The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether respondent committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Carmalita Thomas, was licensed as a registered nurse in the State of Florida, license number RN 1329552. From November 11, 1987, to September 1988, respondent was employed as an independent contractor by Hi-Tech Medical Services, Inc., (the Agency), a comprehensive health maintenance organization. Pursuant to the terms of her employment, respondent was responsible for the Agency's pediatric program, and was to provide skilled nursing visits in homes where ill or disabled persons were receiving care from the Agency. Regarding compensation, their agreement provided: The Contractor will be paid for Agency authorized visits. The Agency will not pay nor be responsible for visits rendered or expense incurred due to the Contractor's execution of unauthorized visits. The Agency will pay the Contractor 30 days after receipt of a statement reflecting number of authorized visits rendered during the previous period at the prevailing rate of 22/27 per visit. The Contractor will prepare and submit a written clinical report for each visit in keeping with Agency policy and requirements. The Agency's written policy regarding the preparation and submittal of written clinical reports required, for verification of visits and billing purposes, that respondent, for each visit, prepare and sign a written nurses progress report. Respondent was aware of this policy, but did not consistently present such reports with her billing form by which she received her compensation. Notwithstanding such failures the Agency routinely paid respondent upon presentation of her billing form. During the period of May 23, 1988, through June 17, 1988, respondent prepared and signed four progress notes reflecting nursing care rendered to pediatric patient Jessica Metzel, and submitted a billing form to the Agency for payment at $27.00 per visit. Respondent was compensated by the Agency, who in turn billed the patient's insurance carrier for the services. While requesting and receiving payment for four visits, the proof demonstrates that respondent was only at the Metzel residence on two occasions. The first occasion was to have Jessica's father sign some paper work, and the occasion was to insure that the family was satisfied with the respiratory therapist that was treating Jessica. At no time did respondent examine or otherwise treat Jessica, and the progress notes prepared by respondent were a fabrication. Respondent also submitted billing forms to the Agency on at least two occasions, which resulted in her being compensated twice for the same working hours. More particularly, respondent billed the agency in December 1987, and was paid, for having worked from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. (3 hours) on December 21, 1987, and from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m. (4 1/2 hours) on December 24, 1987. Thereafter, by separate billing, she also billed the Agency, and was paid, for services purportedly rendered from 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (3 1/2 hours) on December 21, 1987, and from 10:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. (3 1/2 hours) on December 24, 1987.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of having violated the provisions of Section 464.018(1)(d) and (f), Florida Statutes, as heretofore found in the conclusions of law, and that respondent's license be suspended for 90 days, followed by a two (2) year term of probation upon such terms and conditions as the Board of Nursing deems appropriate. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of February 1991. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February 1991.
The Issue Whether or not Respondent's nursing home administrator's license may be disciplined by reprimand, fine, restriction, suspension; or revocation for acts alleged in the administrative: complaint, specifically the alleged violations of Sections 400.022(1)(d), 400.162(1)and (2), 468.1755(1)(e), 468.1755(1)(g), 468.1755(I)(k), and 468.1755(1)(m) Florida Statutes (1983), and Rules 10D-29.104 and 10D-29.118(1) Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Respondent held Florida nursing home administrator's license number 0001557. She is also a registered nurse. She has worked in a variety of positions at various institutions in Florida, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey since 1963, including head nurse, assistant director of nurses, director of nurses, research nurse supervisor, assistant supervisor medical review team, assistant administrator of a nursing home, and administrator of a nursing home. The date she acquired Florida licensure as a nursing home administrator was not established, but it is clear her license has never before been the subject of disciplinary action. Her reputation as a nursing home administrator is outstanding, and in this capacity, she had been the recipient of numerous awards and commendations both prior to and since the incidents giving rise to the administrative complaint herein. Petitioner's argument that the documents in support of Respondent's character and ability which were written in late 1984 and in 1985 are not credible because the writers did not know of the incidents giving rise to the administrative complaint is not persuasive, as it is apparent from the evidence as a whole that the events giving rise to the administrative complaint were a topic of conversation in the community at least by October, 1984. From January 1979 until October 1984, Respondent, who is 46, held the position of nursing home administrator at Heritage Health Care Center, Inc. (HHCC) in Naples, Florida. HHCC is a skilled nursing facility providing services to medicare, medicaid, and private pay patients. Clarence Berylyoung was a 78 year old private pay patient admitted to HHCC on July 21, 1983. His medical records reveal he was hospitalized briefly in October 1983 with a diagnosis of a stroke of unknown severity and organic brain syndrome. Respondent helped transport him to the hospital and back to the nursing home. It is not clear whether Respondent's accompaniment of Berylyoung at that time was part of Respondent's duties as HHCC nursing home administrator or as a result of a close personal relationship which had grown up between Respondent and Berylyoung. According to Ann Heusser, HHCC's current Director of Nursing Services and formerly its Day Supervisor, Berylyoung became more forgetful and harder to deal with after his hospitalization than he had been before and was confused and forgetful immediately afterwards. However, the medical records indicate Berylyoung was alert and had a stronger gait at the time of discharge on January 23, 1984. During his stay at HHCC, Berylyoung and Respondent did develop a close personal relationship; her part in which she described as "that of a good neighbor" or as providing companionship. She checked on his clothes daily. She talked to him when she saw him. At his request, she purchased beer and other items for him outside the facility. Because he had no family close by, she took him outside the facility occasionally at mealtimes and otherwise provided transportation for him to places he might wish to go. It is not clear at what precise dates but apparently while Berylyoung was still a patient at HHCC, and therefore prior to January 23, 1984; Respondent transported Berylyoung to a local attorney's office. While there, but without Respondent's prior knowledge, Berylyoung named Respondent as a beneficiary in his will. At this visit, or perhaps earlier, Berylyoung signed a "power of attorney" permitting Respondent to handle his affairs. Neither the will nor the power of attorney was offered in evidence and no timeframe was established by which the execution of these documents can be related to Berylyoung's October 1983 stroke or his subsequent discharge. Further, there is no evidence whatsoever that Respondent entered the attorney's office, let alone that she influenced Berylyoung then or at any time to make these decisions. While Berylyoung was still a resident of the nursing home; Respondent used this power of attorney to transfer, at Berylyoung's request, approximately $25,000 to $30,000 of his funds from an Ohio bank to a Naples, Florida bank. She also used it to help him sell a trailer and a motor vehicle. There is no evidence that Respondent misused or mismanaged the funds or the sale or performed any act Berylyoung had not instructed her to do. No evidence established any timeframe by which these transactions can be accurately related to Berylyoung's stroke. As a private pay patient at HHCC, Berylyoung received no state or federal funds toward his care. His bill was approximately $1800 to $2,000 per month during his stay. He became dissatisfied with HHCC and wished to move out. After several months, he persuaded Respondent that without her help he would have no chance of ever leaving HHCC. She agreed that he could temporarily move into her home with herself, her husband, her two children, and her mother-in-law. Berylyoung was discharged on January 23, 1984. There is no evidence that the move was other than at Berylyoung's request or that Respondent persuaded, encouraged, or coerced Berylyoung to move from HHCC. Berylyoung stayed at Respondent's home until approximately February 24 or 25, 1984; when she placed him temporarily in a motel. He stayed at the motel for approximately five days, where Respondent checked on him 3-4 times a day and others did likewise. Respondent then helped him find an apartment and get settled and thereafter did occasional grocery shopping and housekeeping for him and generally maintained the friendly relationship they had established until August 26, 1985. Despite speculation by HHCC's Director of Dietary Services, Susan Gentry, as to why the move to the motel may have been desired by Respondent, there is no direct credible evidence that Berylyoung's move to his own apartment was other than at Berylyoung's own request or by mutual agreement. Respondent signed Berylyoung's name to a form indicating receipt of his medications (P-1A). This was done at the time of Berylyoung's discharge on January 23, 1984, at his request, and while Respondent still possessed the power of attorney to act for him. At the time it was signed, Berylyoung, with his medications, was moving into Respondent's home on a temporary basis. This falls short of establishing that Respondent had Berylyoung released into her custody. HHCC also uses a document titled "Standard Admission Record and Agreement" (P-1, page 1). It is divided into two parts. The top portion of a single page is filled out when a patient is admitted to HHCC. At the bottom of the page is a portion designed to elicit discharge information. In this bottom portion, under the date of discharge of 1-23-84, Respondent wrote, "Living by himself--no address." However, Respondent testified that she made this entry not on the date of discharge when she knew Berylyoung would be living with her for awhile but later in 1984 while Berylyoung was temporarily living in a motel with no permanent address, that her purpose in filling in this information at that time was to update the records; and that the statement was true when she wrote it. Neither Mrs. Heusser nor any other witness could state that this information was false when written by the Respondent or even when it was written by the Respondent. Respondent also admits filling in the "agency referral" line at the bottom of a document titled, "Discharge Summary" and dated "1-23-84" at its top. (P-1; page 3). Respondent admits that on the agency referral line she wrote in, "Living by himself at his request. Will follow up as needed. Ann Martin." Respondent claims that despite the 1-23-84 date at the top of the page, this line was added by her as a follow-up after Mr. Berylyoung left her home. Respondent asserts, and Mrs. Heusser confirms, that standard operating procedure at HHCC is that these discharge summaries usually are signed after a patient has been discharged and after a patient has actually left the facility. Mrs. Heusser specifically did not know whether this information added by Respondent was accurate when Respondent wrote it but she did not find it odd or unusual that Respondent would add more to this page as much as 2 to 3 weeks after actual discharge of any patient. Based on the testimony and evidence as a whole, Respondent's explanation that her notations on both the "Standard Admission Record and Agreement" and the "Discharge Summary" would normally be made, and in fact were actually made, by her after the patient's discharge and not on the date of discharge is entirely credible. Moreover, her adding her signature to the agency referral line of the Discharge Summary does not, under these circumstances, indicate an attempt to mislead; falsify, or defraud, so much as it suggests an attempt to indicate who had made this note and that she, Respondent, and not Berylyoung, had filled in this portion of the "Discharge Summary." On May 7, 1984, Berylyoung's outstanding bill of $1,386.90 was written off by HHCC. Attached to the write-off slip was a form collection letter dated February 29, 1984, (5 days after he had left Respondent's home), signed by Respondent on behalf of HHCC, and addressed to Berylyoung at Respondent's home address, 3101 Buena Vista Lane, Naples, Florida 33942. This form collection letter was attached as support for the write-off. (Composite P-2). Typed on the write-off slip itself was the notation, "Funds depleted. Does not qualify for state aid due mobile trailer. Present address unknown. (Discharged due to lack of funds.)" The slip was prepared by someone other than Respondent and how the information concerning lack of funds appeared is not explained. However; it may be reasonably concluded that the notation concerning Berylyoung's unknown address resulted indirectly from the previous notations made by Respondent on the "Standard Admission Record and Agreement"; on the "Discharge Summary," and on her signature on the February 29 letter. Unlike the admission and discharge documents which either require a physician's signature or are otherwise part of a patient's medical chart and so may be classified as "medical records," the debt write-off slip is not a part of a patient's medical records as that term is normally understood. The write off slip is merely a financial or business record of HHCC. This finding is consistent with Rules lOD-29.104 and lOD-29.118(1) Florida Administrative Code. Respondent signed and approved the write-off slip in her capacity as HHCC's nursing home administrator; and Respondent in fact knew where Berylyoung was living (in his own apartment) at the time she signed his financial write-off slip. Approval of these write-off slips is a routine duty and the Berylyoung slip was one of 18-20 such slips Respondent signed on the same day. Upon the foregoing scenario and Respondent's acknowledgement that she is responsible for financial documents she signs in her professional capacity, it is found that Respondent knew the address of Berylyoung when she signed the financial write-off slip but still approved the write-off of his account at least partially on the ground that his present address was unknown. While this falls short of fraud or falsification, it does constitute negligence and incompetence. Respondent did not know until approximately May; 1984 that the Department of Professional Regulation viewed the holding of a power of attorney by an employee of a nursing home to be the type of conduct subject to license discipline. By that time, she had already turned over all of Berylyoung's money to him and torn up the power of attorney. There was no evidence adduced at formal hearing that Respondent's actions resulted in HHCC being charged by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services with violations of Sections 400.022(1)(d) and 400.162(1) and (2) Florida Statutes and Rules lOD-29.104 and lOD-29.118(1) Florida Administrative Code as alleged in paragraph 6 of the administrative complaint. Without such proof, these allegations remain unproven and no harm to HHCC has been established except that it may be "out" $1,386.90. Even that loss, if it occurred, was not established by clear and convincing evidence because it was never clearly established that Berylyoung, if located prior to May 7, 1984, could have paid the $1,386.90. His $25;000-30 000 in the bank plus the proceeds of the sale of his car and trailer, would seem to suggest that at some earlier point in time Berylyoung's finances would have permitted payment to HHCC but no accurate timeframe for these events was established at formal hearing. There is no evidence of record that Berylyoung's health or safety were threatened or impaired by Respondent's influence or actions. Neither Mrs. Heusser, a nurse, nor Miss Gentry, a dietician, who were in the best position to have personally observed Berylyoung's condition, described a patient in danger. Ann Heusser described an elderly man who was alert most of the time, sometimes forgetful as to when he had had his last beer, sometimes belligerent, and who frequently threatened to leave HHCC because he was dissatisfied. All the nursing services did with respect to him is pass out his medication and keep a tight rein on his liquor. They reminded him to wear clean clothes and to feed himself but he could feed himself. He was on a regular diet according to Miss Gentry. His records indicate an intermediate level of care with the need to sometimes clean up loose stools. While he was in her home, Respondent prepared his meals and bathed the man, as did her mother-in-law and friend when Respondent was not there. Her activities with regard to Berylyoung's care at the motel and in his apartment are related supra. Respondent's testimony that Berylyoung was never harmed physically by his discharge is the only factual evidence of his condition after discharge. No other witness observed him after discharge. Mr. John Patrick; Jr.; the current nursing home administrator of HHCC was qualified as an expert witness in nursing home administration and stated that for a nursing home administrator to deliberately falsify medical records of a patient is considered misconduct in the practice of nursing home administration: that falsification of a patient's billing information by the nursing home administrator is considered misconduct in the practice of nursing home administration; and that it is, in Mr. Patrick's personal opinion, misconduct in the practice of nursing home administration for the administrator to falsify information on a patient's write-off slip. He also testified that he knew of no negligence or incompetence of Respondent. This type of "expert" opinion testimony is of negligible value because it invades the province of the trier of fact, because it requires conclusions of law; and because it assumes that "falsification" has been established; which it has not. The undersigned specifically finds no falsification has been established by the evidence adduced at formal hearing. (See findings of fact paragraphs 10-14 and legal determinations in the following conclusions of law concerning falsification versus negligence.) Moreover, with regard to Mr. Patrick's testimony as a whole, his misunderstanding of certain key elements of the allegations against Respondent and of much of the evidence adduced at formal hearing, his unfamiliarity with the statutes, rules, and standards of nursing home administration and what constitutes a medical record, his reluctance to specify "misconduct", his effort to substitute the word "inappropriate" for "misconduct", his desire to distinguish between his personal and professional opinions until after the Methot proffer, and his present close ties with HHCC greatly diminish the weight, credibility, and probative value of his testimony for establishing either existing standards of the profession of nursing home administration or any deviation by Respondent from such standards. Respondent is presently the director of nursing at Bentley Retirement Village, Inc. It is apparent from the testimony of Ray Smith, Executive Director and Vice-President of Bentley Village and one who works with Respondent on a daily basis; that despite any cloud which may have attached to Respondent as a result of the events giving rise to the instant proceedings, Respondent's reputation in the community for being an efficient and responsible nursing home administrator and for personal veracity has not been impaired. Mr. Smith is not qualified as an expert in the standards of nursing home administration since he has no education, training, experience, or license in that profession. Indeed, he was not tendered as an expert on such standards, however, the undersigned has carefully observed the candor and demeanor of all witnesses in this cause and finds Mr. Smith's testimony as to reputation and character to be entirely credible. His admitted desire to appoint Respondent, due to her qualifications and abilities, to the post of nursing home administrator for Bentley's newly authorized addition does not diminish the value of his testimony for reputation, character, and mitigation purposes since he is fully aware of all the charges and their basis. Professional reputation and character testimony is admissible in mitigation. Indeed, as to reputation; Mr. Smith's opinion is entirely corroborated by Petitioner's expert witness, John Patrick, who recommended Respondent for a job as a new nursing home administrator in Cape Coral during the course of the events which led up to these proceedings and by letters of commendation received by Respondent after these events. Respondent has never-acted as a trustee, conservator; or guardian for Clarence Berylyoung.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing Home Administration enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of simple negligence and incompetence within Section 468.1755(1)(g) in signing the write-off slip, reprimanding her therefor, and dismissing all other charges. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1986.
The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) whether the deficiency alleged as a result of a Complaint Survey conducted on June 18, 2002, is appropriately classified as a Class I deficiency; (2) whether a fine in the amount of $10,000 is appropriate; (3) whether the "Conditional" licensure status, issued October 29, 2002, is warranted; and (4) whether the alleged violation constitutes grounds for a six-month survey requirement and $6,000 survey fee.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, AHCA was the state agency responsible for evaluating nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Section 400.23(7), Florida Statutes. As such, in the instant case it is required to conduct a complaint evaluation of nursing homes in Florida in accordance with Section 400.23(8), Florida Statutes (2000). AHCA's evaluation of Florida nursing homes requires an assignment of a rating of standard or conditional to each licensee. In addition to its regulatory duties under Florida law, AHCA is the state "survey agency," which, on behalf of the federal government, monitors nursing homes that receive Medicaid or Medicare funds. Carrollwood Care Center is a nursing home located at 15002 Hutchinson Road, Tampa, Florida, and is duly-licensed under Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes. On June 18, 2002, a complaint investigation survey was conducted at Carrollwood by Pamela Mraz, a surveyor for AHCA, who visited the Carrollwood facility to inquire into the death of Resident 1 that occurred on May 5, 2002. Ms. Mraz is a registered nurse (RN) with over 20 years of nursing experience, including having served as a director of nursing and having completed more than 100 surveys of long-term care facilities. She has been a surveyor for AHCA since September 2001. During the course of her complaint survey of the facility, Ms. Mraz examined the facility's records pertaining to Resident 1's death. Her review indicated that the death of Resident 1 constituted failure to meet the standards set-up under Tag F324, as identified on the Form 2567-L of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Health Care Financing Administration. The parties refer to this form as the HCFA 2567-L or the "2567." The 2567 is the document used to charge nursing homes with deficiencies that violate applicable law. The 2567 identified each alleged deficiency by reference to a tag number. Each tag on the 2567 includes a narrative description of the allegations against Carrollwood and cites a provision of the relevant rule or rules in the Florida Administrative Code violated by the alleged deficiency. To protect the privacy of nursing home residents, the 2567 and this Recommended Order refer to the resident by a number (i.e., Resident 1) rather than by the name of the resident. AHCA must assign a class rating of I, II or III to any deficiency that it identifies during a survey. The rating reflects the severity of the identified deficiency, with Class I being the most severe and Class III being the least severe deficiency. There is one tag, Tag F324, at issue in the instant case, and, as a result of the complaint survey of June 18, 2002, AHCA assigned Tag F324 a Class I deficiency rating. Tag F324, reflecting the requirement of 42 C.F.R. Chapter 483.25(h)(2), requires a facility to ensure that each resident receives adequate supervision and assistance devices to prevent accidents. AHCA's witness, Ms. Mraz, was asked her opinion only regarding the facility's compliance with the requirements of Tag F324. She opined that Carrollwood did not provide adequate supervision and assistance devices to prevent the accidental death of Resident 1. Resident 1's first admission to Carrollwood was on March 27, 2002. He was 89 years of age at the time of his admission, weighted 118 pounds and was 5'3" in height. He did not speak English. His initial screening assessment form reflected that he suffered with both short-term and long-term memory impairment, incontinency, decubitus ulcer, prostate cancer, malnutrition, heart problems, and was determined by Carrollwood's staff to be "bedfast" (in bed not less than 22 hours per day). Resident 1's range of motion was limited to his hands, arms and legs. Even though he could make occasional slight changes in body or extremity positions, he was unable to make frequent or significant body changes independently. Resident 1 was incapable of getting out of bed on his own, had no involuntary body movements, and required two persons to physically assist him in bed mobility. He could not use a wheel chair and experienced short periods of restlessness demonstrated by crying out in Spanish, his native language. Carrollwood's Fall Risk Assessment observation indicated that Resident 1 was virtually immobile and was, therefore, a minimum risk for falls. His assessment and care plan were adequate for his condition and comfort. Resident 1 was placed in a semi-private room with his wife. A curtain between the beds separated them. Viewed from the foot of Resident 1's bed, his wife's bed would be to the left of his bed. On the right side of his bed, an upper half side rail was placed as an enabler. On April 17, 2002, three weeks after his admission, Resident 1 was discharged to the hospital due to an increase in his temperature and congestion. On April 30, 2002, he returned from the hospital and was readmitted to Carrollwood. At this time, his second admission, he was assessed by Carrollwood's staff to be in a much weaker condition than at his initial admission, with additional diagnoses of sepsis, pneumonia, psychosis, anemia, depression and malnutrition. Upon his second admission to Carrollwood, his assessment determination changed, and Resident 1 was classified as "bed-bound," as opposed to the prior assessment of bedfast, and he required extensive assistance, at least two persons to physically assist in transferring and dressing him with use of the upper bed side rail as enablers. The doctors' notes made in conjunction with the second admission did not include the use of upper side rails as in-bed enablers. The Nurse Evaluation Assessment, dated May 1, 2002, reported that Resident 1 was completely dependent on staff for all his daily living activities, i.e., bathing, grooming, dressing, feeding, and toileting, because he could not do these functions for himself. His Resident Care Plan reflected that he had a "potential for falls due to decreased cognition and physical mobility." His bed was lowered, the head of his bed was elevated, a second mattress was added, and a pneumatic call bell was attached. With knowledge of his updated medical history and further weakened condition, the nursing staff made an independent decision to use one upper bed side rail on Resident 1's bed. The staff had received a Food and Drug Administration alert regarding potential dangers resulting from the use of side rails as recently as February 2002, and had participated in in- service training sessions concerning the use of side rails. AHCA presented no evidence of authoritative directives for "the care giver's use of side rails" in long-term care facilities. There was no evidence of statutory proscriptions, rules or accepted industry standards relating to the use of side rails in long-term care facilities. Therefore, each long-term care facility, including Carrollwood, may independently determine when, where, how and under what circumstances bed side rails will be used. Thus, AHCA's evidence of record affords no substantial basis to support its allegation that Carrollwood's decision to use an upper side rail on Resident 1's bed demonstrated a lack of adequate supervision that would cause or tend to cause immediate harm and/or death to Resident 1. Marie Gianan, RN and MDS Coordinator for Carrollwood, which included coordination of assessments and care planning since July 2000, determined that Resident 1's April 17, 2002, transfer to the hospital was a "complete discharge" from Carrollwood. According to Ms. Gianan, Carrollwood's policy, as she understands it, is that once a resident is completely discharged, his or her medical records go to medical storage. Thus, Resident 1's return on April 30, 2002, was considered and treated as a new admission requiring an original initial assessment, a new care plan and 30 days thereafter, preparation of a new MDS. The procedure, as understood by Ms. Gianan, was to not consider Resident 1's old medical records, old care plans, and old MDS, but rather to start anew based upon staff's observations, inquiries, and a check and review of current medical records and, thereafter, formulate an assessment and initial care plan within 24 hours of admission. The MDS would follow within 30 days after completion of the initial care plan. Resident 1's April 2, 2002, care plan and fall risk assessment, indicated the following: skin problems that required repositioning him in bed every two hours; bath to be given on shower day or twice weekly; dehydration requiring liquids every night; placing his bed in a low position to prevent falls due to his decreased physical mobility; providing a pneumatic call bell; and using one upper side rail as an enabler placed on his bed. The care plan for Resident 1 met all requirements and does not indicate nor support an allegation of lack of supervision or inadequate care. Ms. Gianan was adamant that Resident 1, although maybe weaker in body strength than before his discharge on May 8, 2002, was "mobile," per her interpretation of the word on his April 2, 2002, admission. She disagreed with the March 27, 2002, assessment of Resident 1 as being "immobile." Ms. Gianan has opined that, "immobile means you do not move in bed--you just stay in the position that you are put in--I do not agree with that evaluation." Carrollwood's policy permits its MDS Coordinator to independently evaluate, assess, interview and otherwise determine the status and condition of each resident. On May 5, 2002, the date of Resident 1's death, at approximately 6:45 a.m., Ann Nickerson, certified nursing assistant (CNA), entered Resident 1's room to empty his catheter. During this process, Resident 1 cried out in Spanish. His wife, awaken by the activity and Resident 1's cry, said to Ms. Nickerson "he is alright," and Ms. Nickerson completed her task and departed the room. An hour and one-half later, at approximately 8:15 a.m., Jermaine Martinez, CNA, entered Resident 1's room with his breakfast tray. Mr. Martinez found Resident 1 on the floor with his clothing pulled upward around his torso. His head was wedged between the bed's upper side rail and the mattress, with his chin resting upward against the upper side rail, thereby hyperextending his neck. Resident 1 had no pulse or respiration when found by Mr. Martinez. The Hillsborough County Medical Examiner, in an amended1 death certificate, listed Resident 1's cause of death as positional asphyxiation; the result of a lack of oxygen due to the position of his head wedged between the bed mattress and the upper side rail and hyperextension of his neck. Within a few minutes of the discovery of Resident 1 on the floor by the Mr. Martinez, Resident 1's family entered the facility for a visit and was stopped in the hall by the duty nurse who informed them of his death. During that brief period, and following the instructions given by the duty nurse, Mr. Martinez and Ms. Nickerson moved the body of Resident 1 from the floor and placed him back in his bed, pulling the cover up to his chin. Thereafter, staff contacted Carla Russo, director of nursing, for further instructions. Following instructions, staff called and released Resident 1's body to the funeral home without first notifying the Hillsborough County Medical Examiner. Because of this action, in violation of policy, no autopsy was performed on the body. It is undisputed that the facility's failure to immediately notify the Hillsborough County Medical Examiner of Resident 1's death constituted a violation of the facility's own policy and procedures regarding the death of residents at the facility. AHCA did not cite the facility for this particular facility policy violation. Therefore, there is no evidence to support an allegation of lack of supervision or inadequate care for this policy violation. Based upon the care plan, nurse's notes, and medical records, it is undisputed that staff visited Resident 1's room an average of every two and one-half hours, if not more often, to provide medications and to attend the personal needs for both Resident 1 and his wife, during each 24-hour period from April 2, 2002, to May 5, 2002. During those staff visits, while attending one occupant, staff would, could and did observe the other occupant. During those frequent room visits during the 24-hour period preceding Resident 1's demise, staff had not observed him to be restless or to independently move his body about in his bed. There is no evidence that Resident 1 was not under staff's observation, and, by implication, not under staff's supervision for any overly long period or an extended period of time of more than two and one-half hours during the April 2, 2002, through May 5, 2002, time period. The evidence does not indicate or support an allegation of lack of supervision or inadequate care by the facility. From all medical records in evidence, it is clear that during his residency in the facility, Resident 1 never exhibited the type of behaviors that would indicate to staff he was a risk for falls; he had no recorded prior history of falls at home, at the hospital or at Carrollwood, he did not use a wheelchair and he could not independently ambulate. He was never observed by staff attempting to get out of bed, and his only infrequent and occasional expressions of restlessness were "crying out" in Spanish. The evidence of record does not indicate or support an allegation of lack of supervision or inadequate care by the facility. AHCA presented no evidence of sufficient reliability to provide a plausible foundation upon which to conclude that the cause of Resident 1 moving from his bed-bound prone position to a sitting position on the floor with his neck wedged between the upper side rail and the bed mattress was due to a lack of supervision or inadequate care by the facility's staff. The evidence supports a plausible conclusion that Resident 1's demise, although inexplicable from the evidence of record, was nonetheless accidental.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing in its entirety the Administrative Complaints filed in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March, 2003.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent violated Section 464.018(1)(h), Florida Statutes, and Rules 64B9-8.005(2) and 64B9-8.005(12), Florida Administrative Code, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency charged with the regulatory and prosecutorial duties related to nursing practice in Florida. Respondent is a licensed practical nurse in Florida, holding license no. PN 0481631. From May 13, 1992, to April 11, 1997, she was employed by Southlake Nursing and Rehabilitation Center (Southlake). On April 9, 1997, Respondent worked as a nurse on the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift on Southlake's A wing. T.C. was a patient of another nurse on that wing. Around 7:00 p.m., Respondent began administering medications to her patients. Melody Perez, the ward clerk, informed Respondent that T.C. needed assistance because he was in respiratory distress. T.C. was sitting in the hall, six to eight feet from Respondent. Respondent went over to T.C., checked to make sure that there was oxygen in his tank and that his nasal cannula was in place. Respondent saw no outward symptoms of T.C. being in acute respiratory distress such as rapid breathing or anxiety. Respondent told Ms. Perez that she could not help T.C. because he was not her patient. She told T.C. that his nurse, who was on break and had the keys to the other medication cart, would be back in a few minutes. Respondent thought that T.C. just wanted his medications. She did not perform a nursing assessment, as that term is commonly understood in the practice of nursing. She did not take T.C.'s vital signs, count his respirations, or listen to his chest. After telling him to wait for his nurse, she just walked away. On April 10, 1997, T.C. and another resident complained to Southlake's administrative staff about Respondent's failure to help T.C. Southlake initiated an investigation based on these complaints. Conchita Griffin, Southlake's Assistant Director of Nursing, conducted the investigation. As was the custom and procedure at Southlake, Ms. Griffin interviewed T.C., the second complaining resident, Ms. Perez, and two certified nursing assistants (CNAs) who were on duty during the incident. Ms. Griffin then compiled a written report of the incident and submitted it to Southlake's administration. Based on her investigation, and after considering Respondent's disciplinary history at Southlake, Ms. Griffin recommended that Southlake terminate Respondent. Southlake had written policies requiring a nurse to attend to any resident who needed help. The policies require a nurse to assess a patient complaining of respiratory distress by taking the patient's vital signs, listening to respirations and to the chest for congestion. According to the policies, a nurse should attend to any patient in distress, calling the patient's assigned nurse, facility management, or 911 if needed. There are no circumstances where the nurse should do nothing. On April 11, 1997, Respondent was called in and asked about her side of the incident. She admitted that she looked at T.C. and that he did not appear to be in distress. She acknowledged that she did nothing except tell T.C. that his nurse would be back soon. When informed that she was being terminated, Respondent refused to sign the disciplinary form. She was asked to leave the premises immediately. Sharon Wards-Brown, Southlake's nursing supervisor for the evening shift in question, accompanied Respondent to A wing to retrieve her belongings. When Respondent arrived on the A wing, she went into the medication room, picked up T.C.'s chart, removed some pages from the chart, and went to the fax machine just outside the medication room. Ms. Wards-Brown and Beverly Burstell, the nurse manager who was on the floor checking some charts, saw Respondent remove the pages from T.C.'s chart and go to the fax machine. Both of them told Respondent that she could not remove or copy anything from the resident's chart. Respondent told Ms. Wards-Brown and Ms. Burstell not to touch her. Each page of nurses' notes in the patients' charts have a front and back side. Respondent stood at the fax machine for only a couple of seconds, not long enough to copy both sides of one page of nurses' notes. She certainly did not have time to copy both sides of all of the pages that she had removed from T.C.'s chart. Respondent's testimony that she had time to copy some of the nurses' notes from T.C.'s chart is not persuasive. Her testimony that she left all of the original pages in the fax machine is not credible. After being prevented from copying all of the pages that she had removed from T.C.'s chart, Respondent ran into the bathroom. A few seconds later she came out of the bathroom with papers and her purse in her hand. Ms. Wards-Brown called Clara Corcoran, Southlake's administrator, and Ms. Griffen for assistance. All three of them followed Respondent out of the building, demanding that she return the documents that she had removed from T.C.'s chart. Respondent repeatedly told them not to touch her. Ms. Corcoran and Ms. Griffen followed Respondent into the parking lot. Respondent got in her car but Ms. Corcoran and Ms. Griffen blocked Respondent from closing the car door and continued to demand the return of the papers. Respondent finally drove forward over the cement bumper and the grass in order to leave with the papers. Meanwhile, Ms. Wards-Brown returned to the A wing to examine T.C.'s chart. Ms. Griffen also examined the chart within two to three minutes after Respondent left the floor. The chart was still open on the desk. Ms. Wards-Brown and Ms. Griffen discovered that T.C.'s nurses' notes for April 9, 1997, were missing. They knew the notes were missing because both of them had seen the notes in the chart the day before when they reviewed the chart as part of the investigation. Respondent's Exhibit 2 is a copy of the front and back of one page of T.C.'s nurses' notes. The last note is dated March 27, 1997. It is not plausible that T.C.'s chart had no nurses' notes from that time until after April 10, 1997. Even if Respondent did not remove any of T.C.'s original nurses' notes from the premises, she violated the acceptable standards of nursing care by copying the front and back of one page and removing the copies from the facility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order fining Respondent $1,000 and suspending her license for one year, followed by two years of probation with appropriate conditions. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Diane K. Kiesling, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Room 3231A Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Thomas A. Delegal, III, Esquire Randy Rogers, Esquire Delegal & Merritt, P.A. 424 East Monroe Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202-2837 Ruth R. Stiehl, Ph.D., R.N. Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4080 Woodcock Drive, Suite 202 Jacksonville, Florida 32207-2714 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4042 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offences set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, whether Respondent's nursing license should be disciplined accordingly.
Findings Of Fact The Agency for health Care Administration is the agency charged with the regulatory and prosecutorial duties related to nursing practice in the State of Florida. Respondent, Rachelle Chiaro Vaslowski, holds a nursing license number RN 2913542. Respondent's last known address is 240 Brookline Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida 32118. Respondent was employed by the Coquina Center (the Center) from February 12, 1997, until her termination on January 7, 1998. On January 6 and 7, 1998, Respondent was working a day shift at the Center as a registered nurse, at 170 North Center Street, Ormond Beach, Florida. Respondent was under the supervision of Barbara Geyer, R.N., Unit Manager for the sub-acute care section of the nursing home. Respondent was assigned to care for patients which included the administration of their scheduled medications. Ms. Geyer testified regarding Respondent's performance of her duties. On Respondent's shift, patients, whom Respondent was caring for, had not received the medication that they were prescribed. Ms. Geyer also observed twenty to thirty cc' s of clear fluid on Respondent's medication cart when this was brought to her attention by Respondent. Respondent told Ms. Geyer, "I've just spilled a bottle of Roxanol, should I take the plunger and suck it back up again." Roxanol is a strong mixture of pain medication, consisting of Morphine and Demerol, used to medicate the terminally ill. Ms. Geyer advised Respondent that the medication had to be appropriately discarded and the correct documents completed regarding its wastage. Ms. Geyer, who has been an R.N. for many years, observed that Respondent had a very confused look on her face. Ms. Geyer went to her Director of Nursing, Kathy Johnson and advised her of the situation. Both women interviewed Respondent regarding the spilling of the narcotic. A hasty inventory also was conducted of Respondent's medication cart. Respondent was the only person on duty with a key to the cart. There were medications for which Respondent had received which were unaccounted for. Two and a half vials of Morphine and 14 Ambien were missing. They also found two vials marked as containing Roxanol. Since this was the medication that was supposed to have been spilled, Ms. Geyer questioned Respondent about it. Respondent replied, "What do you want, there is more than you need?" Ms. Geyer and Ms. Johnson both stuck their fingers in the supposed vials containing Roxanol. Both women testified that one had a bitter taste and the other had no taste at all. Ms. Geyer observed that, in addition to having a dazed look in her eyes, Respondent gave totally inappropriate responses to the questions she was asked when interviewed. Ms. Johnson, the head nurse, testified that she observed Respondent's nursing skills had declined. Respondent forgot to chart medications she administered. This became a pattern. Ms. Johnson identified Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 as the complaint she had filed with the State against Respondent on February 20, 1998. Ms. Johnson was qualified as a nursing expert based on her education, training, and experience. She observed that Respondent, when interviewed following the spilling incident, was confused and dazed. Questions had to be repeated several times to her. Respondent appeared not to understand the questions. Ms. Johnson described that when Respondent was informed that they were going to do a narcotics count on Respondent's medication cart, Respondent grabbed her belongings and left the facility in haste. She did not clock out. She did not tell anybody she was leaving. She left the keys on the cart and she was out the door. Ms. Johnson opined that this was very unprofessional behavior. The Center's pharmacy policies and procedures were identified by Ms. Geyer. Ms. Geyer explained the policies and procedures regarding controlled substances. Respondent failed to follow the policy and procedure for disposing of controlled substances. As supervising nurse, Ms. Geyer, filled out a narcotics "wasting" report on Respondent spilling of Roxanol. The medication error report was signed by Barbara Geyer. Ms. Johnson also testified that it is a violation of nursing procedures to not account for narcotics properly when you administer or "waste" them. Further, she opined it was unprofessional conduct to work under the influence of narcotics, to take medications that are intended for patients, and not properly chart medications.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Nursing enter a final order suspending the license of Respondent to practice until she has satisfactorily completed the IPN program, and, thereafter, place her on a five-year probation to follow her practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael E. Duclos, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rachelle Chiaro Vaslowski 240 Brookline Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32118 Ruth R. Stiehl, Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4080 Woodcock Drive, Suite 202 Jacksonville, Florida 32207-2714 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Robert G. Brooks, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's license to practice nursing should be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent Rita Flint (Flint) was a licensed practical nurse in the State of Florida, holding license number PN0655201. Flint's last known address is 6494 South West 8th Place, North Lauderdale, Florida 33068. At all times material to this proceeding Flint was employed by North Broward Medical Center (NBMC) located in Pompano Beach, Florida, as a practical nurse. On August 3, 1990, Flint was assigned to care for patients J. C. and J. K. including administering their medications and charting same on their Medication Administration Record (MAR). On August 3, 1990, J. C.'s physician prescribed one (1) nitroglycerine patch each day. Flint failed to administer the patch on this date. On August 3, 1990, J. C.'s physician prescribed 100 mg. of Norpace every six (6) hours. Flint failed to administer the 2:00 p.m. dosage of Norpace to J. C. On August 3, 1990, J. C.'s physician prescribed 120 mg. of Inderal each day. Flint failed to administer the 9:00 a.m. dosage of Inderal until 1:30 p.m. without noting any explanation on J. C.'s MAR. On August 3, 1990, Flint failed to document the administration of J. K's own medications on the MAR. On August 3, 1990, Flint failed to sign the MARs for J. C. and J. K. as required by hospital policy. On August 15, 1990, Flint left an intravenous bag with an exposed needle hanging at the bedside of a patient. On August 29, 1990, Flint was assigned to care for patient R. R. including administering his medications. Flint failed to administer the following medications leaving all of them at R. R.'s bedside: (a) Timolo (9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. doses); (b) Mixide (9:00 a.m. dose); (c) Zantac (9:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. doses); (d) Lasix (9:00 a.m. dose); and, (e) Entozyme (8:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon doses). On August 30, 1990, NBMC terminated Flint's employment as a result of the aforementioned conduct. There is no evidence that any patient suffered any actual harm as a result of Flint's errors. In September of 1990, NBMC referred Flint to the Intervention Project for Nurses. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Flint's job performance was adversely affected by long work schedules necessitated by severe financial problems. During the week of August 3, 1990, Flint worked a ninety-two-hour week. The acute financial stress was due to domestic problems including the breakup of her twenty-two-year-old marriage. Flint had no problems involving substance abuse. Flint attended individual therapy sessions with a clinical psychologist, Priscilla Marotta, Ph.D., and participated in group therapy designed primarily for persons with substance abuse problems. Flint attended weekly therapy sessions for approximately one month after which she could no longer afford treatment. Even though Flint was financially unable to continue treatment with Dr. Marotta or any other counseling program recommended by the Intervention Program for Nurses, she diligently undertook a self-help program to educate herself on stress management techniques, to develop self-reliance, and to improve self-esteem. Flint's effort to participate in therapy, to the extent financially possible, and to rehabilitate herself shows a strong commitment to her profession. Flint has been licensed to practice nursing since May 31, 1982. There is no evidence of any disciplinary action against her license prior to or after the incidents herein described. Flint is currently employed as a nurse in a hospice. Her recent performance appraisal reports indicate that, on an average, she fully meets all job requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore recommended that the Board of Nursing enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 464.018(h), Florida Statutes (1989), as defined in Rule 210-10.005(1)(e)1 and Rule 210-10.005(1)(e)2, Florida Administrative Code, and not guilty of violating Section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes. It is further recommended that the Board's final order: (1) place the Respondent on probation for one year subject to such requirements as the Board may require; and (2) require the Respondent to pay an administrative fine in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars ($250). DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 21st day of November 1994. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-2715 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: Incorporated into Findings of Fact 1. Incorporated into Findings of Fact 2 and 11. Incorporated into Findings of Fact 4. Incorporated into Findings of Fact 5. Incorporated into Findings of Fact 6. Incorporated into Findings of Fact 7. Incorporated into Findings of Fact 8. Incorporated into Findings of Fact 9. Incorporated into Findings of Fact 10. The first sentence is incorporated into Findings of Fact 13. The remaining portion of this proposed fact is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Furthermore, Respondent's Exhibit 3, as it relates to a diagnosis of a mental condition, is hearsay which does not supplement or explain any other psychological or medical evidence. Thus, any reference in Exhibit R3 to a generalized anxiety disorder is insufficient to support Petitioner's proposed finding. Unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Unsupported by competent substantial evidence. See number 10 above. FOR THE RESPONDENT: 1. Respondent did file proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Laura Gaffney, Esquire Natalie Duguid, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Rita Flint 3313 South East Second Street Pompano, Florida 33063 Judie Ritter Executive Director Board of Nursing AHCA 504 Daniel Building 111 East Coastline Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Harold D. Lewis General Counsel The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
