Findings Of Fact Petitioner underwent surgery in August of 1971 for the purpose of reconstructive repair to his leg as a result of burns. He had the first surgery in the early part of August of 1971. That surgery was unsuccessful since the graft did not take. Approximately two weeks thereafter, also during August of 1971, he had further surgery. That graft was also unsuccessful. After eight to nine months, the second graft developed keloid scarring in the area on the back of Petitioner's knee, which necessitated a third operation. The third operation was performed some nine months after the second operation and removed keloid scarring from the back of the knee area and added some additional tissue to allow for contracture during the aging process. In 1972, there was a fourth surgical procedure performed on Petitioner's leg, this time to remove keloid scarring from the front of the knee area. That was the last surgery performed on Petitioner with respect to this injury. Petitioner had no apparent symptoms of additional scarring until 1982. Petitioner joined the plan in December of 1980. From this stipulation of facts and the correspondence forwarded with the request for hearing, it is evident this case should not have been referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings but should have been handled as a Declaratory Statement pursuant to Rule 18-4.05, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Myra McKinney, is a black female. The Respondent is an insurance company which conducts operations in Florida, as pertinent hereto, consisting of the receipt of insurance policy applications with attendant premium payments, the recording of such policy applications, and other administrative procedures and operations necessary to act on the applications and receipt of premium monies by underwriting the risks involved by insurance policies issued by the company. The Respondent is an employer in the State of Florida for the purposes of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner was employed by Respondent at times pertinent hereto and from 1981 through June 2, 1992. When she was terminated she held the position of "processing manager." This position involved presiding over the department as supervisor, with the responsibility and function of receiving insurance policy applications and related binder and/or premium monies and properly accounting for them in the process leading up to the Respondent company issuing insurance policy contracts. The Petitioner was the supervisor of personnel charged with the receipt of and proper accounting for such applications and premium monies. On or about June 11, 1992, after being terminated by the Respondent on June 2, 1992, the Petitioner filed a charge of racial discrimination related to her termination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). An investigation was conducted by the Commission which ultimately resulted in the determination of "no cause." The Petitioner had been placed on work probation on May 11, 1992, because of poor work performance. The terms of her probation status specified that her work performance would have to be reviewed in 30 days and that if objectives were not met she would be terminated. The Petitioner had been asked by her manager or supervisor to provide him with reports on missing work (lost or misplaced applications), as well as a plan to correct the processing deficiencies leading to this problem and to eliminate the backlog of unprocessed applications. The Petitioner failed to provide the requested response and report until the supervisor had to make a second request of her. Witness John Burkhalter, the Petitioner's most recent supervisor, as well as witnesses Maria Diaz and Connie Bonner, established that a corporate audit revealed severe deficiencies and discrepancies in the processing department's function, which the Petitioner supervised. Under the Petitioner's management the processing department had fallen into severe disarray with a serious backlog of unprocessed work, a loss of control by Ms. McKinney over the processing of the work, particularly the problem of lost or misplaced insurance policy applications and related premium or binder checks. There were organizational and work-flow management problems, and very poor morale throughout the processing department. Ms. Diaz established that the poor morale was directly attributable to the Petitioner's performance because she had poor organizational skills. Numerous meetings were held with no apparent purpose for the meetings and little was accomplished. Meeting agendas between the Petitioner and her subordinates were lacking or rudimentary. The Petitioner had the habit of intimidating employees, being critical of them, and causing the employees to feel reluctant to express ideas and opinions clearly, particularly criticisms of the manner in which the office was operated. Once the Petitioner left employment, the backlog of unprocessed work and the problem of missing or misplaced applications was immediately alleviated, with the office functioning in much better fashion ever since. Additional missing applications and a box of "backlogged", unprocesed applications were found concealed in the office on the day of the Petitioner's termination, June 2, 1992, during the course of her work probationary period. Mr. Burkhalter established, as the immediate supervisor of the Petitioner and the regional operations officer of the Respondent company, that the Respondent had a progressive discipline policy and termination policy. The corporate policy was followed with regard to the termination of the Petitioner. The Respondent employed progressive discipline when it learned of the severity of the problems in the processing department, imposing a probationary period first, and giving the Petitioner an opportunity to correct the problems, followed by termination for work performance deficiencies when the opportunity to correct those deficiencies was not taken advantage of by the Petitioner. Ms. McKinney's actual performance in May of 1992 was not consistent with her previous performance evaluations. Her former manager, Mr. McFall, had inflated her performance ratings and given her satisfactory ratings when actually her performance did not justify such. Mr. McFall himself was terminated near the same time as the Petitioner and testified on behalf as concerning purported satisfactory performance but, given the totality of the circumstances surrounding his termination and testimony in support of the Petitioner, is deemed a biased witness against the Respondent. His testimony was colored by his own dispute and history of litigation with the Respondent concerning his employment and termination. Mr. Burkhalter reviewed the Petitioner's entire personnel file, the deficiencies in her work performance and her lack of any improvement during the work probationary period when the Respondent gave her an opportunity to improve and make corrections. He determined termination was, therefore, the only option. He reviewed such considerations as transferring the Petitioner or demoting her to another position. However, because of the exceedingly poor morale generated in the department largely by the Petitioner's management and supervisory practices, Mr. Burkhalter determined that neither option was in the best interest of the Respondent or Ms. McKinney. He, therefore, terminated Ms. McKinney in compliance with the provisions of the work probation policy of the Respondent. He did not terminate her or otherwise discipline her for any reasons motivated by consideration of her race. In establishing this as fact, his testimony is corroborated by that of Ms. Lynn Jones, a black female employee, who testified that she had never been personally discriminated against by Mr. Burkhalter or Colonial nor had she observed any other black person employed by the Respondent treated in what appeared to her to be a disparate fashion, including the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of Record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject petition of Myra McKinney in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 1994 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 1994. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted but not in itself materially dispositive of the relevant issues. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of credible evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of credible evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of credible evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of credible evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as not in accordance with the totality of the preponderant, credible evidence. 8-9. Accepted, but not dispositive of the material issues presented. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant, credible evidence of record. Rejected as not clearly established by the preponderant evidence of record. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Rejected as immaterial and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not entirely in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence. Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of the credible evidence. Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of the credible evidence. Accepted. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial given the issues in this proceeding. Rejected as immaterial and not in accord with the preponderant weight of the evidence and subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as not in accordance with the preponderant weight of the credible evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as not in accord with the preponderant weight of the credible evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on this subject matter. Rejected as immaterial under the circumstances presented by the issues in this case. Rejected as immaterial under the circumstances presented by the issues in this case. Rejected as immaterial under the circumstances presented by the issues in this case. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-14. All accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact on the same subject matter to the extent that they differ. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Myra McKinney 1823 Mayfair Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Lucinda A. Reynolds, Esquire McCutchan, Druen, Maynard, Rath & Dietrich One Nationwide Plaza Columbus, Ohio 43216 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Juvenile Welfare Board of Pinellas County (Petitioner) should have treated John Bucci as a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System from April 1984, through July 1988, and therefore, should be required to submit retroactive adjustments for retirement and social security based upon his earnings during this period.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an independent taxing district created by Special Act in 1945 to provide funding in Pinellas County for services to children. It timely filed a request for hearing on the Respondent's decision to consider John Bucci a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from April 1984, through July 1988. The position of the Petitioner is that John Bucci was an independent contractor, and therefore, should not be considered a mandatory member of the FRS. Bucci worked as a janitor for the Petitioner between April 1984, and July 1988. He opened the building in the morning, deactivated the building alarm, made coffee, cleaned the employee restrooms, emptied waste baskets, vacuumed and dusted. From time to time, he also painted and made minor repairs in the building, and took mail to the post office when directed to do so. While Bucci did not receive daily assignments, his duties were routine and had been worked out with representatives of Petitioner when he was initially employed. If there were problems with his cleaning, he would be told to reclean an area, and he was expected to take care of the problem as soon as possible. The Petitioner provided Bucci with all supplies and equipment necessary to do his job. While he worked with the Petitioner, Bucci did not have a written contract, but rather, he had an annually renewable verbal contract. He was paid on an hourly basis, and submitted a monthly record of hours worked each day, which was reviewed and approved for payment by Petitioner. Bucci received annual increases from the Petitioner, but did not negotiate these increases. The Petitioner simply gave him what it considered to be a cost of living increase each year. According to Petitioner, Bucci was not in an established position, and therefore, did not receive fringe benefits. At the time, Bucci was the only person working with the Petitioner which it considered to be an independent contractor. Subsequent to his leaving, Petitioner bid, and now has a written contract for janitorial services with an agency in Pinellas County that offers employment opportunities to retarded citizens. That agency provides all equipment and supplies necessary for janitorial duties. After several counseling sessions with Carole Gunnels, Petitioner's operations manager at the time, Bucci was terminated because of continued problems with his work. Thereafter, it was determined by the Division of Unemployment Compensation, Department of Labor and Employment Security, that he qualified for unemployment benefits. The Comptroller's Office of the State of Florida has issued Memorandum No. 7 (1988-89) regarding determinations of a person's status as an independent contractor or employee. In pertinent part, that Memorandum sets forth twenty factors to be considered in determining if sufficient control is present to establish an employee-employer relationship, and states: The Internal Revenue Service has provided guidance in making this determination in Revenue Ruling 87-41. It provides generally, that the relationship of employer and employee exists when the person or persons for whom the services are performed have the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but as to how it shall be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct and control the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if the employer has the right to do so. The Respondent has adopted Rule 22B-6.001(15), Florida Administrative Code, which defines the term "independent contractor" as an individual who: agrees to provide certain services; works according to his own methods; is not subject to the control of his employer, except as to the results of his work; and does not receive the fringe benefits offered by the employer. A consultant or independent contractor usually: is compensated from another salaries and wages account; does not earn annual or sick leave; and may frequently do a majority of his work in his own office rather than on the employer's premises. In order to determine if Bucci should have been considered to be an employee of the Petitioner, rather than an independent contractor, the Respondent provided Petitioner with a copy of its Employment Relationship Questionnaire, which Petitioner completed on or about April 10, 1989. The information provided by Petitioner on this Questionnaire indicates that Bucci was required to follow regular routines or schedules, the Petitioner could change the methods by which he performed his work or otherwise direct him in the performance of his duties, the work was to be performed by Bucci personally, the Petitioner could discharge him at any time, and he could quit at any time. It was also indicated that Bucci was not filling a regularly established position, but was retained under an oral contract to perform personal services. Bucci did not work full-time with the Petitioner. Rather, he worked an average of between 4 to 5 hours a day with the Petitioner. On rare occasion during the time he was employed with the Petitioner, he did take other part-time cleaning jobs with other employers. However, he did not have any occupational license as a janitorial service, did not advertise as such, had no yellow page listing for janitorial services, and did not have any equipment or supplies necessary to carry out his duties, other than what Petitioner provided him. The characteristics, terms and conditions of Bucci's employment with the Petitioner from April 1984, through July 1988, support the Respondent's determination that he was an employee, rather than an independent contractor, and that he was, therefore, a mandatory member of the FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order concluding that John Bucci was a mandatory member of the FRS, and as such denying Petitioner's request for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 89-4067) Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as purely procedural matters and not a relevant proposed finding of fact. 3-4. Rejected in Findings of Fact 2-5, 8-10. The Respondent did not timely file Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry A. Smiljanich, Esquire P. O. Box 1578 St. Petersburg, FL 33731 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire General Counsel's Office 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact The employee herein, the Petitioner, is employed by DEP as a park ranger. DEP is an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioner failed to report for work after June 10, 1995. He apparently had some health problem or complaint and was on sick leave for a time. October of 1995 was the first month that he was on leave without pay. He was on leave without pay when he was terminated, which occurred on November 27, 1995. The Petitioner was not receiving workers compensation benefits between his last day of work on June 10, 1995 and the termination date of November 27, 1995. His monthly rate of pay was $1,627.23. He was paid $1,627.62 in gross wages for 176 hours on November 30, 1995. He received $1,319.18 in net wages for November of 1995. The Petitioner was entitled to $71.74 in wages for 10.75 hours for November of 1995. DEP calculated the amount of overpayment by offsetting the wages issued to him in November of 1995 by the amount he was actually entitled to receive for that month for the 10.75 hours. Thereafter, on December 12, 1995, DEP notified the Petitioner, by certified mail, return receipt requested, that he had been overpaid $1,247.44 in net wages for November of 1995. That return receipt reflected that the Petitioner received that letter on December 15, 1995. The Petitioner failed to refund the money to DEP during the 1995 tax year and as yet, has still not refunded the money. Because the money was not refunded during the 1995 tax year, the Petitioner also owes DEP an additional $163.87, which was withheld for taxes on the payment or overpayment in question. Thus, DEP overpaid the Petitioner a total of $1,411.31 in wages for November of 1995.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, enter a Final Order finding that the employee, the Petitioner, Eugene Breeze, owes $1,411.31 for a salary overpayment received by him in November of 1995. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Eugene Breeze 1110 Florida Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444 Melease Jackson, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue Whether Respondent violated the provisions of chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2013)1/, by failing to obtain workers? compensation insurance coverage, as alleged in the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement that employers secure the payment of workers? compensation insurance coverage, pursuant to chapter 440, Florida Statutes, for their employees. Respondent is a Florida-limited liability company engaged in business operations for the time period of March 16, 2010, through March 15, 2013. Mark Markisen is the managing member of Respondent listed with the State of Florida, Division of Corporations. On March 15, 2013, Jack Gumph, an investigator with the Department, conducted a random on-site compliance inspection of a construction site for a single family residence. Gumph determined that the general contractor for the job was Gulf Shore Homes and that it had subcontracted with Tradewinds Design for certain work inside the home. As Gumph interviewed the different workers present on the worksite, he spoke with Mark and Brett Markisen, who informed him that they worked for Tradewinds Design. Gumph observed Brett Markisen installing a wine cabinet in the home. Gumph confirmed through the Department?s online records that Gulf Shores Homes and Tradewinds Design had current workers? compensation insurance coverage on March 15, 2013. Based on this initial information, Gumph left the worksite. On March 19, 2013, Gumph subsequently learned from a conversation with Mark Markisen that Mark and Brett Markisen were not employees of Tradewinds Design. Rather, Tradewinds had subcontracted with Respondent, Cabinetry by Design of Collier County, L.L.C., to build and install the wine cabinets. Mark Markisen stated that he was the managing member of Cabinetry by Design of Collier County, L.L.C., and that he had selected to be exempt from workers? compensation insurance coverage. Gumph confirmed that Mark Markisen had selected to be exempt from workers? compensation insurance coverage. However, because Respondent did not have worker?s compensation coverage for Brett Markisen, the Department issued a Stop-Work Order on March 19, 2013, and Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation on April 8, 2013. Mark Markisen possessed an exemption from the workers? compensation insurance coverage requirement during the penalty period of March 16, 2010, through March 15, 2013. Brett Markisen did not possess an exemption from the workers? compensation insurance coverage requirement during the penalty period. Brett Markisen was employed by Respondent throughout the penalty period. During the penalty period, Brett Markisen received approximately $187,000.00 from Respondent. The amount of this money attributed to wages is unclear, based on the fact that Mark Markisen indicated that some of the payments reflected loans, not wages. Respondent was an “employer” as defined in chapter 440, Florida Statutes, throughout the penalty period. On March 15, 2013, Brett Markisen was Respondent?s “employee” working on the installation of cabinets in the single family residence.2/ On March 15, 2013, Respondent failed to provide workers? compensation insurance coverage for Brett Markisen. Respondent also failed to provide coverage during the penalty period of March 16, 2010, through March 15, 2013. Therefore, the Department properly entered a Stop-Work Order on March 19, 2013. Respondent failed to provide sufficient business records in order to establish a payroll. Therefore, the Department correctly imputed payroll against Respondent. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment used the proper class code for the calculation of the penalty, concerning the installation of cabinets, and correctly followed the procedure set out in section 440.107(7)(d)1, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.028.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order upholding the Stop-Work Order and Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, assessing a penalty against Respondent in the amount of $21,436.61. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2013.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2002), by forcing the termination of Petitioner's employment with Respondent because of his gender (male), and/or national origin (Venezuela), and/or his age (37); and because Petitioner alleged that younger, female lifeguards were given better work assignments.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from November 26, 2002, until April 17 2003, in the position of deep water lifeguard at Respondent's facility at the Grand Floridian Hotel (Grand Floridian) located in Lake Buena Vista, Florida. He worked in that position until his resignation on April 17, 2003. Petitioner is a Hispanic male, aged 37, and a member of a protected class. Respondent is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Petitioner was hired for a full-time position to work 40 hours per week. He normally worked a ten-hour shift, four days a week. Petitioner never applied for any other position or promotions during his employment. All full-time lifeguards at the Grand Floridian are covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Respondent and the Services Trades Council Union. A lifeguard working at the Grand Floridian does not have to be a member or pay dues to the union in order to be covered by the terms of the CBA. Petitioner is not a member of the union. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was provided with a packet of materials containing Respondent's employment policies. Respondent had a policy regarding harassment that covered all of its employees and prohibited all types of harassment in the workplace, including any such behavior based on age, national origin, and/or gender. Respondent also has an "equal opportunity" policy that applies to all of its employees. This policy provides that all employees should be treated equally in terms of hours, work location, and scheduling based on seniority. Operations at the Grand Floridian Of the class of lifeguards hired at the same time, Petitioner was the only one assigned to the Grand Floridian. At the time of being assigned to the Grand Floridian, there were approximately 25 lifeguards employed there. The lifeguards at the Grand Floridian are full-time, part-time casual, or part- time regular employees. There are also "college program" lifeguards who perform all of the same duties as the full-time and part-time employees. The starting times for employees are staggered, based on the needs of the area and the time of the year. The main duties of a lifeguard at the Grand Floridian are to ensure safety and guard the pools, clean the pool and beach areas, work the cash register, and operate the marina. The head supervisor of the Grand Floridian lifeguards during Petitioner's employment was Jerry Davis. Davis has been employed with Respondent for nine years. He has served in his current position as the recreation operations manager for six years. His duties in this position include supervising the outside recreation areas, including the pools, boats, and lifeguards at the Grand Floridian. Davis plays no role in hiring the employees that report to him, but rather Respondent's Employee Relations Department is responsible for hiring these employees. Davis has the authority to terminate lifeguards that report to him. Prior to terminating an employee, however, Davis seeks the input of the Employee Relations Department. The evidence is credible that Davis is accessible to his direct reports and makes sure that his office is always open to them. If a lifeguard wants to speak with Davis, he will make himself available to him or her. As a manager, Davis has undergone training from Respondent regarding its equal employment policies and anti- harassment policies. He has also been trained that employees may raise complaints about working conditions with either their manager or the Employee Relations Department. All employees are made aware of these policies and complaint procedures as a part of their orientation program. Under Davis, the next supervisor was Darin Bernhard. Bernhard has been employed with Respondent for eight years and is currently employed as a recreation guest service manager. Until October 2003, Bernhard was employed at the Grand Floridian. In that capacity, Bernhard directly supervised lifeguards, marina employees, and activities' employees. Bernhard had continuous interaction with lifeguards throughout the day while at the Grand Floridian. Bernhard had an open-door policy to all employees and made himself accessible to them. Under Davis and Bernhard, there were three coordinators who served as the immediate supervisors of the lifeguards. The weekly work schedule for lifeguards was posted on the wall every week. Bernhard, along with Respondent's Labor Office, was responsible for preparing this weekly schedule. The factors used in preparing this schedule were a scheduling bid submitted by each employee, scheduled vacations, and operational needs. As for operational needs, Bernhard would try to give a combination throughout the week based on full-time, part-time, and college program employees and avoid having all college program employees on duty at one time, thereby providing more experience on each shift. The CBA contains a provision stating as follows: "The principles of seniority shall be observed in establishing days off and work schedules by department, location, or scheduling pool." As a result, the schedule bids of all employees were considered based on the seniority of the employees. At the time of his hire, Petitioner spoke with Bernhard about special scheduling requests. Specifically, Petitioner asked to receive early shifts and weekends off. He wanted the weekends off due to child-care issues with his son. Bernhard informed Petitioner that he would attempt to work with Petitioner on this, but that he was limited in what he could do based on the seniority requirements set forth in the CBA, as well as the fact that most of the lifeguards preferred to have weekends off. At that point in time, Petitioner had the least amount of seniority of all the full-time lifeguards, since he was the most recently hired employee. Despite the CBA restrictions, Bernhard made every effort to provide Petitioner with at least one day each weekend off and tried to provide him with two, whenever possible. On a regular basis, Petitioner was scheduled to have Saturdays off. In addition, on numerous occasions, he was given Friday, Saturday, and Sunday off from work, in accordance with his special request. At no time during his employment did Petitioner ever complain to Bernhard about not getting enough days off on the weekend. Employees would occasionally complain to Bernhard about the weekly schedule. When he received such complaints, Bernhard would listen to their complaints and not take any adverse action against any employee for complaining to him about scheduling issues. On occasion, lifeguards would be sent home early due to slow business or inclement weather. This decision would be made either by the immediate supervisor on duty or one of the coordinators. The lifeguards would be allowed to volunteer to go home on a "first-come, first serve" basis. No lifeguard, however, was forced to go home early. Similarly, Bernhard did not receive complaints from any lifeguard about being forced to go home early. The coordinators at the Grand Floridian were responsible for making the daily rotation schedules. There were five primary positions that the lifeguards could be assigned to on a daily basis, consisting of two lifeguard positions at the pool, the slide, the marina, and cashier. The coordinators made these assignment decisions based on the people they had available that day. The primary focus was to make sure that all of the areas were properly covered. Such daily rotation assignments were also based on certain needs during particular periods of the day. In addition, certain assignments were given to certain employees if they are more capable of performing the task. It is also not uncommon for the daily rotation to be changed during the day based on unexpected factors, such as absent employees. In terms of shift assignments, an effort is made to make sure that regular employees and college program employees are working together so that the regular employees can provide guidance when needed. During a workday, most of the employees rotate positions every 30 minutes to an hour. The rotation of duties for the lifeguards changed on a daily basis. Petitioner enjoyed working as a lifeguard because he considered himself a stronger lifeguard than others in his department. He also described himself as the "leader of the lifeguards." All lifeguards are trained in the cashier duties, but very few individuals are chosen to actually work as a cashier. These cashiers undergo special training prior to performing these duties. The primary attributes for a cashier are good guest interaction and good phone skills because a cashier is required to interact with guests, both on the telephone and in person. This assignment also differs from the other assignments in that the employee assigned to this position normally does not rotate throughout the day to other assignments. It is not uncommon for the same employee to serve as a cashier for an entire day. Petitioner was sometimes assigned to work at the marina, but not as a cashier. Petitioner never spoke with any of his supervisors or coordinators about working more at the marina or as a cashier. Each lifeguard at the Grand Floridian was required to complete four hours of in-service training each month, either at his home resort or at another resort. Attendance at these training sessions were tracked on a daily sign-in sheet. If a lifeguard failed to complete his or her in-service training for the month, he would be reprimanded. Davis prepared a reprimand for Petitioner on April 1, 2003. This reprimand was the result of Petitioner's failing to complete his in-service training hours for the month of March 2003. As a result of failing to complete this training, Petitioner received a two-point reprimand for poor job performance. Petitioner did not know when Davis prepared the Poor Job Performance Memorandum dated April 1, 2003. Davis and Petitioner did not see each other between Petitioner's accident on March 30, 2003, and the date Petitioner signed the Poor Job Performance Memorandum on April 9, 2003. At the time that Davis prepared this memorandum, Petitioner had not made any complaints of discrimination or harassment to Davis. The attendance of the lifeguards on a daily basis was tracked by the use of an electronic swipe card. The daily schedule and attendance of the lifeguards was also tracked on a daily sheet completed by the coordinators. This sheet was kept in the managers' office and was forwarded to the Respondent's Labor Office when it was completed. Bernhard usually reviewed these sheets on a daily basis as well. The lifeguards did not have access to these sheets on a daily basis. Under the attendance policy in the CBA, three absences in a 30-day period warranted a one-point written reprimand. An employee had to receive three written reprimands within a 24- month period before he could be terminated for attendance issues. The reasons for an absence did not make a difference for purposes of accruing points under the policy. On March 24, 2003, Petitioner called in sick and did not appear for work. On his way home from work on March 31, 2003, Petitioner was in a car accident in a parking lot on Respondent's property. As a result of that accident, Petitioner's car had to be towed because it was not drivable. Petitioner did not, however, seek medical treatment as a result of the accident. Shortly after the accident occurred, Petitioner contacted Bernhard. He informed Bernhard of the accident and told him that he would not be available for work the next day because his car had been destroyed. He did not inform Bernhard that he had been injured in any way. Petitioner was absent from work on April 1, 2003, because he had no transportation. Petitioner called in his personal absence on April 1, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2003, and was a "no show" on April 2, 2003. As a result of these numerous absences, Davis made a decision to contact Petitioner by telephone and inquire about the reasons for these multiple absences. Petitioner informed Davis that he still did not have transportation. Petitioner expressed concern to Davis that he was afraid he was going to accrue too many points and get himself terminated. Davis responded to Petitioner that if he did not return to work, he would accrue points under the attendance policy. Petitioner asked Davis if it would be better if he terminated himself or if he was terminated by Respondent. Davis also informed Petitioner that if he terminated himself, at some point he might be able to return to his job at Respondent, though he did not guarantee him that he could simply return. Davis made it very clear to Petitioner that this was a decision he had to make. At the time of Davis' phone call to Petitioner, he had accrued sufficient points under the applicable "attendance policy" set forth under the CBA to warrant giving him a one- point written reprimand. Davis had not been able to give the reprimand to Petitioner, however, because he had not returned to work. At no time had Davis ever informed Petitioner that such a reprimand was waiting for him. In addition, such absences would not have provided a basis for terminating Petitioner at that point in time. Petitioner contacted Davis the following day and informed Davis that he was going to voluntarily resign his employment. Upon learning of this decision, Davis informed Petitioner that he needed to return his uniform and all other of Respondent's property prior to receiving his last paycheck. All employees are required to return their uniform and Respondent's property at the time of resignation. Davis never informed Petitioner that he was being terminated or that he had an intention of terminating him. Similarly, Davis never told Petitioner that he had no option but to resign. Davis had no problem with Petitioner returning to work, provided he could obtain proper transportation. After Petitioner's resignation, Davis completed the required paperwork and indicated that Petitioner should be classified as a "restricted rehire." Davis chose this restriction due to Petitioner's tardiness and attendance issues, as well as his failure to take responsibility to make it to work. This decision to categorize him as a "restricted rehire" was not based on Petitioner's age, national origin or his gender. Petitioner visited Respondent's casting center (human resource department) on June 17, 2003, approximately two months after his resignation, with the intent to reapply for his prior position. Petitioner wanted to return to his same position at the Grand Floridian, working for Davis and Bernhard, as well as working under the same coordinators. On June 17, 2003, Petitioner met with Fernanda Smith, who has served as a recruiter for Respondent for five years. Smith was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is Hispanic. As a recruiter, Smith is responsible for interviewing, selecting, and hiring the strongest candidates for positions at Respondent. She is responsible for hiring employees for all hourly, entry- level positions. The hiring process used by Respondent is the same for both new applicants and former employees of Respondent. That process is set forth in the "Rehire Review" policy given to each recruiter. Once Smith is randomly assigned an applicant, she brings them to her office and reviews their personal data in the computer. She then reviews the application for accuracy and completeness. She also confirms that they are qualified to work in the United States and their criminal background. Smith reviews the conditions of employment with the applicant, including compensation, appearance, ability to attend work and transportation. If the applicant was previously employed by Respondent, Smith also reviews the application for the reasons the employee previously left employment and the applicant's rehire status. The different rehire statuses are "yes rehire," "restricted rehire," and "no rehire." If a former employee has been categorized as a "restricted rehire," Smith then must confirm that the person is currently employed and that he or she has been at that employment for a period of at least six months at the time of re-application. Assuming they can satisfy these requirements, the applicant is required to provide an employment verification letter from their current employer within one week of the interview. At that point, the information is forwarded to a rehire committee for consideration. On June 17, 2003, Smith interviewed Petitioner for potential rehire with Respondent. She recalls that when she met him in the lobby, he was very professionally dressed. Upon entering her office, Smith reviewed the information on Petitioner's application with him. At that point, she noticed that he had a recent date of termination from Respondent and asked him the reasons for his termination. Petitioner responded that he had left his employment because of transportation problems and that he had missed a number of days from work. In reviewing Petitioner's application, she realized that he did not meet the requirements for consideration as a "restricted rehire." First of all, Petitioner did not offer any evidence of current employment at the time of the interview. Secondly, Petitioner had only been gone from Respondent for a period of approximately two months, and thus, did not have the six months of continuous employment to be considered for rehire. Smith shared with Petitioner that he did not meet the minimum requirements for a "restricted rehire." Petitioner had no idea what that designation meant. At that point, Petitioner responded by getting very upset, yelling and screaming at Smith, standing up and pointing his finger at her. He then informed Smith that he was going to sue Respondent for discrimination and left her office. Petitioner did not allow Smith to make any other comments to him. Immediately after Petitioner had left the building, Smith prepared the standard evaluation that she prepares for all applicants she interviews, including the incident that occurred in the interview with Petitioner. If Petitioner had allowed Smith to explain the process and eventually provided the appropriate documentation, he might have been considered for rehire. Based on his behavior in the interview, however, Smith recommended that he not be considered for rehire, particularly for the position of lifeguard where he would be dealing with guests on a regular basis. Allegations of Discrimination Petitioner alleges that one of the coordinators referred to his national origin in a derogatory manner on one occasion. Other than this isolated alleged comment, he stated he never heard anyone else at Respondent make any derogatory comments about his being Hispanic or Venezuelan. Petitioner did not complain about this comment to anyone at Respondent and specifically did not complain to Davis, Bernhard, or employee relations about it. Other than this one comment by an unnamed coordinator, Petitioner offered no evidence that any actions or decisions were taken against him based on his national origin. In support of his age discrimination claim, Petitioner alleges that some of his co-workers referred to him once or twice as "old." Petitioner did not offer any evidence that any of his supervisors or coordinators ever used any of these terms in reference to him. Petitioner does not know whether or not he ever discussed his age with other workers. At the time of Petitioner's resignation, he was not the oldest lifeguard working at the Grand Floridian. Penny Ivey and Sherry Morris were both older than Petitioner, and Davis was born on February 5, 1951. At the time of Petitioner's resignation, Davis was 52 years old. Other than these alleged isolated comments, Petitioner offered no other evidence that any actions or decisions were taken against him based on his age. Petitioner claims that one example of gender discrimination was that the rotation schedule was not equal. In particular, he alleges that the "young and beautiful girls" were preferred in the rotation schedules because they were allowed to work in the marina and at the cash register more than males. Petitioner alleges that Jaimy Tully, a 23-year-old female lifeguard, was always late. For example, Petitioner alleges that Tully was late on March 2, 2003, based on the fact that she was supposed to be there at 10:00 a.m. The daily schedule indicates that she arrived for work at 9:30 a.m. In reviewing the document, however, it indicates "S/C" which means that a schedule change was made, and Tully showed up for work half an hour early, not late, and she still worked her scheduled day of ten hours. A schedule change would occur for several reasons, including the need to have certain employees come in early for an in-service session or the personal request of an employee. It sometimes required employees to come in for work early and other times required them to work later. Petitioner similarly alleges that Tully was late on March 22, 2003, and should have been fired for that. In reviewing the daily schedule for that date, however, it is evident that a schedule change was made, and Tully was scheduled to work from 9:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m., a regular 10-hour day, and that she actually worked those hours. Petitioner admitted at the hearing that she was actually early to work and not late. Petitioner alleges that Tully was late again for work on April 7 and April 16, 2003. A review of those daily schedules, however, reveals that Tully had a schedule change on each of those days and that she worked the hours that she was assigned. Of all these allegations of Tully being late to work, Petitioner never complained to anyone about it. Petitioner then alleges that Tully arrived for work early on February 15, 2003, and that she was allowed to work extra hours and earn overtime. On that particular occasion, however, Tully was called in early because she needed to attend an in-service training session that was occurring that day. Petitioner conceded that Tully was not late on that day. Petitioner admitted that both males and females were called in to work additional hours as lifeguards. For instance, Michael Whitt, a male employee, was allowed to start work earlier based on a schedule change on March 4, 2003. Similarly, a schedule change was made involving Whitt on February 25, 2003, and he was required to report to work at 11:40 a.m., not 10:00 a.m., and as a result, was not given any breaks that day. Petitioner never received any discipline as a result of being late to work or for leaving work early. Petitioner claims that he suffered discrimination on January 12, 2003, because Tully was allowed to start work later than he and then was allowed to work as a cashier for the majority of the day. He claims that she should have been on a rotation like him and that she was given more hours than he was. Tully was trained as both a lifeguard and a cashier, but she had more cashier experience than the majority of the other lifeguards. She also had good guest-interaction and cash- handling skills, and thus, she was placed as a cashier more than most of the other lifeguards. The cashier assignment also differed from the other assignments in that the employee assigned to this position normally did not rotate throughout the day, and it was not uncommon for the same employee to serve as a cahier for an entire day. Petitioner never spoke with any of his supervisors or coordinators about serving as a cashier, nor did he ever complain to Bernhard about any of his daily assignments. He alleges that the woman and the "young girls" were always placed at the marina. When asked to identify "these girls," he stated he was referring to Mindy and Matt, a male employee. In particular, Petitioner testified that on December 25, 2002, Matt served in the marina for three consecutive rotations on that particular day. He also points out that Matt had a longer break than he did on that particular day. There was no pay differential between employees who were assigned to work at the marina and those who worked at the pool. Similarly, there was no pay differential between employees working as a cashier and those at the pool. Petitioner never made any complaints to Davis about his weekly schedule or his daily rotation assignments. Similarly, Petitioner never complained to Davis about any disparate treatment or harassment based on his age, national origin, or gender. Petitioner never raised any complaints about discrimination or any other working conditions with Bernhard. Bernhard never made any derogatory comments to him or about him. Bernhard does not give any preference to any employees based on age, national origin, or gender. Petitioner was aware that there was an Employee Relations Department located at the casting center, but never complained to them about his working conditions or alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES Petitioner's Petition for Relief and dismisses his complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Fernando J. Conde 4732 Olive Branch Road Apartment No. 1205 Orlando, Florida 32811-7118 Paul J. Scheck, Esquire Shutts & Bowen, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 4956 Orlando, Florida 32802-4956 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Ocala Exterior Solutions, Inc., failed to properly maintain workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees, and, if so, what penalty should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for ensuring that all employers maintain workers' compensation insurance for themselves and their employees. It is the duty of the Department to make random inspections of job sites and to answer complaints concerning potential violations of workers' compensation rules. This case arose as a result of a random inspection. Respondent is a business created by Johnny Busciglio on or about October 16, 2012. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was duly licensed to do business in the State of Florida. Its business address is 140 Southwest 74th Lane, Ocala, Florida 34476. On May 22, 2015, the Department’s investigator, William Pangrass, made a random site visit to a construction site located at a residence at 9189 Southwest 60th Terrace Road, Ocala, Florida. He saw two men installing soffit as part of the construction which was going on. Pangrass remembers the men identifying themselves as Derek McVey and Frank Deil. When Pangrass inquired as to their employer, the two men were initially not certain for whom they were working. One of the men made a telephone call and then told Pangrass they were employees of Sauer & Sons. Interestingly, Respondent said the two men on-site that day were McVey and a man named James Van Brunt. Pangrass contacted Sauer & Sons and were told that neither McVey nor Deil (or Van Brunt) were employees of that company. He was told by a representative of Sauer & Sons that the men were in fact employees of Respondent. Pangrass then verified that Respondent was a current, viable company and checked whether the company had workers’ compensation insurance coverage for its employees. He found that Respondent had a workers’ compensation insurance policy for a short time in 2014. Two of Respondent’s employees, however, did have exemptions from coverage. Those two were Johnny Busciglio and Anthony Wayne. Based on his findings, Pangrass issued a SWO which he posted at the work site he had visited. He posted the SWO on the permit board in front of the job site on May 26, 2015. On May 29, he served a Request for Production of Business Records on Respondent, seeking information concerning Respondent’s business for purposes of calculating a penalty for failure to have workers’ compensation insurance in place. Respondent emailed the requested business records to Pangrass. The Department requested additional records and clarification concerning some of the records which had been provided. Busciglio made a good faith effort to respond to each of the Department’s requests. After review of Respondent’s business records, the Department calculated a penalty and issued an amended OPA. That amended OPA was issued on September 8 and served on Busciglio (as agent for Respondent) on October 1, 2015. The amount of the penalty in the amended OPA was $9,896.32. Within a few days after receiving the amended Order, Busciglio obtained workers’ compensation insurance for his employees, paid a down payment of $1,000 to the Department, and Respondent was released to resume its work. The penalty in the amended OPA was based upon information obtained from Busciglio concerning Respondent. Using the bank records supplied by Busciglio, the Department determined that Respondent had the following employees: Eric McVey, Frank Dorneden, Jeff Burns, Jordan Anchondo, Anthony Wayne, Nikki Smith, Johnny Busciglio, and Jason Bridge. Their wages were used by the Department to calculate the penalty. The penalty was calculated by the Department as follows: The business was assigned class code 5645, construction on residential dwellings; The period of non-compliance was set at two years; The gross payroll amount for that two-year period was established at $30,905.14; The gross payroll amount was divided by 100, resulting in the sum of $309.05; The approved manual rate, i.e., the amount the employer would have paid if insurance was in place, was assigned for each employee; The gross payroll was multiplied by the manual rate; And the penalty amount was established, taking the figure in (f), above, and multiplying by two. Busciglio established by credible testimony, unrefuted by the Department, that Nikki Smith was a person from whom he bought tools; she was never an employee of Respondent. The same was true for the person listed as Jason Bridge (although his real name may have been Jason Woolridge). As for Eric McVey, he worked for Frank Dorneden, who paid McVey directly. There were no payroll records or checks from Respondent provided to the Department which were attributable to McVey. Dorneden had begun working for Respondent on December 22, 2014. On May 22, 2015, he was asked by Busciglio to visit the work site; he found McVey working there and Deil/Van Brunt was also on the site. Neither the Department nor Respondent offered any further explanation about Deil/Van Brunt, nor did the Department attribute any penalty to Van Brunt as a putative employee. His status in this matter is a mystery. When the penalties associated with McVey, Smith, and Bride are subtracted from the calculation, the amount of the penalty would be $9,454.22.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services requiring Respondent, Ocala Exterior Solutions, Inc., to pay the sum of $9,454.22. DONE AND ORDERED this 20th day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 2015.
The Issue Is the Petitioner handicapped? Was the Petitioner capable of performing her duties satisfactorily? Did Respondent take adverse personnel actions against the Respondent? Were the adverse personnel actions which were taken against the Petitioner based upon her disability? Did the Respondent have a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for taking the adverse actions against Petitioner? Were the reasons articulated by the Respondent pretextual? Did the Respondent provide reasonable accommodations for the Petitioner? To what relief is the Petitioner entitled if she prevails? Are the Petitioner's rights limited by her status as a non-tenured employee on annual contract status? Is the Petitioner entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys fees?
Findings Of Fact Dr. Tony Mason was employed by the School Board of Leon County, Florida, as the Coordinator for Diagnostic Services on January 2, 1986. As is done with all employees of the School Board, she was recommended for employment by the board by her immediate supervisor, Dr. Ruth Mitchell. Dr. Mitchell supervised from four to six coordinators of units similar to the Diagnostic Services during Petitioner's tenure with the Respondent. Each of these units was headed by an individual who was not handicapped and who had an educational background similar to that of the Petitioner. The position requirements for the position of Coordinator for Diagnosis Services were a background in physiology, social work, or a related field as well as educational and administrative background or experience. Dr. Mason holds the following degrees: Bachelor of Arts and Social Studies, English and Speech, Masters Degree in Counselling and Physiology, a doctorate in Administration and Supervision, and an Educational Specialist degree. She was employed by the U. S. Department of Education for several years in an administrative capacity. The Petitioner was well qualified for the position of Coordinator of Diagnostic Services Unit. At the time the Petitioner was hired she was handicapped. Her primary impairment is cerebral palsy. The Petitioner has suffered from this condition since the age of three. This condition is readily apparent from talking with and observing the Petitioner. The Petitioner also has had a partial gastrectomy. This latter condition is not observable. During her employment, she advised her supervisor, Dr. Mitchell, of the nature, symptoms, and problems associated with both conditions. Both impairments significantly limit Petitioner's major life activities. Cerebral palsy, a neuromuscular disease, impedes Petitioner's ability to walk, and causes her to speak slowly. In addition, her speech is distorted although very understandable. A partial gastrectomy is a surgical removal of a portion of one's stomach. Both of the Petitioner's disabilities are negatively impacted by extreme stress. Extreme stress causes the Petitioner's muscles to contract and lock causing intense pain. Inordinate stress causes the Petitioner to "dump" requiring her to go to the nearest restroom as quickly as she can. Both the Petitioner's disabilities are not affected by normal, everyday stress. There was no evidence presented that the Petitioner's disabilities in any way impaired her intellectual capacity or mental abilities. The Petitioner had never been terminated or asked to resign from any position prior to working for the Respondent. While working for the Federal Department of Education and completing her doctorate in 13 months, both of which are stressful activities, the Petitioner did not suffer stress induced impacts on her disabilities. The Petitioner performed the duties of Coordinator for Diagnostic Services for almost two years without difficulty. As Coordinator for Diagnostic Services, Dr. Mason was responsible for the administration of this unit which employed eight social workers and ten physiologists. They were responsible for testing students within the school district and preparing reports based upon their testing to determine the eligibility of the students for participation in various educational programs. The Diagnosis Services Unit (DSU) also employed two secretaries and, at various times during the Petitioner's employment, additional interns and part-time employees. The Petitioner was also responsible for preparing staff papers on matters related to Diagnosis Services for presentation to the School Board together with budget requests, schedules, preparations of grants, and other special reports which were from time to time requested by the Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent, or Petitioner's immediate supervisor. To assist her in the preparation of these reports, the Petitioner was initially assigned a secretary. This secretary also filed the unit's paperwork and generally assisted the Petitioner. The work load of the DSU was consistently high as the unit was responsible for evaluating approximately 2,000 students each year. There has been a steady increase in the work load of the DSU since 1976, and the work load continued to increase through the period of the Petitioner's tenure at the DSU and thereafter. The DSU had suffered from high work load and limited resources prior to and during the Petitioner's employment in the unit. A psychologist working in the unit testified that she suffered severe depression as a result of the stress created by the workload in the Unit. For assistance in preparing reports, the DSU could send draft reports to the word processing unit. However, the word processing unit was slow and not suited to the particular needs of the DSU because the word processing personnel were not familiar with the technical terminology used in the psychological and social work reports, and did not accurately transcribe the material which the DSU sent to them. This resulted in reports having to be returned to the word processing center for corrections. Because the Petitioner's unit was only third in order of priority for using the word processing center, the DSU's turn-around time was lengthy. One school psychologist had to wait an entire summer to receive materials she had sent to the word processing center, and then found it necessary to return them for corrections. The lack of adequate secretarial support adversely impacted the work of the DSU and the Petitioner's personal performance. Dr. Mitchell, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor, forbade the Petitioner to use her secretary for typing Petitioner's written reports because of the backlog in the unit. The Petitioner was forced to print her own work by hand. This was slow and adversely affected by her disability. Because the Petitioner could not use the secretaries who were assigned to and physically located in her unit, the Petitioner had to walk to the word processing center, where obstructions and uneven steps in the area of the unit's office made Petitioner's walking more difficult. This caused further delay. The practice of assigning short suspense projects made the absence of adequate secretarial support worse. The Petitioner paid for secretarial services to prepare various reports for the Respondent paying in one year over $900.00 for secretarial support to meet the demands of her job. The Petitioner made verbal requests for a secretary to her supervisor, Dr. Mitchell, and these requests were denied. The Petitioner made requests to the Superintendent and other members of the School Board Staff, and caused a letter to be written by her physician to the Board explaining the need for secretarial assistance as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. Although the Respondent denies that Petitioner made a request for a secretary as a reasonable accommodation for her disability, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, a memorandum to William Wolley from the Petitioner dated May 4, 1989, which specifically addressed other issues references the aforementioned physician's letter as follows: There is also a letter from a physician earlier relative to that issue in requesting some reasonable accommodation in terms of secretarial assistance that was an attempt to get my Secretary III reinstated . . . [.] The Respondent never assigned a secretary to assist the Petitioner in doing her work although the timeliness of the Petitioner's work was the primary complaint regarding the Petitioner. The school board's yearly payroll was in excess of $110 million. The salary for a secretary varied between $15,000 and $20,000 a year. At the time of Petitioner's employment, the Petitioner walked without the use of a walker although she walked slowly and with some difficulty. The Petitioner wanted to postpone using a walker to assist her in walking because use of a walker causes certain muscles to become dysfunctional and atrophied. Although the Petitioner had a walker in her office restroom and in her car, she avoided use of a walker wherever possible because, as stated above, they can cause the muscles to become dysfunctional, and because they can cause the individual to trip by catching on the uneven surfaces. In late spring or summer of 1988, Dr. Mitchell, the Petitioner's supervisor, told the Petitioner that she wanted the Petitioner to use a walker around the office complex. Dr. Mitchell made the Petitioner's use of a walker a condition of continued employment after Petitioner fell outside the Board's offices when she tripped over an uneven joint in the sidewalk and landed on a piece of broken curbing. A coworker, who is an R.N., was aware of how Petitioner felt about being asked to use a walker and explained to Dr. Mitchell that victims of cerebral palsy strive to maintain the maximum independence and postpone the use of such devices. Dr. Mitchell advised the coworker that if Petitioner wanted to work for the Respondent that she would have to use the walker. The Petitioner felt that Dr. Mitchell's demand was unwarranted, improper, not in her best interest, and refused to use a walker in the absence of a physician's recommendation. The Respondent never referred Petitioner to a physician for evaluation. Subsequent to Dr. Mitchell's demands that the Petitioner use a walker and Petitioner's refusal, Dr. Mitchell made derogatory comments to staff about how slow Petitioner walked. At this time, the professional relationship between Dr. Mitchell and the Petitioner became strained. Dr. Mitchell arranged to have a study done in early 1988 by Case Management Services Inc. Dr. Mitchell requested that Dr. Mason participate in this study which was presented to Dr. Mason as an assessment of the work environment of the board offices; however, the report prepared by the consultant appears to address not the work area, but Dr. Mason personally. The purpose of this report was to support Dr. Mitchell's demand that Dr. Mason use a walker. Notwithstanding the findings by the consultant that there were architectural and facilities maintenance problems which posed a danger to the handicapped, the consultant's first recommendation primarily addressed Dr. Mason's use of a quad-cane (walker). The second recommendation, "occupational therapy evaluation to determine means for enhanced functioning among campus architectural problems," appears to be limited to the Petitioner. In the spring of 1989, Dr. Mitchell gave Petitioner her first unsatisfactory annual performance evaluation. In addition, Dr. Mitchell only extended Dr. Mason's service contract for three months beyond the existing contract and denied Dr. Mason an increase in salary. Dr. Mason appealed Dr. Mitchell's evaluation and Dr. Mitchell reevaluated Dr. Mason's performance as satisfactory. Dr. Mitchell told Dr. Mason that this was the last time she would amend her evaluation of Petitioner pursuant to an appeal. Although not readily apparent from the file, Dr. Mason's employment contract was extended for an entire year and pursuant to that contract she was evaluated again in June of 1990. At that time, Dr. Mitchell evaluated Dr. Mason as unsatisfactory and extended her contract for only three months. During the year 1989-90, Dr. Mitchell documented every instance in which Dr. Mason appears to have departed from school board procedure or failed in any way to meet Dr. Mitchell's expectations. Dr. Mitchell contacted other supervisors of other activities within the school system and requested that they provide her with any information related to the failure of DSU to meet their expectations. See the memorandum of Dr. Mitchell to Beverly Blanton dated June 19, 1989. Dr. Mitchell required Dr. Mason to perform additional work unrelating to any specific program or project, and announced her intention to attend Dr. Mason's staff meetings, to hold weekly meetings to review Dr. Mason's logs and summaries of activities, and to work with Dr. Mason on staff development. (See memorandum Dr. Mitchell to Dr. Mason dated April 10, 1989, subject: Suggestions for improvement in evaluation.) These requirements, placed upon Dr. Mason under the guise of improving her performance, formed the basis for additional criticism of Dr. Mason while at the same time taking up more of her time and undercutting Dr. Mason's authority with her subordinates. Dr. Mitchell also requested access to Dr. Mason's medical records, a request she did not make of any other employee. Dr. Mitchell demonstrated an amazing lack of tact with Dr. Mason. Dr. Mitchell advised Dr. Mason on one occasion when Dr. Mason was hospitalized for burns suffered in an accident while on school business that Dr. Mason had picked an extremely bad time to be injured, and when Dr. Mason was recuperating at home from a severe fall, Dr. Mitchell threatened to bring a television crew to Dr. Mason's house for an interview if Dr. Mason could not come to work. One of the major complaints against Petitioner by Dr. Mitchell was the quality of the reports provided by Dr. Mason's unit to Ray King. A complete file of these reports was provided to Dr. Mitchell by Mr. King's staff as a result of a memorandum from Dr. Mitchell. (See Tab 6, Respondent's Exhibit 3.) The first of these 103 reports is dated May 18, 1988 and the last of these dated December 15, 1989. There were 97 reports returned from Mr. Ray's to Dr. Mason's section between 5-18-88 and 4-20-89. There were six reports returned from Mr. Ray's section after 4-20-89. Contrary to the assertions made by Respondent, the number of reports kicked back by Mr. King during the period following Dr. Mason's initial unsatisfactory evaluation were significantly reduced. The Respondent attempted to justify its denial of a secretary as a reasonable accommodation to Dr. Mason by stating that it was having fiscal problems, and by providing Dr. Mitchell with a computer. Because of Dr. Mason's handicap, she is unable to utilize a computer to prepare her own work. Further, notwithstanding Dr. Mason's inability to use a computer, Dr. Mitchell required her to be conversant in the operation of a computer so she could utilize the computerized data base. Contrary to the Respondent's assertion that Dr. Mason was only required to be knowledgeable about the computer's capabilities, Dr. Mitchell required Dr. Mason to demonstrate use of the computer to her secretary, and was harshly critical of Dr. Mason's inability to do so. Although additional memoranda purportedly documenting additional failings on the part of Dr. Mason and the DSU were introduced, Dr. Mason's explanations are adequate, and these secondary reasons for the adverse personnel action are not meritorious. Because of budgetary constraints in 1990, Dr. Mason's requests for authorization to fly to St. Petersburg to make a presentation at an educational conference was denied. Dr. Mason was told to drive to the conference or not to attend because attendance at the conference was not a part of her normal duties and responsibilities. Presentations at such conferences are considered professionally beneficial both to the individual and to the board. However, Dr. Mason admitted that she had not requested air travel as reasonable accommodation due to her handicap which makes long trips by car very painful and debilitating. On September 22, 1990, the Petitioner received a memorandum from Dr. Mitchell that her contract would not be renewed, and that Petitioner should leave all records in her office.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: The Respondent reinstate the Petitioner to a position comparable to the position from which she was terminated (or in which the Respondent denied the Petitioner employment), The Respondent pay the Petitioner backpay, to include insurance and retirement benefits less $25,241, in accordance with this order, The Respondent pay the Petitioner's reasonable attorney fees and costs, and The Respondent be enjoined from further discrimination against the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-6043 Proposed findings of both parties were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Findings: Para 1-9 Adopted. Para 10 Irrelevant. Para 11-14 (1st sentence) Adopted. Para 14 (2d sentence) Contrary to best evidence. Para 15,16 Adopted. Para 17 Irrelevant. Para 18-42 Adopted. Para 43 Subsumed in 44. Para 44-45 Irrelevant. Para 49-54 Adopted. Para 55 Irrelevant. Para 56-80,82 Adopted or Subsumed. Para 81 Irrelevant. Para 83-92 Irrelevant. Para 93-99 Adopted. Para 100-118 Adopted. Respondent's Findings: Para 1-3 Adopted. Para 4-5 Irrelevant. Para 6 Contrary to best evidence. Para 7-11 Irrelevant. Para 12-13 Contrary to best evidence. Para 14 Irrelevant. Para 15 Contrary to best evidence. Para 16-17 Irrelevant. Para 18,19 Contrary to best evidence. Para 20, 21 The letter was not considered. Para 22-24 Contrary to best evidence. Para 25-27 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn Hathaway, Esquire 924 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Leslie Holland, Esquire Suite 800 2800 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33167 Deborah J. Stephens, Esquire Graham C. Carothers, Esquire 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Merrick, Superintendent Leon County School Board 2757 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304-2907 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent, Raul A. Correa, M.D. (Dr. Correa), failed to provide workers' compensation coverage, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing section 440.107, Florida Statutes (2013). That section mandates, in relevant part, that employers in Florida secure workers’ compensation insurance coverage for their employees. § 440.107(3), Fla. Stat. At all times relevant, Dr. Correa was a Florida small business engaged in the practice of medicine, with his principal office located at 2505 Manatee Avenue West, Bradenton, Florida. Dr. Correa is not incorporated. On February 12, 2014, Ms. Green conducted an on-site workers’ compensation compliance investigation (compliance investigation) of Dr. Correa’s office. After identifying herself to the receptionist, Ms. Green met Dr. Correa and explained the reason for her presence, a compliance investigation. Dr. Correa telephoned his wife who handles his office management from their residence. Mrs. Correa immediately faxed a copy of the liability insurance policy to the office. However, that liability policy did not include workers’ compensation coverage. After a telephonic consultation with her supervisor, Ms. Green served a Request for Production of Business Records (Request) on Dr. Correa at 11:50 a.m. on February 12, 2014. This Request encompassed records from October 1, 2013, through February 12, 2014, for all of Dr. Correa’s payroll documents, account documents, disbursements, and workers’ compensation coverage policies. Ms. Green consulted the Department’s Coverage and Compliance Automated System (CCAS) database to determine whether Dr. Correa had secured workers’ compensation coverage or an exemption from the requirements for coverage for his employees. CCAS is a database Ms. Green consults during the course of her investigations. Ms. Green determined from CCAS that Dr. Correa did not have any current workers’ compensation coverage for his employees and he did not have an exemption from such coverage from the Department. The records reflected that Dr. Correa’s last active workers’ compensation coverage was in 2004. Dr. Correa obtained workers’ compensation coverage on February 20, 2014. Approximately one month later, Ms. Green served a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment Calculation on Dr. Correa. Dr. Correa produced the requested records. These records were given to Lynne Murcia, one of the Department’s penalty auditors, to calculate the penalty. Ms. Murcia determined that the appropriate classification code for Dr. Correa’s employees was 8832, which incorporates physicians and clerical workers. This code was derived from the Scopes Manual, which lists all of the various jobs that may be performed in the context of workers’ compensation. The manual is produced by the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc., the nation’s most authoritative data collecting and disseminating organization for workers’ compensation. Dr. Correa listed seven employees on the Florida Department of Revenue Unemployment Compensation Tax (UCT-6) form for the time period of the non-compliance. The UCT-6 form lists those employees who are subject to Florida’s Unemployment Compensation Law. Ms. Murcia reasonably relied upon the UCT-6 filings for the relevant time period to calculate Dr. Correa’s gross payroll in Florida. Using Dr. Correa’s payroll chart, the UCT reports, and the classification codes for each employee, Ms. Murcia calculated the penalty assessment for the three-year penalty period preceding the investigation. This three-year period is the allocated time for reviewing coverage for those who do not have the appropriate workers’ compensation coverage. On April 9, 2014, Ms. Murcia determined the penalty to be $4,287.12. However, upon receipt of additional information regarding a former employee of Dr. Correa, an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment of $3,898.77 was issued on July 28, 2014. Dr. Correa’s position is that his practice is a small “mom and pop” operation. He employs members of his family to run the business side of his practice. His daughter, Antonia, works as Dr. Correa’s “doctor’s assistant.” She works at the various nursing homes that Dr. Correa services. Antonia believed that the nursing homes’ liability insurance would cover her, and she was not subject to workers’ compensation coverage. However, she was, in fact, paid by Dr. Correa. Dr. Correa’s daughter-in-law, Valeria, works from her home computer completing the medical billing for her father-in- law. She has been working in this capacity for approximately 14- 16 years, and it never occurred to her that she needed workers’ compensation coverage. She was paid by Dr. Correa. Dr. Correa’s brother-in-law, Mr. Collado, runs all the errands for the practice. He may go to the bank, take care of car maintenance, buy office supplies or fix things, all in support of Dr. Correa’s practice. Mr. Collado receives regular pay checks from Dr. Correa. Dr. Correa testified that his wife is his office manager and has been since he opened the practice in 1978. Mrs. Correa works from their home, in a small home office. She does all the paper work related to the practice. Dr. Correa firmly believed that he did not require workers’ compensation coverage because some of his employees were “independent contractors” or never worked in his office, but at other locations (individual homes, nursing homes, or just outside the office). Dr. Correa believed his insurance agent who did not think Dr. Correa needed the workers’ compensation coverage. Based upon the testimony and exhibits, the amended penalty assessment in the amount of $3,898.77 is accurate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, issue a final order upholding the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and assessing a penalty in the amount of $3,898.77. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of September, 2014.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Respondent, an insurance agent, has complied with applicable continuing education requirements.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed life insurance and variable annuity insurance agent, holding license number A104253, and has held the license at all times material to this case. The Respondent is required to meet applicable continuing education requirements set forth by statute. Based on the type of license held by the Respondent, he must complete 28 hours of continuing education instruction during each reporting period. The instruction must be related to the type of insurance the Respondent is authorized to sell. During the reporting period from December 1, 1995 through November 30, 1997, the Respondent completed 28 hours of continuing education instruction; however, only 21 hours of the instruction are creditable to life and variable annuity insurance agents for purposes of complying with the continuing education requirement. Because seven of the Respondent’s 28 hours are not related to his licensure status, they are not applicable to his continuing education requirement; accordingly, the Respondent had a deficit of seven hours for the relevant reporting period. One of the courses completed by the Respondent was "LTC Strategies and Laws" (Course ID 30180) on November 25, 1997. Credit for this three-hour course is available only to licensed health insurance agents. The Respondent is not a licensed health insurance agent, and is not entitled to credit for this course. Another of the courses completed by the Respondent was "Senior Citizen Insurance" (Course ID 4301) on November 25, 1997. The credit for this eight-hour course is divided; four hours of credit is applicable to life insurance agents and four hours is applicable to health insurance agents. The Respondent is entitled only to the four hours of credit available to life insurance agents. By Preliminary Notice of Non-Compliance dated June 15, 1999, the Respondent received notice that, according to the Department’s review of the records, he had not completed the continuing education requirement. The Notice included a number of resolution alternatives, ranging from the licensee’s correction of the records by providing additional information, to resolving the matter by payment of a fine and completion of the hours, to a licensee-initiated license termination. The Department sent the Preliminary Notice to all addresses of record on file for the Respondent. The Respondent did not respond to the June 15 Preliminary Notice of Non-Compliance. On August 17, 1997, the Department issued a Final Notice of Non-Compliance, again advising that the continuing education requirement was unmet, again including options for resolving the deficiency, and advising of the right to request a formal administrative hearing. The Department sent the Final Notice by certified mail to the licensee’s permanent address of record. In response to the Final Notice, the Respondent requested a formal administrative hearing. The Respondent also sent additional information to the Department apparently unaware that some of the completed course hours were inapplicable to his licensure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a final order suspending the licensure of Lannie J. Gregory for not less than one month or until Lannie J. Gregory completes seven additional continuing education hours appropriate to his licensure, whichever is later, and imposing a fine of $1,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Lannie J. Gregory 2680 West Lake Road Palm Harbor, Florida 34684-3120 Miguel Oxamendi, Senior Attorney Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Honorable Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
