The Issue The issues are whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in one or more of the following ways: by discriminating against Petitioner based on her race and/or gender; (b) by subjecting Petitioner to a hostile work environment; and (c) by retaliating against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Respondent hired Petitioner, a black female, as a correctional officer on or about February 25, 2002. Petitioner was initially assigned to the Hernando County Jail. After a series of transfers at Petitioner's request, Respondent assigned Petitioner to the Lake City Correctional Facility in July 2005. Petitioner continued to serve at that facility until she was terminated. On multiple occasions during her employment, Petitioner received copies of Respondent's Harassment/Sexual Harassment policy and Respondent's Code of Ethics policy. Petitioner received formal training relative to the substance of these policies when she was hired and annually thereafter. In October 2007, Petitioner filed two grievances against Captain Michael Register and Chief Daniel Devers. The grievance against Chief Devers alleged a "hostile" work environment. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that Chief Devers created a divide-and-conquer environment by telling new staff that "several dirty officers work for Respondent and that the new staff are to tell on them and replace all the old staff members." The grievance against Captain Register alleged race and gender harassment. Specifically, Petitioner claimed that Captain Register did not relieve Petitioner on time "for three weeks straight." Petitioner believed that Captain Register's alleged conduct was due to his dislike for her and favoritism toward other staff members. Petitioner did not allege that Captain Register or Chief Devers ever said anything to Petitioner or anyone else regarding her race or gender. In response to Petitioner's grievances, Respondent performed an in-house investigation. Subsequently, Petitioner's grievances against Captain Register and Chief Devers were denied as unfounded. Petitioner alleges that she was sexually harassed by Officer/Correctional Counselor Roderick Polite. As a Correctional Counselor, Officer Polite did not have authority to change the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment except that it was possible for Petitioner to receive work orders from a Correctional Counselor. Petitioner went on two consensual dates with Officer Polite prior to his alleged harassment. The first date was in late November 2007. The second date was in early December 2007. At the time that Petitioner went on these dates, she was temporarily broken up with Correctional Officer Darian Blue. In late November and early December 2007, Petitioner worked the 6 p.m. to 6 a.m. shift. Officer Polite was assigned to the 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. shift. Petitioner refused to go to Respondent's December 14, 2007, Christmas party with Officer Polite. Thereafter, Officer Polite called Petitioner's house continuously for three days. In a telephone conversation on December 17, 2007, Officer Polite allegedly told Petitioner that he "just had sex with a girl." Officer Polite also allegedly stated that his fascination with her would be over if she would just give him oral sex. Petitioner told Officer Polite "no" and ended the conversation. Petitioner claims that Officer Polite began to harass her at work after the December 17, 2007, telephone conversation. According to Petitioner, the harassment continued until January 10, 2008. Specifically, Petitioner claims that Officer Polite was critical of her work performance and changed the procedures she was to follow regarding mail distribution and the cleaning of pods by inmates. Officer Polite allegedly also accused Petitioner of improperly counseling an inmate. Petitioner alleges that Officer Polite "wrote her up" on one occasion. However, Petitioner admits that she never saw the alleged write-up. Petitioner also admits that she never suffered any adverse action as a result of the alleged write-up. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Officer Polite never filed a disciplinary action against Petitioner. Petitioner did not complain about Officer Polite's conduct until January 9, 2008. On that date, Petitioner spoke with Captain Joseph Ruby about Officer Polite's alleged conduct. Respondent’s sexual harassment policy prohibits physical and verbal harassment, including inappropriate threats and requests. The policy also set forth the procedure by which employees should utilize to complain about harassment and states that complaints will be promptly and thoroughly investigated. Accordingly, on January 10, 2008, Petitioner was interviewed by Respondent's in-house investigator. Petitioner told the investigator about Officer Polite's alleged harassment but stated that she did not want to file a formal grievance against him. Petitioner simply requested that she be allowed to return to work and that she not have to work with Officer Polite. Officer Polite subsequently resigned his position as a Correctional Counselor and stepped down to a Correctional Officer position. Additionally, Respondent changed Officer Polite to the 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. shift. If there were occasions when Petitioner's and Officer Polite's shifts overlapped, Respondent granted Officer Polite's requests not to work around Petitioner. In March 2008, Petitioner applied for one of three open positions as a Correctional Counselor. Based on the interview panel's recommendation, Warden Jason Medlin selected a white female and two black females for the positions. Petitioner was not selected for one of the positions because of her personnel and disciplinary record, including a prior allegation of excessive force against inmates. Moreover, there is no evidence regarding the personnel and disciplinary records of the three females selected for the positions. On March 30, 2008, Petitioner was assigned to the control room in the South 2 Unit. Her primary duty was to maintain the log and to open doors for other officers. At some point during her shift, Petitioner removed an inmate from his cell, took him to master control, and left him there. A Lieutenant requested another Correctional Officer, Amanda Sanders, to escort the inmate back to his cell and assist Petitioner with a search of the inmate's cell. When Officer Sanders and Petitioner arrived at the cell, the inmate's cellmate, Jose Sandoval, was sitting on his bunk bed. Officer Sanders told Inmate Sandoval to leave the cell. When Inmate Sandoval did not comply, Petitioner ordered him to stand up to be handcuffed. Inmate Sandoval continued to sit on his bunk bed. Petitioner then told Officer Sanders to call a "code red," a request for assistance from other officers. Officer Sanders did not comply immediately with Petitioner's request because Officer Sanders did not believe there was a need for assistance or a reason to handcuff Inmate Sandoval. Next, Petitioner grabbed Inmate Sandoval by his arm, physically removed him from his bed, and placed him face first into the wall. Officer Sanders did not have any contact with Inmate Sandoval when Petitioner removed him from his bed. Inmate Sandoval somehow turned to face Petitioner who had her back to Officer Sanders. Officer Sanders heard a "smack" and concluded that Petitioner had struck Inmate Sandoval. Officer Sanders then saw Inmate Sandoval spit at Petitioner. Officer Sanders immediately called a "code red" and assisted Petitioner in placing Inmate Sandoval on the floor and handcuffing him. Other officers arrived and removed Inmate Sandoval from his cell and the unit. As recorded on the facility's video cameras, the officers carried Inmate Sandoval by his neck, two or three feet off the floor. The officers choked him and slammed him onto the floor. The cameras recorded Inmate Sandoval in the medical department, so incoherent that he had to be held up to prevent him from falling over. When force is used against an inmate, the incident report must be sent to the Florida Department of Corrections' Inspector General (IG). In this case, the IG performed an investigation, concluding that Inmate Sandoval was assaulted by the facility's officers and that blood was cleaned off the walls to hide the assault. Respondent subsequently received a copy of the IG's report. On April 11, 2008, Respondent terminated all officers involved, including Petitioner, for violation of Respondent's Code of Ethics. Specifically, Respondent terminated Petitioner for physically abusing the inmate, for failing to report the extent of abuse on the inmate in written reports and during the IG's investigation, and for failing to call into the facility as directed while on administrative leave after the incident. Other officers that were terminated included the following: (a) Correctional Officer Darian Blue (black male) for use of excessive force; (b) Lieutenant Phillip Mobley (white male) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (c) Captain/Shift Supervisor Joseph Ruby (white male) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (d) Correctional Officer Grace Davie (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; (e) Correctional Officer Melissa Fontaine (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse; and (f) Correctional Officer Eunice Cline (white female) for failure to accurately report the extent of abuse. Respondent did not terminate Officer Sanders. The IG's report did not show that she violated any of Respondent's policies during the incident.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chelsie J. Roberts, Esquire Ford & Harrison LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801 Dafney Cook 2445 Dunn Avenue, Apt 610 Jacksonville, Florida 32218 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway. Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether or not on or about October 24, 1975, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House was convicted upon a plea of not guilty and a verdict of guilty of the offense of unlawfully and knowingly possessing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Subsection 841(a)(1), Title 21, United States Code, and unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally importing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance, into the United States, in violation of Subsection 952(a), Title 21, United States Code, and thereby was guilty of a crime against the laws of the United States, involving moral turpitude, fraudulent or dishonest dealing in violation of 475.25(1)(e), F.S. Whether or not the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, was committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of five (5) years on each of counts one and two of the aforementioned charges and that the execution of those sentences should run concurrently, to be followed by a parole term of five (5) years and thereby is guilty of a violation of 475.25(2), F.S., by being confined in a state or federal prison.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Dallas Norman House, is registered as a non-active salesman under certificate no. 0041416 held with the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission since October 1, 1976. Prior to that date the Respondent held the same certificate number as an active salesman beginning October 4, 1974 through September 30, 1976. Copies of these registrations may be found as part of Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #1, admitted into evidence. On October 24, 1975, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, was adjudged guilty upon his plea of not guilty and a verdict of guilty of the offenses of; (1) unlawfully and knowingly possessing marijuana a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of 841(a)(1), Title 21, United States Code; and (2) unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally importing marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance into the United States, in violation of 952(a), Title 21, United States Code. The Respondent was adjudged guilty and convicted, and committed to the custody of the Attorney General of the United States or his authorized representative for imprisonment for a period of five (5) years on each of the two counts with the execution of the two sentences to run concurrently, to be followed by a parole term of five (5) years. The terms of the judgement and commitment may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit #2, admitted into evidence. On August 2, 1976, the Respondent, Dallas Norman House surrendered himself at the Federal Prison Camp, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida to begin the service of the aforementioned sentences as imposed and at the time of the hearing was serving that sentence.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law in this cause, it is recommended that the Petitioner, Florida Real Estate Commission, revoke the registration of the Respondent, Dallas Norman House, certificate no. 0041416. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 Dallas Norman House c/o Superintendent E.V. Aiken Post Office Box 600 Eglin Air Force Base Eglin, Florida 32542
Findings Of Fact On his application form Petitioner was asked if he had ever been arrested. He checked the box indicating "yes." The form further inquired "If yes, list any and all arrests and dispositions. This may or may not be grounds for denial. If additional space is required, use back of application." To that inquiry, Petitioner indicated a charge for grand theft. He did not indicate the disposition of the charge but did indicate a date of 1958. At the conclusion of the application form Petitioner swore that the information contained therein was true and correct. Petitioner's history of arrests indicates, among others, the following: July 24, 1945 larceny of an automobile; August 31, 1945 unauthorized use of an automobile without owners consent; in addition Petitioner was convicted on July 3, 1947 for grand larceny and sentenced to the Florida State Prison for a period of two (2) years; on August 17, 1949, Petitioner was convicted of auto larceny and sentenced to the Florida State Prison for a period of three (3) years; and on March 11, 1959, Mr. Davis was convicted of robbery and sentenced to the Florida State Prison for the full term of fifteen (15) years. Mr. Davis was released from State custody in 1970. Since that time the available evidence does not indicate any further arrests or convictions of Mr. Davis. At the final hearing in this case Mr. Davis testified that the reason he did not fully disclose his prior arrest record was because he thought that the disclosure of one arrest would lead the Department of State's office to his complete record. This testimony is not accepted as credible. Mr. Davis is now able to vote in Florida elections.
Recommendation In light of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner's application for a Class "F" Unarmed Security Guard License be denied. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact Petitioners and Respondent have stipulated to the following facts: The three petitioners are inmates at Union Correctional Institution, Raiford, Florida, in the custody of the Department of Corrections. All three of the petitioners have had their PPRD's established by the respondent-commission as follows: In June of 1982, Mr. Piccirillo's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 30, 1986. In January of 1982, Mr. Adams' PPRD was established by the commission to be November 11, 1991. In December of 1982, petitioner Hemming's PPRD was established by the commission to be September 29, 1993. Subsequent to the commission having established their PPRD's, all three of the petitioners have been transferred from one Florida penal institution to another state institution as follows: Mr. Piccirillo was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1982. Mr. Adams was transferred from Polk Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on August 18, 1932. Mr. Hemming was transferred from Avon Park Correctional Institution to Union Correctional Institution on February 16, 1983. The petitioners were not transferred to Union Correctional Institution because of any unsatisfactory institutional conduct at their former institutions. Petitioners are currently scheduled by the commission for biennial interviews to review their established PPRD's as follows: Mr. Piccirillo is scheduled for a biennial interview in March of 1984. Mr. Adams is scheduled for a biennial interview in October of 1983. Mr. Hemming is scheduled for a biennial interview in September of 1984. The following additional findings are made from evidence presented at the hearing: The respondent-commission has not made a finding that any of the petitioner's institutional conduct has been unsatisfactory under the challenged rule nor has respondent extended their PPRD's or refused to authorize their EPRD's. In applying the challenged rule, the fact that an inmate has been transferred to a higher custody or higher level institution is only considered to be unsatisfactory institutional conduct where the commission receives documentation evidencing institutional misconduct as the basis for the transfer. Petitioners transfers from other institutions to Union Correctional Institution would not be considered unsatisfactory institutional conduct under the challenged rule because there is no documentation of institutional misconduct which led to these institutional transfers.
Findings Of Fact I find the following facts based on the facts admitted by both parties in the Prehearing Stipulation filed on May 22, 1987. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 33, as found in the Florida Administrative Code Annotated, through the March 1987 supplement, is true and correct. The Petitioner's current address is Douglas M. Jackson, Inmate Number 823916, Florida State Prison, Post Office Box 747, Starke, Florida 32091. The Respondent's name and address is Florida Department of Corrections, 1311 Winewood Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500. The Department rule on which an administrative determination is sought is Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007, "Inmate Grievance Procedure." The statutory provision on which the above Department rule is based is Section 944.331, Florida Statutes, which states: The department shall establish by rule an inmate grievance procedure which shall conform to the Minimum Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures as promulgated by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s. 1997e. The ten (10) days in Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(13), which deals with the filing of appeals of grievances, are "10 calendar days." This can include two weekends (a total of four days) when mail is not normally picked up at the prisons or delivered in the Office of the Secretary. If an inmate receives his institutional response on a Friday that is dated for the previous day (Thursday), his response must be received in Tallahassee by the following Friday. (The second Sunday following would be ten (10) days from the date of the institutional grievance, but the Central Office Inmate Grievance Administrator does not work on Saturday or Sunday to receive and log inmate grievance appeals). Florida Administrative Code Rules 33-3.007(6)(a) and (7) require the availability of grievance forms at all Department institutions. If the inmate needs a day to obtain a grievance appeal form and prepare it, he will not be able to mail his appeal until Sunday. But, there is no mail service on Sunday so his grievance appeal will not be mailed until Monday at the earliest. This means the grievance appeal must get from the prison to the Office of the Secretary in four (4) days or it will be denied as out-of-time. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(8) provides that: An extension of the 15-day period [to file at the institutional level] will be granted when it is clearly demonstrated by the inmate to the satisfaction of the Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent that it was not feasible to file the grievance within the 15- day period. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(15), which covers the filing of the grievance appeal, imposes an absolute requirement of ten (10) calendar days. No possibility exists under the rule, as promulgated, for the slightest extension of time for any possible reason, no matter how meritorious it might be. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007 does not inform the inmate that he must utilize the grievance procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies before he can file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the loss of gain time or confinement as a result of a disciplinary proceeding. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007 has been submitted to the United States Department of Justice for certification approval under the provisions of Section 944.331, Florida Statutes and 42 U.S.C. s. 1997e. Florida Administrative Code Rules 33-3.0025(11)(c), 33-3.012(1)(b)3, 33-3.012(4)(e), and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 33-22 have not been submitted to the United States Department of Justice for certification approval.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are all inmates at the Florida State Prison (FSP) and are subject to the terms of DOC Rule 33- 3.04(9), which requires that the return address of all outgoing mail must contain the inmate's name, identification number and institutional name and address with abbreviations. Petitioner Herzog, in March, 1985 failed to receive directly a letter sent to him from a correspondent in Beacon, N.Y., which was addressed to "Mr. Frederick Herzog, 081003, P. 0. Box 747, Starke, Florida 32091" because, as is indicated by stamp on the front of the envelope, the inmate's number and cell location must be included in the address. As will be seen below from the testimony of Ms. Seally, an inmate's cell number is no longer required. On two other occasions Mr. Herzog attempted to send letters to Beacon, N.Y., utilizing envelopes which reflected his return address merely as P. O. Box 747, Starke, Florida, 32091. These letters were not put into U.S. mail channels by prison mail room personnel because of the failure to reflect the institution's name and address in the return address. Petitioner Abdul Hakgem Jahmal N. Shabazz, also known as Owen D. Denson, on at least two occasions attempted to send letters to various individuals, one in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and one in Nokomosis, Florida, in envelopes bearing the return address, Post Office Box 747, A-013625, either Florida State Prison, Starke, Florida or merely Starke, Florida without identification of the prison. Both were returned to him for failure to have the institution's full name in the return address. Allen Penoyer, representative for Petitioners herein, was denied receipt of mail sent to him which included nude photographs. Neither Petitioner Milton nor Mummakil testified at the hearing or presented any evidence in their behalf. According to Mr. Dugger, Superintendent of FSP, the full identification without abbreviation of the prison name is required in inmate return addresses because of experience in the past which has indicated that inmates often misrepresent their location in correspondence to outsiders which sometimes results in extorting or gaining by fraud, money or other favors. The inclusion of the full prison return address would, it was hoped, give the outside addressees information as to where the letters originate. In one instance, a woman sent an inmate correspondent $10,000.00. The checks were intercepted and when questioned by prison officials, the woman indicated that from the mail she had received, she had no knowledge or indication that she was sending money to an inmate. Another reason for the rule was that some prisoners were subscribing to stock market publications and other periodicals and not paying for them when billed. Without the full return address, the publisher had no idea its publication was coming to a prison. In several instances, the publishers contacted prison officials requesting something be done about the situation. Mr. Dugger further indicated that some correspondents, even those who know an inmate is incarcerated, think the facility is a jail rather than the state prison and that the inmate's sentence is shorter than it actually is. Some correspondents have even shown up on a misrepresented discharge date expecting to see an inmate to whom they have sent money when in reality, the discharge date has been far in the future. Brenda Sealey, the supervisor of the mail room at FSP insures all mail comes in and goes out in proper fashion and that DOC rules for mail are followed. At one point, prison officials interpreted the rule which requires complete address to include the cell number but this policy is no longer followed. Currently, mail will be delivered to prisoners if mail room personnel can in any way find the prisoner somewhere within the DOC. Even though the rule requires an inmate number as a part of the address, as a courtesy, mail room personnel will deliver mail that does not contain this if they can find the prisoner. They will send the mail to another institution if the inmate has been moved. The rule requiring the use of the complete, unabbreviated name of the institution is still being implemented and applies to all routine mail but not to legal mail. Christmas cards, graduation and birthday cards, and the like are all routine mail and must have full return address. Identified legal mail is not held up because of technicalities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. As of the date of final hearing in this cause, Petitioner Durham was classified as "close" custody pursuant to Rule 33-6.09, Florida Administrative Code. Although Petitioner Durham's reclassification questionnaire score was initially five points, which would have qualified him for classification as "medium" custody, Respondent used the override provision contained in Rule 33-6.09 to classify Petitioner Durham as "close" custody by virtue of his poor institutional adjustment. Petitioner Adams was likewise classified as "close" custody at the time of final hearing. Petitioner Adams' numerical score on the inmate reclassification questionnaire would have classified him as "medium" custody, but the override provisions of Rule 33-6.09 were utilized in Mr. Adams' case to reclassify him as "close" custody by virtue of the fact that his sentence expiration date is 1990, and at the time of his reclassification he had not served 20 percent of his sentence. Petitioner Piccirillo was classified as "medium" custody at the time of final hearing. His numerical score on his inmate reclassification questionnaire was three points, which would have qualified him for "minimum" custody had this score not been overridden by virtue of the fact that Petitioner Piccirillo escaped from Department of Corrections custody on November 17, 1979, while in a minimum custody setting. Petitioner Farrell was classified as "minimum" custody at the time of final hearing in this cause, and his presumptive parole release date is set for July 24, 1984. It was stipulated at final hearing in this cause that none of the policy and procedure directives challenged in this cause had been promulgated by Respondent as rules, pursuant to the requirements of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. It is also apparent from the face of the various challenged policy and procedure directives that they have statewide applicability at all institutions administered by the Department of Corrections. On or about May 6, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.22, which was subsequently revised on November 30, 1979. This directive is entitled "Reclassification and Progress Reports," and purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in various sections of Chapters 921, 944, 945, and 947, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge two sections of this directive as unpromulgated rules. The first of these is contained in Section X, entitled "Sources of Information," which provides as follows: It is essential that Progress Reviews Reports be accurate, concise and usable. Compiling up-to-date information to go into the report is as important as writ- ing the report. The following source of information should be utilized by the Classification Team in compiling information for the report. Various evaluation Reports (verbal or written) to include work super- visors, medical, dental, education, recreation, quarters, religious, per- sonal observations, etc Nowhere in either the cited chapters of the Florida Statutes or Chapter 33-6, Florida Administrative Code, are there any specific requirements for information to be considered by the Classification Team in compiling an inmate progress report. Department personnel utilized the above quoted section of the challenged directive in preparing reports on inmate progress. The second section of Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.22 challenged in this proceeding is XVI, entitled "Recommendations for Parole or Pre-Parole Work Release," which provides as follows: The Department may in selected cases recom- mend to the Florida Parole and Probation Commission that an inmate be placed on parole or pre-parole work release. How ever, note should be made of an inmate's Presumptive Parole Release Date(PPRD) when considering such possibilities. If it is felt that such significant progress has taken place since the setting of the PPRD that it should be moved forward to an earlier date, then such recommendations should be made to the Parole Commission in a full Progress Report setting forth the basis for recommending a change in the PPRD. If at the time of the Progress Review/Report the team does not see the justification in recommending the PPRD be changed then no comment will be required. All reports contaning [sic] parole or pre-parole work release recommendations will be reviewed and signed by the Classification Supervisor and forwarded to the Superintendent for his concurrence or disapproval. The Superintendent will indicate his decision by placing his signature on the appropriate line of the block to be added at the close of the Progress Report format. Upon approving a parole or pre-parole work release recommendation, the Superintendent will prepare a cover letter of endorsement which will be attached to the normal distribution of the Progress Report and for warded directly to the Parole Commission. The above-quoted language from Section XVI of Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.22 is virtually identical to the language contained in Rule 33-6.09(7)(m) , Florida Administrative Code. On or about September 30, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.31, entitled "Community Study and Volunteer Service." This directive purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge as rules the following provisions contained in Section III, entitled "Selection": C. The Classification Team should determine if the inmate meets criteria for eligi- bility described in the Program Directive Community Services Programs. When com- parable study programs are available at the institution, community study should not be considered. On-the-job training programs which are limited in scope are not considered comparable. The educational personnel of the Depart- ment should be Particularly involved in referring inmates for community study since they are in a position to evaluate the inmate's desire, ability, and past performance in the education program. The educational personnel will ensure the availability of the requested course of study or training prior to Classification Team action. Inmates considered for community study must have financial assistance from one or more of the following sources for tuition, books and clothing: Vocational Rehabilitation Veterans benefits Personal finances Committed support by the inmate's family Approval for a government grant Proof of financial support must accompany each application. Inmates are not to borrow money from any university, college or private organiza- tion for the purpose of financing their education. Nowhere in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, or Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code, are the above-cited requirements of Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.31 contained. On or about April 27, 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.40, which was subsequently revised on March 10, 1982. This directive, entitled "Community Work Release general Policies and Procedures" purports to be issued pursuant to the authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge as an umpromulgated rule Section IXB of the directive which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: The Department will permit consideration for work release 18 months prior to release. However, normally such consideration will be given within the last nine months prior to the presumptive parole release date or expiration or[sic] sentence. Should special cases arise which warrant attention prior to the nine months remaining, consideration will be given on an individual basis when there appears[sic] to be appropriate reasons for such. Special cases must be recommended by the Classification Team, approved by the Superintendent and Regional Director, and then forwarded to the Central Office where a Special Review Committee will make the final decision. . . . (Emphasis added) The underlined portion of Section IXB quoted above appears nowhere in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, or in Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code. On or about November 30, 1979, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07-90, entitled "Inmate Participation in Outside Activities." This directive purports to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Section 945.21, Florida Statutes. Petitioners in this cause challenge as an umpromulgated rule Section IV of the directive, entitled "Distance Limitations," which provides as follows: The following distance limitations are established as maximums but may be reduced by the Superintendent: Travel to attend civic or religious meeting except the annual statewide meetings will be limited to 100 miles one way. Travel for fund raising projects will be limited to 35 miles one way. Travel to all statewide meetings will be approved by the Regional Director with concurrence of Assistant Secretary of Operations. Nowhere in Section 945.21, Florida Statutes, nor in validly adopted rules of Respondent do the specific requirements contained in Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.90 appear. On or about January 25, 1980, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.42, which was subsequently revised on February 26, 1982. This directive, entitled "Furlough Procedures," purports to be issued pursuant to authority contained in Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33.9, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioners in this cause challenge the entirety of this directive as an unpromulgated rule. The directive establishes a special review team to review furlough applications; makes Florida furlough procedures applicable to federal inmates in interstate compact cases placed with the department; establishes types of furloughs which may be granted; establishes eligibility criteria for selecting inmates for furloughs; sets time and distance limitations for furloughs; establishes the maximum number of furloughs for which inmates may be eligible; establishes verification requirements; establishes clothing requirements while inmates are on furlough; establishes types of transportation available for inmates on furlough; establishes release and check-in procedures; and, finally, establishes a procedure for termination of furloughs in the event of a violation of a furlough agreement. None of the specific requirements contained in Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.42 are contained in either Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, Chapter 33-9, Florida Administrative Code, or any other properly promulgated rule of the Department of Corrections.
The Issue Whether Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l), 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, William Van Poyck, Mike Ramadanovic and Kenneth Boudreaux, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules challenged in these cases, Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l), 33-3.0083(9)(i), and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rules"). Petitioner Van Poyck is on death row, which is considered administrative confinement. All exercise privileges for Petitioner Van Poyck have been suspended for almost three years. Petitioner Ramadanovic at the time of the final hearing was in close management confinement. All exercise privileges for Petitioner Ramadanovic have been suspended for almost one year. Petitioner Bourdreaux at the time of the final hearing was in close management confinement. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Challenged Rules. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "administrative confinement". Administrative confinement is the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for one or more specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (l) Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a 24-hour basis excluding showers and clinic trips may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a 30-day period, an exercise schedule shall be implemented to ensure a minimum of two hours per week of exercise out of doors. Such exercise periods shall be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted. The superintendent or assistant superintendent may restrict exercise for an individual inmate when the inmate continues to pose a serious threat to the safety, security and order of the institution by recent demonstrations of violence, by continuing threats of physical harm, written and spoken, toward staff and other inmates; by involvement in acts which seriously interfere with the staff's daily security functions, or by actions demonstrating an extreme escape risk. Inmates shall be notified in writing of this decision and may appeal through the grievance procedure. The denial of exercise shall be for the shortest length of time to accomplish the goal of safety, security and order within the institution and shall be documented on Form DC4-814. Medical restrictions may also place limitations on the exercise periods. Recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period provided such equipment does not compromise the safety or security of the institution. Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "close management". Close management is the "long-term single cell confinement of an inmate apart from the general inmate population, where the inmate, through his own behavior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of other inmates or disturbing the security, order or operation of the institution." Rule 33-3.0083(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a 24-hour basis, excluding showers and clinic trips, may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a 30-day period, an exercise schedule should be implemented to ensure a minimum of 2 hours per week of exercise outside of cell. Such exercise periods will be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted. Medical restrictions may also place limitations on the exercise periods. Recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period provided such equipment does not threaten the safety or security of the institution. Rule 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "disciplinary confinement". Rule 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (n) Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a twenty- four hour basis (excluding showers and clinic trips) may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a thirty-day period, an exercise schedule should be implemented to ensure a minimum of two hours per week of exercise outside of the cell. Such exercise periods should be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts show that such exercise periods should not be granted. Restrictions may also be placed on the exercise periods by medical staff. The reason for any exercise restrictions shall be documented. Period of Outdoor Exercise. The Challenged Rules all provide that inmates may exercise in their cells and that "a minimum of two hours per week of exercise outside of the cell" should be provided to inmates in administrative confinement, close management and disciplinary confinement. Unless specified otherwise, all references to "inmates" in this Final Order are to an inmate in administrative confinement, close management or disciplinary confinement. At Florida State Prison, non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules are given an opportunity to attend one, two-hour exercise session a week. If an inmate misses a session for medical or attorney "call out", a holiday or inclement weather, the session is not made up. The Challenged Rules do not specifically require that missed sessions be made up. On their face, the Challenged Rules provide that two hours of exercise should be provided without indicating any exceptions. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, is mandatory: two-hours of exercise must be provided each week. The amount of time inmates are allowed to exercise is affected by the budget and staff of the Respondent. Because of lack of funds and staff, the Respondent is not able to provide more exercise time to non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, a maximum security prison, there are thirteen wings housing inmates. Ten wings house inmates (including four housing inmates on death row) in various types of confinement status. Nine of the ten wings have a separate area, referred to as a "yard", in which inmates may exercise outdoors. There are two correctional officers on duty at each of the yards during the outdoor exercise period for non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules. One sergeant also rotates between the yards. Four to five correctional officers are required to take inmates in and out of the yards. Each inmate must be strip searched, handcuffed with his hands behind his back and then escorted into the yard. Exercise Yards. The Challenged Rules do not specify the size of the area in which outdoor exercise to be provided to inmates. The Challenged Rules also do not specify the number of inmates that may be placed in an area for outdoor exercise. Yards at Florida State Prison consist of a fenced concrete slab. The yards for non-death row inmates are approximately 24' by 33', or 792 square feet. Usually 17 inmates are placed in the yard next to the inmates' wing at a time. The number of inmates in the yard on occasion may be 20 to 25. This is the exception, rather than the rule. Recreational Equipment. The Challenged Rules do not require that recreational equipment be provided to non-death row inmates. Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, provide that recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period if it does not compromise the safety or security of the institution Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, is silent concerning recreational equipment. Recreational equipment is not provided to inmates during exercise at Florida State Prison. Inmates tend to fight over recreational equipment and to abuse it when it is provided. In light of the findings of fact, infra, concerning death row inmates, the evidence failed to prove that the failure to provide non-death row inmates with recreational equipment is arbitrary or capricious. Although there is a rational and reasonable reason for not providing recreational equipment to inmates who have proven to be a disciplinary problem (including some death row inmates) the Respondent is evidently prohibited from withholding recreational equipment for death row inmates by court decree. No such decree applies to non- death row inmates. Yard Suspension. The Challenged Rules provide that exceptions to the provision for outdoor exercise may be made "only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted." Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code. Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, contain very similar language. Rules 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, do not specify who may decide who is to be denied exercise in the yard, referred to as being placed on the "yard suspension list", or the specific reasons for placing an inmate on such a list. The various institutions are given discretion to decide who will place an inmate on the yard suspension list and the reasons for such suspensions. Rules 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, also do not specify the procedures for placing an inmate on the yard suspension list, do not require periodic review of the list, do not specify a maximum period of time an inmate may be on the list and do not specify the conditions which must be met for an inmate to be removed from the yard suspension list. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, provides who may restrict exercise, requires that there be a "serious threat to the safety, security and order of the institution by recent demonstrations of violence, by continuing threats of physical harm, written and spoken, toward staff and other inmates" and other acts, requires that inmates be notified in writing and provides that denial of exercise be for the shortest length of time possible. There is a list of inmates at Florida State Prison who have been denied yard exercise. Inmates are placed on the yard suspension list because of security problems similar to those specified in Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, caused by an inmate. The procedure for placing an inmate on the yard suspension list is as follows: The chief security officer recommends that an inmate be placed on the list. The recommendation of the chief security officer is reviewed by a team of senior correctional officers and the superintendent. The superintendent makes the final decision of whether an inmate is placed on the yard suspension list. Any inmate placed on the list is notified in writing and may appeal the decision through the grievance procedure. Chapter 33-29, Florida Administrative Code. The following procedure is followed to determine whether an inmate is removed from the yard suspension list: The list is reviewed monthly by the team of senior correctional officers that recommends the placement of an inmate on the list. If an inmate's behavior demonstrates that he has adapted to the institution and is no longer acting out in such a manner to create a security problem, a recommendation is made to the superintendent to remove the inmate's name from the list. The superintendent makes the final decision of whether an inmate's name is removed. Inmates are placed on the yard suspension list for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the goal of changing the inmate's behavior and to eliminate the threat to security caused by the inmate. Inmates on the yard suspension list are still allowed to exercise in their cells. Although cells are small and exercise is not necessarily easy in the cells, inmates may do elevated push-ups, step-ups, and jog in place. There are at any given time approximately 100 inmates at Florida State Prison on the yard suspension list. Inmates may be kept on the yard suspension list for years. Inmate Jimmy Stephens has been on the yard suspension list since February, 1990, and was previously on the yard suspension list for over fifteen years. Petitioner Van Poyck was placed on the yard suspension list upon his arrival at Florida State Prison on December 28, 1988, and remained on the list until January 7, 1992. Death Row Inmates. Inmates on death row are in administrative confinement and are, therefore, subject to Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Inmates on death row are provided two, two-hour exercise sessions each week. A total of four hours of exercise. If an exercise session is missed by a death-row inmate, the session is made up. The yards provided to death row inmates are larger than the yards provided to non-death row inmates. The yards for death row inmates at Florida State Prison are 71' by 69' (4,899 square feet), 80' by 64' (5,120 square feet), 62' by 91' (5,642 square feet) and 74' by 80' (5,920 square feet). Approximately 24 to 30 death row inmates are placed in the yard next to the inmates' wing at a time. Death row inmates are provided with a variety of recreational equipment. The amount of exercise time, the size of the yards and the amount of recreational equipment provided to death row inmates was agreed to in a consent decree in a federal court proceeding involving the Department of Corrections.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners were inmates incarcerated at Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, Florida. Respondent has stipulated that Petitioners have "standing" to challenge the rules and the policy and procedure directives which are the subject of this proceeding. At the time the petition in this cause was filed, Petitioners challenged the validity of Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, as it existed as of its latest revision on May 22, 1981. However, subsequent to the filing of the petition in this cause, and prior to the date of final hearing, Respondent amended Rule 33-3.081, and filed these amendments with the office of the Secretary of State on June 23, 1983. At final hearing in this cause, the parties stipulated to the Petitioners maintaining a challenge to newly amended Rule 33-3.081(4), (5), and (9)(a) and (d), Florida Administrative Code. On or about November 30, 1979, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.11, which was subsequently revised on June 14, 1981. This directive contains 13 separately titled sections. The first section, entitled Authority, simply lists the authority, both statutory and rule-based, for issuance of the directive. Section three contains definitions which, with a single exception not relevant here, are identical to those contained in Rule 33-3.081(2). Sections four through thirteen likewise recapitulate provisions contained in Respondent's rules or in relevant statutes. The following is a list of titles of sections four through thirteen, each of which is followed with a parenthetical reference of the rule provision substantially incorporated therein: Staff Selection (33- 3.081(10)); Basis for Placement (33-3.081(1)); Placement (33-3.081(4)); Protection Cases (33-3.082); Visiting (33-3.081 (5)); Gain Time (33-11.11 and Section 944.28, Florida Statutes); Review of Administrative Confinement (33- 3.081(6)); Self-Improvement Programs (33-081(7)); Facilities (33-3.081(8)); General Provisions (33-3.081(9)(a)-(k)). Sections 13(l) and (m) of the policy and procedure directive essentially reiterate the provisions of Rule 33-3.081(6) and 33-3.081 (11) , respectively. On or about June 14, 1981, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections issued Policy and Procedure Directive No. 4.07.20, entitled "Discipline." This directive which purportedly issued pursuant to the authority contained in Sections 944.09, 944.14, 944.15, 944.28 and 945.21, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 33-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. In fact, each of the 20 separately numbered portions of this directive substantially recapitulate requirements already contained in Rule 33-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. The single exception is Section 7 of the directive, entitled Administrative Confinement, which finds its support in Rule 33-3.081. Neither Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.11 nor Policy and Procedure Directive 4.07.20 purport to create or otherwise adversely affect rights of inmates in any manner which differs from corresponding provisions of Rules 33- 3.081, 33-3.08 or the provisions of the Florida Statutes cited as authority for issuance of the policy and procedure directive. Rather, the rights of inmates are specifically determinable pursuant to those cited statutory provisions and the requirements of Rules 33-3.081 and 33-3.08, and the challenged policy and procedure directives simply recapitulate the requirements contained therein.
The Issue Whether Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact A. Standing. The Petitioner, Peter B. Dolinger, is not incarcerated by the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is, therefore, not subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rule at issue in this proceeding. The Petitioner is an independent paralegal who owns and operates a sole proprietorship specializing in prisoner related issues. The intended scope of the Petitioner's business is to include research and pleading preparation for licensed members of the Florida Bar; agency representation before state agencies, in a qualified non-attorney representative status. The Petitioner, while representing an inmate in an unrelated administrative proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings, Archie White v. Parole and Probation Commission, DOAH Case No. 92-2392RXP, sought the release of the inmate's records from the Respondent. The request was denied by the Respondent pursuant to Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code. Archie D. White v. Parole and Probation Commission, DOAH Case No. 92- 2392RXP, is no longer pending before the Division of Administrative Hearings. A Final Order was entered in that case in June, 1992. The Respondent. The Respondent is the state agency required to adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (9) When it is reasonably believed that a party may divulge information contained in the files of the department to an offender, the department shall restrict release of any information to that party. The Petitioner has alleged that Rule 33-6.006(9), Florida Administrative Code, "facially fails to establish an adeqaute [sic] standard for agency decisions. In other words, a person of common intelligence may imply the utilization of a 'reasonable' etst [sic] or standard thstb [sic] differs in totality from thst [sic] of another, most notably in the absence of definition, guidelines or policy on the standard to be applied."
