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VOLUSIA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs JOHN FLORIO, 89-006360 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Nov. 22, 1989 Number: 89-006360 Latest Update: Aug. 20, 1990

Findings Of Fact The Respondent was employed by the School Board of Volusia County from September 1, 1981 until November 14, 1989 as a painter or painter mechanic. T- II-39,40. The terms and conditions of the Respondent's employment was governed by the contract between the Petitioner and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 79, Local 850. This contract provides that employees can be disciplined, to include discharge for just cause. Joint Exhibit 1. The Respondent was employed as a painter within the Board's facilities support operations department. This department employs approximately 130 craftsmen and 20 clerical and supervisory staff. T-I-38. The Respondent's immediate superior was foreman of the painters, Joe Isaac, who has held that position for the past 18 years. T-I-38,64 The chain-of-command from the top of the facilities support department is Charles Lambeth, who is Director of Facilities Operation; Terry Ellis, who is Assistant Director in charge of the crafts area; and Clifton Robertson, who is the Director of Facilities Support Operations or the personnel administrator for the facilities support department. Clifton Robertson investigated the allegations against the Respondent, counseled with the Respondent, and issued the disciplinary letters and reprimands given to the Respondent. On October 24, 1989, Mr. Florio engaged in a loud, profane, and inappropriate shouting match with a coworker, Larry Brazil, while on the job scraping paint outside a classroom at Seville School. Their conduct was such that a teacher left her classroom, outside of which they were working, and cautioned them about the disturbance they were causing. The acting foreman, Don Jenkins, overheard the exchange between the Respondent and Brazil in which the Respondent used obscene or profane language. The acting foreman did not hear Brazil use such language, and other witnesses testified that they had never heard Brazil use such language on the job. On October 25, 1989, the Respondent got into another argument with another coworker, Ken Griswold. During this argument, the Respondent threw his paint scraper at Griswold, who had made no threat to the Respondent. With only the verbal provocation, the Respondent threw the scraper at Griswold and would have struck him had Griswold not jumped back out of the way. There was dissatisfaction among the Respondent's coworkers about the way he did his job. The Respondent had been injured in 1987 and was restricted from working on ladders over six feet tall, lifting regular ladders, and spray painting. Sometime later, the Respondent's restrictions were altered to permit him to work on a six-foot aluminum ladder. His refusal to do any type of work which was covered by his medical restrictions was a source of contention with his coworkers. In addition, he had a history of not following regulations and requirements which the other men were required to follow. On October 24 and 25, 1989, the Respondent was assigned to a team of painters to scrape and paint the exterior of a school. On both days, arguments between the Respondent and coworkers arose over the Respondent's refusal to scrape paint from the ladder. On October 24, 1990, this led to a shouting match with Larry Brazil and to the Respondent throwing a paint scraper at Ken Griswold on October 25, 1990. On March 21, 1989, the Respondent was directed at 7:00 a.m. to report to work at Seabreeze Senior High School by his foreman, Joe Isaac. The Respondent did not do so and stayed at the main maintenance facility until 8:45 a.m., when he was discovered by the Assistant Maintenance Director, Terry Ellis, who instructed him to report to the high school. The Respondent again refused to go and remained at the main maintenance facility until 8:54 a.m., when the Maintenance Director, Charles Lambeth, arrived. The Respondent had asked his foreman, Joe Isaac, to see Lambeth; and Isaac had told Florio to report to work at the high school and if Lambeth wanted him, Lambeth would send word through Isaac for Florio to report to Lambeth. When confronted by Ellis, the Respondent told Ellis he wanted to see Lambeth. Ellis also told Florio to report to the school immediately. Florio remained at the maintenance headquarters until Lambeth arrived. Lambeth asked Florio why he was there, and Florio stated that he had been told Lambeth wanted to see him. Lambeth told Florio that he had not wanted to see him, and Florio blamed the incident on the men lying to him. Florio did not report until told to do so by Lambeth. The Respondent had his pay docked for two hours and received a letter of reprimand for failure to follow direct instructions. The letter of reprimand described the Respondent's actions as malingering and insubordination. Painters reported each day to the maintenance headquarters, after which they took School Board vehicles to the job sites. Similarly, after being released at the job site, the painters were supposed to return to the main maintenance facility, where employees were dismissed for the day. On September 11, 12, 13 and 14, 1989, the Respondent drove his private automobile to the school at which the paint team was working. Although the Respondent had been given permission to drive his car on Monday of that week because his stomach had been giving him problems, he took his car the rest of the week and left directly from the school, not returning to the maintenance headquarters, as required on the dates indicated above. The Respondent received written notice that he was being docked 160 minutes. On or about September 21, 1989, the Respondent told a coworker that he refused to drive. The Respondent did not deny telling the coworker that he would not drive but asserted that he had been kidding. On September 22, 1989, the Respondent slammed open the door of a School Board truck striking another School Board truck in the door and damaging both trucks. The property damage was $121.63. The Respondent had slammed the door open because he was angered by the remarks of a coworker who chided him about driving. The letter of reprimand which the Respondent received for his conduct on September 21 and 22 indicated that the Respondent had been encouraged to enter the Employee Assistance Program. The Respondent did not avail himself of the program. The Respondent frequently complained to his supervisors about what he described as "harassment" and "kidding" by his coworkers although the Respondent engaged in similar behavior with his coworkers. As a result of his complaints, his superiors counseled his coworkers not to tease, harass, or kid the Respondent. The Respondent is a malingerer. He developed a pattern of avoiding work by failing to report when he was supposed to report; by refusing to perform duties within his ability as requested by his fellow workers; and by asserting he was ill. The Respondent was ill-tempered and acted out inappropriately with increasing frequency and violence. The Respondent refused to acknowledge that there was a problem, that the problem was him, and to seek assistance for it. The employer counseled with the Respondent and used progressive discipline to attempt to modify the Respondent's behavior to no avail. The employer had just cause to discharge the Respondent.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore recommended that the Respondent be discharged. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-6360 The parties filed proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following is a listing by party of the findings which were adopted and those which were rejected and why: Petitioner's findings by paragraph number which began with paragraph 7: Paragraph 7 Adopted Paragraph 8 Adopted Paragraph 9 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 10 Rejected; restates exhibit Paragraph 11 1st sentence adopted; remainder irrelevant Paragraph 12,13,14 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 15(a) Irrelevant Paragraph 15(b) Rejected; restates exhibit Paragraph 16-20 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 21 Irrelevant Paragraph 22-29 Adopted and rewritten Respondent's findings by paragraph number beginning with paragraph 1: Paragraph 1-4 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 5 Irrelevant Paragraph 6-10 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 11 Whether Brazil was disciplined is unknown Paragraph 12 Rejected as contrary to fact Paragraph 13-14 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 15 Rejected that Florio did not throw the scraper at Griswold; remainder adopted and rewritten Paragraph 16 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 17 Evidence was received that coworkers were counseled on several occasions; however, it is also irrelevant because the disciplinary records of the other employees were not introduced. Evidence was received that; at least one other employee was discharged for similar types of behavior. Paragraph 18 Adopted and rewritten Paragraph 19-24 Irrelevant Paragraph 25 The statement is true, but gives the erroneous impression that Florio was discharged because he did not participate in the program. The employer's reference of the employee to this program was relevant because it shows the employer had such a program and it was available. The employee's rejection was relevant because it indicates how confused the employee is about his situation and condition. Paragraph 26 Rejected as contrary to fact COPIES FURNISHED: Harrison C. Thompson, Esq. THOMPSON, SIZEMORE & GONZALEZ P.O. Box 639 Tampa, FL 33601 Ben Patterson, Esq. P.O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315 Dr. Jame D. Surratt, Superintendent Volusia County School Board P.O. Box 2118 Deland, FL 32720 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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JACKSONVILLE ASSOCIATION OF FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL NO. 1834 vs. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, 77-000425 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000425 Latest Update: Nov. 04, 1977

Findings Of Fact The following quoted provisions of the joint stipulations of fact entered into by the parties, as attached to this recommended order, constitutes the underlying evidential facts to be considered by the undersigned in deliberating the charges in this case. The exhibits mentioned in the quoted provision may be found as a part of the attached joint stipulations of fact and exhibits, which have been made a part of the record herein. The quotation is as follows: JOINT STIPULATIONS OF FACT The charge herein attached as cumulative exhibit #1 was filed by the Charging party on October 21, 1976 and a copy was simultaneously served on Respondent. Pursuant to Florida Administrative Rule 8H-4.03 a copy of the charge is hereby attached. The trial and presentment of the above-captioned cause was assigned to Rodney W. Smith, attorney for the Charging Party on or about February 25, 1977. Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of F.S. 447.203(2) and has its principal place of business in the City of Jacksonville, Duval County, Florida where it is engaged in the business of operating a consolidated municipal government. Respondent is created directly by the legislature of the State of Florida so as to constitute a consolidated government administered by individuals who are responsible to public officials and/or the general electorate. Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein an employee organization within the meaning of 447.203(l0) of the Act. On March 4, 1976 Respondent filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the opinion that said petition would stay the "proposed CERTIFICATION ORDER by the Public Employees Relations Commission until final determination of the case was resolved. On or about May 18, 1976 the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a CERTIFICATION ORDER certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the Public Employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Firefighters Lieutenants Captains Employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department EXCLUDED: All officers above the rank of captain employed by the City of Jacksonville Fire Department and all other employees of the City of Jacksonville On or about June, 1976 the Respondent filed an APPEAL of the above- stated certification order by PETITION FOR REVIEW in the First District Court of Appeal in and for the State of Florida. At no time was a stay of the certification order sought or obtained by the Respondent. Although the CERTIFICATION ORDER was challenged by PETITION FOR REVIEW, the Charging Party has been the certified representative for purposes of collective-bargaining of all public employees in the unit described in the above paragraph since May 18, 1976. It has been the continuous policy, and most recently by special ordinance, for the City of Jacksonville to extend dues- deductions to firefighters, lieutenants and captains authorizing such deductions since on or about 1969. This policy of extending dues-deductions to captains, lieutenants and firefighters has continued at all times until October 15, 1976. On October 15, 1976 the biweekly paychecks of the captains (sic) and lieutenants employed by the, Respondent did not reflect the usual dues- deduction. The Charging Party was notified of the City's intention to discontinue dues-deductions for the employees "in the ranks of lieutenants and captains during contract negotiations in late September, 1976. On or about October 18, 1976 agents for the City, including Dave Thompson, Administrative Aide for the Public Safety Department and John Waters, Director of Department of Public Safety informed Robert Carver, President of the Charging Party, that the Respondent would not extend dues-deductions to the captains or lieutenants since the Respondent did not feel these positions were properly included in the certified bargaining unit. The action of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976 was resultant from the attached cumulative exhibit B, Memorandum of September 24, 1976 from John M. Waters to Jack Parker, City Accountant for the City of Jacksonville, which directs that positions above the rank of firefighter are to no longer receive dues-deductions. The Director of Employee Relations and chief negotiator for the Respondent, William Davis, was officially notified of the proposed discontinuation on September 29, 1976 by action of the attached cumulative exhibit c." The act complained of by the Charging Party, is the act of the Respondent in discontinuing the dues-deductions for the ranks of lieutenant and captain effective October 15, 1976. (The facts that led up to that action are established in the stipulations of fact entered into by the parties.) In the mind of the Charging Party the discontinuation of the dues-deductions on October 15, 1976, constituted: (1) an interference with the rights of employees as described in 447.501(1)(a), F.S.; (2) a unilateral change during the bargaining process in violation of 447.50l(1)(c), F.S.; and (3) a specific refusal to comply with the provisions of 447.303, F.S. The Respondent disputes and joins issue with that claim. To resolve the conflict, the case is best discussed by dividing the consideration into two broad categories. The first category is concerned with the question of whether the Respondent's initial petition for writ of certiorari filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida, on March 4, 1976, and/or the Respondent's appeal of the Public Employees Relations Commission's certification order, which was filed with the First District Court of Appeal, State of Florida; imposed an automatic stay of the effect of the proposed certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission, and/or a stay of the certification order of May 18, 1976, entered by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Any stay of the proposed certification order and subsequent certification order by the Public Employees Relations Commission must have been effectuated by the filing of the initial petition for writ of certiorari on March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976, because the facts establish that no specific request was ever made of the First District Court of Appeal or the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay. To that end, the Respondent contends that it could justifiably rely on the Florida Appellate Rule to grant an automatic stay in both the initial petition for writ of certiorari of March 4, 1976, and the appeal of June, 1976 Pertinent provisions of Rule 5.12 state: "Rule 5.12 Supersedeas Bond not Required of the State and its Political Subdivisions and their Boards, Commissions, etc.; Security when Required When Security Not Required. When the state or any of its political subdivisions, or any officer, board, commission or other public body of the state or any of its political subdivisions, in a purely official capacity, takes an appeal or petitions for certiorari, the filing of the notice of appeal or the petition for certiorari as the case may be shall perfect the same and stay the execu tion or performance of the judgment, decree or order being reviewed and no supersedeas bond need be given unless expressly required by the court. Court May Require Bond. The court may, on motion for good cause shown, require a super sedeas bond or other security, in such amount, form and manner as it may prescribe as a condition for the further prosecution of the appeal or certiorari." On the face of the language of Florida Appellate Rule 5.12, it would appear that the Respondent is correct in its assumption of having an automatic stay; however, there is a subsequent appellate decision which defeats the Respondent's right to rely on the theory it offers as standing for the proposition that an automatic stay is granted. That case is Panama City v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 333 So.2d 470, (1st DCA 1976, Fla.). The decision in this case was initially rendered on May 5, 1976, and a rehearing denied on June 29, 1976. The effective date of the decision is July 14, 1976. The Panama City case, supra, concerns the determination by the Public Employees Relations Commission of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election. Those actions by PERC were not found to be final orders and in discussing the position of that Petitioner requesting a writ of certiorari, the Court stated that a stay of the effect of the enforcement of the agency action does not transpire merely by filing the petition for writ of certiorari. Under the ruling, in the decision, the stay may be granted by the agency or by the Court upon appropriate terms and in keeping with the authority of 120.68(3), F.S. That section of Chapter 120 indicated the following: "(3) The filing of the petition does not itself stay enforcement of the agency decision, but if the agency decision has the effect of suspending or revoking a license, supersedeas shall be granted as a matter of right upon such conditions as are reasonable, unless the court, upon petition of the agency, determines that a supersedeas would constitute a probable danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the state. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms, but, in any event, the order shall specify the conditions upon which the stay or supersedeas is granted." Moreover, in the opinion of the Court in the Panama City case, under Florida Appellate Rule 5.5, the Petitioner for writ of certiorari shall apply to the agency for supersedeas to forestall the terms of the agency action. Through its memorandum the Respondent in this cause has concluded that there is a distinction in the facts of the Panama City case and the facts sub judice, in that the Panama City case dealt with determination of an appropriate bargaining unit and direction of an election which were interlocutory matters, whereas the question here deals with a certification order which is final agency action on the part of the Public Employes Relations Commission. As an adjunct to this argument, Respondent indicated that it is the June, 1976, appeal taken by the Respondent, challenging the Public Employees Relations Commission order of certification, that becomes the focal point of the inquiry upon the subject of an automatic stay. This latter phase of the argument is accepted and it is the June, 1976, appeal that should be addressed. With that fact in mind, the language of the Court's opinion in the Panama City case on a petition for rehearing clarifies any distinction which might be drawn between the right to stay in an interlocutory situation, and the right to a stay of final action by an agency. The Court, in its discussion on rehearing, stated that the PERC order certifying an employee organization's exclusive collective bargaining representative of employees is a final order, which is subject to judicial review, together with all prior interlocutory orders. The Court goes on to say that if PERC refuses to stay any bargaining pending the Court review, the Court would have authority to grant that relief, in A order to make the Court's jurisdiction effective. For this proposition it cites to Article V, Section (4)(b) 3, Florida Constitution. A close analysis of the Court's statement on the rehearing in the Panama City case, supra, points out that the party who takes an appeal of the final order of certification by the Public Employees Relations Commission should look to the Public Employees Relations Commission to grant a stay prior to turning to the Court for such relief. This is in keeping with the requirements of 120.68(3), F.S. It can be seen by an examination of the facts stipulated to in this cause that the Respondent has failed at any point to request of the Public Employees Relations Commission that the effect of the order of certification be stayed pending the outcome of the consideration of the appeal on its merits. Consequently, in keeping with the decision of the Panama-City case, supra, the effect of the certification order is not stayed and any action which the Respondent took in derrogation of the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Panama City, supra, subsequent to July 14, 1976, the date the decision became binding, may constitute an unfair labor practice. See also, Duval Cty School Bd v. Fla. Pub. Emp. etc., 346 So.2d 1086 (1st DCA 1977, Fla.) Having determined that the effect of the certification order of the Public Employees Relations Commission has not been stayed, consideration of the effect of the Respondent's action which discontinued the dues-deduction after October 15, 1976 for those ranks of lieutenant and captain can be made. It is clear from the facts In the record that it had been the practice of the employer to authorize the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains since 1969 and there is no showing that the employees in those ranks who requested the dues- deduction ever asked that the deductions be discontinued. The conclusion on the part of the Respondent that the dues-deduction should be discontinued was a unilateral action, premised upon Respondent's individual evaluation of the propriety of including lieutenants and captains in a unit with firefighters. In view of the history of the dues-deduction process for lieutenants and captains in the City of Jacksonville, and the outstanding unit certification by PERC which includes such employees, it is concluded that deductions should have been continued beyond October 15, 1976. This is authorized under the opinion of United Faculty of Palm Beach Jr. College, Case No. 8H-CA- 754-1158. The failure to continue this deduction program beyond October 15, 1976 constituted an action by the Respondent in regard to conditions of employment and was per se a violation of the duty to collectively bargain. See 447.309(1), F.S., and NLRB v. Katz, 396 U.S.736 (1962). This responsibility on the part of Respondent to continue the dues-deduction has now been specifically established in 447.303, F.S., as amended at 77-343, Laws of Florida which reads: "Any employee organization which has been certified as a bargaining agent shall have the right to, upon request, have its dues and uniform assessments deducted and collected by the employer from the salary of those employees who authorized the deductions, set dues and uniform assessments In a related argument, the Respondent attempts to suggest that the Public Employees Relations Commission has unilaterally expanded and redefined the bargaining unit that had been previously agreed to between the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF. Specifically, the Respondent claims that the City of Jacksonville and Local 1884 IAFF had agreed that only fire privates be included in the unit in 1973-1974 and 1974-1975, and that thereafter the Commission expanded and redefined the bargaining unit to include firemen and fire officers. Although this may be a fact, this fact is not in evidence through the stipulation of facts and in view of the limitations imposed by the agreement of the parties through their stipulation, the above-referenced information may not be utilized in reaching conclusions in this case. However, assuming arguendo the propriety of those facts, they would not seem to promote a different result in this cause. This conclusion is drawn from an examination of Clearwater Firefighters Association; Local 1158, IAFF and City of Clearwater, Case No. 8H- RC-766-1O68, 77E-377, reported at 3 FPER 177 (1977) and City of Titusville v. PERC, 3,30 So.2d 733 (1st DCA 1976, Fla.) Even though the Commission and the Court seemed to be stating that the Public Employees Relations Commission may not extend the unit which has voluntarily been recognized by the parties, or offered for recognition by the Petitioner for unit determination, these cases demonstrate that each case that occurs should be examined on an individual basis. Applying that process, it would be necessary to request the Public Employees Relations Commission to reconsider their position in the instant case on the question of the appropriateness of the inclusion of lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit, and that decision could be subject to appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Because a determination has not been rendered on the merits of excluding lieutenants and captains from the certified bargaining unit, either by the Public Employees Relations Commission or an appellate court, the certification order remains in effect and all rights and entitlements for ,the unit employees remain in force and effect until amended by a Perc order. Consequently, the act of discontinuing the dues-deduction for lieutenants and captains in the bargaining unit after October 15, 1976, constituted a specific refusal to comply with the provision of 447.303, F.S.; an interference with the rights of employees in violation of 447.501(1)(a), and an unilateral change during the bargaining process, in violation of 447.501(1)(c) , F.S.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent, City of Jacksonville, be required to reinstate the dues-deduction authorizations of those lieutenants and captains in the certified bargaining unit. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Robert G. Brown, Esquire Assistant Counsel Office of General Counsel City Of Jacksonville 1300 City Hall Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Leonard A. Carson, Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FLORIDA Exhibit A STATE OF FLORIDA

Florida Laws (9) 120.68447.03447.203447.301447.303447.309447.501447.503837.012
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LAUDERHILL FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL NO. 2332 vs. CITY OF LAUDERHILL, 77-000430 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000430 Latest Update: Jul. 29, 1977

Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1976, James McKnight was fire chief for respondent City of Lauderhill. At that time there was a vacancy in respondent's fire department for a fire lieutenant. Respondent's mayor gave Chief McKnight a list of three names which had been given to the mayor by the civil service board. The mayor told the fire chief to pick a person from the list for the fire lieutenant position and said "that he had been advised that the lieutenants were not eligible or allowable to belong to the union." (R17) The names on the list were those of Messrs. Scheiblich, Farmer and Schwartz, in that order, all of whom worked for respondent as firefighters. On September 30, 1976, Chief McKnight summoned Mr. Scheiblich to his office and discussed promoting him to fire lieutenant. The fire chief told Mr. Scheiblich that he could not be active in the union while service as a fire lieutenant and that he would have to resign from the union at the conclusion of his probationary period as a fire lieutenant. Mr. Scheiblich answered that he was under the impression that, although he would have to leave the bargaining unit, he could remain an active member of the union, but that, if a promotion would require his leaving the union, he would rather forego the promotion and remain a member of the union. Chief McKnight said he would consult the city attorney for his advice on whether Mr. Scheiblich's promotion would require his resignation from the union. Chief McKnight telephoned the city attorney, Mr. Titone, who told him that Mr. Scheiblich's serving in the rank of fire lieutenant would necessitate his resigning from the union. This advice was based in part on PERC's decision in its Case No. 8H-RC-756-1240. In that case, On June 23, 1976, PERC voted two to one to exclude fire lieutenants from the bargaining unit; because, as was subsequently explained, in the written order entered in Case No. 8H-RC-756-1240 on October 4, 1986, "the lieutenants manage the men on a day-to-day basis and will provide the basic input for promulgating and evaluating collective bargaining proposals submitted during negotiations." Although the record does not reflect that respondent had made a separate application for determination of the managerial or confidential status of fire lieutenants, respondent's attorney acted in good faith in advising Chief McKnight that Mr. Scheiblich would not be eligible for promotion to fire lieutenant if he was unwilling to resign from the union; and Chief McKnight acted in good faith in following Mr. Titone's advice. Acting on instructions from the mayor, whom he had apprised of the situation, Chief McKnight next interviewed Mr. Farmer. Among the questions he asked Mr. Farmer was one "about having to get out of the union in order to be able to accept lieutenant's promotion; and he said, it was all right with him" (R19) After this interview, Chief McKnight recommended Mr. Farmer's promotion, just as he had earlier recommended Mr. Scheiblich's promotion. The mayor was pleased with Mr. Farmer's selection. He nevertheless told the fire chief to interview the only other person listed, Mr. Schwartz, which Chief McKnight did even though he "couldn't see the necessity." (R29) The question of fire lieutenants' union membership came up in the Schwartz interview, too, and Chief McKnight indicated he was relying on what he had been told by the mayor and by the city attorney. At the time of these events, Mr. Scheiblich was union president and Mr. Schwartz was secretary-treasurer of the union. Chief McKnight and Mayor Cipolloni were aware of this because a letter from Mr. Schwartz, dated August 16, 1976, had so informed them. After Chief McKnight had interviewed Mr. Scheiblich for the fire lieutenant's job, he saw for the first time and read a petition signed by most of the firemen in respondent's employ, including all three persons listed as possibilities for promotion to fire lieutenant. This petition was critical of the management of the fire department, and "was a pretty strong petition. It was ultimately very successful. It got [Chief McKnight] fired." (R18) After reading the petition, Chief McKnight was unsure how long he would remain fire chief, and he told Mr. Scheiblich "to just sit tight [because Chief McKnight] wasn't going to do anything about promoting somebody to lieutenant until [he] was sure whether [he] was still working [for the fire department himself]." (R18-19) The firemen's petition upset Chief McKnight, but did not influence his recommendations for fire lieutenant. Chief McKnight withdrew his recommendation that Mr. Scheiblich be promoted to fire lieutenant, because Mr. Scheiblich would not agree to resign from the union, which respondent's mayor and city attorney had advised Chief McKnight would be necessary. Chief McKnight recommended that Mr. Farmer be promoted to fire lieutenant because his name was next on the list and because Mr. Farmer had no objection to resigning from the union at the end of a probationary period as fire lieutenant. Chief McKnight did not recommend that Mr. Schwartz be promoted to fire lieutenant because he had already recommended Mr. Farmer for the position, and Mayor Cipolloni had indicated he was going to accept the recommendation that Mr. Farmer be promoted. Mr. Farmer was in fact promoted to fire lieutenant, while Messers. Scheiblich and Schwartz were not. The case file reflects that the union filed unfair labor practice charges against respondent and mailed a copy to respondent's counsel on October 8, 1976. In addition to alleging that the circumstances surrounding the promotion of Mr. Farmer amounted to an unfair labor practice, the union alleged that respondent's mayor, Eugene Cipolloni, had sent two letters and made a public statement that constituted unfair labor practices. On or about October 13, 1976, Eugene Cipolloni, respondent's mayor, gave Chief McKnight a verbal directive to change the fire department's temporary shift exchange policy, effective November 1, 1976. Even though respondent's city council had adopted the policy on August 13, 1976, as its Resolution No. 572, the mayor felt a memorandum under the fire chief's signature should suffice to alter the policy. Before the change, the procedure was that a fireman who wanted another fireman to fill in for him made his request in writing and secured the signature of the proposed substitute. These requests then went up through the chain of command and were routinely granted. On one occasion, a fire lieutenant failed to report as a substitute, after agreeing to do so. Since the change in policy, temporary shift exchanges have only been allowed in cases of illness or in other emergencies. This change in policy was ordered by Mayor Cipolloni in retaliation for the filing of the unfair labor practice charges, although ensuring a full complement on each shift was the ostensible reason for the change in policy. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which appears as an appendix to the order.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent restore and reestablish the temporary shift exchange policy which obtained before the memorandum posted on October 13, 1976, changed the policy, effective November 1, 1976. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: William E. Powers, Jr., Esq. General Counsel Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Anthony J. Titone, Esq. City Attorney City of Lauderhill 6299 West Sunrise Boulevard Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33313 Robert A. Sugarman, Esq. Post Office Drawer 520337 Miami, Florida 33121 APPENDIX The charging party's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant, with these exceptions: There was only one opening for fire lieutenant. Chief McKnight had the authority to select the person for promotion only in the sense that he had authority to recommend somebody for promotion. Some of the details of the temporary shift exchange policy set forth in the last paragraph of page four of the charging party's proposed fact findings were recited by Mr. Schwartz in the course of examining witnesses but were not established as part of the evidence adduced at the hearing. Respondent's proposed fact findings Nos. 1, 3(b), 3(d), and 3(f)-(h), have been adopted, in substance. Respondent's proposed fact findings Nos. 2(a)-(e) have been rejected because the evidence as a whole persuaded the hearing officer that the change in temporary shift exchange policy was in retaliation for the filing of unfair labor practice charges. Both the mayor and the fire chief testified that the change was ordered by the mayor himself and that the fire chief merely carried the mayor's order out. The procedure by which the previous policy had been adopted was not followed in amending the policy. The change came at a time of upheaval, after a period of "rumors and commotion," (R19), and at a time when the mayor had just been accused of personally committing unfair labor practices. The mayor's demeanor at the hearing and the evasive manner in which he answered Mr. Schwartz's questions contributed significantly to the hearing officer's conclusion: In testifying, the mayor essentially took the tack that there had been change in the temporary shift exchange policy. The only credible testimony concerning shortcomings under the original policy concerned a single instance in which a fire lieutenant had failed to show up for a shift he had agreed to work, for which dereliction he had been disciplined. Respondent's proposed fact findings No. 3(a) and 3(c) have been rejected because the evidence showed that respondent failed to promote Mr. Scheiblich because he would not agree to resign from the union at the end of a probationary period as fire lieutenant. Respondent's proposed fact finding No. 3(e) has been rejected because Chief McKnight had also been advised by the mayor and the city attorney on the question of the fire lieutenants' managerial status.

Florida Laws (2) 447.203447.501
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WALTER LEE TATE vs MOLD-EX, L.L.C., 00-003846 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Sep. 15, 2000 Number: 00-003846 Latest Update: Feb. 13, 2002

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner was terminated from his employment by the Respondent based on discrimination because of his race in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an African-American male. He was employed at times pertinent hereto until his termination, by the Respondent Mold-Ex, L.L.C. The Respondent is a manufacturing company located in Milton, Florida, which operates a manufacturing facility and operation on a multi-shift basis, engaged in the manufacturing of various plastic and rubber products, particularly automotive-related parts. The Petitioner began employment with the Respondent on September 8, 1989, as a press operator. He also worked as a machine operator for about four months and was promoted to Second Shift Supervisor in the injection department. This is an injection molding operation which molds plastic and rubber parts. The Petitioner was a Second Shift Supervisor in that department for eight and one- half years. The Petitioner reported to Jerry Decker, who was his supervisor. The Petitioner is an employee and the Respondent company is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner's duties included monitoring overall operation of the machinery, training, new employees, setting up machines and jobs, completing attendance reports and holding employee meetings. As many as twenty-three employees were supervised by him on the second shift. The Petitioner was the only black supervisor at Mold-Ex. The Petitioner was terminated from his employment on December 4, 1998. He was told by Mr. Decker, his supervisor, that he was being terminated because the company was "down-sizing" or reducing positions and the number of employees due to financial difficulties. The Petitioner elected to contest this by filing a Charge of Discrimination with the Commission, claiming that he was harmed because he was discharged because of his race. Beginning in early 1998, the corporate parent company which owned Mold-Ex, L.L.C., was experiencing significant financial difficulties. This resulted in part from the "reservoir seal project" which involved a contract for a certain part that the Respondent was to manufacture for the Delphi Division of General Motors Corporation. There were difficulties in manufacturing the reservoir seal successfully, it was difficult to manufacture and required extra labor. It was termed by the Respondent's president as a "real disaster" which caused serious financial drain on the company. The company had a great deal of difficulty in successfully manufacturing the part to the correct specifications and lost much revenue due to unfilled orders and/or improperly manufactured parts which had to be replaced. Additionally, and related to these difficulties, the parent company was having great difficulty meeting its debt service obligations. In fact, the parent company never actually recovered from the financial difficulties from 1998, such that ultimately the Respondent was sold to another corporation. These financial difficulties throughout 1998 resulted, by the fall of that year, in the parent corporation putting significant pressure on the Respondent's management in Milton to reduce costs substantially, including labor costs. The Respondent considered and implemented several ideas for cutting costs, including restructuring the supervision of the operation and otherwise seeking to reduce labor costs. In September of 1998, the Respondent employed an excess of people over those needed to operate efficiently. At that time the Respondent employed approximately three-hundred workers. Because there was an excess of employees and, therefore, payroll expense, a hiring freeze was instituted. This resulted in a steady reduction of employees through not filling positions that were voluntarily vacated by employees leaving the company, as reflected in the Respondent's Exhibit 10 in evidence. The overall operating officer of the Milton facility, Vice President Ettelson, established in his testimony that in late November of 1998, the hiring freeze resulted in a reduced head count which saved the company substantial amounts of money. Thus, by the end of 1998, the company employed only approximately 280 persons instead of the 300 who were employed in September of 1998. By April of 1999, the employment roster was down to approximately two hundred and fifty persons. The Respondent additionally restructured supervision in order to save money and to operate more efficiently, in terms of simply more effective manufacture and filling of orders, as well as in the saving of personnel and related expenses. This restructuring involved combining supervisory positions and re- allocating duties, such that one plant superintendent was placed in charge of all of the operations on the second shift rather than having approximately three supervisors overseeing the individual business units operating on the second shift. The Petitioner was a Second Shift Supervisor whose position was eliminated in this restructuring. His duties were distributed among Mr. Don Brumley, who was a long-experienced employee who was re-hired out of retirement and who became the Second Shift Plant Superintendent; an employee in the injection and molding department, referred to as a "lead-employee" and also to certain individuals on the first shift. The restructuring resulted in a savings of approximately $40,000.00 as to salaries by eliminating three positions and selecting Mr. Brumley as the plant superintendent for the second shift. The re-structuring concentrated on the second shift because the other two shifts required the management personnel that were currently in place. On the first shift, various improvement projects and process development efforts required more intense, active supervision and supervisory personnel that were already in place. On the second shift, because no improvement projects were being conducted, the differences in activity between the second and first shift allowed the company to supervise that entire shift, as to all departments, by placing a strong effective plant superintendent in charge of that entire shift; eliminating three supervisory positions for a substantial savings in expenses. On the third shift, no re- structuring occurred because it was only a small operation of approximately twenty-five employees. The highest management personnel present for that shift was already a lead person in the mixing department and a supervisor in the injection molding department. Additionally, the company management recognized a strong need for a superintendent such as Mr. Brumley who had a record of implementing better disciplinary measures and who could ensure consistency and efficiency of operation in all of the operating departments on the second shift. The re-structuring effort resulted in a change in the reporting system or "chain of command" as well. Prior to re- structuring, three managers, one for each of the three business units (profile extrusion, molding, and reinforced hose), reported directly to Vice President Ettelson. Below these three managers were the supervisors in charge in each individual department within the three business units. For example, in the molding department where the Petitioner worked as Injection Molding Supervisor on the second shift, supervisors in injection molding on the first and third shifts as well as a first shift supervisor in the trim department, for a total of four supervisors, reported directly to molding manager Jerry Decker. Four supervisors reported to the Reinforced Hose Manager, Sidney Hood. Two supervisors reported to Profile Extrusion Manager Steve Wieczorek. Those three managers reported to Vice President Ettelson. After the re-structuring, supervisors remained in place on the first and third shifts, but on the second shift no supervisors remained who would be reporting to the department managers Decker, Hood and Wieczorek. Instead, Don Brumley, re- hired from retirement as the second shift plant superintendent, reported directly to Vice President Ettelson. Don Brumley was therefore in charge of all three business units during the second shift. His duties were much more substantial than the Petitioner's. He managed approximately 60 people while the Petitioner had managed approximately 20 to 23 people. Mr. Brumley had more administrative duties than did the Petitioner. He had hiring and firing authority that the Petitioner did not have and had the responsibility for adherence to company policy on the entire second shift rather than in only one department. Molding Manager, Jerry Decker, established that the re-structuring organization functioned effectively. It resulted in the elimination of the Petitioner's position on or about December 4, 1998. Additionally, two white males in supervisory roles were terminated by the Respondent because of the re-structuring. The Petitioner maintained that one of those terminated white individuals, Dan Lowery, had been out of work seven months with tuberculosis and was permanently disabled and, therefore, was terminated because he was not qualified to perform his job duties. However, the Human Resources coordinator, Nick Bores, the person with probably the most knowledge and insight concerning Mr. Lowery's employment capabilities, established in a credible fashion that Mr. Lowery had indeed been on leave for a few months due to his illness but returned to his employment duties with a full clearance from his physician to perform all of his duties. This testimony was corroborated by that of molding manager Jerry Decker and Vice President David Ettelson and is accepted. The Petitioner also contended in his testimony, in essence, that racially discriminatory motivation for his termination existed as shown by two incidents. One incident in 1997 involved an employee who had been disciplined in some way by the Petitioner, who then purportedly placed a "swastika" symbol on the Petitioner's car in the parking lot. The Petitioner asserts that the employee was not disciplined for that act, which he contends was indicative of racially discriminatory animus toward him by the Respondent's management. In fact, however, the Respondent did not discipline that employee because, upon questioning, he denied the conduct. The Respondent had no independent proof that he was guilty of the act. The Petitioner himself was not disciplined on an occasion when he was accused of sexual harassment by a female employee, because he denied it and the Respondent had no independent proof that he was guilty of the alleged conduct. Moreover, at about the same time as the "swastika incident" the Petitioner received a written commendation, signed by CEO Thomas Henry and Vice President Ettelson. These facts, considered together, tend to show lack of racial animus by the company management. The other incident described by the Petitioner related to management reaction to observing an employee under the Petitioner's charge failing to wear safety goggles. Mr. Ettelson purportedly told the Petitioner he would "kick his butt" if his employees again failed to wear protective goggles. This statement, if made, may be coarse or harsh, but was not shown to be other than an isolated occurrence. Moreover, it does not evince a racially discriminatory motive or attitude on the part of an employment-related decision-maker. The Petitioner maintained that his replacement, Don Brumley, was not qualified for the position created by the re- structuring and that his "lead man," Eddie Byers, was the only person in the department who could have performed the duties that the Petitioner had performed. This testimony, however, is rebutted by the testimony of witnesses Decker, Ettelson and Thomas Henry, the CEO of the company. Their testimony establishes that Mr. Brumley was well-qualified to assume management of the entire second shift operations as Plant Superintendent which included the scope of the Petitioner's job but included other substantial duties and responsibilities as well. In fact, with the exception of being retired for approximately one year, Mr. Brumley worked for the Respondent since 1963 and was the company's first employee after it was founded by Mr. Henry, his father and Mr. Henry's brother. Prior to his retirement, Mr. Brumley functioned as Compression Molding Manager, which was a position above the Petitioner's position level in the hierarchy of the company and at the same level as the Petitioner's former supervisor, Jerry Decker. In fact, Mr. Brumley, at one time, had a supervisory role over the Petitioner. The Petitioner's experience was limited to one department during his tenure with the company. Mr. Brumley, however, had worked in all departments in his 36 years with the Respondent. Mr. Brumley knew the operations of the company very well and bringing him back to the company to function as the Second Shift Plant Superintendent, with his skills and experience, saved the company substantial expenses by allowing it to avoid the necessity of retaining other employees. Additionally, Mr. Brumley had a reputation as a strict disciplinarian and Mr. Ettelson and the company management felt that stricter discipline was required for the operations on the second shift. When the Petitioner was terminated he was offered a severance package of four weeks' pay at the time of termination, but elected not to accept that offer. He was not offered a different employment position with the Respondent because no suitable options, in terms of his skills and qualifications and in relation to his salary level, were available with the company at that time. The Petitioner was earning $7.80 per hour, at the time of his termination and his annual salary, without overtime, was $16,234.00. During 1998, which was his best year in terms of income, he earned approximately $27,000.00 when overtime was added to his regular salary. The Petitioner earned a total of $13,175.72, in 1999 and earned $3,117.00 in unemployment compensation in 1999. He earned $7,513.51, when employed by Britt Landrum Temporaries, Inc., in 1999, and earned $1,608.01 when employed by Interim Services, Inc., in 1999. Additionally, he was employed by Transport Leasing Contract, Inc., in 1999 and earned $937.20 with that employer. Since approximately January 2000, the Petitioner has been working at the Waterfront Mission and earned $6.50 per hour, and then in September 2000, was raised to $7.00 per hour. The Petitioner concedes that with his qualifications and experience he could obtain employment at more than $7.00 per hour, which he makes at the Waterfront Mission. He chose to work at the Waterfront Mission because that employment is compatible with his calling to be a minister. He desires to have work which is compatible with his duties as a pastor for two churches in the area. He has earned about $375.00 per month as a pastor for his two churches since approximately May 2000. The Respondent presented evidence by witnesses Ettelson, Decker and Bores, the Human Resources coordinator, all of whom testified that the re-structuring plan, which included the elimination of the Petitioner's position, was for the purpose of serving the above-referenced financial business needs in relation to reducing costs, as the reasons which led to the Petitioner's termination. All testified that the primary goal was reducing costs in order to help the company to survive its business downturn, including the fact, established by Mr. Henry's testimony, that the United Auto Workers strike of the Delphi Division of General Motors began in the summer of 1998. This caused a loss of approximately one-million dollars per month. That is the reason that the re-structuring was effected which allowed them to bring in a more experienced man, Mr. Brumley, who was qualified to run the entire department at lower costs as the Plant Superintendent on the second shift, rendering the Petitioner's job and position unnecessary. Their testimony that these business reasons were the cause of the re- structuring and the Petitioner's termination is accepted, rather than the Petitioner's contention that the reasons for his termination involved his race.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.L. 1108-A North 12th Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32501 Heather Fisher Lindsay, Esquire Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, P.C. 1400 South Trust Tower Birmingham, Alabama 35203 Azizi Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (4) 120.57760.01760.10760.11
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DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, DIVISION OF WORKERS` COMPENSATION vs TOM DYBALSKI ENTERPRISES, INC., 98-002495 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Jun. 02, 1998 Number: 98-002495 Latest Update: Jan. 21, 1999

The Issue The issue is whether two persons were employees or independent contractors of Respondent, pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and, if employees, an additional issue is the penalty that Petitioner should impose against Respondent for his failure to obtain workers’ compensation coverage for the two employees.

Findings Of Fact At the time in question, Respondent was in the business of erecting enclosures for swimming pools. On most of these jobs, Respondent served as a subcontractor of Commercial Residential Construction. On April 7, 1998, Respondent was providing labor and materials, as a subcontractor to Commercial Residential Construction, on a screened-enclosure job located at 2242 Otter Creek Lane in Sarasota. Commercial Residential Construction supplied the aluminum and screen used for this job. For this job, Respondent hired two individuals who had worked for Commercial Residential Construction or other independent contractors in the construction business. Respondent did not have workers’ compensation coverage for the two individuals working with him on this job. Respondent’s agreement with these two persons was to pay them, on a weekly basis, a specified percentage of the total price that Respondent was to receive for the work. If the contractor refused to pay Respondent due to unsatisfactory work, then Respondent would not pay the two individuals. The two individuals had to supply their own tools. Sometimes they transported themselves to the job site; sometimes, as a matter of convenience, Tom Dybalski, the owner of Respondent, transported them or was transported by them. The two individuals did not testify. Petitioner called Mr. Dybalski as a witness; otherwise, Petitioner’s witnesses consisted exclusively of staff and investigators. However, these witnesses were unable to establish the statements of the two putative employees because of hearsay. The findings of fact contained in this recommended order are derived from Mr. Dybalski’s testimony or admissions made to one of Petitioner’s investigators. However, the administrative law judge has not relied on hearsay testimony, which is admissible under the exception for admissions against interest, that Mr. Dyblaski admitted that the two individuals were employees. Mr. Dyblaski is an aluminum contractor, not an attorney, and his “concession” concerning a complex matter, especially given his obvious ignorance of the applicable legal criteria, is not entitled to any weight. Admissible evidence does not establish whether the two individuals had exemptions from workers’ compensation. Mr. Dybalski testified that he did not know whether they did. The two individuals did not testify, so it is impossible to determine from this source whether they had exemptions. The record is similarly devoid of competent evidence establishing Respondent’s contention that the two individuals were employees of Commercial Residential Construction while working on the subject job.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Workers’ Compensation enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of failing to obtain workers’ compensation coverage to two employees and imposing a penalty in the amount of $1000. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Louise T. Sadler Senior Attorney Division of Labor and Employment Security Suite 307, Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 A. Brent McPeek Attorney 3986 South Tamiami Trail Venice, Florida 34293 Edward A. Dion, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Douglas L. Jamerson, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152

Florida Laws (4) 120.57440.10440.107440.13
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FLOYD PEACOCK vs AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC., D/B/A AIR PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING CORP., 90-001222 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Feb. 28, 1990 Number: 90-001222 Latest Update: Mar. 28, 1997

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner filed his complaint against Respondent for race discrimination more than 180 days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practices contrary to Section 760.10(10), Florida Statutes (1989).

Findings Of Fact The parties' Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Material Facts constitute the following findings of fact: The Petitioner, Floyd Peacock, Jr., a black male, was hired by the Respondent, Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., on August 22, 1980. The Petitioner was initially hired and employed by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic at the hire (entry) level. On August 22, 1980, James Coleman, a white male, was hired by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic. On August 25, 1980, Elvin Higgins, a white male, was hired by the Respondent as a maintenance mechanic at the second year step level. The Respondent has had two means of filling the vacancies that arose in the plant. First, whenever someone left the Respondent's employ due to retirement, a voluntary discharge, or involuntary termination, that vacancy would be posted on a job board on the Respondent's premises. Employees wishing to transfer to the department where the vacancy arose were then allowed to apply, or bid, for the posted vacancy. Bids are awarded based upon job skills and seniority. For positions within the operations department, seniority is determined by the amount of time the employee had with the company. For maintenance positions, seniority is determined by the amount of time the employee had with the maintenance department. The second method used by the Respondent to fill vacancies was a "back- fill" procedure. When an employee's bid was awarded and that employee then transferred to another department, the vacancy created in the transferring employee's department was "back-filled" with a new hire from outside of the company. Additionally, a position that was opened for bids but not bid upon was also back-filled with new hires from outside of the company. In 1982, the Petitioner, whose pay level as a mechanic with the Respondent was at the "second step/year level," became interested in a three- year position in the ammonia methanol area and inquired about bidding for the job. He was told by the personnel manager, Laura Finn, that since he was at the two-year level, he did not qualify for the three-year position. The Petitioner did not bid for the job. Two white males, Roy Mony and Clayton Perry, who were previously employed as mechanics with Carroll Construction, as had the Petitioner, were hired at the "third step/year level" and placed in the two "third step/year level" mechanics jobs. The Petitioner filed no charge or complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission concerning his not bidding for the "three step/year level" mechanics position or the hiring and assigning of the two white males "three-step" mechanics to those positions in 1982. At the time of his "fifth-year step" mechanic's interview in 1985 for obtaining his "five year/step" pay increase, the Petitioner confirmed with his supervisor that James Coleman had been made senior mechanic and had been advanced to the "senior mechanic" pay level. The Petitioner was given a "fifth year/step" mechanic's pay increase. Soon after the 1985 pay increase interview, the Petitioner went to the Respondent's Personnel Department with his supervisor to inquire about why James Coleman had been made a senior mechanic before the Petitioner. When the personnel manager was unable to provide the reason, the Petitioner talked with a staff member of the Escambia-Santa Rosa Human Relations Commission about his being given a "fifth year/step" mechanic's pay increase while James Coleman received a senior mechanic's title and pay increase. However, the Petitioner did not file any complaint with that agency or with the Florida Commission on Human Relations or the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. In June, 1986, the Respondent had a reduction in force (RIF) that resulted in some employees' employment being terminated and other employees being reassigned to other lower level and lower paying jobs. The following actions were taken as part of the RIF process in June, 1986: Maintenance mechanics hired prior to June 10, 1977, continued in their positions. Maintenance mechanics hired after June 20, 1977, but before the Petitioner's date of hire of August 22, 1980, were assigned permanent operator positions. Fifteen or sixteen maintenance mechanics who had been hired on or after the Petitioner's date of hire were placed in a temporary job position designated as "utility operators." Among the mechanics retained in the employ of the Respondent but assigned as utility operators was Elvin Higgins, a white male senior mechanic, and the Petitioner. The remaining mechanics were discharged as a result of the RIF in June, 1986. Among the mechanics who were discharged at that time were Roy Mony and Clayton Perry, whose hiring dates were after the Petitioner's date of hire. The utility operator position was a new, temporary position created in response to the RIF. In lieu of being discharged, fifteen employees, including Petitioner, were placed in the utility operator position. Utility operators worked at reduced pay, performing work previously accomplished by independent contractors. As vacancies arose in other departments of the company, one by one, each of the utility operators were to fill these vacancies until no one remained in the utility operator position. The respondent provided the utility operators with two means of transferring out of the utility operator position into a regular, higher paying position. First, utility operators were allowed to bid on any position that was subject to the Respondent's customary bid procedure. The second means that the utility operators had for leaving the utility operator position was through the assignment of a "back-fill" position. Instead of back-filling positions with new hires from outside of the company, as was the procedure before the RIF, utility operators were to be assigned to the back-fill positions. A utility operator would be back-filled into any vacancy that had been opened up for bids under the customary bid procedure, but on which no one had bid. Second, utility operators could be back-filled into a secondary vacancy created when another employee transferred from one position to another. The utility operators were to back-fill these non-bidded [sic] positions and secondary vacancies in order of seniority with the company (i.e., by date of hire). In June, 1986, when Elvin Higgins was reduced from senior mechanic to a utility operator because of the reduction in force (RIF), the Petitioner first became aware that Elvin Higgins had previously received senior mechanic status. On July 28, 1987, Aubry Garrett, one of the utility operators, used the normal bid procedure and successfully "bid-out" of the utility operator's position and took an operator's position. The Petitioner did not bid for this position. Between the time of the RIF in June, 1986, and the time the first back-fill position arose in September, 1987, the Respondent had not provided its employees with a finalized written or oral statement about how the back-fill positions would be administered after the RIF; however, during this period before the Petitioner refused the first back-fill position, when asked about this procedure by employees, Ernest Labadie, the personnel manager, told them that utility operators would be assigned back-fill positions in the order of the employees' length of service with the company. In September, 1987, two operator positions became available for utility operators to "back-fill" as secondary vacancies. The Petitioner, as the most senior utility operator based on date of hire, was offered one of the positions, but he refused the job because it was rotating shift work and he desired to work only "day hours" like he was working as a utility operator and had worked as a maintenance mechanic. Elvin Higgins and Gene Moore, the next senior utility operators based on date of hire, accepted the "back-fill" positions and were assigned those positions in early October, 1987. At the time of the Petitioner's refusal to "back-fill" and accept the available advancement to operator, the Petitioner was informed by Ernest Labadie, the personnel manager, that the Petitioner would be placed at the bottom of the list of the utility operators for future "back-filling" of jobs by utility operators. The Petitioner made no complaint to anyone or any agency about his being placed at the bottom of the list of utility operators for "back-filling" purposes in September, 1987, and believed at that time that his placement at the bottom of the list was fair and not discriminatory. Gary Kent is a white male who is senior the Petitioner both by date of hire and by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department. Before the reduction in force (RIF) in June, 1986, Mr. Kent was a mechanic, but as a result of the RIF, he was transferred to an operator's position in the amines area of the company. The amines job was not shift work. On November 24, 1987, Mr. Kent bid for an operator's position in the PVC area and received the job on December 8, 1987. His move to the PVC area from the amines area resulted in an operator vacancy (secondary vacancy) in the amines area that would be "back- filled" from the utility operators' list (i.e., without the need for bidding for the vacant position). On December 8, 1987, the vacant operator position in the amines area was "back-filled" by David Hart, who was the next utility operator on the "back- fill" list since the Petitioner was at the bottom of the list. The Petitioner became aware of this assignment, or surmised that the assignment of Mr. Hart to the amines area would occur, before the announcement of the assignment was posted and when he heard that Mr. Kent had bid for the PVC area operator position. In November or December, 1987, the Petitioner spoke with the personnel manager, Mr. Labadie, about the Petitioner's chances of getting the vacant amines area operator position that was to be "back-filled" since Gary Kent had bid for the PVC operator's position. The Petitioner was interested in this operator position because it was not a rotating shift job. The Petitioner was told that consistent with the personnel manger's discussions with the Petitioner in October, 1987, the Petitioner was not eligible to "back-fill" the position because he was at the bottom of the "back-fill" list. The Petitioner accepted the explanation and understood the policy and procedure for "back-filling." The Petitioner made no complaint to anyone about assigning the amines area operator's job to Mr. Hart instead of to the Petitioner. In January, 1988, Bruce Holiday, a white male who is senior to the Petitioner by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department and who has been working as an operator after the reduction in force, bid for and received on February 1, 1988, the assignment back into the maintenance mechanic. The Petitioner had bid for this position but has no complaint of racial discrimination about his not being awarded the position because Mr. Holiday was a senior to the Petitioner for the maintenance mechanic position by the amount of time in the maintenance department. In February, 1988, the Petitioner and the other two last remaining utility operators, Randy Mock and Lawrence Pearce, were assigned and "back- filled" to operator positions. The Petitioner made no complaint and has no complaint about this assignment. In November, 1988, Gary Kent, who was also senior to the Petitioner both by date of hire and by amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department, bid for and received on November 20, 1988, an assignment back into the maintenance department as a maintenance mechanic, a position subject to the customary bidding procedures. The Petitioner had also bid for this position. The announcement of Mr. Kent's assignment was posted on the bulletin board for employees to see. The Petitioner became aware of the assignment of Mr. Kent to maintenance on or before the posting of the announcement on November 16, 1988. On or about November 16, 1988, the Petitioner discussed with Mr. Labadie, the personnel manager, Mr. Kent's bidding and being assigned into the maintenance department as a mechanic. The Petitioner complained that since Mr. Kent had previously bid and received the PVC position in December, 1987, Mr. Kent, in the Petitioner's view, had decided at that time that Mr. Kent did not want to go back into the maintenance department. Therefore, the Petitioner surmised that, even though Mr. Kent would later be the senior person eligible to be awarded a maintenance mechanic job if he had bid it, Mr. Kent should have been "placed at the bottom of the list" for purposes of bidding on any maintenance mechanic positions. The Petitioner asserted that this would be consistent with his being placed at the bottom of the "back-fill" list when he refused to accept the "back-fill" assignment in September or October, 1987. Mr. Labadie asserted in response to the Petitioner that there was nothing inconsistent since Mr. Kent's assignment was pursuant to and consistent with the Respondent's bidding procedures and policies for maintenance department positions which were in effect and used both before and after the RIF (and under which the Petitioner was allowed to bid and did bid for mechanic's positions); while the Petitioner's assignments from utility operator to the operator positions were governed by the "back-fill" procedure. The Petitioner personally did not agree with and did not accept this explanation, although he understood the two different procedures, and told Mr. Labadie that it was Petitioner's opinion that the bidding and "back-filling" should operate the same way. In January, 1989, the Petitioner again had a similar conversation with Mr. Labadie about Mr. Kent's bidding and being assigned a maintenance mechanic's job and the Petitioner's being put at the bottom of the "back-fill" list for assignment to operator positions. In late February, 1989, Ricky Cook and John Rink, both white males who are senior to the Petitioner by the amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department and who had been working as operators after the June, 1986 reduction in force, bid for and received assignments back into the maintenance department as mechanics. The Petitioner has no complaint, based on racial discrimination or otherwise, as to these assignments. The Petitioner's employment discrimination charge was filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations on March 27, 1989, and filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on March 31, 1989. On or about March 29, 1989, the Petitioner bid for and received assignment to maintenance mechanic in the Respondent's maintenance department, along with Larry Perritt, who is a white male and who was a senior to the Petitioner by the amount of time in the Respondent's maintenance department. The Petitioner was assigned the job on April 16, 1989, at the senior mechanic pay level. The Petitioner has no complaints about any of these assignments. The Petitioner received a pay increase at the "top level" of senior mechanic in October, 1989, after serving six (6) months in that position. In October, 1989, Elvin Higgins, after bidding for the position, was assigned to maintenance mechanic at the senior mechanic pay level.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charges. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of June, 1995. SUZANNE F. HOOD, Hearing Officer Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Johnson, Esq. Spriggs & Johnson W. College Ave. Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ralph B. Peterson, Esq. Beggs & Lane P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576-2950 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esq. Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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JACK L. SHOEMAKER vs TARMAC AMERICA, INC., D/B/A TARMAC FLORIDA, INC., 96-004418 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Melbourne, Florida Sep. 20, 1996 Number: 96-004418 Latest Update: Apr. 28, 1997

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner for the reasons stated in the Charge Of Discrimination and Petition For Relief.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing, distributing, and selling cement and concrete. Respondent operates throughout the state and employs a substantial number of people. Respondent maintains an Equal Employment Opportunity Policy (the "policy"). Respondent promulgates the policy to all employees in its various facilities throughout the state. Respondent encourages the employment of disabled but qualified individuals. Respondent routinely makes reasonable accommodations for disabled employees. Respondent first employed Petitioner on June 29, 1981, but terminated that employment. Respondent subsequently rehired Petitioner in February, 1983, as a ready-mix driver and front end loader, and also as an occasional batcher. Respondent employed Petitioner in various positions until Petitioner resigned his last position on October 5, 1993. During his employment, Petitioner suffered physical injuries that resulted in both temporary and permanent impairment. All of the injuries occurred from work-related accidents. Petitioner suffered no other physical impairment. Petitioner is not physically disabled as a result of the physical injuries he suffered from his work-related accidents. The injuries Petitioner suffered did not substantially limit his ability to perform his duties and responsibilities. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's physical impairment. Respondent provided Petitioner with reasonable accommodations. The first injury to Petitioner occurred on August 5, 1986. While driving a cement truck for Respondent, Petitioner drove his truck off of the road to avoid hitting a car that was stopped in front of him. Petitioner was thrown into the steering wheel and injured his stomach. Petitioner also injured his back and was treated by a chiropractor. On October 6, 1987, Petitioner reached maximum medical improvement under Workers' Compensation guidelines. His back injury left him with a total permanent impairment of seven percent. Petitioner returned to work on March 5, 1987. Respondent offered both light duty and regular work to Petitioner from October 6 through March 27, 1987. However, Petitioner refused to return to work prior to March, 1987, due to a labor dispute involving Teamsters Local 769. When the labor dispute was resolved, Petitioner returned to work as a batcher. The position was not defined specifically as a light duty job. However, it did accommodate the work restrictions prescribed after his previous accident. Petitioner subsequently resumed driving a truck for the Respondent. Petitioner was able to drive without restrictions. On March 17, 1988, Petitioner had the latest in a series of accidents as a truck driver for Respondent. On March 21, 1988, Respondent notified Petitioner that he had exceeded the number of accidents permitted under Respondent's "Accident Classification Policy" and prohibited Petitioner from operating any company vehicle for Respondent until further notice. On January 29, 1990, Petitioner passed a physical examination to be recertified as physically qualified to drive a truck. The examining physician certified Petitioner as physically able to drive a truck. Petitioner verified on the examination form that he did not suffer from any permanent defects resulting from illness, disease, or injury. Petitioner continued treatment for chronic discomfort caused by the back injury he sustained in August 1986. Petitioner's chiropractor intermittently prescribed light duty to alleviate Petitioner's discomfort. On September 6, 1991, Respondent attempted to accommodate Petitioner's chronic discomfort. Respondent offered Petitioner a position as a dispatcher in Respondent's Cocoa facility. The dispatcher position was not a light duty job. However, it did accommodate Petitioner's intermittent need for light duty work to alleviate his discomfort. Petitioner declined the dispatcher position. Petitioner elected to replace a junior truck driver in another location. Petitioner's chronic back discomfort continued to cause absences from work and frequent need for light duty work. However, no permanent light duty positions existed. Respondent repeatedly created temporary light duty work for Petitioner in attempts to provide Petitioner with employment. Respondent experienced increasing difficulty finding suitable work for Petitioner. The vast majority of positions involved a greater degree of manual labor than Petitioner was able to perform under his work restrictions. On August 13, 1992, Respondent's Worker's Compensation carrier had Petitioner examined by an orthopedic surgeon. At the time, Petitioner was being treated once a week by his chiropractor. Petitioner had a full range of motion in his cervical region, shoulders, elbows, wrists and fingers. X-rays showed no fracture, dislocation, or congenital abnormality. The orthopedic surgeon diagnosed Petitioner as suffering from a cervical sprain or strain which had become somewhat chronic in nature. He found that Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement with a total permanent impairment of four percent according to Workers' Compensation guidelines. The orthopedic surgeon determined that Petitioner was able to work on a regular basis without restrictions. He concluded that Petitioner's permanent impairment did not interfere with the performance of his occupation. Petitioner aggravated his back injury while driving a truck. Petitioner's chiropractor excused him from work from September 28 through September 30, 1992, and placed him on light duty from December 10, 1992 through January 14, 1993. On December 17, 1992, the chiropractor sent a letter to Respondent's Risk Management Director discussing Petitioner's work restrictions. The letter designated Petitioner's work restrictions as: no prolonged sitting; no lifting over 30 pounds; no repetitive bending or twisting; and no climbing ladders. Climbing stairs was permitted. Petitioner's work restrictions continued in effect during the remainder of Petitioner's employment. In December, 1992, Respondent was unable to create temporary light duty work for Petitioner. Respondent had no other work available that accommodated Petitioner's work restrictions. Petitioner applied for Worker's Compensation benefits and apparently sought other employment for approximately two weeks. On January 5, 1993, Respondent located a suitable temporary position as a batcher at the Tarmac plant in Melbourne, Florida. Petitioner temporarily replaced the permanent batcher who was out on an extended illness. The batcher position was not a light duty position. However, it did accommodate Petitioner's work restrictions. After the permanent batcher returned, Respondent continued to find work Petitioner could perform. Respondent found temporary light duty work at the Melbourne plant. Respondent created a temporary position for an "aggregate dispatcher." Two employees performed the functions of the aggregate dispatcher in addition to their other regular job duties. The aggregate dispatcher position was not a position for which Respondent had a need. Respondent created the position for Petitioner in an attempt to accommodate his work restrictions and to keep him working. Respondent never represented the position as a permanent solution to Petitioner's need for light duty work. In July 1993, the permanent dispatcher at the Melbourne plant asked to move to another position. Respondent offered the full-time position to Petitioner. The dispatcher position was not a light duty position. However, it did accommodate Petitioner's work restrictions. Petitioner accepted the dispatcher position at the Melbourne plant. On August 1, 1993, Respondent promoted Petitioner to dispatcher and increased Petitioner's salary accordingly. Petitioner complained that he was unable to do the work by himself. Petitioner requested help to perform the job. The dispatcher job at the Melbourne plant had always been performed by one person and was routinely performed by one person at other locations. However, Respondent instructed Petitioner's supervisors to give him assistance when needed. In late August 1993, Petitioner stated to his supervisors that he could not perform the duties of dispatcher because he could not cope with the stress. Petitioner asked to be relieved of his responsibilities and resigned as dispatcher. No other suitable work was available. Petitioner agreed to remain in the dispatcher position until a replacement was hired and trained. A dispatcher from another plant, a 42 year-old female, transferred and took over the job. Petitioner's last day of employment was October 5, 1993. Unknown to Respondent, Petitioner was suffering from a severe major depression when he resigned from Respondent's employment. Sometime after August 13, 1996, an Administrative Law Judge for the U.S. Social Security Administration found that Petitioner had been disabled, within the meaning of the Social Security Act, since October 5, 1993. Petitioner suffered from a dysthymic disorder. He had a history involving a depressed mood. Petitioner did not respond to treatment. Petitioner lost his appetite, suffered insomnia, lethargy, inability to modulate anger in an effective manner, and disinterest in almost all activities. Petitioner was disabled. He was substantially limited in his ability to perform a major life activity such as work. Petitioner was significantly restricted, when compared with the average person having similar qualifications, from performing a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. Petitioner entertained thoughts of suicide. He did not have the ability to follow instructions or to function independently. He had very limited concentration. His memory was impaired. Petitioner had marked deficiencies in concentration, persistence, pace, daily living skills, and socialization. Petitioner's disability prevented him from completing tasks in a timely manner. He suffered episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work resulting in withdrawal from the situation or exacerbation of his symptoms. Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner on the basis of Petitioner's disability. Petitioner's disability existed for some time before Petitioner resigned from Respondent's employment. During that time, Respondent repeatedly provided Petitioner with reasonable accommodations to enable Petitioner to continue his employment with Respondent. Petitioner performed the duties of dispatcher satisfactorily prior to his resignation. There were no complaints about his work. Respondent had no reason to terminate Petitioner from the position. Petitioner did not express an interest in the possibility of alternative employment with Respondent. Petitioner did not request any further accommodations to enable him to continue working for Respondent. Petitioner's physical impairment did not prevent him from performing the dispatcher job. The dispatcher job at the Melbourne plant no longer exists because Respondent has undergone major restructuring. The functions of the dispatcher are presently divided among different individuals. Some of the functions are no longer performed at individual plants but are performed at centralized locations.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent not guilty of discriminating against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of April 1997 COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission On Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission On Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jack L. Shoemaker, pro se 106 Cameron Street, Southeast Palm Bay, Florida 32909 Charles S. Caulkins, Esquire Wendy J. Smith, Esquire Fisher and Phillips 2300 Nations Bank Tower One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394

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ORANGE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs. JOHN PALOWITCH AND ORANGE COUNTY CLASSROOM TEACHERS, 76-001714 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001714 Latest Update: Feb. 17, 1977

Findings Of Fact The Business of Respondent The Respondent is a public employer with its principle place of business located in Orange County, Florida, where it is engaged in the business of operating a school system. Respondent is created directly by the Florida State Constitution or legislative body so as to constitute a department or administrative arm of the government and is administered by individuals who are responsible to the public officials or to the general electorate. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The Employee Organization Involved The Orange County Classroom Teachers Association is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. Background During April, 1975, PERC certified the employee organization as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the following collective bargaining unit: INCLUDED: All certified non-administrative personnel including the following: teachers, teachers-countywide, teachers-exceptional, teachers-gifted, speech therapist, teachers- specific learning disabilities, teachers-adults full-time, guidance personnel, occupational specialist, teachers-adult basic education, librarians-media specialist, deans, department chairpersons, physical therapist. EXCLUDED: All other positions of the Orange County Public Schools. Soon thereafter, the CTA and the School Board began negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement. Each party submitted written proposals or counter proposals. (See Joint Exhibit #3 and #4, received in evidence). When negotiations began, teachers in the bargaining unit represented by the CTA were employed in one of the following categories: 10, 11, or 12-month contract. While most bargaining unit members were on 10-month contract status, some guidance counselors and approximately 90 teachers commonly referred to as vocational/technical teachers were on 12-month contract status. `These 90 vocational/technical teachers had been on 12-month contract status since at least 1970 and some since at least 1965. The negotiations resulted in a collective bargaining agreement which became effective on October 1, 1975. (Joint Exhibit #1). Neither the CTA's proposals nor the School Board's counter proposals for the 1975-76 contract contained a provision expressly granting the School Board the right to unilaterally change 12-month employees to 12 month status. Additionally, there was no specific discussion during negotiations regarding the alteration of the vocational/ technical teachers' 12-month contract status. During late spring, 1975, the Charging Party, and others similarly situated, were informed that during the 1975-76 fiscal year (which runs from July 1, 1975 through June 30, 1976) they would be employed for a full twelve months. They began their twelve month period of employment on July 1, 1975, prior to the effective date of the collective bargaining agreement-between the Board and the teachers' union. At that time there were approximately 200 teachers employed within the vocational/technical and adult education department. During the 1975-1976 school year, the school system with the exception of the post-secondary programs operated for two full semesters plus a summer school. Portions of the post-secondary programs, such as the vocational/technical and adult educational programs operated on a year-round basis. During the school year, the School Board decided to institute a system- wide program of year-round schools by adopting the quinmester system. Under the quinmester system the year is divided into five terms, each consisting of forty- five (45) days of student class time. Students can attend all five terms (or quins) thereby allowing them to graduate early, take extra courses or make up failed courses. Respondent takes the position that it was not possible to employ teachers on the 12-month basis as they would not be available for the required number of days. This is based on the fact that, as stated during the hearing under the 12-month system of employment, employees were only available for a total of 233 working days. Such a figure is derived by taking the number of days in a year, 365, and subtracting the number of Saturdays and Sundays, 104, which leaves 261 days. The School Board allows up to nineteen (19) days annual leave each year. Further, employees did not work on nine legal holidays on which the school system was closed which together with the 19 days annual leave made an additional 28 days that the employees would not be available for work in addition to the 104 Saturdays and Sundays. Thus when Saturdays, Sundays, Holidays and leave time are subtracted from the total 365 days, there are 233 available working days that employees working on a 12-month basis would be available. Therefore, the Board contended that in making its operational decision to change to a year-round school system, by adoption of the quinmester program, it needed employees to be available for 237 days if the teacher would be available to work all five quinmesters. Such a figure is derived by computing the number of days that the student will attend and the number of days that the teacher would therefore be required to be in attendance. Under the quinmester system, the student attends classes forty-five (45) days each quinmester, which means that the teacher needs to be present at least 225 days when the students are going to be present. Additionally, the Respondent urges that the collective bargaining agreement (Joint Exhibit #2) requires that teachers be on duty twelve (12) days when the students are not in attendance. These twelve days consist of five days of preplanning, five days of in-service training and two days of post-planning. With these figures, it is apparent that the teacher who is to work the entire year must be available the 225 days which the students are to be present together with the twelve days which the students are not present. Thus, wider this system, the teachers must be available 237 days during the school year. It is based on these figures that the Respondent contends that it made the operational decision to convert to a year-round school system, during the spring of 1976. In so doing, the Board advised its employees in the bargaining unit that they would be employed for an initial period of ten (10) months and given an extended contract for services rendered in programs extending beyond the regular school year. The regular school year comprises 196 days during a 10-month period of employment. Under the 10-month appointment, the teacher would be employed for an initial period of 196 days as provided for by the collective bargaining agreement and by statute. Out of the 196 days, the teacher earns 4 days leave which leaves available 192 work days in the initial employment period. The 192 work days include the 12 days that teachers are present and students are not. It also includes 180 days that the teacher is present with the students. This of course equals the first 4 quinmesters. The teacher employed to work year-round during the fifth quinmester would, under the operation of the quinmester system, be issued an extended contract to cover the additional 45 days of the fifth quinmester. By so doing, the 45 working days of the fifth quinmester with the 192 working days of the initial employment period provided for in the 10-month contracts provides the total 237 days needed to implement the year-round school system. It suffices to say that the neither the employee organization nor Respondent bargained about the implementation of the year-round school system. The teachers' union was not given advance notice of this action by the school board nor was there any attempt by the school board to bargain the impact of this decision with the teachers' union. During the course of the hearing, the Respondent introduced evidence to establish that the Charging Party and others similarly situated who are employed on a 10-month basis would receive a salary of $17,629.00 whereas the salary for the same services rendered under the 10-month plus extended contracts for the fifth quinmester would be $18,063.75. Respondent also introduced evidence establishing that the sick leave under either system was identical and that the Charging Party and others similarly situated are able to work 4 more work days under the 10-month plus extended contract than was available under the 12-month system. As stated, Respondent does not deny that it made its decision to employ vocational/technical teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis and that such was a departure of the contract status which said teachers had received in the past. In making its decision, Respondent contends that its acts were permissible under Chapter 447.209,F.S., since it is clothed with the statutory authority to unilaterally "determine the purpose of each of its constituent agencies, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion over its organizations and operations It contends further that armed with this authority, it was not required to bargain concerning its management rights (which it contends that this was) in that here there is no violation of any contractual provision or of any other section of Chapter 447, Florida Statues, since Chapter 447 does not call for year-round bargaining. Chapter 447.309, F.S., provides in pertinent part that a certified employee organization and the public employer shall jointly bargain collectively in the determination of the wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees. Respondent contends that since a collective bargaining agreement "shall contain all the terms and conditions of employment for the bargaining unit employees" and that since the current collective bargaining agreement does not provide in any part that bargaining unit employees are given a contractual right to a 12 month contract, there has been no violation of Chapter 447, F.S. While research reveals no reported decisions in Florida defining or otherwise interpreting terms and conditions of employment, other public employment relations boards aid state courts have determined that terms and conditions of employment means "salaries, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment". The length of the work year is a function of hours or work and thus has been determined to be a term of employment, and thus a public employer is required to negotiate with its employees concerning all terms and conditions unless a specific statutory provision prohibits negotiations on a particular item. See for example, Board of Education of Union Free School District #3 of the Town of Huntington v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, 30 N.Y. 2nd 122 at 129. First of all it is clear in this case that there has been no bargaining on this item and further that there has been no express waiver to bargain regarding the employment term. It is also clear that the employees in question had been granted 12 month contracts during previous years and that they were not advised of the alteration of the term of their contracts until Respondent had unilaterally made its decision to employ said teachers on a 10 month plus extended contract basis. Finally, there is no specific statutory provision which prohibits the parties from negotiating the term of the employment contract other than Section 447.209(5), F.S., which is inapplicable here. Based thereon, I find that the Respondent's actions in unilaterally adopting a year round instructional program by terminating the 12 month contract status of teachers-adult full-time and teachers-adult basic education by placing such teachers on 10 month plus extended contract status was a unilateral alteration of a term and condition of said employees' employment relationship in violation of Sections 447.501(1)(a) and (c) and is a derivative violation of Section 447.301(a) of the Act.

Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it: Bargain collectively upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above. Such duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including changes in the term of the contract year of said bargaining unit employees. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by PERC, a notice substantially providing: that it will not refuse to bargain, upon request, with the Orange County Classroom Teachers Association, as exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above; and that its duty to bargain shall extend to all mandatory subjects of bargaining including, but not limited to, any changes in the term of the employment contracts of bargaining unit employees. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Rowland, Petruska, Bowen & McDonald by John W. Bowen, Esquire 308 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Thomas W. Brooks, Esquire Staff Attorney for the Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John W. Palowitch, President Orange County Classroom Teachers Association 6990 Lake Ellenor Drive Orlando, Florida

Florida Laws (5) 447.203447.209447.301447.309447.501
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NATHANIEL E. SMITH vs. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO., 79-002169 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002169 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

The Issue Whether, as alleged, Respondent, International Paper Company, violated the Human Rights Act of 1977, by discharging Petitioner from employment because of his race or color, and, if so, the affirmative relief which should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a twenty-five year old black male, was hired as a general laborer by the Company on August 4, 1972, and continued in the Company's employment until his discharge on August 28, 1978. During the course of his employment, Petitioner worked at the Company's Panama City pulp and paper mill as a laborer, power plant utility man, turbine operator, assistant water treatment plant operator, and finally, as a power plant tender. Each new job assignment was a promotion and was accompanied by a salary increase. At the time of his discharge by the Company, Petitioner was employed as a power plant tender, and received $9.08 per hour. (Testimony of Petitioner, P.E. 2, 4, 5, 6,) Petitioner's Performance Record During his six years of employment with the Company, Petitioner's work performance was periodically reviewed every six months by this supervisors through completion of an Employee Performance Review Form. His performance records reflect that his work performance was marginally satisfactory, generally meeting minimum Company standards, although falling below average in several areas. He was frequently characterized by his supervisors as an individual who was lazy, laced initiative, needed frequent reminders to do his work, and not dependably present at his work station. His last periodic performance evaluation, dated April 6, 1978, noted that his performance, after two and one half years on the job, had not improved, and that he "must improve his performance during the next period." (P.E. 9) The Petitioner's reactions, during the counseling session on that performance review, were characterized by his supervisor as "passive-unconcerned." Id. (Testimony of Petitioner, P.E. 8, 9) Petitioner's Disciplinary Record Prior to Discharge During his employment with the Company, and prior to the final infraction resulting in his discharge, Petitioner was subject to disciplinary actions by the Company on five separate occasions. Each disciplinary action was evidenced by an Employee Warning Record completed by the Petitioner's foreman at, or near, the time of the infractions. The first three disciplinary infractions occurred on July 8, 1974, January 14, 1976, and May 20, 1977. Each infraction involved defective work performance by Petitioner, or his failure to follow proper work and safety procedures. In each case, the Company action consisted of reprimanding the Petitioner, and warning him that further occurrences of such nature could result in stronger or more serious disciplinary action. (R.E.2) The next disciplinary infraction by Petitioner occurred during May, 1977. Petitioner had been counseled on four separate occasions during the work week beginning May 22, 1977, for being absent fro his area of responsibility, and not answering his calls. On May 27, 1977, he was again reminded of the importance of being in his assigned work area so that he could hear calls and immediately respond. Later that day, Petitioner was told to go to the fourth floor and stand by for a call to start the load burners. When he was later called from the control room, Petitioner did not respond. Upon checking, the shift foreman found him sitting on the fourth floor porch. The pertinent Employee Warning Record concluded: "Communication is a critical part of the Power Plant, and it has been reemphasized to Smith that he must be in the area where he can hear his calls and respond. He understands that a recurrence of this nature will result in more severe disciplinary action." (R.E. 2) On July 7, 1978, Petitioner, without authorization, used a company telephone to make personal long-distance calls at Company expense. In lieu of discharge, the Petitioner was lid off for fourteen working days, and required to reimburse the Company for the telephone charges connected with his calls. The Company expressly informed Petitioner that "further acts of neglect of duty and/or improper use of telephones will be considered as cause for discharge". (R.E. 2) Petitioner's Discharge for Repeated Acts of Neglect of Duty Since 1973, the Petitioner performed various jobs working in the company power plant which furnishes essential power to its Panama City pulp and paper mill. The mill is dependent upon the power plant for its electrical power - a ten minute interruption of power would require the mill to shut down production. Because of the sustained steam pressure, high temperature conditions, and the possibility of ruptured valves and pipes, work at the power plant can be both dangerous and difficult. Power plant workers must be able to respond immediately and effectively to the exigencies associated with operating the plant, and take remedial action. (Testimony of Weathers, Daniels, P.E. 8 and 9) On August 16, 1978, Petitioner worked as a power tender at the mill power plant during the 11:00 P.M. - 7:00 A.M. shift. He became overheated while working in the cinder pit area and asked for and received permission to take a break to "cool-off." Ten to fifteen minute breaks for such purposes were normally authorized at the plant, since no regular lunch hour or breaks were specified during the production workers' eight hour shift. Production workers, such as Petitioner, were required, however, to be on duty, i.e., within the work area or responsive to calls, at all times during their eight hour shifts. (Testimony of Weathers, Daniels, Petitioner) Upon receiving permission to take a break, Petitioner proceeded to the porch and then to the No. 5 men's bathroom. After Petitioner remained absent for twenty - twenty-five minutes, his lead worker, E. J. Weathers became concerned and sought to locate him by calling the control room, and repeatedly paging him on the house loudspeaker system. That system has loudspeakers located throughout the work area, including the bathrooms. (Testimony of Petitioner, Weathers) After Petitioner failed to respond to Weathers' efforts to locate him, Weathers called and reported the Petitioner's absence to his shift supervisor, Marion Daniels. Daniels told him to search for and locate the Petitioner. Five minutes later, Weathers located the Petitioner asleep, seated on the toilet, located in the first stall in the men's bathroom. Weathers, then, reported the incident to Daniels, without waking Petitioner, because Weathers had previously told him not to wake Petitioner if he were found sleeping. Daniels came immediately to the bathroom, where Petitioner remained seated on the toilet, asleep, with his head down, eyes closed, and pants down around his ankles. Daniels called out Petitioner's name, and shined a flashlight in his face - but Petitioner did not respond. Finally, Daniels turned up the squelch volume on his radio, and Petitioner awoke. Petitioner denied he had been sleeping. Approximately thirty - thirty-five minutes elapsed between the commencement of Petitioner's "cooling-off" break, and the awakening of him from his sleep. (Testimony of Weathers, Daniels and Petitioner) Daniels, then, filed a report on the incident with the power plant supervisor. The next day, the superintendent told Petitioner that he would be discharged and informed him of his appeal rights. On August 19, 1978, a meeting was held between the mill manager, union representatives, and Petitioner to discuss the incident. At the close of the meeting, the Petitioner was advised by the mill manager that he was "layed [sic] off until further investigation." On August 25, 1978, Petitioner was informed, in writing, by the mill manager that he was discharged from employment, effective August 22, 1978, for "repeated acts of neglect of duty." (Testimony of Petitioner, P.E. 12) Grounds for Discharge Under Labor Agreement Petitioner's discharge from employment was subject to a Labor Agreement between the Company and two labor unions represented at the Panama City mill. The Agreement lists fifteen specific grounds for the discharge of mill employees. The grounds are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and include, without further elaboration, "neglect of duty," and "deliberate sleeping on duty." An employee's previous disciplinary record may be considered in determining the appropriate disciplinary action, but; "[w]hen an Employee has received no disciplinary action for a period of one year, prior disciplinary warnings for minor offenses will not be used against him." (P.E. 1) (Testimony of Daniels) Several of the more specific grounds listed for discharge, such as "deliberate sleeping on duty," are interpreted by the Company's management as falling within the more general ground for discharge - "neglect of duty." An employee can be discharged for one or more of the grounds which apply to a given factual situation. (Testimony of Daniels) Company's Disciplinary Action Against Caucasian Mill Workers On July 7, 1978, Michael Dewberry, a white male employee, improperly used Company telephones to make long-distance personal calls at the Company's expense. As with Petitioner, he was laid off for fourteen days, required to reimburse the Company, and warned that further acts of neglect of duty or improper use of telephones would be grounds for discharge. He did not subsequently neglect his duty or improperly use the telephones. (Testimony of Petitioner, P.E. 17) Bill O'Neal, a white male employee, was laid off on June 24, 1976, for being under the influence of alcohol. He was given a thirty-day leave of absence with the understanding that he would make a good faith effort at rehabilitation, and expressly warned that future misconduct of such nature would be considered as grounds for discharge. On September 9, 1976, O'Neal was, again, disciplined for reporting to work under the influence of alcohol. Instead of being discharged, O'Neal was suspended from work, and advised that reinstatement would be considered only after he provided proof of having received professional assistance. (P.E. 20) Edward Demers, a white male employee, was disciplined for numerous infractions. On January 1, 1978, Demers was reprimanded for pulling a knife in an argument with another employee; on March 14, 1978, and June 16, 1978, he was reprimanded for reporting late to work, and not reporting prior to the start of his shift, respectively; on June 27, 1978, he was reprimanded for being uncooperative with fellow workers, inattentive to instructions, slow in performing his duties, and making personal telephone calls; and, on August 25, 1978, he was suspended from work for seven working days for defective work, and warned that neglect of such magnitude would not be tolerated and recurrence would result in "the most severe disciplinary action." Occasionally, however, Demers performed his work in a good, and above average, manner. (P.E. 22) From January 1, 1976, to December 31, 1978, eight Company employees were disciplined for sleeping on duty - three were white and five black. Each employee, irrespective of color, received the identical punishment - a seven day suspension. Company disciplinary records referred to these as "sleeping on job" rather than "neglect of duty" offenses. (P.E. 26) From January 1, 1976, to December 31, 1978, ten Company employees (five black, five white) were discharged from employment for disciplinary reasons. Six of these employees were discharged after having received prior Company warnings that another infraction would be grounds for, or result in, discharge. (P.E. 26) The Company has promulgated Absentee Control Guidelines which allow three or four unauthorized absences within a twelve month period before discharge can be considered. (R.E. 1)

Conclusions Conclusions: The company established that Petitioner was found sleeping on duty after receiving a prior warning that further neglect of duty would be grounds for his discharge. Such conduct by Petitioner constituted neglect of duty and provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge. Petitioner failed to prove, by statistical or comparative evidence, that this stated reason for his discharge was a pretext, or mask for a discriminatory motive. Since Petitioner did not show that he was discharged because of his race or color, the Company's action did not constitute an unlawful employment practice in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977. [Section 23.167(1), Florida Statutes] Recommendation: That the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, and supported by Intervenor, be DISMISSED. Background: On October 11, 1978, Petitioner, a black male, filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (hereinafter "Commission"), a discrimination complaint charging Respondent, International Paper Company (hereinafter "Company"), with unlawfully discharging him from his employment because of his race or color. On June 6, 1979, after investigating the charges, the Commission entered a "Determination" that there was reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. On August 15, 1979, after unsuccessful efforts to conciliate Petitioner's complaint, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from the Company's alleged unlawful employment practice. On October 25, 1979, the Commission forwarded the Petition for Relief to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a Hearing Officer and the conducting of a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statute (1979), hearing. The Commission's subsequent Motion to Intervene in the proceedings was granted. On November 28, 1979, the Company filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Relief on several grounds. The motion was denied. The Company also filed its Answer to the Petition, denying that it had engaged in the alleged unlawful employment practice. On February 27, 1980, Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was denied. By Notice of Hearing, dated November 9, 1979, final hearing was set for February 4, 1980. The Petitioner's subsequent motion to continue the hearing was granted and hearing was reset for March 5, 1980. On March 4, 1980, the Company moved to continue the hearing, which motion was granted and final hearing was rescheduled for April 8, 1980. At final hearing, Petitioner testified in his own behalf, and offered Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1 through 26, 1/ inclusive, each of which was received into evidence. The Company called E. J. Weathers and Marion Daniels as its witnesses, and offered Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 1 through 6, inclusive, each of which was received in evidence. At the close of hearing, the parties requested into evidence. At the close of hearing, the parties requested the opportunity to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by April 21, 1980. On April 18, 1980, due to an automobile accident involving her husband, counsel for the Company requested additional time within which to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. After hearing arguments of the parties, the time for filing was extended to May 2, 1980, with the Petitioner and the Commission granted the additional right to file reply memoranda within five working days from the Company's filing. The parties agreed that the thirty-day period for submittal of the Recommended Order to the Commission would begin to run upon receipt of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, or the reply memoranda, whichever was later.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, and supported by Intervenor, be DISMISSED. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. R.L. CALEEN, JR., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675

Florida Laws (2) 120.52120.57
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