Findings Of Fact Respondent, Graystone Fairways Corporation (GFC), is wholly owned by Louis Wingold, a Canadian developer. He is also its president. In January, 1979, GFC entered into a five-year joint venture with Tamway Corporation (Tamway), whose president was Harvey Kaliff. The agreement provided that GFC and Tamway would construct, develop and market a two phase condominium project in Tamarac, Florida known as Fairways of Tamarac III (Fairways or project). Each phase of the project was intended to have thirty units. To date only the first phase of the project has been constructed. Building permits for the second phase have been obtained, but no construction work has commenced. The project was apparently subject to registration requirements with petitioner, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (Division). It is that agency which has initiated the complaint herein, of which two of three counts therein remain pending. Under the foregoing joint venture agreement, GFC generally provided the financing for the project while Tamway provided the site construction and sales of units. The agreement further designated Tamway as the managing partner to conduct the day-to-day business of the joint venture. Among other things, Tamway was authorized to enter into purchase and sale contracts for the sale of individual units in the project. Accordingly, Wingold had no active participation in the management of the project's day-to-day business, for the agreement provided that Kaliff would have that responsibility. After Fairways of Tamarac III was constructed, Kaliff hired Ron Settler and Victoria Falzone as salespersons to market and sell the individual units. The first unit was sold by Settler to Irving A. Goodman in November, 1982. Goodman was represented by counsel at the closing and, through counsel, received a packet of documents. In the summer of 1984 Goodman learned that he should have received a prospectus prior to closing, but did not. He was given a prospectus by the present project manager, Joan Nathanson, after asking for a copy. Two other units were purchased in July and September, 1983, respectively, by Sidney G. Resnick and Morton Tolmack. Both were sold by either Settler or Falzone. Tolmack was represented by counsel at closing while Resnick had no attorney. Although both executed receipts for condominium documents which reflected a prospectus was included in their packet of documents, their oral testimony to the contrary is accepted as being more credible and persuasive, and it is found that neither received a prospectus at or before closing. When they discovered at a later date they were supposed to have received one, they were given one by Nathanson. Wingold had no knowledge of Tamway's failure to give a prospectus to Goodman, Resnick and Tolmack. He first learned of this when the complaint herein was filed. Sometime in 1983 or early 1984, Wingold discovered that Kaliff was not fulfilling the terms of his obligation under the joint venture. Beginning in February, 1984, three circuit court actions were filed, and a settlement, the joint venture was dissolved, and GFC was given exclusive title and rights to the project by Tamway/Graystone. According to Wingold, Settler was convicted on 22 counts of theft from the project. He was dismissed from employment around May, 1984. During the course of the above litigation, no units could be sold because Kaliff would not agree to sign any documents conveying clear title to the purchaser. Consequently, no sales efforts could be made during this period of time. Except for the time when the litigation was pending, the unsold project units were being offered for sale by the developer in the ordinary course of business. When the settlement was executed on September 5, 1984, thirteen out of thirty units had been sold by Kaliff and Tamway. The last closing under Kaliff's management occurred in May, 1984. Wingold hired a new project manager that same month, and after the litigation was settled, began advertising in local newspapers in an effort to sell the remaining units. This included periodic advertising in two Fort Lauderdale newspapers in September and October, 1984 and January, 1985. This effort met with little or no success due to the then-existing "glut" of condominiums in South Florida. Wingold then searched for a broker to sell the units. Although he had a difficulty in finding a broker who was interested in marketing the units, in February, 1985 he executed a six-month agreement with Condovest, Inc., a firm in Miami that specializes in such sales. Since September, 1984 the developer has closed on six units and has four more under constract at the present time. This leaves seven unsold units, all of which are now rented except one which is used as a model apartment and office. The office is open only on week-days except by special appointment. The unsold units were rented by Wingold due to a large monthly payment ($15,000) on the construction loan. Such units were offered for rent in local newspaper advertisements and at one time on a sign appearing at the front entrance to the property. The rents are used to cover the debt service until the units are sold. The oldest lease agreement expires in May, 1986. Therefore, only the model unit is immediately available for occupancy by a buyer. All others must be sold subject to the lease. Even so, four units are now under contract subject to the leases, and Wingold continues to seek buyers for the remaining rented units. Subsection 718.503(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984), requires that a prospectus be given to purchasers of condominium units prior to closing. Goodman, Resnick and Tolmack were not given such documents as required by law. This finding is based upon the testimony of the three unit owners which is accepted as being the more persuasive evidence on this issue. However, there is no evidence that any of the three was harmed or disadvantaged by their failure to receive copies of the prospectus until 1984 or 1985, particularly since two were represented by counsel at closing. Subsection 718.301(2), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984), also requires that a meeting be called to allow unit owners to elect a majority of the members of the board of administration when none of the unsold units in the project are being "offered for sale by the developer in the ordinary course of business." There is no evidence of record as to how the agency construes that term, or what is the generally accepted meaning within the condominium industry. It is undisputed that no meeting has yet been called by Wingold. However, Wingold has not done so nor is he required to do so since units have been and are still being offered for sale in the ordinary course of business. Besides this, he fears that he cannot fulfill the terms of the four pending purchase and sell contracts if control of the project is turned over to the present unit owners.3 But this concern is irrelevant to a determination of the issue presented herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty as charged in Count II of the amended notice to show cause, and that it be fined $500.00 to be paid within thirty days from date of the Final Order in this Cause. Count I should be DISMISSED, with prejudice. DONE and ORDERED this l6th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1985.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to these Findings of Fact, the Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0317497. In 1985, the Respondent operated his own real estate brokerage firm, Kline Real Estate, Inc., which acted as a marketing agent for Majestic Builders, a construction company. Both Kline Real Estate, Inc., and Majestic Builders did business in and around the Spring Hill, Hernando County, Florida, area. Majestic Builders was owned by George Orlando. In early 1985, Majestic Builders' qualifying general contractor was Stephen Cannon. In early 1985, the Respondent was contacted by the Whitmarshes of Lynchburg, Virginia, who expressed interest in having a modified version of a Majestic Builders model home built on a piece of property in Spring Hill, Florida. Eventually, the Whitmarshes selected a lot on which to have the residence built, and the Respondent brokered the purchase of the lot (from a third party) and the construction contract. Both contracts were entered into on or about April 27, 1985. Both contracts required that the Whitmarshes make a deposit, $1,000 on the lot purchase and $5,000 on the construction contract. Both deposits were made into the escrow account maintained by Kline Real Estate, Inc. The $1,000 deposit was disbursed without incident at the closing of the lot purchase on or about May 7, 1985. The construction contract between the Whitmarshes and Majestic Builders provided in connection with the deposit: DEPOSIT TO FIX HOME PRICE FOR PERIOD OF 6 MOS. [MONTHS), DURING WHICH COMMENCEMENT MAY BEGIN WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTIFICATION AND INITIAL PAYMENT OF 30% OF BALANCE. SHOULD COMMENCEMENT BE AFTER 6 MOS., DEPOSIT WILL STILL APPLY BUT TO NEW PURCHASE PRICE OF MODEL AT TIME OF CONSTRUCTION. For the balance of the spring and summer of 1985, the Whitmarshes continued to consult with the Respondent and, primarily through the Respondent, with George Orlando regarding the modifications the Whitmarshes desired to make to the Majestic Builders model, but they were not particularly anxious to commence construction for personal, family health reasons. In addition, they understood and knew from the contract provision and from conversation with the Respondent that their $5,000 deposit was supposed to be credited to the price of the home they eventually built even if commencement was more than six months from the contract date. On or about November 11, 1985, the Respondent advised the Whitmarshes by telephone, confirmed in writing: This [is] notification, that in accordance with your contract, you are legally in default. This letter is written out of legal necessity and has no bearing on your deposit which will bw [sic] applied to the agreed upon purchase price of a Majestic Home. The default merely is to state the builder is no longer held to the prices quoted. And any changes either up or down will be reflected in the new contract price. (Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding his November 11 letter, the Respondent withdrew the Whitmarshes' $5,000 deposit from the Kline Real Estate, Inc., escrow account and deposited it in the Kline Real Estate, Inc. operating account. Of the $5,000, $1,000 was used the purchase of a building lot for Majestic Builders, and $1,500 was paid directly to George Orlando, to whom the Respondent believed the $5,000 belonged. 1/ The Respondent is unable to account for the balance of the $5,000. 2/ On or about March 21, 1986, the Respondent received a letter from Mr. Whitmarsh stating: "With this letter I authorize you to use $500 from my escrow account to obtain a new floor plan and prepare a cost estimate for my revised version of your Wind and Wildfire Model Home." The Respondent, who had had a heart attack in September, 1985, and was in the process of closing out Kline Real Estate, Inc., and getting out of the real estate business, passed the letter on to George Orlando. Orlando balked at the request, taking the position that the purpose of the $5,000 was not for use to draw up revised plans. But it is the Respondent's understanding that Orlando eventually relented and agreed not to require the Whitmarshes to pay for the revised plans with new money. It is unclear from the evidence whether revised plans ever were drawn. 3/ In approximately June or July, 1986, the Respondent closed Kline Real Estate, Inc., and got out of the real estate business. He never heard anything else from the Whitmarshes about the transaction and assumed that Orlando and the Whitmarshes had satisfactorily concluded their business dealings. But in fact in approximately early 1987, the Whitmarshes received information that Majestic Builders was not a licensed contractor. Although, on checking, they learned that Majestic Builders then had a licensed qualifying contractor, the Whitmarshes still did not feel comfortable with Orlando and Majestic Builders. In about April, 1987, the Whitmarshes decided to hire another builder and asked Orlando for the return of their deposit. Orlando refused, saying that the Respondent had the money. 4/ Nonetheless, the Whitmarshes never contacted the Respondent for the return of the deposit. Later, the Whitmarshes and Orlando became involved in another dispute arising out of the alleged improper use of Orlando's Wind and Wildfire drawings by the Whitmarshes and the builder they eventually hired, Stephen Cannon, who had been Majestic Builders' qualifying general contractor but had left to start his own construction company with the understanding that Cannon would not use any of Majestic Builders' drawings. The Respondent had no knowledge of any of these disputes between Orlando and the Whitmarshes until he was interviewed by a Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) investigator in August, 1988. The DPR had begun an investigation of Orlando on the Whitmarshes' complaint of alleged violations of the laws regulating construction contractors and learned that the dispute involved a deposit that had been held in trust by a licensed real estate broker. DPR then began an investigation of the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding the Respondent, Ronold E. Kline, guilty of violating portions of paragraph (b) and paragraphs (d) and (k) of Sections 475.25(1), Florida Statutes (1987), and suspending his license for a period of one year. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact M. G., Incorporated, a real estate developer in Brevard County, Florida, caused to be constructed The Bello Rio Condominium complex at 255 South Tropical Trail, Merritt Island, Florida. On January 25, 1979, the Chief, Bureau of Condominiums, Department of Business Regulation, State of Florida, advised the attorney for the Developer that, pursuant to Rule 7D-17.05, Florida Administrative Code, the condominium documents submitted for approval for the project in question here had been reviewed and were considered proper for filing, and that the Developer could lawfully close sales contracts on units within the project. Units were sold; and on September 1, 1981, the project was "turned over" by the Developer to the association. At the meeting held for this purpose, several documents were delivered by the Developer to the association's Board of Administration (Board) in the person of Faye Shaffer, a resident of the development. These documents consisted of: Three (3) checks totaling $1,800; The association seal; The original recorded copy of the Declaration; The original copy of the Articles of Incorporation; A condominium insurance policy; A flood insurance renewal declaration; and Certificates of Occupancy for twelve (12) units. All plans and specifications in the hands of the Developer were released to the association's attorney sometime in that general time frame. Further, because there were no common areas covered by warranties, none were available to turn over. Either at the time of turnover or shortly thereafter, during the month of September, 1981, Mrs. Shaffer also received from the Developer five sheets of check ledger paper reflecting the following categories of entries: Date of check; Payee; Check number; Amount of check; Lawn maintenance; Utilities; Insurance; Garbage pickup; Bank service charge; Miscellaneous; and Management fee (10 percent). These ledger sheets were not certified as reviewed by a certified public accountant and constituted the only financial records turned over to the association by the Developer at any time. The accounting and bookkeeping functions for this project were accomplished initially in the offices of the Developer. Thereafter, the Developer retained Guest Realty, Inc., to manage the facility, including the collection of maintenance fees and making payments as required for utilities, etc. During the period of that company's stewardship, all accounting for funds and bank statement reconciliations were handled by Guest Realty, Inc. Any deficiencies resulting between fees collected and expenses paid during that period were made up by the Developer, and Guest Realty, Inc., received a fee of 10 percent of the maintenance fees received for its services. Any bills, receipts, cancelled checks, or other records kept during the period are now in storage; and Mr. Guest, on behalf of Respondent, M. G., Incorporated, will not make the effort to retrieve them unless required to do so by some competent authority.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be assessed a penalty of $500 under the provisions of Section 718.501(1)(d)4, Florida Statutes (1981) RECOMMENDED this 13th of May, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of May, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Helen C. Ellis, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William C. Irvin, Esquire Post Office Box 606 Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Mr. Gary R. Rutledge Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Margaret Cline is an applicant for licensure as an employment agency/agent. Cline meets all qualifications for licensure except the experience requirements, which are the subject of this proceeding. Cline was employed until December, 1975, with the Ramada Inn. The Department recognizes that her experience in this employment was equivalent that of an employment clerk. Cline was unemployed for a period of four to five months immediately following the termination of her employment with the Ramada Inn. From May until September, 1976, she was sales director for a condominium. She admits that her employment was not as an employment clerk or its equivalent. From September, 1976, until September, 1977, she was employed in establishing a bookkeeping system in another condominium company. She admits that the duties of her employment were not those of an employment clerk or its equivalent. Cline was employed from September, 1977, until February, 1978, by Gulf Terrace Condominium. She asserts, and the agency does not deny, that her employment was as an employment clerk or its equivalent. Cline was employed from February, 1978, until September, 1978, with Seascape Inn. She asserts, and the agency does not deny, that her employment during this period was as an employment clerk or its equivalent. Since September, 1978, Cline has been involved in preparing to open or in operating an employment agency. She currently operates an employment agency in Dothan, Alabama, and has done so since November, 1978. Cline has been continuously employed as an employment clerk or its equivalent since September of 1977, or approximately 18 months.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the application of Margaret Cline be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Curington, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida Margaret Cline 940 Santa Rosa Boulevard Fort Walton Beach, Florida
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's application for a real estate license should be denied for the reasons stated in Respondent's Notice of Intent to Deny, dated November 2, 2018.
Findings Of Fact The Commission is the state agency charged with licensing real estate brokers and sales associates in Florida. See § 475.161, Fla. Stat. On August 17, 2018, Petitioner filed with the Commission an application for a Real Estate Broker License – Out of State Experience. According to his PRO, however, he is applying for a "real estate associate license." In conjunction with the application, a lengthy and somewhat confusing record of Petitioner's administrative and criminal history in New York and Minnesota between 1995 and 2018 has been compiled and is found in Commission Exhibit 11, consisting of approximately 300 pages. Besides holding an active Colorado real estate license, he also has a mortgage originator's license issued by the State of Minnesota in 2018. The application required Petitioner to provide answers to four background questions. In response to question 1, which asks the applicant if he has ever been convicted or found guilty of, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, regardless of adjudication, a crime in any jurisdiction, or is currently under criminal investigation, Petitioner answered yes. In his explanation to the question, Petitioner listed four arrests, discussed below, all occurring in the State of Minnesota. Although the Notice of Intent to Deny alleges that he was convicted of a felony, the Commission now concedes that all convictions are for misdemeanors. First, on July 1, 1997, Petitioner, then 22 years old, was arrested for one felony count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and two felony counts of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree. In May 1998, he pled guilty to fifth degree sexual conduct, a gross misdemeanor, and was fined $900.00, sentenced to nine days in jail, placed on two years' probation, ordered to undergo sex offender treatment, and required to register as a sex offender for ten years in New York (where he had relocated temporarily) and Minnesota. Petitioner completed all conditions required by the court. In his application, Petitioner explained that the arrest and conviction were the result of "interactions with an underaged woman [a 15-year-old babysitter for his fiancee's child] that lied about her age." At hearing, he testified that he pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge because he did not have sufficient funds to continue to fight the original felony charges, and he "did not want to take the chances with the jury," even though the prosecutor admitted to the court the defendant's attorney "can kill our guys on cross-examination." He decided to "take the misdemeanor and get on with [his] life." Petitioner acknowledges that he pled guilty to a sexual offense, but it is fair to find that he wants the Commission to accept his version of events - that the girl fabricated the entire incident. Second, on July 10, 1997, Petitioner was arrested for disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor, after an "[a]rgument with girlfriend and her brother." He was found guilty of the charge and paid a $150.00 fine. Third, in October 2008, while in a divorce proceeding with his then wife, Petitioner was charged with violation of an Order for Protection for "exchanging messages with my wife on childcare/exchange matters which were allowed according to the original order. She called in and filed a complaint." The application states that the charge was later dismissed. The Commission does not dispute this representation. Finally, in November 2008, Petitioner was arrested for gross misdemeanor domestic assault against his then wife. Petitioner explained that this incident occurred after an "argument with wife (she was heavily intoxicated) that escalated." He later pled guilty to disorderly conduct, paid a $300.00 fine, and was given one year of unsupervised probation. He successfully completed all conditions imposed by the court. Question 1 requires that an applicant also report traffic offenses other than parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signals. The Commission's PRO points out that Petitioner failed to disclose that in 1995, while a resident of the State of New York, he pled guilty to operating a motor vehicle (motorcycle) while impaired by drugs (marijuana). At hearing, Petitioner testified that he forgot about the traffic violation, as it occurred 24 years ago when he was only 20 years old. Even though the Notice of Intent to Deny does not allege that Petitioner failed to disclose his complete criminal record, the issue was tried by consent at hearing. However, Petitioner's omission of this minor item should have no bearing on whether to approve or deny the application. Question 4 asks the applicant to disclose whether he ever has had a license to practice any regulated profession revoked, annulled, suspended, relinquished, or otherwise disciplined in any jurisdiction. Petitioner answered yes. In explaining his answer to question 4, Petitioner stated that his Minnesota real estate broker license was revoked by the Department of Commerce in May 2018 for (a) failure to self-report a 2008 bankruptcy; (b) the denial in 2009 of his application for a residential general contractor's license; and a 2012 felony charge (domestic assault by strangulation of his ex-wife), which was dismissed later. The application added that due to the revocation of the Minnesota license, his Colorado realtor license "is currently in review." At hearing, however, Petitioner testified that Colorado is not taking any action on that license. The revocation order provided in part that Petitioner obtained his license by fraud and misrepresentation, he had a complete disregard for the law, and he could not be trusted to make material disclosures and otherwise comply with licensing requirements. See Comm. Ex. 11, p. 208. Obtaining a license by fraud and/or misrepresentation, and not being trusted to make material disclosures and comply with licensing requirements, are grounds for revoking or suspending a license in the state of Florida had Petitioner then been registered. At hearing, Petitioner testified that he actually had disclosed the bankruptcy and administrative action to the state when he submitted an application to transfer a brokerage license in 2009. Evidently, this contention was not accepted by the Department of Commerce. Petitioner says he "attempted" to appeal the revocation order, but the appeal was denied. In its PRO, the Commission alleges that Petitioner failed to disclose an enforcement action instituted by the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (MDLI) in 2009, which resulted in him voluntarily consenting to the revocation of a residential building contractor license held by Vanquish Custom Homes, LLC, a company he controlled. Although this omission is not cited in the Notice of Intent to Deny, the issue was raised at hearing without objection by Petitioner. Petitioner's response to background question 3 acknowledges that his application for a "residential general contractor's license" was denied in 2009. Also, in a letter attached to the application, Petitioner made reference to that action, although in a somewhat confusing and incomplete manner. See Comm. Ex. 11, p. 187. The letter fails to disclose that the proceeding arose in the context of an enforcement action by MDLI, which alleged, among other things, that Petitioner was untrustworthy, incompetent, and unqualified to act as a licensee's qualifying owner. The letter and application also fail to disclose that MDLI issued a consent order revoking the license, imposing a $5,000.00 suspended civil fine, and ordering him to cease and desist from acting as a residential building contractor. Had Petitioner been registered in the state of Florida, these actions would have been grounds to suspend or revoke the license. At hearing, Petitioner explained that the license lapsed around 2007, he reapplied for licensure in 2008, but he withdrew the application after MDLI issued an intent to deny. He says he took this action because he "didn't need the contractor license, and it just wasn't worth spending the money to fight it." By consent of the parties, Petitioner acknowledged that he failed to disclose a consent order issued by MDLI in 2013, which determined that Vanquish Services Group, LLC, another company controlled by Mr. Shields, had violated the 2009 consent order. Petitioner was ordered to cease and desist from any further residential building contractor violations and to pay a $5,000.00 civil penalty, of which $4,500.00 was stayed. At hearing, Petitioner testified that in an effort to procure clients, his company incorrectly advertised four trades on Angie's List, when the company was allowed no more than three trades to be advertised. He admits this was a "mistake." Two character witnesses, Mr. Hartos and Ms. Anderson, both currently licensed as realtors in Minnesota, testified on behalf of Petitioner. Both testified that they are aware of his prior administrative and criminal history. Mr. Hartos is a long- time licensed broker, who has served on the Minnesota Association of Realtors Board of Professional Standards for more than 25 years, and was Petitioner's broker and "boss" for the last five years. The other is a former employee. Based on their work experience with Petitioner, they found him to be ethical, truthful, honest, and trustworthy, and not a danger to the public. Forty-three letters of recommendation, including those submitted by the two character witnesses, all hearsay in nature, corroborate this conclusion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a license as a real estate broker or sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2019.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the real estate license of Keith Allen. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Allan M. Parvey, Esquire Goldberg, Rubinstein & Buckley, P.A. Post Office Box 2366 Fort Myers, Florida 33902
Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. One Respondent in this matter is Tanwin Corporation (hereinafter "Tanwin") the developer of two residential condominiums known as Vista Del Lago Condominium I and Vista Del Lago Condominium II, located in West Palm Beach, Florida. The other Respondent is Vista Del Lago Condominium Association, Inc. (hereinafter "Association"), the condominium association for Vista Del Lago Condominiums I and II. Transition from developer control of the Association has not occurred, and at all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Tanwin has in fact controlled the operation of the Respondent Association. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium I (hereinafter "Condo I") was recorded in the public records on December 12, 1980. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium II (hereinafter "Condo II") was recorded in the public records on March 11, 1982. Condo I contains 16 units; and Condo II contains 18 units. Herbert and Judith Tannenbaum are the President and Secretary, respectively, of both Tanwin and the Association and are members of the Association's Board of Directors. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I for the fiscal year 1982. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I and Condo II for 1983 until the unit owner meeting in March or April of 1983. The budget provided at that time contained no provision for reserves. Although the document alleged to be the 1983 proposed budget admitted in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 does contain an allocation for reserves, Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 17 is not the 1983 budget disseminated to unit owners at the annual meeting in 1983. In addition, the 1983 budget was received by the unit owners at the meeting at which the proposed budget was to be considered and not prior to the budget meeting. Statutory reserves were not waived during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The "start-up" budgets contained as exhibits to the Declarations of Condominium indicate that reserves were to be collected from unit owners at the rate of $15 per month per unit at least during the first year commencing December of 1980 with the first closing. Hence, reserves were not waived December, 1980 through December, 1981. From November, 1981 through December, 1983, no vote to waive reserves was taken by the unit owners. Although reserves were discussed at the 1983 meeting, no vote was taken during the period in question including 1983, to waive reserves. The developer as owner of unsold units; has failed to pay to the Association monthly maintenance for common expenses during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The developer Tanwin has, in the nature of an affirmative defense, alleged the existence of a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes, which purportedly ran from the inception of the condominiums to date. Accordingly, the initial issue for resolution is whether the developer pursuant to statute guaranteed common expenses. Section 718.116(8)(b) provides that a developer may be excused from payment of common expenses pertaining to developer-owned units for that period of time during which he has guaranteed to each purchaser in the declaration of condominium, purchase contract or prospectus, or by an agreement between the developer and a majority of unit owners other than the developer, that their assessments for common expenses would not increase over a stated dollar amount during the guarantee period and the developer agrees to pay any amount necessary for common expenses not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners, or "shortfall". Actual purchase agreements were admitted in evidence. Respondents seek to label certain unambiguous language in the purchase contracts as a guarantee. This language, uniform throughout all those contracts as well as the form purchase contract filed with Petitioner except that of Phillip May, provides as follows: 9. UNIT ASSESSMENTS. The Budget included in the Offering Circular sets forth Seller's best estimation of the contemplated expenses for operating and maintaining the Condominium during its initial year. Purchaser's monthly assessment under the aforementioned Budget is in the amount of $109.00. Until Closing of Title, Seller has the right (without affecting Purchaser's obligation to purchase in accordance with the provisions hereof, to modify the estimated Budget and assessments periodically if then current cost figures indicate that an updating of estimates is appropriate). [Emphasis added]. That portion of the purchase agreement set forth above does not constitute a guarantee. Instead, the purchase agreement simply includes a best estimation of expenses for the initial year. It does not govern assessments after the expiration of one year, and even as to the initial year, the language in the contract sets forth only a "best estimation" and not a guarantee that the assessments would not increase during the "guarantee period." Phillip May's purchase agreement reflects that he purchased his unit in August of 1983; after condominium complaints had been filed by the unit owners with the Florida Division of Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. His purchase agreement has been altered from the purchase agreement of earlier purchasers in that his purchase agreement expressly, by footnote contains a one- year guarantee running from closing. The guarantee contained in his purchase agreement was presented by the developer without any request from Mr. May for the inclusion of a guarantee in his purchase agreement. The guarantee language in this purchase agreement is useful for the purpose of comparing the language with those portions of the pre-complaint contracts which Respondents assert contain or constitute a guarantee. Similarly it is determined that no guarantee of common expenses exists in the Declarations of Condominium for Condo I and II or in the prospectus for Condo II. While Respondents seek to assert the existence of a guarantee in those documents, the portions of those unambiguous documents which according to Respondents contain a guarantee, have no relation to a guarantee or do not guarantee that the assessments for common expenses would not increase. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to prove the existence of an oral guarantee which was allegedly communicated to purchasers at the closing of their particular condominium units. However, purchasers were told by Herbert or Judith Tannenbaum only that assessments should remain in the amount of $109 per month per unit unless there existed insufficient funds in the Association to pay bills. This is the antithesis of a guarantee. During a guarantee period the developer in exchange for an exemption from payment of assessments on developer- owned units agrees to pay any deficits incurred by the condominium association. Accordingly, no guarantee was conveyed at the closing of condominium units. Further Respondent Tanwin's additional contention that an oral guarantee arose when the condominiums came into existence is plainly contradicted by the express language throughout the condominium documents and purchase agreements that there exist no oral representations and that no reliance can be placed on any oral representations outside the written agreements. Further, prior to December, 1983, no reference was ever made by the developer either inside or outside of unit owner meetings as to the existence of the alleged guarantee. Moreover, a comparison between on the one hand, the 1981 and 1982 financial statements prepared in March of 1983, and on the other hand, the 1983 financial statements, clearly reveals that even the accountant for Tanwin was unaware of the existence of a guarantee during the period in question. While the 1983 statements, prepared in 1984 after unit owners filed complaints with Petitioner contain references to a developer guarantee, the 1981 and 1982 statements fail to mention a guarantee. Instead, included in the 1981 and 1982 statements of the Association are references under the current liabilities portion of the balance sheets for those years, to a "Due to Tanwin Corporation" liability in the amounts of $2,138 for 1981 and $2,006 for 1982. Petitioner through Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, established that at a minimum, the $2,006 figure reflected in the 1982 balance sheet was in fact reimbursed to Tanwin. Section 7D-18.05(1),(c), Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Budgets" and effective on July 22, 1980, was officially recognized prior to the final hearing in this cause. That section requires each condominium filing to include an estimated operating budget which contains "[a] statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election and obligation of the developer pursuant to Section 718.116(8); Florida Statutes." The estimated operating budgets for Condo I and Condo II do not include a statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election or obligation of the developer. The testimony of Herbert Tannenbaum with regard to an oral (or written) guarantee is not credible. He first testified that an oral guarantee was communicated to purchasers at the closing of each unit. In contrast, Tannenbaum also testified that the first discussion he had regarding a guarantee occurred with his attorney after the filing of the Notice to Show Cause in this action. Tannenbaum further testified that he did not understand what a guarantee was until after this case had begun and was unaware of the existence of any guarantee prior to consulting with his attorney in regard to this case. Moreover, Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin testified that it was Tannenbaum who informed DiCrescenzo of the existence of a guarantee but DiCrescenzo was unable or unwilling to specify the date on which this communication occurred. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to establish the existence of a guarantee through Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 which is a document signed by less than the majority of unit owners even including Tannenbaum and his son, and signed on an unknown date during 1984. The document provides: The undersigned Unit Owners at the Vista Del Lago Condominium do not wish to give up the benefits of the developer's continuing guarantee which has been in effect since the inception of the condominium and agreed to by a majority of unit owners and whereby the developer has continuously guaranteed a maintenance level of no more than $109.00 per month per unit, until control of the condominium affairs is turned over to the unit owners in accordance with Florida's Condominium law. According to Respondent Tanwin, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 constitutes a memorandum signed by unit owners evidencing their belief that a continuous guarantee of the developer has been in effect. First, however, this document was never admitted into evidence for that purpose; rather the document was admitted only to establish the fact that a unit owner had signed the document. Second, this document, unlike the purchase agreements or other condominium documents is ambiguous and is not probative of the existence of a guarantee. Instead, the evidence is overwhelming that the document was prepared by the developer in the course of this litigation for use in this litigation. Moreover, unit owner testimony is clear regarding what Mr. and Mrs. Tannenbaum disclosed to unit owners as the purpose for the document when soliciting their signatures, to- wit: that the document was a petition evidencing the unit owners' desire that their monthly maintenance payments not be increased and that prior confusion as to whether reserves had been waived needed resolution. Respondent Tanwin did pay assessments on some developer-owned units during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983, a fact which is inconsistent with its position that a guarantee existed. Noteworthy is the statement by Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, in his August 16, 1983, letter to Herbert Tannenbaum wherein it is stated: "It is my understanding that you are doing the following: . . .[Playing maintenance assessments on units completed but not sold." It is inconceivable that a developer during a "guarantee period" would pay assessments on some developer units as the purpose of the statutory guarantee is to exempt the developer from such assessments. The assessments for common expenses of unit owners other than the developer have increased during the purported guarantee period. At least some, if not all, unit owners paid monthly assessments of $128 - $130 for at least half of 1984. This fact is probative of the issue of whether a guarantee existed because unit owner assessments must remain constant during a guarantee period. At the Spring 1984 meeting chaired by Mr. Tannenbaum a vote was taken for the first time as to whether reserves should be waived. Although only 21 owners were present in person or by proxy; the vote was tabulated as 12 in favor and 12 opposed. Mr. Tannenbaum, therefore, announced an increase in monthly maintenance payments to fund reserves. Thereafter owners began paying an increased assessment. The fact that the developer-controlled Association collected increased assessments from unit owners during 1984, and had up to the time of the final hearing in this cause made no effort to redistribute those funds suggests that the developer-controlled Association and the developer considered themselves to be under no obligation to keep maintenance assessments at a constant level. There was no guarantee of assessments for common expenses by Tanwin from December, 1980, through at least December, 1983. Since there was no guarantee during the time period in question, Respondent Tanwin is liable to the Respondent Association for the amount of monthly assessments for common expenses on all developer-owned units for which monthly assessments have not been paid. In conjunction with the determination that Tanwin owes money to the Association (and not vice versa), Respondent Tanwin attempted to obtain an offset by claiming the benefit of a management contract between either Tannenbaum or Tanwin and the Association. No such management contract exists, either written or oral. Although a management contract is mentioned in one of the condominium documents there is no indication that one ever came into being, and no written contract was even offered in evidence. Likewise, no evidence was offered to show the terms of any oral contract; rather, Tannenbaum admitted that he may never have told any of the unit owners that there was a management contract. Tannenbaum's testimony is consistent with the fact that no budget or financial statement reflects any expense to the Association for a management contract with anyone. Likewise, the "budget" contained within Condo II's documents recorded on March 11, 1982, specifically states that any management fee expense was not applicable. Lastly, Tannenbaum's testimony regarding the existence of a management contract is contrary to the statement signed by him on February 10, 1981, which specifically advised Petitioner that the Association did not employ professional management. To the extent that Respondent Tanwin attempted to establish some quantum meruit basis for its claim of an offset, it is specifically found that no basis for any payment has been proven for the following reasons: Tannenbaum had no prior experience in managing a condominium, which is buttressed by the number of violations of the condominium laws determined herein; Tannenbaum does not know what condominium managers earn; no delineation was made as to specific duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of the Association as opposed to those duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of Respondent Tanwin; since there was no testimony as to duties performed for the Association, there was necessarily no testimony as to what duties were performed on behalf of the Association in Tannenbaum's capacity as President of the Association and member of the Association's Board of Directors as opposed to duties allegedly performed as a "manager." Tannenbaum's testimony as to the value of his "services" ranged from $10,000 to $15,000 a year to a lump sum of $60,000; it is interesting to note that the value of his services alone some years exceeded the Association's annual budget. Respondent Tanwin has failed to prove entitlement to an offset amount, either pursuant to contract or based upon quantum meruit. The financial statements of the Association--including balance sheets, statements of position, and statements of receipts and expenditures--for 1980-81 and for 1982 reveal consolidation of the records for Condo I and Condo II in these statements. Additionally, DiCrescenzo admitted that separate accounting records were not maintained for each condominium and Herbert Tannenbaum also admitted to maintaining consolidated records. Accordingly, the developer- controlled Association failed to maintain separate accounting records for each condominium it manages. The By-Laws of the Association provide: SECTION. 7. Annual Audit. An audit of the accounts of the Corporation shall be made annually by a Certified Public Accountant - and a copy of the Report shall be furnished to each member not later than April 1st of the year following the year in which the Report was made. The financial statement for 1981 bears the completion date of February 9, 1983. The 1982 financial statement contains a completion date of March 1, 1983. Both the 1981 and the 1982 statements were delivered to the unit owners in March or April, 1983. Accordingly, Respondents failed to provide the 1981 financial report of actual receipts and expenditures in compliance with the Association's By-Laws. As set forth hereinabove, statutory reserves were not waived during the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. Being a common expense, reserves must be fully funded unless waived annually. In the instant case, Respondents, rather than arguing that reserves had in fact been fully funded, sought to prove that reserves had been waived during the years in question. The fact that reserves were not fully funded is established by reviewing the financial statements. In accordance with the start-up budgets, reserves were initially established at the level of $15.00 per unit per month. Therefore, during 1981, for Condo I containing sixteen units, the Association's reserve account should contain 16 multiplied by $15.00 per month multiplied by 12 months, or $2,880. Since the Declaration of Condominium for Condo II was not recorded until March 11, 1982, assessments for common expenses including allocations to reserves, were not collected from Condo II during 1981. Therefore, the balance in the reserve account as reflected in the balance sheet for the year 1981 should be no less than $2,880. The actual balance reflected in this account is $2,445. Both Tannenbaum and DiCrescenzo testified that most of the balance in that account was composed of purchaser contributions from the closing of each condominium unit "equivalent to 2 months maintenance to be placed in a special reserve fund" as called for in the purchase contracts. Tannenbaum further admitted that instead of collecting $15.00 per month per unit for reserves, the money that would have gone into the reserve account was used "to run the condominium." Similarly, for the year ending 1982, the balance in the reserve account also reflects that reserves were not being funded. First, the amount of reserves which should have been set aside in 1981 of $2,880 is added to the total amount of reserves which should have been collected for 1982 for Condo I ($2880), giving a total figure of $5,760. To this figure should be added the reserves which should have been collected from units in Condo II during 1982. This figure is derived by multiplying the total number of units in Condo II, 18 units, by $15.00 per unit multiplied by 8 months (since Condo II was recorded in March of 1982) to yield a figure for Condo II of $2,160. Adding total reserve assessments for Condo I and II, $2,160 plus $5,760 equals $7,920 the correct reserve balance at the close of 1982. The actual balance for the period ended December 31, 1982, is reflected to be $4,138. Similarly, the amount of reserves required for Condos I and II as of December 31, 1983, can be calculated using the same formula. Although the 1983 financial statement prepared in 1984 reflects the existence of a funded reserve account, both DiCrescenzo and Tannenbaum admitted there was no separate reserves account set up during the time period involved herein. Statutory reserves were not waived and were not fully funded for the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. All parties hereto presented much evidence, unsupported by the books and records of the corporations, for the determination herein of the amounts of money owed by Respondent Tanwin to the Association to bring current the total amount which Tanwin should have been paying to the Association from the inception of each condominium for monthly maintenance on condominium units not yet sold by the developer, together with the amount owed by Tanwin to the Association so that a separate reserve account can be established and fully funded for all years in which the majority of unit owners including the developer have not waived reserves. No findings of fact determining the exact amount Tanwin owes to the Association will be made for several reasons: first, the determination of that amount requires an accounting between the two Respondents herein which is a matter that can only be litigated, if litigation is necessary, in the circuit courts of this state; second, the determination of the amount due between the private parties hereto is not necessary for the determination by Petitioner of the statutory violations charged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and third, where books and records exist; one witness on each side testifying as to conclusions reached from review of those records, even though the witnesses be expert, does not present either the quantity or the quality of evidence necessary to trace the income and outgo of specific moneys through different corporate accounts over a period of time, especially where each expert opinion is based upon questionable assumptions. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that Respondent Tanwin owes money to the Respondent Association and further owes to the Respondent Association an accounting of all moneys on a specific item by item basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Tanwin Corporation guilty of the allegations contained in Counts 1-7 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Dismissing with prejudice Count 8 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Assessing against Respondent Tanwin Corporation a civil penalty in the amount of $17,000 to be paid by certified check made payable to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within 45 days from entry of the Final Order herein; Ordering Respondents to forthwith comply with all provisions of the Condominium Act and the rules promulgated thereunder; And requiring Tanwin Corporation to provide and pay for an accounting by an independent certified public accountant of all funds owed by the developer as its share of common expenses on unsold units and the amount for which Tanwin is liable in order that the reserve account be fully funded, with a copy of that accounting to be filed with Petitioner within 90 days of the date of the Final Order. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph S. Paglino, Esquire 88 Northeast 79th Street Miami, Florida 33138 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL CONSENT ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, Petitioner, CASE NO. 84-0437 DOCKET NO. 84001MVC TANWIN CORPORATION and VISTA DEL LAGO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. Respondents. / FINAL CONSENT ORDER The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, (hereinafter the Division), Vista Del Lago Condominium Inc., (hereinafter the Association), and Tanwin Corporation, (hereinafter Tanwin), hereby stipulate and agree to the terms and issuance of this Final Consent Order as follows: WHEREAS, the Division issued a Notice to Show Cause directed to Respondents and, WHEREAS, after issuance of the Recommended Order in this cause, the parties amicably conferred for the purpose of achieving a settlement of the case, and WHEREAS, Tanwin is desirous of resolving the matters alleged in the Notice to Show Cause without engaging in further administrative proceedings or judicial review thereof, NOW, THEREFORE, it is stipulated and agreed as follows:
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents, The Fourth Bayshore Condominium Association, Inc. (“Bayshore”), Karl Stemmler (“Stemmler”), and/or Richard Grove (“Grove”), discriminated against Petitioner, Robert Pagano (“Pagano"), on the basis of his physical handicap in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Pagano is a Caucasian male who is handicapped by virtue of medical complications which resulted in the amputation of his left leg in March 2008. He has been confined to a wheelchair since that time. At all times relevant hereto, Pagano was renting a condominium unit at Bayshore. In January 2012, Pagano saw another unit at Bayshore advertised for rent. He called Grove, listed as the owner of the unit, and inquired about renting the property. Grove told Pagano that a key to the unit would be left under a mat between the screen door and front door on January 19, 2012. On that day, Pagano went to inspect the unit, accompanied by a friend, Philip Saglimebene. Upon arrival at the unit, Pagano and his friend began looking for the hidden key, but could not find it. They apparently made some noise while searching for the key, because they were confronted by Stemmler. According to Pagano, Stemmler began asking them in unfriendly terms who they were and what they were doing at the unit. The friend then told Stemmler they were looking for a key so they could go in and inspect the unit as Pagano was interested in renting it from Grove. Stemmler, supposedly identifying himself as a “building representative,” said there was no key to be found. He also reputedly told Pagano and his friend that they would not need a key anyway, “because you are not moving in.” When the friend explained that the unit was for Pagano, not him, Stemmler allegedly said that Pagano was not moving in either because he was an “undesirable.” When asked to explain that comment, Stemmler purportedly said, “He just is; that’s all you need to know.” (None of Stemmler’s comments were verified by competent evidence and, without verification or support, cannot be relied upon to make a finding of fact in this case.) Pagano believes Stemmler’s purported comments were based on the fact that he (Pagano) has long hair and a beard and does not fit into the conventional norm at Bayshore. He also believes that his handicap served as a basis for Stemmler’s alleged comments. There was no credible evidence presented at final hearing to substantiate Pagano’s suppositions. Grove had put his condominium unit up for rent at the beginning of the year. When Pagano called to inquire about it, Grove – who lives out-of-state – notified a friend to leave a key under the mat, as described above. That friend simply forgot to leave a key at the unit on the designated date. Grove knew nothing about Pagano’s interaction with Stemmler. Grove had not spoken to Stemmler prior to the day he and Pagano had their interaction. Stemmler had no authority to speak for Grove or to make a decision concerning to whom Grove would rent his condominium unit. Subsequent to the day Pagano visited the unit, Grove took the unit off the rental market because his wife decided to use the unit to house family and friends rather than renting it out to someone else. It took several weeks for the rental advertisement for the unit to be removed from a locked bulletin board at Bayshore. Grove said that if the unit ever went back on the market, he would call Pagano first about renting it, i.e., Grove had no opposition whatsoever to Pagano’s being a tenant. Van Buren, president of Bayshore, explained that the condominium association utilizes the support of voluntary building representatives to assist with security and minor maintenance at Bayshore. The volunteers, who are generally seasonal residents at Bayshore, do not hold keys to individual units and have no authority to grant or deny an applicant’s request to rent a unit. Stemmler is one of many building representatives who resides part-time at Bayshore. Pagano does not know of any non-handicapped individual who was allowed to rent a unit at Bayshore to the exclusion of himself or any other handicapped person. In fact, Pagano currently resides in another unit at Bayshore; he is already a resident there.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Robert Pagano in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of September, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 2012.
