Findings Of Fact Based upon the pleadings and responses thereto, an Order imposing sanctions for Respondent's failure to submit discovery as required by the undersigned dated October 15, 1986 and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. Respondent is the developer of a condominium known as La Residence. As Presently developed, La Residence consists of sixty units. La Residence is located in Boca Raton, Florida. Respondent failed to meet the completion date for the subsequent phases of La Residence as is described in the declaration of condominium of La Residence. According to the Declaration of Condominiums for La Residence, the scheduled dates listed for construction of the subsequent phases of La Residence were June, 1982 for phase II; February, 1983 for phase III, and November, 1983 for phase IV. Amendments to the Declaration of Condominium of La Residence were recorded on June 30, 1981, March 22, 1982 and August 2, 1984. Respondent did not furnish the Division with copies of the above-referred amendments. Additionally, Respondent failed to provide purchasers of units within La Residence, copies of the above-referred amendments. Respondent failed to hold annual members meeting for the years 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. Respondent failed to call a members meeting to allow non-developer unit owners to elect a director after fifteen percent of the available units had been conveyed. Respondent failed to mail to unit owners, copies of the proposed annual budget for the years 1982, 1983, and 1984. Respondent failed to include the statutory reserves and the proposed annual budget as required for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984. Respondent failed to fund reserve accounts for the years 1982, 1983 and 1984. Respondent failed to provide unit owners with financial reports for fiscal years 1982, 1983 and 1984. Respondent failed to pay the developer's share of assessments due to be paid by the developer after June 30, 1982. The Declaration of Condominium for La Residence was recorded in the public records of Palm Beach County in 1981. Control of the Condominium Association was turned over to non-developer unit owners on February 16, 1985. No "turnover report" was prepared by a certified public accountant nor was such a report ever furnished to the Condominium Association by Respondent. Respondent has not provided the Condominium Association copies of all canceled checks and bank statements for the time period dating from the recordation in 1981 to January 31 1984. Respondent, or a representative on its behalf, did not appear at the hearing to refute or otherwise contest the alleged violations set forth in the Notice to Show Cause filed herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions, of a Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED Respondent pay to the Division, within thirty (30) days of issuance of the Division's Final Order, a civil penalty in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000). Respondent secure the services of an independent certified public accountant who shall review the condominium records and submit a turnover review in accordance with the provisions of Section 718.301(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1985) and rule 7B-23.03(4)(5) and (6), Florida Administrative Code. Within thirty days of the Division's Final Order, it is recommended that the Division issue guidelines to Respondent to ensure that the condominium records are reviewed in accordance with the above-referenced statutory and rule provisions. Provided that monies are found to be due and owing the association based on the review, Respondent shall be directed to remit such amounts to La Residence of Boca Del Mar Condominium Association. Recommended this 23rd day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1987.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, within the meaning of and in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, Sections 760.20 through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2005), by requiring Petitioners to submit a second application for the approval of a condominium purchase.
Findings Of Fact It is undisputed that Petitioner, Allan Kangas, has no handicap and is not a disabled person. At the conclusion of Petitioners' case-in-chief, Mr. Kangas testified that he has no handicap. The undersigned, sua sponte, entered an ore tenus order on the record dismissing the case brought by Mr. Kangas. Petitioner, Anna Kangas, is an elderly female and the mother of Mr. Allan Kangas and Mr. Sheldon Kangas, the latter being the representative in this proceeding for the named Petitioners. It is undisputed that Mr. Sheldon Kangas is not handicapped, but that Mrs. Kangas is handicapped, within the meaning of Section 760.22(7), Florida Statutes (2005), because of Alzheimer's disease. Respondent is a condominium association lawfully incorporated as a Florida corporation (Association). Respondent must operate in accordance with the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, and Declaration of Condominium (condominium documents). The condominium documents require the Association to approve each purchase of a condominium. On December 8, 2005, Mr. Sheldon Kangas and Mrs. Anna Kangas contracted with Ms. Mary Cox to purchase condominium unit 15, located at 23 Hatchett Creek Road. Ms. Cox is a real estate agent and a co-owner of unit 15. Ms. Cox notified Ms. Pat Williamson, Association Secretary, of the prospective purchase. For the reasons stated herein, Respondent did not discriminate against the prospective purchasers, but approved the purchase of condominium unit 18 in a timely manner after the purchasers changed their purchase contract from unit 15 to unit 18. The prospective purchasers completed an application for approval of the purchase of unit 15 sometime between December 8 and 10, 2005. The Association conducted a meeting to approve the proposed purchase on December 10, 2005. During the meeting on December 10, 2005, the purchasers informed the Association that they wished to purchase unit 18, located at 29 Hatchett Creek Road, rather than unit 15. Unit 18 was owned by Mr. Brian Isaac. Ms. Cox did not object to releasing the purchasers from the contract for the purchase of unit 15. The Association informed the purchasers that a new application for unit 18 would be required. The purchasers completed a new application under protest. At a meeting conducted on January 3, 2006, the Association approved the application for the purchase of unit 18. The purchase of unit 18 closed on January 25, 2006. The purchasers seek reimbursement of living expenses incurred for hotel rooms and meals during the delay caused by the requirement for a second application. The purchasers are not entitled to reimbursement. The purchase of unit 18 was the first time the Association had required a second application. However, it was also the first time a purchaser had changed his or her choice of units after submitting an application. The Association did not discriminate against Mrs. Kangas because of her handicap. The record evidence contains no justifiable issue of law or fact to support the alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of January 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of January 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David G. Muller, Esquire Becker & Poliakoff, P.A. 630 South Orange Avenue, Third Floor Sarasota, Florida 34236 Shelden Kangas Allan Kangas 4578 Manor Drive Sarasota, Florida 34233
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the unlawful housing discrimination practices alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. Petitioner is a "unit owner" of a condominium located at 210-174th Street #310, Sunny Isles Beach, Florida. Said unit is located in the Winston Towers 600 Condominium ("Condominium"). Respondent, the Association, is a Florida non-profit corporation and the entity responsible for the operation of the Condominium. Respondent, Board of Directors, possesses the powers and duties necessary for the administration of the affairs of the Condominium. Pursuant to the Association By-Laws, the affairs of the Association are to be governed by a board of initially three, and not less than three, nor more than nine directors. Respondent, Jorge Nunez, was the President of the Association's Board of Directors at all times material to the Complaint. During his tenure, Mr. Nunez was also the chairman of the financial committee.4/ Respondent, Monica Zarante, possesses a Florida Community Association Manager ("CAM") license and at all times material was the Association's manager. Condominium Facilities and Services Pursuant to the Condominium prospectus, the following facilities have been constructed in the Condominium, and form a part of the "common elements" of the Condominium and are to be used exclusively by the unit owners, their tenants, and guests: clubroom and entertainment areas (billiard room, library, men's and women's card rooms, meeting room and kitchen, bicycle room, and large screen television room); (b) main lobby; (c) mail room; (d) laundry room and vending machine room; (e) association office; (f) four elevators; (g) recreational facilities (tennis court, recreation pavilion, men and women's health clubs, party room, and sun deck); (h) L-shaped swimming pool; (i) jogging trail; (j) two shuffleboard courts; and (k) an irregularly-shaped reflecting pool. Pursuant to the Condominium prospectus, the following are the delineated utilities and services available to the Condominium: electricity, telephone service, waste disposal, domestic water supply, sanitary sewage, storm drainage, and master antenna service. Association Committees As noted above, Petitioner's Complaint alleges that, "sometime in 2012 she was denied her right to participate on Association committees because of her race." Association By-Law 5.2 addresses committees and provides as follows: Committees. The Board of Directors may designate one or more committees which shall have the powers of the Board of Directors for the management of the affairs and business of the Association to the extent provided in the resolution designating such a committee. Any such committee shall consist of at least three members of the Association, at least one of whom shall be a Director. The committee or committees shall have such name or names as may be determined from time to time by the Board of Directors, and any such committee shall keep regular minutes of its proceedings and report the same to the Board of Directors as required. The foregoing powers shall be exercised by the Board of Directors or its contractor, manager or employees, subject only to approval by Unit Owners when such is specifically required. Respondent Nunez credibly testified that the availability to participate on committees is open to all unit owners. If an owner wishes to be on a committee, he or she simply needs to communicate that desire to the particular committee chairperson. Mr. Nunez, at some point in time, was apparently the chairman of the financial committee. In Petitioner's direct examination of Respondent Nunez, the following exchange occurred: Q. Okay. Did you say, "You sit at this table with us, never?" A. Never. I can't say that. I can't say "never." I cannot reject anybody to belong to any committee. I can't. It's impossible. Q. Okay. A. I like you, I don't like you, you want to be on the committee, you have a right to be on the committee. Petitioner testified that she was denied access to the financial committee to which Mr. Nunez chaired. Petitioner failed, however, to present sufficient evidence for the undersigned to determine whether this alleged denial occurred during the time relevant to the allegations of Petitioner's Complaint. Even if relevant, outside of her bare assertion, which is not credited, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that she was ever denied the right to participate on any Association committee. As a subset, Petitioner argues that she was denied "meaningful participation" on the committees, and thus, in condominium decision-making. In support of this contention, Petitioner references the testimony from Association Board Member Audrey Bekoff. In response to Petitioner's question of "why did the Petitioner point her finger at you?," Ms. Bekoff responded as follows: I haven't got the slightest idea. When you get angry, you pull your hair, you scream, you yell, you wipe the things off Monica's desk. You knock the things off. Everybody knows you on the Board. When you come into the meeting, everybody leaves. Petitioner contends that the "refusal to allow her to participate arose from Respondents' extreme dislike for her, and this extreme dislike was likely based, at least in part, on her race." Petitioner's contention, however, is belied by the record evidence. Indeed, audio recordings of various Association meetings provide multiple examples of Petitioner's robust participation in a variety of condominium issues. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner provided evidence to support the position that she is not well-liked, aside from her bald allegation, she failed to present any evidence of discriminatory animus in regards to Association committee participation. Association Records Petitioner claims she was denied access to the Association's financial records (in general) and records related to a particular condominium unit, Unit 2007, on the basis of her race. Petitioner alleges that the records requests were made on July 30, 2012, and November 1, 2012. Monica Zerante testified that the Association's protocol for requesting records from the Association included submitting a request in writing, and, thereafter, the Association provides a copy of the requested document or the requesting party may be given access to find the document. She further explained that the Association's policy is to charge 25 cents per copy; however, that charge is frequently waived. Mr. Nunez provided the further detail that once the Association receives a records request, the Association has ten days to accommodate the request. Although the Association has established rules regarding the frequency and time of record inspections and copying, Mr. Nunez credibly testified that same were not enforced concerning Petitioner. It is undisputed that on at least one occasion, while Petitioner was present in the Association's office for the purpose of inspecting/reviewing Association documents, a conflict arose between Petitioner and Monica Zerante such that Ms. Zerante requested law enforcement assistance. In support of her contention that she was treated differently because of her race, Petitioner testified as follows: Okay. Mr. Nunez, while not on the Board, goes to the office and he gets a monthly statement of the Association operating budget on a monthly basis and he is entitled to that. I go and request the same thing and I'm told I have to pay for it. And if I object to paying for it, then the police is called. * * * Q. You have no evidence that Mr. Nunez, when he was off the Board, did not similarly have to pay for records, correct? A. I have seen with my eyes that he has not. Q. Well, you have no idea if he actually paid for those records separately, do you? A. I've never seen him pay for that. Inconsistently, Petitioner subsequently testified that, at times, like Mr. Nunez, she was also provided documents free of charge. Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any document that the Association was required to maintain (and not prohibited from disclosure) was not, in fact, provided or made available for inspection. Respondents' witnesses credibly testified that Petitioner had access to all available documents, and their testimony was buttressed by the record evidence. Furthermore, a review of the record reveals that Respondents' legal counsel, on multiple occasions, provided written responses to Petitioner's document requests.5/ Even if Petitioner had presented sufficient evidence to establish that she was denied access to the Association's records, Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that any such denial was due to any discriminatory animus on the basis of her race.6/ Access to Property Petitioner's Access The original Condominium Rules and Regulations provided that, "[a]utomobiles belonging to residents must at all times bear the identifying garage sticker provided by the Association." On July 27, 2011, Ms. Zarante, on behalf of the Condominium, authored a memorandum to all residents. The contents of the memorandum are as follows: DEAR RESIDENT, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT AS OF TODAY, YOU MUST DISPLAY THE CAR BARCODE LABEL IN YOUR CARS AT ALL TIMES, WHILE COMING INTO THE BUILDING SO YOU CAN USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE AND WHILE YOUR CAR IS PARKED IN YOUR ASSIGNED PARKING SPACE. ALSO, THE DRIVER SIDE OF THE CAR'S WINDSHIELD MUST DISPLAY THE WINSTON TOWERS LABEL SHOWING THE SPACE NUMBER. IN CASE YOU DO NOT HAVE THE BARCODE LABEL OR THE WINSTON TOWERS LABEL, PLEASE, STOP BY THE OFFICE IN ORDER TO GET THEM. IF YOU ALREADY HAVE THE CAR BARCODE LABEL DISPLAYED IN YOUR CAR, WE ASK YOU TO PLEASE REFRAIN FROM USING THE VISITOR'S GATE AND TO ALWAYS USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE. On that same date, Ms. Zarante, on behalf of the Condominium, authored a memorandum to the gate security personnel. Said memorandum set forth the same information as above, and further advised the gate personnel to advise residents without the requisite barcode and label to stop by the office to obtain the same. The memorandum further instructed the security personnel as follows: SHOULD THE RESIDENT WITH A CAR BARCODE LABEL ALREADY PLACED IN THE CAR STILL DECIDES [sic] TO USE THE VISITOR'S GATE, PLEASE TELL THEM THAT YOU WILL ONLY OPEN THAT TIME FOR THEM, THAT IN THE FUTURE THEY MUST USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE GATE AS YOU WILL NOT OPEN FOR THEM. SHOULD THEY HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH THE BARCODE LABEL, PLEASE TELL THEM TO STOP BY THE OFFICE. On September 8, 2011, the Board of Directors issued a memorandum to "Residents Using Visitor's Gate" entitled "FINAL NOTICE/RESIDENT BUILDING ACCESS." The memorandum advised the residents as follows: DEAR RESIDENT, PLEASE BE INFORMED THAT YOU MUST DISPLAY THE CAR BARCODE LABEL IN YOUR CARS AT ALL TIMES. YOU MUST USE THE CAR BARCODE LABEL AND USE THE RESIDENT'S ENTRANCE WHEN ENTERING OUR BUILDING. SHOULD YOU CONTINUE USING THE VISITOR'S GATE, WHICH IS FOR VISITORS AND DELIVERIES ONLY, YOU WILL NOT BE ADMITTED. AS AN OWNER/RESIDENT YOU WILL BE PERMITTED TO ENTER; HOWEVER, YOUR AUTOMOBILE WILL NOT. IF YOU LEAVE YOUR AUTOMOBILE IN THE VISITOR'S ENTRANCE THE POLICE WILL BE NOTIFIED AND YOUR AUTOMOBILE WILL BE TOWED. PLEASE, ABIDE BY THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO AVOID FUTURE PROBLEMS. The Condominium maintained regular office hours of 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for residents to obtain the aforementioned barcode/label. On or about September 14, 2011, Petitioner attempted to enter the Condominium using the visitors' gate. Despite being advised of the barcode/label requirement and the admonition against using the visitors' gate, Petitioner had not acquired the barcode/label. After the security officer advised Petitioner that he was not permitted to open the visitors' gate for residents, Petitioner entered the security gate house and opened the gate herself. As a result of her actions, law enforcement was called to the scene, and ultimately Petitioner gained access to the Condominium. Subsequently, as a result of Petitioner's actions, she was advised via correspondence that her actions were improper.7/ After obtaining the requisite barcode/label, there is no evidence that Petitioner experienced any further inconvenience regarding the gate. The undersigned finds that Petitioner was not denied access to her property. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner presented no evidence that any inconvenience regarding the gate was due to her race. Petitioner's Son Visitors of unit owners were required to pay $2.00 to park in the guest parking lot. Unit owners, like Petitioner, for the convenience of their guests, were permitted to pre-pay for a guest if the guest was anticipated to arrive that day. Carlos Devesa, a security guard at the front gate, testified that a special exception was made for Petitioner, wherein she was allowed to accept a deposit for her guests for a longer period of time. Petitioner testified that on one occasion, a security guard, who is not an employee of the Condominium or the Association, delivered a package to Petitioner's son at the front gate. Petitioner extrapolates that benefit into a denial of access to her property: Security was trying to be nice by greeting him off the property with a package that was left on the property for him. Q. Okay. What evidence do you have that was based on race? A. In the case of my son, again, he was denied access to come to the property. It wasn't because of parking, so maybe you should have been asking security what was his motivation. Q. I'm asking you because you made the allegation. A. Well, I believe that he met him out at the street because he wanted to interfere with his right to come on the property. The undersigned finds that Petitioner's son was not denied access to Petitioner's property. The undersigned further finds that Petitioner failed to present any evidence that Petitioner's son's access to Petitioner's property was denied due to her or his race. Lien Between the twelfth and fifteenth day of each month, the Association runs a "delinquency report." If it is determined that a unit owner or resident is delinquent (in maintenance fees, assessments, etc.) an initial letter is issued reminding of the delinquency. If the delinquency is not then satisfied, a thirty (30) day certified letter is issued. Thereafter, if the delinquency is not cured, the Association ceases to be involved and refers the matter to the Association's legal counsel for further handling. It is undisputed that Petitioner became delinquent in maintenance fees. Following the above protocol, a lien was ultimately placed on Petitioner's unit. Thereafter, Petitioner satisfied the maintenance fees; however, she refused to pay the attorneys' fees associated with the legal process. Petitioner contends that she was treated differently in the lien process due to her race. In support of her position, Petitioner believes that Unit 2007 was not subject to the same protocol. The evidence establishes that Unit 2007 was delinquent for a longer period of time than Petitioner's unit prior to being sent to the Association's counsel. Unlike Petitioner's unit, however, Unit 2007 was placed in foreclosure, and was ultimately sold through a foreclosure sale. The undersigned finds that a lien was placed on Petitioner's unit. The undersigned finds that Petitioner presented no evidence to establish that the lien process was initiated due to her race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of July, 2014.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents are guilty of the following: (a) breach of fiduciary relationship in violation of Section 718.111(1)(a), Florida Statutes; (b) failure to respond in writing to written inquiries in violation of Section 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes; (c) failure to properly notice a meeting in which regular assessments were discussed in violation of Section 718.112(2)(c), Florida Statutes; (d) failure to proportionately excuse payment of common expenses for all units owners after doing so for one unit owner in violation of Section 718.116(9)(a), Florida Statutes; and (e) willfully and knowingly violating Chapter 718, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 718.501(d)(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Ocean Gate is a unit-owner controlled condominium located in St. Augustine, Florida. A three-member board of directors governs Ocean Gate. However, Article V of Ocean Gate's Articles of Incorporation states as follows in relevant part: This corporation shall have three (3) directors initially. Thereafter, the number of directors may be increased from time to time in the manner provided by the Bylaws, but shall never be fewer than three. Ocean Gate's original developer was Robert Laurence/Ocean Gate Development, Inc. On or about June 16, 1999, the developer recorded Ocean Gate's Declaration of Condominium in the official record book 1417, page 1932, of the public records of St. Johns County, Florida. At that time, Ocean Gate's directors, as set forth in the Articles of Incorporation, were Roger W. McClain, Leslie Gallagher, and Robert J.L. Laurence. The property at issue includes two buildings (2.1 and 2.2) containing a total of 10 units. Units 600, 604, 608, 612, 616, and 620 are located in Ocean Gate's 2.1 building. Units 605, 609, 613, and 617 are located in Ocean Gate's 2.2 building. On June 16, 1999, the following deeds were recorded in the official record book of St. Johns County, Florida: (a) unit 600 to Mr. and Mrs. Grissom (later sold to the Mr. Barrow/Flag Development Corporation); (b) unit 604 to Mr. and Mrs. McNeely; (c) unit 608 to Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship; (d) unit 612 to Mr. and Mrs. Klinehoffer; (e) unit 616 to Mr. and Mrs. Pittman (later sold to Mr. and Mrs. Weaver); and (f) unit 620 to Mr. and Mrs. Carabetta. The unit owners in the 2.1 building had to lend the developer funds to complete the construction of their units. Even so, these unit owners had to foreclose on that loan and spend additional funds to complete the construction on their units. On or about July 1, 1999, Ocean Gate issued a Notice of Owners Meeting. The meeting was scheduled for July 17, 1999. The agenda attached to the notice included the following: (a) call to order; (b) establish a quorum; (c) waiver of 60-day notice; (d) introduction of May Management Services, Inc. (May Management); (e) official approval of management contract; (f) discussion of board members; (g) discussion of contract; and (h) adjournment. Ocean Gate held its first unit owners' meeting on July 17, 1999. Mr. Klinehoffer, Mr. and Mrs. Pittman, Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship, Mr. and Mrs. McNeely, Mr. Grissom, and Mr. and Mrs. Carabetta attended the meeting. The developer did not attend the meeting. During the July 17, 1999, meeting, the unit owners accepted the resignation of Les R. Gallagher, as a director, and elected the following directors/officers: Mr. Grissom, president; Mr. Kleinhoffer, vice president; and Mrs. Pittman, secretary/treasurer. The representative of May Management announced that the developer had turned over $8,308.44 to the unit owners. Ocean Gate conducted a unit owners meeting on December 4, 1999. Mr. Grissom and Dr. Blankenship attended the meeting. Mrs. Pittman attended by proxy. A representative of the developer was also in attendance. During the meeting, the unit owners approved Ocean Gate's 2000 operating budget. On or about January 14, 2000, Mrs. Pittman resigned as a director and secretary/treasurer. A unit owners meeting took place on January 29, 2000. Mr. Grissom, Dr. and Mrs. Blankenship, Mr. Carabetta, Mr. and Mrs. McNeely, and Mr. Weaver were in attendance. In a notice dated March 22, 2000, Ocean Gate scheduled a unit owners meeting for April 15, 2000. The agenda included the following: (a) call to order; (b) establish a quorum; (c) approval of minutes of January 29, 2000; (d) financial report; (e) old business (release of lien payment for John M. Williams); (f) new business, including election of director; (g) date of next meeting; and (h) adjournment. During the meeting, Mr. Weaver was elected to fill a vacancy on Ocean Gate's board of directors. The Carabettas' unit, which is located in the 2.1 building, is the largest unit on the property. Mr. Carabetta refused to pay some of Ocean Gate's assessments because he did not believe Ocean Gate was properly maintaining his unit. In time, he filed at least one lawsuit against Ocean Gate and its board of directors. He also filed defamation and discrimination lawsuits against some of the unit owners in their individual capacities. Mr. Carabetta testified at hearing that Ocean Gate failed to maintain his unit while expending funds to maintain the units of the Weavers, the Blankenships, the McNeelys, and the Klinehoffers. There is no persuasive evidence that the directors of Ocean Gate improperly refused to pay for maintenance/repair of the common elements in the 2.1 building, including the limited common elements directly affecting Mr. Carabetta's unit. The 2.2 building was the subject of a foreclosure suit. It was sold on the courthouse steps to Flag Development Corporation on June 13, 2000. Pursuant to that sale, Flag Development Corporation also bought two additional condominium developments, Ocean Gate Phase II and Ocean Gate Phase III, which are not a part of the property at issue here. The record contains a Certificate of Title conveying real and personal property to Flag Development Corporation. The certificate refers to a description of real and personal property, "Exhibit A," which is not attached to the copy of the certificate in the record. John Williams and Mr. Barrow are business associates affiliated with Flag Development Corporation. After receiving title to the 2.2 building, their company did nothing more than clean up the property. They did no construction, maintenance, or repair work. In two letters, Jones & Pellicer, Inc., civil engineers and land surveyors, responded to Mr. Weaver's request for a survey to determine the square footage for each unit. The first letter dated May 31, 2000, referred to the survey of units 600, 604, 608, 612, 616, and 620 in the 2.1 building. The second letter dated July 31, 2000, referred to the survey of units 605, 609, 613, and 617 in the 2.2 building. According to the letters, the surveys determined the square footage for each unit using the floor area, as defined by Section 4.7-Unit Boundaries "A" and "B" in the Ocean Gate Declaration of Condominium. Mr. Walters purchased the four units in Ocean Gate's 2.2 building from John Williams/Flag Development Corporation in late July or early August 2000. The purchase price was approximately one million dollars. The record contains a copy of the corporate warranty deed conveying the 2.2 building to Mr. Walters. The deed states that the transfer of title is "subject to taxes for the current year, covenants, restrictions, and easements of record, if any." The attachments to the deed describing the property include Schedule A, Exhibit A, and Exhibit A Continued. The document identified as Exhibit A Continued, and which appears to be signed by the original developer, is not legible. When Mr. Walters bought the four units, the 2.2 building had a roof, windows, walls, and doors from which the square footage of each unit could be determined. The building was about 45 percent complete but not sufficiently complete to qualify any of the units in the building for a certificate of occupancy. Mr. Walters hired a contractor to complete the construction on his units. The construction, which involved a considerable sum of money, included work on the common elements and the interior of the units. There were liens on the 2.2 building for Ocean Gate's assessments when Mr. Walters purchased his four units. Mr. Walters refused to pay any past or ongoing assessments on his four units. In turn, Ocean Gate refused to expend any funds to maintain or repair the 2.2 building. Ocean Gate continued to impose assessments on all unit owners, including Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. Ocean Gate also had to impose special assessments on some unit owners to make up the shortfall when Mr. Walters and/or Mr. Carabetta refused to pay their regular assessments. On October 17, 2000, Ocean Gate filed a Revised Claim of Lien against Mr. Walters for unpaid assessments and late charges. The Revised Claim of Lien alleged that Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate a balance of $20,983.42. In a letter dated October 18, 2000, Ocean Gate advised Mr. Walters that a foreclosure suit would be instituted if he did not pay the assessments and charges. Early in 2001, Ocean Gate filed a Complaint seeking foreclosure of the liens against Mr. Walters in Case No. CA-01- 85, in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. On or about March 1, 2001, Mr. Walters filed a Motion to Dismiss in Case No. CA-01-85, in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. Mr. Walters took the position that he was not obliged to pay condominium assessment until a certificate of occupancy was issued and that the original developer had never relinquished control of Ocean Gate. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta together owned over 51 percent of the total square footage in all units. Therefore, they controlled a majority of Ocean Gate's voting interests, which are directly proportional to the square footage in each unit. Specifically, Mr. Walters controlled a total of 36.207 percent of the membership voting interests and Mr. Carabetta controlled a total of 15.990 percent of the membership voting interests. Mr. Weaver was Ocean Gate's president in September 2001. Mr. McNeely and Mr. Klinehoffer were also directors/officers. All three of the directors were named as defendants in one or more of Mr. Carabetta's lawsuits. On or about September 26, 2001, Mr. Weaver issued the second notice of Ocean Gate's annual meeting of unit owners. The notice included the following agenda items: (a) roll call; (b) reading of minutes of last meeting; (c) reports of officers; (d) election of directors; (e) unfinished business; (f) original resolutions and new business; and (g) adjournment. The annual meeting of Ocean Gate's unit owners took place on October 27, 2001. During the meeting Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta, in concert with one additional unit owner, used their majority voting interests to elect themselves as directors. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta received 64 percent of the votes. Dr. Blankenship, receiving 84.69 percent of the votes, became Ocean Gate's third director and "acting" president. After the election of the directors, Mr. Walters expressed his frustration about the liens on his property and the pending foreclosure action involving at that time approximately $50,000 in assessments and interest. In an effort to resolve the conflict, Dr. Blankenship proposed the following as a global concept: Homer Barrow and the newly elected Ocean Gate Phase I Condo Association Board will attempt to satisfy the concerns of the Carabetta's [sic] with regard to correction of deficiencies on their unit. The Carabettas will dismiss all lawsuits and complaints against other unit owners and boards and pay overdue assessments. Richard Walters will contribute $10,000 to the Phase I Association as final settlement of lien/foreclosure action. Unit owners will end foreclosure action against Richard Walters and forgive existing liens against Richard Walters. It is understood that the above action and commitments are interdependent and sequential in the order listed above. Minutes of Meeting of the Unit Owners, October 27, 2001. Mr. Walters initially objected to paying the $10,000. However, John Williams persuaded Mr. Walters to join in the proposed agreement. After Dr. Blankenship's motion regarding the proposed agreement was seconded, the unit owners who were present at the October 27, 2001, meeting verbally approved the proposed agreement. The unit owners never reduced the proposed agreement to writing. They never signed a copy of the minutes containing the proposed agreement. Mr. Klinehoffer was the only unit owner who was not present at the meeting. Mr. Klinehoffer had not given Mr. Weaver or any other unit owner his proxy to vote in favor of a settlement of the pending litigation against Mr. Walters. More importantly, the consideration of assessments and a settlement agreement regarding the foreclosure suit were not included as agenda items in the notice of the unit owners' meeting. On November 17, 2001, Ocean Gate's directors held another meeting. They elected the following officers: Dr. Blankenship, president; Mr. Walters, vice-president; and Mr. Carabetta, secretary/treasurer. During the November 17, 2001, meeting, Mr. Walters wanted to discuss implementing the proposed settlement agreement from the October 27, 2001, unit owners' meeting. In other words, Mr. Walters wanted Ocean Gate to drop the foreclosure suit against him in exchange for $10,000. However, the minority unit owners asserted that Mr. Carabetta had not dropped his lawsuits against Ocean Gate and the other unit owners in the 2.1 building. Mr. Weaver took the position that the proposed settlement agreement was not valid unless it was implemented sequentially beginning with coming to terms with Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Carabetta dropping all of his lawsuits. Mr. McNeely asserted that he would not agree to participate in the global agreement. Mr. Klinehoffer stated that he did not agree to the global agreement and specifically objected to any change in Mr. Walters' assessment responsibilities or liabilities. On December 10, 2001, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta conducted a board of directors meeting. A facsimile transmission had been sent to Dr. Blankenship as notice of the meeting, but he was out of town and had no actual prior knowledge about the meeting or its agenda. The notice for the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting was posted on Ocean Gate's property 48 hours in advance of the meeting. The agenda attached to the notice made reference to a non-specific item identified as "approval of resolutions" without reference to the subject matter and without mention of assessments or settlement agreements. During the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting, Mr. Walters proposed a resolution to allow him to pay $10,000 in lieu of his past due assessments, to release the liens on his four units, and to dismiss the foreclosure action. After Mr. Walters proposed the resolution, Mr. Carabetta provided a second and voted to pass the resolution. Mr. Weaver and Mr. McNeely protested that Mr. Walters could not vote due to a conflict of interest and that without Mr. Walters' vote, the board of directors did not have a quorum. Mr. Walters then recused himself. Next Mr. Weaver contacted Dr. Blankenship by telephone. However, on faulty advice from Mr. Carabetta's personal attorney, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta refused to let Dr. Blankenship vote on the resolution. Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta also refused to let Ocean Gate's attorney, Roseanne Perrine, participate in the meeting by telephone. Before the meeting adjourned, Mr. Walters declared that the resolution had passed and the matter was closed based on Mr. Carabetta's sole affirmative vote. Next, Mr. Walters proposed that Ocean Gate terminate its contract with May Management. Mr. Walters then introduced a representative of Coastal Realty and Property Management, Inc. (Coastal). Over Mr. Weaver's objections, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta voted to replace May Management with Coastal. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that May Management was a reputable company with no major complaints from the unit owners. In a letter dated December 11, 2001, Ms. Perrine reminded Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta that her firm represented Ocean Gate in the foreclosure action against Mr. Walters. She claimed that the resolution passed on December 10, 2001, was invalid. She asserted that she would withdraw as counsel of record if requested to dismiss the lawsuit based on the December 10, 2001, resolution. In a letter dated December 12, 2001, Mr. Carabatta enclosed a copy of a check made payable to Ocean Gate in the amount of $8,062.54. According to the letter, the check represented the amount of Mr. Carabetta's assessments though year 2001. The letter stated that the check had been delivered to Coastal for deposit into an operating account for Ocean Gate. Finally, the letter demanded that May Management stop all foreclosure proceedings against Mr. Carabetta and release the lien of record against his property. On December 12, 2001, Mr. Carabetta authorized Coastal to open new bank accounts for Ocean Gate using his check as an initial deposit. Dr. Blankenship wrote a letter dated December 13, 2001, to Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. In the letter, Mr. Blankenship objected to the lack of notice regarding the December 10, 2001, board of directors meeting and its agenda. Dr. Blankenship's letter complained that he had not been allowed to vote when he was called during the meeting. On or about December 16, 2001, the Circuit Court Judge in Case No.: CA-01-85, in the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida, entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants Motion to Dismiss. The order states as follows in pertinent part: Third, the Defendants assert the Plaintiff is without standing to assess maintenance fees, file liens, or foreclose any lien because the developer never turned over control of the association to the unit owners pursuant to Article 8.5 of the Declaration of Condominium of Ocean Gate Phase I, A Condominium. Nothing contained in Article 8.5 of the Declaration supports the Defendant's assertion. The Association was given the authority to assess fees in Paragraph 7 of the Declaration, not Article 8.5. Paragraph 7 states: Assessments. To provide the funds necessary for proper operation and maintenance of the Condominium, the Phase I Association has been granted the right to make, levy, and collect Assessments and Special Assessments against all Unit Owners and Units. Fourth, the Defendants' assert the condominium association had no authority to charge condominium fees since the buildings have not yet been completed, nor have certificates of occupancy been issued. According to Ris Investment Group, Inc. v. Dep't of Business and Professional Regulation, 695 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the question before the Court is whether, in accordance with the Declaration, the term "unit" was intended to encompass raw land and/or condominiums which had not yet been purchased, or just land upon which the condominium units had already been built and/or purchased. A review of the pertinent portion of the Declaration is necessary to answer the foregoing questions. Paragraph 7 of the Declarations states: Assessments. To provide the funds necessary for proper operation and maintenance of the Condominium, the Phase I Association has been granted the right to make, levy, and collect Assessments and Special Assessments against all Unit Owners and Units. Paragraph 3 of the Declaration states: Definitions. ‘Unit’ means a part of the Condominium Property, which is to be subject to exclusive private ownership as defined in the Condominium Act. ‘Condominium Property’ means the parcel of real property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto, together with all improvements built or to be built thereon, and the easements and rights appurtenant thereto. A review of Exhibit ‘A’ and ‘A-1’ reveals that the term "Condominium Property" refers to the entire condominium complex, not just one unit. Reading the pertinent portions of the Declaration, in toto, it appears as though the parties intended that the Association could assess fees from "units" which encompass any portion of the condominium property, whether improvements have been built or are to be built thereon. Accordingly the Defendant's assertion is without merit and the Motion to Dismiss in this regard is denied. Around the first of January 2002, Mr. Walters tendered a check to Ocean Gate in the amount of $10,000. The front side of Mr. Walter's check, number 652, indicates that it was for association dues in full through December 31, 2001. The backside of the check states, "Endorsement of this instrument constitutes payment in full for association dues on 605, 609, 613, and 617, Mediterranean Way, thru December 31, 2001." There is no evidence that the $10,000 check was deposited to Ocean Gate's bank account. After the December 2001 meeting, the Weavers, McNeelys, Klinehoffers, and Blankenships sent numerous letters by certified mail to Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta. The letters protested the manner in which Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta had conducted the December 10, 2001, and subsequent meetings, demanding that they remove themselves as directors, and inquiring about many other matters relating to the operation and management of Ocean Gate. Many of the letters specifically requested Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta to respond in writing within 30 days as required by Section 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Mr. Carabetta responded to one of the complaint letters. All subsequent complaint letters were referred to Alan Scott, Esquire. Mr. Scott did not provide a written response to the letters unless specifically directed to do so by Mr. Walters and/or Mr. Carabetta. Mr. Scott responded to one complaint letter. On or about January 24, 2002, Mr. Scott, writing on behalf of Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta, sent a letter to Dr. Blankenship and May Management. The letter stated that a majority of Ocean Gate's voting interests (Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta) had entered into written agreements to remove Dr. Blankenship from his position as a director. On January 29, 2002, Mr. Carabetta filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice in one of his lawsuits naming Ocean Gate as defendant. That case was Case No. CA01-858 in the Circuit Court, Seventh Judicial Circuit, in and for St. Johns County, Florida. Competent evidence indicates the Mr. Carabetta dismissed all of his lawsuits against his neighbors after the December 2001 meeting. Ocean Gate's directors issued a notice dated February 4, 2002. The notice indicated that the directors would meet on February 7, 2002. The agenda for that meeting included the following: (a) call to order; (b) roll call; (c) appointment of new director; (d) fill officer vacancies; (e) consider discharge of association attorneys and appointment of new association legal counsel; (f) consider discharge of May Management and appointment of Coastal; and (g) consider change of association mailing address and resident agent. During the directors' meeting on February 7, 2002, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta appointed Mr. Barrow as a director. The directors then elected Mr. Walters as president, Mr. Barrow as vice-president, with Mr. Carabetta retaining his office as secretary/treasurer. Next, the directors voted to make the following changes: (a) to fire May Management and hire Coastal as Ocean Gate's management company; (b) to discharge Ms. Perrine and retain Mr. Scott as Ocean Gate's attorney; and (c) to update the corporate report data showing Mr. Scott as registered agent. In a letter dated February 8, 2002, Mr. Klinehoffer, Mr. Weaver, Mr. McNeely, and Dr. Blankenship advised Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta that the February 7, 2002, directors' meeting had not been properly noticed. The letter alleged that the notice had not been posted on the property 48 hours in advance of the meeting and that none of the minority unit owners had received notice by fax, phone, or letter. By letter dated March 1, 2002, Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Barrows advised Ms. Perrine's law firm that her services as counsel for Ocean Gate were terminated. The letter directed Mr. Perrine to turn over her foreclosure file to Mr. Scott, who would replace her as counsel for Ocean Gate. By letter dated March 25, 2002, the minority unit owners objected to the termination of Ms. Perrine as Ocean Gate's attorney. During an April 10, 2002, directors' meeting, Mr. Carabetta and Mr. Barrows voted to accept Mr. Walters' payment of $10,000 in satisfaction of his past due assessments, penalties and interest. Thereafter, Mr. Walters tendered his check for $10,000 on the same day that Ocean Gate's new attorney, Mr. Scott, dismissed the foreclosure suit against Mr. Walters. In a letter dated April 17, 2002, Mr. Weaver protested the actions taken by Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta, and Mr. Barrows during the April 10, 2002, directors' meeting. Additionally, the minority unit owners continued to send Mr. Walters, Mr. Carabetta, and Mr. Barrow letters complaining about various problems in the management of Ocean Gate and requesting a response within 30 days. The minority unit owners did not receive any responses to these letters. In a letter dated April 17, 2002, Petitioner's investigator, Eurkie McLemore, advised Mr. Walters about the complaints filed against him and Mr. Carabetta by the minority unit owners. Ms. McLemore requested a response to the allegations by April 30, 2002. The letter contained the following warning: Please note that if you as a MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICER OF THE ASSOCIATION fail to respond to this letter, or if another complaint is received, the Division will pursue an enforcement resolution, which may result in civil penalties of up to $5,000 per violation. Therefore, you are urged to respond appropriately to this warning letter and to use your best efforts to comply with sections 718.111(1)(a), 718.116(9)(a), 718.112(2)(c), 718.112(2)(a)2., Florida Statutes, now and in the future. By letter dated April 30, 2002, Ocean Gate's attorney, Mr. Scott, responded to Ms. McLemore's letter. According to the letter, Mr. Walters and Mr. Carabetta denied the allegations and did not indicate that any corrective action would be taken. In June 2002 Ocean Gate's directors authorized Mr. Scott, as Ocean Gate's counsel, to file a voluntary dismissal with prejudice in the foreclosure suit against Mr. Walters. Mr. Walters sold his units at an on-site auction in July 2002. Mr. Walters executed warranty deeds for the three successful bidders in August 2002. As of January 31, 2002, Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate past-due assessments plus interest in the amount of $62,943.56. The accrued interest on that amount as of June 16, 2003, was $15,767.36. Mr. Walters paid his quarterly assessments at the end of March and June 2002. He also paid Ocean Gate $10,000 when the foreclosure suit was dismissed in June 2002. Therefore, the total amount that Mr. Walters owed Ocean Gate as of June 16, 2003, was $68,710.92 During the hearing, Mr. Walters presented evidence that he was entitled to an offset for his expense in maintaining and repairing the 2.2 building. However, the evidence presented is insufficient to determine whether Mr. Walters' expenses were related to maintenance and repair of common elements. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Mr. Walters is not entitled to an offset.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner issue a final order imposing a civil penalty on Respondents in the amount of $10,000 each and requiring Mr. Walters to make restitution to Ocean Gate in the amount of $68,710.92 plus interest on this amount from June 16, 2003, until the date payment is made. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: John B. Bamberg, Esquire Post Office Box 2210 St. Augustine, Florida 32085 Joseph S. Garwood, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Ross Fleetwood, Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0892 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the following relevant facts are found: At all times material hereto, Pinnacle Port Community Association (hereinafter referred to as PPCA) has been a not- for-profit corporation created under Chapter 617 Florida Statutes, and was the association, as defined in Section 718.103(2), Florida Statutes, which operated the four separate condominiums which together constitute the Pinnacle Port Resort. The Pinnacle Port Resort is located in Bay County, Florida and consists of four separate residential condominiums, identified as Phases I-A, I-B, I-C, I-D, and together these condominiums have a combined total of 408 units. Although each of the above condominiums was created by a separate recorded declaration of condominium, the declarations are, in all respects material to this proceeding and for all time periods relevant hereto, identical to the declaration for Phase I-B received into evidence as Joint Exhibit I. The Pinnacle Port Condominiums are located on a pie- shaped parcel of property which is bordered by the Gulf of Mexico on the south and there is a large lake, known as Lake Powell, located a short distance to the north of the condominium property. Immediately to the west of the condominium property, on land owned by a third party, Avondale Mills Corporation, there is a narrow channel, known as Phillips Inlet, that connects the Gulf of Mexico to Lake Powell. Because of fluctuating water levels in the channel and tidal action which regularly causes some shifting of sand around the channel, the current inlet does not provide trustworthy year round navigation for use by recreational boats between Lake Powell and the Gulf of Mexico. During 1983, several individuals owning land adjacent to Lake Powell, including Avondale Mills Corporation and certain unit owners at Pinnacle Port, decided to work together to investigate the possibility of stabilizing the inlet in order to provide a year round navigable channel between Lake Powell and the Gulf of Mexico. In March of 1984, the above land owners formed a not- for-profit corporation, known as Lake Powell Improvement Corporation, and through individual financial contributions by the members of this corporation began developing plans and conducting studies on the feasibility of stabilizing the Phillips Inlet. In May of 1984, the board of directors of Respondent adopted a resolution supporting the efforts of the Lake Powell Improvement Corporation and a non-binding straw vote of Pinnacle Port unit owners was conducted by the board of directors. The results of this vote were 232 votes in favor, 32 votes opposed, 6 votes requesting additional information and 138 unit owners did not respond. A true and correct copy of the correspondence which was sent to unit owners and representative samples of ballots returned from unit owners was received into evidence as Joint Exhibit 3. On or about August 11, 1984, at a meeting of the Respondent association, a majority of the voting interests present at the meeting for each of the four Pinnacle Port Condominiums approved a resolution "to participate in the stabilization of Phillips Inlet at the cost of no more than an average of $700.00 per unit." The resolution, which would authorize assessments in a total amount of $285,600.00, was passed by a vote of 179 votes in favor, of which 108 votes were by proxy; 81 votes against, of which 36 votes were by proxy; and 2 abstentions. The association is comprised of 408 members entitled to vote, in person or by proxy, and at least 205 members must be present, in person or by proxy, at a meeting of the association to satisfy quorum requirements. As part of the above resolution, the unit owners were advised that up to 50% of the proposed assessment would be used to obtain governmental permits required prior to beginning construction activities to stabilize the inlet and 50% of the assessments collected, plus any remaining funds collected previously for permitting purposes, would be used later for construction of the stabilized inlet if the governmental permits were granted. Based on the August 1984 resolution, the association has assessed as a common expense approximately $142,000.00 from unit owners and has contributed approximately $110,792.00 of these funds to the Lake Powell Improvement Corporation. In addition, the association is currently holding approximately $14,823.00 as interest on the funds collected for the Phillips Inlet projects. The Respondent has no written or formal agreement with Lake Powell Improvement Corporation. The funds were contributed to that corporation with the understanding that they would be used to conduct environmental and engineering studies and take other similar steps to obtain governmental permits which are necessary as a prerequisite to constructing the stabilized inlet. Respondent alleges that all of the funds spent have either been paid to Lake Powell Improvement Corporation or to third parties performing professional services for that corporation and that these funds have in fact been used to conduct environmental studies and to take other steps to obtain the necessary governmental permits. The Petitioner and the Intervenors do not dispute this statement in this proceeding. If the necessary governmental permits can be obtained, Lake Powell Improvement Corporation intends to dredge a new channel adjacent to the existing channel at Phillips Inlet and located on property owned exclusively by Avondale Mills Inc. The exact location of the proposed channel on the Avondale Mills property has not yet been determined. The Respondent expects the channel to be located approximately as shown on the maps included in the joint-application filed with the various agencies which have jurisdiction to issue the necessary permits. A true and correct copy of this joint application was received into evidence as Joint Exhibit 2. In order to complete the proposed channel, it will be essential that permits be obtained from the Florida, Department of Natural Resources and the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and the United States Army Corps of Engineers. Although Lake Powell Improvement Corporation filed a joint application with both the above agencies in October of 1985, the permits have neither been granted nor denied. At the time of the August 1984 resolution, and continuing to the present, the property upon which the stabilized --inlet is proposed to be constructed was not a common element for -any of the Pinnacle Port Condominiums and the Respondent-Association does not have any contractual or property interest, existing or contingent, in this property. Although no agreement has previously been entered into between the members of Lake Powell Improvement Corporation concerning the future maintenance of the proposed channel, it is contemplated that an agreement will be entered into prior to the actual construction of the channel. The Respondent further contemplates contributing up to one third of the cost of maintenance, contingent upon unit owner approval, through further assessments against the unit owners. If the governmental permits applied for are granted and the inlet is constructed and maintained to a depth and width as proposed in the permit applications, the Pinnacle Port unit owners and their guests with boats, either docked at the Respondent's pier or launched at the boat ramp in Lake Powell, will have convenient access to the Gulf of Mexico. There are no existing boat ramps, piers, or docks located along the Gulf of Mexico or Pinnacle Port property. The Pinnacle Port condominiums have a rental program which advertises and rents owner's units on both a short and long term basis for owners who so desire. At the present time, 240 units participate in this rental program and an unknown number of additional owners occasionally rent their units independently. Based on the evidence produced at the hearing and the testimony of Randall Clark Chandler, the following finding of fact is made: Although it is reasonable to expect that the planned stabilization of Phillips Inlet would provide recreational benefit to some unit owners and might help to make the units at the resort more marketable, factors affecting the relative costs and benefits of the project (such as, whether necessary governmental permits are granted; the amount of future assessments which will be imposed against units to pay for construction and maintenance costs of the inlet; the possible imposition of restrictions or restrictive convenants on the use of the inlet or the adjoining lands; the effect of the inlet on water quality; and future market conditions are speculative at this time and make it impossible to quantify the value of the stabilization project or even to conclude that the project will clearly or substantially benefit unit owners.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) Respondent immediately cease and desist any further collection of assessments based on the August, 1984 resolution at issue herein and immediately obtain and refund to unit owners, on a pro rata basis, any monies in its possession which were previously collected under this assessment; (2) Respondent refund, on a pro rata basis, all interest on the funds previously collected for the Phillips Inlet project and; (3) Respondent, in the future, strictly comply with the provisions of Chapter 718, Florida Statutes and any future violations of the statutes at issue here shall be considered as a basis for aggravating civil penalties should administrative action be necessary in the future. Respectfully submitted and entered this 20th day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard Coats, Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 James Rearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John C. Courtney, Esq. Deputy General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32301-1927 Michael Reichman, Esq. Post Office Box 4 Monticello, FL 32344 Marshall Conrad, Esq. Post Office Box 39 Tallahassee, FL 32302 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1.-3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-3. 4. Rejected as immaterial and irrelevant. 5.-21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4-19. 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1.-19. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1-19. 20. Rejected as not comporting to the substantial competent evidence in the record. The Intervenors submitted a "Recommended Order" which adopted the Findings of Fact submitted by the Respondent in its Proposed Findings of Fact.
The Issue Whether La Vita Condominium Association, acting through its Board of Directors, refused to allow Linda C. Andzulis, a member of the association, to fill a vacancy on the board because of her gender, and thereby committed a discriminatory housing practice in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Linda C. Andzulis is a resident of the La Vita Condominium. As the owner of the condominium unit in which she resides with her husband, Ms. Andzulis is also a member of the La Vita Condominium Association. She has never served on the Association’s Board of Directors, but she has a keen interest in the business of the association. She frequently attends board meetings. Ms. Joan Di Gregorio, past President of the Board sums up Ms. Andzulis’ participation at board meetings: Ms. Andzulis is a “strong individual . . . who has her agenda and she will bring it forward.” Described by some who live at the condominium as an “aggressive woman of integrity,” energetic, very intelligent, even “brilliant,” Ms. Andzulis' views and methods of expressing her views finds opposition among other association members. The La Vita Condominium Association is a Florida not- for-profit corporation. Organized pursuant to Chapter 617, Florida Statutes, the Association operates and administers the condominium officially known as “La Vita, a Condominium.” The condominium is located in Altamonte Springs, Florida. The Board and its HistoryComposition There are five seats on the Association’s board. In January of 1995, (the time at which the main act of discrimination on the basis of gender is claimed by Ms. Andzulis to have been committed by the board,) four of the five seats were filled, all by men: H. C. Roddenberry, then the president, Robert Shorthouse, Tom Anderson and a fourth man who had filled a vacancy on the board the month before but who did not attend the January, 1995 board meeting. At least six women have served on the board over the years, four prior to January, 1995, and two since January of 1995: Rosemary Anderson, Sue Bridwell, Joan di Gregorio, Brenda Herndon, Shirley Turner, and Patricia Schmidt. Several women have served as president of the board, including the board’s current president, Rosemary Anderson. These women have been encouraged to serve on the board by both Mr. Roddenberry and Mr. Shorthouse. In some cases they were not only nominated as candidates for the board by Mr. Roddenberry or Mr. Shorthouse, but were actually recruited to run for the board by either Mr. Roddenberry or Mr. Shorthouse, or both. Of these six female board members, Ms. Schmidt found it necessary to end her service on the board at one point because she was being bothered by a member of the association. There is nothing to indicate that the harassment was on the basis of gender. Furthermore, the harassment was from an individual and not in any way the result of any action by the association or the board, itself. Ms. Schmidt’s experience is all too typical for condominium association board members in this state, particularly when the association is plagued with the intra-association conflict, internal dissension, and turmoil that afflicts La Vita. None of the six women who have served as members of the board, including Ms. Schmidt, recount any trouble with any board member on account of their gender. In fact, all state that they have never been treated by male members of the board in any way other than with courtesy. They have been comfortable serving on the board with the board’s male members and relate that they have been treated “just the same as any other board member.” In short, they report that during their tenures on the board they have been accorded the respect due each and every member willing to be subjected to the rigor of running for the board and, if elected, to assume the demanding, often thankless, task of serving on the association’s board of directors. b. Issues Confronting the Board As is typical of condominium associations in Florida, particularly those with retired residents on fixed incomes, the Board of Directors of the La Condominium Association has faced many tough issues over its lifetime. One of the most difficult issues for the board has been the roofing system at the condominium. Not long after Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida, Central Florida was hit with a number of serious storms. During this time, La Vita Condominium suffered numerous roof leaks. It was difficult to obtain bids from licensed roofing contractors, let alone find a qualified roofing contractor to actually provide necessary repairs and roof replacements, because so many local roofing contractors were in South Florida in response to the tremendous demand for roofing services in the aftermath of Andrew. Roofers who remained in Central Florida were tied up with local business created by the demand for roofing services in the wake of the serious storms of 1992-93. The board of directors did the best it could, including frequently seeking the consult of legal counsel, with a difficult roofing situation. Ms. Andzulis, however, among others, felt the board had not handled the situation properly. She was not shy about bringing her opinion on the matter to the attention of the board at its regularly scheduled meetings. Another difficult problem with which the board has been and continues to be beset is the association’s relationship to the developer of La Vita and the developer’s refusal to pay assessments for “phantom” units, unbuilt units in phases of the condominium not yet constructed. The Board has struggled with the issue for many years. Again, it has sought the advice of counsel and gone to the length of bringing suit against the developer. None of the attempts to resolve the developer’s refusal to pay assessments have borne fruit. As one board member stated, the developer has more attorneys, threatens or commences bankruptcy proceedings and always seems to be “one step ahead” of the board. Just as Ms. Andzulis has not been satisfied with the board’s attempts to address the association’s roofing problems, she has not been satisfied with the association’s attempts to deal effectively with the developer. Again, she has not been shy to make her feelings known at the board meetings. While there are certain members of the Association who support Ms. Andzulis’ views on these matters, her participation at board meetings has reached the point where a number of observers feel that she has monopolized time at the board meetings to the detriment of the board being able to accomplish the business of the association. Achieving Board Membership There are three ways to become a member of a board of directors of a condominium association in Florida. The first and most obvious is by election. The latter two are without election: (a) when time for nomination for candidates in an election closes and the number of nominated candidates do not exceed the number of seats up for election; and, (b) by filling a vacancy on the board that occurs before the expiration of the vacant seat’s term. There is a critical difference between the two ways of taking a seat without election. As explained by Mr. Peter McGrath, who has served as legal counsel to the Board in the past, if there are only as many candidates for election to the board as there are seats, by operation of law, those candidates automatically become members of the board. In other words, the election is dispensed with as unnecessary. The reason for dispensing with an election and seating the candidates automatically is the difficulty many condominium associations have experienced, particularly the longer they have existed and the more intractable the problems they have faced, in finding association members willing to serve on the association’s board. In such a case, any qualified and duly-nominated party willing to serve takes a seat on the board. No one has any power to refuse to seat the candidate. In contrast, Mr. McGrath, as an expert in condominium law, explained that when there is a vacancy on the board mid- term, a person who offers his or her services does not automatically assume the position. The board may legitimately refuse to seat a qualified person who seeks the seat. The reason for the difference in approach when an entirely new board is seated as opposed to when a vacancy mid- term occurs is timing. A board that has been in existence when a vacancy occurs may have embarked on a certain course of action. Or an individual member of the board may have hopes of convincing other members that a certain direction should be pursued. Members of the board are allowed to consider whether a volunteer for board service will support that course or direction. In undertaking consideration of the volunteer’s offer it is legitimate to examine the volunteer’s statements and opinions as to the board’s direction. It is completely legitimate for a board member to vote against a volunteer on the basis that he or she would be an impediment to the board’s adopted course or to the direction the director chooses to pursue and hopes the board will pursue. Ms. Andzulis Expresses Interest in Membership on the Board On July 12, 1994, Ms. Andzulis had a conversation with Mr. Shorthouse, then a member of the board of directors. Ms. Andzulis told Mr. Shorthouse that she hoped to serve on the board since the board had asked for volunteers the previous June 7, following the occurrence of one or more vacancies. Ms. Andzulis left the discussion thinking that Mr. Shorthouse would place her name in nomination at the next board meeting on August 9, 1994. Neither Mr. Shorthouse nor anyone else nominated Ms. Andzulis to fill a vacancy on the board at the August 9, 1994 meeting. Ms. Andzulis did not step up at the meeting to volunteer. The next morning, August 10, 1994, Ms. Andzulis confronted Mr. Shorthouse. At hearing, Ms. Andzulis attempted to prove that Mr. Shorthouse said to her on the morning of August 10, 1994, that the board did not want women on the board. Other than the association’s presentation of Mr. Shorthouse’s testimony, neither party presented any witnesses to this conversation. Ms. Andzulis attempted to prove her version of the conversation through witnesses to a second conversation she had with Mr. Shorthouse following a board meeting months later. She asked these witnesses whether she had stated to Mr. Shorthouse that he had told her during the August 10, 1994 meeting that the board did not want women on the board and Mr. Shorthouse, in the presence of these witnesses, did not deny the accusation. Each of the three witnesses answered in the affirmative. In his testimony, however, Mr. Shorthouse, adamantly denied that he ever made any such statement. Ms. Andzulis, the only person other than Mr. Shorthouse who heard the August 10, 1994 conversation, did not testify at the hearing. This second conversation in the presence of witnesses took place following a board meeting on January 10, 1997. At this meeting, Ms. Andzulis again had hopes that she would be accepted to fill a vacant seat on the board. Prior to the January 10, 1997 board meeting, Ms. Andzulis asked Mr. Roddenberry, then president of the board, if he would meet with her. He agreed. Their meeting took place on January 5, 1996. They discussed Ms. Andzulis’ interest in filling a vacancy on the board. During the discussion Mr. Roddenberry pointed out the many difficulties of serving on the board. He asked Ms. Andzulis, in light of those difficulties, if she was sure she wanted to be on the board. Mr. Roddenberry left the meeting with the expectation that if Ms. Andzulis continued to be interested in being on the board, she would raise her hand during the meeting to indicate her interest. Mr. Roddenberry was hoping against hope that Ms. Andzulis would not volunteer at the meeting. He could not support her candidacy and he did not want her to know that he would vote against her. He did not want her to know because he feared repercussions both to himself and any other board member, repercussions that he believed would be brought by Ms. Andzulis. Ultimately, Mr. Roddenberry was concerned about what might happen to the association and the business of the condominium should Ms. Andzulis’ offer be turned down by the board. Normally at La Vita, when an association member offers to fill a vacancy on the board, the wish is made known at the opening of the meeting and a vote is immediately taken so that if the volunteer is approved by vote of the board then the new director will be able to participate in the business conducted at the meeting. At the January 10, 1995, board meeting this procedure was not followed. It was not followed because Ms. Andzulis did not make her wish to be on the board known at the opening of the meeting and because Mr. Roddenberry was not then certain whether Ms. Andzulis wanted to fill the vacancy or not. As the meeting came to a close, however, Ms. Andzulis raised her hand. For the first time in the meeting, Mr. Roddenberry realized Ms. Andzulis had made up her mind; she wanted to fill the vacancy. Mr. Roddenberry, as president of the board, called for a secret ballot on whether the Board should seat Ms. Andzulis. Unbeknown to Mr. Roddenberry at the time, and apparently to everyone else present (including Ms. Andzulis since she did not make an issue of it at the meeting,) secret votes by a condominium association are in violation of the Condominium Act. Mr. Roddenberry called for the secret ballot, not because he had any intention of violating the condominium law, but because Mr. Roddenberry, for the reasons stated earlier, did not want Ms. Andzulis to know how he would vote. As it turned out, all three board members present voted against seating Ms. Andzulis on the board. The secret nature of the ballot was short-lived. Soon after the result of the vote was announced, it was also announced that all three members of the board present had voted against seating Ms. Andzulis. The March 6, 1996 Emergency Meeting On March 6, 1996, a duly-noticed emergency meeting of the board was convened. Mr. Roddenberry read a statement to all assembled. The statement reviewed Mr. Roddenberry’s tenure as President of the association and his accomplishments. After relating that he had enjoyed the challenges confronting the association and did not regret the time spent participating in the business of the condominium, the statement concluded as follows: Since the January board meeting, the association has had to deal with a homeowner’s onslaught of insurance claims, a complaint filed with the State of Florida, a complaint filed with the board of directors, all of which has significantly increased the amount of time that I must devote to association business . . . The final act of this homeowner was to file a housing discrimination complaint based on sex discrimination against the three board members who voted against her being on the board. I feel that this claim is a malicious attack on my integrity. If this is what a board member must be subjected to, then I respectfully submit my resignation to the Board of Directors effective immediately and I also am withdrawing my name from nomination at the annual meeting. Petitioner’s Ex. No. 8, page 1 of 3. The homeowner to whom Mr. Roddenberry referred in this statement is Ms. Andzulis. Mr. Roddenberry’s resignation was greeted generally by the members of the association with dismay. As a person of considerable business, financial and accounting experience, he had been instrumental while serving on the board in setting up a new accounting system and had been invaluable in many ways to the association in the conduct of its business. He was well- respected and his resignation was a great loss to La Vita. In her Petition for Relief from a Discriminatory Housing Practice, which serves as the foundation of this proceeding, Ms. Andzulis refers to the March 6 emergency meeting as “retaliatory.” The meeting was not retaliatory. It was for Mr. Roddenberry to resign effective immediately, nothing more, nothing less. His resignation, as is evident from the statement read at the meeting, was because of the numerous issues he had had to deal with subsequent to the board’s vote to turn down Ms. Andzulis' offer to fill a vacancy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order concluding that the La Vita Condominium Association, through the action of its board or otherwise, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice by refusing to allow Linda C. Andzulis to fill a vacancy on the association’s board of directors. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda M. Skipper, Esquire Paul L. Wean, P.A. 1305 East Robinson Street, Suite C Orlando, Florida 32801 Linda C. Anzulis, pro se 546-202 Via Fontana Drive Altamonte Springs, Florida 32714 Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Petitioner herein is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. One Respondent in this matter is Tanwin Corporation (hereinafter "Tanwin") the developer of two residential condominiums known as Vista Del Lago Condominium I and Vista Del Lago Condominium II, located in West Palm Beach, Florida. The other Respondent is Vista Del Lago Condominium Association, Inc. (hereinafter "Association"), the condominium association for Vista Del Lago Condominiums I and II. Transition from developer control of the Association has not occurred, and at all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Tanwin has in fact controlled the operation of the Respondent Association. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium I (hereinafter "Condo I") was recorded in the public records on December 12, 1980. The Declaration of Condominium for Vista Del Lago Condominium II (hereinafter "Condo II") was recorded in the public records on March 11, 1982. Condo I contains 16 units; and Condo II contains 18 units. Herbert and Judith Tannenbaum are the President and Secretary, respectively, of both Tanwin and the Association and are members of the Association's Board of Directors. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I for the fiscal year 1982. The developer-controlled Association failed to provide a proposed budget of common expenses for Condo I and Condo II for 1983 until the unit owner meeting in March or April of 1983. The budget provided at that time contained no provision for reserves. Although the document alleged to be the 1983 proposed budget admitted in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 17 does contain an allocation for reserves, Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 17 is not the 1983 budget disseminated to unit owners at the annual meeting in 1983. In addition, the 1983 budget was received by the unit owners at the meeting at which the proposed budget was to be considered and not prior to the budget meeting. Statutory reserves were not waived during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The "start-up" budgets contained as exhibits to the Declarations of Condominium indicate that reserves were to be collected from unit owners at the rate of $15 per month per unit at least during the first year commencing December of 1980 with the first closing. Hence, reserves were not waived December, 1980 through December, 1981. From November, 1981 through December, 1983, no vote to waive reserves was taken by the unit owners. Although reserves were discussed at the 1983 meeting, no vote was taken during the period in question including 1983, to waive reserves. The developer as owner of unsold units; has failed to pay to the Association monthly maintenance for common expenses during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983. The developer Tanwin has, in the nature of an affirmative defense, alleged the existence of a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8), Florida Statutes, which purportedly ran from the inception of the condominiums to date. Accordingly, the initial issue for resolution is whether the developer pursuant to statute guaranteed common expenses. Section 718.116(8)(b) provides that a developer may be excused from payment of common expenses pertaining to developer-owned units for that period of time during which he has guaranteed to each purchaser in the declaration of condominium, purchase contract or prospectus, or by an agreement between the developer and a majority of unit owners other than the developer, that their assessments for common expenses would not increase over a stated dollar amount during the guarantee period and the developer agrees to pay any amount necessary for common expenses not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners, or "shortfall". Actual purchase agreements were admitted in evidence. Respondents seek to label certain unambiguous language in the purchase contracts as a guarantee. This language, uniform throughout all those contracts as well as the form purchase contract filed with Petitioner except that of Phillip May, provides as follows: 9. UNIT ASSESSMENTS. The Budget included in the Offering Circular sets forth Seller's best estimation of the contemplated expenses for operating and maintaining the Condominium during its initial year. Purchaser's monthly assessment under the aforementioned Budget is in the amount of $109.00. Until Closing of Title, Seller has the right (without affecting Purchaser's obligation to purchase in accordance with the provisions hereof, to modify the estimated Budget and assessments periodically if then current cost figures indicate that an updating of estimates is appropriate). [Emphasis added]. That portion of the purchase agreement set forth above does not constitute a guarantee. Instead, the purchase agreement simply includes a best estimation of expenses for the initial year. It does not govern assessments after the expiration of one year, and even as to the initial year, the language in the contract sets forth only a "best estimation" and not a guarantee that the assessments would not increase during the "guarantee period." Phillip May's purchase agreement reflects that he purchased his unit in August of 1983; after condominium complaints had been filed by the unit owners with the Florida Division of Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes. His purchase agreement has been altered from the purchase agreement of earlier purchasers in that his purchase agreement expressly, by footnote contains a one- year guarantee running from closing. The guarantee contained in his purchase agreement was presented by the developer without any request from Mr. May for the inclusion of a guarantee in his purchase agreement. The guarantee language in this purchase agreement is useful for the purpose of comparing the language with those portions of the pre-complaint contracts which Respondents assert contain or constitute a guarantee. Similarly it is determined that no guarantee of common expenses exists in the Declarations of Condominium for Condo I and II or in the prospectus for Condo II. While Respondents seek to assert the existence of a guarantee in those documents, the portions of those unambiguous documents which according to Respondents contain a guarantee, have no relation to a guarantee or do not guarantee that the assessments for common expenses would not increase. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to prove the existence of an oral guarantee which was allegedly communicated to purchasers at the closing of their particular condominium units. However, purchasers were told by Herbert or Judith Tannenbaum only that assessments should remain in the amount of $109 per month per unit unless there existed insufficient funds in the Association to pay bills. This is the antithesis of a guarantee. During a guarantee period the developer in exchange for an exemption from payment of assessments on developer- owned units agrees to pay any deficits incurred by the condominium association. Accordingly, no guarantee was conveyed at the closing of condominium units. Further Respondent Tanwin's additional contention that an oral guarantee arose when the condominiums came into existence is plainly contradicted by the express language throughout the condominium documents and purchase agreements that there exist no oral representations and that no reliance can be placed on any oral representations outside the written agreements. Further, prior to December, 1983, no reference was ever made by the developer either inside or outside of unit owner meetings as to the existence of the alleged guarantee. Moreover, a comparison between on the one hand, the 1981 and 1982 financial statements prepared in March of 1983, and on the other hand, the 1983 financial statements, clearly reveals that even the accountant for Tanwin was unaware of the existence of a guarantee during the period in question. While the 1983 statements, prepared in 1984 after unit owners filed complaints with Petitioner contain references to a developer guarantee, the 1981 and 1982 statements fail to mention a guarantee. Instead, included in the 1981 and 1982 statements of the Association are references under the current liabilities portion of the balance sheets for those years, to a "Due to Tanwin Corporation" liability in the amounts of $2,138 for 1981 and $2,006 for 1982. Petitioner through Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, established that at a minimum, the $2,006 figure reflected in the 1982 balance sheet was in fact reimbursed to Tanwin. Section 7D-18.05(1),(c), Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Budgets" and effective on July 22, 1980, was officially recognized prior to the final hearing in this cause. That section requires each condominium filing to include an estimated operating budget which contains "[a] statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election and obligation of the developer pursuant to Section 718.116(8); Florida Statutes." The estimated operating budgets for Condo I and Condo II do not include a statement of any guarantee of assessments or other election or obligation of the developer. The testimony of Herbert Tannenbaum with regard to an oral (or written) guarantee is not credible. He first testified that an oral guarantee was communicated to purchasers at the closing of each unit. In contrast, Tannenbaum also testified that the first discussion he had regarding a guarantee occurred with his attorney after the filing of the Notice to Show Cause in this action. Tannenbaum further testified that he did not understand what a guarantee was until after this case had begun and was unaware of the existence of any guarantee prior to consulting with his attorney in regard to this case. Moreover, Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin testified that it was Tannenbaum who informed DiCrescenzo of the existence of a guarantee but DiCrescenzo was unable or unwilling to specify the date on which this communication occurred. Respondent Tanwin also seeks to establish the existence of a guarantee through Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 which is a document signed by less than the majority of unit owners even including Tannenbaum and his son, and signed on an unknown date during 1984. The document provides: The undersigned Unit Owners at the Vista Del Lago Condominium do not wish to give up the benefits of the developer's continuing guarantee which has been in effect since the inception of the condominium and agreed to by a majority of unit owners and whereby the developer has continuously guaranteed a maintenance level of no more than $109.00 per month per unit, until control of the condominium affairs is turned over to the unit owners in accordance with Florida's Condominium law. According to Respondent Tanwin, Petitioner's Exhibit numbered 5 constitutes a memorandum signed by unit owners evidencing their belief that a continuous guarantee of the developer has been in effect. First, however, this document was never admitted into evidence for that purpose; rather the document was admitted only to establish the fact that a unit owner had signed the document. Second, this document, unlike the purchase agreements or other condominium documents is ambiguous and is not probative of the existence of a guarantee. Instead, the evidence is overwhelming that the document was prepared by the developer in the course of this litigation for use in this litigation. Moreover, unit owner testimony is clear regarding what Mr. and Mrs. Tannenbaum disclosed to unit owners as the purpose for the document when soliciting their signatures, to- wit: that the document was a petition evidencing the unit owners' desire that their monthly maintenance payments not be increased and that prior confusion as to whether reserves had been waived needed resolution. Respondent Tanwin did pay assessments on some developer-owned units during the period December, 1980 through December, 1983, a fact which is inconsistent with its position that a guarantee existed. Noteworthy is the statement by Ronald DiCrescenzo, the C.P.A. for Tanwin, in his August 16, 1983, letter to Herbert Tannenbaum wherein it is stated: "It is my understanding that you are doing the following: . . .[Playing maintenance assessments on units completed but not sold." It is inconceivable that a developer during a "guarantee period" would pay assessments on some developer units as the purpose of the statutory guarantee is to exempt the developer from such assessments. The assessments for common expenses of unit owners other than the developer have increased during the purported guarantee period. At least some, if not all, unit owners paid monthly assessments of $128 - $130 for at least half of 1984. This fact is probative of the issue of whether a guarantee existed because unit owner assessments must remain constant during a guarantee period. At the Spring 1984 meeting chaired by Mr. Tannenbaum a vote was taken for the first time as to whether reserves should be waived. Although only 21 owners were present in person or by proxy; the vote was tabulated as 12 in favor and 12 opposed. Mr. Tannenbaum, therefore, announced an increase in monthly maintenance payments to fund reserves. Thereafter owners began paying an increased assessment. The fact that the developer-controlled Association collected increased assessments from unit owners during 1984, and had up to the time of the final hearing in this cause made no effort to redistribute those funds suggests that the developer-controlled Association and the developer considered themselves to be under no obligation to keep maintenance assessments at a constant level. There was no guarantee of assessments for common expenses by Tanwin from December, 1980, through at least December, 1983. Since there was no guarantee during the time period in question, Respondent Tanwin is liable to the Respondent Association for the amount of monthly assessments for common expenses on all developer-owned units for which monthly assessments have not been paid. In conjunction with the determination that Tanwin owes money to the Association (and not vice versa), Respondent Tanwin attempted to obtain an offset by claiming the benefit of a management contract between either Tannenbaum or Tanwin and the Association. No such management contract exists, either written or oral. Although a management contract is mentioned in one of the condominium documents there is no indication that one ever came into being, and no written contract was even offered in evidence. Likewise, no evidence was offered to show the terms of any oral contract; rather, Tannenbaum admitted that he may never have told any of the unit owners that there was a management contract. Tannenbaum's testimony is consistent with the fact that no budget or financial statement reflects any expense to the Association for a management contract with anyone. Likewise, the "budget" contained within Condo II's documents recorded on March 11, 1982, specifically states that any management fee expense was not applicable. Lastly, Tannenbaum's testimony regarding the existence of a management contract is contrary to the statement signed by him on February 10, 1981, which specifically advised Petitioner that the Association did not employ professional management. To the extent that Respondent Tanwin attempted to establish some quantum meruit basis for its claim of an offset, it is specifically found that no basis for any payment has been proven for the following reasons: Tannenbaum had no prior experience in managing a condominium, which is buttressed by the number of violations of the condominium laws determined herein; Tannenbaum does not know what condominium managers earn; no delineation was made as to specific duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of the Association as opposed to those duties performed by Tannenbaum on behalf of Respondent Tanwin; since there was no testimony as to duties performed for the Association, there was necessarily no testimony as to what duties were performed on behalf of the Association in Tannenbaum's capacity as President of the Association and member of the Association's Board of Directors as opposed to duties allegedly performed as a "manager." Tannenbaum's testimony as to the value of his "services" ranged from $10,000 to $15,000 a year to a lump sum of $60,000; it is interesting to note that the value of his services alone some years exceeded the Association's annual budget. Respondent Tanwin has failed to prove entitlement to an offset amount, either pursuant to contract or based upon quantum meruit. The financial statements of the Association--including balance sheets, statements of position, and statements of receipts and expenditures--for 1980-81 and for 1982 reveal consolidation of the records for Condo I and Condo II in these statements. Additionally, DiCrescenzo admitted that separate accounting records were not maintained for each condominium and Herbert Tannenbaum also admitted to maintaining consolidated records. Accordingly, the developer- controlled Association failed to maintain separate accounting records for each condominium it manages. The By-Laws of the Association provide: SECTION. 7. Annual Audit. An audit of the accounts of the Corporation shall be made annually by a Certified Public Accountant - and a copy of the Report shall be furnished to each member not later than April 1st of the year following the year in which the Report was made. The financial statement for 1981 bears the completion date of February 9, 1983. The 1982 financial statement contains a completion date of March 1, 1983. Both the 1981 and the 1982 statements were delivered to the unit owners in March or April, 1983. Accordingly, Respondents failed to provide the 1981 financial report of actual receipts and expenditures in compliance with the Association's By-Laws. As set forth hereinabove, statutory reserves were not waived during the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. Being a common expense, reserves must be fully funded unless waived annually. In the instant case, Respondents, rather than arguing that reserves had in fact been fully funded, sought to prove that reserves had been waived during the years in question. The fact that reserves were not fully funded is established by reviewing the financial statements. In accordance with the start-up budgets, reserves were initially established at the level of $15.00 per unit per month. Therefore, during 1981, for Condo I containing sixteen units, the Association's reserve account should contain 16 multiplied by $15.00 per month multiplied by 12 months, or $2,880. Since the Declaration of Condominium for Condo II was not recorded until March 11, 1982, assessments for common expenses including allocations to reserves, were not collected from Condo II during 1981. Therefore, the balance in the reserve account as reflected in the balance sheet for the year 1981 should be no less than $2,880. The actual balance reflected in this account is $2,445. Both Tannenbaum and DiCrescenzo testified that most of the balance in that account was composed of purchaser contributions from the closing of each condominium unit "equivalent to 2 months maintenance to be placed in a special reserve fund" as called for in the purchase contracts. Tannenbaum further admitted that instead of collecting $15.00 per month per unit for reserves, the money that would have gone into the reserve account was used "to run the condominium." Similarly, for the year ending 1982, the balance in the reserve account also reflects that reserves were not being funded. First, the amount of reserves which should have been set aside in 1981 of $2,880 is added to the total amount of reserves which should have been collected for 1982 for Condo I ($2880), giving a total figure of $5,760. To this figure should be added the reserves which should have been collected from units in Condo II during 1982. This figure is derived by multiplying the total number of units in Condo II, 18 units, by $15.00 per unit multiplied by 8 months (since Condo II was recorded in March of 1982) to yield a figure for Condo II of $2,160. Adding total reserve assessments for Condo I and II, $2,160 plus $5,760 equals $7,920 the correct reserve balance at the close of 1982. The actual balance for the period ended December 31, 1982, is reflected to be $4,138. Similarly, the amount of reserves required for Condos I and II as of December 31, 1983, can be calculated using the same formula. Although the 1983 financial statement prepared in 1984 reflects the existence of a funded reserve account, both DiCrescenzo and Tannenbaum admitted there was no separate reserves account set up during the time period involved herein. Statutory reserves were not waived and were not fully funded for the period of December, 1980 through December, 1983. All parties hereto presented much evidence, unsupported by the books and records of the corporations, for the determination herein of the amounts of money owed by Respondent Tanwin to the Association to bring current the total amount which Tanwin should have been paying to the Association from the inception of each condominium for monthly maintenance on condominium units not yet sold by the developer, together with the amount owed by Tanwin to the Association so that a separate reserve account can be established and fully funded for all years in which the majority of unit owners including the developer have not waived reserves. No findings of fact determining the exact amount Tanwin owes to the Association will be made for several reasons: first, the determination of that amount requires an accounting between the two Respondents herein which is a matter that can only be litigated, if litigation is necessary, in the circuit courts of this state; second, the determination of the amount due between the private parties hereto is not necessary for the determination by Petitioner of the statutory violations charged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and third, where books and records exist; one witness on each side testifying as to conclusions reached from review of those records, even though the witnesses be expert, does not present either the quantity or the quality of evidence necessary to trace the income and outgo of specific moneys through different corporate accounts over a period of time, especially where each expert opinion is based upon questionable assumptions. It is, however, clear from the record in this cause that Respondent Tanwin owes money to the Respondent Association and further owes to the Respondent Association an accounting of all moneys on a specific item by item basis.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent Tanwin Corporation guilty of the allegations contained in Counts 1-7 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Dismissing with prejudice Count 8 of the Amended Notice to Show Cause; Assessing against Respondent Tanwin Corporation a civil penalty in the amount of $17,000 to be paid by certified check made payable to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within 45 days from entry of the Final Order herein; Ordering Respondents to forthwith comply with all provisions of the Condominium Act and the rules promulgated thereunder; And requiring Tanwin Corporation to provide and pay for an accounting by an independent certified public accountant of all funds owed by the developer as its share of common expenses on unsold units and the amount for which Tanwin is liable in order that the reserve account be fully funded, with a copy of that accounting to be filed with Petitioner within 90 days of the date of the Final Order. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of August, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Karl M. Scheuerman, Esquire Thomas A. Bell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph S. Paglino, Esquire 88 Northeast 79th Street Miami, Florida 33138 E. James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard B. Burroughs, Jr., Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL CONSENT ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, Petitioner, CASE NO. 84-0437 DOCKET NO. 84001MVC TANWIN CORPORATION and VISTA DEL LAGO CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC. Respondents. / FINAL CONSENT ORDER The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, (hereinafter the Division), Vista Del Lago Condominium Inc., (hereinafter the Association), and Tanwin Corporation, (hereinafter Tanwin), hereby stipulate and agree to the terms and issuance of this Final Consent Order as follows: WHEREAS, the Division issued a Notice to Show Cause directed to Respondents and, WHEREAS, after issuance of the Recommended Order in this cause, the parties amicably conferred for the purpose of achieving a settlement of the case, and WHEREAS, Tanwin is desirous of resolving the matters alleged in the Notice to Show Cause without engaging in further administrative proceedings or judicial review thereof, NOW, THEREFORE, it is stipulated and agreed as follows:
