variable annuity agent (2-15), general lines agent (2-20), and a legal expense agent (2-56), held pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2003)?
Findings Of Fact Facts Established by the Answer Pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, you, Brian Whitney McDaniel (Respondent), currently are licensed in this state as a life, health, and variable annuity (2-15), general lines (2-20) and legal expense (2-56) agent, and were so licensed at all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referenced herein. Respondent's license identification no. is A171563. Pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, Petitioner has jurisdiction over your (Respondent's) license and appointments. At all times relevant to the dates and occurrences referenced herein Respondent, was employed with Cash Register. Respondent's Duties at Cash Register Respondent was employed at the Cash Register agency in Gainesville, Florida from March 1998 through September 2002. He began his employment as a limited customer service representative (4-40). Respondent became the designated primary agent at the location in June 2000, at which time he was licensed as a general lines agent (2-20). He continued in the capacity as a designated primary agent until his departure from the agency. As the primary agent at Cash Register, Respondent was expected to make sure that the customer service representatives employed at the agency were properly trained and the customers were taken care of in a manner that they were expecting as consumers. Respondent also took care of paper work such as payroll, keeping the lights on, and similar activities. In addition to his supervisory duties Respondent dealt with the public, to include selling insurance to members of the public. The principal form of insurance sold at Cash Register was automobile insurance. Cash Register also sold boat insurance, insurance for motorcycles, and ancillary products, such as towing and rental. Cash Register sold legal insurance underwritten by Southern Legal Services (Southern Legal). Other products sold were hospital indemnity and accidental death benefits policies. The products such as hospital indemnity and legal service plans, were insurance products that could be financed for the balance of the amount due following a down-payment. The towing and rental contracts were not insurance products and not subject to financing. Hypothetically, and the hypothetical pertains to the experiences that customers in this case would typically be exposed to when the customer came into the agency, the customer took a seat and Respondent began to collect necessary information. That information pertained to name, address, phone number, age, driving record, and vehicle information. Then the discussion would turn to the nature of the automobile insurance that the customer was interested in purchasing. That issue concerned whether the customer wanted only property damage liability, and personal injury protection (PIP), as required by the State of Florida to maintain their tag registration or desired greater coverage. Other offerings included bodily injury liability, uninsured motorists, comprehensive and collision. Comprehensive and collision was explained to the customer as being a necessary coverage where automobiles have been financed. The information that had been gathered would be entered into a computer program which Cash Register used. That program was known as "Quick Quote." The quotation method was designed to select the better price from among a number of insurance companies. This process that has been described concerning the quote would pertain equally when quotations were provided over the telephone. Cash Register is affiliated with LR3 Enterprises, Inc. (LR3), its parent company. The parent company insisted that its employees who sold automobile insurance at Cash Register agencies during the time in question follow a script in selling the insurance. This involved the offer of several options to purchase. The first option was to pay the full price of the insurance. The second option was a standard down-payment, which was a greater amount down than the third option. The second option with the greater down-payment carried a smaller monthly payment in the part financed and saved money for the customer over time compared to the remaining option. The third option was a lower down-payment with a larger monthly payment that included necessarily, among other mandatory alternatives, in accordance with the management policy from LR3, the purchase of a legal service plan in relation to traffic violations to include DUIs, accidents, and child support. The legal service plan that is at issue here is legal insurance underwritten by Southern Legal. The value of this required purchase was that if any of the legal services were needed, the insurance plan that was required under option three would help defray the cost for those legal services. Respondent emphasized that the employees within the Cash Register agency must follow the script concerning the three options, failing which the employee would be "fired on the spot." Respondent described how this requirement was the first thing he had been told when he was hired. Having considered this explanation concerning the three options, it leaves the impression that a customer might come to believe that the legal insurance plan was an integral part of the automobile insurance that the customer sought to purchase. This impression could be created notwithstanding the documents that might be produced beyond that point, where careful review might lead one to a different conclusion as to the necessity to purchase the ancillary product. It is a significant issue in that most customers who purchased automobile insurance wanted the lowest down-payment available when transacting business with Cash Register. In this connection, the majority of customers who were served by Cash Register were interested in obtaining "tag insurance," referring to the basic coverage necessary to comply with Florida law. Those are the customers who almost always wanted a low down-payment. Returning to the several options that were explained by Respondent, option two carried a 35 percent down-payment with no necessity to purchase an ancillary product in addition to the automobile insurance. By contrast the third option carried an 18 percent down-payment and the Cash Register agency through its employees, to include Respondent, would require that the customer buy a legal services plan to warrant the low down- payment. Alternatively, the 18 percent down-payment under option three would be available in the instance where a customer bought a motor club contract, towing and rental. In this setting, unlike the legal plan, the towing and rental contract could not be financed. More specifically, Respondent explained that when customers called for a quotation on automobile insurance, he routinely, that is taken to include those instances described in this case, would say to the customer, "There's three different ways of paying for this. You can pay for it all at once, paid in full, the cash price is this, or we have two different payment options. The standard down-payment option is more out of your pocket, but it keeps your monthly low and saves you money in the long run, and it is this. We also have a low down- payment, which is the other way around, it's less money out of your pocket, but your monthly payment goes up and it includes an additional coverage for legal fees for traffic violations, DUIs, accidents. If you need an attorney it helps to pay his fee and that price is this." The same script was followed with customers who came to the office, as opposed to calling on the telephone. Respondent described how the application involved with the purchase of auto insurance was printed and brought to the desk where the customer was located. The application was not the only document involved in the transaction. Among the papers with the insurance application, was a confirmation of coverages, a premium finance agreement, where applicable; and a disclosure form, and a new business receipt, where applicable. All these documents were printed through a computer program. The documents were presented to the customer so that the customer could read it. As Respondent explains, it was not necessary for the employee to read it because the employee was familiar with the information that is established by the documents. A pen would be used to direct attention to documents, the first document pointed out, the confirmation of coverages. An example of the discussion with the customer would be, "You are buying property damage liability with a $10,000.00 limit, personal injury protection with a $10,000.00 limit, with a $2,000.00 deductible. You are rejecting bodily injury liability. You are rejecting uninsured motorists. You are purchasing comprehensive and collision with a $500.00 deductible. You chose the low down-payment option so you are purchasing the legal protection plan which goes with the low down-payment option. Please sign both of these signatures and date it for me." The arrangement was one in which the low down-payment option necessarily committed the customer to purchasing a legal protection plan as Respondent describes the arrangement. The next document in the series was in relation to the automobile insurance application per se. By using a pen the Respondent would show the purchaser what they were obtaining in coverage and what they were not. Respondent would gain the signature from the customer. Next in series, depending on the nature of the option pursued by the customer, was the legal protection plan or motor club, if it was involved in the purchase; the finance agreement; and the disclosure form and receipt, as applicable. Copies of the documents that have been identified were provided to the customers. Other remarks concerning the legal protection plan, which Respondent would make to the customers, would be that it helps to pay legal fees such as, if you were given a ticket that is contested or an accident where the customer is being sued, or have issues concerning child support, the plan would help to pay for legal fees. Nothing in this explanation was designed to explain to the customer that the legal insurance was not part of the automobile insurance. Count I Beverly Akpo-Sani On November 27, 2001, Beverly Akpo-Sani went to the Cash Register in Gainesville and purchased automobile insurance. She was waited on by Respondent. Ms. Akpo-Sani intended only to purchase what the state required to maintain coverage for her 1988 Plymouth station wagon. She also discussed the requirement for an SR-22, which is a Florida financial responsibility form to provide proof of insurance. Respondent followed the script that has been set forth earlier in selling automobile insurance and legal insurance plan to Ms. Akpo-Sani, with the exception that additional discussion was held concerning the SR-22 Florida financial responsibility form. Respondent described to Ms. Akpo-Sani the three agency options for purchasing the automobile insurance. Her interest was to have a low down-payment. As a consequence, Respondent offered her option three. Ms. Akpo-Sani applied for automobile insurance from Direct General Insurance Company (Direct General Insurance). Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 1. Ms. Akpo-Sani also executed a document in relation to legal insurance, referred to as "Sav-Cash Traffic Protectors," for pre-paid traffic violation insurance. That insurance was underwritten by Southern Legal. A copy of the document supporting the purchase is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3. Ms. Akpo-Sani and Respondent signed the document. On its face it indicates that it was paid for through a premium finance agreement with Direct General Financial Services, Inc. (Direct General Financial), and an amount of $105.00 is stated. In pertinent part, the document related to the pre- paid traffic violation insurance stated: Cardholder acknowledges receipt of goods and/or services in the amount of the total shown hereon and agrees to perform the obligations set forth in the cardholder's agreement with the issuer. I hereby apply for participation in Southern Legal Services Plan, Inc. SL 210 Driver's Protection Legal Plan, and acknowledge coverage is conditioned by receipt and approval by the Company. I understand that legal services will be provided under the plan for certain legal proceedings and that I am responsible for all costs associated with any matter. I agree to abide by the provisions and rules of the plan. I agree and authorize that the premiums be paid as indicated above. I understand that my attorney-client relationship will be with the attorney providing legal services under the plan and not with Southern Legal Services Plan, Inc. I represent that to the best of my knowledge all of the information contained herein is correct and that no person to be insured under this policy is now involved in any litigation, court proceedings, or other matter which could result in legal action. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3, which is by way of an application, was to be mailed to Robinson Insurance Agency c/o CTA in Palm Coast, Florida. Other than the information which has been quoted from the application document, the exact nature of the coverage provided by the pre-paid traffic violation insurance has not been explained in this record. Although Ms. Akpo-Sani signed the document applying for the legal insurance as reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3, she believed that she was purchasing automobile insurance and to the extent that the legal insurance was not part of the automobile insurance purchase she had no intent to buy it. Respondent did not explain adequately the legal insurance purchase. Instead Ms. Akpo-Sani was led to believe that it was part of the procedure necessary to get her automobile insurance policy. No oral explanation was made that the cost of the legal insurance was an additional charge. Ms. Akpo-Sani was provided additional documents that portrayed the legal insurance as a different cost item, mainly the Premium Finance Agreement with Direct General Financial. A copy of that finance agreement is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5, which was signed both by Ms. Akpo-Sani and Respondent. On its first page under the schedule of policies, it separately sets out that the auto coverage was for a premium of $688.00, with $124.10 down and the balance to be paid to Direct General Insurance on her behalf. The schedule of policies refers to the legal insurances as "LGL," totaling a $105.00 premium, with $18.90 down and $86.10 to be paid to Southern Legal on Ms. Akpo-Sani's behalf. But the document goes on to set out the total premium financed in the aggregate, without separately stating the amount related for Direct General Insurance and the Southern Legal, with installment payments in the aggregate of $73.68, to be made in connection with both purchases at an annual percentage rate of 27.29 percent. The second page in disclosing information about her purchases referred to the PIP, property damage liability, and bodily injury pertaining to an SR-22 requirement. It goes on to describe the legal services purchase separately on the second page. Ms. Akpo-Sani received a receipt, referred to as a New Business Receipt drawn on a form by Cash Register. That receipt is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 4. It breaks out the cost items under a heading entitled "Vehicle(s)," wherein it sets out property damage liability, PIP, and bodily injury liability, all in the automobile insurance coverage category, as well as the driver's protection legal plan, which is not part of the automobile insurance. Nonetheless, it is depicted under the heading "Vehicle(s)." The document explains the amount tendered as an aggregate amount paid, which would be constituted of $124.10 for the automobile insurance and $18.90 for the legal plan, totaling $146.00 as depicted on the receipt. The document goes on to describe the "policy total" under the section in relation to the vehicle as being $796.00, which would include both the automobile insurance and the driver's protection legal plan. Other than the brief reference to the drivers protection legal plan depicted as part of the "Vehicle(s)," the balance of the receipt provides information concerning the automobile insurance side of the purchase. Another document provided to Ms. Akpo-Sani and signed by her on the occasion, was a document titled "Confirmation of Coverages." It is Respondent's Exhibit number 5. In relation to purchases made it sets out the property damage liability, and the PIP as required coverage, bodily injury liability as optional coverage, and the election of a driver's protection legal under ancillary products identified as optional. Although the document refers to the legal insurance as an optional opportunity, by the design of the form, given the manner in which this sale was made to Ms. Akpo-Sani, the impression created by Respondent would lead one to believe that it was not an option for her to decline the drivers protection legal. Instructions within the Confirmation of Coverages document explain the several parts. These parts are: auto insurance coverages required (1, 2), optional auto insurance coverages (3-6) and ancillary products (optional) (7-10), among them the driver's protection legal (10). The instructions state: Please READ the ten (10) sections above to be sure the coverages or benefits circled or checked are the coverages or benefits you want. The terms 'Full Coverage', 'Minimum Coverage', and 'State Required Coverage' are not specific enough to assure that you are buying the insurance coverages or benefits you want. The above confirmations are meant to protect you, your agent, and your insurance company from misunderstandings. If 'NO COVERAGE' or 'DECLINED' is marked in any section, you are not buying that sections coverages and benefits. COVERAGES AND BENEFITS ARE SUBJECT TO THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THE INDIVIDUAL POLICIES OR PLANS. Please read the policy jacket or plan descriptions that re available to you for detailed definitions of the coverages and benefits. If you still have questions, ask your agent to explain in more detail. Items seven (7) through ten (10) are high commission items that allow the agency to make a reasonable profit and continue to offer you the most competitive rates available on your auto insurance. These are separate plans from your auto policy and are optional. I have read, confirm and consent to the coverages and benefits indicated on this form. The instructions identify ancillary products, to include the driver's protection legal, as separate from the auto policy but the sales pitch by Respondent related to option three did not treat the purchase in that manner. It made the purchase of the legal plan appear mandatory. Moreover the instructions themselves make it appear that the ancillary products are linked with the auto insurance in the interest of establishing competitive auto insurance rates. Ms. Akpo-Sani did not read the application for pre- paid traffic violation insurance which is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 3 before signing it. Similarly Ms. Akpo-Sani did not notice the details within the Premium Finance Agreement. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5. Ms. Akpo-Sani did not read the Confirmation of Coverages document, Respondent's Exhibit numbered 5, before signing. Mr. Akpo-Sani was in a hurry and this explains why she did not take the time to carefully read the documents that have been described. Count II Samina C. Ashraf On July 20, 2001, Samina C. Ashraf purchased automobile insurance at Cash Register in Gainesville from Respondent. Respondent also sold Ms. Ashraf pre-paid traffic violation insurance underwritten by Southern Legal as part of the transaction. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 19 is the deposition provided by Ms. Ashraf which forms the basis of her testimony for hearing purposes. Attached to that deposition are various exhibits. Exhibit "A" is the application for insurance with Direct General Insurance. Exhibit "B" is Confirmation of Coverages document. Exhibit "C" is a document referring to a travel protection plan, which cost $60.00 as a premium. Exhibit "C" is related to bail bond coverage, ambulance assistance, collision loss of use, theft loss of use, emergency travel loss of use, and personal effects loss from an auto rented as a result of loss under previously stated coverages. Exhibit "D" to the deposition is the application for pre-paid traffic violation insurance through Southern Legal. Exhibit "E" to the deposition is the Premium Finance Agreement with Direct General Financial, which sets out costs related to the basic automobile insurance, the legal insurance, and the travel protection plan, which is a type of motor club. The automobile and legal insurance was financed beyond the down-payment. The motor club premium was fully paid at the time the transaction commenced. In format the application with Direct General Insurance, the Confirmation of Coverages document, the pre-paid traffic violation insurance underwritten by Southern Legal, and the Premium Finance Agreement are the same as has been discussed concerning Ms. Akpo-Sani. Highlighting the Ashraf transaction, $105.00 was paid for the legal insurance, consisting of an $18.90 down-payment, with $86.10 to be financed with Direct General Financial. The Premium Finance Agreement with Direct General Financial included the automobile insurance and legal insurance, with a total amount to be financed of $873.15 at 25.71 annual percentage rate, $97.93 due on each payment financed. When Ms. Ashraf arrived at Cash Register she was interested in purchasing the minimum insurance necessary for her automobile. She had just purchased the auto and told Respondent that she needed to obtain insurance and return to the car lot where she had purchased the auto and show proof of insurance coverage. Ms. Ashraf was interested in a low down-payment for auto insurance. Respondent told her that she could pay the full amount of the insurance premium. Alternatively, Respondent explained what the down-payment amount would be and the continuing payment process beyond that point in time. In discussing towing and rental, Respondent told Ms. Ashraf the cost for that premium. Respondent explained the towing option (motor club) to Ms. Ashraf. Respondent did not tell Ms. Ashraf of other options available, to include the legal plan, as she recalls the transaction. Ms. Ashraf did sign the various documents involved in the transaction that have been described. The documents that have been identified were stacked one on top of the next. Respondent told Ms. Ashraf in relation to those documents, "Just sign here, here, here, here." Respondent did not discourage Ms. Ashraf from reading the documents but she did not read them. She was in a hurry. She had told Respondent that she was only interested in the automobile insurance that was necessary in association with the purchase of the car on that day. She erroneously assumed that Respondent was giving her what was needed and nothing more. Aside from the motor club, which Ms. Ashraf knowingly purchased, she did not realize that she had also purchased legal insurance through Southern Legal. Respondent had not separately explained that the legal insurance product was optional and that it was not part of the basic auto insurance policy or that there was an additional charge for the legal plan, notwithstanding any written explanation provided that would suggest otherwise. In relation to the Premium Finance Agreement, Respondent explained the portion dealing with the amount financed, the finance charge, the total payments, and the total sales price, but not the individual breakout of charges set out at the top of the document. Count III Kim Langford and Count IV Joana Samad Kim Langford and Joana Samad bought auto insurance from the Cash Register agency in Gainesville and the legal plan through Southern Legal, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. However, Respondent did not sell the legal plan to these customers. He was not immediately involved with either transaction and cannot be factually implicated under terms set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint.1 Count V Albert B. Tomes On November 2, 2001, Albert B. Tomes bought auto insurance from Respondent at Cash Register in Gainesville. The company that he purchased the automobile insurance from was Direct General Insurance. The application for auto insurance is Respondent's Exhibit numbered 24. Respondent also sold Mr. Tomes pre-paid traffic violation insurance underwritten by Southern Legal. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 13. The format of the application for the legal insurance is the same as with Ms. Akpo-Sani. The total cost of the legal insurance was $105.00. During the transaction, a Confirmation of Coverages document was executed. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 27. A Premium Finance Agreement was entered into following a down- payment in relation to the Direct General auto coverage insurance and the legal insurance through Southern Legal. Respondent's Exhibit numbered 25. The format of Confirmation of Coverages and the Premium Finance Agreement through Direct General Financial were the same as with the transaction involving Ms. Akpo-Sani. The documents that have been described were laid out in front of Mr. Tomes and he quickly signed his name and initials where necessary. As he explains it, he was told, "Initial here, initial here, initial here, sign this, sign this, and that's what I did." Mr. Tomes was there at the agency about 20 minutes. Mr. Tomes signed all documents that have been described in relation to the transaction. Mr. Tomes did not read the Premium Finance Agreement which he signed that set out the charges for the auto insurance and legal insurance. Mr. Tomes signed the Confirmation of Coverages document without reading it. Mr. Tomes paid a down-payment for the auto insurance of $107.50, with a premium to be financed in the amount of $358.00. He paid $31.50 as a down-payment for the legal insurance, with $73.50 to be financed. As reflected in the Premium Finance Agreement pertaining to the purchase of auto insurance, and legal insurance, the total amount financed was $325.40 at an annual percentage rate of 33.55 percent. The installment amount for each payment was $37.75. Mr. Tomes had called ahead before going to Cash Register. Information provided in the telephone call described a down-payment and monthly payments beyond that point. When Mr. Tomes arrived at Cash Register and spoke to Respondent, he was told by the Respondent that the automobile insurance could be paid for in cash or a down-payment could be made in monthly payments to follow. Mr. Tomes was told by Respondent that if more were paid down, then the monthly payments would be lower in cost. Although Mr. Tomes acknowledged signing the application for pre-paid traffic violation insurance, he does not recall seeing the document on November 2, 2001. He did not understand what he was buying as evidenced by the document. The product described in the document was not explained to him by Respondent. All that Mr. Tomes was interested in purchasing was automobile insurance sufficient to "be legal." He just wanted the basic automobile insurance coverage, and that is what he asked for. He understood this to mean PIP coverage. Although Mr. Tomes does not recall the application for legal insurance and its terms, Respondent and Mr. Tomes generally discussed the legal plan. Mr. Tomes told Respondent he did not want the legal plan. Respondent said to Mr. Tomes "You don't have to have the legal plan just take the standard down-payment option. I know that is a little harder on your checkbook today, but it keeps your monthly payment a lot lower and saves you money in the long run." This is taken to mean the option that required a larger down-payment and smaller monthly payments without having to purchase the additional product, the legal plan. Mr. Tomes told Respondent in reply "Well, I want the low down-payment option but I don't want the legal." Respondent said in turn that he couldn't do it that way. He stated that if Mr. Tomes took the 18 percent down-payment, he would also have to take the legal plan. Mr. Tomes was not happy with that arrangement where he was allowed a low down-payment conditioned upon the purchase of the legal plan but ultimately "did it." Count VI Raymond L. Washington On September 19, 2001, Raymond L. Washington purchased automobile insurance from Cash Register in Gainesville. Respondent was the employee for the agency involved in the transaction. The automobile insurance was purchased from Direct General Insurance. At the same time, Respondent sold Mr. Washington pre-paid traffic violation insurance from Southern Legal and a motor club contract from American Bankers Motor. A Premium Finance Agreement was entered into between Mr. Washington and Direct General Financial in relation to the automobile insurance and the legal insurance. A Confirmation of Coverages document was executed on this occasion. The format of all documents that have been described was the same as for the Akpo-Sani transaction. Mr. Washington signed all the documents. The automobile insurance application is Respondent's Exhibit numbered 28. The application for pre-paid traffic violation insurance is Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 15. The Premium Finance Agreement with Direct General Financial is Respondent's Exhibit numbered 29. The Confirmation of Coverages document is Respondent's Exhibit numbered 31. The Premium Finance Agreement sets out a down-payment of $93.10, with a balance to be paid of $418.90 pertaining to the automobile insurance. Mr. Washington, according to the Premium Finance Agreement, paid $18.90 down for the legal insurance, with $86.10 to be paid through installment payments. The Premium Finance Agreement sets out that $567.10 in the aggregate was financed for the auto insurance and for the legal insurance, at an annual percentage rate of 28.22 percent. The monthly payment was $64.30. The motor club was a $60.00 one time premium payment. On the date in question, Mr. Washington went to Cash Register with the intent to purchase basic insurance, what he refers to as "PIP." He told Respondent what he wanted to buy. Respondent offered towing and rental insurance. Mr. Washington was interested in that offering and purchased the towing and rental through the motor club contract. By contrast, Mr. Washington has no recollection of the discussion between the parties of the legal insurance through Southern Legal. He was told he needed to sign the document applying for the legal insurance and that he should have it. The legal insurance was not something he was interested in purchasing. Mr. Washington had called for a quotation of the price of auto insurance before arriving at Cash Register. Once there, he spent approximately one and one-half hours to finish his business. Respondent explained the several options for auto insurance, to include the cash purchase, a higher down-payment or a lower down-payment, with the purchase of an additional product. Mr. Washington wanted to make a lower down-payment. While at the agency Mr. Washington read some of the Premium Finance Agreement but not in all its details. He did not read the top of the document referring to the schedule of policies, with the types of coverage and the listing of the auto insurance, legal insurance and motor club. He did not read the upper right portion of the document pertaining to the companies being paid through the finance agreement. He read the part setting forth the monthly amount to be paid as an installment, which was $64.30. Mr. Washington did not read the application for legal insurance through Southern Legal before signing the document. Concerning the Confirmation of Coverages, Mr. Washington looked at that part of that document that told him to read all ten sections above. But he did not read item 10 which had a check-mark placed next to the driver's protection legal plan SL-210-A. Although Mr. Washington was at the agency for over an hour, he did not feel that he had time to read all the documents provided him. He was in a hurry to leave. Mr. Washington cannot remember the details of the discussion but he does recall that some questions that he asked Respondent concerning the transaction were not fully addressed. He has no recollection of any discussion of item 10 within the Confirmation of Coverages document associated with the driver's protection legal plan, and he did not realize that he had purchased the legal insurance. Respondent recalls his dealings with Mr. Washington and the offering of the three options to purchase auto insurance and that Mr. Washington chose the low down-payment option. Count VII Change of Address On August 1, 2003, Respondent became an agent for Allstate at West Newberry Road, Highway 26, Jonesville, Florida, without notifying Petitioner of this change in his business address. According to records maintained by the Petitioner, Respondent had not provided information concerning the change of address as late as March 3, 2004. Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 18. Respondent proceeded with the mistaken belief that once he was appointed as an agent for Allstate, that the insurer would notify Petitioner of that appointment and presumably include information on the address of his business.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered finding Respondent in violation of those provisions within Counts I, II, and V through VII, that have been concluded as violations, dismissing the others within those counts, dismissing Counts III and IV; suspending Respondent's licenses for one year, imposing a $100.00 administrative fine, placing Respondent on two years' probation and requiring attendance at such continuing education courses as deemed appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Kathryn Genevieve Saviak, did business as J & J Insurance Agency at all times pertinent to these proceedings. As a general lines insurance agent, she maintained five offices at one time or another in Dade, Broward and Hillsborough counties, for the sale of automobile insurance. Respondent did not deal with customers directly herself. She visited her offices occasionally, perhaps once a month, and spoke to the office managers more frequently by telephone. Some of her employees travelled among offices. Respondent authorized her employees to write insurance policies on behalf of the FJUA under an arrangement with the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF&G), a servicing carrier for the FJUA. Prior to December, 1978, respondent was the only licensed agent with the J & J Insurance Agency assigned to USF&G. Agents like respondent who represented the FJUA were required to forward to the servicing carrier money thee received in payment of premiums on the date received or, at the latest, on the following day. An agent need not require payment of the entire premium in order to write an insurance policy, so long as the agent collected a specified minimum deposit. Any money actually collected above the amount of the minimum deposit, however, was to be forwarded to the servicing carrier daily. E.R. Milbourne, Jr., the USF&G employee with direct charge of FJUA operations, personally apprised respondent at various times, including prior to 1978, of the requirement that monies be forwarded upon receipt. Agents were first advised of this requirement in writing on or about September 17, 1973. Respondent is one of approximately 250 agents for whom USF&G has been designated the servicing carrier by FJUA. Respondent's offices wrote 60 to 70 policies a month as compared to USF&G's 25,000 FJUA policies a year. The FJUA policies respondent's offices wrote became effective on the date they were written. USF&G then had thirty days in which to issue the policy. In its last audit before the final hearing began, USF&G determined that two percent of its private passenger vehicle policies and four percent of its commercial vehicle policies had not been issued within the thirty-day period. Routinely, USF&G issued a notice of termination if the premium for a policy had not been paid in full within thirty days, but, in some cases, as many as sixty days might have elapsed from the date of application before USF&G issued a notice of termination. On March 30, 1978, Carlene Grigg made application for automobile insurance at respondent's Ft. Lauderdale Office. She made payment of $309.00 at that time. USF&G received the application on May 15, 1978, accompanied by only $200.00. In late July, Carlene's husband, Marvin, received a notice of termination from USF&G dated July 26, 1978, stating that USF&G was owed $188.00. Petitioner's exhibit No. 5. In September, Mr. and Mrs. Grigg paid an additional $73.00 to respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. On or about November 6, 1978, USF&G received an additional $139.00 from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. Together with the initial $200.00, this constituted full payment of the premium for the policy Ms. Grigg applied for on March 30, 1978 (which has subsequently been revised to eliminate physical damage coverage, resulting in a decrease in premium.) (Count I) On August 14, 1978, Constantine A. Ronca made application for an automobile insurance policy at respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office and paid $257.00. USF&G received Mr. Ronca's application later in August, accompanied by $100.00. USF&G sent a notice of termination dated October 26, 1973, to be effective November 9, 1978, for the stated reason of unpaid premium. (Count II) On June 27, 1978, Antonio Vettorazzi purchased automobile insurance at respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. Against a total premium of $437.00, Mr. Vettorazzi made a down payment of $153.00. The balance of the premium, $284.00, was financed. USF&G received Mr. Vettorazzi's application from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office accompanied by a check for $284.00. Thereafter Mr. Vettorazzi received a notice of termination from USF&G dated November 15, 1978, threatening to terminate the policy effective November 29, 1978, for alleged nonpayment of a premium balance of $153.00. In late November or early December of 1978, USF&G received a check for $153.00 from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. Although Mr. Vettorazzi made his payments to the premium finance company, he made no additional payments directly to respondent after June 27, 1978. (Count III) Also on June 27, 1978, Linda Diane Moray Blair purchased automobile insurance from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. Against a total premium of $308.00 she made a cash down payment of $112.00, for which she received a receipt. Petitioner's exhibit No. 2 attached to petitioner's exhibit No. 3. The balance of the premium was financed by Capitol Premium Plan, Inc. Ms. Blair made monthly payments of $29.20 to Capitol Premium Finance in a timely fashion. Subsequently she received a notice from J & J Insurance that another $10.00 was due. In September of 1978, Ms. Blair sent a $10.00 money order to respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. Thereafter, Ms. Blair received from USF&G a notice of termination dated October 12, 1978, stating that a balance was owed the company of $122.00. On October 27, 1978, USF&G received from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office a check in the amount of $122.00. (Count IV) On October 18, 1978, David G. Fuerst purchased automobile insurance at respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. He wrote a check for $210.00, half the annual premium. On November 21, 1978, Mr. Fuerst wrote another check in favor of J & J Insurance for the remainder of the premium in the amount of $210.00. Petitioner's exhibit No. 8. When USF&G received Mr. Fuerst's application, respondent's check in the amount of $150.00 accompanied the application. Eventually USF&G issued a notice of termination dated December 18, 1978, advising Mr. Fuerst that his policy would be terminated on account of an unpaid balance of $270.00. Petitioner's exhibit No. 9. Shortly after receiving the notice of termination, Mr. Fuerst received from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office a form "Special Notice" stating that the cancellation of the policy "was due to a computer error. Petitioner's exhibit No. 10. On January 9, 1979, USF&G received the $270.00 balance from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. (Count XXVIII) On October 30, 1978, William Patrick Pete went into respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. He purchased an automobile insurance policy for which he paid the entire premium of $170.00. Additionally, he purchased membership in an automobile club for which he paid $30.00. USF&G received Mr. Pete's application on November 8, 1978, accompanied by respondent's check for $50.00. On December 26, 1978, USF&G sent Mr. Pete a notice of termination for the stated reason that he owed $120.00 toward his premium. On January 9, 1979, USF&G received $120.00 from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. (Count XXIX) On October 3, 1978, Linda J. Brown purchased insurance from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. On that date she made a do payment of $96.00 against a total premium of $275.00. She financed the remainder of the premium, $179.00, under an agreement with Time Premium Company. Petitioner's exhibit No. 15. USF&G received Ms. Brown's application on October 18, 1978, accompanied by a check for $179.00. On December 11, 1978, USF&G directed a notice of termination to Ms. Brown for the stated reason that she owed $96.00 on her premium. Petitioner's exhibit No. 16. On January 2, 1979, USF&G received from respondent a check in the amount of $96.00. (Count xxx) 12. In July, 1978, Robert Charles Oberheim purchased insurance from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. He made a down payment of $249.00 against a quoted premium of $711.00. He financed the balance of $462.00, and made regular monthly payments of $63.00. When USF&G issued Mr. Oberheim's policy, it adjusted the premium downward by $40.00 so that the total premium was in fact $671.00. On October 2, 1978, USF&G issued a notice of termination for the stated reason of a balance owing by Mr. Oberheim of $209.00. Thereafter, some time before October 16, 1978, USF&G received respondent's check in the amount of $209.00. Not until August 1, 1979, did J & J Insurance draw a check in favor of Mr. Oberheim in the amount of $40.00, representing the refund he was owed. Petitioner's exhibit No. (Count XXXI) On November 4, 1977, Jean L. Snyder, wife of Paul Snyder, purchased automobile insurance from respondent's Miami office. She was quoted a premium of $1,153.00 and wrote a check for the full amount on November 16, 1977. Petitioner's exhibit No. 20. USF&G received this application on February 13, 1978, accompanied by a check in the amount of $400.00. (Count XXXII) On February 9, 1978, Joseph J. Guido purchased automobile insurance from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. He made a down payment of $221.00 against a total premium of $631.00, and financed the balance of $410.00 under an agreement with Time Premium Company. Petitioner's exhibit No. 25. He subsequently sold the vehicle he had insured and, on August 8, 1978, cancelled the policy. On August 28, 1978, Time Premium Company received a $490.00 refund check from USF&G. Brooksie Peeples, Time Premium Company's manager, deposited this check against Mr. Guido's account. The check was enough to pay off Mr. Guide's indebtedness to Time Premium Company in its entirety, with $207.73 remaining. This balance was forwarded to respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office on September 13, 1978. Petitioner's exhibit No. 26. The check was deposited on September 19, 1978. Beginning in November of 1978, Mr. Guido and his wife made repeated demands for the refund. Finally, when Mr. Guide refused to leave the premises until the check was written, on March 29, 1979, the manager of respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office wrote Mr. Guide a check for $207.73. (Count XXXIV) On December 7, 1978, Shirley Payne purchased automobile insurance from respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. On that date she made a down payment in the amount of $300.32 against a quoted premium of $682.32. She was told she would receive her policy within thirty days, along with a bill for the balance due. In fact, she received her policy in March of 1979. She paid respondent another $100.00 on March 20, 1979, petitioner's exhibit No. 28, and the final $282.00 on March 28, 1979. Petitioner's exhibit No. 29. USF&G received Ms. Payne's application on February 28, 1979, accompanied by a check in the amount of $214.00. (Count XXXVI) Lena Sabel accompanied her daughter, Sylvia Robbins, to purchase automobile insurance at respondent's Hollywood office on July 25, 1978. On that date Ms. Sabel wrote a check in the amount of $556.23 in favor of J & J Insurance Agency. Petitioner's exhibit No. 22. The total premium for the policy she purchased was $406.00. When USF&G received the Robbins' application from respondent it was accompanied by a check in the amount of $150.00. On October 23, USF&G issued a notice of termination for the stated reason that $256.00 was owed for the premium. On receipt of this notice, Ms. Robbins' son sent USF&G a check for $256.00. It arrived shortly after a check in the same amount that respondent's office sent. Having received duplicate checks, USF&G wrote a refund check to the order of Sylvia Robbins in the amount of $256.00 and forwarded the check to respondent. Sylvia Robbins' endorsement was forged and the check was deposited to the J & J Insurance Premium account at the Commercial Bank and Trust Company in Miami. About two weeks before the final hearing began, Ms. Sabel received a refund check in the amount of $256.00. (Count XXXVIII) USF&G drew Check No. 111558 in favor of Robert K. Kaganac in the amount of $44.00 on December 11, 1978, and forwarded the check in care of respondent's Hollywood office. Mr. Kaganac's endorsement was forged and the check was deposited to J & J Insurance Premium account at Commercial Bank and Trust Company in Miami. (Count XXXIX) On December 1, 1978, USF&G drew a check to the order of J. Bruce Garland in the amount of $54.00 and forwarded it to respondent's Ft. Lauderdale office. There Mr. Garland's endorsement was forged and the check was deposited to the J & J Insurance Premium account at the Commercial Bank & Trust Company in Miami. On August 1, 1979, respondent mailed Mr. Garland a check in the amount of $24.00. (Count XLI) Guillermo Citelli purchased automobile insurance at respondent's Hollywood office. On November 22, 1978, USF&G drew its check No. F110271 in favor of Mr. Citelli in the amount of $91.00 and forwarded it to respondent's Hollywood office. Mr. Citelli's endorsement was forged and the check was deposited to the J & J Insurance Premium account at the Commercial Bank & Trust Company in Miami. (Count XLIII) On October 11, 1978, Kevin B. McGuire purchased automobile insurance at respondent's Hollywood office. On that day he paid a premium of $108.00. He later requested that the policy be cancelled. On December 5, 1975, USF&G drew its check No. F110568 in favor of Kevin B. McGuire in the amount of $53.00 and forwarded the check to respondent's Hollywood office. Mr. McGuire's endorsement was forged and the check was deposited to the J & J insurance Premium account at the Commercial Bank & Trust Company in Miami. In January, 1979, Mr. McGuire received a refund from respondent in the amount of $53.00. (Count XLIV) In each instance in which it was shown that USF&G had cancelled a policy for which respondent had failed to forward the entire premium, USF&G later reinstated the policy, effective retroactively to the date of cancellation. Paula Davis, who managed respondent's Hollywood office from March of 1978, until January of 1979, was instructed by respondent to forge endorsements on refund checks and did so. This practice antedated Ms. Davis' employment at the Hollywood office. Marie Vernon, also employed by respondent at her Hollywood office, forged endorsements on refund checks, believing respondent had directed that this be done. Before each forgery, a photostat of the refund check was made and attached to the pertinent file against the possibility that the payee might make demand for the refund. Deborah Goldberg's testimony on this and other points has not boon credited. With respect to certain classes of insurance, respondent instructed Ms. Davis to forward to USF&G only a specified minimum deposit even when the office received more than the minimum deposit toward payment of the premium. With respect to these policies, respondent gave Ms. Davis standing instructions to forward the premium balances only upon receipt of notices of termination from USF&G. These instructions were followed, and monies belonging to USF&G were diverted to a separate account. Respondent also represented an Alabama insurance company to whom she forwarded premiums as promptly as that company required. Many of her employees engaged in no improper conduct of any kind and were completely unaware of what was going on. Both parties have furnished proposed findings of fact which have been considered in preparation of the foregoing findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact inconsistent with the foregoing are hereby expressly rejected.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner revoke respondent's license and her eligibility for licensure. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Patrick F. Maroney, Esquire S. Strom Maxwell, Esquire Department of Insurance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward S. Jaffry, Esquire. S. Jack Carrouth, Esquire Suite 300, Barnett Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32302
