Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto Susanne Bennington was licensed as a real estate broker and active firm member of Bennington & Associates, Inc., a corporate real estate broker; and Kathleen P. Archangeli was licensed as a real estate salesman in this firm. Susanne Bennington, while working as a broker/salesman for another real estate broker in 1979, sold Margaret S. Purvance a condominium at La Concha Condominium. She also negotiated the sale of land on which Beach Cottage Condominiums were subsequently built, and thereafter opened her own office of Bennington & Associates, Inc., the corporate respondent herein. Bennington & Associates became the sales agents for Beach Cottage Condominiums. Following the sale of the condominium to Purvance in 1979, Bennington and Purvance saw each other frequently, as Bennington owned the condominium next to the one she had sold to Purvance. When the sale of Reservations to Purchase Beach Cottage Condominiums was commenced, Bennington told Purvance about the project and that she thought it would be one of the better condominium projects on the Gulf Coast. During the summer of 1930 Purvance worked at the Bennington office for one week as a receptionist. She met the developer of Beach Cottage Condominiums and became aware of the enthusiasm displayed in the Bennington real estate office regarding this project. She also became aware that Bennington and Archangeli were sufficiently impressed with the potential of Beach Cottage Codominiums as an investment that both bought reservations and expected to make a profit before the time came to complete the transaction by going through the closing. On November 1, 1980, Purvance executed a Reservation Deposit (Exhibit 1) to reserve Unit 1109 A for purchase upon completion at a purchase price of $191,900 and gave Respondent Archangeli $5,000 to deposit in escrow. This contract provided that the $5,000 deposit would be applied to the purchase price at closing, that upon receipt of condominium documents, purchase agreements, and other papers, the buyer had fifteen (15) days to review the condominium documents and accept or the option to cancel the Reservation Agreement and get the full deposit returned. Construction on Beach Cottage Condominiums was commenced after the developer arranged his financing. Thereafter, Purvance, on August 31, 1981, executed a contract dated August 8, 1981, to purchase Condominium 1109 A in the Beach Cottage Condominiums for the total purchase price of $191,900 (Exhibit 4) and made an additional deposit of $14,190 which was to be held in escrow until closing at which time the balance of $172,7l0 was due from buyer. This contract provided the contract was voidable by buyer giving seller written notice to cancel within 15 days of signing the contract or receipt of all condominium documents. Upon cancellation all deposits were refundable to buyer. Purvance is a widow whose husband died in 1968 leaving her a home in Countryside free and clear, bank accounts, and a widow's portion of his pension from U.S. Steel Corporation. Although not wealthy by many standards, Purvance has sufficient income (approximately $1 ,800 per month) to live comfortably. The condominium she purchased at La Concha at a price of $135,000 with $80,000 down had obviously turned out to be a good investment and a tax shelter prior to the signing of the contract to purchase Condominium 1109 A, Beach Cottage Condominiums. Purvance read all of the documents she signed, employed an accountant to prepare her taxes, had purchased the La Concha condominium from information received from her attorney, saw this attorney socially and took him to an open house at Beach Cottage Condominiums, executed the contract to purchase in her broker's office where the contract was witnessed and the $14,190 check was written, was told by her broker that the condominium was not a wise investment; but now contends that she relied on the representations of the Respondents that the Beach Cottage Condominiums was a good investment, that she could double her money, that she would not have to close, but could sell her contract before closing, and that she believed the statements rather than the written contract provisions. Ms. Purvance actually believed the Beach Cottage Condominiums development was a good investment and that she was privileged to be in on this condominium project. She was fully aware of her option to cancel the contract to purchase within 15 days after she executed the contract. Before executing the contract, she discussed the purchase with her accountant and showed him the financing figures she had received. Her accountant inquired of her about taxes and advertising costs to operate the condominium as rental property. Purvance was aware in April, 1982, before the final contract was executed, that she could lease the condominium to the developer as a model for $1,500 pear month. She was also aware, before she executed the contract on August 31, 1933, that she could not qualify for conventional financing. This contract had been forwarded to Purvance in mid-July, 1982, with instructions that she had only 15 days in which to execute or reject the contract. She did not execute the contract at the end of that 15-day period but waited until August 31, 1982. To keep within this 15-day period she dated the contract August 8, 1982. In her testimony Purvance acknowledged that her purchase was motivated by the fact that she expected to make a lot of money out of her Beach Cottage condominium. When she ended up losing money, she complained to the Real Estate Commission and brought civil suit against the developer and the Respondents herein. She characterized her complaint as she lost a lost of money relying on Respondents' false representations that Beach Cottage Condominiums could be sold before closing, that she did not feel Respondents should make false promises, and that Respondents had a duty to keep a buyer away from a improvident investment. Respondents never saw a financial statement on Purvance. They only knew that she owned a home in a well-to-do neighborhood, that she had purchased a condominium at La Concha, that she had been audited by the IRS, that she was interested in acquiring another condominium, and that she appeared financially capable of purchasing the Beach Cottage condominium. Both of these Respondents purchased a Reservation to Buy a condominium at Beach Cottage Condominium, neither could qualify for financing, one executed a contract and lost her additional deposit of $15,000, one never got to the contract stage and had to wait until the unit sold before her initial deposit was refunded. Both categorically denied they ever told Purvance that she could make $20,000 in one year on the project, that either told her that she would never have to close, or that under no circumstances would she ever lose her deposit. Neither Respondent had any reason to believe that Purvance did not know what she was doing when she signed the reservation form and when she signed the contract to purchase.
Findings Of Fact Eden Isles Condominiums are residential condominiums consisting of 7 identical buildings with 52 units in each building. Each building has a separate Declaration of Condominium which declaration is identical with the other 6 Declarations of Condominiums except as to the identification of the condominium. There are 4 swimming pools, parking areas, etc., the expenses for which are shared by the 7 condominiums. The Declarations of Condominiums provide for the percentage of the common ownership and expense associated with each unit in the condominium. The Declarations provide that the affairs of each condominium will be managed by the Eden Isles Condominium Association, Inc., Respondent. Duties of the Association include the preparation of budgets, collection of assessments for expense of maintaining common elements from each unit owner, maintenance of all common elements and generally conducting all of the business dealings associated with the common elements. From the inception of the Association in 1972 a common budget has been prepared for the 7 condominiums which is assessed against unit owners by taking total expenses for the common elements of the 7 buildings, dividing this by 7 and then allocating to each of the 52 unit owners in each building his pro rata share of those expenses. This has the effect of requiring the unit owners housed in Building D to share the cost for the replacement of an elevator in Building P or the replacement of a roof on Building C. The net result of the consolidated budget is to treat the 7 condominiums as one for the purpose of maintaining the common elements. When built and the Declarations of Condominiums recorded, Eden Isles was not a phased development.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the administrative agency of this state empowered to ensure that condominium associations comply with the Condominium Act. The Association is the condominium association which manages and operates 12 separate condominiums known as the Pines of Delray, located in Delary Beach, Florida. This case involves a structure placed on the common elements of three of those condominiums: The Pines of Delray condominiums 5, 6, and 11. Condominium 5 has 64 units, 6 has 72 units, and 11 has 96 units. Initially, the 12 condominiums received television under a "Central Television Antenna System Lease" with the Pines of Delray CAT, an agent of the condominium developer. On November 1, 1979, the unit owners of 8 of the 12 condominiums, including condominiums 5, 6 and 11--by vote equal to or in excess of 75 percent of the unit owners in each of the 8 condominiums--voted to cancel or terminate the television system lease pursuant to Section 718.302, Florida Statutes. The leased television equipment was eventually removed by the owner. On February 1, 1982, the Association entered into a written agreement with A-I Quality TV, Inc. d/b/a Denntronics Cable to provide television service for the 12 condominiums. The agreement was authorized by the Association's board of directors; the unit owners were not given an opportunity to vote on the agreement. An addendum to the agreement was entered in December, 1982. The addendum authorized Denntronics to install a satellite receiving station or dish at an unspecified location on the property of the 12 condominiums. The addendum was authorized by the Association's board of directors, but again, a vote of the unit owners was not taken. The Board subsequently selected the site for the receiving dish, centrally locating it on common elements of condominiums 5, 6, and 11, between building no. 65 in condominium 6, no. 25 in condominium 5, and nos. 66 and 110 in condominium 11. On December 24, 1982, Denntronics, with the Board's authorization, entered the premises of the condominiums and cut down four full-grown pine trees on the site to allow construction of a concrete foundation or pad and erection of the satellite dish. The parties stipulate that this cutting of the trees was an alteration of the common elements and that it was not approved by the owners of 75 percent of the condominium units in the affected area. The pertinent declarations of condominiums provide a specific procedure for obtaining approval before altering or improving common elements of the condominium. Article 5.1(b) of each declaration states: 5 MAINTENANCE, ALTERATION AND IMPROVEMENT Responsibility for the maintenance of the condominium property and restrictions upon the alteration and improvement thereof shall be as follows: .1 Common Elements. (b) Alteration and Improvement. After the completion of the improvements included in the common elements which are contemplated in this Declaration, there shall be no alteration nor further improvement of common elements without prior approval, in writing, by record owners of 75 per cent of all apartments. The cost of such alteration or improve ment shall be a common expense and so assessed. After removing the trees, Denntronics poured the concrete pad and attached it to the realty. The pad measures 10 feet by 10 feet, has a depth of 18 inches, and is reinforced with no. 5 grade steel bars. The construction of this pad, as with the tree removal, was not approved or voted on by the condominium owners. Denntronics then anchored the satellite receiving dish to the concrete pad. The dish is approximately 16 feet in diameter, extending 20 to 25 feet in the air. It remains the property of Denntronics since it was only leased to the Association. It is not a fixture since it may be detached and removed from the concrete pad. The cutting of the trees, the construction of the concrete pad, and the erection of the satellite dish altered the common elements. The condition of the real property was changed and the satellite dish affected nearby residents' view and enjoyment of the park-like green space in which it was placed. The replacement of the trees with the concrete pad and satellite dish affected the appearance of the surrounding area. A park-like environment of grass and pine trees surrounds the condominiums; it was this feature which persuaded some residents to originally purchase condominiums at Pines of Delray. Both the name of the condominium and its accompanying description on the condominium documents, "A Condominium in the Woods" emphasize this aesthetic feature of the condominium. As shown by the photographs in evidence, the reinforced concrete pad with satellite dish is an intruding presence in a park- like, pristine area. It is an incongruous, even imposing structure, 1/ and, in the setting in which it was placed, is aesthetically displeasing. 2/ It has adversely affected some residents' enjoyment of the grassy green space and has disturbed the scenic view which they enjoyed from their windows. Some residents now keep their window shades closed or no longer use the park-like surroundings. One resident was so upset by the sudden placement of the structure that she sold her condominium and moved away. Another nearby resident who purchased his unit, in large part, because of its proximity to the park-like green space, would not have purchased it if the pad and satellite dish had been there. Denntronics has a franchise application pending before the City of Delray Beach. If it is granted a franchise, Denntronics will remove the pad and satellite dish, and replace it with underground cable. If Denntronics is not granted a franchise, it intends to maintain and operate the satellite dish at least until June 30, 1987, when the agreement with the Association expires and is up for renewal. If the satellite dish is removed now, however, the Pines of Delray Condominium will not necessarily be without cable television service. Leadership Cable, the only cable T.V. company franchised by the City of Delray Beach, is willing and able to provide cable T.V. reception to the pines of Delray Condominiums.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums find the Association guilty of violating Section 718.113(2) and order it to cease and desist from further violations. Further, the order should require the Association to remove the concrete pad and satellite receiving dish within 10 days and restore the affected area, as nearly as possible, to its prior condition. Restoration should include the placing and maintenance of grass sod and at least four healthy trees, aesthetically pleasing and not less than 12 feet in height. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. Caleen, Jr. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1984.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Royal Arms Villas Condominium, Inc., discriminated against Petitioners, Eric and Nora Gross, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are a married couple, living in a rental home at 209 Yorkshire Court, Naples, Florida (rental unit). Petitioners have two children and two grandchildren; however, none of these relatives live in Petitioners’ rental unit. Mr. Gross was diagnosed with stage four hodgkin’s lymphoma in 2002. Mr. Gross has been in remission since 2003. Mr. Gross was declared disabled by the Social Security Administration in 2003. Petitioners have lived in this rental unit since August 2006. A Florida residential lease agreement with the property owners, Joan and Charles Forton, was entered on August 8, 2006.3/ This lease was for a 12-month period, from September 1, 2006, through August 31, 2007. At the end of this period, the lease became a month-to-month lease and continued for years without anyone commenting on it. In 2012, Respondent inquired about a dog that was seen with Petitioners. After providing supporting documentation to Respondent, Petitioners were allowed to keep Mr. Gross’ service dog, Evie. Respondent is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. There are 62 units, and the owner of each unit owns a 1/62 individual share in the common elements. Since its inception, Respondent has, through its members (property owners), approved its articles of incorporation, bylaws, and related condominium powers, and amended its declaration of condominium in accordance with Florida law. Ms. Orrino is currently vice-president of Respondent’s Board of Directors (Board). Ms. Orrino has been on the Board since 2009 and has served in every executive position, including Board president. Ms. Orrino owns two condominiums within Respondent’s domain, but does not reside in either. In 2012 or 2013, Respondent experienced a severe financial crisis, and a new property management company was engaged. This company brought to the attention of Respondent’s Board that it had not been approving leases as required by its Declaration of Condominium.4/ As a result of this information, the Board became more pro-active in its responsibilities, and required all renters to submit a lease each year for the Board’s approval. Petitioners felt they were being singled out by Respondent to provide a new lease. The timing of Respondent’s request made it appear as if Respondent was unhappy about Petitioners keeping Evie. Petitioners then filed a grievance with HUD.5/ HUD enlisted the Commission to handle the grievance, and Mr. Burkes served as the Commission’s facilitator between Petitioners and Respondent. On October 24, 2013, Petitioners executed a Conciliation Agreement (Agreement) with Respondent and the Commission. The terms of the Agreement include: NOW, THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed between the parties as follows: Respondent agrees: To grant Complainants’ request for a reasonable accommodation to keep Eric Gross’s emotional support/service dog (known as “Evie”) in the condominium unit even though it exceeds the height and weight limits for dogs in the community. That their sole remedy for Complainants’ breach of the provisions contained in subparagraphs (a) through (g) below, in addition to the attorney’s fees and costs provision of paragraph 10 of this Agreement, shall be the removal of the Complainants’ dog. Complainants agree: That they will not permit the dog to be on common areas of the association property, except to transport the dog into or out of Complainants’ vehicle, to and from Complainants’ unit, and to take the dog through the backyard of the unit to walk it across the street off association property. That if the dog is outside of the condominium unit, they will at all times keep the dog on a leash and will at all times maintain control of the dog. That if their dog accidentally defecates on association property, they will immediately collect and dispose of the waste. That they are personally responsible and liable for any accidents or damages/injuries done by the dog and that they will indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless and defend Respondent for such claims that may or may not arise against Respondent. That they will not allow the dog to be a nuisance in the community or disrupt the peaceful enjoyment of other residents. A nuisance will specifically include, but is not limited to, loud barking and any show of aggressive behavior, including, but not limited to, aggressive barking, growling or showing of teeth regardless of whether the dog is inside or outside of the unit. That they will abide by all community rules and regulations of Respondent with which all residents are required to comply, including but not limited to submitting to the required pre-lease/lease renewal interview, and completing a lease renewal application and providing his updated information to Respondents and submitting to Respondent a newly executed lease compliant with Florida law and the Declaration of Condominium. The pre-lease/lease renewal interview will be conducted at Complainants’ unit at a time and date agreeable to the parties but not to exceed 30 days from the date of this agreement. If Complainants’ current dog “Evie” should die or otherwise cease to reside in the unit, Complainants agree to replace the dog, if at all, with a dog that is in full compliance with the association’s Declaration of Condominium or Rules and regulations in force at that time and will allow the dog to be inspected by Respondent for approval. Respondent agrees to ensure, to the best of their abilities, that their policies, performance and conduct shall continue to demonstrate a firm commitment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Sections 760.20-37, Florida Statutes, (2012), and the Civil Rights Act of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982 and 3601 et.seq). [sic] Respondent agrees that it, its Board members, employees, agents and representatives shall continue to comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by The Fair Housing Act, which provides that Respondents shall not make, print or publish any notice, statement of advertisement with respect to the rental or sale of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability or familial status. Respondent also agrees to continue to comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by The Fair Housing Act, which prohibits Respondents from maintaining, implementing and effectuating, directly or indirectly, any policy or practice, which causes any discrimination or restriction on the bases of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability or familial status. Respondents also agree to continue to comply with Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute a judgment on the part of the Commission that Respondents did nor did not violate the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended, Section 760.20-37, Florida Statutes (2011). The Commission does not waive its rights to process any additional complaints against the Respondent, including a complaint filed by a member of the Commission. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute an admission on the part of the Respondent that they violated the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended, or Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. Complainants agree to waive and release and do hereby waive and release Respondent from any and all claims, including claims for court costs and attorney fees, against Respondent, with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agree not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in this complaint under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Respondent’s performance of the premises and representations contained herein. The Commission agrees that it will cease processing the above-mentioned Complaint filed by Complainants and shall dismiss with prejudice said complaint based upon the terms of this Agreement. Respondent agrees to waive and release any and all claims, including claims for court costs and attorney fees, against Complainants with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agree not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in these complaints under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Complainants’ performance of the premises and representations contained herein. The parties agree in any action to interpret or enforce this agreement the prevailing party is entitled to the recovery from the non-prevailing party its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including attorney’s fees and costs of any appeal. FURTHER, the Parties hereby agree that: This Agreement may be used as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other forum in which any of the parties allege a breach of this Agreement. Execution of this Agreement may be via facsimile, scanned copy (emailed), or copies reproduced and shall be treated as an original. This Conciliation Agreement may be executed in counterparts. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Conciliation Agreement to be duly executed on the last applicable date, the term of the agreement being from the last applicable date below for so long as any of the rights or obligations described here in continue to exist. Eric Gross and Nora Gross signed the Agreement on October 24, 2013. Ms. Orrino, as President of Respondent, signed the Agreement on September 9. The Commission’s facilitator, Mr. Burkes, signed the Agreement on October 24. The Commission’s housing manager, Regina Owens, signed the Agreement on October 30, and its executive director, Michelle Wilson, signed the Agreement on November 4. The effective date of the Agreement is November 4, the last day it was signed by a party, and the clock started running for compliance. Petitioners failed to abide by the Agreement in the following ways: Petitioners failed to submit an updated lease agreement that conformed to Respondent’s rules and regulations. Petitioners failed to submit to the required pre- lease/lease renewal interview within 30 days of signing the Agreement. Petitioners failed to complete a lease renewal application. Petitioners failed to provide updated information to Respondent. It is abundantly clear that Eric Gross and Ms. Orrino do not get along. However, that personal interaction does not excuse non-compliance with an Agreement that the parties voluntarily entered. Each party to the Agreement had obligations to perform. Respondent attempted to assist Petitioners with their compliance by extending the time in which to comply, and at one point, waving the interview requirement. Petitioners simply failed to comply with the Agreement. Petitioners failed to present any credible evidence that other residents in the community were treated differently. Mr. Gross insisted that the Agreement had sections that Petitioners did not agree to. Mr. Burkes was unable to shed any light on the Agreement or the alleged improprieties that Mr. Gross so adamantly insisted were present.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioners in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Grove Isle, Ltd. is the developer of a 510 unit three-tower condominium project on an island now known as Grove Isle in Biscayne Bay. As part of the project Grove Isle plans to construct a ninety slip pleasure boat marina on the west side of the island. Since its inception, the project has been in litigation between the parties to this Proceeding. See Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc., et al v. DER, DOAH Case No. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354; State ex rel. Gardner v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 295 So.2d 658 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1974); Doheny vs. Sailboat Key, Inc., 306 So.2d 616 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1974); Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Ferre, Case No. 80-101-AP (Circuit Court, Appellate Division, Dade County, September 16, 1980). Petitioners Doheny and Filer have their residences near the site of the proposed marina. In the past they have used the waters in and around this site for fishing, boating and swimming. If the marina is constructed their use of the waters in the immediate area of the marina could be limited somewhat. While Petitioner Jaffer does not live in the immediate area of the marina, he also uses the waters of Biscayne Bay around Grove Isle for recreation. The project could have some minimal impact on his use of those waters. The protesting organizations: Bayshore Homeowners Association, Inc., Coconut Grove Civil Club, Tigertail Association, and the Tropical Audubon Society, Inc. all have members who use the waters of Biscayne Bay in the area of the project for nature study or recreation. The use of these waters by their members could be diminished in some degree if the marina is constructed. That portion of Grove Isle from which the marina will project is owned by Grove Isle Club, Inc., an entity created to operate the recreational facilities appurtenant to the Grove Isle Condominium. The Club is an integral part of the Grove Isle condominium project. Membership in the Club is mandatory for unit owners. It is the plan of Grove Isle, Ltd. that after the marina is constructed the individual wet-slips will be sold to only condominium owners. Grove Isle, Ltd. expects to realize a onetime profit from the sale of each slip. The slips would therefore not produce a periodic or reoccurring income to the developer. In the recent past, DNR has interpreted its rules relating to submerged land leases not to require a lease for the construction of a marina over submerged state lands if the marina will not generate a regular income. Evidence of this practice dates back to June 8, 1978. On March 29, 1979, Grove Isle applied to DNR for a state lease of the submerged lands over which the proposed marina would be constructed. By a letter of April 4, 1979, from Daniel S. Meisen, Administrator, Operations Section, Bureau of State Lands, the Department informed Grove Isle that a lease would not be required. The full text of the letter follows: April 4, 1979 Ms. Pat Bourguin Post, Buckley, Schub and Jernigan, Inc. 7500 Northwest 52nd Street Miami, Florida 33166 Dear Ms. Bourguin: Martin Margulies A review of the above referenced application has aided us in determining that a lease will not be required although the submerged bottom lands are state-owned. Submerged land leases are not re- quired for private docks or non-income producing facilities. Your $150.00 refund is being processed and will be forwarded to you within the next two months. If we can be of further assistance in this matter, please contact Laura Lewallen of this office. Sincerely, Daniel S. Meisen Administrator Operations Section Bureau of State Lands DSM/11m cc: DER West Palm Beach Health Department The State of Florida owns the submerged lands to the west of Grove Isle over which the marina would be constructed. Beginning in the fall of 1979 and continuing through the spring of 1980, there was a string of correspondence between DNR, Mr. Doheny and Grove Isle. This was its basic pattern. Mr. Doheny would write to DNR with some information indicating in his opinion that the proposed marina would not be private in nature, that is, persons other than condominium owners might be able to use the wet-slips. In response to Mr. Doheny's letter DNR would then query Grove Isle requesting assurances that the marina would be private. At least three of these inquiries, April 26, 1979; October 26, 1979; and February 12, 1980, appear in the record. Grove Isle then responded with letters indicating in various ways that the marina would not be income producing. It is apparent from some of the correspondence that there were also oral communications among the parties. The contents of these communications do not appear in the record. Finally on March 13, 1980, Mr. Doheny wrote to DNR on behalf of the Homeowner Petitioners to express his disagreement with the Department's position previously expressed in correspondence dating back to April 4, 1979, that if the proposed marina is limited to only condominium owners and does not produce direct income then it does not require a lease. Mr. Dean on behalf of Dr. Gissendaner replied to Mr. Doheny on March 24, 1980, by reiterating the Department's consistent position on this project. The text of the letter fellow's: March 24, 1980 David A. Doheny, Esquire 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Re: Grove Isle Marina Dear David: Dr. Gissendanner asked that I respond to your letter dated March 13, 1980 regarding Grove Isle Marina. Attached his a copy of the affidavit executed by Grove Isle, Ltd. and the subsequent letter to Grove Isle, Ltd. from the Department of Natural Resources. It is the position of the Department of Natural Resources that where a condominium marina will derive no income from the rental or lease of boat slips and furthermore, where all slips will be used exclusively by the condominium unit purchasers that the marina is not a commercial/industrial docking facility requiring a lease from the Trustees pursuant to Rule 16C-12.14, F.A.C. and Chapter 253.03, F.S. (1979). This position is based on the proposition that riparian rights attached to a single condominium unit purchaser as do riparian rights for a single family lot owner who likewise is exempt from a submerged land lease. Sincerely, Henry Dean Assistant Department Attorney Division of State Lands HD/le Enclosures cc: Elton J. Gissendanner Richard P. Ludington On May 3, 1979, the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund passed a resolution which states in pertinent part that: Where the Trustees have title, by either deed of conveyance or sovereignty pursuant to 1 and/or 2 above, and where any person has requested an environmental or other permit and where the Trustees neither by statute nor rule must give permission for the use involved in the permit, the Execu- tive Director is authorized to indicate, by letter or otherwise, said circumstances and that no action by the Trustees is necessary for the said use; . . . Subsequently Mr. Jaffer, the Homeowners and Mr. Filer filed their petitions for administrative hearings on April 2, 1980, 4/ April 9, 1980, and April 21, 1980, respectively. DNR's position concerning a lease requirement was well known to all of the Petitioners by at least January 2 and 3, 1980, the date of the final hearing on the related DER cases for the instant project. 5/
Recommendation For the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Natural Resources issue a final order dismissing the petitions in Case Nos. 80-670, 80-768, and 80-815. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1980.
Findings Of Fact Respondent A.R.M. Limited, Inc., is the developer of the residential condominium known as Trails at Royal Palm Beach, a phase condominium containing a total number of 230 units when completed, located in Royal Palm Beach, Florida. During 1981 Respondent submitted to Petitioner all documents required to properly register the condominium, including the Declaration of Condominium and the Contract for Sale. By letter dated June 16, 1981, Petitioner notified Respondent that the documents it had received were in acceptable form and that Respondent would soon be advised as to the results of the Petitioner's "content examination". By letter dated July 14, 1981, Petitioner notified Respondent that it had completed its examination, and the condominium documents were proper. On April 27, 1982, Respondent recorded the Declaration of Condominium for Phases I and II in the public records in Palm Beach County. The Offering Circular, the Declaration of Condominium, and the Contract for Sale contained a developer's guarantee of common expenses for a two-year period commencing with the recording of the Declaration of Condominium and guaranteeing that the unit owners' monthly assessment would not exceed $75 a month for the period of the guarantee. Accordingly, the initial guarantee period terminated April 27, 1984. Thereafter, the guarantee period was extended by the developer until April 27, 1985, and again until December 31, 1985. No evidence was offered to show that any unit owner objected to the extension of the guarantee period. However, no vote of the unit owners was taken regarding either of the two extensions, and no written agreement was obtained. During the period of time between the initial guarantee period and January 1, 1986, Respondent did not pay assessments on a regular basis but instead paid the difference between the association's expenses and income. In other words, the developer did fund all shortfalls through December 31, 1985. The Offering Circular approved by Petitioner in 1981 contained a copy of the Contract for Sale which was to be used, and in fact has been used, for the condominiums units. That Contract specifically provides for purchasers to pay an initial contribution to working capital in the amount of "$300 . . . which may be used by the Association for start-up expenses as well as ordinary expenses . . . " Pursuant to that contract, Respondent utilized start-up funds to off set common expenses of the condominium arising from the sale of 28 units between April 27, 1984 and April 27, 1985. Fourteen of those units were sold between April 27, 1984 and October 1, 1984, and 14 of those units were sold between October 1, 1984 and April 27, 1985. In a phase condominium, since the total number of units within the condominium increases as phases are added, the number of unit owners paying assessments for common expenses increases and, consequently the percentage of ownership of the common elements and percentage of common expenses liability changes per unit. When Respondent registered the condominium with Petitioner in 1981 Respondent filed all documents necessary for the entire project (including all phases) but only paid the filing fee related to Phases I and II at that time. As Respondent continued developing the condominium and selling additional units in subsequently-constructed phases, appropriate amendments to the original Declaration were recorded in the public records. Respondent, however, failed to file copies of those recorded amendments with Petitioner. By cover letter dated March 3, 1986, Respondent filed with Petitioner a developer's filing statement for subsequent phases and enclosed a check in the amount of $940 to cover filing fee requirements. According to an attachment to that filing, Respondent was filing Phases 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 2000, 2100, 2200, 2400, and 2500, which in totality comprised 94 units. According to the same attachment, these Phases were added to the condominium through recordation of amendments to the original Declaration with such recordation occurring between 1983 and 1986. According to information submitted by Respondent to Petitioner, as of March 3, 1986, closings had taken place on 77 units in Phases 900, 1000, 1100, 1200, 1300, 1400, 2100, 2400, and 2500 prior to Respondent's filing the subsequent phase documents with Petitioner. There is no allegation that the documents when filed were improper or that Respondent failed to provide them to the unit owners at the time they were executed. In January of 1988 unit owners other than the developer elected a majority of the board of administration of the condominium association, and turnover of control of the association from developer control to control by unit owners other than the developer occurred.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it Is'; RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent guilty of the allegation contained within count one; Finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained within counts two and three of the Notice to Show Cause; Requiring Respondent to effectuate the financial review discussed in the Conclusions of Law section of this Recommended Order and pay to the condominium association any amount of unpaid assessments for the time period in question; and Assessing a fine against Respondent in the amount of $1000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of May, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 87-2917 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, the first sentence of 9, the third sentence of 15, and 16-20 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 8 has been rejected as being immaterial to the issues under consideration herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2, 4, 6, 9 except for the first sentence, 10-14, and 15 except for the third sentence have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law, argument of counsel or recitations of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Van B. Poole, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 A.R.M. Limited, Inc. Trails at Royal Palm Beach Suite 315 1300 North Florida Mango Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Dennis Powers, Esquire Suite 315 1300 North Florida Mango Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33409
Findings Of Fact For purposes of the Motions to Dismiss filed by Agrico and the Department, the following findings of fact are based upon the pleadings in this case, matters to which the parties have stipulated, and DOAH Case Number 86-3618, as well as final agency action resulting therefrom: On or about August 26, 1986, Petitioners filed with the Department a petition for formal administrative proceeding which challenged the dredge and fill permit that the Department intended to issue to Agrico. The Department transmitted this matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing, and it was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer as DOAH Case Number 86- 3618. Petitioners relied upon Sections 120.57(1) and 403.412(5), Florida Statutes, to "initiate" DOAH Case Number 86-3618 as is clearly set forth in paragraph 20 of their Petition filed in that case. In their Motion for Fees and Costs at paragraph 3, Petitioners further allege, and thereby concede, that they "initiated the above styled proceeding (DOAH Case Number 86-3618)." A final hearing was scheduled to begin on April 28, 1987 in DOAH Case Number 86-3618. However by letter to the Department dated March 2, 1987, Agrico voluntarily withdrew its application for a dredge and fill permit which was the subject of that case. Thereafter, a telephone conference call was held on March 17, 1987, following which an Order Closing File was filed in DOAH Case Number 86-3618 on that same date, and jurisdiction was relinquished to the Department. The Final Order in Case Number 86-3618 was entered by the Department on May 18, 1987 which states: Upon consideration, it is ORDERED that the withdrawal of permit application number 53-1093999 is GRANTED with prejudice to further Department consideration of the application, but without prejudice to the future submission of another dredge and fill application covering the same tract of land covered by application number 53-1093999. The withdrawal of permit application number 53-1093999 divests the Department of jurisdiction to proceed with consideration of (Booker Creek and Manasota's) petition. Humana of Florida, Inc., v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 500 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Accordingly, the above-captioned case (DOAH Case Number 86-3618) is DISMISSED as moot. On July 16, 1987, Petitioners timely filed their Motion for Fees and Costs which was assigned to the undersigned Hearing Officer and given DOAH Case Number 87-3007F. Petitioners are each incorporated as not-for-profit corporations within the State of Florida, with principal off ices in Florida, and each having less than twenty-five full time employees, as well as a net worth of not more than two million dollars.
The Issue The issues in this matter concern an Administrative Complaint/Notice to Show Cause, which has been brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent charging various violations of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes. Those accusations are more completely described in the conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact The parties in the person of their counsel entered into a written prehearing stipulation, by which certain facts were agreed to. Those facts are as follows: Stipulated Statement of Facts: The Petitioner herein is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums. The Respondent in this matter is Sujac Enterprises, Inc., the developer of a residential condominium known as Ginger Park Condominium located in Jacksonville, Florida. Mr. Jackson M. Jobe is the president of the developer corporation. Transition from developer control of the condominium association occurred pursuant to Section 718.301, Florida Statutes, on November 1, 1983. Prior to this date, Respondent Sujac Enterprises, Inc., was in control of the condominium association. On April 18, 1983, The Division received a condominium complaint from unit owner, Cynthia A. Doallas, filed against Sujac Enterprises, developer of the Ginger Park Condominium. The Division investigation file was opened on April 20 and this investigation was assigned to Janice Snover, specialist and investigator. The Declaration of Condominium was recorded March 12, 1982. The condominium association was incorporated February 16, 1982. Section 8.4 of the declaration of condominium provides for an assessment guarantee for so long as the developer shall own any condominium units within the condominium. At the time of this stipulation, the developer still owns at least one condominium unit within the condominium. The developer controlled association failed to maintain the accounting records provided by Section 718.111(7)(a), (b), Florida Statutes, during the period beginning with the incorporation of the association through at least March 1983. Accounting records were assembled after March of 1983. Mr. Phillip DiStefano was elected to the board of administration in March of 1983 in accordance with Section 718.301(1) , which provides that when unit owners other than the developer own 15 percent or more of the units, the unit owners other than the developer shall be entitled to elect no less than one-third of the members of the board of administration. Mr. DiStefano was elected by unit owners other than the developer. The developer through its president instituted recall procedures pursuant to the procedure as outlined in Section 718.112(2)(g), Florida Statutes, against board member Phillip DiStefano, by circulating a form entitled "Removal of Director or Directors." Mr. Jobe solicited signatures for the agreement, and further, voted the developer corporation's unsold unit votes in favor of the recall. Mr. DiStefano was recalled, with a sufficient number of unit owners other than the developer voting in favor of recall to approve the recall. The developer controlled condominium association failed to provide to unit owners a financial statement of actual receipts and expenditures for the fiscal/calendar year ending December 21, 1982, within 60 days of the end of the year. This financial statement was, however, provided to unit owners approximately three months after the 60 day time period provided in Section 718.111(13), Florida Statutes, had elapsed. The following additional facts are found based upon the presentation made at the final hearing: At the point of the final hearing, the developer still owned a condominium unit within the condominium. The developer had allowed other persons to take charge of the accounting procedures of the condominium association from the inception of the association through March 1983. Those other persons operated on the basis of a checkbook in which check stubs were maintained and deposit slips kept. Some invoices were also maintained. These records, in addition to not being maintained by the developer when the developer was serving as the association in this period through March 1983, were not in accordance with good accounting practices. Moreover, they did not contain an account for each unit, designating the name and current mailing address for the unit owner, with the amount of each assessment, the dates and the amounts in which the assessments came due and the amount paid upon these individual accounts, with the balance due being reflected. As revealed by an audit which the developer had requested of an accountant which it hired, this audit dating from June 7, 1983, there was a deficit in the reserve account on that date. This discovery was made prior to the transfer of the accounting records from the developer to other condominium unit owners. In effect, on June 7, 1983, the reserve account for capital expenditures and maintenance was insufficiently funded. The exact amount of deficit was not shown in the course of the hearing. Therefore, it has not been demonstrated that the deficit of June 7, 1983, corresponds to the deficit in the reserve account in the amount of $1,186.18, effective December 31, 1983 as found by Petitioner's accountant. Respondent in its efforts to refute responsibility for the reserve deficit has failed to demonstrate, by way of defense, that charges incurred on behalf of other condominium unit owners should reduce the developer's deficit responsibility. This pertains to its reference to prepaid insurance, pest control and construction costs related to a fence. The reserve account for capital expenditures and maintenance is a common expense. The developer, pursuant to Section 8.4 of the declaration of condominium is responsible for the deficit in the reserve account as reflected on June 7, 1983, in keeping with the assessment guarantee set forth in that section. That guarantee continued until the account was tranferred to the other condominium unit owners. Features of the aforementioned guarantee related to responsibility to insure against additional assessments attributable to deficits other than those in the reserve account, i.e. for other forms of common expenses, developer's share, only would occur at the point of sale of the last condominium unit. That contingency had not occurred at the time of the conduct of the final hearing. The developer kept the accounting records from April 1983 until June 1983. Subsequently when the records were turned over to the other condominium unit owners as a part of the transition of association control, the developer failed to have a transitional review conducted by an independent accountant related to financial records of the association.
Recommendation It is recommended that a final order be entered which imposes a penalty in the amount of $2,500 for those violations established pertaining to Count I, IV and V and that Counts II and III be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of July 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jerry A. Funk, Esquire 1020 Atlantic Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 E. James Kearney, Director Division of Land Sales and Condominiums The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (Florida Housing) intended decision to award Respondent, Brixton Landing, Ltd., low-income housing tax credits is contrary to Florida Housing’s governing statutes, rules, or the solicitation specifications.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida Housing, is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2015). Its purpose is to promote the public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Petitioners, Madison Hollow, LLC, and American Residential Development, LLC (Madison Hollow or Petitioners), are Florida limited liability corporations engaged in the business of affordable housing development. Brixton Landing, is a Florida limited liability corporation also engaged in the business of affordable housing development. Florida Housing is the housing credit agency for the State of Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and has the responsibility and authority to establish procedures for allocating and distributing low-income housing tax credits, which are made available to the states annually by the United States Department of the Treasury. The State Housing Tax Credit Program is established in Florida under the authority of section 420.5093, Florida Statutes. Florida Housing is the designated entity in Florida responsible for allocating federal tax credits to assist in financing the construction or substantial rehabilitation of affordable housing. Because the demand for tax credits provided by the federal government far exceeds the supply available under the State Housing Tax Credit Program, qualified affordable housing developments must compete for this funding. On November 21, 2015, Florida Housing issued Request for Applications 2014-115, Housing Credit Financing for Affordable Housing Developments in Broward, Duval, Hillsborough, Orange, Palm Beach, and Pinellas Counties (the RFA). No challenge was filed to the terms, conditions, or requirements of the RFA. According to the RFA, Florida Housing expected to award up to approximately $15,553,993 in tax credits for qualified affordable housing projects in those six large counties. Florida Housing received approximately 58 applications in response to the RFA. Madison Hollow, Brixton Landing, Sheeler Club Apartments, Sheeler Club Apartments-Phase II, Banyan Station, Lauderdale Place, and Lake Sherwood timely submitted applications in response to the RFA requesting financing of their affordable housing projects from the funding proposed to be allocated through the RFA. Petitioners requested an allocation of $2,110,000 in annual tax credits for their development, Madison Hollow, located in Orange County. Brixton Landing requested an allocation of $1,330,000 in annual tax credits for Brixton Landing’s proposed development in Orange County. On May 8, 2015, the Board of Directors of Florida Housing approved the preliminary rankings and allocations, and issued its Approved Preliminary Awards/Notice of Intended Decision (Notice of Intended Decision), in which Florida Housing scored both Madison Hollow’s and Brixton Landing’s projects as eligible for funding and awarded each application 23 points. In addition, Sheeler Club Apartments, Sheeler Club Apartments- Phase II, Banyan Station, Lauderdale Place, and Lake Sherwood were all found to be eligible applications. On that same date, Florida Housing published on its website the Notice of Intended Decision, which included a three- page spreadsheet listing all applications made in response to the RFA and identifying those which were eligible and ineligible. Ranking and Selection Process Applications were evaluated for eligibility and scoring by a Review Committee appointed by Florida Housing’s executive director. Applications were considered for funding only if they were deemed “eligible,” based on the terms of the RFA. Of the 58 timely-submitted applications, 52 were deemed eligible and six were deemed ineligible. The highest scoring applications were determined by first sorting all eligible applications from highest score to lowest score. Pursuant to the RFA, applicants could achieve a maximum score of 23 points. Eighteen (18) of those 23 points were attributable to “proximity” scores based on the distance of the proposed development from services needed by tenants. The remaining five points were attributable to Local Government Contributions. In scoring housing tax credit applications, many applicants achieved tie scores. In anticipation of that occurrence, Florida Housing designed the RFA and rules to incorporate a series of “tie breakers” to separate any scores that tied as follows: First by the Application’s eligibility for the “SAIL RFA 2014-111 Unfunded Preference”, which is outlined in Section One of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference). Next, by the Application’s eligibility for the Development Category Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.5.c.(1)(a)(iii) of the RFA (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next by the Application’s eligibility for the Per Unit Construction Funding Preference which is outlined in Section Four A.12.e. of the RFA, (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); Next by the Application’s Leveraging Classification (applying the multipliers outlined in Exhibit C below and having the Classification of A be the top priority); Next by the Application’s eligibility for the Florida Job Creation Preference which is outlined in Exhibit C below (with Applications that qualify for the preference listed above Applications that do not qualify for the preference); and Finally by lottery number, resulting in the lowest lottery number receiving preference. The Leveraging Classification is essentially a ranking of eligible applications based upon the cost per unit (referred to in the RFA as Total Corporation Funding Per Set-Aside Unit), with the most cost-effective project at the top of the list and the least cost-effective at the bottom. The top 90 percent of applications on the list were classified as Group A and the bottom 10 percent of applications classified as Group B. Applicants in Group B are not eligible for funding until all applicants in Group A are funded. Pursuant to Item 9 of Exhibit C to the RFA, Florida Housing classified Brixton Landing and Madison Hollow in the Group A Leveraging Classification, and classified Sheeler Club Apartments, Sheeler Club Apartments-Phase II, Banyan Station, and Lauderdale Place in the Group B Leveraging Classification. Both Brixton Landing and Madison Hollow were scored identically by Florida Housing, and both developments are located in Orange County. Because the RFA provided that only one project will be funded in each county, and because Brixton Landing had a lower lottery number than Madison Hollow, Brixton Landing was selected for funding. A total of 52 applications were found to be eligible for funding. According to the leveraging calculations, the Group B applications were removed from consideration for funding. Brixton Landing was number 45 on the list, thus classified in Group A. Brixton Landing will be moved to Group B classification, if at least two of the five applications in Group B are found to be ineligible. If Brixton Landing is moved into Group B, Madison Hollow will be eligible for funding. The Challenged Applications Madison Hollow alleges that the applications for Sheeler Club Apartments and Sheeler Club Apartments-Phase II should have each been found ineligible for failure to demonstrate the “ability to proceed” required in the RFA. Madison Hollow also alleges that the applications for Banyan Station and Lauderdale Place should have each been found ineligible for failure to fully disclose the principals of the applicant and developer.1/ Madison Hollow is thus in the unusual position of challenging four applicants who were not selected for funding and are not parties to this case. Brixton Landing is in the equally unusual position of defending the applications of those four unfunded applicants. Sheeler Club Atlantic Housing Partners (Atlantic) submitted two applications in response to the RFA. Sheeler Club Apartments was an application for development of affordable multifamily units to serve a family demographic. Sheeler Club Apartments- Phase II was an application for development of multi-family garden homes to serve an elderly demographic. The projects were proposed to be located adjacent to each other. The RFA sets forth the following specific requirements for applicants to demonstrate the ability to proceed: 5.f. Ability to Proceed: The Applicant must demonstrate the following Ability to Proceed elements as of Application Deadline, as outlined below. * * * Status of Site Plan Approval. The Applicant must demonstrate the status of site plan approval as of the Application Deadline by providing, as Attachment 7 to Exhibit A, the properly completed and executed Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification of Status of Site Plan Approval for Multifamily Developments form (Form Rev. 11-14). Appropriate Zoning. The Applicant must demonstrate that as of the Application Deadline the proposed Development site is appropriately zoned and consistent with local land use regulations regarding density and intended use or that the proposed Development site is legally non-conforming by providing, as Attachment 8 to Exhibit A, the applicable properly completed and executed verification form: The Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification that Development is Consistent with Zoning and Land Use Regulations form (Form Rev. 11-14); or The Florida Housing Finance Corporation Local Government Verification that Permits are not Required for this Development form (Form Rev. 11-14). Similarly, the RFA requires applicants to submit forms to demonstrate availability of electricity, water, sewer, and roads to serve the proposed development. The Verification of Status of Site Plan Approval form (Site Plan form) must be completed by the local government official responsible for determination of issues related to site plan approval within the applicable jurisdiction. The official must choose between two optional paragraphs related to proposals for new construction: (1) the proposed development “requires additional site plan approval or similar process” and the “final site plan . . . was approved on or before the submission deadline for the” RFA; or (2) the proposed development “requires additional site plan approval or similar process” and either the jurisdiction requires preliminary or conceptual site plan approval, “which has been issued,” or (b) the jurisdiction provides neither preliminary nor conceptual site plan approval, “nor is any other similar process provided prior to issuing final site plan approval,” but the site plan, in the applicable zoning designation, has been reviewed. Orange County provides neither preliminary nor conceptual site plan approval. Thus, the local government official must certify that the site plan for the proposed project has been reviewed. The Local Government Verification that Development is Consistent with Zoning and Land Use Regulations form (Zoning form), requires that the local government official responsible for issues related to comprehensive planning and zoning certify the following: (1) the zoning designation applicable to the property; (2) that the proposed number of units and intended use are consistent with current land use regulations and the zoning designation; (3) that there are no additional land use regulation hearings or approvals required to obtain the zoning classification or density proposed; and (4) that there are no known conditions that would preclude construction of the proposed development on the site. It is undisputed that Atlantic submitted both verification forms with its application. Olan Hill, Chief Planner for Orange County, reviewed, completed, and signed each of these forms, attesting that in his opinion both of the proposed projects would be in compliance with local zoning and land use regulations. Mr. Hill was fully authorized to sign the forms on behalf of Orange County. The two Atlantic projects are proposed adjacent to one another on a site which has a Planned Development (PD) zoning approval for development of 152 single-family townhome units in the Medium Density Residential Future Land Use category (MDR), which allows a maximum density of 20 units per acre. The County’s PD zoning approval was based on review of Atlantic’s Land Use Plan (LUP) for the site. According to Mr. Hill, the LUP is a “bubble plan” outlining the general entitlements and development program for the site. In the case at hand, the Atlantic site also has an approved preliminary subdivision plan (PSP), which is the first step to subdivide the property. Under the PSP, the property is proposed to be subdivided into 152 lots for development of single-family townhomes. For purposes of certifying the Site Plan and Zoning forms, Mr. Hill reviewed the PD LUP, not the PSP. Regarding the Site Plan form, Mr. Hill certified that, although the County requires no preliminary or conceptual site plan approval process and the final site plan approval has not yet been issued, the site plan for the project in the applicable zoning classification, the PD LUP, had been reviewed. With respect to the Zoning form, Mr. Hill first certified that the proposed number of units and intended use are consistent with current land use regulations and the PD zoning designation. The PD LUP limits the total number of units to 152, which would accommodate either of the Sheeler Club applications (Sheeler Club Apartments proposes 88 units, while Sheeler Club-Phase II proposes 64 units). The MDR land use category allows the multi-family uses proposed for the development up to 20 units per acre. Under the MDR category, the 21.4-acre site could be approved for well over 152 units. Mr. Hill next certified that there are no additional land use regulation hearings or approvals required to obtain the zoning classification or density described in that zoning classification. The PD zoning is final and is not dependent upon whether Atlantic goes forward with subdivision of the property as proposed in the existing PSP. Atlantic could subdivide the property for a different number of lots, or in a different configuration, without changing the zoning of the property. Finally, Mr. Hill certified that there are no known conditions that would preclude construction of the referenced Development on the proposed site, assuming compliance with the applicable land use regulations. There are numerous county approvals needed throughout the development approval process. The Zoning form does not require the local government official to certify that no additional approvals are needed following site plan review, or that the proposed project is ready to begin construction. Petitioners contend that neither of the Sheeler Club applications should have been deemed eligible because, despite Mr. Hill’s authorized certifications to the contrary, the projects do not have the ability to proceed. Petitioners do not contend that Mr. Hill was not authorized to execute the forms, or that the certifications were obtained through fraud or other illegality. As to the Site Plan form, Petitioners contend first that Mr. Hill did not review a site plan for either project proposed by Atlantic: Sheeler Club Apartments, 88 multi-family units; or Sheeler Club Apartments-Phase II, 64 garden apartments. Instead, Mr. Hill reviewed and certified the site plan for Sheeler Avenue Townhomes PD, which provides for development of single-family townhomes in a single phase over the entire site. Petitioners argue that the PD is conditioned upon development of townhomes in single ownership complying with section 38-79(20) of the Orange County Code of Ordinances, which is unrelated to construction of the “garden apartments” proposed by Atlantic in its application to Florida Housing for financing. Thus, Petitioners conclude, Mr. Hill has not reviewed a site plan for either Sheeler Club Apartments or Sheeler Club Apartments-Phase II. Mr. Hill testified that his certification did not depend on whether either or both of the proposed projects was eventually developed, but that the overall site has a PD zoning approval for a total of 152 units. Ken Reecy is the Director of Multi-family Programs for Florida Housing. He testified the purpose of the Site Plan form, and, for that matter, the Zoning form, is to verify “high- level” approval of the site. For example, if the applicant proposes a 64-unit project, Florida Housing wants verification that the developer will be able to deliver 64 units. As to the Zoning form, Petitioners present a parade of objections. Petitioners argue that the proposed use of the property for multi-family apartments and garden apartments is inconsistent with the zoning approval for single-family townhomes; thus, additional land use regulation approvals are required, contrary to the certified Zoning form. Petitioners point to the PSP approved for the subdivision of the property and argue that neither Sheeler Club project could be built in conformity with the PSP, which proposes to subdivide the property into 152 townhome lots. Relying on the PSP, Petitioners also argue that Sheeler Club Apartments-Phase II has no public road access without the Sheeler Club Apartments development, thus, Mr. Hill’s certification as to Phase II was incorrect and the project is not ready to proceed. Moreover, Petitioners argue that Atlantic “gerrymandered” the boundaries of the two projects in order to secure the most advantageous location for the “development location point”; therefore, the lot layout proposed in the PSP cannot be achieved on either of the two projects. Likewise, Petitioners argue the boundary is a change from the approved PSP, which requires additional land use approvals from the Board of County Commissioners. It is Florida Housing’s practice to accept the zoning and land use certifications by local officials, which it followed in this case. Florida Housing does not have the expertise, resources, or authority to evaluate local zoning and land use decisions. Petitioners would have the undersigned perform the analysis that Florida Housing did not and make a determination whether the Atlantic projects, as proposed, meet the requirements for zoning and land use approvals set forth in the certifications signed by Mr. Hill. Petitioners would have this tribunal interpret the Orange County Code of Ordinances and make findings regarding: whether the LUP PD would have to be amended for Atlantic to build the projects proposed in its funding application to Florida Housing; whether said amendments would constitute “substantial changes” to the approved PD, thus requiring additional public hearings; and, ultimately, whether the Site Plan and Zoning forms were executed in error. The undersigned declines to do so, as set forth more fully in the Conclusions of Law. In this particular case, Mr. Reecy testified that Orange County was aware of the issues raised by Madison Hollow and that he relied on Mr. Hill’s knowledge to make the right call on these forms. While there was certainly an abundance of testimony attempting to call into question the decisions of the Orange County authorities, the evidence does not support a finding that Florida Housing’s proposed action is contrary to the agency’s governing statutes, the agency’s rules or policies, or the solicitation specifications, or that it was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. In light of that finding, the audio recordings of Orange County Commission Meetings proffered by both Petitioners and Brixton Landing are not admitted. The recordings are irrelevant in this proceeding and have not been relied upon by the undersigned. Banyan Station and Lauderdale Place Madison Hollow alleges that two other applications, Banyan Station and Lauderdale Place, should have been found ineligible for failure to disclose the principals of the applicant and the developers, as required by RFA section Four.A.3. Both the applicants for, and developers of, Banyan Station and Lauderdale Place are limited liability companies (LLCs). Section Four.A.3.d.(2) requires applicants that are LLCs to provide a list identifying the principals of the applicant and the principals of each developer as of the application deadline. The RFA also directs applicants to Section 3 of Exhibit C “to assist the [a]pplicant in compiling the listing.” Exhibit C provides, “[t]he Corporation is providing the following charts and examples to assist the Applicant in providing the required list[.] The term Principal is defined in Section 67-48.002, F.A.C.” Florida Administrative Code Rule 67-48.002(93) reads, in relevant part, as follows: (93) ‘Principal’ means: With respect to an Applicant or Developer that is a limited liability company, any manager or member of the Applicant or Developer limited liability company, and, with respect to any manager or member of the Applicant or Developer limited liability company that is: 3. A limited liability company, any manager or member of the limited liability company. Exhibit C provides the following chart applicable to disclosures by LLC applicants: Identify All Managers And Identify all Members and For each Manager that is a Limited Partership: For each Manager that is a Limited Liability Company: For each Manager that is a Corporation: Identify each General Partner Identify each Manager Identify each Officer and and and Identify each Limited Partner Identify each Member Identify each Director and Identify each Shareholder and For each Member that is a Limited Partnership: For each Member that is a Limited Liability Company: For each Member that is a Corporation: Identify each General Partner Identify each Manager Identify each Officer and and and Identify each Limited Partner Identify each Member Identify each Director and Identify each Shareholder For any Manager and/or Member that is a natural person (i.e., Samuel S. Smith), no further disclosure is required. Exhibit C further provides examples of fictitious applicants and developers followed by disclosure listings of managers, members, general and limited partners, officers, directors, and shareholders, as applicable. Banyan Station, applicant, HTG Banyan is a limited liability company. HTG Banyan listed its managers as Matthew and Randy Rieger, and its members as Camillus-Banyan, LLC, and Housing Trust Group, LLC. It then listed Camillus House, Inc., and RER Family Partnership, Ltd., as sole members of those LLCs, respectively. Applicant’s developer is also a limited liability company, HTG Banyan Developer, LLC. HTG Banyan Developer listed Matthew and Randy Rieger as the developer’s managers, and Camillus-Banyan, LLC, HTG Affordable, LLC, and Reiger Holdings, LLC, as its members. It listed Camillus House, Inc., RER Family Partnership, Ltd., and Balogh Family Investments Limited Partnership, as members of those LLCs. HTG Banyan Developer disclosed Matthew Reiger as the sole member of Rieger Holdings. Likewise, Lauderdale Place applicant, HTG Anderson, LLC, identified its managers and members, although some members were identified as LLCs. In each case, the applicant identified the principals of the applicant and the developer down “two levels” of organizational structure, even though in some cases this did not result in the disclosure of natural persons. Petitioners urge an interpretation of the disclosure requirement that would require an LLC to continue to identify members and managers until natural persons are identified. Respondents maintain that the rule and the RFA require disclosure of only “two levels” of organizational structure, as shown on the charts in Exhibit C. Petitioners did not make a showing that Florida Housing’s interpretation of the rule and the RFA is unreasonable. The definition of “principal” of an LLC includes members which are likewise LLCs. The assistive chart includes disclosures at only two levels of organizational structure. Furthermore, in Exhibit C, example 3, the disclosure for ABC, LLC, includes XYZ, LLC, as a member without further disclosure. In support of its argument, Petitioners rely upon the language below the chart which states, “[f]or any Manager and/or Member that is a natural person (i.e., Samuel S. Smith), no further disclosure is required.” The plain language of the chart states that when disclosing managers and members of an LLC, for any manager or member who is a natural person, no further disclosure is required. The language does not state, as Petitioners would prefer, when disclosing managers and members of an LLC, disclosure must be made until all natural persons are disclosed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order affirming Brixton Landing for funding under RFA 2014-115. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2015.
