Findings Of Fact On August 28, 1987, Respondent, David E. Hancock, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer, holding certificate #11-87-502-02. On March 4, 1988, Respondent, Floyd W. Winkle, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission as a correctional officer, holding certificate #11-87-502-03. In March, 1989, Respondents were employed as correctional officers by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA operates the county corrections facilities for Bay Counnty, Florida. Additionally, CCA is responsible for booking new arrestees into the jail facility. On March 11, 1989, Respondent Hancock was the supervisor of the night shift at the main jail facility in Bay County. Respondent Winkle was the booking officer. The evening of the 11th was a very heavy evening for arrests. The facility was understaffed for the numbers of arrests being processed. In fact, the holding cells, located in the basement of the jail, were full and female prisoners were being held in the interview rooms across the hall from the holding cells. Marcus Kitchens was brought to the jail in a highly intoxicated state. He was bleeding and exhibited lacerations and abrasions to his face and limbs. Mr. Kitchens was also in a very noisy and rowdy state. During the course of the evening, one of the female prisoners requested to use the restroom facilities. These facilities are located in the holding cells which were occupied by the male prisoners. The male prisoners were transfered to an interview room so that the female prisoner could use the restroom facility in the holding cell. The transfer was made by Officer Winkle. One of the inmates was Marcus Kitchens. He had not yet been officially booked into the jail. While transferring the male prisoners back to the holding cell Mr. Kitchens asked Officer Winkle for a blanket. For a number of valid security reasons jail policy does not permit a prisoner to have a blanket until the prisoner is officially booked into the facility and on his her her way to a more permanent cell. When Mr. Kitchens was told that he could not have a blanket he became violent and charged Officer Winkle, hitting the officer on the left side of face with his fist and knocking the officer's glasses off. Officer Winkle pushed Mr. Kitchens into the holding cell. Mr. Kitchens grabbed Officer Winkle by the shirt and pulled him into the holding cell with him. The two landed up against one of the walls of the holding cell and Mr. Kitchens hit Officer Winkle several more times in the chest and abdomen with his fist. While Officer Winkle was trying to block the blows, Mr. Kitchens hit Officer Winkle again on the left side of the face. Officer Winkle then grabbed Mr. Kitchens and put him on the floor. Officer Hancock heard the noise from the altercation and responded from another part of the basement area to the site of the altercation. By the time Officer Hancock arrived, Officer Winkle had Mr. Kitchens on the floor. Officer Winkle was sitting on top of Mr. Kitchens trying to subdue him. Officer Hancock stepped in between Officer Winkle and the inmate, put his knee into Mr. Kitchens chest, grasped the shoulder area and shoved Mr. Kitchens against the back wall of the holding cell. Officer Hancock inquired if Officer Winkle was alright. After Officer Winkle responded that he was, Officer Hancock told him to leave the cell. Officer Winkle left the cell and Officer Hancock released Mr. Kitchens from the wall. Mr. Kitchens began to charge Officer Hancock. Officer Hancock ordered him not to move and Mr. Kitchens sat back down on the floor. Officer Hancock left the cell and the door was locked. The entire altercation to the close of the cell door lasted a maximum of two and one-half minutes. It was while Respondents were in the holding cell with Mr. Kitchens that the alleged excessive use of force occurred by Officer Winkle banging Mr. Kitchens' head against the floor and hitting him three times on the side of the head with his fist after Mr. Kitchens had submitted to the officers. The use of excessive force was testified to by an officer who arrived from another part of the basement area after the altercation began and who could only have seen the last few seconds of the incident. The only testimony this officer gave regarding Officer Hancock was that while he was leaning against the cell wall he told Officer Winkle that Mr. Kitchens was "all his" after which Officer Winkle allegedly banged Mr. Kitchens' head on the floor and punched him on the side of the head. Contrary to this officer's testimony and corroborative of Respondents' testimony was the testimony of the nurse on duty at the jail facility. She did not see any excessive use of force and did not hear Officer Hancock make the statement referenced above while the officers were in the holding cell. She also testified that Mr. Kitchen's appeared to be struggling somewhat while he was on the floor. Officer Hancock testified that he told Officer Winkle Mr. Kitchens was "all his" after the officers had locked the door to the holding cell. Officer Hancock made the statement in response to Officer Winkle's complaint that he needed help in booking. The statement was meant to communicate to Officer Winkle that help would not be forthcoming and that he had to handle Mr. Kitchens during the booking process. Clearly, given the facts of this case, such a vague statement, regardless of where it was made, does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Officer Hancock aided, abetted, counseled or procured any battery being effected against Mr. Kitchens. Moreover, this case boils down to a swearing match between the various parties and witnesses involved. On these facts and given the demeanor of the witnesses, such a swearing match does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Respondents have failed to maintain the good moral character required of correctional officers. Additionally, given the fact that the Respondents were subdueing a violent inmate and the very short time span in which the alleged use of force occurred it is improbable that any excessive force was used which would reflect on the character of either Respondent. Therefore the Administrative Complaints against each Respondent should be dismissed. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the amended Administrative Complaints filed against David E. Hancock and Floyd W. Winkle be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 1992.
The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, William Van Poyck, and the Intervenor, Robert David Roy, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner and the Intervenor are subject to the rules of the Respondent. The evidence failed to prove that the Petitioner and Intervenor are, or have been, placed in administrative confinement by the Respondent. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, the Florida Department of Corrections, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, a rule of the Respondent, governs the placement of an inmate in "administrative confinement". "Administrative confinement" is "the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for . . . " various specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated September 27, 1990, the Respondent advised the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee"), of proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Be letter dated November 5, 1990, M. Catherine Green, an attorney with the Committee, informed the Respondent that a review of the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, had been completed. Ms. Green also informed the Respondent of certain "technical errors" and "substantive errors" that she found with Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green indicated that a "substantive error" referred to "errors which will result in recommended objections to the committee unless they are eliminated prior to adoption." Among the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code: (3) Placement in administrative confinement shall be for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 9 was, in pertinent part, as follows: What does "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" mean? This has the effect of not notifying the inmate of the length of time in which he will be in administrative confinement and the criteria to be considered in releasing him or her. The rule discusses criteria for placing inmates in administrative confinement, but sets no criteria other than "desired results" as to when an inmate shall be released. If the two criteria are the same, please make that clear. Another of the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after an informal hearing when no reasonable alternative exists. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. Rule 33-3.0081(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, provides for review of the senior correctional officer's "informal hearing" and Rule 33-3.0081(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides for a 48-hour delay in the "informal hearing" in case of certain emergencies. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 11 was, in pertinent part, as follows: Please provide a cross reference to the rules of procedure for an informal hearing. Does the review procedure conflict with provisions of Chapter 33-29, F.A.C.? Please clarify what the phrase "when no reasonable alternative exists" means in reference to an inmate's confinement after an informal hearing. . . . . In a letter dated January 23, 1991, the Respondent, through a Senior Attorney, responded to Ms. Green's comments. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, was made: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replace it with "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replacing it with the phrase "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the circumstances under which an inmate placed in administrative confinement will be returned to the general inmate population. Under Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, prior to the proposed amendment, "the shortest time possible" occurred when the factors which necessitated placing an inmate in administrative confinement no longer applied. The proposed amendment merely clarifies when "the shortest time possible" has occurred. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, was also made in the January 23, 1991, letter: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "an informal hearing" and insert "being advised of an incident or situation which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the terms "informal hearing" and replacing them with the following underlined language: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after being advised of a situation or incident which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution, if the situation cannot be resolved. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. . . . The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the manner in which an inmate is informed that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The "informal hearing" previously required in Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, required no more than the proposed amendment provides for. By eliminating the terms "informal hearing" the proposed rule amendment eliminates any confusion as to whether some more formal process is to be followed by the Respondent in informing an inmate that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which contained the proposed amendments at issue in this proceeding was subsequently filed by the Respondent with the Bureau of Administrative Code, for publication, and with the Committee. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking included the following "purpose and effect" clause: The proposed amendments are needed in order to correct technical and substantive errors noted by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. The proposed amendments provide clarification of policies and procedures regarding administrative confinement and protective management. The purpose and effect clause is consistent with the substantive changes to Rule 33-3.0081(3) and (4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding are arbitrary or capricious. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any of the suggestions concerning Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, made by Ms. Green were ever approved, adopted, or reviewed by the Committee. In fact, Ms. Green indicates in her letter that "substantive errors" she perceived would be recommended as objections to the Committee only if they were not eliminated prior to adoption. Since the "substantive errors" at issue in this proceeding were eliminated, they were apparently never recommended or considered by the Committee.
Findings Of Fact The Alachua County Detention and Corrections Department (Exhibit 9) consists of 50 full-time employees (Exhibit 17). Authorized personnel spaces include the Correctional Director, the Correctional Assistant Administrator, the Correctional Inmate Consultant, the Correctional Recreation and Education Consultant, a Correctional Officer V, a Correctional Officer IV, six Correctional Officers III, five Correctional Officers II, and thirty Correctional Officers I (see Exhibit 10). Also authorized are a Secretary III who is the secretary to the Director, three Food Service Employees and one Accounting Clerk I. Alachua County has a total of about 786 County employees, including constitutional officers such as the Sheriff, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Tax Appraiser, Tax Collector, Supervisor of Elections and the County Commission Staff. This figure includes 91 professional employees. If employees of constitutional officers were excluded from a single bargaining unit for the County, such a unit would consist of 360 employees. The County is under a unified pay plan for all county employees. It retains the services of a pay plan consultant who does an annual review of pay, job descriptions and duties of all county employees. It also has a unified classification plan and personnel regulations that govern salaries, work hours, vacation, sick leave, leaves of absence and the like (Exhibits 10,11). The County Administrator is the chief executive officer for the county and, with respect to the Department of Corrections, supervises basic policies and budgetary functions. The department budget is proposed by the Director of the Department, submitted to the County Administrator for review and corrections, and then approved by the County Commission. The Director implements the plan and can change line items only by permission of the County Administrator and the County Commission. The only history of prior collective bargaining in the county was recognition of the Sheriff's office on or about May, 1972. The Police Benevolent Association is the bargaining agent for that unit. The position of the County at this time is that it is a co-employer with the Sheriff as to that unit. The current contract with sworn personnel includes about 133 employees. The Police Benevolent Association declined to be included in a county-wide unit of county employees. Alachua County is the subject of special state legislation which permits it to manage funds allocated to constitutional officers such as the Sheriff, Clerk of Circuit Court, Tax Assessor, and Tax Collector for the county (Exhibits 12-15). The functions of the Corrections Department include the detention of persons awaiting criminal trial, care and housing of prisoners serving sentences, work release and school release programs, classification and diagnostic services, recommendations to the court for referrals to these programs and recommendations for diversionary programs. Unlike most counties, the Corrections Department does not operate within or under the office of the Sheriff. The Department is conducting a modern concept in rehabilitation of offenders through a variety of programs which are designed to re-orient prisoners for more useful lives. To this end, the department secures grants which enable it to fulfill some of these functions. In hiring personnel, it looks for those who have a high school degree and preferably some college work in the social services area. When forming the department in 1973, most of the employees hired came "off the street", although some came from the office of the Sheriff and from other county departments. Correctional Officers carry identification as Special Deputies which empowers them to detain people for corrections only. This status is unique to them. They wear a modified uniform consisting of a blazer, slacks and tie. Correctional Officers carry arms in transporting prisoners to and from court and in supervising their recreational activities outside the correctional facility. The department has tried to get away from a chain of command concept to lessen a law enforcement image. Although it has done away with military titles there are still some personnel who use military titles such as Sergeant and Lieutenant in addressing personnel. Employees of the department have their most continuing contacts with the Sheriff's office because they are in the same building and have similar interests in connection with county prisoners. The Correctional Director is responsible to the County Administrator for all activities, operations and functions of the department. His duties include fiscal, plant, manpower planning, management, organization, staff selection and supervision, policy formulation, the establishment of programs for the department, and for the operation and maintenance of the detention center. He alone has the authority to hire, discharge, promote or discipline personnel of the department. He formulates the budget which is submitted through the County Administrator of the County Commission. He is assisted in the hiring process by a panel which includes himself or the Assistant Administrator, another department employee and either the inmate consultant or a faculty member from the University of Florida. The Assistant Administrator assists the Director by making recommendations as to departmental policy, securing grant applications,. and formulating departmental programs. He also makes recommendations to the Director as to personnel matters and assists in fiscal matters. The Director holds periodic staff meetings at which the Correctional Officers IV and V usually attend. The Correctional Officer V is the Commander of the Detention Center and is thus responsible for direct supervision of all personnel and operations at that facility. He carries out operational policy established by the Director in the form of orders and memoranda. He makes budget recommendations to the Director as to necessary equipment but is not directly involved in the budget process. He makes recommendations to the Director concerning all personnel actions affecting the Detention Center, to include leaves, promotions or terminations. He exercises direct supervision over the Correctional Officer IV and the shift commanders (Correctional Officer III). The Correctional Officer IV is under the general supervision of the Detention Center commander and is responsible for supervision of all logistical and support services of the center. He also assists the Commander in maintaining communication and coordination among shift commanders. He serves as the Acting Commander in the absence of the Correctional Officer V. The Correctional Officers III have direct supervision of Correctional Officers I and II in the operation of the center and related programs. They serve as shift commanders for three shifts of 8 1/2 hours a day each. Correctional Officers I and II perform essentially the same duties which involve primary responsibility to maintain physical custody and control of prisoners within the detention facility and while transporting inmates. Their secondary responsibility is support of program goals through communication and observation of behavior and inmate attitude which is reported to the shift commander or treatment staff. The Correctional Officer II also assists in supervision and on the job training for new employees. In the absence of the shift commander, the Correctional Officer II becomes responsible for the functions of the Detention Center and supervision of correctional officers on duty on that shift. The Correctional Recreation and Education Consultant is preferably an ex-offender who initiates programs and activities for the prisoner population, including various sports and games, competitions among the inmates, and assists the Correctional Inmate Consultant. The Correctional Inmate Consultant is a member of the personal staff of the Director. It is his responsibility to spend great portions of his workday in direct contact with the inmate population and to advise the Director on matters pertaining to the well-being, health, sanitation and programming activities of the inmates. He assists individual inmates with their problems and makes recommendations to the director concerning work release, furloughs, extra "gain time" and, in certain instances, disciplinary matters. He attends all staff meetings except those involving departmental personnel and advises the Director on matters relating to policies of the department with reference to inmate treatment and control. He is an ex-inmate and, in general, advises on the institutional climate. The Food Service personnel are cooks who prepare food for the institution in the cafeteria. They report to the Correctional Officer IV. The Secretary III is the secretary to the director of the department who handles confidential matters for him, including meeting agendas, taking and transcribing dictation, minutes of meetings, conferences and other activities.
The Issue Whether Rules 33-3.0084(1)(i)1 and 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, William Van Poyck and Mike Ramadanovic, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules at issue in this proceeding. The rules at issue in this proceeding govern the treatment of inmates while in "disciplinary confinement." At the time of the formal hearing, neither of the Petitioners were in disciplinary confinement. Both Petitioners have, however, been in disciplinary confinement. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing the rights of inmates, inmate conduct, inmate discipline and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. C. Rules 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), and 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioners have challenged Rules 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), and 33- 3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Challenged Rules"). Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part: (4) . . . . Inmates in disciplinary confinement status shall not be allowed to prepare legal documents and legal mail while in that status except under the following conditions: When there is a time limitation on the filing of legal material with a court and it reasonably appears necessary for the inmate to prepare the same while in confinement status in order to get the same filed within the required time. When the inmate wishes to prepare legal material to file with a court for the purpose of testing the legality of his disciplinary confinement. The specific statutory authority for Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 20.315, 944.09 and 944.11, Florida Statutes. The law implemented by Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 944.09 and 944.11, Florida Statutes. Rule 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part: 1. Legal materials shall be accessible to inmates in disciplinary confinement provided such use of legal material is for the purpose of challenging such confinement or in the event there are time restrictions on filing court papers. The specific statutory authority for Rule 33-3.0084, Florida Administrative Code, is Section 944.09, Florida Statutes. The law implemented by, Rule 33-3.0084, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 20.315 and 944.09, Florida Statutes. Chapter 33-22, Florida Administrative Code, titled "Inmate Discipline", specifies what constitutes prohibited conduct for inmates, the procedures for determining if an inmate has violated the rules establishing prohibited conduct and the maximum punishment which may be imposed if an inmate violates the rules establishing prohibited conduct. The "Rules of Prohibited Conduct" and the maximum punishment for an infraction of these rules are contained in Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code. Among other things, an inmate who violates the Rules of Prohibited Conduct, may be placed in "disciplinary confinement" for specified periods of time. The length of time an inmate may be placed in disciplinary confinement for is not to exceed 60 days for any one infraction. "Disciplinary confinement" is defined in Rule 33-22.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, as: (3) Disciplinary Confinement -- Confinement which includes the loss of privileges normally afforded other inmates and is effected only after procedures outlined in this chapter have been fully complied with. Although the maximum term of disciplinary confinement is 60 days, it is possible for an inmate to be placed in disciplinary confinement for longer periods of time: (1) an inmate may be convicted of more than one violation of the Rules of Prohibited Conduct and be sentenced to multiple 60-day (or less) sentences to be served consecutively; (2) an inmate may commit another infraction(s) (including a violation of the Challenged Rules) while in disciplinary confinement, resulting in additional disciplinary consecutive confinement sentences; and (3) an inmate may commit an infraction soon after release from disciplinary confinement and be returned to disciplinary confinement. It is also possible for an inmate to serve less than the full term of his sentence to disciplinary confinement. Being placed in disciplinary confinement is a direct result of the actions of an inmate in failing to follow the established rules of conduct of the Respondent. At least one inmate has been in disciplinary confinement for periods of up to two and one-half years. An inmate would have to commit a minimum of fifteen infractions to be sentenced to disciplinary confinement for two and one- half years. The evidence failed to prove that the one inmate that has been in disciplinary confinement for two and one-half years was in disciplinary confinement continuously without any break. The inmate could not recall. The number of inmates in disciplinary confinement for more than one year was not proven. At best, it was proved by the Petitioners that one inmate (Charles William Bowe, Jr.) has served more than one year in disciplinary confinement. Even the evidence concerning Mr. Bowe, however, did not prove that his time in disciplinary confinement was continuous and without any break. Based upon an estimate of the Respondent, it is likely that no more than 1% of the inmate population (less than 460) is in disciplinary confinement for more than one year. Although the evidence did not prove that any inmate has actually been in disciplinary confinement for more than two and one-half years, it is not impossible that an inmate could be in disciplinary confinement for an unlimited period of time, as long as the inmate continues to commit violations of the Respondent's Rules of Prohibited Conduct. Although it may be unlikely, it is not impossible for an inmate to be in disciplinary confinement for the entire term of his sentence. The purpose for placing an inmate in disciplinary confinement and the purpose of the Challenged Rules is to attempt to correct an inmate's demonstrated negative behavior; to eliminate "privileges" inmates normally are given. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, an inmate who is placed in disciplinary confinement is prohibited from instituting any new litigation (other than a challenge to the decision to place the inmate in disciplinary confinement or litigation which must be instituted within a specified time period) while the inmate is in disciplinary confinement. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, an inmate who is placed in disciplinary confinement is generally prohibited from preparing legal documents and legal mail unless the inmate is required to meet a time limitation in an existing legal matter or the inmate intends to test the legality of his disciplinary confinement. When an inmate is placed in disciplinary confinement, all of the inmate's legal materials are confiscated and impounded. Access to an inmate's legal materials may be obtained while in disciplinary confinement pursuant to the exceptions of the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, access is allowed to an inmate' legal materials if the inmate can show the necessity for those materials through: (1) a court order that requires the inmate to take some action in a pending matter; (2) any other source, i.e., a rule of the court, indicating that the inmate must meet some procedural or other requirement of the court; or (3) if the inmate indicates a desire to prepare a challenge to the legality of his disciplinary confinement. The procedure followed at Florida State Prison for an inmate in disciplinary confinement to obtain access to the inmate's legal materials is as follows: The inmate makes a request to an institutional counselor assigned responsibility for the inmate; The inmate must indicate to the institutional counselor why one of the exceptions provided in the Challenged Rules allowing access to his legal materials applies; If the institutional counselor is convinced that one of the exceptions applies, access to the inmate's legal materials is allowed. If not, no access is allowed; The procedure followed at Florida State Prison if an inmate convinces an institutional counselor that access to his legal materials should be allowed is as follows: The institutional counselor retrieves the inmate's legal materials and brings them to the inmate's cell; In some instances the institutional counselor may give the legal materials to the inmate or require the inmate to describe to the counselor, and convince the counselor of, what materials he actually needs to meet the deadline or to challenge his disciplinary confinement; and The institutional counselor, based upon the inmate's description of the materials he needs, makes the final determination of what materials may actually be given to the inmate. If the inmate does not get the materials he needs, he then must convince the counselor of what additional materials are needed. If an inmate is denied access to his legal materials or is not provided with the materials he needs, the inmate may challenge the decision of the institutional counselor by filing a grievance. Based upon the experiences of the inmates who testified in this proceeding, requests for access to an inmate's legal materials may be granted or denied, and when granted, an inmate may be given the whole file, he may be denied materials, he may be asked "is this it" and he may get only the materials he actually needs. Institutional counselors may even make more than one attempt to find the requested materials. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code, an inmate may not have access to any legal materials except to the extent necessary for the inmate to meet a time limitation in an existing legal matter or if the inmate intends to test the legality of his disciplinary confinement. Access to legal materials in the library may generally be obtained by inmates. Such access is not, however, without limitation. There are limitations on the procedure which must be followed to obtain access to the library and the amount of materials which may be obtained at any one time. An inmate in disciplinary confinement is further limited as to when and how he may access library resources pursuant to the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, access is allowed to library legal materials only if an inmate can show the necessity for those materials in the same manner an inmate may obtain access to his own legal materials as explained in finding of fact 26. The procedure followed at Florida State Prison for an inmate in disciplinary confinement to obtain access to library legal materials is as follows: The inmate must make a request in writing to the librarian; The inmate must indicate to the librarian why one of the exceptions to the lack of access to library legal materials applies; If the librarian is convinced that one of the exceptions applies, access to the library's legal materials is allowed. If not, no access is allowed; The librarian, based upon the inmate's description of the materials he needs, makes the final determination of what materials may actually be given to the inmate. If the inmate does not get the materials he needs, he may make additional requests. If an inmate is denied access to library legal materials or is not provided with the materials he needs, the inmate may challenge the decision by filing a grievance. Institutional counselors and librarians are not required to have legal education or training. The evidence failed to prove that any inmate has been totally denied access to the courts by the proper application of the Challenged Rules. The evidence proved that the Challenged Rules are inconvenient and aggravating to some inmates who have experienced the procedures which must be followed in order to obtain access to the inmate's legal materials or library legal materials. The procedures can be a hinderance to an inmate's pursuit of litigation to the extent that the procedures are one more step an inmate must follow that the inmate would not otherwise have to follow if he were not in disciplinary confinement. The evidence proved that, although inconvenient, some of the inmates who testified were able to pursue litigation even though they have been in disciplinary confinement at times. There was some aggravation and frustration caused those inmates who testified because of the Challenged Rules, but the evidence failed to prove that any of the inmates who testified or any other inmates were actually prevented from pursing litigation: Inmate Bowe, who has served two and one-half years of disciplinary confinement (although it was not proved whether the time was without interruption because of Inmate Bowe's memory lapse), had several court proceedings (Florida and federal) pending at the time of the formal hearing and did not indicate that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the Challenged Rules; Leonard Bean, another inmate who testified, has served 140 to 150 days in disciplinary confinement for multiple infractions. Although Inmate Bean testified that his co-defendant's conviction had been reversed (in February, 1991), the evidence failed to prove that Inmate Bean's conviction would have also been reversed but for his disciplinary confinement or, more importantly, would have also been reversed but for the Challenged Rules. Although Inmate Bean was released from disciplinary confinement in May, 1991, he still had not filed for habeas corpus as of the date of the formal hearing; Jimmy Stephens, another inmate who testified, has served 240 days of disciplinary confinement for four infractions during the past two years. Although inconvenienced by the limitation on library legal material use, Inmate Stephens did not indicate that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Carl Watts, another inmate who testified, served 180 days in disciplinary confinement prior to being transferred to Florida State Prison and another 60 days after arriving at Florida State Prison. Inmate Watts' testimony concerning a possible habeas corpus action failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Petitioner Ramadanovic has served up to 100 days in disciplinary confinement. Although he filed two grievances dated August 22, 1990, concerning his efforts to file a brief in an appellate court proceeding, his disciplinary confinement ended August 23, 1990, and therefore, he failed to prove that he was prevented from filing a brief or any other pleading in any case pending while he was in disciplinary confinement. The evidence also failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Petitioner Van Poyck failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue. As long as an inmate is in disciplinary confinement, that inmate may not file an action for federal habeas corpus. An inmate in disciplinary confinement may also not file an action for habeas corpus in the State courts until some, unspecified date, which the Respondent determines is close enough to necessitate preparation of the pleadings in order to meet the time limitations on habeas corpus in Florida.
Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
The Issue Whether Respondent was the subject of an unlawful discrimination action as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female. She was certified as a corrections officer in March 1991. In November 1995, Petitioner was employed by Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Taylor Corrections Institution in Perry, Florida, as a correctional officer with the rank of sergeant. Prior to her employment at Taylor Corrections Institution she had been a corrections officer at a correctional facility in Jefferson County. Petitioner did not have employment problems while working at the Jefferson County facility. Petitioner's first year at the Taylor County correctional facility was "O.K." However, Petitioner was not well liked among her fellow officers. Between June through October 1996, Petitioner was the subject of several complaints from her fellow officers. These separate complaints were: On June 12 or 13, 1996, King cursed at an entire dormitory of inmates. On June 19 King was assigned to assist another officer in conducting a recount of inmates. She failed to assist the officer in conducting the recount. On July 24, 1996, King was assigned to escort the swill truck (a food truck) by the control room sergeant. She refused to accept the assignment and cursed at the control room sergeant. A few days later, she confronted another officer in a hostile and threatening manner because the officer had submitted an incident report concerning King's conduct in cursing at the control room sergeant. On October 9, another sergeant asked King to sign a typed incident report regarding King's loss of her state-issued handcuff case. King initially refused to sign the report. Shortly thereafter, she tore up the report in the presence of an inmate because she was displeased with certain comments in the report. On October 28, King cursed at a coworker. Id. PERC Final Order dated October 8, 1997. In October 1996, Petitioner filed several internal discrimination complaints against the agency generally opposing unfair employment practices. The exact nature of these complaints was not established by the evidence. On December 13, 1996, Petitioner received a notice of disciplinary charges being brought against her based on the earlier-filed employee complaints. The notice lists the charges as follows: Multiple charges are being brought against you stemming from several investigations. In the first case, you are being charged with malicious use of profane or abusive language toward inmates, visitors, or persons under supervision, use of verbal abuse of an inmate, conduct unbecoming a public employee, and willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement. Specifically on June 25, 1996, an anonymous request was received by the Superintendent's Office alleging that you cursed the entire dormitory of inmates on June 13, 1996. It was also alleged that you had been gambling and would not pay off your debts. This prompted an investigation into these allegations. Several witnesses including an inmate verified the above allegations. The basis for these charges is contained in the Institutional Investigation Report #96-044, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33- 4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4)(9), and 33- 4.003(6)(20)(22)(24), F.A.C., copies attached and made a part hereof. In the second case, you are being charged with willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, conduct unbecoming a public employee, unwilling to follow lawful orders or perform officially designated duties, interference with an employee, failure to follow oral or written instructions, witness tampering during an investigation, and retaliation. Specifically on July 24, 1996, Sergeant J. Pickles reported that while assigned as Control Room Supervisor, he advised you via radio that he needed an escort for the swill truck. You responded by telephone and stated "Why are you calling me? I'm not escorting that fucking swill truck. I'm busy in the Caustic Room. Get someone else to do that shit." Officer V. Aman submitted an incident report verifying the telephone conversation since it was the dormitory in which she was assigned to that you came to use the telephone. On August 1, 1996, Officer Aman also stated that you made threats toward her in retaliation for submitting her report, in which you admitted to confronting this officer. The basis for these charges is contained in Institutional Investigation Report #96-052, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33- 4.002(4)(11)(17), 33-4.003(22)(24)(32), F.A.C., and Sections 914.22, 914.23, Florida Statutes, copies attached and made a part hereof. In the third case, you are being charged with willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, conduct unbecoming, unwillingness to perform officially designated duties, substandard quality of work, negligence, and failure to follow oral or written instructions. Specifically, on June 19, 1996, a recount was ordered and you were informed by the control room that your dormitory officer needed assistance in the recount. The officer stated that he waited approximately ten (10) minutes for your arrival and proceeded to recount without assistance. He then submitted an report as to the incident. You then submitted an incident report concurring with the officer with the exception that you observed the recount from the Officer's Station. The basis for these charges can be found more specifically contained in the Institutional Investigation #96-058, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(4)(11) and 33-4.003(10)(13)(22)(24)(32), F.A.C., Institutional Post Orders 17.02(j), 06.03(B)(1b)(1c)(1f)(lg)(2a), and (D)(4), and Institutional Operating Procedures 3.03.3(C)(5)(11e), copies attached and made a part hereof. In the fourth case, you are being charged with conduct unbecoming a public employee, willful violation of state statute, rule, directive, or policy statement, and destruction or abuse of DC property or equipment. Specifically on October 9, 1996, you submitted an Incident Report for losing your state issued handcuff case. On October 13, 1996, after being typed, Sergeant Chad Dees gave the Incident Report to you to be signed. Upon receiving the report, you allegedly stated "I will show you what I will do with this," then tore the report up and walked away. You admitted to tearing up the report because of the comments written by Captain Simons, but denied making the comment alleged by Sergeant Dees. Officer Tammy Alvarez witnessed you tear up the report, but denied hearing any statements made by you. The basis for these charges is contained in the Investigative Report #96-23008, a copy attached and made a part hereof. This conduct violates Department of Corrections' Rules 33-4.001(4)(a), 33-4.002(25), and 33- 4.003(22)(24)(27), F.A.C., copies attached and made a part hereof. All of these charges pre-date Petitioner's internal complaints. On January 23, 1997, a predetermination conference was held on the above charges. The evidence did not demonstrate that the employee charges or the disciplinary action were retaliatory in nature or based in discrimination. Moreover, the factual basis of the charges was upheld in the PERC Final Order. As referenced in the letter, Petitioner was the subject of several investigations conducted by the Inspector General's Office of the Department of Corrections. The role of the Inspector General was to gather the facts and evidence involved in a complaint. The Inspector General does not make any recommendations as to discipline or determine if a rule or statutory violation has occurred. Raleigh Sistruck, an Inspector with the Inspector General's office conducted some of the investigations of Petitioner. He did not personally know Petitioner. There was no evidence that he treated Petitioner differently than he did any other investigatory subject. Nor did Inspector Sistruck engage in any conspiracy or act alone to fabricate evidence against Petitioner or elicit false testimony from witnesses. Indeed, the only evidence presented in this case, is that Inspector Sistrunk followed standard investigatory procedures in investigating the complaints against Petitioner. In January, 1998, Petitioner was accused of soliciting an inmate and another correctional officer to cause harm to another inmate at the facility. The Inspector General's office investigated that accusation. Again there was no evidence that the inspectors engaged in any conspiracy to falsify or fabricate evidence. Normal investigatory procedures were followed. Based on the various complaints and the findings set forth in various Inspector General investigations, Mr. Drake decided to terminate Petitioner. Petitioner received a letter of extraordinary dismissal on February 7, 1997. The dismissal letter dismisses Petitioner for: This dismissal is the result of you being charged with willfully engaging in conduct which violates state statutes and Agency rules; conduct unbecoming a public employee; failure to conduct yourself in a manner consistent with the welfare of inmates; soliciting, bartering, dealing, trading with or accepting a gift or other compensation from an inmate(s); willfully treating an inmate in a cruel or inhuman manner; threatening or interfering with other employees while on duty; failure to maintain a professional relationship with inmates; giving false testimony; and interfering with an inmate. Specifically, on or about January 10, 1997, you solicited the assistance of inmate Tony Jackson, DC#724515 and Correctional Officer Jacqualyn Jackson-Beasley to cause harm to inmate Mike Doty, DC#725094. As a result of your actions and requests, Officer Jackson- Beasley, inmate Jackson, inmate Mark Smith, DC#724887, inmate Alberto Matta, DC#191523 and inmate Thomas Carrillo, DC#195319, conspired and did plant a homemade knife, with an approximate 14 inch blade, in inmate Doty's cell in an effort to set him up. When inmates Carrillo and Matta entered F- Dorm with the knife, Officer Jackson-Beasley signaled then with her fingers indicating inmate Doty's cell number. She also acted as a cover while the inmates planted the knife in inmate Doty's cell. Once the knife was planted, you and Officer Jackson-Beasley had a telephone discussion during which you instructed her to call Sergeant Gerald Miller and have inmate Doty's cell searched. Once Officer Jackson-Beasley reported the information to Sergeant Miller, a search of Doty's cell was made and the knife was recovered. Sergeant Miller than notified Captain William F. Buchtmann. After questioning by Captain Buchtmann, inmates Carrillo and Mata, both admitted their participation in placing the knife in inmate Doty's pillow and stated they were contacted by inmates Jackson and Smith for assistance. Carrillo was told by Jackson and Smith that it was you who wanted inmate Doty taken care of and they gave inmate Carrillo the impression that if he took care of inmate Doty, he would be paid $50.00 and be given an undisclosed amount of marijuana for his assistance. The following day, January 11, 1997, you stated to inmate Jackson words to the effect, "They locked up inmate Smith" and "That motherfucker talked" (referring to inmate Matta) You also stated to inmate Jackson words to the effect, "It's not cool for me to be seen talking to you." On or about January 17, 1997, Officer Beverly Pratt overheard you state to an unidentified inmate, words to the effect, "Something needs to be done with Doty." On that same date, inmate Willie Jackson, DC#041463, overheard you state to an unidentified inmate, words to the effect, "I am going to get Officer Jackson-Beasley and Sergeant Miller." When questioned under oath, on January 24, 1997, you gave false testimony when you denied all allegations. Additionally, the letter dismisses Petitioner for the earlier disciplinary charges discussed at the predetermination conference in December. Mr. Drake, Superintendent of Taylor Correctional Institute at the time, testified that Petitioner's termination was based on his belief that she had in fact committed the aforementioned rule and statutory violations. He stated that the termination was not based on Petitioner's race or sex or any other of her characteristics; rather, the termination was based on rule and statute violations. There was no evidence which demonstrated Mr. Drake engaged in any conspiracy to concoct evidence against Petitioner or to falsely accuse her. Angela Ratliff, Personnel Supervisor at the time, testified that she did not have any conversation with Petitioner wherein she told her that the Department, her supervisors or coworkers were "out to get her" or words to similar effect. Additionally, Ms. Ratliff does not recall having any conversations with prospective employers for Petitioner. The Respondent's policy is to recite to a prospective employer information contained in the employee's personnel file. The Department does not offer opinions or recommendations about an employee. Moreover, most of the information in the personnel file is considered a public record and must be released to any person or entity requesting the information. In any event, other than broad general statements about seeking employment and what she was told by others who did not testify at the hearing, there was no evidence regarding any specific prospective employer or the information, if any, the prospective employer received from the Department. There is no doubt that Petitioner feels very strongly she was discriminated against. The problem with Petitioner's case is a total lack of evidence to support her allegations. Throughout the hearing she made allegations of discrimination. However, no evidence apart from her allegations of which she had no personal knowledge, was offered. For instance, the alleged paper trail created against her or documents she claimed were changed were not introduced into evidence. No witness was called who wrote or filed such document or statement was called to testify about any such document or statement or any alleged change made to the document or statement. The paper noises or pauses of tape-recorded interviews of witnesses taken during the Inspector General's investigation did not support Petitioner's claim that the witnesses were prompted or told what to say. Such noises or pauses sounded exactly like pages being turned in a notebook when one page is full and a new page is needed to continue taking notes. The pauses sounded like a note taker pausing the witnesses' statement in order to catch up the notes to the witnesses' statement. Given these critical lapses in evidence and the earlier PERC Final Order, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Anita King 108 Alice Street Perry, Florida 32347 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Azizi M. Coleman, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibit received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Respondent, Mr. John S. Moncrief, was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on June 12, 1980, and was issued Certificate Number C-9151 Mr. Moncrief worked in various law enforcement positions from 1979 through 1984. From December 1, 1981, until September 27, 1982, Mr. Moncrief worked as a Corrections Officer for the Okeechobee Sheriff's Office. During the entire time that Mr. Moncrief worked in law enforcement, the only charges or complaints made against him were those which form the basis for the charges in this case. During the months of March and April of 1982, Mr. Gerald Ray "Cowboy" Powell was an inmate of the Okeechobee County Jail. During a portion of that time Ms. Lynda Carroll was also an inmate of the Okeechobee County Jail. At all relevant times Mr. Powell was housed in a downstairs cell which was used for trustees and minimum security inmates and Ms. Carroll was housed in the women's cellblock which was on the second floor of the jail facility. It was not possible for an inmate housed on the second floor to come down to the first floor without the assistance of a jail employee. On two occasions during the months of March and April of 1982, Moncrief allowed Ms. Carroll to come downstairs at night and visit Mr. Powell in the latter's downstairs cell. In order to do so, it was necessary for Mr. Moncrief to enter the portion of the jail facility in which female inmates were housed and to open locked doors for Ms. Carroll. On both of the occasions mentioned immediately above, Mr. Powell and Ms. Carroll engaged in sexual intercourse in Mr. Powell's cell.2 On one occasion during the month of April of 1982,another Corrections Officer employed by the Okeechobee Sheriff's Office allowed Mr. Powell to go upstairs at night and visit with Ms. Carroll in her cell. On this occasion Mr. Powell and Ms. Carroll did not engage in sexual intercourse. Mr. Moncrief was not involved in any way with Mr. Powell's upstairs visit with Ms. Carroll. During March and April of 1982 the policies and procedures in effect at the Okeechobee County Jail prohibited male Corrections Officers from entering the area in which female inmates were housed unless the male Corrections Officer was accompanied by a matron or a female dispatcher. Policies and procedures in effect at that time also prohibited inmates of one sex from visiting with inmates of the opposite sex. Mr. Moncrief was aware of these policies. It was a violation of these policies for Mr. Monerief to allow Ms. Carroll to visit with Mr. Powell in the latter's cell.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, I recommend that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. enter a Final Order dismissing all charges in the Amended Administrative Complaint on the grounds of insufficient evidence. DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 1985, Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH ISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of September, 1985.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Commission as a correctional officer on July 1, 1981, and was issued Certificate Number 33-81-500-00. At all times material to these proceedings, the Respondent was employed by the Collier County Sheriff's Office and was assigned to work with inmates in the county jail. In the course of his duties, Respondent Parks became acquainted with a young female inmate, Melissa Sue Watson. After her release from jail, the Respondent continued to see the woman socially. As part of their relationship, the Respondent would occasionally give the woman money or anything else she requested that he was able to provide for her. While the Respondent and the young woman eventually became sexually intimate, the money was not given to her in direct exchange for sexual services. Instead, the money and other requested items were bestowed as gifts to demonstrate his affection and to assure that she would continue to allow a married man of his years to court her. Due to the fact that Respondent's wife was in charge of the family finances, the sums of money given to the young woman were sparse. These gifts amounted to little more that the Respondent's spare change and lunch money. After the relationship progressed to the stage where the parties had become sexually intimate, the young woman asked the Respondent to get her some marijuana. She was provided with the pipe and marijuana the Respondent had confiscated from his teenaged son. The Respondent smoked the marijuana with the young woman. During her relationship with the Respondent, the young woman had an ongoing relationship of a different kind with another member of the Collier County's Sheriff Department. Melissa Sue Watson was a confidential informer for Linda Leis, a narcotics investigator with the Vice-Intelligence-Narcotics Unit (VIN Unit). She assisted Ms. Leis in the arrest of several narcotics violators prior to her report that Respondent Parks had given her money and marijuana in exchange for sex. Ms. Watson gave the investigator the pipe used to smoke the marijuana. A field test confirmed that it had contained marijuana. The young woman was told to arrange an assignation with the Respondent so his actions could be documented and an arrest made if the allegations were well-founded. Pursuant to instructions from Ms. Leis, the woman placed a telephone call to the Respondent which was recorded by the sheriff's department. The Respondent was asked to join Ms. Watson at White's Motel after work. Ms. Watson requested that the Respondent bring money and marijuana because she needed funds and wanted "to get high." In response to her invitation, Respondent told Ms. Watson that he would meet her and that he had ten dollars she could have. However, he was unable to provide marijuana because he did not know where to get it. When she inquired as to where he got the marijuana in the pipe, he teased her by withholding the information. Eventually, after she prodded him for an answer, he agreed with her suggestion that he had grown the marijuana in order to stop the inquiry. He told her there was no more and closed the topic. In fact, the Respondent had not grown the marijuana. As mentioned previously, he confiscated it from his son. When the Respondent arrived at the hotel, members of the VIN Unit had already installed listening and recording devices in the room. They waited in the adjoining room to take pictures and make an arrest once it was determined that Respondent Parks had given Melissa Sue Watson money for sex. During the motel room conversations between Respondent and Ms. Watson, the Respondent expressed concern about Ms. Watson's failure to appear in court that morning on a new pending criminal charge. She feigned surprise about having been on the court docket and stressed her need for money. She teased the Respondent during their foreplay that she had something for him if he had the money he said he was bringing to her. Because the Respondent was expected home shortly, he handed Ms. Watson the money he brought to give to her when she asked to see it. Based upon their prior relationship and the contents of the recorded conversations, the giving of the money and the sexual activity between the parties were concurrent actions that were not connected to each other. They occurred at the same time because the parties were involved in a clandestine, adulterous affair that allowed them to see each other on an infrequent basis. Once the Respondent stripped down to his underwear in order to proceed further with the sex play, members of the VIN Unit entered the room and placed the Respondent under arrest. After he waived his right to receive the Miranda warning, the Respondent admitted to having had sex with Melissa Sue Watson in the past and having smoked marijuana with her that he had provided at her request.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of unlawfully, delivering less than twenty grams of cannabis to another person and of constructive possession as set forth in Paragraph 2(a) and 2(b) of the Administrative Complaint. That the Respondent be found not guilty of having engaged in prostitution with another person, as set forth in Paragraph 2(c) of the Administrative Complaint. That Respondent's certificate as a correctional officer be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-6766 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Accepted. See HO #1. 2. Accepted. See HO #2. 3. Accepted. See HO #7. 4. Accepted. See HO #7. 5. Accepted. See HO #7. 6. Accepted. See HO #8. 7. Accepted. See HO #9. 8. Accepted. 9. Accepted. See HO #10. 10. Accepted. See HO #10. 11. Accepted. See HO #10. 12. Accepted. See HO #11. 13. Accepted. 14. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #12-#13. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #16. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #16. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #14. Copies furnished to: Joseph S. White, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Al Beatty, Qualified Representative c/o Clyde W. Parks 5226 Jennings Street Naples, Florida 33962 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, Esquire General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Proposed Rule 33.9007(9), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Steven Rivera, Petitioner, is currently serving a prison sentence at Walton Correctional Institution at DeFuniak Springs, Florida. He is on his fifth commitment to prison. Respondent supervises the operation of correctional institutions in Florida and promulgates rules governing the operation of the prisons and various subjects relating to inmates of these prisons. The proposed rule here under challenge provides: Any inmate who is serving his fourth commitment to prison or higher shall be excluded from work release if the inmate has previously been given the opportunity to participate in work release, except that an inmate may be given consideration if the inmate has demonstrated outstanding institutional adjustment and if extenuating circumstances exist. Petitioner has been admitted to the work release program in a prior commitment and, with more than four prison commitments is in the class of prisoner covered by this rule. Accordingly, he has standing to challenge the rule. The work release program is intended to motivate the individual offender toward self improvement, to ease the transition from prison into the community, place the inmate in employment to which he or she may return after release from the institution, permit the offender to contribute towards his own support and the support of his or her family, help determine the prisoner's readiness for parole, preserve family and community ties, and permit the offender to develop or maintain occupational skills. (Exhibit 6) The Florida work release program has been in effect for many years allowing Department of Corrections officers the opportunity to gain experience in the effectiveness and efficacy of the program. First commitment offenders are more likely to benefit from work release than are those who have three or more prior commitments. Inmates who have been given one chance in the work release program and are subsequently recommitted to the prison institution have thereby demonstrated that they did not obtain the anticipated benefit of remaining crime free subsequent to being admitted to the work release program. Following a murder committed by a prisoner who escaped from the work release program at another institution, a Task Force was set up to study the work release program and prepare recommendations affecting this program. As a result of this Task Force's recommendations, wide ranging changes to the rules affecting the work release program were promulgated of which the rule here challenged is only one small subsection. Furthermore, prior to the commission of the crime referred to above, there were approximately 4000 prisoners admitted to the work release program. Legislative changes since that time have limited the maximum number of prisoners admitted to the work release program to 2100. Although Petitioner contends that there is no rule definition of commitment, this is a word that is well recognized in the prison community. As defined by one of Respondent's witnesses in these proceedings, each time a prisoner is committed following a release from a prior commitment whether in Florida or in another jurisdiction, this counts as an additional commitment. If the inmate commits an offense while in confinement, is taken to court and receives an additional sentence, this is not counted as an additional commitment. This method of counting commitments inures to the benefit of the prison inmates. Petitioner also contends that the phrase "has demonstrated outstanding institutional adjustment and if extenuating circumstances exist" is arbitrary and vests unbridled discretion in the prison officials. However, admission to the work release program is a privilege which all prisoners admitted to such program must earn. They earn this privilege by adhering to the code of conduct established for prisoners, by participating in education, drug and alcohol abuse programs, and by other acts contributing to earning gain time. Certain classes of prisoners, e.g. those who have committed serious crimes, sex crimes, and crimes evincing a violent disposition must demonstrate more clearly than does the less violent criminal that he is eligible for work release. No one act can show that one prisoner is better deserving for the limited number that can be admitted to the work release program than is another prisoner. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider innumerable factors to determine which are the prisoners most likely to benefit from work release based upon their history and their current conduct in the prison system. A finite list of factors to be considered in determining those most eligible for work release is impracticable because the list would be too numerous and could still omit factors deserving consideration. The proposed rules, including the rule in issue here, provide that certain prisoners are not eligible for work release; but the rule provides two exceptions to this general disqualification, to wit: those who "demonstrate outstanding institutional adjustment and extenuating circumstances." By providing these exceptions, the rule removes the arbitrary exclusion of certain prisoners from work release regardless of their good conduct in prison and demonstration that they have totally reformed and are most unlikely ever to again commit a crime.
The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent for her acts as a correctional officer in association with an inmate?
Findings Of Fact In response to requests for admissions, Respondent admitted the following: The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 6, 1992, and was issued correctional number 94229. Between June 1 and July 31, 1994, the Respondent was employed as a Correctional Officer with the North Florida Reception Center. On October 16, 1995, during an interview with Inspector H. McBride, the Respondent denied knowing Inmate Dean Richardson. (D) On October 16, 1995, during an interview with Inspector H. McBride, the Respondent denied knowing Toyia Kelly. E) On March 6, 1996, Respondent resigned her position at North Florida Reception Center. Between June 1, 1994 and July 31, 1994, Inmate Dean Richardson was committed to the North Florida Reception Center as a permanent inmate. In that period Respondent came in contact with Mr. Richardson in her capacity as a correctional officer and his capacity as an inmate at North Florida Reception Center. Their contacts occurred while Respondent was on duty as a correctional officer. In a conversation that took place between Respondent and Mr. Richardson in a recreation room within the prison, Respondent told Mr. Richardson that she was "having a problem moving." Mr. Richardson responded by offering to give Respondent money. At first Respondent declined the offer. A week to two weeks later after Mr. Richardson "pushed the issue," Respondent agreed to accept the money. Mr. Richardson had approached Respondent about a dozen times before Respondent was willing to accept the money. Under the terms of their arrangement, Respondent gave Mr. Richardson a post office box address to send the money and a name at that address. The name was Toyia Kelly. In furtherance of the agreement between Mr. Richardson and the Respondent, Mr. Richardson caused a $200 draft from his inmate bank fund to be sent to Toyia Kelly on June 8, 1994, at the address Respondent had provided . After Mr. Richardson sent the $200, he asked Respondent if Respondent had received the money. She answered "no." This conversation took place within the institution where Mr. Richardson was housed. When Respondent told Mr. Richardson she did not receive the $200, Mr. Richardson told Respondent that he would send more money. Mr. Richardson did send more money, but this time he sent the money to a different post office box than before. Respondent had provided Mr. Richardson the new post office box address. On June 24, 1994, Mr. Richardson withdrew $150 by draft from his inmate bank fund and paid it to the order of Toyia Kelly at the new post office box address. Mr. Richardson did not confirm with Respondent whether Respondent had received this $150 that had been paid directly to Toyia Kelly. Of his own volition Mr. Richardson determined to send an additional $150 by a draft from his inmate bank fund. Again this was paid to the order of Toyia Kelly at the second post office box address that had been provided by Respondent. This draft was made on July 11, 1994. On this occasion Mr. Richardson asked Respondent if she had received the second $150 draft. In response Respondent nodded her head in the affirmative.
Recommendation Upon consideration the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which revokes Respondent's correctional certificate number 94299. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Simmons, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sandra Griffin 2852 Wayne Drive Lake City, Florida 32055 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302