The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Real Estate Commission should discipline the Respondent, Mounir Albert El Beyrouty, on charges that he failed to deliver rental proceeds, was dishonest in his dealings regarding the rental property, failed to escrow rental deposits and proceeds, and failed to properly reconcile his escrow account.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Mounir Albert El Beyrouty, is licensed as a real estate broker in Florida, having been issued license no. BK 596936. He is the qualifying broker for Intermab, Inc., d/b/a Byblos Beach Realty. Acting through the real estate brokerage he qualified, Intermab, Inc., the Respondent orally agreed with Virginia Covington to manage apartment Unit 1-E, Redington Tower 3, located at 17940 Gulf Boulevard in Redington Shores, Florida. Initially, Covington, who is a federal district judge, was the personal representative and sole beneficiary of her mother's estate, which owned the unit; after probate, Judge Covington became the owner of the unit. The Respondent and Judge Covington agreed orally that the Respondent would try to lease the apartment on an annual basis at a lease rate of $850 per month, less a 15 percent commission to the Respondent. Although the Respondent was unable to secure such a lease, he intentionally misled Judge Covington to think there was such a lease and, in January 2008, began paying her $722.50 per month by check drawn on his brokerage operating account. He did this because he wanted her to think highly of his abilities as a real estate broker in the hopes that she would retain him to list the property when she decided to sell. Not long after he began sending monthly checks, the Respondent told Judge Covington that a leak in the kitchen sink should be repaired and a stained mattress should be replaced. He got her permission, took care of both items, and was reimbursed. However, he perceived that Judge Covington did not want to put additional money into the apartment unnecessarily and decided to avoid these kinds of conversations and dealings with her. Instead, he began to expend his own funds to maintain and upgrade the property as he saw fit without telling her. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for six weeks during February and March 2008. He collected a $500 security deposit and $5,250 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. In April 2008, the Respondent allowed friends to stay in Judge Covington's apartment free of charge and without paying a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington, rationalizing that he was paying her the $722.50 per month she thought was her share of the annual lease payments. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for January, February, and March 2009. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for January, February and March 2010. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. In July 2010, the Respondent was able to lease the apartment for a year at a monthly rent of $1,300. He also collected a $1,000 security deposit. He deposited this money in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. In November 2010, Judge Covington told the Respondent to tell the tenant she wanted to increase the annual lease rate to $935 a month. The Respondent continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month and told her that he would advise the supposed tenant of the rent increase. Instead, he kept collecting $1,300 a month from the tenant and began paying Judge Covington $794.75 a month (the $935, less a 15 percent commission). He did not tell her there actually was an annual lease for $1,300 a month. The $1,300 annual lease was not renewed in July 2011. The Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $794.75 a month and to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $935 a month. In about June 2011, Judge Covington decided to sell her apartment. As the Respondent hoped and planned, she listed it with his brokerage. Judge Covington asked the Respondent to notify the supposed annual tenant, who she believed had been living in the apartment since December 2007, to make sure the tenant would be agreeable to a month-to-month lease during their efforts to sell. The Respondent continued to lead Judge Covington to believe there was such an annual tenant and assured her that he would be able to convince the tenant to cooperate with her plan to sell. From August 29 through October 5, 2011, the Respondent allowed friends to stay in Judge Covington's apartment free of charge and without paying a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington, rationalizing that he was paying her the $794.75 per month she thought was her share of the annual lease payments. In November and December 2011, the Respondent rented Judge Covington's apartment to the sister of the court clerk for $850 a month without requiring a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington about this rental. The Respondent secured paying tenants for the apartment for February, March and April 2012. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $794.75 a month and led her to believe there was an annual lease for $935 a month. Despite several price reductions, the Respondent was unable to sell the apartment, and Judge Covington decided to switch selling brokers. In February 2012, she signed a listing agreement with another real estate broker. Later in February 2012, a real estate salesperson showed Judge Covington's apartment to a prospective purchaser. Upon questioning, an older woman told the salesperson that they were paying $3,000 a month in rent. The Respondent told the salesperson to disregard the information because the woman was not thinking straight, or words to that effect, because her husband had been ill. He also told her that the woman's son was actually paying the rent. The salesperson related this information to Judge Covington and also told her that she noticed that the residents were not the same people she happened to see in the apartment on one occasion in February 2012. Upon receiving this information, Judge Covington became suspicious that the Respondent had been dishonest and misleading her. She contacted the State Attorney's Office and the Division regarding the process for filing a complaint against the Respondent. She also arranged for a meeting with the Respondent. When she met with the Respondent, she brought a forensic accountant to review the Respondent's records. The Respondent told them he was sorry that Judge Covington was upset with him, but that he did not owe her any money--to the contrary, that she owed him money. However, he told them he was being audited by the Division and was unable to provide supporting documentation. At the final hearing, the Respondent provided a ledger to support his position that all the rent he collected belonged to him alone because Judge Covington owed him money throughout his dealings with her due to his payments to her, regardless whether her apartment was rented, and the money he spent to maintain and improve the apartment. (This was an after-the-fact justification for his failure to deposit any security deposits or rental payments into his escrow account when, in fact, he did not do so because he did not know it was required.) There is reason to believe that the ledger is not entirely accurate. For example, the Respondent omitted rent collected from at least one occupant of the apartment. It also does not account for the times the Respondent allowed friends and relatives to stay there free of charge, essentially acting as if he owned the apartment. Although the Respondent's testimony regarding the money he paid to maintain and improve the apartment is accepted, his failure to timely apprise Judge Covington regarding those expenditures makes it difficult to be certain about it. Finally, even accepting the ledger at face value, it shows that there were times when the Respondent owed Judge Covington, and not vice-versa. The Division attempted to make a case that the Respondent intended to and attempted to steal rental proceeds. It is unlikely that the Respondent actually targeted a federal judge to victimize in that way. It is more likely that the Respondent was attempting to impress Judge Covington with his skill and expertise as a real estate broker and, ultimately, to be rewarded with the listing on the property when it was sold. In so doing, the Respondent flagrantly violated several laws and rules regarding his professional responsibilities as a licensed Florida real estate broker. Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker for many years and depends on his license to make a living to support himself and his family. He has no prior disciplinary record. However, it has become known in this case that, over the years, he consistently has failed to use his escrow account for rental deposits and proceeds because he did not know it was required.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: finding the Respondent guilty as charged; fining him $2,000; suspending his license for one year; and placing him on probation for a suitable period of time and upon suitable conditions. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Deborah Lynn Tengzelius (Tengzelius), was at all time material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0229363. Tengzelius was the qualifying broker for Respondent, The Rental Center, Inc. (Rental Center), a corporation licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida under license number 0229362. Respondents are, inter alia, engaged in the business of providing rental information for a fee. Consequently, in October 1983, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 21V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, Respondents forwarded to the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), a copy of their proposed rental information agreement. By letter of October 31, 1983, the Department returned Respondent's proposed agreement with instructions to correct certain provisions to bring it into compliance with Section 475.453, Florida Statutes. Respondents made the necessary changes, and by letter of November 15, 1983, the Department advised them that their agreement now appeared to comply with the rules and regulations of the Florida Real Estate Commission. On August 22, 1985, Tengzelius, on behalf of the Rental Center, executed its standard rental information agreement with Elizabeth Wilson (Wilson) in exchange for a fee of $60.00. That agreement, previously approved by the Department, provided in part: NOTICE: Pursuant to Florida law, if the rental information provided under this contract is not current or accurate in any material aspect you nay demand within thirty (30) days of this contract date a return of your full fee paid. If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of seventy-five (75 percent) percent of the fee paid if you make a demand within thirty (30) days of this contract date. CLIENT COMMITMENT As a prospective Tenant, I hereby agree: 1. To make any refund request within 30 days following above date, in writing, and delivered to The Rental Center, Inc. .... (Emphasis added). In mid-September, less than 30 days after the rental information agreement was signed, Wilson telephoned the Rental Center and requested a return of the fee she had paid. Wilson averred that she was not able to obtain a rental. Respondents refused to return 75 percent of the fee because Wilson's request was not in writing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the administrative complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3776 Respondents submitted an unnumbered 13 paragraph memorandum of law and facts". These paragraphs have been number 1-13 and addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 3. 3-4. Addressed in conclusions of law. 5-7. Addressed in paragraph 2. 8-13. Addressed in conclusions of law if pertinent. Respondent's suggestion that the doctrine of entrapment is applicable to the facts of this case is ill-founded. See: Thomas v. State, 243 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 C. Michael Shalloway, Esquire 909 North Dixie Highway West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wings Benton, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Ralph B. Snyder, Jr. ("Respondent"), was a licensed real estate broker having been issued license No. 0082998. Respondent was the qualifying broker for Home Hunters V, Inc., a corporate real estate broker having been issued license No. 0221795, with a principal business address of 2829 Okeechobee Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida. In September, 1981, Respondent registered Home Hunters V, Inc., as a real estate brokerage corporation, with himself as qualifying broker. The office remained open until April, 1982. Respondent was not present in the West Palm Beach office of Home Hunters V on a full-time basis because, in addition to that business, he was involved in a construction business on Sanibel Island, Florida. In late September or early October, 1981, Respondent hired Greg Howle to manage the Home Hunters V office in West Palm Beach. At all times material hereto, Howle was not registered as either a broker or salesman. Respondent's business, insofar as here pertinent, consisted of maintaining card files of rental properties available in the West Palm Beach area, and advertising availability of those properties for the owners. When a prospective tenant came to Respondent's office in response to advertisements or otherwise, those tenants would sign an agreement with Home Hunters V, Inc., and, after payment of a $60 fee, would be furnished information concerning available properties in the area that generally conformed to the types of properties prospective tenants were seeking. The standard procedure in Respondent's office was that the prospective tenants would first meet with Greg Howle, the office manager, who would have them execute the agreement with Home Hunters V, Inc., collect the $60 fee from them, and then refer prospective tenants to other office employees. Among these other office employees were Ilana Frank, a licensed real estate salesperson who began employment with Respondent in late September or early October, 1981, and Sheryl Kimball, an unlicensed employee, who was employed by Respondent on or about October 16, 1981, and continued as an employee until about November 29, 1981. Respondent testified that Ms. Kimball was hired as a receptionist and, in addition, performed general clerical responsibilities in the office, including greeting potential customers and referring them to licensed salespersons. The record in this cause establishes that Ms. Kimball did, on at least two occasions, speak with persons on the telephone concerning sales, and on both of those occasions she was reprimanded by Respondent for acting outside the scope of her employment. Ms. Kimball was never directed by Respondent to negotiate the rental of any real property nor does this record establish that Respondent knew of Ms. Kimball's engaging in any such activity. Respondent testified that Ms. Kimball was paid $150 per week for her services, and, in addition, was compensated for any overtime work she might have performed. Ms. Kimball testified, however, that she was paid $150 per week together with $3.00 for each contract she negotiated. However, Ms. Kimball could identify only one such contract on which she worked. With regard to that contract, which involved a customer named Paul Palmero, Respondent never received any funds, and the record in this cause does not reflect that any services were ever performed for Mr. Palmero. Further, the entire Palmero transaction was conducted in the presence of another of Respondent's employees, Ilana Frank, who, as indicated above, was a licensed salesperson. Accordingly, there is insufficient credible evidence of record in this cause to establish that Sheryl Kimball ever negotiated the rental of real property or interest therein; procured lessees of the real property of others; or performed any of the acts of a broker or salesman as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Further, the record in this cause contains no evidence establishing the amounts actually paid to Ms. Kimball during the six-week period in which she was employed by Respondent. In reaching this conclusion, the Hearing Officer has taken into account the testimony and interests of both Ms. Kimball and Respondent in the outcome of this proceeding in attempting to reconcile the direct conflicts in their testimony. Ms. Kimball was discharged from Respondent's employ after having received two reprimands and having been accused of misappropriating funds. Thereafter, Ms. Kimball filed a complaint against Respondent with the Florida Real Estate Commission. Conversely, Respondent obviously has an interest in retaining his license as a broker. When viewed as a whole, it is concluded that facts of record in this cause with respect to Counts I and II are qualitatively and quantitatively insufficient to establish the factual allegations contained therein. Count III of the Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent ". . . inserted or caused to be inserted fraudulent, false, deceptive or misleading advertisements in the Post and Evening Times newspaper of West Palm Beach, Florida." The same count further alleges that those advertisements were fraudulent, false, deceptive or misleading ". . . in that the content thereof stated to the public that respondents had available for lease through their firm various rental units at stated prices when in fact rental units of the advertised type were not available through their firm at the stated price." There is no evidence of record in this proceeding that would in any way establish the facts alleged in Count III of the Administrative Complaint. In fact, the only evidence of record on this issue is the testimony of Ms. Kimball that she observed Mr. Howle, the office manager, copying listings from Fort Myers newspapers for use in the West Palm Beach area. However, Ms. Kimball conceded that she did not know if any such ads were ever placed in the West Palm Beach newspaper. No such advertisements were introduced into evidence in this proceeding from which any comparison to any of the listings available through Respondents could be made to determine whether the ads were fraudulent, false, deceptive, or misleading. County IV of the Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with having solicited and accepted money as advance rental fees with knowledge that rental units of the type and price desired by potential tenants were not available through Respondent's firm, and with making false representations as to the availability of rental units. Again, there is no evidence of record in this cause to establish a single, identifiable instance in which Respondent either individually or through its employees represented that rental units were available of a type and price that were not in fact so available.
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent, Cristal Coleman, committed the violations alleged in two separate four- count Administrative Complaints filed with the Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation on April 17, 2009, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her Florida real estate associate license.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (hereinafter referred to as the “Division”), is an agency of the State of Florida created by Section 20.165, Florida Statutes. The Division is charged with the responsibility for the regulation of the real estate industry in Florida pursuant to Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Cristal Coleman, was at the times material to this matter, the holder of a Florida real estate associate license, license number 693909, issued by the Division. From January 4, 2005, until March 31, 2008, Ms. Coleman was registered as a sales associate with Cristal Clear Realty (hereinafter referred to the “Realty Company”). Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC., and Ms. Coleman’s Relationship Thereto. Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC (hereinafter referred to as the “CC Rentals”), is a Florida limited liability company registered with the office of the Florida Secretary of State, Division of Corporations. CC Rentals business consisted of marketing and renting for compensation transient rental properties. CC Rentals did not engage in the sale of real estate and, therefore, was not registered with the Division as a licensed real estate broker. Ms. Coleman became the sole managing member of CC Rentals as of December 5, 2007. As a managing member, CC Rentals office manager, rental manager, and accountant reported to her on a regular basis. The Richard Bloom and Greg Sousa Rentals. CC Rentals, at the times relevant, was managing two separate properties, one owned by Richard Bloom (hereinafter referred to as the “Bloom Property”), and one owned by Greg Sousa (hereinafter referred to as the “Sousa Property”). The nature of the role of CC Rentals in managing the Bloom Property and the Sousa Property was not proved. Whatever agreements existed as to the management of these properties was not proved. Nor was any evidence presented as to whether any money, in the form of a security deposit, rental fees, or any other form, was received or in the possession of CC Rentals at the times relevant to this matter. On or about May 6, 2008, a form email was sent from Ms. Coleman’s email address to clients of CC Rentals notifing clients of the financial demise of CC Rentals (hereinafter referred to as the “Email Notice”). The Email Notice was sent to Mr. Bloom and to Mr. Sousa. In pertinent part, the Notice Email stated: We regret to advise you that Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC is no longer sufficiently solvent to continue operating. The Company has ceased trading effective May 6, 2008. We have tried to weather a very difficult season where the economic crisis in our country has seriously impacted travel and especially rentals in the Florida Keys this year. Since the Company has no funds, we need to advise Owners: The contract between you and Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC is no longer valid and is terminated. There are no funds to pay Owners any rentals collected but not yet paid to Owners through April 2008. If there are current reservations we are providing the contact details below to allow you to make direct contact with your pending guests. Since there are no funds in Cristal Clear Rentals, LLC, the Company cannot refund any security deposits to the people who made the reservation. This means that any Owner accepting the reservation directly will need to reimburse the guest out of pocket for the amount of the Security Deposit after their stay. . . . . According the specific information included in Email Notices sent to Mr. Bloom and Mr. Sousa, there were tenants in the Bloom Property and Sousa Property of a term longer than a transient rental. Ms. Coleman was not, however, aware of either rental property or the nature of any agreement with Mr. Bloom and Mr. Sousa for the management of their properties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Commission: Finding that the Division failed to prove any of the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaints; and Dismissing the Administrative Complaints. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Blakeman, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Nicholas W. Mulick, Esquire Nicholas W. Mulick, P.A. 91645 Overseas Highway Tavernier, Florida 33070 Thomas W. O’Bryant, Jr., Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Hurston Building-North Tower, Suite N802 Orlando, Florida 32801 Reginald Dixon, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue to be determined in this bid protest matter is whether Respondent, Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s, intended award of funding under Request for Applications 2017- 108, entitled “SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments To Be Used In Conjunction With Tax-Exempt Bond Financing And Non-Competitive Housing Credits” was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes. Its purpose is to provide and promote public welfare by administering the governmental function of financing affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing is designated as the housing credit agency for Florida within the meaning of section 42(h)(7)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code. As such, Florida Housing is authorized to establish procedures to distribute low income housing tax credits and to exercise all powers necessary to administer the allocation of these credits. § 420.5099, Fla. Stat. For purposes of this administrative proceeding, Florida Housing is considered an agency of the State of Florida. To promote affordable housing in Florida, Florida Housing offers a variety of programs to distribute housing credits. (Housing credits, also known as tax credits, are a dollar-for-dollar offset of federal income tax liability.) One of these programs is the State Apartment Incentive Loan program (“SAIL”), which provides low-interest loans on a competitive basis to affordable housing developers. SAIL funds are available each year to support the construction or substantial rehabilitation of multifamily units affordable to very low- income individuals and families. See § 420.5087, Fla. Stat. Additional sources of financial assistance include the Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bond program (“MMRB”) and non- competitive housing credits. Florida Housing administers the competitive solicitation process to award low-income housing tax credits, SAIL funds, nontaxable revenue bonds, and other funding by means of request for proposals or other competitive solicitation. Florida Housing initiates the competitive application process by issuing a Request for Applications. §§ 420.507(48) and 420.5087(1), Fla. Stat.; and Fla. Admin. Code R. 67-60.009(4). The Request for Application at issue in this matter is RFA 2017-108, entitled “SAIL Financing of Affordable Multifamily Housing Developments to Be Used in Conjunction with Tax-Exempt Bond Financing and Non-Competitive Housing Credits.” Florida Housing issued RFA 2017-108 on August 31, 2017. Applications were due by October 12, 2017.6/ The purpose of RFA 2017-108 is to distribute funding to create affordable housing in the State of Florida. Through RFA 2017-108, Florida Housing intends to award approximately $87,000,000 for proposed developments serving elderly and family demographic groups in small, medium, and large counties. RFA 2017-108 allocates $46,279,600 to large counties, $32,308,400 to medium counties, and $8,732,000 to small counties. RFA 2017-108 established goals to fund: Two Elderly, new construction Applications located in Large Counties; Three Family, new construction Applications located in Large Counties; One Elderly, new construction Application located in a Medium County; and Two Family, new construction Applications located in Medium Counties. Thirty-eight developers submitted applications in response to RFA 2017-108. Of these applicants, Florida Housing found 28 eligible for funding, including all Petitioners and Intervenors in this matter. Florida Housing received, processed, deemed eligible or ineligible, scored, and ranked applications pursuant to the terms of RFA 2017-108, Florida Administrative Code Chapters 67- 48 and 67-60, and applicable federal regulations. RFA 2017-108 provided that applicants were scored based on certain demographic and geographic funding tests. Florida Housing sorted applications from the highest scoring to the lowest. Only applications that met all the eligibility requirements were eligible for funding and considered for selection. Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to review and score each application. On November 15, 2017, the Review Committee announced its scores at a public meeting and recommended which projects should be awarded funding. On December 8, 2017, the Review Committee presented its recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors for final agency action. The Board of Directors subsequently approved the Review Committee’s recommendations and announced its intention to award funding to 16 applicants. As a preliminary matter, prior to the final hearing, Florida Housing agreed to the following reassessments in the scoring and selection of the applications for funding under RFA 2017-108: SP Lake and Osprey Pointe: In the selection process, Florida Housing erroneously determined that SP Lake was eligible to meet the funding goal for the “Family” demographic for the Family, Medium County, New Construction Goal. (SP Lake specifically applied for funding for the “Elderly” demographic.) Consequently, Florida Housing should have selected Osprey Pointe to meet the Family, Medium County, New Construction Goal. Osprey Pointe proposed to construct affordable housing in Pasco County, Florida. Florida Housing represents that Osprey Pointe is fully eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. (While Osprey Pointe replaces SP Lake in the funding selection for the “Family” demographic, SP Lake remains eligible for funding for the “Elderly” demographic.) Sierra Bay and Northside II: In the scoring process, Florida Housing erroneously awarded Sierra Bay proximity points for Transit Services. Upon further review, Sierra Bay should have received zero proximity points. Consequently, Sierra Bay’s application is ineligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. By operation of the provisions of RFA 2017-108, Florida Housing should have selected Northside II (the next highest ranked, eligible applicant) for funding to meet the Elderly, Large County, New Construction Goal. Florida Housing represents that Northside II is fully eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. Harbour Springs: Florida Housing initially deemed Harbour Springs eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108 and selected it to meet the Family, Large County, New Construction Goal. However, because Harbour Springs and Woodland Grove are owned by the same entity and applied using the same development site, under rule 67-48.004(1), Harbour Springs is ineligible for funding. (Florida Housing’s selection of Woodland Grove for funding for the Family, Large County, New Construction Goal, is not affected by this determination.) The sole disputed issue of material fact concerns Liberty Square’s challenge to Florida Housing’s selection of Woodland Grove to meet the Family, Large County Goal. Liberty Square and Woodland Grove applied to serve the same demographic population under RFA 2017-108. If Liberty Square successfully challenges Woodland Grove’s application, Liberty Square, as the next eligible applicant, will be selected for funding to meet the Family, Large County Goal instead of Woodland Grove. (At the hearing on December 8, 2017, Florida Housing’s Board of Directors awarded Woodland Grove $7,600,000 in funding.) The focus of Liberty Square’s challenge is the information Woodland Grove provided in response to RFA 2017-108, Section Four, A.5.d., entitled “Latitude/Longitude Coordinates.” Liberty Square argues that Woodland Grove’s application is ineligible because its Development Location Point, as well as the locations of its Community Services and Transit Services, are inaccurate. Therefore, Woodland Grove should have received zero “Proximity” points which would have disqualified its application for funding. RFA 2017-108, Section Four, A.5.d(1), states, in pertinent part: All Applicants must provide a Development Location Point stated in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place. RFA 2017-108 set forth scoring considerations based on latitude/longitude coordinates in Section Four, A.5.e, entitled “Proximity.” Section Four, A.5.e, states, in pertinent part: The Application may earn proximity points based on the distance between the Development Location Point and the Bus or Rail Transit Service . . . and the Community Services stated in Exhibit A. Proximity points will not be applied to the total score. Proximity points will only be used to determine whether the Applicant meets the required minimum proximity eligibility requirements and the Proximity Funding Preference ” In other words, the Development Location Point identified the specific location of an applicant’s proposed housing site.7/ Applicants earned “proximity points” based on the distance between its Development Location Point and selected Transit and Community Services. Florida Housing also used the Development Location Point to determine whether an application satisfied the Mandatory Distance Requirement under RFA 2017-108, Section Four A.5.f. To be eligible for funding, all applications had to qualify for the Mandatory Distance Requirement. The response section to Section Four, A.5.d., is found in Exhibit A, section 5, which required each applicant to submit information regarding the “Location of proposed Development.” Section 5 specifically requested: County; Address of Development Site; Does the proposed Development consist of Scattered Sites?; Latitude and Longitude Coordinate; Proximity; Mandatory Distance Requirement; and Limited Development Area. Section 5.d. (Latitude and Longitude Coordinates) was subdivided into: (1) Development Location Point Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place In its application, Woodland Grove responded in section 5.a-d as follows: County: Miami-Dade Address of Development Site: NE corner of SW 268 Street and 142 Ave, Miami-Dade, FL 33032. Does the proposed Development consist of Scattered Sites? No. Latitude and Longitude Coordinate; Development Location Point Latitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place: 25.518647 Longitude in decimal degrees, rounded to at least the sixth decimal place: 80.418583 In plotting geographic coordinates, a “-” (negative) sign in front of the longitude indicates a location in the western hemisphere (i.e., west of the Prime Meridian, which is aligned with the Royal Observatory, Greenwich, England). A longitude without a “-” sign places the coordinate in the eastern hemisphere. (Similarly, a latitude with a negative value is south of the equator. A latitude without a “-” sign refers to a coordinate in the northern hemisphere.) As shown above, the longitude coordinate Woodland Grove listed in section 5.d(1) did not include a “-” sign. Consequently, instead of providing a coordinate for a site in Miami-Dade County, Florida, Woodland Grove entered a Development Location Point located on the direct opposite side of the planet (apparently, in India). At the final hearing, Florida Housing (and Woodland Grove) explained that, except for the lack of the “-” sign, the longitude Woodland Grove recorded would have fallen directly on the address it listed as its development site in section 5.b., i.e., the “NE corner of SW 268 Street and 142 Ave, Miami-Dade, FL 33032.” In addition to the longitude in section 5.d., Woodland Grove did not include a “-” sign before the longitude coordinates for its Transit Services in section 5.e(2)(b) or for any of the three Community Services provided in section 5.e(3). Again, without a “-” sign, the longitude for each of these services placed them in the eastern hemisphere (India) instead of the western hemisphere (Miami-Dade County). In its protest, Liberty Square contends that, because Woodland Grove’s application listed a Development Location Point in India, Florida Housing should have awarded Woodland Grove zero proximity points under Section Four, A.5.e. Consequently, Woodland Grove’s application failed to meet minimum proximity eligibility requirements and is ineligible for funding. Therefore, Liberty Square, as the next eligible applicant, should be awarded funding for the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017-108.8/ Liberty Square asserts that a correct Development Location Point is critical because it serves as the beginning point for assigning proximity scores. Waiving an errant Development Location Point makes the proximity scoring meaningless. Consequently, any such waiver by Florida Housing is arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to competition. At the final hearing, Woodland Grove claimed that it inadvertently failed to include the “-” sign before the longitude points. To support its position, Woodland Grove expressed that, on the face of its application, it was obviously applying for funding for a project located in Miami-Dade County, Florida, not India. In at least five places in its application, Woodland Grove specified that its proposed development would be located in Miami-Dade County. Moreover, several attachments to Woodland Grove’s application specifically reference a development site in Florida. Woodland Grove attached a purchase agreement for property located in Miami-Dade County (Attachment 8). To satisfy the Ability to Proceed requirements in RFA 2017-108, Woodland Grove included several attachments which all list a Miami-Dade address (Attachments 9-14). Further, Woodland Grove submitted a Local Government Verification of Contribution – Loan Form executed on behalf of the Mayor of Miami-Dade County, which committed Miami-Dade County to contribute $1,000,000.00 to Woodland Grove’s proposed Development (Attachment 15). Finally, to qualify for a basis boost under RFA 2017-108, Woodland Grove presented a letter from Miami-Dade County’s Department of Regulatory and Economic Resources, which also referenced the address of the proposed development in Miami-Dade County (Attachment 16). In light of this information, Woodland Grove argues that its application, taken as a whole, clearly communicated that Woodland Grove intended to build affordable housing in Miami-Dade County. Nowhere in its application, did Woodland Grove reference a project in India other than the longitude coordinates which failed to include “-” signs. Accordingly, Florida Housing was legally authorized to waive Woodland Grove’s mistake as a “harmless error.” Thus, Florida Housing properly selected the Woodland Grove’s development for funding to meet the Family, Large County Goal. Florida Housing advocates for Woodland Grove’s selection to meet the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017- 108. Florida Housing considers the omission of the “-” signs before the longitude coordinates a “Minor Irregularity” under rule 67-60.002(6). Therefore, Florida Housing properly acted within its legal authority to waive, and then correct, Woodland Grove’s faulty longitude coordinates when scoring its application. In support of its position, Florida Housing presented the testimony of Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s current Director of Multifamily Allocations. In her job, Ms. Button oversees the Request for Applications process; although, she did not personally participate in the review, scoring, or selection decisions for RFA 2017-108. Ms. Button initially explained the process by which Florida Housing selected the 16 developments for funding under RFA 2017-108. Ms. Button conveyed that Florida Housing created a Review Committee from amongst its staff to score the applications. Florida Housing selected Review Committee participants based on the staff member’s experience, preferences, and workload. Florida Housing also assigned a backup reviewer to separately score each application. The Review Committee members independently evaluated and scored their assigned portions of the applications based on various mandatory and scored items. Thereafter, the scorer and backup reviewer met to reconcile their scores. If any concerns or questions arose regarding an applicant’s responses, the scorer and backup reviewer discussed them with Florida Housing’s supervisory and legal staff. The scorer then made the final determination as to each application. Ms. Button further explained that applicants occasionally make errors in their applications. However, not all errors render an application ineligible. Florida Housing is authorized to waive “Minor Irregularities.” As delineated in RFA 2017-108, Section Three, A.2.C., Florida Housing may waive “Minor Irregularities” when the errors do not provide a competitive advantage or adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 67- 60.002(6) and 67-60.008. Such was the case regarding Woodland Grove’s application. Heather Green, the Florida Housing staff member who scored the “Proximity” portion of RFA 2017-108, waived the inaccurate longitude coordinates as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Green then reviewed Woodland Grove’s application as if the proposed development was located in Miami-Dade County, Florida. Florida Housing assigned Ms. Green, a Multifamily Loans Manager, as the lead scorer for the “Proximity” portion of RFA 2017-108, which included the Development Location Point listed in Exhibit A, section 5.d. Ms. Green has worked for Florida Housing since 2003 and has scored proximity points for Request for Applications for over ten years. At the final hearing, Florida Housing offered the deposition testimony of Ms. Green. In her deposition, Ms. Green testified that she is fully aware that, to be located in the western hemisphere (i.e., Miami-Dade County), a longitude coordinate should be marked with a negative sign or a “W.” Despite this, Ms. Green felt that the longitude coordinates Woodland Grove used without negative signs, particularly its Development Location Point, were clearly typos or unintentional mistakes. Therefore, Ms. Green waived the lack of a negative sign in front of the longitude coordinates in section 5.d. and section 5.e. as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Green understood that she was authorized to waive “Minor Irregularities” by rule under the Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green felt comfortable waiving the inaccurate longitude coordinates because everywhere else in Woodland Grove’s application specifically showed that its proposed housing development was located in Miami-Dade County, not India. Accordingly, when scoring Woodland Grove’s application, Ms. Green corrected the longitude entries by including a negative sign when she plotted the coordinates with her mapping software. Ms. Green then determined that, when a “-” was inserted before the longitude, the coordinate lined up with the address Woodland Grove listed for the Development Location Point. Therefore, Woodland Grove received proximity points and was eligible for funding under RFA 2017-108. (See RFA 2017-108, Section Five.A.1.) However, Ms. Green acknowledged that if she had scored the application just as it was presented, Woodland Grove would not have met the required qualifications for eligibility. Ms. Button relayed that Florida Housing fully accepted Ms. Green’s decision to waive the missing negative signs in Woodland Grove’s response to section 5.d. and 5.e. as “Minor Irregularities.” Ms. Button opined that Woodland Grove’s failure to place a “-” mark before the longitude was clearly an unintentional mistake. Ms. Button further commented that Florida Housing did not believe that scoring Woodland Grove’s development as if located in the western hemisphere (instead of India), provided Woodland Grove a competitive advantage. Because it was evident on the face of the application that Woodland Grove desired to develop a housing site in Miami-Dade County, Ms. Green’s decision to overlook the missing “-” sign did not award Woodland Grove additional points or grant Woodland Grove an advantage over other applicants. Neither did it adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. However, Ms. Button also conceded that if Ms. Green had scored the application without adding the “-” sign, Woodland Grove would have received zero proximity points. This result would have rendered Woodland Grove’s application ineligible for funding. Ms. Button also pointed out that Ms. Green waived the omission of “-” signs in two other applications as “Minor Irregularities.” Both Springhill Apartments, LLC, and Harbour Springs failed to include negative signs in front of their longitude coordinates. As with Woodland Grove, Ms. Green considered the development sites in those applications as if they were located in Miami-Dade County (i.e., in the western hemisphere). Ms. Green also waived a mistake in the Avery Commons application as a “Minor Irregularity.” The longitude coordinate for the Avery Commons Development Location Point (section 5.d(1)) was blank. However, Ms. Green determined that Avery Commons had placed the longitude in the blank reserved for Scattered Sites coordinates (section 5.d(2)). When scoring Avery Commons’ application, Ms. Green considered the coordinate in the appropriate section. According to Ms. Button, Florida Housing felt that this variation did not provide Avery Commons a competitive advantage. Nor did it adversely impact the interests of Florida Housing or the public. Finally, Ms. Button explained that the application Florida Housing used for RFA 2017-108 was a relatively new format. In previous Request For Applications, Florida Housing required applicants to submit a Surveyor Certification Form. On the (now obsolete) Surveyor Certification Form, Florida Housing prefilled in an “N” in front of all the latitude coordinates and a “W” in front of all the longitude coordinates. However, the application used in RFA 2017-108 did not place an “N” or “W” before the Development Location Point coordinates. Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, Liberty Square did not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Florida Housing’s decision to award funding to Woodland Grove for the Family, Large County Goal, under RFA 2017-108 was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Florida Housing was within its legal authority to waive, then correct, the missing “-” sign in Woodland Grove’s application as “Minor Irregularity.” Therefore, the undersigned concludes, as a matter of law, that Petitioner did not meet its burden of proving that Florida Housing’s proposed action to select Woodland Grove for funding was contrary to its governing statutes, rules or policies, or the provisions of RFA 2017-108.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order dismissing the protest by Liberty Square. It is further recommended that Florida Housing Finance Corporation rescind the intended awards to Sierra Bay, SP Lake, and Harbour Springs, and instead designate Northside II, Osprey Pointe, and Pembroke Tower Apartments as the recipients of funding under RFA 2017-108.10/ DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 2018.
Findings Of Fact At all times referred to in these findings of fact, Carlson was a licensed real estate salesman having been issued License Number 0187184. The last license issued was as a salesman, c/o Pauls Real Estate and Investments, Inc., 441 East Shore Drive, Clearwater Beach, Florida 33515. From October 13, 1982, to June 28, 1983, Carlson was licensed as a real estate salesman in the employ of corporate real estate broker Alliance Real Estate, Inc. of which Nicholas G. Mastro was a qualifying broker and officer. During her employment, Carlson was employed to solicit and obtain landlords and tenants in connection with the rental property management brokerage business of Alliance Real Estate, Inc. Carlson worked out of Alliance's Clearwater Beach office, ten miles from the main office on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, Clearwater. Generally, Alliance's official policy was that the originals of property listings, property management agreements and rental agreements were to be maintained at the main office, with work copies filed at the Beach office. Correspondence and miscellaneous property management papers, such as invoices, frequently are maintained exclusively at the Beach office. Funds were to be deposited into, and checks were to be written out of, Alliance's operating account by Alliance's staff at the main office. However, due to the distance between the main office and the Beach office, it was inefficient and inconvenient for Carlson to follow the official policies and procedures. Instead, Carlson began using her own personal bank account as a conduit for funds flowing to and from Alliance (including brokerage fees to Alliance). She also ceased following the procedure for maintaining certain original papers at the main office and even began maintaining files at her home. Alliance knew or should have known that Carlson was using her personal bank account as a conduit for Alliance funds. Alliance's ledgers showed these transactions, and Alliance's bookkeeper wrote reimbursement checks to Carlson for some of them. Since Ronald Lohr, Alliance's qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over the Beach office, did not testify, the evidence did not preclude the possibility that he had actual or constructive knowledge of this deviation from official policy. Regarding Carlson's maintenance of files (including original papers normally kept at the main office) at her house, Alliance did not have actual or constructive knowledge of this deviation from official policy. Rather, Alliance's minimal supervision of the Beach office gave Carlson the opportunity to deviate from that official policy without detection. Through the combined effect of these circumstances, Carlson was able to operate as a salesman for Alliance in connection with the following transactions while concealing the transactions from her employer and wrongfully retaining brokerage commissions which properly should have been paid over to Alliance. At the conclusion of these transactions (except one), Carlson "pitched" her file on it. In February, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $1,000.00 as rental payments from William Russ, as a tenant, for the rental of Unite 908, Clearwater Point Condominium, 830 S. Gulfview Blvd., Clearwater Beach, Florida owned by Bernhardt Elsen. In March, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $680 from Carl Dotterman, as a tenant, for the rental of Elsen's condominium. Notwithstanding that Carlson had received $1,680, Carlson advised Bernhardt Elsen that she had only received $1,600. Carlson disbursed $1,513.30 to Bernhardt Elsen, calculated as $1,600, minus $160 being a 10 percent management fee, plus $73.39 as reimbursement for payment of an electric bill. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Russ and Dotterman rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Elsen rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In February and March, 1983, Carlson negotiated for her son Martin Carlson, as tenant, and Dr. Rolando Perez, as owner, for the rental of Unit 207, Commodore Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Dr. Rolando Perez. Rent was to be $800. Carlson, for her son, paid Dr. Rolando Perez $720 calculated as $800 minus $80 being a 10 percent management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Carlson rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Perez rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In April, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $500 as rental payment from a Mr. and Mrs. Scalise, as tenants, for the period April 9, 1983, to April 15, 1983, for the rental of Unit 701, Sailmaster Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Anthony and Jeanette Eman. On or about April 14, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained a $100 rental deposit from Mr. and Mrs. Scalise for the rental of Eman's condominium for a period in 1984. On or about April 15, 1983, Carlson disbursed to Mr. and Mrs. Eman the $100 deposit and $200 of the $500 rental payment with $300 thereof being retained by Carlson as a management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Scalise rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Eman rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. In January and February, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained $2,400 as rental payments from Ernest Pfau, as a tenant, for the rental of Unit 605, Shipmaster Building, Clearwater Point Condominiums, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Joseph Seta. Carlson disbursed to Joseph Seta $2,160 calculated as $2,400 minus $240 being a 10 percent management fee. Carlson collected, received and disbursed the Pfau rental money in her own name. She engaged in the Eifert rental property management activities and received compensation for the performance of real estate brokerage services all without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. On or about June 7, 1983, Carlson solicited and obtained a $100 rental deposit from Lawrence Augostino, as a tenant, for the rental of Unit 706, 450 Gulf Blvd., South Building, Clearwater Beach, Florida, owned by Dr. Donald F. Eifert. Carlson was to hold the deposit until she was able to obtain a listing on the rental property. While waiting for a listing on the Eifert property, Alliance, through Mr. Mastro, became aware of one of Carlson's "secret clients," Mr. Elsen, and confronted Carlson about it. In response to Mastro's demand, she retrieved the entire Elsen file from her home. When Mastro learned about a second "secret client," Dr. Perez, a short time later, Mastro immediately terminated Carlson from her employment on June 15, 1983. Carlson did not advise Alliance of the Augostino deposit and was not able to get a good address for Augostino to return the deposit before she left the Clearwater area to go to Michigan for a month. Carlson collected and received the Augostino deposit in her own name. She engaged in the Eifert rental property management activities without the prior knowledge and consent of her employing broker, Alliance Real Estate, Inc., or any of its qualifying brokers. As previously alluded to, Carlson produced evidence of having used her personal checking account as a conduit for funds flowing between Alliance and its customers (including brokerage fees payable to Alliance) with the actual or constructive knowledge of Lohr and Alliance's bookkeeper. But Carlson was unable to produce any similar evidence (such as Alliance's ledgers or her cancelled checks) in response to the absence of any Alliance corporate records indicating that Carlson paid any of the brokerage fees generated in the foregoing transactions over to Alliance. Carlson's self-serving and vague testimony that she did not owe Alliance any money was insufficient in this respect.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order suspending respondent's license for two (2) years for violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983). RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32002 Bruce M. Harlan, Esquire 110 Turner Street Clearwater, Florida 33516 Harold Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated in accordance with those statutes. Respondent is now and was at all times associated with this administrative complaint a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0251002 under the authority of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent's last license was issued as a real estate broker with the firm of Eastern Marketing, Inc. which is located at 17841 U.S. Highway 441, 3 Mount Dora, Florida 32757. RESPONDENT'S ROLE At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been involved in the real estate profession for approximately 18 years. This real estate practice has been exclusively in the state of Florida. In addition to being a real estate broker, Respondent is licensed as a general contractor in Florida and as a mortgage broker in the state. His general contractor's license is a certified license. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was a real estate broker with Collins and Associates, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. He also had affiliation with Collins Builders, Inc., a licensed general contracting firm. He was a one half owner in Tallahassee Properties, a Florida general partnership in which the other ownership was held by W. Ronnie Collins, Respondent's brother. All of these firms did business in Florida and particular as these firms are involved with the issues in dispute, they did business in Tallahassee, Florida. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was involved in a sales promotion program which has been referred to as a trade-in program. In essence, this program was designed to allow persons who had purchased residences from a firm or through affiliated Collins companies to turn over the initial residence to Tallahassee Properties in exchange for a new home bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with the builder using the real estate services of Collins and Associates, Inc. to sell the new home. The house that was being traded was deeded to Respondent or one of the companies with which he was affiliated. In this case, the company with which Respondent was affiliated with which had property deeded to it was Ralco, Inc. Those persons who were trading one home for another had been solicited by Collins and Associates, Inc. as a realtor in an advertising program. No realtor was involved in making commissions associated with the closing that took place between the sellers who were trading in a home and Tallahassee Properties, Respondent and Ralco, Inc. with whom he was affiliated. This arrangement was designed to stimulate sales of the new home being purchased. The traded homes typically had mortgages. Tallahassee Properties not only took possession of the traded or exchanged homes but was responsible for the activities associated with the closing of the transaction, to include assumption and payment of mortgages associated with the exchanged property. As grantee on the deeds in the traded homes Respondent and Ralco, Inc. were also responsible for assumption and payments. As Respondent identified in his testimony, he and his brother W. Ronnie Collins; Collins and Associates, Inc.; Collins Builders, Inc. and Tallahassee Properties were anticipated as being the individuals to apply for the assumption of loans with the lending agencies who held the mortgages on the traded property. W. Ronnie Collins was also one of the names in the overall scheme in which the traded-in property could be placed as grantee. Approximately 80 homes were traded over a period of 6 or 7 years. The properties in dispute in this case were among them. Respondent had authorized Tallahassee Properties and in particular his brother W. Ronnie Collins as managing partner of that partnership, to place the properties in Respondent's name, W. Ronnie Collins' name or any of several companies affiliated with Respondent in furtherance of identifying a grantee that the mortgage holder would allow to assume the mortgage. Respondent's expectation was that Tallahassee Properties and the title company involved in the closing of the transaction associated with the traded property would facilitate the assumption arrangement with the mortgage holder. The title company used in the cases that are at issue here was Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. In the closings for the traded homes, which are at issue in this case, the evidence presented at hearing which may be relied upon for fact finding did not reveal what attempts were made to have the mortgage holders for the traded homes ultimately accept the substitution of Respondent, his brother or one of the companies with which he was affiliated as parties responsible for the existing mortgages on the traded properties. The reason which Respondent gave for allowing his brother, W. Ronnie Collins to act in his behalf in Tallahassee Properties was that he felt that it was impossible for him to involve himself in that business and its day to day process and at the same time be active in Collins and Associates, Inc. and Collins Builders, Inc. Therefore, he allowed W. Ronnie Collins to act for him in the business of Tallahassee Properties. This explanation has not been disputed and being tenable is credited as true. In accepting deeds related to the traded property, as will be described in the individual instances that follow, Respondent recognized that he had obligated himself to take the responsibility for assumption of and payment of the mortgage. Respondent has no direct knowledge of whether any of the trade-in transactions were followed up by gaining permission from the mortgage holder to allow someone other than the original mortgagor to become responsible for the mortgage payments. The contracts for obtaining the traded-in homes were executed by Tallahassee Properties. Nonetheless, as described, Respondent was given a deed to some of the properties purchased, to include properties in dispute here. Respondent never orally or in writing advised the sellers of the traded property that the routine mortgage payments associated with the traded property and the overall mortgage obligation would no longer be the responsibility of those sellers. In one of the cases which is at issue here involving the trade-in property of John M. and Jeanne B. Miller, Respondent stated that he received their traded property as grantee on the deed. In fact Ralco, Inc. was grantee. When asked about whether he had assumed the obligation for the mortgage that existed on that home, Respondent replied that he had assumed the loan. When asked if he explained the fact to that assumption to the Millers, he pointed out that he had never talked to the individuals. When asked if he had directed anyone in any of his companies or his real estate company in particular to explain the details of the transaction, Respondent pointed out that Collins and Associates, Inc. as realtor, and as a licensed broker had trained each associate to explain all of the rules and procedures associated with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, VA and HUD loans and that Respondent as the broker of those associates would expect that the associates would explain everything to the Millers. Whether the Millers were informed about such matters by Collins and Associates, Inc. employees was not proven. The traded in properties were rented, repaired and sold or kept in inventory by Tallahassee Properties. After purchase of the traded-in properties, Respondent's expectations as a partner in Tallahassee Properties was that the partnership would take possession of the properties and manage them and make payments on existing mortgages associated with any of those properties. Respondent believes that until the latter part of 1985 when he and some of his operations were involved in a Chapter 11 Federal Bankruptcy declaration, payments on the existing mortgages for traded properties were being made, in that had it not been so that he would have been notified. The record offers no proof that can be relied upon to satisfactorily corroborate or rebut this assumption on his part. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was not caused by problems associated with the traded properties. Ralco, Inc. was not involved in the bankruptcy. Some of the traded properties in question were owned by Ralco as grantee. Although Ralco was not involved in the bankruptcy, it was unable to make payments because of the bankruptcy in that the houses in question had a negative cash flow and Respondent was unable to take funds from the bankruptcy court and place them with Ralco, Inc. to make the payments on mortgages that existed on the traded properties. Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. were not involved in the closings of the traded property. Their involvement was with the new house being purchased following the trade. The closing associated with the new house under purchase was a separate closing and Collins and Associates, Inc. received a real estate commission for its participation. None of the exact details of the solicitation process by Collins and Associates, Inc. in which homeowners were encouraged to trade existing residences on other homes built by Collins Builders, Inc. were made known, so that it might be understood whether Collins and Associates, Inc. promised to make the attempt to have the lender accept a substitute for the original mortgagor on the mortgage indebtedness, to include the possibility of the outright release of the original mortgages from the debt obligation. Therefore, that solicitation process has no part to play in examining the issue of Respondent's conduct associated with the closings of the traded homes. In the latter part of 1985, following the filing of the petition under Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Laws, Respondent and Duval First Corporation with which he was affiliated were granted an order of relief on December 23, 1985 in Case Nos. 85-07179B and 85-07178C, respectively in the United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division. As part of the disposition in front of the bankruptcy court, the bankrupt estates and Real Estate Financing, Inc. agreed that the bankruptcy estates would surrender certain properties and the automatic stay in all expressed injunctions associated with those properties were lifted. The bankruptcy court held that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 506, Real Estate Financing, Inc. would not be entitled to an unsecured claim against the bankrupt estates for debts secured by the lien on those properties. Those properties had been encumbered by a first mortgage in favor for Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Court found that the value of those properties was equal to or exceeded the debts secured by the mortgage lien of Real Estate Financing, Inc. as of the date of the Order for Relief. In that Order for Relief, Real Estate Financing, Inc. was allowed a secured claim for the full extent of the debt due as of the date of the Order for Relief plus interest accrued up to the extent of the value of each property and up to the date of November 18, 1986. The bankruptcy court did not hold that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was entitled to any unsecured claim for any pre-petition debt that was secured by the lien on its mortgages. Among the properties affected by this action were those properties of David Walsh, Troy Brewer, Sam Hinson, Harold C. Miller, Peter Hartman, and John Miller, all of whom are listed as individuals whose transactions with Respondent are found in the Administrative Complaint and about which Respondent is said to have violated the aforementioned disciplinary provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. By this arrangement in bankruptcy court, Respondent hoped to avoid the circumstance by which the mortgage was foreclosed leaving a deficiency against the original mortgagor/homeowner of the traded-in property which would in turn lead to some claim against the bankruptcy estates for the amount of the deficiency. Nonetheless, Real Estate Financing, Inc. proceeded to foreclose on its mortgages as subsequently discussed in commenting on the individual counts to the Administrative Complaint pertaining to individual homeowners. While the bankrupt estates would have preferred to deed back the property in lieu of foreclosure, it accepted the foreclosures given the protections to the bankrupt estates that have been identified in this discussion. It should also be mentioned that two of the accounts in the Administrative Complaint pertaining to Eric Larsen and Robert Aubin, to be discussed, were not part of this arrangement in the bankruptcy court associated with Real Estate Financing, Inc. At the closings on the traded homes in question some explanations about the mortgage assumptions were made by persons who may have been representing Tallahassee Properties or other Collins affiliates, but these persons are not clearly identified in the record as to their actual position with those organizations and how Respondent was accountable for their remarks. Those remarks will be discussed in the assessment of the individual counts that follow. Respondent, following the petition for bankruptcy in his own name and that of companies with which he was associated, wrote to advise homeowners who had traded in their homes about his perception of the homeowners' status following that bankruptcy. These letters were written on February 18, 1986 on stationary of the Respondent and were signed by him. In this correspondence, which is the same format in all instances, he would make reference to the date upon which the transaction closed at which time the homeowner deeded over the traded property to Respondent or a company with which he was affiliated. He described the existence of the prior mortgage to Real Estate Financing, Inc. with a loan number and the existence of the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause and, according to the letter, that the loan was not paid off at the time of the closing and the assertion that the lender would not allow the assumption of that loan by Respondent or one of his companies. Again this record is silent on the subject of what attitude the lender held about this, or even the matter of whether an attempt was made to have the lender accept a new obligor. He described how the lender was not considering Respondent or his company as purchaser but that the original mortgagor was being considered. This was taken to mean that Respondent was trying to express that the lender was looking to the original mortgagor as a responsible entity on the mortgage. The letter described how Respondent or one of his companies had been renting and making payments since the time of closing until December 23, 1985 when declaration of the Petition in bankruptcy went forward. It described how the Respondent and his companies were unable to continue funding payments related to the mortgages on the traded property which was in the name of the homeowners who had traded the property. The letter went on to describe how the payments would be brought current until February 28, 1986. The letter is interpreted to suggest that beyond that point, the property would either be deeded back to the original owner or the lender would foreclose. The letter expressed a preference by Respondent that because, interpreting the letter again, there was no cash flow that he preferred to see the property deeded back to the original owner. The name Bobbie May was given as a contact person and a telephone number provided for the homeowners to call regarding the return of the property back to the original homeowner. The letter goes on to describe an apology from Respondent to the homeowners. Movaline Hill who was a property manager for Tallahassee Properties traded in homes, to include the homes in discussion in the Administrative Complaint, offered her testimony at hearing. The principal business of Tallahassee Properties as established in her testimony was to rent homes. Ms. Hill advertised the property for rent, collected the rent, made payments on existing mortgages on the homes, and took care of maintenance matters. Tallahassee Properties took the rent and put the payments in escrow. One of the homes that Ms. Hill was involved with had belonged to David Walsh. It was a traded home and she had discussed with Walsh getting payment cards or coupons for the mortgage that existed on the traded home. The mortgage company had sent these cards or coupons to Walsh and Hill desired to have them so that the payments on the mortgage could be made. In this connection, Hill wrote Walsh a letter. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20. It indicates enclosure of a recorded deed on the traded property of Mr. Walsh showing Respondent as having the title in his name. It further states that Mr. Walsh should sign and mail a pre-prepared letter to Real Estate Financing, Inc. telling that lender to change the mailing address and requesting new payment cards. The letter describes that Real Estate Financing, Inc. did not know that the title was no longer in Mr. Walsh's name and that the lender would not transfer the mortgage to anyone and asks Walsh not to send the copy of the deed to the Respondent to the lender. Emphasis is placed in this correspondence on not sending that information to the lender. Ms. Hill was not instructed by anyone to write the letter. The reason why Ms. Hill said that she put an indication in the letter that the transfer of the mortgage could not be done was based upon her assertion that she had been told this by the lender. What connection Respondent had with the letter, if any, was not established. The cards that she received from Mr. Walsh on coupons for payments would have his name struck over and Respondent's name placed on it and Hill would send the check to the mortgage company for payment of the mortgage. With Real Estate Financing, Inc., Ms. Hill was sending one or two checks per month that dealt with 15 or 20 mortgages. There would be a lump sum payment with account numbers and backup materials sent with the check. The backup materials would include the payment cards or coupons. During Ms. Hill's tenure with the Tallahassee Properties, she says that she kept the mortgage payments current. No evidence was presented to the contrary which is competent. From this it is found that mortgage payments were kept current for a period of time which is not specifically shown. She received no contact from the mortgage companies on the topic of any assumption packages for these loans being assumed. She did receive some coupon books with the Respondent's name affixed. Those latter circumstances were not shown to be associated with any of the traded properties that are at issue in this case. Charles O. Middleton testified at the hearing. He had worked in 1981, 1982 and up to September, 1983, with Capitol Abstract and Title, Inc. which served as a closing agent on traded properties that were picked up by Tallahassee Properties. His recollection of the events is that, as closing agent for the title company, he worked from a contract which identified the terms of the transaction. His recollection is that the transactions associated with a trade property and the new home being purchased after trade was handled together. This is in contrast to the understanding of those homeowners whose traded properties are the subject of this Administrative Complaint and Respondent. The explanation by those homeowners and Respondent that two separate closings were held, one for the traded property and one for the newly purchased property is accepted as factually correct. Middleton recalls that explanations were given by him as closing agent concerning the nature of the transaction to include the matters of the paragraph 17 "due on sale" clause. He describes this arrangement as involving an affidavit or hold harmless agreement that had to be signed. This included the initialing of the paragraphs within that agreement by the buyer and the seller. Again, none of the homeowners who sold traded property that is described in the Administrative Complaint recalls such explanations and documents and their recollection is deemed more creditable and is accepted in lieu of the comments by Mr. Middleton. Likewise, the document for purposes of explanation which was offered as Respondent's Exhibit 8 containing disclaimers about the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause, while admitted, offers no insight into the nature of what the homeowners were told in the cases that are at issue here because it isn't the same form that Middleton recalls using in the transactions he participated in as closing agent and hasn't been shown to be a form used in any of the cases here. Middleton explained that in the transactions he was involved in, the homeowners were provided a copy of every document to be utilized in the closing and that the original documents had their pages turned while the copies for the homeowners were being examined at the same time. A brief explanation would be given about each document and the homeowners were asked if they wished to take some time to read the documents and to ask any questions. Middleton as closing agent would offer to answer questions or put them in touch with the lender and let the lender answer questions. In Middleton's estimation, it was the closing agent's responsibility to make sure that necessary documents were presented to the lenders in the assumption of the mortgage for the traded in property. Respondent had not instructed Middleton in any of the closings on the topic of what to do with closing documents that were used at the time of transaction. Middleton said that he was unable to produce any of the documents of explanation concerning the closings which he participated in for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. because he has no access to those files. Middleton identified the fact that in a circumstance in which a home had a mortgage and an assumption was called for, an assumption packet would be customarily ordered at the time of the request for assistance in the closing, which he refers to as an order. Middleton identifies the fact that he is only vaguely familiar with the transactions that are at issue in this Administrative Complaint. He thinks he may have closed some of them but he has no specific recollection about that. As a consequence, he has no worthwhile knowledge of how many of those transactions had assumption packages completed. COUNT I Samuel Hinson, Jr. owned property in Arbor Hills which he had bought from Collins Builders, Inc. on June 30, 1982. This house was taken in trade for a house on Starmount. This Starmount home was also purchased from Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. served as the real estate firm for the purchase of the new home as agent for the seller. Andrew Jackson Federal Savings financed the new purchase. The traded in home was sold to Tallahassee Properties with Capital Abstract and Title, Inc., serving as closing agent according to documents presented at hearing. Mr. Middleton did not appear for Capital Abstract at that closing. In the purchaser's closing statement, W. Ronnie Collins is shown as the representative for Tallahassee Properties. Two warranty deeds were made from Hinson in selling his Arbor Hill property. In deeding his Arbor Hill property on May 20, 1983, one of those went to the Respondent and the other to Tallahassee Properties. In both warranty deeds, the grantee promised to assume and pay an existing mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. The existing mortgage on the Arbor Hills property had the paragraph 17 clause which absent certain exceptions allowed Real Estate Financing, Inc. at its option to declare all sums secured by the mortgage to be immediately due and payable, if the property was sold or transferred without prior written consent from the lender. None of the exceptions pertained to this transaction between Hinson and either Respondent or Tallahassee Properties. The paragraph 17 clause also stated that the mortgage holder was considered to have waived its option to accelerate if prior to the sale or transfer, the mortgage holder reached agreement with the purchaser in writing that the credit of the purchaser was satisfactory to the mortgage holder, thus allowing the purchaser to become responsible for the mortgage. In that instance, interest payable on the sum secured by the mortgage would be at the rate requested by the mortgage holder. The mortgagor, Hinson, would be released from all obligations under the mortgage note if the purchaser was substituted on prior written approval. Hinson went into the transactions involving the sale of his Arbor Hill house and the purchase of the Starmount house with the impression that he had to sell the Arbor Hill house in order to purchase the Starmount house. This was his surmise. Money realized in the sale of the Arbor Hill house was used as a down payment for the Starmount home. Petitioner believed that he had an arrangement to purchase the Starmount home with Ralph Collins. In reality, he was purchasing the home from Collins Builders, Inc. with Collins and Associates, Inc. being the seller's broker. In Mr. Hinson's mind, Respondent and Collins Brothers, Inc. and the then Collins real estate firm through Century 21 were all the same. Going into the transaction, Hinson was not familiar with Tallahassee Properties and its business purpose. Respondent was at both closings, the closing to sell the Arbor Hill house and the closing to purchase the Starmount home. No one discussed the matter of the assumption of the mortgage associated with the Arbor Hills house during the course of the closing of that home. Hinson got the impression from events that Respondent had bought his Arbor Hills house and that everything was being paid off. This impression was not based upon anything Respondent said to him. Hinson, after the closings, requested his insurance company to write to First Alabama concerning the cancellation of his homeowners policy on Arbor Hills. His understanding was that the insurance company sent a letter to do this and that First Alabama sent back a letter saying that they needed certain information. That latter correspondence was then taken to the Respondent. Respondent, under those circumstances, stated to Hinson that it was a mistake and that he would handle it, but that it would take some time to get some of the paper work done. Respondent did not comment to Mr. Hinson on that occasion that he had not assumed the mortgage for the Arbor Hill property nor did he indicate that none of the companies with which he was affiliated had assumed the mortgage. Respondent made no comment whatsoever about assumption of the mortgage in this conversation shown by facts presented at hearing. Hinson then got a new payment book from First Alabama, which he received a couple of days after the insurance letter. This was taken to Respondent and Respondent said that he would take care of it, that it was just a mistake. Again, what was meant by this remark was not developed at hearing. Hinson got one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent that has been referred to previously. Having received this correspondence, Hinson complained to the Tallahassee Board of Realtors. Out of the process of his complaint, Hinson met with Keith Kinderman, Respondent's counsel and the Respondent together with Eric Hoffman, counsel to Hinson. Respondent told Hinson he would help get information and that his counsel, Mr. Kinderman would help in getting some form of restitution and help clear Hinson's name and seek relief from the Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. who had closed the Arbor Hill home. In attempting to obtain a Visa credit card and a Sears credit card, Hinson has been denied that credit. The reason given for the denial is the circumstance associated with the Arbor Hills home and non-payment of the mortgage. The exact circumstance of the Arbor Hills property, concerning who holds it now was not proven at hearing by evidence that can be relied upon for fact finding. COUNT II David P. Walsh and Leila DeJarnette Walsh, his wife bought a home in Huntington Woods from Collins Builders, Inc. on December 23, 1981. This home was financed through Real Estate Financing, Inc. and carried a mortgage from that lender. The mortgage included a paragraph 17 whose language was the same as the Hinson home financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Walshes traded in the Huntington Woods property for a home on Faversham Drive which was financed by Citizens and Southern Mortgage Company. Separate closings were conducted. One was for the sale of the Huntington Woods property with Respondent receiving a warranty deed for that property which property was to be taken over by Tallahassee Properties. The second closing was associated with the sale of the Faversham Drive property from Collins Builders, Inc. to the Walshes. In executing the warranty deed in favor of Respondent as grantee pertaining to the Huntington Woods property, a condition of the warranty deed was an agreement by the grantee to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. and pay Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. through some person other than Middleton was the closing agent at the transaction involving the sale of the Huntington Woods property, according to documents at the hearing. Both that sale and the purchase of the Faversham Drive property took place on March 30, 1983. The Walshes signed a document reference the escrow account held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. on its Huntington Woods property. There is no indication whether this was or was not signed by Tallahassee Properties or the Respondent and sent to the Real Estate Financing, Inc. pertaining to funds in the escrow account and insurance coverage being transferred from the Walshes to Tallahassee Properties or Respondent as contemplated by the form. The separate closing associated with the Faversham Drive property was done through Tallahassee Title Company. Respondent was at the closing associated with the homes. Mr. Walsh is not in a position to pay for mortgages on two homes. Mr. Walsh's understanding of the trade in of his Huntington Woods home for the Faversham Drive home was to the effect that he could buy a new home from the transaction and that he would no longer be liable for the traded home, that all paperwork would be taken care of. Some salesman involved in these transactions made these remarks to Mr. Walsh; however, he doesn't know who that person was. Consequently, it is not possible to attribute responsibility for those remarks to Respondent. Subsequent to the closings, the Walshes received correspondence purportedly from First Alabama having to do with Real Estate Financing, Inc.'s mortgage held on the Huntington Woods' property. This correspondence of April 4, 1983, by its terms, reminds the Walshes that the mortgage holder has received notification of cancellation of the homeowner's policy and that the Walshes were to provide insurance coverage at all times. What the real circumstances of the homeowners policy was is not proven by competent evidence. In connection with the transactions, Mr. Walsh describes that he felt that he was dealing with a reputable real estate broker and that they had his best interest in mind. He was not represented by counsel at the closings. Mr. Walsh received one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. Mr. Walsh hired a lawyer to try to address the situation of the Huntington Woods property without success in the endeavor. To his knowledge the Huntington Woods property has been foreclosed on. No proof which is competent has been presented in the hearing to describe the exact nature of the developments with the property. Nonetheless, Mr. Walsh has had problems receiving credit twice since that time. Before the situation with the property he had never had credit problems. Mr. Walsh was proceeding in these transactions on the basis on the belief that Tallahassee Properties and the Respondent were the same entities. COUNT III Troy A. Brewer and Tina J. Brewer, his wife purchased a home from Collins Builders, Inc. in Huntington Woods on December 30, 1981. This home was financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. A mortgage was given by the Brewers in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. and it included a paragraph 17 assumption clause as described in the Hinson mortgage financed by that lender. On March 25, 1983, the Brewers traded their Huntington Woods property for a home on Faringdon Drive. The seller of the Faringdon Drive property was Collins Builders, Inc. In these transactions, the Huntington Woods property was deeded to Respondent with the provisor in the warranty deed that Respondent would assume and agree to pay for the mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. Mr. Brewer is not in a position to meet mortgage payments associated with two mortgages; one on the Huntington Woods property and one on the Faringdon Drive property. Therefore, he would not knowingly obligate himself to assume mortgages associated with both of those properties. In the transactions associated with the traded property and new home purchased, Mr. Brewer proceeded on the basis that the first home was being taken over by the Respondent and that the mortgage would be paid off after a month or so as a means for him to purchase the second home. What led him to believe this is not clear. Mr. Brewer's recollection is that he was told that everything would be taken care of and he would not have to worry about anything and there wouldn't be any problems about the house being traded and that he could stay in the home that he was selling until the new home had been built and that once built, all transactions would be taken care of. Both the traded property and the property being purchased were financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. He was not represented by an attorney in these matters. Some undisclosed realtor had told Mr. Brewer he could have an attorney but that he really didn't need one. As shown in the testimony of Mr. Brewer given at hearing, he had spoken to Respondent at closing. He also had conversations with Jackie Collins whom he believed to be a representative of Respondent. Jackie Collins was understood by Mr. Brewer to be a realtor. Again, the exact nature of the affiliation of Jackie Collins to the Respondent or his companies was not established in this hearing. Mr. Brewer did state that at the closing he was told by Respondent that there would be no problems. The nature of that remark was not further developed under interrogation of the witness. Nor was the matter of Mr. Brewer's comment to the effect that he had questioned the fact that his first mortgage on the Huntington Woods home was not assumable and had made that question known at the closing, other than to state that in response "they" had assured him everything would be taken care of and he wouldn't have to worry about it. This was associated with some remarks to the effect that Mr. Brewer should not worry that "we" would take it all in and that "they" would transfer everything over and take it out of the Brewers' name, again not pursued as to who "they" and "we" were and whether Respondent was a "they" or "we" or was in attendance when a "they" or "we" made the comments if he was not a "they" or "we." On this subject, Mr. Brewer was of the understanding that the transfer of the mortgage from Mr. Brewer to Respondent had in fact been tentatively approved by Real Estate Financing, Inc. but this was not proven by competent proof either. Mr. Brewer received one of the February 8, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. He in turn composed a letter of complaint concerning the transactions associated with the traded property. The complaint is dated March 31, 1986 and is addressed "To whom it may concern". As a result of the non-payment of the Huntington Woods property, Mr. Brewer received a letter purportedly from First Alabama for Real Estate Financing, Inc. dated February 13, 1986 that indicated that payment for the mortgage in the Brewer property had not been paid in January and February, 1986 and under paragraph 18 of the mortgage, Mr. Brewer was being notified of the failure to make payments and the possibility of the pursuit of these delinquent payments through legal means. Whether the assertions in this unauthenticated hearsay document are true was not proven by competent evidence. Beyond that date, in an action in which Respondent and the Brewers were named as defendants, Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. obtained a Summary Final Judgment of foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property on June 1, 1988. This points out that the Brewers were not released from the mortgage obligation as envisioned by paragraph 17. It does not address what attempts were made by Respondent or his companies to gain their release. As a result of the foreclosure, Mr. Brewer has had problems with his credit. Notwithstanding the foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property, there has been no deficiency judgment entered against Mr. Brewer, to his knowledge. COUNT V On November 30, 1983, Collins Company of Pensacola, Inc. conveyed property at Eldorado Drive in Pensacola, Florida to Harold C. Miller, Jr., a Collins employee. That property was subject to a mortgage from Real Estate Financing, Inc. which included a paragraph 17 as included in the facts pertaining to the Hinson transaction involving that lender. This house was purchased because of a transfer of Mr. Miller to Pensacola as a condition of his employment with the Collins Company. The Collins Company of Pensacola was responsible for paying the mortgages during that time frame. In conversation with Respondent, it was determined that Miller would buy the house and the Respondent would buy it back and in the interim, Mr. Miller would live rent free. On May 23, 1985, a quit claim deed was executed by Mr. Miller in favor of the Respondent returning possession of the Pensacola home. Because Respondent had told Mr. Miller that Respondent would make payments on this home, Mr. Miller did not make any payments. Mr. Miller speaks of a contract that was in writing and was involved in the closing on the Pensacola home when it was purchased and that there was a promise to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Finance, Inc. This comment is made in a deposition of Mr. Miller which was entered as Exhibit 71 by the Petitioner. Whether this refers to an assumption by the Respondent or someone else is not clear. As pointed out by the deposition testimony, more importantly, this contract was not produced then and is not available now for consideration in the deliberation of this case. Mr. Miller bought another house from Collins Construction in Leon County which is at Foxcroft. At the time of the deposition it was occupied by Susan, Mr. Miller's wife. Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued the Respondent and Harold C. Miller, Jr. and Susan F. Miller, his wife, in a foreclosure associated with the Pensacola property and received a Final Judgement for foreclosure on May 11, 1988. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. By the circumstances, Mr. Miller was persuaded that the Respondent would take care of the mortgage on the Pensacola home until it was paid off. What the payment history was on the mortgage prior to foreclosure has not been established in this record. In terms of any promises from Respondent about further obligations on the mortgage on the Pensacola home, Mr. Miller describes that Respondent never told him that he was relieved of that obligation or that he wasn't. Mr. Miller did not question the Respondent about this because he trusted him. COUNT VI On September 25, 1981, Collins Builders, Inc. sold a home to Peter A. Hartmann at Grantham Lane in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Hartmann borrowed money from Real Estate Financing, Inc. to purchase that home secured by a mortgage that included paragraph 17 the language of which is the same as in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. That property was subsequently deeded to Respondent on March 25, 1983. In the deed Respondent as grantee promises to assume and pay the Real Estate Financing, Inc. mortgage on the property. The Hartmann property upon which Real Estate Financing, Inc. held a mortgage was foreclosed upon in a suit by Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. against Respondent and in Peter A. Hartmann. Action was taken by order of court on May 3, 1988 and the property sold on May 27, 1988 as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Second Judicial Court in and for Leon County, Florida. This points out that Mr. Hartmann was not released form the mortgage obligation. There is a potential for a deficiency judgement against Mr. Hartmann following that sale. The details of the Hartmann transaction were not presented at hearing through his testimony or anyone else. COUNT VII On April 22, 1982, Collins Builders, Inc., sold John A. Miller and Jeanne B. Miller, his wife, a home in Lakewood Estates. That home was secured by a mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. It contained a paragraph 17 which had the language set out in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. which has been described. The home at Lakewood Estates was traded for a home in Huntington Woods II. Those transactions took place on March 2, 1984, and on that date the Millers executed a deed to Ralco, Inc., one of Respondent's companies. The warranty deed contained language to the effect that Ralco, Inc. promised to pay on the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. Bobbie G. May signed the contract for sales and purchase as representative of Ralco, Inc. The Huntington Woods II property that was bought by the Millers was bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with Bobbie G. May serving as representative for Collins Builders, Inc. in the contract for sale and purchase. The payments were not made as promised by Ralco, Inc. and Respondent sent the Millers one of the February 18, 1986 letters as previously described. Ultimately, Florida National Mortgage Association through Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued Ralco, Inc. and the Millers in foreclosure and obtained a summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure against those defendants. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. This as with other foreclosures does not speak to attempts by Ralco, Inc. to be allowed to assume the mortgages in a novation. The property at Lakewood Estates which had been traded in was then sold June 28, 1988, as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida. That judgment against the Millers is shown on the credit report of John Henry Miller. Mrs. Miller understood that the mortgage payments on the traded home would be made until the property was sold by Ralco, Inc. Visits to the neighborhood where that traded home was found did not indicate any activities toward the sale by way of for sale signs. No one was living in the traded home at that time. The Millers were not represented by counsel during the course of the closings associated with the two homes. They were represented in the foreclosures suit. In reference to the credit circumstance of the Millers, in trying to buy a vehicle they had been denied credit once. They were eventually able to buy the vehicle. The Millers had been told when purchasing the initial home at Lakewood Estates that the reason for buying it would be the possibility of being able to trade for a larger home at some later date if needed. Again, it is not clear who made those statements to the Millers. On the day before the closing of the traded home, Mrs. Miller spoke with Sissie Collins whom she understood to be affiliated with Respondent or one of his companies. The record does not show what that affiliation would have been, if anything. In this conversation with Sissie Collins, Mrs. Miller pointed out to Ms. Collins that the loan with Real Estate Financing, Inc. was not assumable without qualifying. Moreover, Mrs. Miller believed that Respondent did not qualify for the loan and that it was not assumable unless he did. Sissie Collins stated that this was not a problem and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. or First Alabama allowed Respondent to assume a mortgage and make the payments until the property was sold and the mortgage was paid off and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was fully aware of the circumstance. Whether this was true or not was not proven by competent evidence. What Respondent knew about these matters wasn't shown either. At the time of hearing, the Millers had not been called upon to pay any deficiencies associated with the foreclosure of their Lakewood Estates property. COUNT VIII Eric R. Larsen and Young Oak Larsen, his wife, purchased a home from a Collins Company in Huntington Woods Unit II. That house was eventually traded for a home in Cross Creek. The traded home was deeded to Respondent with the promise that Respondent would assume an existing mortgage on the Huntington Woods Unit II property which is owed to Andrew Jackson State Savings and Loan Association and make payments. The closing associated with the traded property took place on December 2, 1982. The new home was being purchased through the same lending institution as the traded home. The Larsens were not represented in the closings associated with the traded home and the purchased home. The closing of the traded home took place in offices of the Respondent's business. The second closing for the purchased home took place at the Andrew Jackson Federal Savings. When Mr. Larsen asked why the deed for his Huntington Woods II property was being made to the Respondent, he was told that it was to facilitate the assumption of the mortgage. By his remarks, Mr. Larsen is not clear on whether the Respondent attended the closing associated with the traded property. He does recall someone whose name is Chip who he thought was the real estate broker who worked with Respondent was at the closing. No further indication of who this man named Chip might be as to association with Respondent or his companies was shown in this record. The Larsens received a February 18, 1986 letter from Respondent as previously described, when the problems occurred about payments for the traded property, and at that time the mortgage was shown as being held by Colonial Mortgage Company. Mr. Larsen also received a letter on April 8, 1987, purportedly from Colonial Mortgage Company, which states that Mr. Larsen is not released from liability on the traded property and some comment about assumption packages having been sent on various dates and reminds Mr. Larsen that the loan could not be assumed without the prospective purchaser's credit having been approved. The letter describes other perceptions about the ability of the Respondent to take over responsibility for the mortgage on the traded property. All of the matters set out in this unauthenticated correspondence are hearsay and they cannot form the basis of fact-finding in terms of whether Respondent or his companies were ever allowed to assume the mortgage on the traded property. People who had a direct knowledge of the mortgage circumstance with Colonial Mortgage Company pertaining to this traded property as with other traded property on which a lender held mortgages and sent letters have not been presented to explain that circumstance by competent evidence. Likewise, the outcome of what has happened with the traded property in the Larsen transaction has not been proven by competent evidence. The explanation of the outcome with that property is hearsay which may not be used as a basis for fact finding. COUNT IX Robert R. and Patricia A. Aubin, husband and wife, traded property under the program which Respondent was affiliated with for taking in one residence and selling another. Mr. Aubin thought that this kind of transaction was common and that led to his telling his financing institution that the same builder was taking back the original home in order to build Mr. Aubin another house, thinking that this might simplify the transaction. In speaking to someone about the obligation to deal with the existing mortgage on the traded property, he identifies the person he was talking to as Ed Hines. Again, it is not clear what Mr. Hines' association was with the Respondent and his companies. The traded home was going to be given to Tallahassee Properties. Mr. Aubin was not certain of the arrangement Respondent had with his individual companies. Ultimately, there was a problem with the payments on the house that had been traded in. Respondent wrote the Aubins one of the February 18, 1986 letters reference the property at Huntington Woods Unit I. An arrangement was being made whereby Real Estate Financing, Inc. received $3,704.48 from Ralco, Inc. by a check of June 26, 1986. That check was issued after Ralco, Inc. conveyed the traded property back to the Aubins on June 17, 1986 and this resolved the problem for the Aubins.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-3850 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed fact-finding offered by the parties. PETITIONER'S FACTS Paragraph 1 is utilized. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. 4-5. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are set out in the findings of fact. 6-10. Paragraphs 6-10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 has not been proven. Paragraph 12 is correct in terms of Hinson's decision to convey the property; however, what Hinson was allowed to believe concerning the matter of assumption as it might show culpability on the part of the Respondent has not been proven. This matter set forth in paragraph 13 has not been proven. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 15 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 16 has not been proven as to any financial losses due to dishonest acts or false promises of the Respondent. Hinson was found to have been denied credit cards. The latter sentence in paragraph 16 is speculation and not fact. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 18 in the suggestion that the Respondent through his real estate office and salesmen made representations and promises to the Walshes was not proven in the sense that persons involved with the Walshes and the transaction to trade in the home were not sufficiently identified to understand how those persons were affiliated with the Respondent. Paragraph 19 is accepted as to the documents and promises by the Respondent. Again, what the association was of the other person identified as the salesman may have been is not clear in this transaction. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 21 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 is not proven in the first sentence. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 23 was not proven. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found except in its suggestion that the Walshes had been deceived in the sense of the idea of the mortgage not having been assumed or attempts made to have it assumed. Paragraph 26 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to facts found except as it identifies the nature of the salesperson and what the affiliation was with Collins and Associates insufficient proof was made to show the true nature of the position of the salesperson in Collins and Associates, Inc., if any, and what Respondent had in mind and any instructions to this person who was reportedly the salesperson. Paragraph 29 is subordinate to facts found as to promises in the document system responsibilities of Respondent. Otherwise it is not accepted. Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found except as to its suggestion that deceit has been proven relating to the Respondent's attempts to have the mortgage assumed. Paragraph 31 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found except as to the suggestion that this problem of the foreclosure dissolved the marriage. Paragraph 35 in its first sentence is contrary to the Impression of the facts. There was a discussion and a decision reached to buy the house, whether Respondent was acting as a real estate broker individually or as a builder developer is unclear. Whether he made his employee buy the house or directed him to is not accepted as a fact. Paragraph 36 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 37 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 38 was not proven on the issue of whether Respondent applied for an assumption. The Final Judgment of closure was proven. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found in a suggestion of an agreement to take over the Huntington Woods property. Reference to the allegations and the foreclosure petition are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute and do not constitute an explanation of how Respondent may have carried out his promise to take over responsibilities for the mortgage and the traded property which is the true issue. Likewise, paragraph 42 where it is acknowledged in that suit the agreement to assume the mortgage does not answer the issue of whether attempts were made to bring about that assumption. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 44 and its suggestion as to any intended action on the part of a mortgage insurer has not been proven by competent evidence. Paragraph 45 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 47 in the suggestion of activities by a salesperson of Collins and Associates has not been shown in terms of the affiliation with the Respondent's companies or with the Respondent in terms of the details of that affiliation sufficient to show that Respondent is culpable for any acts of his employees. Respondent through Ralco, Inc. had agreed to assume and pay for the existing mortgage on the traded property. Paragraph 48 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 49 is subordinate to facts found. Suggestion by counsel that Respondent's admission of 86 coincide with the fact finding in paragraph 50 is erroneous as is reference to page 11 in the transcript which speaks of the admissions. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found with the exception that the Respondent was not shown to have been deceitful in saying that the mortgage had not been allowed for assumption in that no competent proof was offered as to the attitude of the lender concerning the assumption. Paragraph 53 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 54 is correct in terms of the credit report on foreclosure, otherwise it is rejected as heresay. Paragraph 55 is inaccurate when it suggests that proof was made that Respondent did not take care of the assumption in the Larsen trade-in property. Paragraph 56 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 57 constitutes legal argument. RESPONDENT'S FACTS 1-7. Paragraphs 1-7 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence of Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. The remaining sentences within paragraph 8 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 9 is subordinate to facts found. In paragraph 10, Charles Middleton was not shown to have been the closing agent for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. in the transactions which are at issue here. In paragraph 11, Respondent was responsible for applying for the mortgage assumptions but the proof was not made that he did not do so or that he did. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 14 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 15 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 16 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 19 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 20 is not accepted. Paragraph 21 is not accepted. Paragraph 22 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23 is not relevant. Paragraph 24 is the reputation of the Respondent is only relevant if culpability has been shown. It has not been. 25. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 26 is not accepted in terms of what position Chip Miller held and what capacity he was acting in when involved in the Hinson transaction as employee of Collins and Associates, or Tallahassee Properties or exactly what capacity. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 29 is heresay and not accepted. Paragraph 30 is contrary to the impression of the credit circumstance of Mr. Hinson. Whatever the current credit report may say, Mr. Hinson's credit had been hurt. Paragraph 31 is true. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to the facts found except for deprivation of credit. Paragraph 33 is not necessary to the resolution of dispute. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 35 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 36 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 37 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 38 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 42 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found, except in its suggestion of what capacity Sissie Collins really served which is not established. Paragraph 44 is subordinate to facts found, except not proven that mortgage assumption tentatively approved. He did make representations as the mortgage grantee. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 47 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 48 is contrary to facts found. There is no paragraph 49. Paragraph 50 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found. 53.-55. Paragraphs 53-55 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 56 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 57 is subordinate. Paragraph 58 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 59 is subordinate to the facts found. 60.-62 Paragraphs 60-62 are subordinate to the facts found. 63.-64. Paragraphs 63-64 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 65 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 66 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 67 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 68 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 69 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 70 is subordinate to the facts found. 71.-72. Paragraphs 71-72 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 73 in the first sentence is subordinate to the facts found. The second sentence has to do with whether Andrew Jackson gave preliminary approval for the assumption of the mortgage on the traded property and is heresay not accepted. Paragraph 74 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 75 is subordinate to the facts found. 76.-77. Paragraphs 76 and 77 are accepted as true but are not needed. 78.-79. Paragraphs 78-79 are subordinate to the facts found. 80. In this instance and all that have discussed before, Respondent did make representations through the February 18, 1986 letters. 81-82. Paragraphs 81-82 are subordinate to facts found. 83. Paragraph 83 is subordinate to facts found. 84.-85. Paragraphs 84-85 are subordinate to facts found. Suggestion that the paragraph 86 relates back to initial paragraphs is acknowledged and accepted in the manner that has been described in the discussion at the paragraphs set forth in the proposed fact finding. Paragraph 87 is legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR-Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32817 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Eaton, Davis, Marks, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Keith Kinderman, Esquire 906 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
