The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against her and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since November 29, 2001, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. She holds Correctional Certificate Number 2000056. Javeres Kendrick and Willie Kendrick are Respondent's brothers. Respondent has lived in the same residence as her brother Javeres her entire life. Since February of 1999, when they were placed on probation for committing the felony crime of lewd and lascivious assault on a child under 16 years of age, Javeres Kendrick and Willie Kendrick have been under the supervision of the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC). On or about November 27, 2000, Respondent completed and submitted to the Department of Corrections (DOC) a Correctional Officer/Correctional Probation Officer Supplemental Application. At the time, she did not have any training or experience as correctional or probation officer. Question 4 on this employment application asked: Do you have a business or personal relationship with anyone presently incarcerated or under the supervision of the Florida Department of Correction's system? If yes, give name, relationship, and place of incarceration/supervision. Respondent answered this question by checking "No." In doing so, she believed that she was providing accurate information to DOC. Although she was aware that her brothers were on probation, she did not understand them to be "incarcerated or under the supervision of the Florida Department of Correction's system," within the meaning of the question, because they were not in state prison. Furthermore, in her mind, she had a familial, not a "business or personal relationship" with her brothers.3 Respondent was ultimately employed by DOC as a correctional officer and assigned to Broward Correctional Institution (BCI). On September 18, 2003, a team of DOC correctional probation officers (Team), consisting of Raul Fernandez, Sara Bermudez, and Juan D'Elia, accompanied by local law enforcement officers, including David Torres of the Miami-Dade County Police Department, went to the residence of Javeres Kendrick at 4270 Northwest 197th Street, Miami, Florida, to conduct a "pre- planned sex offender compliance check." The purpose of the Team's visit was to ascertain whether Mr. Kendrick was in compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation. When the Team arrived at the residence, Mr. Kendrick was outside washing a vehicle. The Team members exited their vehicles and walked up to Mr. Kendrick. They identified themselves as correctional probation officers and told Mr. Kendrick that they were there to make sure that he was in compliance with the terms and conditions of his probation. To do so, they advised him, they needed to search his bedroom (which they were authorized to do by the court order placing Mr. Kendrick on probation). Mr. Kendrick responded that his bedroom was "a mess" and that he wanted "to go and clean [it] up" before the Team conducted its search. Despite being told that he "couldn't do that," Mr. Kendrick "bolted" away from the Team members and went "inside the house." Officers Fernandez and D'Elia followed Mr. Kendrick to the front door of the residence, where they were met by Respondent, who "intercepted" them and blocked their paths, thereby "prohibit[ing] [them] from entering [the residence] immediately." While standing in their way and interrupting their pursuit of Mr. Kendrick, Respondent, using profanity, yelled at Officers Fernandez and D'Elia in a "hostile and belligerent" manner, expressing her strong displeasure over their presence at the residence. She told them that they "had no right to be there," adding that "every time [they] show[ed] up there [they] always w[ound] up arresting her brother."4 Respondent was asked at least twice to "please move," which she finally did, albeit "in a very slow and deliberate manner." Officer Fernandez instructed Respondent to "take the children out of the residence and to wait outside until [the Team] conducted [its] search." With Respondent out of the way, Officer Fernandez and D'Elia entered the residence. Officer D'Elia spotted Mr. Kendrick "in the second bedroom on the left." Mr. Kendrick had his hand in a chest drawer. While Officer D'Elia "secured" Mr. Kendrick, Officer Fernandez searched the drawer and found "paraphernalia used for the pack[ag]ing of narcotics" and baggies containing what appeared to be cocaine and marijuana. After this discovery was made, Respondent came into the bedroom (contrary to the instructions she had been given) and asked "how much longer [the Team] had left." A conversation between Officer Fernandez and Respondent ensued, during which Officer Fernandez informed Respondent about "the narcotics that were in the drawer." Upon being so informed, Respondent, with the intent to deceive the Team, falsely claimed that the bedroom in which the "narcotics" had been found was not her bother Javeres' bedroom. Rather, she told Officer Fernandez and the other Team members, the bedroom had last been occupied by her uncle, who "had wound up going to jail." As the Team was leading him away from the residence, Mr. Kendrick asked Respondent to "retrieve" for him from "his room" a pair of pants, socks, and tennis shoes that he could wear in jail. Complying with this request, Respondent, followed by Officer Bermudez, went straight to the bedroom in which the "narcotics" had been found (which was Mr. Kendrick's bedroom, contrary to what Respondent had previously claimed) and "retrieve[d]" the items her brother had requested. During her dealings with the Team that day, Respondent revealed that she was a correctional officer at BCI. Upon returning to his office, after having "finished processing Mr. Kendrick and logging in the evidence" seized from Mr. Kendrick's bedroom, Officer Fernandez complained to his supervisor about Respondent's hostile and obstructive conduct during the Team's "compliance check" at Mr. Kendrick's residence earlier that day. Inasmuch as Respondent was a DOC employee, Officer Fernandez's supervisor referred the matter for an internal affairs investigation pursuant to DOC policy. Scott Thomas, a senior prison inspector with DOC, conducted the investigation. As part of his investigation, Inspector Thomas reviewed the contents of Respondent's DOC personnel file (including the employment application she had submitted on November 27, 2000) and obtained sworn affidavits from Officers Fernandez, Bermudez, and D'Elia. In addition, on November 12, 2003, he interviewed Respondent under oath. During the interview, among other things, Respondent repeated the falsehood that the bedroom in which the "narcotics" had been found during the September 18, 2003, "compliance check" was not her brother Javeres' bedroom. In addition, she falsely denied ever having used "profanity towards the [Team] members" conducting the "compliance check" and further falsely denied that that the Team members, during the September 18, 2003, "compliance check," ever told her to "wait outside the house." Respondent made these statements to Inspector Thomas knowing that they were not true. Inspector Thomas determined from his investigation that Respondent had "provided untruthful information" on her November 27, 2000, employment application and that she had engaged in "conduct unbecoming" a DOC employee during the September 18, 2003, "compliance check" at her residence. Based on the findings of Inspector Thomas' investigation, Respondent's employment with DOC was terminated.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of Allegation Two and Three and, based on these findings of guilt, revoke her certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 2004.
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a 47-year old resident of Hollywood, Florida. He is married and has a five-year old step-daughter. His wife's father is the minister of the First Methodist Church in Hollywood. Petitioner is an active member of his father-in-law's church. In recent years, he has volunteered a significant amount of his time to perform tasks on behalf of the church. Petitioner is now, and has been since June of 1997, employed as a salesperson by Rex Yacht Sales (Rex) in Fort Lauderdale. As a salesperson for Rex, he sells new boats and he also sells used boats that are 32 feet or less in length.3 Approximately, 75 percent of the sales he makes are of used boats. Petitioner specializes in the sale of sailboats. He possesses a considerable amount of knowledge concerning sailboats as a result of the years (since he was a young child) that he has devoted to sailing. Petitioner owned, lived aboard, and captained a sailboat named the "Wave Dancer" from 1975 until the late 1980's. He acquired the "Wave Dancer" in return for his participation in an illicit drug smuggling operation. In 1975, when he was still living in his hometown of Port Washington, New York, Petitioner was approached by a childhood friend, Dan Locastro. Locastro advised Petitioner that he (Locastro) and his associates wanted to buy a sailboat to use to transport marijuana from St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands to the New England coast. Locastro promised Petitioner that, if Petitioner were able locate a sailboat for them to purchase and if he thereafter successfully captained the newly purchased sailboat on its journey to and from the Virgin Islands, Petitioner could keep the sailboat. Approximately a month later, Petitioner notified Locastro that he had located a sailboat for Locastro and his associates. The sailboat was the "Wave Dancer." Locastro and his associates subsequently purchased the "Wave Dancer." They purchased the boat in the name of Richard Harrison. Following the purchase of the "Wave Dancer," Petitioner, accompanied by Locastro, sailed the boat to an island near St. Thomas. There, 500 pounds of marijuana were loaded onto the "Wave Dancer." Petitioner then sailed the boat to the New England coast, where he delivered the marijuana. Petitioner participated in this illicit smuggling operation because he wanted his own sailboat. He was neither arrested, nor charged, for having participated in this operation. As promised, Petitioner was allowed by Locastro and his associates to keep the "Wave Dancer" after the conclusion of operation. The boat was subsequently titled in Petitioner's name. For approximately 12 or 13 years, Petitioner (who was then single) lived in the Caribbean aboard the "Wave Dancer." He earned a living by taking tourists (usually one couple at a time) out in the water on his boat. In the late 1980's, Petitioner decided to return to the United States to live with and care for his parents, who, because of their advanced age, required his assistance. Before moving back to the United States, Petitioner put the "Wave Runner" up for sale. He was unsuccessful in his efforts to sell the boat. He discussed with a friend of his, Ken Fish, the possibility of Fish purchasing the boat for $50,000.00, but no sale was consummated. Petitioner was still the owner the "Wave Runner" when he flew to the United States and moved in with his parents (in their home). He left the "Wave Runner" behind in the Virgin Islands in the care of his friend Fish. Approximately nine months after he left the Virgin Islands, Petitioner received a telephone call from Fish, who indicated that he was having financial difficulty and that he wanted to use the "Wave Runner" in a "marijuana scheme." Approximately six months later, Fish again telephoned Petitioner. This time he told Petitioner that he wanted "to do a cocaine smuggling venture with [the "Wave Runner]." At first, Petitioner told Fish that he (Fish) was "out of his mind." Later during the conversation, however, Petitioner relented and agreed to allow Fish to use the "Wave Runner" in the proposed "cocaine smuggling venture." Petitioner gave his permission without receiving any promise from Fish that he (Petitioner) would receive anything in return. The "cocaine smuggling venture" was unsuccessful. The "Wave Runner" was seized by authorities in Martinique. In the spring of 1991, in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR- HIGHSMITH, Petitioner was criminally charged by the United States government for his role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. Petitioner's role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" was limited to permitting Fish to use the "Wave Runner" to transport cocaine into the United States. After his arrest in May of 1991, Petitioner agreed to, and he subsequently did, cooperate with federal authorities by participating in federal undercover drug enforcement operations under the supervision of federal agents. At times during these operations, he was required to place himself in situations where his personal safety was compromised. In or around January of 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91- 349-CR-HIGHSMITH to one count of conspiracy to import cocaine. On January 30, 1995, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of said crime and, as punishment, placed on probation for five years and fined $17,500.00. Such punishment constituted a substantial downward departure from the range provided in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge explained that he was "constrained to substantially modify the sentence in this case downward" because of the risks Petitioner had taken to assist federal authorities in their drug-fighting efforts. Although under no legal obligation to do so, Petitioner continued to provide similar assistance to federal authorities (at a substantial personal risk) after his sentencing. In September of 1996, Petitioner filed with the Department an application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. Question 13 on the application form read as follows: CRIMINAL HISTORY: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the law of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. Yes No The application form instructed those applicants whose answer to Question 13 was "Yes" to "attach [their] complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or [were] pending." On the application form that he submitted to the Department, Petitioner answered "Yes" to Question 13, but he did not attach the required signed statement. He merely appended to the application form a copy of the judgment entered in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On or about October 1, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioner: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Section of General Regulation is in receipt of your application for a yacht Salesman. A review of your application has disclosed the following deficiencies: You answered Yes to question 13 which asked "Have you been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" The paragraph under question 15 further states "If your answer to question 13, 14, 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." You will need to submit a signed statement of the charges and facts, within twenty-one (21) days to this office before your application can be checked for form. Should you have any questions, please contact me. After receiving the Department's October 1, 1996, letter, Petitioner telephonically requested additional time to respond. By letter dated December 13, 1996, Petitioner's attorney, John J. Lynch, Esquire, responded on Petitioner's behalf to the Department's October 1, 1996, letter. Lynch's letter, which was received by the Department on December 17, 1996, read as follows: I represent the Applicant, Richard E. Parker. In response to concerns raised by Richard Parker's application's disclosure of charges and crimes and the results thereof, please consider the following as part of the application process: The subject matter was limited to involvement in a conspiracy to import controlled substances. Mr. Parker voluntarily entered a guilty plea in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami, Florida, in an action entitled, "United States v. Richard Parker" Criminal No. 91-349-CR- Highsmith. Upon being aware of potential liability, he cooperated fully with the U.S. Government. During a four-year period, he provided extensive assistance to the U.S. Government in ongoing investigations and provided training and resources to special agents. Mr. Parker's participation as a Government agent put him at considerable risk. His case remains under court seal to protect information which may be used by the Government in future criminal prosecutions. I cannot provide a complete transcript of the court proceedings without jeopardizing Mr. Parker's safety. To appreciate Mr. Parker's significant assistance to the U.S. Government, a portion of the Honorable Judge Highsmith's sentencing comments has been enclosed. Pages 11, 12, 14 and 15 of the sentencing memorandum specify the efforts made by Mr. Parker, and recognized by the Court to rectify his prior conduct. (Note: All individuals, other than Mr. Parker, have been redacted to preserve a measure of safety since the matter remains under court seal). In recognition of [his] assistance, Mr. Parker was placed on probation for five years and fined on January 30, 1995. The fine was paid and probation has commenced. I trust this supplemental response answers concerns regarding this unfortunate episode in Mr. Parker's life. As his attorney asserted in the foregoing letter, as of the date of the letter, Petitioner had paid the $17,500.00 fine imposed in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On January 17, 1997, the Department issued its Notice of Intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure. On February 12, 1997, Petitioner requested a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the matter. On August 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH requesting that "his period of probation [be reduced] from a term of 60 months to a term of 32 months thereby terminating his probation on September 30, 1997." In support of his motion, he stated the following: On January 30, 1995, Richard Parker was sentenced by this Court to five years probation for his participation in a cocaine conspiracy. The Court imposed this lenient sentence because of the extraordinary cooperation Richard Parker had rendered (a transcript of the sentencing is attached hereto as Exhibit A). As part of his cooperation Parker had gone to Columbia in a sailboat, at great personal risk and with no protection from law enforcement, and developed a case involving significant arrests, convictions, and seizure of cocaine. Since sentencing Parker has remarried and complied with all terms of probation. Parker had promised the agents and the Court that his cooperation would continue regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. True to his word, following sentencing, at the request of the DEA, Richard Parker traveled alone to Columbia and negotiated the location in the Caribbean Sea for an air drop of 300 kilos of cocaine. Parker then captained a sailboat and traveled to Dominica and Barbados, St. Kitts and the British Virgin Islands with DEA agents on board and participated in the recovery of the 300 kilos of cocaine as it was dropped from a plane in 50 kilogram packages. Parker received no payment for this cooperation. Parker rendered substantial assistance to the Government after sentencing because of his moral commitment to cooperation as a form of restitution, because of his sense of obligation and gratitude, and because he had given his word to the Government and this Court. It is now over 2 1/2 years since Parker was sentenced. Parker has complied fully with all conditions of probation. Parker has committed himself to building a productive law-abiding life. The Count may well recall that Parker's marriage ended during his cooperation and sentence. Parker has recently married again becoming the father of a four-year old in the process. Parker has spent his life working on and sailing boats. Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a license to be a yacht salesman. The issuance of these licenses in Florida is regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR). The DBPR has denied Parker's request for a license citing Parker's conviction as irrefutable proof of moral turpitude as a basis for denial. Parker has petitioned for review and a hearing before an administrative law judge is scheduled for October 14, 1997. Undersigned counsel has been advised that the hearing scheduled for October 14, 1997, will be the final hearing regarding Parker's petition for a license to sell boats in the State of Florida. Regarding this issue, undersigned counsel has become aware of an administrative decision where an application for a license as a yacht and ship salesman was granted by DBPR to an applicant who had been convicted of a drug felony, sentenced to probation and had been terminated from probation. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes v. Orr, Docket No. YS95025 (Final Order No. BPR-95-03991, 7/20/95). It is respectfully submitted that evidence of successful completion of probation by Parker prior to the time of final hearing on October 14, 1997, will either result in the DBPR rescinding their denial of Parker's application or a reversal of DBPR's denial by the administrative law judge. Assistant United States Attorney John Schlessinger has conferred with the United States Probation Officer Anthony Gagliardi regarding this motion and has authorized undersigned counsel to state that the United States has no objection to a reduction of probation from 60 months to 36 months. Richard Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a yacht salesman license so that he can support himself and his family. Richard Parker, through his cooperation, has rebutted any presumption of moral turpitude that attached to his conviction and has affirmatively and courageously demonstrated good moral character; Richard Parker has honored and will continue to honor his pledge to the United States and to this Honorable Court never to break the law again. . . . The Final Order in the Orr case, which was referenced in Petitioner's Motion to Modify Probation, contained the following "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law":
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1997.
The Issue What relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations provide Petitioner to remedy the unlawful employment practice that Respondent admits that it committed by refusing to further consider Petitioner's application for employment as a correctional officer once it learned that Petitioner is an insulin-dependent diabetic?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner's Employment at the South Florida Reception Center Petitioner previously worked full-time as a Correctional Officer I at the State of Florida Department of Corrections' (DOC's) South Florida Reception Center, a maximum security facility that houses convicted felons. Petitioner and his coworkers at times were asked to work double shifts. On several occasions, Petitioner was threatened with disciplinary action when he refused to work a second shift immediately following the completion of his regularly assigned shift. Prior to the expiration of his probationary period, Petitioner was advised that he was going to be fired. Petitioner requested, and was granted permission by the Superintendent of the facility, the opportunity to resign in lieu of termination. Petitioner resigned his position effective June 27, 1989. Petitioner's Application for Employment with Respondent In October of 1988, while still employed by DOC, Petitioner applied for a Correctional Officer I position with Respondent. Respondent's official job description for the position describes the nature of the work performed by Correctional Officer I's as follows: This is routine security work in maintaining order and discipline among prisoners held in County correctional facilities. Employees in this class are responsible for receiving and controlling prisoners, preventing escapes and enforcing departmental rules and regulations on an assigned shift at a County correctional facility. Duties include maintaining various records on prisoners, supervising work details, transporting prisoners to a variety of medical or correctional institutions, and ensuring the proper discharge of prisoners. Work occasionally involves an element of personal danger during emergencies and in controlling potentially violent prisoners. Duties are performed in accordance with established departmental regulations and security procedures. Supervision is received from a superior officer who reviews work for compliance with established rules and regulations. These duties are similar to those performed by correctional officers who work at the South Florida Reception Center. There was a delay in the processing of Petitioner's application for employment. On April 12, 1990, Iliana O. Garcia, a Personnel Specialist 2 with Respondent, sent Petitioner a letter, the body of which read as follows: We wish to take this opportunity to thank you for placing your application for the position of Correctional Officer 1 with our Department. The time and effort you devoted to your pursuit of this position is sincerely appreciated, however, at the present time, we regret that we are unable to consider your application further. Many exceptional candidates are seeking limited number of positions and this creates a very competitive situation. Please be assured that our decision in your case was based on very careful consideration of your application and qualifications in direct comparison with all others seeking the position and was not a judgment arrived at lightly. Thank you again for your demonstrated interest in our Department, and we wish you success in your endeavors. On May 9, 1990, Louvenia Lee, the Commander of Respondent's Human Resources Bureau, sent Respondent a follow-up letter explaining in greater detail why Respondent was no longer being considered for the position for which he had applied: On February 26, 1990 you were scheduled for a physical examination at Mt. Sinai Medical Center. This exam was another step in the hiring process for a Correctional Officer. However, on the basis of the physical exam, the results were disqualifying. Therefore, your application with the Corrections and Rehabilitation Department was discontinued. The disqualifying results are in accordance with the physical standards set forth in the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Chapter IX-1. These standards are utilized by other law enforcement agencies in Metropolitan Dade County. Thank you again for your demonstrated interest in our Department and we wish you success in your endeavors. If I can be of further assistance, please contact me at 547-7052. The results of the physical examination that Petitioner had taken were "disqualifying" because they had revealed that Petitioner was an insulin- dependent diabetic. Lost Earnings Had Petitioner been selected to fill the position for which he had applied, he would have had to have first undergone four months of academy training, starting in late July or early August of 1990, before assuming the duties of a Correctional Officer I. He would have received a stipend of $400 for each month that he was in training. Had Petitioner successfully completed his academy training, he would have been placed on the payroll as a Correctional Officer I on December 3, 1990. Had Petitioner remained on the payroll as a Correctional Officer I from December 3, 1990, to January 3, 1993, 3/ he would have earned a total of $54,142.22 ($47,367.16 for the pay periods reflected on Petitioner's Exhibit 7; $804.83 for the two bonus payments reflected on Petitioner's Exhibit 7; $932.86 for the January 21, 1991, through February 3, 1993, pay period; $972.45 for the March 30, 1992, through April 12, 1992, pay period; and $4,064.92 for the four pay periods immediately following the October 26, 1992, through November 8, 1992, pay period). Mitigation At the time he learned that he was no longer being considered by Respondent as a candidate to fill the Correctional Officer I position for which he had applied, Petitioner had applications for employment pending with two other prospective employers, the City of Hollywood and the Metro Dade Police Department. Both applications were for law enforcement officer positions. In August or September of 1990, Petitioner was informed that neither the City of Hollywood nor the Metro Dade Police Department would be offering him a position. The City of Hollywood advised him that the position for hich he had applied had been filled by another of the over 100 applicants for the position. The Metro Dade Police Department told Petitioner that it could not hire him because he was an insulin-dependent diabetic. Some time shortly after receiving his rejection notice from Respondent, Petitioner applied for a correctional officer position with the Broward Sheriff's Office. He did not get the position. The explanation that he was given was that he had failed the polygraph test he had taken. At the outset of the 1990-1991 school year Petitioner began working as a substitute teacher for the Dade County School Board. He continued working as a substitute teacher during the remainder of the 1990-1991 school year, as well as the following school year. The work was sporadic. Frequently, he would not know until the morning of his teaching assignment that he had the opportunity to substitute teach that day. 25. In 1990, 1991 and 1992, Petitioner earned $694.00, $2,212.50 and $2,360.00, respectively, working as a substitute teacher for the Dade County School Board. In 1992, Petitioner also worked for Publix Super Markets, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Publix). His last day of work for Publix was August 14, 1992. Petitioner earned $2,063.78 working for Publix in 1992. From the date he was informed that Respondent had rejected him for employment until January 3, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as the "back pay period"), Petitioner was not otherwise gainfully employed, nor did he, with the exception noted above, seek other gainful employment. During the back pay period, there were various advertised openings for correctional officers at the South Florida Reception Center (hereinafter referred to as the "Center"). These positions offered considerably less pay than Petitioner would have received had be been hired by Respondent. Furthermore, the working conditions at the Center were far inferior to those he would have experienced working for Respondent as Correctional Officer I. Petitioner did not apply for any of these advertised positions because he reasonably believed that to do so would be an exercise in futility given that he had been constructively discharged in June of 1989, from a similar position at the Center. Attorney's Fees and Costs On March 25, 1992, after the Executive Director of the Commission had issued a Notice of Determination: Cause and conciliation efforts had failed, Petitioner executed the following written agreement to retain the law firm of Simon, Schindler and Sandberg, P.A., to represent him in the instant matter: I, the undersigned, do hereby retain and employ the law firm of: SIMON, SCHINDLER & SANDBERG, P.A. 1492 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 as my attorneys to represent me, DONALD C. FERRARO, in the petition now pending before the Florida Commission on Human Relations. I fully understand that the fee is based upon an hourly rate of $250.00, which I am obligating myself to pay. I also agree to pay my said attorneys the sum of $100.00 for out-of-pocket expenses. You are authorized to pay or incur liability for all expenses . . . If bills are not paid when due, or a mutually agreeable payment schedule is not made and adhered to, I agree that my attorneys may withdraw as my counsel in any proceeding in which they represent me. Also I agree to bear the cost of collection, including a reasonable attorney's fees, and all other costs. I understand that I will be billed periodically both as to expenses and attorney's fees, and fully agree to pay said bill promptly upon receipt of same. In addition to any other lien contemplated hereunder, we are given a lien on the claim or cause of action, on the sum recovered by way of settlement, and on any judgment that may be recovered, for fees as well as any fund we may have advanced on your behalf for costs in connection with the cause of action. You agree that we have all general, possessory, or retaining liens, and all special or charging liens, known to the common law. If we use the services of an attorney to enforce the terms of this agreement, you agree to pay, in addition to all other sums due us, a reasonable attorney's fee for said enforcement. I further agree that you shall have the right to withdraw from my case: (a) If I do not make the required payments pursuant to this agreement; (b) if I have misrepresented or failed to disclose material facts to you; or (c) if I fail to follow your advice. In any of the foregoing events, I agree to execute any such documents permitting you to withdraw. The Attorney is an officer of the court and is bound by the rules regulating the Florida Bar. The client acknowledges and understands that while an attorney accepts this employment and promises to render professional legal services to the best of his ability during the continuation of this employment, that the attorney makes no warranties, representations or guarantees regarding the favorable outcome, result or successful termination of the representation and that this Retainer Agreement is not "contingent" thereon. The client agrees to fully cooperate with the attorney; to do nothing which would compromise the attorney's professional ethics; and not to request or require the attorney to do anything in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. If the client has misrepresented or failed to disclose any material facts, refuses to follow the attorney's advice, or fails to be available as necessary for preparation, conferences, depositions, hearings or other court proceedings, the attorney may withdraw from representation with leave of court. I acknowledge that you have made no representations or guarantees concerning the outcome of this case. I agree to the above terms and conditions of this Retainer Agreement and further acknowledge that I have received a copy thereof. Pursuant to this retainer agreement, the law firm of Simon, Schindler and Sandberg, P.A., (hereinafter referred to as the "Firm") provided Petitioner with legal representation in this matter. Roger J. Schindler, Esquire, a name partner in the Firm, was the most senior of the Firm's attorneys who worked on Petitioner's case. Schindler is a Florida-licensed attorney who has been practicing law in this state since the spring of 1970. He has litigated numerous civil rights actions. Schindler's hourly fee is $250.00. Through November 11, 1992, Schindler had reasonably spent 49.00 hours performing various tasks in connection with the instant case for which Petitioner has been billed $12,200.00 based upon a reasonable hourly fee of $250.00. Through November 11, 1992, Joe Constant, a Florida-licensed attorney and one of the Firm's associates, had reasonably spent 16.20 hours performing various tasks in connection with the instant case for which Petitioner has been billed $2,673.00 based upon a reasonable hourly fee of $165.00. Through November 11, 1992, another of the Firm's associate attorneys had reasonably spent one hour working on legal research done in connection with the instant case for which Petitioner has been billed $165.00 based upon a reasonable hourly fee of $165.00. Through November 11, 1992, a law clerk working for the Firm had reasonably spent 11.80 hours performing research-related tasks in connection with the instant case for which Petitioner has been billed $885.00 based upon a reasonable hourly fee of $75.00. The Firm has also billed Petitioner a total of $368.22 for costs reasonably incurred through November 11, 1992, in connection with the instant case. Through November 11, 1992, the Firm had billed Petitioner a total of $16,391.22 ($15,923.00 for attorney's fees and $368.22 for costs), but had not received any payments from Petitioner, notwithstanding that, under the retainer agreement, he was responsible to pay the Firm this entire amount regardless of the outcome of the instant case.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in Petitioner's Petition for Relief, (2) prohibiting the practice, (3) awarding Petitioner back pay in the amount of $55,742.22, together with prejudgment interest thereon at the statutory rate of 12% per annum, (4) awarding Petitioner reasonable prehearing attorney's fees and litigation costs in the amount of $16,391.22 ($15,923.00 for fees and $368.22 for costs), and (5) awarding Petitioner reasonable attorney's fees and litigation costs for work performed, and costs incurred, by the Firm in connection with this case after November 11, 1992, in an amount to be determined by agreement of the parties or, in the absence of such agreement, by subsequent Commission order. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 26th day of February, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1993.
Conclusions THIS MATTER came before the Construction Industry Licensing Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 420.57(2), Florida Statutes, on April 10, 2008, in Indialantic, Florida, for consideration of the Administrative Complaint (attached hereto as Exhibit A), in the above styled case. Petitioner has filed a Motion for Final Order. Petitioner was represented by Jeff Kelly, Esquire. Respondent was present. Upon consideration, the Board FINDS: 1. The Petitioner’s Motion is granted. 2. The material facts are not in dispute. 3. The allegations of fact set forth in the Administrative Complaint are approved, adopted, and incorporated herein by reference as the Board's Findings of Fact. 4. The conclusions of law alleged and set forth in the Administrative Complaint are approved, adopted, and incorporated herein by reference as the conclusions of law of (A) Respondent is required to appear before the Probation Committee of the Board at such times as directed by the Board Office, approximately every six (6) months. Respondent's first probationary appearance requires a full day attendance at the Board meeting. In connection with each probation appearance, Respondent shall answer questions under oath. In addition, Respondent shall provide such other information or documentation as is requested by either the Petitioner, Department, the Board or the Probation Committee. Respondent shall forward said documentation to the Board:at least - 30 days in advance of the probation appearance or as otherwise directed. for 4 -(B) The burden shall be solely upon’ Respondent to remember the requirement for - said appearance and to take the necessary steps in advance of said appearance to contact the Board office and ascertain the specific time, date, and place of said appearance. Respondent shall not rely on notice of said appearance from the Board or the Department. (C) Should Respondent violate any condition of the probation, it shall be considered a violation of Section 489.129(1)(i), Florida Statutes, and shall result in further disciplinary action by the Board. (D) Should the Respondent fail to make a satisfactory appearance as determined by the Board, the term of the probationary period shall automatically be extended by six (6) months. If there occurs a second such failure then the term of probationary period will be extended an additional year. Should the Board determine a third failure of the Respondent to make a satisfactory appearance, the stay of suspension of the Respondent's license to practice contracting shall be lifted and the license shall remain in suspended status unless and until a further stay is granted by the Board. (E) Should Respondent's license to practice contracting be suspended or otherwise placed on inactive status, the probation period shall be tolled during the period of the suspension or inactivity and shall resume running at the time the suspension is stayed or Respondent reactivates the license and Respondent shall serve the time remaining on the term of probation. . (F) To ensure successful completion of probation, Respondent's license to practice contracting shall be suspended for the period of probation, with the suspension stayed for the period of:probation. ‘The time-of the suspension and ‘the stay shall run concurrently” ~~ --with the period of probation. If Respondent-successfully completes probation, the’ »- - suspension shall terminate.’ If Respondent fails to comply with the requirements set forth in the Final Order imposed in this ‘case, or fails to make satisfactory appearances as determined by the Board, the stay shall be lifted. Once the stay is lifted, the license shall remain in suspended status unless and until a further stay is granted by the Board. 5. In addition, Respondent shall complete seven (7) additional credit hours of continuing education which must be related specifically to Chapter 489 and related rules, within this renewal period. The seven (7) hours ordered shail be in addition to the continuing education required by Rule 61G4-18.001, F.A.C. Proof of the seven (7) additional hours must be supplied directly to Executive Director of the Construction Industry Licensing Board at 1940 N. Monroe Street MS# N14, Tallahassee, FL 32399-1039. Failure to provide such proof direct to the Executive Director will result in a violation of this Order. 6. Achangein licensure status, including the suspension, revocation, voluntary relinquishment, or involuntary relinquishment of license does not relieve Respondent of the obligation to pay any fines, costs, interest or restitution imposed in this Order. This Final Order shall become effective upon filing with the Clerk of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation. DONE AND ORDERED this O; day of oe , 2008. RAYMOND R. HOLLOWAY, Chair Construction Industry Licensing Board
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at Tomoka Correctional Institution, Daytona Beach, Florida. He is presently serving a sentence of 60 years and has a presumptive parole release date of 180 months. Petitioner specifically challenges the validity of the matrix time range contained in Rule 23-21.09(5), Florida Administrative Code. That provision contains a matrix which sets the time ranges for presumptive parole release dates. A copy of that matrix is attached to this order as Appendix I. The most current matrix was last amended effective October 1, 1982. The initial or first matrix was developed and became effective in 1979 in response to legislation adopted in 1978 which required the Parole and Probation Commission (hereafter referred to as Commission) to develop and implement objective parole guidelines. Prior to this time, the granting or denying of parole had been a subjective decision by the commissioners and required a majority vote of the commissioners. In originally developing the matrix, the Commission used the Thurston Scaling Method in ranking various criminal offenses from least to most serious offense. This method involved providing each of the Commissioners with 40 index cards on which the various criminal offenses were written. Each commissioner then ranked the various criminal offenses in order of seriousness. The Board then reviewed the results and arrived at a consensus on the ranking of the various crimes. The Thurston scaling methodology is an accepted scientific methodology for ranking different crimes by level of seriousness or severity. This methodology was recommended to the Commission by three consultants in the field of parole. These same three experts, Peter Hoffman, Director of Research for the U.S. Parole Commission, Dale Parent, Director of the Sentencing Guidelines Commission for the State of Minnesota, and Betty Taylor, a parole commissioner for the State of Oregon, advised and consulted with the board in developing the objective parole guidelines. After the initial matrix was adopted as a Commission rule, it was reviewed on an annual basis as required by statute. Since 1979, some changes in the matrix have been adopted by the Commission based upon their annual review. Each change was adopted as a rule change and the procedures for adopting or amending administrative rules were followed. The procedure for adopting the rule changes generally took at least 90 days. The present matrix contains six categories of crimes broken down by degrees. Each inmate is assigned a salient-factor score and by using this score with the offense for which the person was sentenced a time range for the Presumptive parole release date for that individual is obtained from the matrix. The Commission sets the presumptive parole release date within that range unless other factors warrant going outside that range by extending or reducing the number of months to the presumptive parole release date. The inmate's presumptive parole release date may also be extended for unsatisfactory institutional behavior while incarcerated. The Commission, in granting or denying parole, considers the total case package including those specific reasons which may serve as a basis for going above or below the matrix time range. When the Commission goes outside the matrix time range it must state its reason for doing so. Prior to March 1983, the forms of the Commission's actions were filed in a central storage area. In March 1983, the mechanism became available for feeding this information into the computer. Using the computer and data which is maintained by the Department of Corrections, the Commission now generates quarterly reports. These reports provide a statistical analysis which indicates whether the guidelines are being following by the Commission. This same data also provides a possible indicator for needed changes in the guidelines. All revisions to the guidelines must now be made based upon such statistical analysis. Sentencing guidelines and objective parole guidelines are separate. The salient-factor scores for the sentencing guidelines and objective parole guidelines are similar, but not the same. Sentencing involves a separate branch of government, a separate function, separate measurements, and separate criteria. Sentencing can be done only by a court of law and is accomplished by court order. Sentencing sets the limit of the incarceration period. The parole function is a function of the executive branch and cannot be ordered by the Commission. An offer of parole is tendered or offered by the Commission and the inmate may accept or reject the offer and its condition. If the inmate accepts an offer of parole, the form used is a contract form which must be signed and agreed to by the inmate. Parole results in release under supervision whereas completion of the sentence results in full release without conditions or supervision. Section 947.165(2), Florida Statutes, was amended by the 1982 legislature. See Session Law 82-171. Prior to this amendment, changes made in the objective parole guidelines were to be based upon the "experience" of the commission. The amended section provides that the Commission shall review the guidelines at least once each year and make any revisions considered necessary by virtue of statistical analysis of Commission actions. The initial report of the data generated by this statistical analysis was to be due January 30, 1983. See Florida Statute 947.13(3)(1982). The Commission and its staff began work immediately after the passage of 82-171 to implement the statistical analysis and reporting requirements.
Findings Of Fact 1. The Administrative Law Judge’s Findings of Fact are hereby approved and adopted and incorporated herein by reference. 2. There is clear and convincing evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge’s Findings of Fact.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of failing to maintain good moral character, in violation of Section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent as a correctional probation officer on February 1, 1991, and as a criminal justice training instructor on December 7, 1999. Her respective certificate numbers are 20851 and 205697. Respondent was first employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC) on August 10, 1990. She was employed as a correctional probation officer. As a result of promotions, Respondent became a DOC Correctional Probation Specialist in February 1995, so that she was responsible for, among other things, various administrative duties, such as handling citizens' complaints of employee misconduct and coordinating training events. In April 2001, Respondent filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that DOC forced her to work in a hostile environment. On February 15, 2002, Respondent, alleging the same facts, commenced a legal action against DOC in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 02-60236-CIV. As part of the federal litigation, DOC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing, in part, that Respondent's complaint failed to claim damages. In response, on March 28, 2003, Respondent, representing herself, filed a lengthy affidavit, to which she personally attested. In the affidavit, Respondent swore to the following statement: I requested assistance from management [following the departure of the other Correctional Probation Specialist from Respondent's office and DOC's failure to fill the empty position], but they refused to assign another Specialist to the office to assist me. As a result I had to work an average of five hours per week extra in overtime without pay to properly supervise this caseload to prevent from being reprimanded, suspended or terminated by [DOC]. I was not paid for this time. The evidence is clear that Respondent did not work overtime, with or without pay. The Correctional Probation Supervisor who directly supervised Respondent at the time testified at the hearing. Obviously not hostile to Respondent, the supervisor testified definitively that during the relevant period in the affidavit--March 2, 2001 through May 9, 2002--she was intimately familiar with Respondent's work, including her itinerary and travel logs. The supervisor testified that Respondent incurred no overtime whatsoever during this period, and this testimony is credited in its entirety. Respondent's sworn statement in the affidavit is false and was false at the time that Respondent made it. Respondent's sole purpose in making this false statement was to deceive the court and show an element of damages that did not, in fact, exist. DOC terminated Respondent on August 1, 2003. She has not since worked in a job that requires certification from Petitioner.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order suspending Respondent's certificates as a correctional probation officer and criminal justice training instructor for one year retroactive to August 2, 2003; placing these certificates on probation for two years from the date of the final order; and requiring Respondent to attend an ethics course approved by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Joseph S. White Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Faye E. Wright-Simpson
Findings Of Fact On or about January 16, 1981, the Petitioner began regular employment with the Probation and Parole Services, Region IV, office of the Department of Corrections. He was hired as a "Probation and Parole Officer (Trainee)." On or about June 15, 1981, the Department advised Petitioner that he had been dismissed from his position with the Department. The dismissal was effective June 18, 1981. At that time, Petitioner had not yet attained permanent status in the Florida Career Service System. He was serving a probationary period. In the notice of dismissal, it was provided, as follows: This action is taken after careful consideration and discussion with your immediate supervisor concerning the following: The falsification of your employment application when applying for employment in the Miami Circuit Office of Probation and Parole Services. Your actions were in violation of Chapter 22A-4.03(2) of the rules of the Department of Administration of the Career Service System. This action is in accordance with the State of Florida Rules and Regulations of the Career Service System Chapter 22A-7.10(7)(H). Since you have been terminated during your trainee status, Chapter 22A- 7.03(4), Florida Personnel Rules and Regulations would apply. Petitioner thereafter filed his "Petition for Section 120.57(1) Formal Administrative Hearing" with the Department of Corrections. In his employment application, Petitioner stated that he had never been convicted of a felony or first degree misdemeanor. On January 10, 1971, Petitioner was convicted of municipal ordinance violations in the city of Pueblo, Colorado. The violations were misdemeanors. Petitioner was fined $50 for "disturbance," and $75 for "assault and battery." He paid the fine and served one-half day in the city jail. The Department contends that on account of these convictions, Petitioner's statement in his employment application was false.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Corrections dismissing the petition for formal administrative hearing filed by Heriberto Roman Conti. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Sisinio Ortiz Valentin, Esquire Puerto Rico Legal Services Corp. Box 727 Guaynabo, Puerto Rico 00657 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Louie L. Wainwright Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
