The Issue The issue for disposition in this case is whether Respondent has implemented an agency statement that meets the definition of a rule, but which has not been adopted pursuant to section 120.54, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board) is charged with the management of state lands, including sovereign submerged lands. § 253.03(1), Fla. Stat. The Department of Environmental Protection (Department) is charged with the duty to “perform all staff duties and functions related to the acquisition, administration, and disposition of state lands, title to which is or will be vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund.” § 253.002(1), Fla. Stat. The City of Titusville operates a municipal marina, which includes a 205-slip docking facility for mooring of commercial and recreational vessels (Marina), on sovereignty submerged lands leased from the Board. Petitioner owns a Florida-registered vessel which he keeps at the Marina pursuant to an annual mooring/dockage agreement. On June 9, 2009, the City of Titusville and the Board entered into a “fee waived” lease renewal and modification for a parcel of sovereignty submerged land in the Indian River (Lease). The Lease allows the Marina to operate “with liveaboards as defined in paragraph 26, as shown and conditioned in Attachment A, and the State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Consolidated Environmental Resource Permit No. 05-287409-001, dated December 31, 2008, incorporated herein and made a part of this lease by reference.” Paragraph 26 of the Lease provides that: 26. LIVEABOARDS: The term “liveaboard” is defined as a vessel docked at the facility and inhabited by a person or persons for any five (5) consecutive days or a total of ten (10) days within a thirty (30) day period. If liveaboards are authorized by paragraph one (1) of this lease, in no event shall such “liveaboard” status exceed six (6) months within any twelve (12) month period, nor shall any such vessel constitute a legal or primary residence. On or about July 31, 2015, Petitioner and the City of Titusville entered into the annual contractual mooring/dockage agreement, paragraph 4 of which provides that: 4. LIVEABOARDS: For the purposes of this Agreement, the term “liveaboard” is defined herein as a vessel docked at the facility and inhabited by a person or persons for any five (5) consecutive days or a total of ten (10) days within a thirty (30) day period. Pursuant to requirements of the City’s Submerged Land Lease with the State of Florida, no vessel shall occupy the Marina in this “1iveaboard” status for more than six (6) months within any twelve (l2) month period, nor shall the Marina Facility constitute a legal or primary residence of the OWNER. Petitioner asserts that the alleged agency statement regarding “liveaboard” vessels “unreasonably and arbitrarily denies me the unrestricted right to stay on my vessel by limiting the number of consecutive days during which I may occupy the vessel,” and that “[t]he Board’s non-rule policy denies me the unrestricted freedom to enjoy my vessel as a second home.”
Findings Of Fact The department hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the findings of fact set forth in the Recommended Order.
Conclusions This cause came on before me for the purpose of issuing a final agency order. The Hearing Officer assigned by the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) in the above-styled case submitted a Recommended Order to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). A copy of that Recommended Order is attached hereto. RULING ON EXCEPTIONS FILED BY PROCACCI In this proceeding the parties stipulated that the issues to be decided were: one, whether the department's decision to reject all bids was improper and; two, if rejection was improper, which bidder should be awarded the lease contract. (See Recommended Order, page 3 and 28.) In his exceptions, Procacci now seeks to disregard the second prong of the stipulation and asserts that only a review of the record - basis of the initial rejection decision is appropriate. This view is inconsistent with the nature of a Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, proceeding, a de novo, evidentiary hearing, which gives all substantially affected persons the opportunity to change the agency's mind.1 Capeletti brothers vs. State, 432 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). This bid protest proceeding commenced in June 1990, and by law the solicitation process was stopped. Section 120.53(5)(c), Florida Statutes. Competent, substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the Lima proposal be accepted. The exceptions are rejected.
Findings Of Fact Sea Isles Condominium Association (Petitioner) is the riparian owner of lands at 25714 Hickory Boulevard, Bonita Springs, Florida 33923. The Petitioner's lands lie along the Broadway Channel connecting the Gulf of Mexico to Estero Bay. There are 84 upland units in the condominium. Some condominium residents without docking slips have requested that the Petitioner apply for expansion of the existing facility. The waters adjacent to Petitioner's upland property are located within the Estero Bay Aquatic Preserve (pursuant to Section 258.39(28), Florida Statutes) and are designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW) by the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER). At some point in approximately 1982, the condominium developer sought approval for the construction of docking facilities. By letter of January 25, 1982, Richard P. Ludington, then Director of the Division of State Lands of the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), indicated that there was no objection to the proposed dock project. The parties to this case have jointly stipulated that the Ludington opinion was based on the fact that the proposed project was a private non-income producing facility (a lease therefore not being required) and was not in conflict with any existing rules. The DER issued permit number 36-42521-5E, dated February 9, 1982, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers issued general permit number SAJ-33, both approving and authorizing the construction of the docking facility. Although the water body had been designated as an aquatic preserve, there were no adopted administrative rules regulating such projects at the time of the initial dock construction. The approved sixteen slip docking facility was constructed along the margin of the shoreline in 1983 by the developer of the condominium. Due to extremely shallow water depths, only two of the slips were accessible. At some point thereafter, the Petitioner began efforts to remedy the unusable slip situation. Initially, the Petitioner desired to dredge the area, but was unable to secure approval to dredge from regulatory agencies. The Petitioner then began to consider additional solutions. The solution upon which the Petitioner decided was removal of the existing slips and construction of an extended boardwalk and dock located in navigable water. On March 28, 1985, the DNR notified the Petitioner that the project would require approval in the form of a submerged land lease from the Governor and Cabinet, sitting as the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund ("Board"). On August 20, 1985, the DER issued permit number 361011295, authorizing the removal of the existing structure and the construction of a 22 slip docking facility as proposed by the Petitioner. On behalf of the Board, the DNR reviews applications for leases of sovereignty submerged lands. In reviewing such requests, the DNR calculates the maximum amount of sovereignty submerged lands which may be preempted by a proposed facility. According to administrative rule, the area of sovereignty submerged land preempted by a private residential multi-slip docking facility may not exceed the total square footage equal to ten times the riparian waterfront footage of the affected waterbody. DNR's calculation of the affected shoreline indicated that the Petitioner's riparian waterfront measured 433 feet. Application of the 10:1 ratio would indicate that the area of sovereignty submerged land preempted by the proposed multi-slip docking facility could not exceed 4330 square feet. As early as 1986, a surveyor employed by the Petitioner believed the DNR shoreline calculation to be erroneous and determined the Petitioner's riparian shoreline to be 601 feet. After discussing the discrepancy between measurements, the DNR representative informed a representative of the Petitioner that Sea Isles could obtain a mean high waterline survey to determine the actual shoreline footage if it disagreed with the DNR calculation. Although there is testimony that a survey provided to the DNR established the mean high waterline, the greater weight of the evidence establishes that the survey was not identified as a mean high waterline survey, but as a safe upland line survey. No credible mean high waterline survey was provided to the DNR by the Petitioner at that time. Abutting the Petitioner's property to the south is a man-made channel which results in an unnatural extension of the shoreline. Such extensions are not included in computing the allowable square footage of sovereign submerged lands because the man-made shoreline does not abut sovereign submerged lands. It is unclear whether the calculations of shoreline were affected by this consideration. Despite the discrepancy, the Petitioner reduced the size of the requested docking facility to include a boardwalk and dock of ten slips totalling approximately 4300 square feet and extending 208 feet into the waterbody (approximately 35 percent of the waterbody's width). The length of the extension violates administrative rule provisions governing extension into a waterbody which are addressed elsewhere herein. On July 23, 1986, Lee County passed a resolution of approval for the proposed docking facility land lease and granted a variance to Lee County Ordinance 85-25. The resolution of approval contained additional requirements, included a provision restricting the approval to not more than ten slips. The Petitioner asserts that the determination of shoreline was incorrect and was the result of "mutual mistake". The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner's acceptance of the DNR's shoreline determination was based upon "mutual mistake." The evidence establishes that the Petitioner's representatives were aware of the discrepancy. The fact that the Petitioner agreed to deed a 575 foot conservation easement to the Board (to offset the potential adverse impact on manatee habitat as discussed elsewhere herein) would suggest that the parties were aware that the 433 foot measurement was inaccurate. For whatever reason, the Petitioner agreed to the DNR shoreline and dock calculation which formed the basis for the lease approved by the Board. Prior to approval of the lease, the Board reviewed a written "public interest" assessment which indicates that the length of the boardwalk to the proposed docking facility exceeded standards set by administrative rules. Pursuant to rule, exceptions to length restrictions may be made only where the applicant demonstrates that such exception is necessary to insure reasonable riparian ingress and egress. The Petitioner apparently demonstrated that, given the location of the existing sand flat, such exception was necessary to provide ingress and egress. According to the written analysis, the proposed project adversely impacted the manatee habitat located in the aquatic preserve. The analysis states that 575 foot conservation easement to the Board would offset the potential adverse impact on manatee habitat. The Petitioner committed to the conservation easement in order to meet the public interest test required of all docking facilities within an aquatic preserve. Special lease condition paragraph 5 requires the Petitioner to record a conservation easement for approximately 575 linear feet of shoreline in perpetuity to run with the land. The provision requires that documentation of the recording of the easement be provided to the Board within thirty days of the Board action and prior to execution of the lease. The lease conditions clearly indicate that the Petitioner will not seek authority to expand the docking facility. Special lease condition paragraph 5 prohibits any additional docking facilities or any other such development along the lessee's shoreline. Review of proposed special lease condition paragraph 6 (as compared to the staff recommendation and a subsequent affidavit executed by the Petitioner's representative on June 6, 1987) indicates that the paragraph appears to contain a typographical error in deleting the word "not" from the condition. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the Petitioner agreed not to request authorization to dredge the docking area or channel or to request additional expansion of the facility. On April 21, 1987, the Board, apparently acting against the staff recommendation, voted to grant to the Petitioner a submerged land lease for the construction of a ten slip facility. Representatives of the Petitioner appeared before the Board during consideration and approval of the lease. On June 6, 1987, a representative of the Petitioner executed an affidavit on behalf of the Petitioner which sets forth the language of special condition paragraph six as originally proposed. In the affidavit, the Petitioner's representative agrees not to apply for authorization to dredge the dock or access channel, or to request expansion of the facility. A deed of conservation easement dated October 21, 1985, and signed by a representative of the Petitioner, was attached to the materials submitted to the Board for the April 21, 1987 meeting. Contrary to the lease requirement, the attached deed of conservation easement was never recorded. In 1986 or 1987, a conservation easement was recorded by the Petitioner in favor of the Board, but the easement contained no legal description of the subject property. However, the recorded easement does prohibit additional docking facilities and waives the Petitioner's rights of ingress or egress related to any such additional facilities. In early 1991, the Petitioner requested approval to expand the existing dock from 10 to 14 slip. The expanded structure would preempt 5620 square feet of sovereign submerged land. On May 15, 1991, the DER granted approval of the four slip expansion. On November 27, 1991, the DNR, by letter signed by Michael E. Ashley, Chief of the Bureau of Submerged Lands and Preserves, denied the requested four slip expansion. The letter was prepared at the direction and with the approval of the Director of the Division of State Lands. Mr. Ashley cites two reasons for the denial. First, the request violated the terms of the existing lease which provides that there will be no expansion requested. Second, the Petitioner had failed to record the 575 foot conservation easement which was required by the terms of the original lease. The request for extension was not presented to the Governor and Cabinet for consideration, but was reviewed by the "agenda review committee" of the DNR. The committee includes the Deputy Director, two Deputy Assistant Executive Directors, the General Counsel, and the Cabinet Coordinator for the DNR. The committee reviews matters which are identified as potentially requiring Board action to resolve. Where issues exist related to existing sovereignty submerged land leases, the DNR attempts to resolve the matter without referral to the Board. The authority to conduct business in this manner has not been reduced to writing, but is based on verbal direction from the Board and from Cabinet assistants. Subsequent to the letter of denial issued by Mr. Ashley, the Petitioner on or about December 30, 1991, filed a conservation easement granting to the Board, a perpetual interest in a parcel of land lying ten feet landward of the Safe Upland Line as described in the deed recorded in the records of Lee County, Florida, (OR 2268, Page 0401) with the Clerk of Court for Lee County. The parcel of land identified in the deed runs along the shoreline for a distance of 601 feet. The easement provides for modification by the signed agreement of the parties. Because the Petitioner seeks to expand an existing lease, it is required to demonstrate an additional public benefit would result from approval of the request. The Petitioner has proposed to plant an area of mangroves in the shallow "sand bar" area located behind the existing slips. There is no additional public benefit related to the request. The evidence fails to establish that granting the request to expand the docking facility is in the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund enter a Final Order denying the request of Sea Isles Condominium Association to modify the existing sovereignty submerged land lease to provide for four additional boat slips to their existing ten slip docking facility. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1077 The following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 17. Rejected, not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 19. Rejected as to comments by Miller, irrelevant. 20-21. Rejected, irrelevant. Rejected as to 6,010 square feet of permissible preemption. Based upon shoreline calculation which is not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. Rejected, irrelevant. The manatee information was required under the conditions of the existing lease, and do not constitute a benefit to be considered in addressing the request to modify the lease. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 16. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: The Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund c/o Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Robert Routa, Esquire Post Office Drawer 6506 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6506 L. Kathryn Funchess, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station #35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a proposed activity by Cayo Costa Island Partnership is exempt from permitting.
Findings Of Fact Cayo Costa Island is a bridgeless barrier island situated between Gasparilla Island to the north and Captiva Island to the south. East of Cayo Costa Island is Pine Island, and east of Pine Island is Cape Coral. In the 1960s, Travis Gresham subdivided and commenced development of a portion of Cayo Costa Island. Development included the dredging of canals. Eventually, one or more plat maps were recorded in the public records of Lee County, so that warranty deeds for residential lots referred to such recorded plat maps. There is also a subdivision sales plat map, which may not have been recorded. Not all of the land was subdivided into lots. The sales plat map reserves a considerable amount of land and canals for future development. One of the reserved areas is to the east of the subdivided lots. The location of the proposed dock is in the extreme southwest corner of this unplatted area. The dock would be located at the western end of a relatively wide manmade canal, which measures 2000 feet long and 105 feet wide. The east end of the canal terminates in Pine Island Sound. Petitioner and her late husband purchased from Mr. Gresham lot 16 in block 1 over 30 years ago, and they moved onto the island almost 20 years ago. The lot does not abut the canal, nor the upland adjacent to the subject dock. She has permanently resided on the island continuously since 1976. In 1984, she and her husband conveyed their property by warranty deed to the State of Florida, reserving a life estate. Petitioner's husband and some friends constructed the subject dock at the end of the canal in September 1978. A couple of years later, another nearby resident named Carl Noah substantially enlarged the dock. On March 16, 1993, Mr. Noah conveyed by warranty deed his real property to Paul Faust. At the same time, Mr. Noah gave Mr. Faust a quitclaim deed for "boat docks constructed by [Mr. Noah] to be used with the [residential] structure." After purchasing the property from Mr. Noah, Mr. Faust was contacted by Petitioner, who told him that she had previously owned the dock and that Mr. Noah had shared it with her. Mr. Faust agreed to share the dock with her, for as long as he owned it. There are no recorded easements concerning the use of the dock. On the sales plat map, the west end of the canal is clearly separated from the subdivided area by a road, which is named Harbor Drive. However, Harbor Drive was never constructed and there is no physical evidence of the proposed road. Petitioner's late husband and his friends who helped build the dock mistakenly believed that the west end of the canal terminated at Harbor Drive. Undoubtedly, other persons were similarly confused, including the property assessor, who had never assessed the property that separates the west end of the canal from Harbor Drive. However, in May 1993, Noel Andress, one of the partners of Cayo Costa Island Partnership, obtained a warranty deed from Mr. Gresham for a triangular- shaped piece of land running north just to the existing dock from the intersection of Harbor Drive and an actual road known as La Costa Drive. Mr. Andress quitclaimed the triangular-shaped parcel, which is described by metes and bounds, to Cayo Costa Island Partnership on January 13, 1994. After Mr. Andress acquired the triangular-shaped parcel, he directed his attorney to write Petitioner and Mr. Faust and inform them to remove their personal property from the real property that Mr. Andress had recently acquired. Mr. Faust is contesting this matter in court. Unfortunately, the record does not include the application or applications submitted by Cayo Costa Island Partnership. Mr. Andress testified that he submitted an application in February or March of 1993. The proposed dock, which would replace the dock built by Mr. Sellars and Mr. Noah, would serve a single family. The proposed dock would consist of two sections: a 5' by 92' main section and a 6' by 10' walkway to the upland area. Thus, the total area of the dock would be 520 square feet. The application reportedly provides that Cayo Costa Island Partnership would use turbidity barriers during construction. The location of a 92-foot dock running parallel to the end of a 2000- foot long undeveloped canal presents no impediment to navigation. There is no reason to infer an adverse impact to flood control or, as long as turbidity barriers are used, a violation of water quality standards. By letter dated June 15, 1994, the Department of Environmental Protection acknowledged receipt of the application, as well as additional drawings and documents submitted on April 8, 1994. Based on these materials, the letter states that the proposed project "appears to qualify as an activity which is exempt from the need for a Department wetland resource permit under Florida Administrative Code Rule 17-312.050(1)(h)."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order dismissing the petition of Petitioner. ENTERED on November 22, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 22, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings A-C: rejected as not findings of fact. A1: rejected as not finding of fact and irrelevant, except for last sentence, which is adopted or adopted in substance. A2-end: rejected as irrelevant, recitation of evidence, subordinate, and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Cayo Costa's Proposed Findings 1-10: adopted or adopted in substance. 11-12: rejected as subordinate. 13-15: adopted or adopted in substance. 16-23: rejected as subordinate, recitation of testimony, and unnecessary. 24-31: adopted or adopted in substance. 32-33: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Barbara Mathews Trescott Pepper Law Firm 1505 S.E. 40th St. Cape Coral, FL 33904 Mary F. Smallwood Ruden, Barnett P.O. Box 10888 Tallahassee, FL 32302 John Chaves Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
The Issue Whether Respondent, Royal Arms Villas Condominium, Inc., discriminated against Petitioners, Eric and Nora Gross, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are a married couple, living in a rental home at 209 Yorkshire Court, Naples, Florida (rental unit). Petitioners have two children and two grandchildren; however, none of these relatives live in Petitioners’ rental unit. Mr. Gross was diagnosed with stage four hodgkin’s lymphoma in 2002. Mr. Gross has been in remission since 2003. Mr. Gross was declared disabled by the Social Security Administration in 2003. Petitioners have lived in this rental unit since August 2006. A Florida residential lease agreement with the property owners, Joan and Charles Forton, was entered on August 8, 2006.3/ This lease was for a 12-month period, from September 1, 2006, through August 31, 2007. At the end of this period, the lease became a month-to-month lease and continued for years without anyone commenting on it. In 2012, Respondent inquired about a dog that was seen with Petitioners. After providing supporting documentation to Respondent, Petitioners were allowed to keep Mr. Gross’ service dog, Evie. Respondent is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. There are 62 units, and the owner of each unit owns a 1/62 individual share in the common elements. Since its inception, Respondent has, through its members (property owners), approved its articles of incorporation, bylaws, and related condominium powers, and amended its declaration of condominium in accordance with Florida law. Ms. Orrino is currently vice-president of Respondent’s Board of Directors (Board). Ms. Orrino has been on the Board since 2009 and has served in every executive position, including Board president. Ms. Orrino owns two condominiums within Respondent’s domain, but does not reside in either. In 2012 or 2013, Respondent experienced a severe financial crisis, and a new property management company was engaged. This company brought to the attention of Respondent’s Board that it had not been approving leases as required by its Declaration of Condominium.4/ As a result of this information, the Board became more pro-active in its responsibilities, and required all renters to submit a lease each year for the Board’s approval. Petitioners felt they were being singled out by Respondent to provide a new lease. The timing of Respondent’s request made it appear as if Respondent was unhappy about Petitioners keeping Evie. Petitioners then filed a grievance with HUD.5/ HUD enlisted the Commission to handle the grievance, and Mr. Burkes served as the Commission’s facilitator between Petitioners and Respondent. On October 24, 2013, Petitioners executed a Conciliation Agreement (Agreement) with Respondent and the Commission. The terms of the Agreement include: NOW, THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed between the parties as follows: Respondent agrees: To grant Complainants’ request for a reasonable accommodation to keep Eric Gross’s emotional support/service dog (known as “Evie”) in the condominium unit even though it exceeds the height and weight limits for dogs in the community. That their sole remedy for Complainants’ breach of the provisions contained in subparagraphs (a) through (g) below, in addition to the attorney’s fees and costs provision of paragraph 10 of this Agreement, shall be the removal of the Complainants’ dog. Complainants agree: That they will not permit the dog to be on common areas of the association property, except to transport the dog into or out of Complainants’ vehicle, to and from Complainants’ unit, and to take the dog through the backyard of the unit to walk it across the street off association property. That if the dog is outside of the condominium unit, they will at all times keep the dog on a leash and will at all times maintain control of the dog. That if their dog accidentally defecates on association property, they will immediately collect and dispose of the waste. That they are personally responsible and liable for any accidents or damages/injuries done by the dog and that they will indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless and defend Respondent for such claims that may or may not arise against Respondent. That they will not allow the dog to be a nuisance in the community or disrupt the peaceful enjoyment of other residents. A nuisance will specifically include, but is not limited to, loud barking and any show of aggressive behavior, including, but not limited to, aggressive barking, growling or showing of teeth regardless of whether the dog is inside or outside of the unit. That they will abide by all community rules and regulations of Respondent with which all residents are required to comply, including but not limited to submitting to the required pre-lease/lease renewal interview, and completing a lease renewal application and providing his updated information to Respondents and submitting to Respondent a newly executed lease compliant with Florida law and the Declaration of Condominium. The pre-lease/lease renewal interview will be conducted at Complainants’ unit at a time and date agreeable to the parties but not to exceed 30 days from the date of this agreement. If Complainants’ current dog “Evie” should die or otherwise cease to reside in the unit, Complainants agree to replace the dog, if at all, with a dog that is in full compliance with the association’s Declaration of Condominium or Rules and regulations in force at that time and will allow the dog to be inspected by Respondent for approval. Respondent agrees to ensure, to the best of their abilities, that their policies, performance and conduct shall continue to demonstrate a firm commitment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Sections 760.20-37, Florida Statutes, (2012), and the Civil Rights Act of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982 and 3601 et.seq). [sic] Respondent agrees that it, its Board members, employees, agents and representatives shall continue to comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by The Fair Housing Act, which provides that Respondents shall not make, print or publish any notice, statement of advertisement with respect to the rental or sale of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability or familial status. Respondent also agrees to continue to comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by The Fair Housing Act, which prohibits Respondents from maintaining, implementing and effectuating, directly or indirectly, any policy or practice, which causes any discrimination or restriction on the bases of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability or familial status. Respondents also agree to continue to comply with Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute a judgment on the part of the Commission that Respondents did nor did not violate the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended, Section 760.20-37, Florida Statutes (2011). The Commission does not waive its rights to process any additional complaints against the Respondent, including a complaint filed by a member of the Commission. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute an admission on the part of the Respondent that they violated the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended, or Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. Complainants agree to waive and release and do hereby waive and release Respondent from any and all claims, including claims for court costs and attorney fees, against Respondent, with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agree not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in this complaint under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Respondent’s performance of the premises and representations contained herein. The Commission agrees that it will cease processing the above-mentioned Complaint filed by Complainants and shall dismiss with prejudice said complaint based upon the terms of this Agreement. Respondent agrees to waive and release any and all claims, including claims for court costs and attorney fees, against Complainants with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agree not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in these complaints under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Complainants’ performance of the premises and representations contained herein. The parties agree in any action to interpret or enforce this agreement the prevailing party is entitled to the recovery from the non-prevailing party its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including attorney’s fees and costs of any appeal. FURTHER, the Parties hereby agree that: This Agreement may be used as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other forum in which any of the parties allege a breach of this Agreement. Execution of this Agreement may be via facsimile, scanned copy (emailed), or copies reproduced and shall be treated as an original. This Conciliation Agreement may be executed in counterparts. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Conciliation Agreement to be duly executed on the last applicable date, the term of the agreement being from the last applicable date below for so long as any of the rights or obligations described here in continue to exist. Eric Gross and Nora Gross signed the Agreement on October 24, 2013. Ms. Orrino, as President of Respondent, signed the Agreement on September 9. The Commission’s facilitator, Mr. Burkes, signed the Agreement on October 24. The Commission’s housing manager, Regina Owens, signed the Agreement on October 30, and its executive director, Michelle Wilson, signed the Agreement on November 4. The effective date of the Agreement is November 4, the last day it was signed by a party, and the clock started running for compliance. Petitioners failed to abide by the Agreement in the following ways: Petitioners failed to submit an updated lease agreement that conformed to Respondent’s rules and regulations. Petitioners failed to submit to the required pre- lease/lease renewal interview within 30 days of signing the Agreement. Petitioners failed to complete a lease renewal application. Petitioners failed to provide updated information to Respondent. It is abundantly clear that Eric Gross and Ms. Orrino do not get along. However, that personal interaction does not excuse non-compliance with an Agreement that the parties voluntarily entered. Each party to the Agreement had obligations to perform. Respondent attempted to assist Petitioners with their compliance by extending the time in which to comply, and at one point, waving the interview requirement. Petitioners simply failed to comply with the Agreement. Petitioners failed to present any credible evidence that other residents in the community were treated differently. Mr. Gross insisted that the Agreement had sections that Petitioners did not agree to. Mr. Burkes was unable to shed any light on the Agreement or the alleged improprieties that Mr. Gross so adamantly insisted were present.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioners in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2015.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a licensed real estate salesman with license number 0364554. On or about August 13, 1982, Richard J. and Gav Greco entered into a lease purchase agreement with James C. and Phyllis Waid for residential property located at 1685 Markham Woods Road, Longwood, Florida. The purchase price of the Waid property was $190,000 towards which the Grecos made a $10,000 non-refundable deposit and agreed to pay a monthly rental of $1000. On or about November 14, 1982, the Grecos executed an Agreement with Respondent and his wife by which the Grecos assigned all rights and privileges relating to the lease and purchase of the residence at 1685 Markham Woods Road to the Alvarados. The consideration to be given for this Agreement was a payment of $10,000 by the Alvarados to the Grecos, with $5000 payable upon signing of the Agreement and $5000 payable within six months. The Alvarados, as assignees, agreed to abide by all provisions of the lease purchase agreement and were to make their first $1000 monthly lease payment to the Waids on December 4, 1982. Respondent gave Richard J. Greco a check in the amount of $5000 dated November 14, 1982 and requested that he hold the check for a couple of days before depositing it. Greco complied with the request, but was advised on December 3, 1982 that Respondent's $5000 check had been returned unused by Respondent's bank due to the fact that Respondent's account had been closed. Respondent has never paid the Grecos any part of the $10,000 due them under the assignment executed November 14, 1982. Respondent made no monthly lease payments on the property to the Waids. By letter dated February 25, 1983, James C. Waid notified the Grecos and the Alvarados that the lease purchase agreement was in default and that the $10,000 deposit paid by the Grecos was being forfeited because the rent was in arrears. The Grecos paid the Waids an additional $4000 on March 1, 1983, which represented the unpaid lease payments, for a general release from all obligations under the lease purchase agreement. Respondent and his wife executed a promissory note on March 1, 1983 whereby they agreed to pay the Grecos $10,000 on or before March 16, 1983, but no payments have ever been made pursuant to this promissory note. The Grecos brought suit against Respondent and his wife for damages arising out of this transaction, and obtained a Final Judgment on June 30, 1983 in Case No. 83-1191-CA-03-P, Circuit Court in and for Seminole County, in the amount of $15,101.28. The Grecos have not been able to execute this Final Judgment and therefore no payments on this judgment have been made to them by the Respondent or his wife. At the time of this transaction, the Alvarados were family friends of the Grecos. Richard J. Greco entered into this transaction with Respondent primarily because of the personal acquaintance and not because Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman. However, Greco knew that Respondent was licensed and therefore assumed that he was a man of integrity who would deal fairly with him in this real estate transaction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final order be issued suspending Respondent's license for a Period of one (1) Year. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson St. Orlando, Fl. 32802 Ignacio J. Alvarado 5166 Glasgow Avenue Orlando, Fl. 32819 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Fl. 32802 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, Fl. 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Keith Rockman's construction of a dock and other structures on Choctawhatchee Bay in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, is exempt from Wetland Resource Permit requirements, and whether authorization to use sovereign submerged lands for the project should be given.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: On December 19, 2005, Mr. Rockman, who lives at 325 Brooks Street, Southeast, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, filed an application with the Department's Northwest District Office in Pensacola requesting authorization to construct a platform seven feet wide by eight feet long; an access pier three feet long; another access pier four feet wide by forty-five feet long; four mooring pilings outside the slip; and ten mooring pilings inside the proposed slip, totaling 371 square feet. The application indicated that the proposed construction activities would take place in the Choctawhatchee Bay, a Class III water of the State, on which Mr. Rockman's property fronts. (This waterbody is more commonly known as the Santa Rosa Sound or the Intracoastal Waterway.) The property already had an existing 25-foot dock when Mr. Rockman purchased the property sometime in 2005; however, because Mr. Rockman wishes to dock a larger boat than the prior owner, he has requested authorization to build the structures in issue here. Based upon the information supplied by the applicant, Diana Athnos, an Environmental Manager with the Northwest District Office, advised Mr. Rockman by letter dated January 31, 2006, that the Department had "determined that [his] project is exempted from [the Department's] Wetland Resource Permit requirements by Rule 62-312.050(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code." The letter also stated that the "letter is your authorization to use sovereign submerged land (if applicable) for the construction of your project, as required by Chapter 253.77, Florida Statutes and Chapter 18-21, F.A.C." After Department approval was obtained, Mr. Rockman completed construction of the project. Mr. Rockman elected not to publish notice of the Department's decision or provide notice by certified mail to specific individuals. Therefore, third parties were not barred from challenging the Department's decision until after they received actual notice. Petitioner, who lives next door to Mr. Rockman, learned about the Department's decision in a telephone call with the Northwest District Office on March 8, 2006. The papers filed in this case indicate that Petitioner and other neighbors had actually observed construction activities on Mr. Rockman's property in November 2005 and had filed complaints with the Department regarding these unauthorized activities. These complaints evidently led to the filing of an application by Mr. Rockman. On March 17, 2006, Petitioner, who resides at 328 Brooks Street, Southeast, Fort Walton Beach, and has 50 feet of frontage on the water with a dock extending into those waters, filed a letter with the Department, which was treated as a Petition challenging the Department's earlier decision. This Petition was later dismissed by the Department on the ground it raised claims concerning Petitioner's riparian rights, a matter beyond the Department's jurisdiction. Petitioner then filed an Amended Petition on July 11, 2006, in which he again contended that his riparian rights would be severely restricted by the proposed activities, and that the dock would create a navigational hazard. Although Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-312.050(1)(d)3. requires that a project not "create a navigational hazard" in order to be exempt from permitting requirements, Petitioner opted to base his claims on two provisions in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(7), which contains the general conditions for authorizations to use sovereign submerged lands. The riparian rights issue was again excluded from consideration at a status conference held on January 5, 2007. The parties advise that this issue is now being pursued in a separate action in circuit court. Through the introduction into evidence of its complete permit file as Department Composite Exhibit 1, the Department established that the proposed activities are exempt from permitting requirements under Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-312.050(1)(d). More specifically, the activity will take place in waters which are not located in Outstanding Florida Waters; the structures are less than 1,000 square feet of surface area over the landward extent of waters of the State; they will be used for recreational purposes; they will be constructed on pilings; they will not substantially impede the flow of water or create a navigational hazard; and the structure is the sole dock constructed pursuant to the exemption as measured along the shoreline for a minimum distance of 65 feet. The dock and associated structures and pilings will be constructed over sovereign submerged lands owned by the State of Florida. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005(1), which specifies the forms of authorization for consent to use sovereign submerged lands, "no application or written authorization is required for an activity that is exempt from the requirements of obtaining a permit," so long as certain conditions are met, including those found in Florida Administrative Code Rules 18-21.004(7). See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.005(1)(b). The only relevant condition raised in the Amended Petition is whether or not the "[s]tructures or activities shall . . . create a navigational hazard." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(7)(g). In construing this rule, and the similar requirement in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 312.050(1)(d)3., the Department considers whether the structures will create a navigational hazard for boaters on the Intracoastal Waterway, as well as the owners of property who reside on either side of Mr. Rockman. In his Amended Petition, Mr. Woolshlager contended that the proposed structures or activities will create a navigational hazard when he accesses the dock in front of his property. As clarified at hearing, Petitioner does not dispute that he (or any "good boat driver") has adequate ingress and egress for his smaller boat, even with the larger dock on Mr. Rockman's property. Indeed, the record shows that he has been observed leaving his dock and accessing the Intracoastal Waterway. However, Petitioner indicated that if he should die, his wife intends to sell the property. If the new purchaser desires to dock a larger boat, he fears that there will not be sufficient room to do so, and the value of his property will be diminished. Through testimony from a licensed boat captain, it was established that Mr. Rockman's dock does not create a navigational hazard for boaters in the Intracoastal Waterway whose boat channel lies at least 600 feet or so from the shoreline, or for property owners on either side of the applicant's property. Although Petitioner cannot dock a larger boat than he now has (a 21-foot boat), this is because he needs to dredge out the area where his existing dock is built and reconfigure its shape. (Mr. Woolshlager agreed that his dock actually encroaches a few feet onto Mr. Rockman's property; however, Mr. Woolshlager advises that the prior owner (who sold the property to Mr. Rockman) agreed to this encroachment when he purchased the property.) Therefore, all criteria have been satisfied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting Mr. Rockman's application for an exemption from permitting requirements and authorization to use state-owned submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John N. C. Ledbetter, Esquire 4641 Gulfstarr Drive Suite 102 Destin, Florida 32541-5324 Nona R. Schaffner, Esquire Amanda G. Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael William Mead, Esquire John S. Mead, Esquire Michael Wm Mead, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1329 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549-1329 Gregory M. Munson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Respondent Carter is the owner of real property located at 102 Hummingbird Lane, Crescent City, Putnam County, Florida, ("The Property") The Property has a shore length of 68.5 feet on Crescent Lake. Crescent Lake is a "water of the state" as defined in Section 403.031, F.S. The agency, now DEP, is the state agency charged with environmental concerns and permission to use submerged state lands. There are two types of authorization an applicant must receive in order to construct a dock on state owned submerged lands. The first is regulatory, which addresses issues concerning environmental impacts. The second is proprietary, which addresses issues concerning use of state owned submerged lands. Mr. and Mrs. Hageman, Petitioners herein, own property adjacent on the east of Mr. Carter's property. 1/ They have a 240 foot dock in place going out into Crescent Lake. Mr. Carter's westerly neighbor also has a shorter dock going into the lake. The Carters purchased the Property from an estate, with the announced intention to erect their own dock for water recreational purposes. Before closing the sale, they were warned off the property by Mr. Hageman who claimed his riparian rights would be violated if any dock were built on the Property. After inquiries to DEP and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Carters purchased The Property anyway. DEP has no jurisdiction to regulate docks under 1000 square feet. Mr. Carter received DEP Exemption 542504222 to construct a dock under 1000 square feet on The Property. Mr. Carter constructed a single family private use dock, including a boat shelter, extending from The Property into Crescent Lake. The dock was built approximately 35 feet from Hagemans' property line, straight out into the water, and 25 feet from the property line of his neighbor on the other side. This placed the Carter dock roughly perpendicular to the approximate center of Mr. Carter's shoreline. Petitioners conceded that Mr. Carter honored his westerly neighbor's property line, but asserted that he should have, and had not, honored his easterly property line, the line dividing his and Petitioners' property, waterward beyond the shoreline. In all, Petitioners Hageman have filed three formal petitions against the Carter dock. See Findings of Fact 16, 18, and 33, infra. All three petitions herein oppose the Carter dock as constructed upon a theory that it crosses Petitioner's riparian rights line and therefore violates the setback criteria found in Rule 18-21.004(3)(d) F.A.C.; that it blocks a channel exclusive to Petitioners' use and poses an impediment to navigation of all boats, particularly Petitioners' sailboat; that its boat shelter is enclosed contrary to rule; that it does not meet the ten-to-one rule; and that it blocks Petitioners' view and lowers their property value. The Hagemans initially filed a complaint with the DEP in regard to the dock. In response to the Hagemans' complaint, Steven Biemiller, an environmental specialist in the dredge and fill compliance/enforcement section of DEP's northeast district, and John Hendricks of the Army Corps of Engineers visited the Property on July 25, 1994. They found that the Carter dock as built exceeded 1,000 square feet in surface area. It was, however, consistent in length, width, and alignment with other docks in the area, including Petitioners' dock. Mr. Biemiller calculated Carter's dock to be 1,400 square feet. It therefore exceeded the state exemption criteria and required a state permit. Mr. Carter had constructed his dock without a valid permit from the state agency, and DEP responded by issuing him a warning letter. Carter and DEP thereafter entered into Consent Order O.C.G. 94-2443 to address the unpermitted dock construction. Testifying as an expert in the agency's enforcement and compliance procedures, Mr. Biemiller established that negotiated consent orders of this type are a standard agency procedure to resolve minor permitting violations. His testimony is accepted on that issue and to the effect that the purpose of all consent orders, including the one at issue here, is to return the non-complying structure to compliance with the applicable state rules and statutes. The consent order provides, in pertinent part, that Mr. Carter will (a) pay the agency $300.00, which amount includes a $200.00 civil penalty and $100.00 for agency costs and expenses; AND (b) reduce the size of his dock to under 1,000 square feet or obtain an after-the-fact permit whereby the agency would authorize the 1400 square foot dock to remain in place as already constructed. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the consent order. The consent order herein addressed DEP's environmental concerns by jump-starting the permit process through which the agency could examine the environmental impacts posed by the dock project. In Mr. Biemiller's expert opinion, this consent order accomplished the agency's statutory and regulatory goals at that point because Mr. Carter paid his fine and applied for a dredge and fill permit. Agency permit 542558842 was issued to Mr. Carter on November 16, 1994. It approved the proposed project and authorized construction of a private use dock having a 4.75-foot wide plus 230-foot long access walkway, a 10.3-foot wide and 20.3-foot long covered boat shelter, plus an 8.5-foot long and 12.8-foot wide waterward "L" platform, within Crescent Lake, Putnam County. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the permit. The Hagemans' concerns about the Carter dock and boat shelter blocking their view and diminishing their property value were raised by their petitions, but no evidence or argument was presented on the latter issue. "View" and market value concerns are not addressed by the jurisdiction or authority conferred upon DEP by either statute or rule, and may not be considered here. In determining whether or not to issue dredge and fill permits, the agency examines a project's impact on water quality, its biological impacts, whether the project is contrary to the public interest and how it impacts, if at all, on wetlands. The agency does not look at riparian rights. Those rights are addressed, if at all, by agency review of applications for consents of use and the rules applicable thereto. Thomas Wiley was the field inspector for the dredge and fill permit which is at issue. He visited Mr. Carter's property with another agency employee, Erica Robbins, to conduct a site assessment. Mr. Wiley prepared the Permit Application Appraisal. Mr. Wiley has a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental biology and twelve hours towards his Masters degree in the same discipline. He has been employed by the agency for four and a half years as a environmental specialist. During that time, he has reviewed approximately 300 dredge and fill applications. He was accepted as an expert in the agency's environmental resource permitting procedures and the impacts of dredging and filling projects on wetlands. Mr. Wiley recommended issuance of the permit in part based on his determination that the long term adverse impacts of the Carter dock on water quality are minimal and that the long term adverse impacts of the project on submerged resources also are minimal. His expert opinion on these issues is accepted, as is his unrefuted mixed fact and opinion testimony that the project site contains submerged beds of eelgrass (vallisnaria). These eelgrass beds end approximately 20 feet landward of the Carter boat shelter and dock. Carter's boat shelter and dock do not pose a significant impact to the eelgrass and will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife. The Carter boat shelter has one almost closed side, one side which descends to about one and a half feet above the water and two open ends. It is not substantially different from other local boat shelters. There are water hyacinths in the same area as the eelgrass and nearer to the shoreline. DEP has issued a permit to Mr. Hageman to clear such water hyacinths from a 25-foot swath in front of his property so as to keep clear the channel to his dock and boat shelter. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that Mr. Hageman has been zealous in his removal of water hyacinths and has exceeded the 25-foot limitation. Existence of this permit allowing Mr. Hageman to remove hyacinths and existence of this larger cleared swath of water/shoreline is not dependable evidence of the Hagemans' riparian rights claim and does not alter or affect DEP's determination that no aquatic plants will be seriously endangered by the Carter dock and boat shelter. The parties stipulated that the construction of Carter's dock has not, and will not, degrade the water quality of Crescent Lake and that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 62-302 F.A.C., are not violated because of the construction of the dock. The parties stipulated that the Carter dock as constructed will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational value or marine productivity on Crescent Lake. The parties stipulated that the dock as constructed will not adversely affect any historical or archaeological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061 F.S. In determining whether a dock poses a navigational impediment, DEP looks for the presence of marked navigational channels and the proximity of the dock to other docks in the area. The credible competent evidence as a whole shows that the Carter dock is similar to the Hagemans' dock and is located about 100 feet west of the Hagemans' dock. The Carter structure also conforms with the prevailing alignment of all docks in the immediate area and its distance from neighboring structures is sufficient so that the Carter dock will not present a hindrance to navigation. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the Hagemans have sailed in and out from their adjacent dock without any obvious problems occasioned by the Carter dock. There is plenty of room between the Carter and Hageman docks so that the Carter dock has not so far obstructed the Hagemans' ability to navigate their sailboat. Mr. Carter has provided reasonable assurances that his dock is not contrary to the public interest under Section 373.414 (1)(a) F.S. In determining the cumulative impacts a project may have, the agency looks at the total impact of past, present and future projects on water quality and function in wetland systems. Mr. Wiley determined it is reasonable to expect other lakefront property owners will construct docks into the lake, but based on his experience and expertise, he concluded that Mr. Carter's project's long-term impact still will continue to be minimal. The permit is appropriate and insures compliance with all applicable statutory and rule guidelines for dredge and fill permits. Mr. Carter also applied to the agency for a consent of use for submerged state lands. This was appropriate because Crescent Lake is a "water of the state". A consent of use is generally a letter of authorization for minor projects, such as single family docks, bulkheads and dredging that occur on state owned land and submerged land. The ten-to-one ratio found in Rule 18- 21.005(1)(a)2 F.A.C. allows an applicant to have ten square feet of preempted area for every linear foot of the shoreline that he owns. If an applicant meets the rule criteria, he is issued a consent of use. Generally, if an applicant exceeds the criteria, he would be issued a lease, as opposed to a consent of use. The agency issued a consent of use to Mr. Carter on December 5, 1994. The Hagemans filed a petition challenging the consent of use. DEP acts as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The authority to issue consents of use has been delegated to a planning manager. In the instant situation, that planning manager was Russell Price. Russell Price is employed by DEP as planning manager of the submerged land section and has served in that capacity for two years. Mr. Price holds a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, has a year of education towards his Master's degree in biology, and has reviewed approximately two to three hundred applications for consents of use. Mr. Price was accepted as an expert in state lands determination and regulation. In issuing the consent of use to Mr. Carter, Mr. Price relied on his education, training and experience in state lands regulation, and considered the application, the drawings, the agency's regulatory permit section's field report, comments from staff of the Army Corps of Engineers and a memorandum from the agency's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. See Finding of Fact 40. Mr. Price opined, on behalf of the agency's interpretation of its own statute and rules, that the agency does not uniformly require a lease where the ten-to-one rule is minimally exceeded; that the agency will issue a consent of use if the applicant's structure is still relatively small and is configured in the minimum way possible to obtain access at reasonable water depths; that in its discretion, the agency does not apply the ten-to-one rule to require leases; 2/ and that consents of use are issued to single docks that are the minimum length necessary to reach reasonable access to navigable waters. Mr. Price issued the consent of use in this case after determining that Mr. Carter's dock as constructed was a single family dock configured in the minimum size and length necessary to achieve reasonable access to navigable waters and that the nearshore area located adjacent to Mr. Carter's upland property required that his dock exceed the ten-to-one ratio in order to access reasonable water depths for navigation. In so doing, Mr. Price relied on the DEP Permit Application Appraisal measurement of the water depth at the end of Carter's dock as 4.5 feet deep and analyzed the configuration and angle of the other docks in the area. This was in accord with the specific language of Rule 18-21.005(1)(a)1 F.A.C. 3/ Evidence adduced at formal hearing suggests that there has been some erosion, possibly due to the removal of the water hyacinths and that shows that it is environmentally desirable to avoid recreational contact with the eelgrass, especially by boats. These factors also support the reasonableness of Carter's dock configuration, even though it minimally exceeds the ten-to-one rule. Petitioners Hageman contended that their riparian rights may be determined by projecting a line straight waterward from the upland fence line between their lot and Mr. Carter's property. If that is the appropriate determination of their riparian rights, then the Carter dock does cross that projected line, but that projected line has not been placed by a surveyor or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. At best, there has been a post erected by Mr. Hageman as the result of a prior lawsuit concerning easements. Respondent Carter's property is narrower than Petitioners' property and somewhat wedge-shaped. Petitioners assert that because the lake curves, Mr. Carter's riparian rights form a narrow pie slice-shaped area in the water. However, without a legal determination to that effect, there is only the foregoing unsupported assertion concerning either landowner's riparian rights. Although the agency's rules require a 25-foot setback of a dock (10- foot setback for marginal docks) from the applicant's riparian rights line, 4/ the agency does not measure the setback of a dock by that rule unless there has already been a determination of a riparian rights line by a court of law. DEP witnesses clearly enunciated and explicated agency policy that DEP does not affirmatively take it upon itself to determine riparian rights as between private land owners because the agency has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to do so. To Mr. Price's knowledge, the agency has never determined the riparian rights line of two private property owners. The agency relies on circuit courts to resolve those types of disputes. In response to the Hagemans' concerns about encroachment on their asserted riparian rights and in an abundance of caution, Mr. Price sent aerial photographs, the county plat map, and the drawings submitted with Mr. Carter's application to the DEP's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. He requested that the Bureau make a guesstimation of the common riparian rights line based on a methodology it has developed for estimating riparian rights lines. The memorandum constitutes little more than legal research discussing various methodologies courts have used in the past for determining riparian rights. It reaches no definite conclusion with regard to the riparian rights between the Hagemans and Carter. Beyond explaining and supplementing the direct evidence of the agency policy to rely on courts to determine riparian rights, its contents and conclusions are unreliable hearsay which is outside the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S., because no one connected with the preparation of that report testified at formal hearing. No reliable determination of the riparian rights line dividing the Petitioners' property and the property of Applicant/Respondent Carter was presented as evidence at formal hearing. DEP is not aware that any court determination specifically setting out the boundaries of the parties' riparian rights exists. DEP did not require Mr. Carter to institute a lawsuit to establish riparian boundaries before considering his application. This also appears to be common agency procedure. The agency addressed the absence of a clear showing of riparian rights and implemented its policy directed thereto in the standard language of the consent of use, which provided in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Grantee agrees that all title and interest to all lands lying below the historical mean high water line or ordinary high water line are vested in the Board, and shall make no claim of title or interest in said lands by reason of the occupancy or use thereof * * * 5. Grantee agrees to indeminity, defend and hold harmless the Board and the State of Florida from all claims, actions, lawsuits and demands arising out of this consent. * * * 12. In the event that any part of the structure(s) consented to herein is determined by a final adjudication issued by a court of competent jurisdiction to encroach on or interfere with adjacent riparian rights, Grantee agrees to either obtain written consent for the offending structure from the affected riparian owner or to remove the interference or encroachment within 60 days from the date of the adjudication. Failure to comply shall constitute a material breach of this consent and shall be grounds for its immediate termination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that dismisses the three petitions, ratifies the consent order, and issues the after- the-fact permit and consent of use with the safeguards already contained therein to protect the Petitioners' riparian rights in case the Petitioners hereafter obtain a circuit court determination of those riparian rights. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1995
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a dealer in heavy construction equipment and has been since its incorporation on August 1, 1946. Among petitioner's competitors are Dewind Machinery Company, Florida Equipment Company of Jacksonville, Florida- Georgia Tractor Company, Inc., Great Southern Equipment Company, Inc., Pilot Equipment Company, Inc., Ring Power Corporation and Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Company. Like its competitors, petitioner frequently leases equipment to its customers, giving them an option to purchase, rather than selling them the equipment outright. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1 reflects one such transaction. On April 19, 1973, petitioner quoted Houdaille Duval Wright Company (Houdaille) a purchase price of twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) plus sale's tax, and monthly rent of fourteen hundred dollars ($1,400.00) plus sales tax on a diesel powered, self-propelled vibratory roller. After negotiations between petitioner and Houdaille, the purchase price dropped to seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), but the monthly rental remained unchanged. Houdaille agreed to lease the vibratory roller from petitioner on these terms. With respect to its option to purchase, Houdaille specified that: 100 percent of all rentals to apply towards purchase price of $17,000.00 less 10 percent discount on remaining outstanding balance at time of purchase. Interest to accrue at a rate 7 1/2 percent simple. Houdaille made lease payments for nine months, totaling twelve thousand six hundred dollars ($12,600.00), before electing to exercise its option to purchase. In calculating the amount of money Houdaille was to pay to close out the transaction, petitioner began by treating the payments Houdaille had made under the lease as if they had been payments made in repayment of a loan, outstanding for the period of the lease, in the amount of seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), at 7 1/2 percent per annum. Petitioner allocated portions of each lease payment to principal and to interest, calculated on the declining principal balance, aggregating eleven thousand nine hundred ten dollars and fifty-four cents ($11,910.54) to principal, and six hundred eighty-nine dollars and fourty-six cents ($689.46) to interest. Petitioner then calculated the 10 percent discount by multiplying one tenth times the difference between the original price ($17,000.00) and the amount aggregated to principal ($11,910.54), which yielded five hundred eight dollars and ninety-five cents ($508.95). This figure was subtracted from the original contract price ($17,000.00) to ascertain the' discounted price ($16,491.05) against which the lease payments were credited in their entirety ($12,600.00), yielding the figure three thousand eight hundred ninety-one dollars and five cents ($3,891.05), on which petitioner calculated 4 percent sales tax. In addition, petitioner required Houdaille, in exercising its option to purchase, to pay six hundred eighty-nine dollars and forty-six cents ($689.46), the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. In every respect pertinent to the dispute between petitioner and respondent, this transaction between petitioner and Houdaille is typical of the transactions on which contested portions of the tax assessments were based. The same is true of petitioner's lease and sale of a truck crane to Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc. (Poston), the transaction reflected in exhibit No. 2 (although petitioner's agreement with Poston did not involve a discount.) The terms of the lease purchase agreement, as stated on respondent's exhibit No. 2, were: Option Price $124,855.00 with 100 percent of paid rentals to apply to purchase price less interest at 8.5 percent simple. After making lease payments totalling twenty-six thousand dollars ($26,000.00), Poston exercised its option to purchase. At this point the lease payments were recast as installment sales payments, portions being allocated to principal and interest accordingly. Respondent collected sales tax on the amount of money Poston paid in exchange for title, after electing to purchase, less the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. Petitioner has been entering into lease purchase agreements of this kind with various customers since 1946 or 1947, and, when customers exercised purchase options, petitioner ordinarily calculated sales tax in the manner it employed in connection with the sale of the vibratory roller to Houdaille, and the truck crane to Poston. In at least one instance, however, petitioner calculated sales tax as 4 percent of all the money a customer, Misener Marine Construction, Inc., paid when exercising its option to purchase a truck crane, including portions of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. On the lease payments themselves, petitioner regularly collected 4 percent sales tax which it regularly remitted to respondent. For federal income tax purposes, petitioner treated payments from customers under a lease purchase agreement as lease payments for every tax year in which the option to purchase was not exercised. For the tax year in which the option to purchase was exercised, the lease payments were treated as payments under an installment sale contract, for federal income tax purposes. When respondent audited petitioner's rentals for the period May 1, 1970, to April 30, 1973, and earlier when respondent performed a general audit of petitioner's books for the period July 1, 1959, to February 28, 1962, no mention was mace of petitioner's sales tax treatment of lease purchase agreements under which lessees had exercised purchase options. Before the audit which eventuated in the assessments now in controversy, however, the auditors were given a copy of a letter from L. N. Hansen to Thomas D. Aitken dated December 9, 1974. Mr. Hansen was formerly director of respondent's sales and use tax division. In the fall of 1974, he was one of a group or "board" of respondent's employees who considered questions arising under the tax laws and formulated policy for respondent. His letter to Mr. Aitken, which came in evidence as, petitioner's exhibit No. 5, was written on behalf of respondent after its substance was discussed at a meeting of respondent's policy group. It pertains to lease purchase agreements entered into by Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Co. (Rozier). Mr. Hansen's letter stated that Rozier was "not correct in reducing the taxable sales price by the rental payments and thereafter adding an interest charge which, if it was incurred at all, was incurred prior to the time of sale." Petitioner's exhibit No. 5, p. 1. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stucky's of Eastman, Georgia vs. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which appears as an appendix to the order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent abandon the uncollected portions of its deficiency assessments. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 4-8, and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2 is irrelevant insofar as it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, and for that reason has not been adopted where it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3 has not been adopted because it is not relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 9 has not been adopted because what motivated respondent's employees is not relevant and because it was not proven what would have happened "[b]ut for the Hansen letter." Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 11 and 12 have not been adopted because they are irrelevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 13 has not been adopted as such because it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. The first paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, except that exercise of the purchase option may be said to relate back to the beginning of the contract. Significantly, respondent proposes as a finding of fact that the "amount termed 'Interest' . . . is payable for the use of the money during the rental/lease period." Paragraphs two through seven, nine and ten of respondent's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. The eighth paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has not been adopted; it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire Post Office Box 1118 424 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ms. Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether respondent's license as a registered residential contractor and a registered plumbing contractor should be disciplined on charges that he unlawfully (1) diverted funds received for the purchase of a lot and construction of a home; (2) acted in the capacity of a contractor and used a name other than that appearing on his license; (3) aided and abetted an uncertified or unregistered person to violate the Construction industry Licensing Law; and (4) failed to properly qualify percent business organization.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Is a Licensed Contractor At all times material to the charges, respondent John W. Powell was licensed as a registered residential contractor (license no. RR 0002745) and a registered plumbing contractor (license no. RF 0038050). (Prehearing Stipulation; P-7) Respondent's Sale and Conveyance of Real Property In October, 1978, Joseph J. D'Antoni, a resident of Baltimore, Maryland, visited Indian Lake Estates Subdivision ("Subdivision") in Polk County, Florida, with the intention of purchasing a lot. Respondent, who owned numerous lots in the Subdivision, agreed to sell two lots to Mr. D'Antoni (and his brother-in-law) for the sum of $7,500. Mr. D'Antoni gave him a $1,000 payment, then mailed him the $6,500 balance after returning to Maryland. (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-2) Respondent then executed and mailed a warranty deed conveying Lot 5, Block 340, Indian Lake Estates Subdivision, Unit II, to Mr. D'Antoni and his wife. He used a standard warranty deed form printed for Lawyers' Title Guaranty Fund, Orlando, Florida, and conforming to Section 689.02, Florida Statutes. As grantor, he "fully warrant[ed] the title to said land, and [promised to] defend the same against the lawful claims of all persons whomsoever." (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-2) The deed was prepared by John P. White, an attorney in Lake Wales, Florida. Although respondent, as grantor, did not limit his warranty except for a standard limitation relating to taxes, easements, restrictions, and conditions of record), the preparer of the deed included a personal disclaimer indicating that he (the preparer) was expressing no opinion as to the condition of title: The preparer of this instrument was neither furnished with or requested to review an abstract on the described property and therefore expresses no opinion as to the condition of title. (P-2) Mr. D'Antoni was unaware that the property was encumbered by a mortgage held by the First Highlands Service Corporation. The mortgage had been executed by respondent in 1973. It covered numerous lots in the Subdivision and secured a loan of $330,000. Mr. D'Antoni, who trusted respondent, thought that he was receiving the property free and clear of encumbrances. Respondent did not tell him otherwise. Although the title disclaimer was not read by Mr. D'Antoni, it, by its terms, applied only to Mr. White, the identified preparer of the deed. It did not affect the warranty of title given by respondent, the grantor. (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-2) A year later, in December, 1979, First Highlands Service Corporation sued the D'Antonis, Joseph Giardina, (his brother-in-law), and 19 other owners, seeking to foreclose its mortgage covering the Subdivision lots. In order to obtain release from the mortgage, the D'Antonis and Mr. Giardina paid First Highland Service Corporation $4,000 each. Respondent neither defended their title to the property, nor repaid them the $4,000. (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-4, P-5) Respondent's Construction of a House for the D'Antonis On November 6, 1978, after the deed to lot 5 was executed and delivered, the D'Antonis executed a construction contract with J. W. Powell and Sons, Inc. Respondent, who signed as President of J. W. Powell and Sons, Inc., had not qualified that company with the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. (Testimony of D'Antoni; Prehearing Stipulation, P-6) Under the contract, respondent agreed-to build a house on lot 5, in accordance with certain specifications, for $42,000. Item 10 of Article 8 specifies that the price includes "city water." The home was built; the D'Antonis paid the purchase price, then moved in. Some time later, they were sued by Consolidated Utility Company for $425, the waterline connection fee. They subsequently paid that amount, plus court costs, to the utility company. (Testimony of D'Antoni; P-6) At the time respondent built the D'Antonis' house, Wilbur Sheffer was employed by Consolidated Utility Company to install waterlines along Fort Meyers Drive, the road where the D'Antonis' house was located. Mr. Sheffer installed the waterlines up to the individual property boundaries. It was standard practice for contractors to pay sewer charges and water meter deposit and connection (or tap-in) fees when they obtained their building permits, after which he would install the meter. The contractors would then lay waterline from the meter to the home, leaving the line uncovered for later inspection. Property owners were not allowed to connect to the adjacent waterlines unless fees were paid and the meters installed. Respondent paid the meter fee on the D'Antonis' home, but the meter was not installed because he did not pay the connection fee. Nevertheless, respondent, without authorization from the utility company, connected the D'Antonis' house to the utility's adjacent waterlines. (Testimony of Sheffer; P-8) On block 340 of the subdivision, where Ft. Meyers Drive was located, respondent was responsible for paying the water tap fees when the water was available. Records of the utility company show that respondent paid two of the four water tap fees he was billed for on block 340. At the time the D'Antonis' home was under construction, the utility company sometimes negotiated with contractors, who were building homes in the Subdivision, and waived tap fees in exchange for their constructing adjacent waterlines. However, such line extension agreements were usually handled through the office of the company's engineer, Richard Madaus. Mr. Madaus had no record of any agreement with respondent regarding waterline extensions to block 340, where the D'Antonis' home was being constructed. Instead, the records show that respondent was billed for connection fees on block 340 as early as October 26, 1978, and that, thereafter, he paid tap fees for two of the four homes on that block in March and July of 1979. (Testimony of Madaus; P-9a, P-9c, P-9d, P-9e) Respondent's testimony that he was never billed for water connection fees in block 340 and that it was not his responsibility to pay those fees because he had already paid for installing the adjacent waterline, is not credible given the fact that he paid two such connection fees and that the utility company requested these connection fees from him before he began building the D'Antonis' home. The only change in the utility company's policy occurring around the time the D'Antonis' home was constructed was to request the health department to notify the company when septic tank permits for homes in the Subdivision were paid for so that the company could request tap fees at the same time. (P-9a-F) Respondent's Failure to Qualify J. W. Powell and Sons, Inc. It is undisputed that respondent failed to qualify J. W. Powell and Sons, Inc. with the Construction Industry Licensing Board. He did not know that such action was required. The attorney who formed the corporation did not tell him of this requirement. Neither did the county tax collector who Issued him occupation licenses under both his and the corporation's name. (Testimony of respondent)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent be fined $500. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 1983.
