The Issue The issues are whether Keith Rockman's construction of a dock and other structures on Choctawhatchee Bay in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, is exempt from Wetland Resource Permit requirements, and whether authorization to use sovereign submerged lands for the project should be given.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the following findings of fact are made: On December 19, 2005, Mr. Rockman, who lives at 325 Brooks Street, Southeast, Fort Walton Beach, Florida, filed an application with the Department's Northwest District Office in Pensacola requesting authorization to construct a platform seven feet wide by eight feet long; an access pier three feet long; another access pier four feet wide by forty-five feet long; four mooring pilings outside the slip; and ten mooring pilings inside the proposed slip, totaling 371 square feet. The application indicated that the proposed construction activities would take place in the Choctawhatchee Bay, a Class III water of the State, on which Mr. Rockman's property fronts. (This waterbody is more commonly known as the Santa Rosa Sound or the Intracoastal Waterway.) The property already had an existing 25-foot dock when Mr. Rockman purchased the property sometime in 2005; however, because Mr. Rockman wishes to dock a larger boat than the prior owner, he has requested authorization to build the structures in issue here. Based upon the information supplied by the applicant, Diana Athnos, an Environmental Manager with the Northwest District Office, advised Mr. Rockman by letter dated January 31, 2006, that the Department had "determined that [his] project is exempted from [the Department's] Wetland Resource Permit requirements by Rule 62-312.050(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code." The letter also stated that the "letter is your authorization to use sovereign submerged land (if applicable) for the construction of your project, as required by Chapter 253.77, Florida Statutes and Chapter 18-21, F.A.C." After Department approval was obtained, Mr. Rockman completed construction of the project. Mr. Rockman elected not to publish notice of the Department's decision or provide notice by certified mail to specific individuals. Therefore, third parties were not barred from challenging the Department's decision until after they received actual notice. Petitioner, who lives next door to Mr. Rockman, learned about the Department's decision in a telephone call with the Northwest District Office on March 8, 2006. The papers filed in this case indicate that Petitioner and other neighbors had actually observed construction activities on Mr. Rockman's property in November 2005 and had filed complaints with the Department regarding these unauthorized activities. These complaints evidently led to the filing of an application by Mr. Rockman. On March 17, 2006, Petitioner, who resides at 328 Brooks Street, Southeast, Fort Walton Beach, and has 50 feet of frontage on the water with a dock extending into those waters, filed a letter with the Department, which was treated as a Petition challenging the Department's earlier decision. This Petition was later dismissed by the Department on the ground it raised claims concerning Petitioner's riparian rights, a matter beyond the Department's jurisdiction. Petitioner then filed an Amended Petition on July 11, 2006, in which he again contended that his riparian rights would be severely restricted by the proposed activities, and that the dock would create a navigational hazard. Although Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-312.050(1)(d)3. requires that a project not "create a navigational hazard" in order to be exempt from permitting requirements, Petitioner opted to base his claims on two provisions in Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.004(7), which contains the general conditions for authorizations to use sovereign submerged lands. The riparian rights issue was again excluded from consideration at a status conference held on January 5, 2007. The parties advise that this issue is now being pursued in a separate action in circuit court. Through the introduction into evidence of its complete permit file as Department Composite Exhibit 1, the Department established that the proposed activities are exempt from permitting requirements under Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-312.050(1)(d). More specifically, the activity will take place in waters which are not located in Outstanding Florida Waters; the structures are less than 1,000 square feet of surface area over the landward extent of waters of the State; they will be used for recreational purposes; they will be constructed on pilings; they will not substantially impede the flow of water or create a navigational hazard; and the structure is the sole dock constructed pursuant to the exemption as measured along the shoreline for a minimum distance of 65 feet. The dock and associated structures and pilings will be constructed over sovereign submerged lands owned by the State of Florida. Under Florida Administrative Code Rule 18-21.005(1), which specifies the forms of authorization for consent to use sovereign submerged lands, "no application or written authorization is required for an activity that is exempt from the requirements of obtaining a permit," so long as certain conditions are met, including those found in Florida Administrative Code Rules 18-21.004(7). See Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.005(1)(b). The only relevant condition raised in the Amended Petition is whether or not the "[s]tructures or activities shall . . . create a navigational hazard." Fla. Admin. Code R. 18-21.004(7)(g). In construing this rule, and the similar requirement in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62- 312.050(1)(d)3., the Department considers whether the structures will create a navigational hazard for boaters on the Intracoastal Waterway, as well as the owners of property who reside on either side of Mr. Rockman. In his Amended Petition, Mr. Woolshlager contended that the proposed structures or activities will create a navigational hazard when he accesses the dock in front of his property. As clarified at hearing, Petitioner does not dispute that he (or any "good boat driver") has adequate ingress and egress for his smaller boat, even with the larger dock on Mr. Rockman's property. Indeed, the record shows that he has been observed leaving his dock and accessing the Intracoastal Waterway. However, Petitioner indicated that if he should die, his wife intends to sell the property. If the new purchaser desires to dock a larger boat, he fears that there will not be sufficient room to do so, and the value of his property will be diminished. Through testimony from a licensed boat captain, it was established that Mr. Rockman's dock does not create a navigational hazard for boaters in the Intracoastal Waterway whose boat channel lies at least 600 feet or so from the shoreline, or for property owners on either side of the applicant's property. Although Petitioner cannot dock a larger boat than he now has (a 21-foot boat), this is because he needs to dredge out the area where his existing dock is built and reconfigure its shape. (Mr. Woolshlager agreed that his dock actually encroaches a few feet onto Mr. Rockman's property; however, Mr. Woolshlager advises that the prior owner (who sold the property to Mr. Rockman) agreed to this encroachment when he purchased the property.) Therefore, all criteria have been satisfied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting Mr. Rockman's application for an exemption from permitting requirements and authorization to use state-owned submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Lea Crandall, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 John N. C. Ledbetter, Esquire 4641 Gulfstarr Drive Suite 102 Destin, Florida 32541-5324 Nona R. Schaffner, Esquire Amanda G. Bush, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael William Mead, Esquire John S. Mead, Esquire Michael Wm Mead, P.A. Post Office Drawer 1329 Fort Walton Beach, Florida 32549-1329 Gregory M. Munson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Michael W. Sole, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Respondent Carter is the owner of real property located at 102 Hummingbird Lane, Crescent City, Putnam County, Florida, ("The Property") The Property has a shore length of 68.5 feet on Crescent Lake. Crescent Lake is a "water of the state" as defined in Section 403.031, F.S. The agency, now DEP, is the state agency charged with environmental concerns and permission to use submerged state lands. There are two types of authorization an applicant must receive in order to construct a dock on state owned submerged lands. The first is regulatory, which addresses issues concerning environmental impacts. The second is proprietary, which addresses issues concerning use of state owned submerged lands. Mr. and Mrs. Hageman, Petitioners herein, own property adjacent on the east of Mr. Carter's property. 1/ They have a 240 foot dock in place going out into Crescent Lake. Mr. Carter's westerly neighbor also has a shorter dock going into the lake. The Carters purchased the Property from an estate, with the announced intention to erect their own dock for water recreational purposes. Before closing the sale, they were warned off the property by Mr. Hageman who claimed his riparian rights would be violated if any dock were built on the Property. After inquiries to DEP and the Army Corps of Engineers, the Carters purchased The Property anyway. DEP has no jurisdiction to regulate docks under 1000 square feet. Mr. Carter received DEP Exemption 542504222 to construct a dock under 1000 square feet on The Property. Mr. Carter constructed a single family private use dock, including a boat shelter, extending from The Property into Crescent Lake. The dock was built approximately 35 feet from Hagemans' property line, straight out into the water, and 25 feet from the property line of his neighbor on the other side. This placed the Carter dock roughly perpendicular to the approximate center of Mr. Carter's shoreline. Petitioners conceded that Mr. Carter honored his westerly neighbor's property line, but asserted that he should have, and had not, honored his easterly property line, the line dividing his and Petitioners' property, waterward beyond the shoreline. In all, Petitioners Hageman have filed three formal petitions against the Carter dock. See Findings of Fact 16, 18, and 33, infra. All three petitions herein oppose the Carter dock as constructed upon a theory that it crosses Petitioner's riparian rights line and therefore violates the setback criteria found in Rule 18-21.004(3)(d) F.A.C.; that it blocks a channel exclusive to Petitioners' use and poses an impediment to navigation of all boats, particularly Petitioners' sailboat; that its boat shelter is enclosed contrary to rule; that it does not meet the ten-to-one rule; and that it blocks Petitioners' view and lowers their property value. The Hagemans initially filed a complaint with the DEP in regard to the dock. In response to the Hagemans' complaint, Steven Biemiller, an environmental specialist in the dredge and fill compliance/enforcement section of DEP's northeast district, and John Hendricks of the Army Corps of Engineers visited the Property on July 25, 1994. They found that the Carter dock as built exceeded 1,000 square feet in surface area. It was, however, consistent in length, width, and alignment with other docks in the area, including Petitioners' dock. Mr. Biemiller calculated Carter's dock to be 1,400 square feet. It therefore exceeded the state exemption criteria and required a state permit. Mr. Carter had constructed his dock without a valid permit from the state agency, and DEP responded by issuing him a warning letter. Carter and DEP thereafter entered into Consent Order O.C.G. 94-2443 to address the unpermitted dock construction. Testifying as an expert in the agency's enforcement and compliance procedures, Mr. Biemiller established that negotiated consent orders of this type are a standard agency procedure to resolve minor permitting violations. His testimony is accepted on that issue and to the effect that the purpose of all consent orders, including the one at issue here, is to return the non-complying structure to compliance with the applicable state rules and statutes. The consent order provides, in pertinent part, that Mr. Carter will (a) pay the agency $300.00, which amount includes a $200.00 civil penalty and $100.00 for agency costs and expenses; AND (b) reduce the size of his dock to under 1,000 square feet or obtain an after-the-fact permit whereby the agency would authorize the 1400 square foot dock to remain in place as already constructed. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the consent order. The consent order herein addressed DEP's environmental concerns by jump-starting the permit process through which the agency could examine the environmental impacts posed by the dock project. In Mr. Biemiller's expert opinion, this consent order accomplished the agency's statutory and regulatory goals at that point because Mr. Carter paid his fine and applied for a dredge and fill permit. Agency permit 542558842 was issued to Mr. Carter on November 16, 1994. It approved the proposed project and authorized construction of a private use dock having a 4.75-foot wide plus 230-foot long access walkway, a 10.3-foot wide and 20.3-foot long covered boat shelter, plus an 8.5-foot long and 12.8-foot wide waterward "L" platform, within Crescent Lake, Putnam County. The Hagemans timely filed a petition challenging the permit. The Hagemans' concerns about the Carter dock and boat shelter blocking their view and diminishing their property value were raised by their petitions, but no evidence or argument was presented on the latter issue. "View" and market value concerns are not addressed by the jurisdiction or authority conferred upon DEP by either statute or rule, and may not be considered here. In determining whether or not to issue dredge and fill permits, the agency examines a project's impact on water quality, its biological impacts, whether the project is contrary to the public interest and how it impacts, if at all, on wetlands. The agency does not look at riparian rights. Those rights are addressed, if at all, by agency review of applications for consents of use and the rules applicable thereto. Thomas Wiley was the field inspector for the dredge and fill permit which is at issue. He visited Mr. Carter's property with another agency employee, Erica Robbins, to conduct a site assessment. Mr. Wiley prepared the Permit Application Appraisal. Mr. Wiley has a Bachelor of Science degree in environmental biology and twelve hours towards his Masters degree in the same discipline. He has been employed by the agency for four and a half years as a environmental specialist. During that time, he has reviewed approximately 300 dredge and fill applications. He was accepted as an expert in the agency's environmental resource permitting procedures and the impacts of dredging and filling projects on wetlands. Mr. Wiley recommended issuance of the permit in part based on his determination that the long term adverse impacts of the Carter dock on water quality are minimal and that the long term adverse impacts of the project on submerged resources also are minimal. His expert opinion on these issues is accepted, as is his unrefuted mixed fact and opinion testimony that the project site contains submerged beds of eelgrass (vallisnaria). These eelgrass beds end approximately 20 feet landward of the Carter boat shelter and dock. Carter's boat shelter and dock do not pose a significant impact to the eelgrass and will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife. The Carter boat shelter has one almost closed side, one side which descends to about one and a half feet above the water and two open ends. It is not substantially different from other local boat shelters. There are water hyacinths in the same area as the eelgrass and nearer to the shoreline. DEP has issued a permit to Mr. Hageman to clear such water hyacinths from a 25-foot swath in front of his property so as to keep clear the channel to his dock and boat shelter. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that Mr. Hageman has been zealous in his removal of water hyacinths and has exceeded the 25-foot limitation. Existence of this permit allowing Mr. Hageman to remove hyacinths and existence of this larger cleared swath of water/shoreline is not dependable evidence of the Hagemans' riparian rights claim and does not alter or affect DEP's determination that no aquatic plants will be seriously endangered by the Carter dock and boat shelter. The parties stipulated that the construction of Carter's dock has not, and will not, degrade the water quality of Crescent Lake and that the water quality standards set forth in Chapter 62-302 F.A.C., are not violated because of the construction of the dock. The parties stipulated that the Carter dock as constructed will not adversely affect the fishing or recreational value or marine productivity on Crescent Lake. The parties stipulated that the dock as constructed will not adversely affect any historical or archaeological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061 F.S. In determining whether a dock poses a navigational impediment, DEP looks for the presence of marked navigational channels and the proximity of the dock to other docks in the area. The credible competent evidence as a whole shows that the Carter dock is similar to the Hagemans' dock and is located about 100 feet west of the Hagemans' dock. The Carter structure also conforms with the prevailing alignment of all docks in the immediate area and its distance from neighboring structures is sufficient so that the Carter dock will not present a hindrance to navigation. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the Hagemans have sailed in and out from their adjacent dock without any obvious problems occasioned by the Carter dock. There is plenty of room between the Carter and Hageman docks so that the Carter dock has not so far obstructed the Hagemans' ability to navigate their sailboat. Mr. Carter has provided reasonable assurances that his dock is not contrary to the public interest under Section 373.414 (1)(a) F.S. In determining the cumulative impacts a project may have, the agency looks at the total impact of past, present and future projects on water quality and function in wetland systems. Mr. Wiley determined it is reasonable to expect other lakefront property owners will construct docks into the lake, but based on his experience and expertise, he concluded that Mr. Carter's project's long-term impact still will continue to be minimal. The permit is appropriate and insures compliance with all applicable statutory and rule guidelines for dredge and fill permits. Mr. Carter also applied to the agency for a consent of use for submerged state lands. This was appropriate because Crescent Lake is a "water of the state". A consent of use is generally a letter of authorization for minor projects, such as single family docks, bulkheads and dredging that occur on state owned land and submerged land. The ten-to-one ratio found in Rule 18- 21.005(1)(a)2 F.A.C. allows an applicant to have ten square feet of preempted area for every linear foot of the shoreline that he owns. If an applicant meets the rule criteria, he is issued a consent of use. Generally, if an applicant exceeds the criteria, he would be issued a lease, as opposed to a consent of use. The agency issued a consent of use to Mr. Carter on December 5, 1994. The Hagemans filed a petition challenging the consent of use. DEP acts as staff for the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. The authority to issue consents of use has been delegated to a planning manager. In the instant situation, that planning manager was Russell Price. Russell Price is employed by DEP as planning manager of the submerged land section and has served in that capacity for two years. Mr. Price holds a Bachelor of Science degree in biology, has a year of education towards his Master's degree in biology, and has reviewed approximately two to three hundred applications for consents of use. Mr. Price was accepted as an expert in state lands determination and regulation. In issuing the consent of use to Mr. Carter, Mr. Price relied on his education, training and experience in state lands regulation, and considered the application, the drawings, the agency's regulatory permit section's field report, comments from staff of the Army Corps of Engineers and a memorandum from the agency's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. See Finding of Fact 40. Mr. Price opined, on behalf of the agency's interpretation of its own statute and rules, that the agency does not uniformly require a lease where the ten-to-one rule is minimally exceeded; that the agency will issue a consent of use if the applicant's structure is still relatively small and is configured in the minimum way possible to obtain access at reasonable water depths; that in its discretion, the agency does not apply the ten-to-one rule to require leases; 2/ and that consents of use are issued to single docks that are the minimum length necessary to reach reasonable access to navigable waters. Mr. Price issued the consent of use in this case after determining that Mr. Carter's dock as constructed was a single family dock configured in the minimum size and length necessary to achieve reasonable access to navigable waters and that the nearshore area located adjacent to Mr. Carter's upland property required that his dock exceed the ten-to-one ratio in order to access reasonable water depths for navigation. In so doing, Mr. Price relied on the DEP Permit Application Appraisal measurement of the water depth at the end of Carter's dock as 4.5 feet deep and analyzed the configuration and angle of the other docks in the area. This was in accord with the specific language of Rule 18-21.005(1)(a)1 F.A.C. 3/ Evidence adduced at formal hearing suggests that there has been some erosion, possibly due to the removal of the water hyacinths and that shows that it is environmentally desirable to avoid recreational contact with the eelgrass, especially by boats. These factors also support the reasonableness of Carter's dock configuration, even though it minimally exceeds the ten-to-one rule. Petitioners Hageman contended that their riparian rights may be determined by projecting a line straight waterward from the upland fence line between their lot and Mr. Carter's property. If that is the appropriate determination of their riparian rights, then the Carter dock does cross that projected line, but that projected line has not been placed by a surveyor or determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. At best, there has been a post erected by Mr. Hageman as the result of a prior lawsuit concerning easements. Respondent Carter's property is narrower than Petitioners' property and somewhat wedge-shaped. Petitioners assert that because the lake curves, Mr. Carter's riparian rights form a narrow pie slice-shaped area in the water. However, without a legal determination to that effect, there is only the foregoing unsupported assertion concerning either landowner's riparian rights. Although the agency's rules require a 25-foot setback of a dock (10- foot setback for marginal docks) from the applicant's riparian rights line, 4/ the agency does not measure the setback of a dock by that rule unless there has already been a determination of a riparian rights line by a court of law. DEP witnesses clearly enunciated and explicated agency policy that DEP does not affirmatively take it upon itself to determine riparian rights as between private land owners because the agency has no constitutional or statutory jurisdiction to do so. To Mr. Price's knowledge, the agency has never determined the riparian rights line of two private property owners. The agency relies on circuit courts to resolve those types of disputes. In response to the Hagemans' concerns about encroachment on their asserted riparian rights and in an abundance of caution, Mr. Price sent aerial photographs, the county plat map, and the drawings submitted with Mr. Carter's application to the DEP's Bureau of Surveying and Mapping. He requested that the Bureau make a guesstimation of the common riparian rights line based on a methodology it has developed for estimating riparian rights lines. The memorandum constitutes little more than legal research discussing various methodologies courts have used in the past for determining riparian rights. It reaches no definite conclusion with regard to the riparian rights between the Hagemans and Carter. Beyond explaining and supplementing the direct evidence of the agency policy to rely on courts to determine riparian rights, its contents and conclusions are unreliable hearsay which is outside the parameters of Section 120.58(1)(a) F.S., because no one connected with the preparation of that report testified at formal hearing. No reliable determination of the riparian rights line dividing the Petitioners' property and the property of Applicant/Respondent Carter was presented as evidence at formal hearing. DEP is not aware that any court determination specifically setting out the boundaries of the parties' riparian rights exists. DEP did not require Mr. Carter to institute a lawsuit to establish riparian boundaries before considering his application. This also appears to be common agency procedure. The agency addressed the absence of a clear showing of riparian rights and implemented its policy directed thereto in the standard language of the consent of use, which provided in pertinent part, as follows: 2. Grantee agrees that all title and interest to all lands lying below the historical mean high water line or ordinary high water line are vested in the Board, and shall make no claim of title or interest in said lands by reason of the occupancy or use thereof * * * 5. Grantee agrees to indeminity, defend and hold harmless the Board and the State of Florida from all claims, actions, lawsuits and demands arising out of this consent. * * * 12. In the event that any part of the structure(s) consented to herein is determined by a final adjudication issued by a court of competent jurisdiction to encroach on or interfere with adjacent riparian rights, Grantee agrees to either obtain written consent for the offending structure from the affected riparian owner or to remove the interference or encroachment within 60 days from the date of the adjudication. Failure to comply shall constitute a material breach of this consent and shall be grounds for its immediate termination.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order that dismisses the three petitions, ratifies the consent order, and issues the after- the-fact permit and consent of use with the safeguards already contained therein to protect the Petitioners' riparian rights in case the Petitioners hereafter obtain a circuit court determination of those riparian rights. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of July, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 1995
The Issue In relation to DOAH Case No. 05-0515, does the case involve the sale of securities as described in Chapter 517, Florida Statutes (2002), that would confer jurisdiction upon OFR to proceed to a hearing on the merits of the Administrative Complaint that forms the basis for DOAH Case No. 05-0515, and to what extent, if any, the named Respondents have been involved with the sale of securities sufficient to declare jurisdiction over their activities? Preliminary to that determination is the related issue concerning the possible pre-emption of OFR's regulatory authority by virtue of the regulatory action previously taken by the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (DBPR) under authority set forth in Chapter 721, Florida Statutes (2002)? Argument has also been set forth concerning the significance of court cases as they might influence OFR's ability to declare their regulatory authority in this instance.
Findings Of Fact * * * 2. RESPONDENT is the 'creating developer' of the Universal Luxury Lease Plan, a personal property 'timeshare plan' as those terms are defined in sections 721.05(9)(a) and 721.05(37), Florida Statutes, located in the city of Sanford, Florida. * * * On or about July 10, 2003, DIVISION was made aware of a newspaper advertisement for Universal Luxury Lease Plan. This advertisement, promoted the purchase of a timeshare interest in the Universal Luxury Lease Plan as an investment that offered purchasers a 10 percent per year return on their investment. On July 25, 2003, DIVISION'S investigators were given an application package containing the Universal Luxury Lease Plan Enrollment Forms, CD-ROM, Public Offering Statement, Contracts and Motor Coach Brochures. The application package stated that it was advertising material being used for the purposes of soliciting timeshare interests. It described a component of the timeshare plan called the 'Affinity Rental Program' and stated that the program will typically produce a monthly income of 10 percent of the lease-hold ownership interest.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That an order be entered by OFR finding jurisdiction to proceed with the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 05- 0515 on its merits. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2006.
Findings Of Fact By Outdoor Advertising Space Lease Agreement dated February 19, 1985 (Exhibit 1), Harry Moody Outdoor Advertising, Inc. leased property along SR 52 520 feet west of Hicks Road to be used for an outdoor advertising sign, applied for and was issued sign permit tags for a structure at this location. That lease agreement provided that in the event of a bona fide sale of the property the lessee agrees to remove the billboards upon 30 days written notice. By letter dated July 10, 1986 (Exhibit 2) the current owner of the property rescinded the prior lease agreement with Harry Moody Outdoor Advertising, Inc. and requested removal of the sign. A building permit for a sign to be erected by Greater Outdoor Advertising at this location was issued July 24, 1986 (Exhibit 3), subject to removal of the Moody sign.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether, and how, the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) should discipline the Respondent, Theresia Helton, on charges that she: failed to account and deliver rental payments and deposits; was culpably negligent and in breach of trust in her dealings regarding rental property; failed to escrow rental payments and deposits; failed to properly reconcile her escrow account; and failed to make transaction agreements and bank statements available for inspection.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the events giving rise to the Administrative Complaint in this case, the Respondent, Theresia Helton, held two Florida real estate broker licenses (BK 3077530 and BK 3248280) and was the owner and qualifying broker for 1010 Apartments, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. However, on May 22, 2013, FREC entered a Final Order suspending those licenses for five years. The Final Order is on appeal by the Division, which seeks to revoke the Respondent's licenses, as recommended by the Administrative Law Judge in that case. Eileen and Ernest Armitage ("the Armitages") reside in New Jersey and own a condominium located at 15599 Latitude Drive, Bonita Springs, Florida ("the property" or "condo"). In 2010, the Armitages began communicating with the Respondent and asked her to find a tenant for the property. In return for the Respondent's services, the Armitages verbally agreed to pay her a commission of ten percent of the annual gross rent. In September 2010, the Respondent obtained a tenant, Marion Ward Bentson, to rent the property for $1,400 a month and pay a security deposit in the amount of one month's rent. The Respondent filled in a form lease to begin on September 14 of that year. On September 8, 2010, the lease was signed by Ms. Bentson and by the Respondent on behalf of the Armitages (in one place as their agent, and in another as landlord). The Respondent collected the $1,400 security deposit and $700 prorated first month of rent from Ms. Bentson. The lease directed the tenant to mail future rent payments to "Ilene [sic] Armitage/1010 Apartments, Inc." at the brokerage's address in Naples. The Respondent then submitted the lease to the homeowners association (HOA) for approval. The lease was approved by the HOA on September 14, 2010, and became effective on that date. The Respondent kept the $2,100 collected from the tenant in payment of the $1,680 commission, plus other charges. Some details of the 2010 transactions remain unclear. The Armitages testified that the Respondent sent the lease to them and that they made corrections, signed the corrected lease, and returned it to the Respondent. The Respondent testified that the HOA sent the lease to the Armitages after approval and that no corrected lease signed by the Armitages was returned to her. A corrected lease was introduced in evidence. It indicates that Eileen Armitage corrected the spelling of her name, clarified that the Armitages were the landlord under the lease, clarified that future rent and notices were to be sent to the Armitages in New Jersey, initialed the changes, and signed the corrected lease on September 15, 2010. The corrected lease apparently was not presented to the HOA for approval, and it is not clear what happened to it. It is, however, clear from the evidence that the parties' subsequent conduct was consistent with the corrected lease, and that the Armitages had no complaints about the Respondent's conduct with respect to the Bentson lease. In July 2011, Ms. Bentson stopped paying rent and gave notice that she was moving out. The Armitages contacted the Respondent and asked her to help them find a tenant to replace Ms. Bentson. It was agreed verbally, or assumed, that the Respondent again would be paid a commission of ten percent of the annual gross rent. The Armitages testified that there also was a verbal agreement that the commission on the Bentson lease would be prorated, entitling the Armitages to a refund. The Respondent denied that there was any agreement to prorate the Bentson lease commission. On this disagreement, the Respondent's testimony was more believable. The Armitages remained in communication with the Respondent while she attempted to find a new tenant. At the end of August 2011, Laurie Ungar contacted the Respondent regarding the Armitage property, and the Respondent arranged for Mrs. Ungar to see the condo. Mrs. Ungar noted that there were scuff marks on the walls, trash that needed to be removed, and carpet and a patio deck that needed cleaning. She expressed her interest in renting the condo, if those items were corrected. The Respondent reported to the Armitages, who were under the impression that the condo already was in good condition and did not agree to spend money for additional repairs. The Respondent decided to proceed with the lease negotiations and arrange for whatever work would be needed to satisfy the Ungars. The Respondent met with Mrs. Ungar on August 31, 2011, and negotiated on behalf of the Armitages. The Respondent filled in a form lease to begin on September 21, 2011. Mrs. Ungar signed for herself and her husband and gave the Respondent a check for $75 for the HOA application fee. The lease identified "Ilene [sic] Armitage" as landlord and provided for notices to be sent to her, although no contact information was included for her. The Respondent signed as landlord in one place on the form and as agent in another. She also initialed the lease as landlord. By checks dated September 1, 2011, Mrs. Ungar gave the Respondent $500 for the first month's prorated rent, $1,500 for the following month's rent, a security deposit in the amount of $1,500, and a pet security deposit in the amount of $250. The Respondent reported to the Armitages that the Ungars signed the lease. She then sent someone to touch up the scuff marks on the walls and clean up the apartment. Either the Armitages or the HOA apparently asked for a pet fee from the Ungars, which they delivered to the Respondent by check dated September 13, 2011. The Respondent then submitted the lease to the HOA for approval. The lease was approved by the HOA on September 19, 2011. The Ungars moved in at 3 a.m. on September 21, 2011. When the Ungars arrived, they still were dissatisfied with the condition of the condo. The walls had been touched up with the wrong color paint, so it looked like graffiti. There was still trash at the condo, and the patio deck and carpet still needed cleaning, in their opinion. They contacted the Respondent, who came over with a can of paint and removed some of the trash. The Ungars remained very dissatisfied with the condition of the condo. Shortly after the Ungars moved in, the Armitages began asking the Respondent for a copy of the lease. For reasons not clear from the testimony, they did not receive the lease or any money from the Respondent and became increasingly agitated about it. At the end of the month, the Armitages received a final bill from the utility company. When they inquired, they were told that the utilities had been transferred to another payor, who was occupying the condo. They contacted the Ungars directly, and the Ungars told them that they still were dissatisfied with the condition of the condo and wanted to terminate the lease at the end of October and get their deposits refunded. The Armitages told them that they did not have the deposits, as the Respondent still had not forwarded them any money. Mr. Ungar went to the Respondent's office, told her about the conversation with the Armitages, and demanded a refund of the deposits. She told him she already had sent the money to the Armitages. On October 6, 2011, the Respondent emailed the Armitages to report her conversation with Mr. Ungar and tell them it was up to them if they wanted to let the Ungars out of the lease, but that she had earned her commission. She stated that she had cleaned up the condo for the Ungars after the Armitages had declined and had mailed the Armitages a check for $1,500, which was what was left of the moneys paid by the Ungars after deducting her commission in the amount of $1,800, a cleaning fee of $150, another $150 for pressure-washing the patio deck, a painting fee of $200, and another fee of $200 for cleaning and hauling out trash. There was no evidence that those sums actually were incurred by the Respondent or that any of the work had been done, except for the poor touch-up of the scuff marks on the walls. After the Respondent sent the email, she thought better of sending the $1,500 check since both the Armitages and the Ungars were claiming it. The money remained in her operating account. She believed she was entitled to keep the balance of the $4,000 paid by the Ungars. She did not notify FREC of any deposit dispute. On October 7, 2011, the Armitages emailed the Respondent to again ask for a copy of the signed lease and listing agreement. On October 10, 2011, they emailed to again ask for the signed lease and ask for the invoices for the work done (or at least contact information for the vendors). By email dated October 12, 2011, they followed up to again request the information. They got no response from the Respondent, except to say that she did not mail the check referred to in the email on October 6, 2011. The Armitages and Ungars renegotiated the lease. The Armitages reduced the monthly rent to pay the Ungars for painting, cleaning, and other work they did at the condo to make it satisfactory to them. The Armitages sued the Respondent and settled for $2,700, which was paid by check dated July 12, 2012. The Armitages used $2,000 from the settlement to return deposits to the Ungars. During the Division's investigation, the Respondent was asked to provide a copy of her agreement with the Armitages and her escrow bank account records. There were no such records. Later, a subpoena was issued for the records for the Respondent's operating account, which were produced. There was no evidence that the Division asked for the records for the operating account before issuing the subpoena. The Respondent's license is suspended until May 21, 2018, because the Division proved charges that in the fall of 2010, she was culpably negligent, in violation of section 475.25(1)(b), and failed to account and deliver, in violation of section 475.25(1)(d)1. The Respondent is the single mother of two daughters, whom she was supporting by income earned as a real estate broker, as well as child support payments. The Division has incurred costs in the amount of $825 in prosecuting this case against the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: finding the Respondent guilty as charged in Counts I through V of the Administrative Complaint; revoking her licenses; and assessing costs in the amount of $825. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2013.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether state use tax is due and payable on transactions wherein the taxpayer rented mobile homes to persons for use as private residences (which the lessees were required to maintain, repair, and insure), pursuant to leases under which the lessee would acquire title to his home upon payment in full of the total rent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order withdrawing the tax assessment against Park Place. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Sunset Company of Wilton, Incorporated, is the record title owner of a parcel of real property in Government Lot 1, Section 5, Township 66 South, Range 33 East, on Crawl Key No. 3 also known as Fat Deer Key, Monroe County, Florida. A portion of that parcel has been conveyed by Sunset Company to Whaler's Plaza, Incorporated, although that deed may not have been recorded. Petitioner Fred Roth owns and controls both corporations and exerts ownership and control over the entire parcel. The submerged lands in Tarpon Creek which are waterward of the line of mean high water contiguous to the parcel are sovereignty submerged lands. Roth received "major development" approval from Monroe County to develop the parcel by constructing a commercial/retail development known as "Whaler's Plaza.' The major development plan submitted to and approved by Monroe County includes a docking facility. In 1979 Roth filed an application with the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation for a private dock facility at Whaler's Plaza. The Department of Environmental Regulation approved that application and issued to Roth Permit/Certification No. 44-18542-5E. Roth never constructed that docking facility, and the permit expired on August 1, 1980. One of the agencies involved in reviewing that permit application was the Respondent. On June 26, 1979, Respondent notified Roth that upon review of the application in DER File No. 44-18542-5E, it had determined that the submerged lands were state-owned but that no lease agreement with Respondent would be required. After Permit No. 44-18542-5E expired on August 1, 1980, the Department of Environmental Regulation directed a letter to Petitioner advising him that the permit had expired and further advising him that if he wished to pursue the project he would have to obtain a new permit. in October 1983 Roth sought new authorization from the Department of Environmental Regulation and Respondent to construct a docking facility at Whaler's Plaza. His application was assigned DER File No. 440774875. On December 29, 1983, Respondent notified Roth that a lease would be required for the use of state-owned lands contiguous to Whaler's Plaza, relative to DER File No. 440774875. Respondent's rules changed in 1982 so that Roth's docking facility would be required to meet new criteria. The docking facility proposed by Roth in 1983 was similar to the docking facility proposed in 1979. The 1983 proposed modified docking facility was still represented to the Department of Environmental Regulation to be a private boat dock. The Department of Environmental Regulation issued an intent to deny the 1983 application under its then-existing rules, and Roth requested a formal hearing on that preliminary denial. Before a final hearing could be conducted, Roth again modified the proposed docking facility so that he qualified for a dredge and fill permit exemption from DER, so that no DER permit was needed for his project. A final order was entered by the Department of Environmental Regulation on August 27, 1985. While Roth's 1983 application was pending before the Department of Environmental Regulation, Roth was processing his application with Respondent for a submerged land lease for the docking facility. The documents he filed with Respondent, however, indicated that the docking facility was not intended to be a private dock but rather was a dock related to the commercial development at Whaler's Plaza. Roth represented to Respondent that the proposed docking facility would be for the convenience of patrons of the stores and restaurant at Whaler's Plaza and for his own personal use. Specifically, on June 3, 1985, Roth directed a letter to Respondent pursuant to Respondent's request for additional information. He described the Whaler's Plaza docking facility as follows: The wood dock will be used for arriving and departing customers of the restaurant and stores and my own personal use. The upland land use and activities of the property--will be developed into a shopping center. At the present time, the first phase is completed which is a one-story building containing four units, housing six retail stores, plus offices. The next phase will consist of three more buildings having five units each, 1,0000 [sic] sq. ft. each unit which will be for retail stores and offices, and the final phase will be a 200 seat restaurant, a miniature [sic] petting zoo and possibly a miniature golf course. ... 70 percent of the slips will be open to the general public for their convenience In patronizing the restaurant and stores; the remaining 30 percent of the slips will be for my own personal use. Roth never completed the lease application he filed with Respondent, and he failed to obtain approval for the use of the sovereignty submerged lands preempted by the docking facility proposed in DER File No. 440774875. Eventually, his pending application with Respondent was deactivated, and the file was closed. In late 1986, Roth initiated construction of his docking facility on sovereignty submerged lands, and he caused 30 pilings with cross-bracing to be placed into the submerged lands. On September 1, 1986, Grant Gelhardt, one of Respondent's enforcement officers, discovered the dock being constructed and verbally instructed Roth, through Mrs. Roth, to immediately cease construction activity. No further construction has taken place. Despite the verbal notification, a subsequent warning notice sent by certified mail, and Respondent's Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action, Roth has failed to remove the pilings and/or to take corrective measures regarding the partially completed docking facility. Roth has allowed vessels to be moored at the partially completed docking facility, has moored his own vessels at the partially completed docking facility, and has failed to prevent other persons from mooring at the partially completed docking facility. Roth's actions have resulted in damage to a benthic seagrass community on the adjacent sovereignty submerged lands over which Roth's partially completed docking facility is located, and over which vessels using the facility have been and would be moored. Those submerged lands constitute a benthic community of seagrass which supports various fauna and which would be adversely affected by completion and operation of the docking facility. The water depths in the area are shallow, with areas of less than -4 feet mean low water. The width of Tarpon Creek in the project area is approximately 100 feet. The length of the partially completed docking facility is approximately 150 feet. Although the dock extends parallel to the shore, the distance the dock extends into Tarpon Creek, as measured from the shoreline, is approximately 35 feet. Roth knowingly trespassed on sovereignty submerged lands by initiating construction of the docking facility, and he has willfully damaged those lands by drilling holes and placing pilings, and by allowing moored vessels to shade the seagrass. Although Roth ceased construction of the docking facility when told to stop, he has failed to attempt to resolve the violation, to remove the pilings, to seek an after-the-fact approval, or to cease all mooring of vessels on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to the uplands, even subsequent to receiving the Notice of Violation and Order for Corrective Action. Respondent's June 26, 1979 letter to Roth authorized the activities described in DER Permit No. 44-18542-5E, for the period authorized by that permit. Roth knew that the DEP permit, and therefore Respondent's approval to engage in the activity authorized by that permit, had expired. Roth further knew that his new application filed in 1983, DER File No. 440774875, which was approved by DER after Roth further modified it in order to qualify for an exemption, did not exempt him from obtaining authorization from Respondent to use sovereignty submerged lands for the project and further knew that when he commenced construction of the docking facility in 1986 that he had not obtained approval from Respondent to use state-owned submerged lands. Roth offered no evidence to demonstrate any detrimental reliance upon the June 26, 1979, DNR letter, and the letter did not create a vested right for Roth to construct a different docking facility at a later time without authorization from Respondent. The uplands at the Whaler's Plaza commercial/retail development are owned by for-profit corporations which Roth controls and which derive income from the business and commercial activities at Whaler's Plaza. The docking facility intended primarily for the use of customers of Whaler's Plaza would therefore constitute a revenue generating/income related activity.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring petitioner to: Remove the unauthorized structure within 20 days from the date on which the Final Order is entered and in accordance with Respondent's supervision of that removal; Immediately cease all mooring of vessels on sovereignty submerged lands adjacent to the uplands of the parcel known as Whaler's Plaza until authorized to use state-owned lands; and Pay a fine of $2500 within 15 days of receipt of a certified letter from the Executive Director of the Department of Natural Resources demanding payment to the internal improvement Trust Fund. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of October, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of October, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: David L. Manz, Esquire Post Office Box 177 Marathon Florida 33050 Ross S. Burnaman, Esquire Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32303
