Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Richard M. Woodley has two inactive contracting licenses numbered CB CA 17970 and CB CO 17970, and was so licensed in 1986. The Respondent's license CB CA 17970 qualified "Woodley Builders, Inc." with the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. At the time of the hearing, the Respondent was no longer in the construction contracting business as a licensed contractor. With respect to case number 87-2809, on December 15, 1985, the Respondent, on behalf of Woodley Builders, Inc., entered into a contract with Catherine M. Richardson and Jonathan P. Richardson to build a residence in or near Orlando, Florida. The contract price was $90,000, with $20,000 attributable to the land. The contract specified that payments would be made to Woodley Builders, Inc. "in accordance with the disbursement schedule set forth by the construction lender." P. Ex. 1, paragraph 7. Woodley Builders, Inc. also agreed in the contract to furnish to the Richardsons lien waivers as required by the construction lender for disbursements. The construction lender disbursed the following amounts on the indicated dates: $10,200 March 17, 1986 $10,200 March 19, 1986 $17,000 March 27, 1986 $17,000 April 24, 1986 To induce these disbursements, a total of $54,400, the Respondent signed lien waivers stating that all bills for labor and materials used had been paid in full. P. Ex. 5. At the time of signing, the Respondent told the construction lender that he had paid all bills due to that time, but had not paid bills not yet presented. T. 89. Thus, the lien waivers were intended to be a certification of the partial completion and payment for the work billed to the date of the waiver, and a promise to pay other bills for work already completed as such bills were presented. Six claims of liens were filed by subcontractors. The Richardsons hired a lawyer, and the lawyer was able to defend against two of the liens for failure to properly comply with procedures for mechanic's liens. Four liens for the following amounts and for work beginning on the dates indicated ultimately had to be satisfied by the Richardsons: $ 2,851.45 March 19, 1986 $13,462.34 March 7, 1986 $ 1,944.57 April 8, 1986 $ 785.01 April 9, 1986 These liens were for work commenced before the last lien waiver was signed on April 24, 1986. Thus, the Respondent failed to comply with the oral representations he made at the time of signing the lien waivers. The Richardsons were forced to execute a second mortgage in excess of $17,000 to pay off the unpaid liens. The Richardsons terminated the contract with Woodley Builders, Inc. when subcontractors quit working for lack of payment by Woodley Builders, Inc. Some money was obtained from family loans. It cost the Richardsons about $30,000 to have the house finished, which has added about $325 per month to their mortgage obligations. The Respondent and Woodley Builders, Inc. have not paid anything on these liens. Woodley Builders, Inc. filed bankruptcy. The Richardsons sued the Respondent as trustee for Woodley Builders, Inc. and obtained a default judgment for $149,839, which was a judgment of $32,380 in compensatory damages, trebled, plus costs, interest, and attorney's fees. With respect to case number 87-2810, on June 11, 1986, Woodley Builders, Inc. entered into a contract with Tom Jamieson to construct an addition to his residence in Orlando, Florida. The price of the work was $18,500. The contract specified that the price was a cash price, and that draws were to be made according to a schedule stated in the contract. Mr. Jamieson paid to Woodley Builders, Inc. about $11,700 of the contract price. At some time before completion of the addition, the owner, Mr. Jamieson, evidently became dissatisfied with the Respondent's work. Mr. Jamieson was given the Respondent's copy of the contract and refused to return it to the Respondent. Mr. Jamieson then owed the Respondent a draw of $3500, but refused to give it to him, and refused to have it put in escrow for the payment of subcontractors. The date that this occurred is not in evidence. T. 35-36, 39. Since Mr. Jamieson had taken back the contract, the Respondent thought that he (the Respondent) no longer had any legal proof of the contract (either scope of work or amount due), and thus had no contract to complete the work. He also did not receive the draw that was due. The Respondent thus ceased work on the addition for fear that he would not be paid without a copy of his contract. T. 36-37. The Respondent offered to complete the work. T. 51. The drywall contractor, Rick's Drywall, Inc., filed a lien for $465 for work done from August 12, 1986 and August 20, 1986. The Respondent would have paid this lien had Mr. Jamieson not terminated the contract and refused to give the Respondent a draw still due of $3500. T. 49-50. There may be a claim for unpaid electrical work in July, 1986, see P. Ex. 15, but it is impossible to tell if this occurred before or after Mr. Jamieson terminated the contract, or whether the Respondent had received draw money that should have paid this claim. The only evidence is that the Respondent had an agreement with the electrical subcontractor to pay that subcontractor at the time of the final draw, a draw never received as discussed above. T. 53. P. Ex. 11 is insufficient evidence that there were unpaid claims for roof trusses. Moreover, it cannot be determined whether the Respondent received a draw before contract termination which should have been used to pay for roof trusses. The Respondent had been a contractor for eight years before he began to have financial difficulties resulting in the problems with the Richardson's residence. There is no evidence of any prior discipline.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter its final order finding in case number 87-2809 that the Respondent, Richard M. Woodley, violated sections 489.129(1)(m), 489.129(1)(j), and 489.119, Fla. Stat. (1986), misconduct in contracting by diversion of funds, and failure to supervise as a qualifying agent, and in case number 87-2810, dismissing the administrative complaint for failure of proof by clear and convincing evidence. It is further recommended for the violation set forth above that the license of the Respondent be suspended for one year. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1988. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard M. Woodley 2521 Tuscaloosa Trail Maitland, Florida 32751 David Bryant, Esquire 1107 East Jackson, Suite 104 Tampa, Florida 33602 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Nonroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
The Issue This is a license discipline proceeding in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of alleged violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. Specifically, the Respondent has been charged in a three-count Administrative Complaint with violations of paragraphs (e), (h) and (m) of Section 489.129(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed Certified General Contractor, having been issued license number CG C046109, by the State of Florida. At all times material hereto, the Respondent was the qualifying agent for Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc. On November 2, 1990, the Respondent, doing business as Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc., contracted with New Life Presbyterian Church for the construction of a church at 7355 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155, for the price of Two Hundred and Ninety Four Thousand dollars ($294,000.00). New Life Presbyterian Church paid Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc., One Hundred and Four Thousand dollars ($104,000.00) toward the contract price. The Respondent constructed a foundation and two exterior concrete block walls with tie beams, and then abandoned the project without just cause or notice to the owner during or near March of 1991. The work performed by the Respondent amounted to approximately ten or fifteen percent of the total work to be performed under the contract. The amount of money the Respondent received from the New Life Presbyterian Church amounted to approximately thirty-five percent of the full price to be paid under the contract. On May 17, 1991, a lien in the amount of One Thousand Eighty Nine dollars and Seven cents ($1,089.07) was filed against 7355 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155, the property known as New Life Presbyterian Church, for building materials furnished by Nachon Enterprises, Inc., in accordance with a contract between Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc., and Nachon Enterprises, Inc. The Respondent failed to remove said lien and the New Life Presbyterian Church paid Nachon Enterprises, Inc., to satisfy said lien. On April 19, 1991, a lien in the amount of Ten Thousand One Hundred Eighty Four dollars and Fourteen cents ($10,184.14) was filed by Southeastern Municipal Supply, a Division of Clayton Group, Inc., against 7355 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155, for plumbing materials furnished in accordance with a contract with Downrite Engineering. On April 19, 1991, a lien in the amount of One Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty One dollars and Thirty Six cents ($1,861.36) was filed by PreCon Products, a Division of Clayton Group, Inc., against 7355 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155, for plumbing materials furnished in accordance with a contract with Downrite Engineering. The Respondent failed to remove the liens filed by Southeastern Municipal Supply and PreCon Products, a Division of Clayton Group, Inc., and New Life Presbyterian Church paid both liens. Downrite Engineering was a subcontractor of Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc., in the construction of the New Life Presbyterian Church, and the materials furnished to the New Life Presbyterian Church by Southeastern Municipal Supply and PreCon Products, both Divisions of Clayton Group, Inc., were furnished in accordance with Respondent's instructions. On May 17, 1991, a lien in the amount of Four Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Four dollars and Ninety One cents ($4,794.91) was filed by Standard Concrete Corporation against 7355 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155, for concrete furnished in accordance with a contract between Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc., and Standard Concrete Corporation. On February 1, 1991, a lien in the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety Nine dollars and Eighty Four cents ($4,999.84) was filed by Central Concrete Supermix, Inc., against 7355 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155, for concrete furnished in accordance with a contract between Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc., and Central Concrete Supermix, Inc. The Respondent failed to remove the lien filed by Central Concrete Supermix, Inc., and the New Life Presbyterian Church paid Four Thousand dollars ($4,000.00) in satisfaction of the lien. On February 22, 1991, a lien in the amount of Two Thousand One Hundred Twelve dollars ($2,112.00) was filed by Del Amo Plumbing, Inc., against 7355 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155, for plumbing materials and labor furnished in accordance with a contract between Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc., and Del Amo Plumbing, Inc. The Respondent failed to remove the lien filed by Del Amo Plumbing, Inc. On April 10, 1991, a lien in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred and Fourteen dollars and Ninety Three cents ($2,214.93) was filed by Austin Tupler Trucking, Inc., against 7355 Coral Way, Miami, Florida 33155, for trucking and related services furnished in accordance with a contract between Downrite Engineering and Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc. The Respondent failed to remove the lien filed by Austin Tupler Trucking, Inc., and the New Life Presbyterian Church paid to satisfy the lien. Downrite Engineering was a subcontractor of Florida Hi-Tech Construction, Inc., in the construction of the New Life Presbyterian Church, and the materials furnished to the New Life Presbyterian Church, by Austin Tupler Trucking, Inc., were furnished in accordance with the Respondent's instructions. New Life Presbyterian Church overpaid the Respondent by approximately Sixty Five Thousand Seven Hundred and Five dollars ($65,705.00). The New Life Presbyterian Church suffered financial harm as a result of the Respondent's activities. The Respondent obtained money draws from the New Life Presbyterian Church in a manner that did not conform to the contract requirements. The Respondent hired Joe Al Electric, Inc., to perform electrical work on the New Life Presbyterian Church. Joe Al Electric, Inc., was not a licensed entity pursuant to Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. The Respondent failed to ensure that Joe Al Electric, Inc., was an entity licensed to practice electrical contracting in the State of Florida. The Respondent assisted Joe Al Electric, Inc., in the uncertified and unregistered practice of contracting. The Respondent was previously found guilty of violations of paragraphs (k), (h), and (m) of Section 489.129(1), Florida Statutes, in a Final Order issued by the Construction Industry Licensing Board on May 13, 1994, in DBPR Case No. 92-14332. As of the date on which it submitted its proposed recommended order, the Petitioner had incurred costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of this case of at least Eight Thousand Three Hundred Six dollars and Sixty Two cents ($8,306.62).
Recommendation On the basis of all the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Concluding that the Respondent is guilty of the violations charged in all three counts of the Administrative Complaint; and Imposing the following penalties for the violations alleged in Counts I and II of the Administrative Complaint: (a) administrative fines totaling Ten Thousand dollars ($10,000.00) (a $5,000.00 fine for each of the two counts); and (b) revocation of the Respondent's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April 1995 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April 1995 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Mr. Gonzalo Ardavin 6120 East Territorial Avenue Tucson, Arizona 85718 Richard Hickok, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Linda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Samuel J. Marshall, was born on November 19, 1936. In March 1986 he began employment as a truck driver hauling sand for Taylor Concrete and Supply, Inc. (Taylor) at its Palatka, Florida plant. When he began his employment with Taylor, Marshall advised his supervisor that because of his religious beliefs, he could not work on Saturdays. The name of the religion is not of record. Marshall says that after giving such notification to his employer, he was never required to work on Saturdays during his tenure with Taylor. This was not contradicted. In 1989, Taylor sold the plant to respondent, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac). As an employer with more than fifteen full-time employees, Tarmac is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Shortly after the sale, petitioner was advised that his position as a sand truck driver was being eliminated but he could transfer to a position as a ready-mix driver in the ready-mix division at the same plant. Petitioner accepted this offer effective November 28, 1989. Because the new position required the driver to work every other Saturday, petitioner advised the new plant manager, Byron White, that he could not work on Saturdays because of his religious beliefs. After Marshall produced evidence to verify his claim, White excused Marshall from working on Saturdays. Tarmac employee timecards confirm that Marshall was never required to work on a Saturday. Petitioner was required to undergo a brief period of training by riding for several weeks with a senior driver, James Bolt. During petitioner's training period, Bolt was engaged in the illicit practice of selling any concrete left in his truck at the end of the day to third parties and then pocketing the money. This was obviously contrary to company policy. Petitioner was aware of this activity but said nothing. On occasion, Bolt would give petitioner some of the illicit proceeds, which he accepted. In the first week of February 1990, or after he had completed his training with Bolt, petitioner went to White and told him that there was "illicit" activity being conducted at the plant, but he refused to disclose the nature of the activity or the name of the individual engaged in that enterprise. He also failed to tell White that Bolt had given him money. White communicated this conversation to the regional manager, Jack Stegall, but because they had no specific information on which to proceed, they were unable to investigate the allegations. Tarmac has a number of plants within each division. It is not uncommon for drivers to be transferred from one location to another, based on the varying demands of the different plants. In June 1990 Stegall decided to transfer two drivers from the Palatka plant to the Green Cove Springs plant due to increased business at the latter facility. Petitioner and another driver, Dennis Folmer, then approximately thirty years of age, were selected for transfer since they had the least seniority in the Palatka ready-mix division. After learning of Stegall's decision, petitioner contacted Stegall and advised him that he believed the company policy required that transfer decisions be made based on seniority with the company, rather than seniority in a particular position. Stegall then checked with the human resources department and learned petitioner was correct. Petitioner's name was thereafter removed from the transfer list and James Bolt, who had less seniority than petitioner, was placed on the list. During his meeting with Stegall, petitioner informed him about the illegal concrete sales that had occurred during his training period. After petitioner was told to inform White about this matter, he took White to the locations where he was with Bolt when the concrete was illegally sold. He also turned over to White the $30 he had received from Bolt. Based on Marshall's revelation, on June 25, 1990, Bolt was terminated as an employee for the unauthorized sale of concrete. Because he had come forward and disclosed the illegal activity, petitioner was only given a one-week suspension without pay. Petitioner did not question nor challenge the suspension and admitted to White that he was involved in the sales. Also, on July 11, 1990, he was given a warning notice prepared by White and which read in part as follows: Sam confessed to selling unauthorized concrete on three separate occasions. Sam also reported others involved. For this reason only Sam was given one week off. If for any reason this happens again or attempt (sic) to, Sam will be terminated. Although petitioner was handed a copy of the notice, he refused to sign it, threw it back at White and walked away. At the same time petitioner notified Stegall of the illegal concrete sales, he also asked Stegall about the possibility of transferring to Tarmac's Deland facility, which was closer to his home. Stegall indicated he would try to assist petitioner with a transfer, if possible. The next day, petitioner drive to the Deland facility and spoke with the Deland plant manager who indicated there was a ready-mix driving position available. The plant manager also agreed to contact White on petitioner's behalf. Even so, because the Palatka facility was short two drivers due to the transfer of Bolt and Folmer to Green Cove Springs, White could not afford to allow petitioner to transfer to Deland. He did promise petitioner that he would arrange for a transfer as soon as an opportunity arose which would not adversely impact the Palatka facility. After petitioner's suspension for his participation in the illegal sale of concrete, Tarmac received complaints from other Tarmac employees regarding petitioner. Believing this conduct to be detrimental to the integrity of the company and a disruption of the harmony of the work unit, Minor Turrentine, then the Tarmac area production manager, advised petitioner that if he continued to talk about the illegal sale of concrete with other drivers and customers, he would be terminated for breaching company policy, that is, disclosing confidential information that was contrary to the company's best interests. He was also given a written warning on July 16, 1990, which read as follows: You were recently suspended for your admitted involvement in certain activities that are against company policy. It has been reported that you have openly discussed these matters with employees at various locations. Be advised that any further discussion concerning your suspension and the circum- stances surrounding it will be considered breach of confidentiality, which is a violation of company policy. Any further violation of company policy will subject you to severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. After White received further complaints regarding petitioner, Tarmac terminated petitioner's employment effective August 21, 1990, for breaching company policy. The separation notice, which was dated the same date, gave the following reason for his termination: Employee was formally warned on July 16 to discuss no further his recent suspension. Discharged for further discussion on or about 8/20/90. There is no evidence as to whether petitioner was replaced by another driver, and if so, the age of that driver. When terminating petitioner, Tarmac did not do so because of petitioner's age or religious beliefs. Indeed, Marshall conceded at hearing that he had no direct proof of discrimination but merely believed he was improperly terminated for those reasons. As evidence of age discrimination, petitioner speculated that Tarmac may have been attempting to lower its insurance rates by removing an older person from its payroll, a belief based solely on a conversation he had with an insurance agent a few weeks prior to hearing. However, at least three other ready mix drivers at the Palatka plant are older than Marshall. He also speculated that because he was not required to work on Saturdays, this caused ill-will among his co-workers, and Tarmac terminated him for his religious beliefs. Again, there was no proof, either circumstantial or direct, to support this assertion. Regarding the claim that Tarmac's decision to transfer petitioner to Green Cove Springs in June 1990 was in retaliation for him telling White that working Saturdays was against his religion, the evidence shows that petitioner was removed from the transfer list once his seniority was brought to the company's attention. Petitioner also suggests that he was denied a transfer to the Deland facility in June 1990 as retaliation for his religious beliefs. However, the evidence shows that it was not feasible for Tarmac to transfer him at that time due to a shortage of drivers but Tarmac promised that an effort would be made to comply with his request when it was feasible. Petitioner did not state whether he desires reinstatement to his former position. In his petition for relief, petitioner did request "70 percent of (his) average yearly base pay since August 20 on". However, petitioner's salary at the time of discharge is not of record. Further, there was no evidence presented to establish his salary nor the monetary losses, if any, petitioner has suffered by virtue of his termination. He is currently employed with another company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5927 Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 20-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 24. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Samuel J. Marshall S. R. Box 1075 Georgetown, Florida 32139 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Donna M. Griffin, Esquire 1408 North Westshore Boulevard Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner timely filed a complaint of discrimination in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2009).
Findings Of Fact Prior to November 28, 2007, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent. On November 26, 2008, the Petitioner sent a Technical Assistance Questionnaire (TAQ) to the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The TAQ was submitted via facsimile transmission and was not signed. The Petitioner believed she was complying with the directives of the FCHR website and that follow-up assistance (from the FCHR) would not be required. The Petitioner did not understand that a signature was required, notwithstanding the place for same (along with a date) on page 2 of the TAQ. The Petitioner maintains that the FCHR website instructions were unclear and that she erroneously relied on the directions that did not specify she was required to sign the TAQ. The Petitioner filed a signed Charge of Discrimination with the FCHR on January 14, 2009. On February 5, 2009, the Petitioner received a "Notice of Receipt of Complaint" from the FCHR. At the same time, a copy of the complaint was furnished to the Respondent, who was then, presumably, put on notice of the Petitioner's charge. The FCHR did not advise the Petitioner that the TAQ had to be signed. In the course of its review of the instant charge, the FCHR entered a determination of "untimely." Per the FCHR's assessment, the charge of discrimination was filed more than 365 days from the last incident or act of discrimination. Thereafter, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination and to seek relief against the Respondent. The Commission then forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal proceedings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of September, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Levitt, Esquire Allen, North & Blue 1477 West Fairbanks Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 Marie C. Perez 517 29th Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of making misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent representations in or related to the practice of contracting, in violation of Section 289.129(1)(c), Florida Statutes; mismanagement or misconduct in the practice of contracting that causes financial harm to a customer, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(h)2, Florida Statutes; failing to comply with any of the provisions of Chapter 489, Part I, or a rule or lawful order of the Construction Industry Licensing Board, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes; abandoning a construction project, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes; committing fraud or deceit in the practice of contracting, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes; two counts of committing incompetency or misconduct in the practice of contracting, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(n), Florida Statutes; and failing to satisfy, within a reasonable time, a civil judgment obtained against him, or a business entity that he has qualified, and related to the practice of contracting, in violation of Section 489.129(1)(r), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a certified general contractor, holding certificate number CR C016649. He has been continuously certified since 1980 and has been licensed since 1988 as the qualifier of Dunbar Development, Inc. On August 19, 1994, Carla and Vernon Prevatt entered into a contract with Dunbar Development, Inc., for the construction of a residence. The contract calls for Dunbar Development, Inc. (Dunbar), to construct the "Horizon" model home on two platted lots for the sum of $73,395 plus an additional $7400 for Addendum 2. The contract permits Dunbar to cancel the contract if the Prevatts timely apply for a mortgage, but are denied. However, in such event, the contract requires Dunbar to return to the Prevatts all of their money. The contract acknowledges that the Prevatts paid Dunbar the sum of $1500 at the time of entering into the contract. A handwritten note states: "June 06, 1995—Rec'd $17,000.00 ck no. 16655 to initiate construction application for permits & building." Although the contract was originally signed by John Danzy, as "authorized representative" for Dunbar, this handwritten note bears the initials, "WB." The contract does not contain Respondent's certificate number. The contract does not contain a completion date. The contract provides that Dunbar will "commence construction . . . after full down payment and mortgage financing is received" and "will complete the same as soon as practicable, subject to the availability of labor and supplies [and] delays not within the control of [Dunbar]." Another clause in the contract states that Dunbar shall complete construction within two years of the date of the contract. On August 30, 1994, the Prevatts applied for a construction mortgage loan with the First Bank of Clewiston. The bank processed the loan application without any delays or problems. However, there was a substantial delay not attributable to the Prevatts or Respondent in obtaining an appraisal. The appraiser completed the appraisal before March 5, 1995, but probably not much prior to that date. By letter dated March 5, 1995, from Dunbar's financial officer to the Prevatts, Dunbar acknowledged the receipt of the appraisal and proposed a draw schedule totaling $80,795. The first payment under the draw schedule was $18,500 for "applicable fees and permits, plus, the plylon engineered foundation and engineered septic field construction initiation." The policy of First Bank of Clewiston is to match the value of the work to the payments to the contractor. The first payment due under Dunbar's draw schedule called for a payment substantially in excess of the value of the goods and services rendered. However, the bank acceded to the schedule and delivered a check dated June 6, 1995, in the amount of $17,000 payable jointly to the Prevatts and Dunbar. As Dunbar had done with the $1500 down payment received at the time of the execution of the contract, Dunbar deposited the $17,000 check and received payment of these funds. On behalf of Dunbar, Respondent hired Johnson-Prewitt & Associates, Inc., in early November 1995, to prepare the engineering drawings for the septic tank and foundation. These materials are specific to the Prevatts' homesite. By invoice dated November 13, 1995, Johnson-Prewitt & Associates, Inc., invoiced Respondent at Dunbar a total of $1700 for the completed work. After a credit of $700, the outstanding balance was $1000, which remains unpaid. From 1994 through 1995, Respondent, on behalf of Dunbar, provided information to Alpha Engineering, which was retained to prepare the plans for the Horizon model that the Prevatts were building. Most of this work was for the prototype Horizon home, but the work reflected by an invoice dated March 16, 1996, was exclusively for the home to be built for the Prevatts. Respondent and Dunbar never paid this invoice and never picked up the plan revisions that were the subject of this invoice. In fact, Respondent and Dunbar never commenced construction of the Prevatts' home and refused to return any portion of the $18,500 that the Prevatts paid to Dunbar. Although the bank never made any additional disbursements, the Prevatts nevertheless owed the bank the $17,000 disbursed as the first draw and, at the time of the hearing, had paid the sum of $6522.96 in interest and closing costs on this loan. With two checks totaling $2800 that, in June 1995, Yvonne Bushnell delivered to Respondent, on behalf of Dunbar, Ms. Bushnell entered into a contract with Dunbar for the construction of a residence. After Dunbar declined to construct a house or return the money, Ms. Bushnell filed an action against Respondent and Dunbar in Lee County Court on January 31, 1997. On March 12, 1997, the court entered a default judgment against Dunbar Developing, Inc., for the sum of $2800 and costs of $79.50. Following entry of the judgment, on September 14, 1998, Ms. Bushnell and Respondent agreed to settle the matter with the payment of $1600. However, upon payment of only $800, Respondent obtained Ms. Bushnell's signature on a letter dated September 14, 1998, to Petitioner acknowledging the full settlement of the case. Respondent then proceeded to obtain court issuance of a satisfaction when Ms. Bushnell refused to sign a satisfaction, absent payment of the remaining $800. By Order to Set Aside Settlement Agreement entered November 24, 1998, the court reinstated the original judgment. The judgment remains unsatisfied.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order revoking Respondent's certificate as a general contractor and imposing an administrative fine against him of $4000. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 6th day of May, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul F. Kirsch, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 P. Michael Villalobos Sussman Law Group, P.A. 1375 Jackson Street, Suite 201 Fort Myers, Florida 33901 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Graham is a black male. He filed an employment application with Pier 1, a "chain retailer," on August 23, 1999. The application indicated that he applied for a position as a sales associate but in fact he was to be employed as a stockroom assistant. His employment application included a block denominated, "Work Availability." Graham completed this block indicating that he was available to work between 6:00 a.m., and 12 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The employment application stated in the block denominated, "Work Availability," the following: "Although an effort will be made to accommodate individual work schedule preferences and availability, work schedules such as start time, number of daily or weekly hours and assigned work days are subject to change at any time. Availability to work on weekends is required. Number of hours may vary based on business necessity and could change an individual's employment status." Graham was hired on August 30, 1999, as a full-time employee. He worked primarily in the back stockroom. A meeting of store personnel was scheduled at the store on Sunday, November 17, 1999, at 6:30 p.m. Graham was aware of the meeting. He was 20 minutes late because he was participating in a church service at Macedonia Primitive Baptist Church. As a result of his tardiness he was presented with an Associate Corrective Action Documentation, which is a confidential Pier 1 form. The form noted that this was his first "tardy." The form as completed took no action such as suspension or loss of pay. It merely informed him that further instances of tardiness could lead to disciplinary action. Graham testified that he was treated differently from a white woman employee, one Christy Musselwhite, who did not attend the meeting, because Musselwhite did not receive a counseling form. However, Graham's personal knowledge of Musselwhite's situation was insufficient to demonstrate that Musselwhite was treated differently from Graham because of race or gender. Graham felt humiliated because he received the Associate Corrective Action Documentation form. Graham resigned from Pier 1 effective November 12, 1999, so that he could begin employment with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services at a rate of pay in excess of that which he received at Pier 1.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission Human Relations enter a final dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Russell D. Cawyer, Esquire Kelly, Hart & Hallman 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Kenneth Terrell Graham 2811 Herring Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2511 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ronni Morrison Pier 1 Imports Post Office Box 961020 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-0020
The Issue Whether Respondents failed to maintain and deposit payment instruments into their own commercial account in a federally- insured financial institution, in violation of section 560.309(3), Florida Statutes (2013).1/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner, Office of Financial Regulation, is the state agency charged with administering and enforcing chapter 560, Florida Statutes, including part III of that statute, related to money services businesses. Respondent, Moctezuma Envios, Inc. ("Moctezuma Envios"), is a Florida corporation operating as a money services business, cashing checks and acting as a money transmitter, as authorized by License No. FT30800203 issued by Petitioner. Its address of record is 19784 Southwest 177th Street, Miami, Florida 33187. Respondent Liliana Carrascal has a 100 percent controlling interest in, and is the sole officer of, Moctezuma Envios.3/ The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Respondents have been in the money services business, and Moctezuma Envios has been licensed to conduct this business, since 2001. Respondents were doing business with Intermex Wire Transfer LLC ("Intermex"), a money transfer services business, before the events giving rise to this proceeding. Sometime prior to January 2013, Carrascal was approached by representatives of Intermex about opening an account in the name of Moctezuma Envios at U.S. Bank.4/ Intermex representatives told Carrascal that the account could be used for depositing the checks that Moctezuma Envios cashed and also for paying Intermex for money transfers. According to Carrascal, this offer was attractive to Respondents because U.S. Bank accepted third-party checks, and opening a check-cashing account that accepts such checks is difficult. Additionally, having the account would streamline the process by which Moctezuma Envios paid Intermex to serve as its money transmitting agent, and would enable Carrascal to avoid driving across town carrying large sums of money to deposit cash into Intermex's account. Carrascal testified, credibly, that Intermex representatives told her she would be the owner of the account, that she could deposit payment instruments into and withdraw funds from the account, and that the account would be compliant with the law. On the basis of these representations, Carrascal authorized Intermex representatives to open an account in the name of Moctezuma Envios at U.S. Bank. The account number was XX3503. The persuasive evidence shows that Account No. XX3503 was established as an agent account, with Moctezuma Envios acting as a money transmitter agent for Intermex. As such, Moctezuma Envios was authorized to deposit funds and payment instruments into the account. Robert Lisy and Darryl J. Ebbert, both employees of Intermex, were signatories on Account No. XX3503, and, as such, were the owners of the account. They were authorized to deposit funds into, withdraw funds from the account, and otherwise control the account. The persuasive evidence further shows that Respondents were not signatories to Account No. XX3503.5/ Accordingly, they were not authorized to withdraw funds from the account. During the period spanning from January 2013 to late 2014, Respondents deposited payment instruments received through their check-cashing business into Account No. XX3503. The persuasive evidence shows that once Respondents deposited the payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they lost access to and control of those funds. This is because, as noted above, only Intermex representatives were authorized signatories on the account. When Respondents deposited payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, those funds were thereafter "swept" into Account No. XX7788, which was Intermex's main operating account at U.S. Bank. This means that the funds were removed from Account No. XX3503 and deposited in Account No. XX7788. Respondents were not signatories to Account No. XX7788, so did not have access to the funds in that account. As a result of Respondents not being signatories on either Account No. XX3503 or Account No. XX7788, once they deposited payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they lost access to and control of the funds paid under those payment instruments. The persuasive evidence establishes that Respondents deposited approximately ten percent of the payment instruments that they received from their check cashing business into Account No. XX3503 during the timeframe pertinent to this proceeding. The other payment instruments were deposited into other accounts that Respondents held at other banks. Carrascal credibly testified that when Intermex first approached her about opening an account at U.S. Bank, she was concerned because she knew that the law required payment instruments to be deposited into the business's own commercial account. Thus, she declined to open such account. When Intermex representatives approached her a second time, they told her that the account would be in the name of Moctezuma Envios and assured her that Moctezuma Envios would be in compliance with the law. She believed them, so authorized them to open Account No. XX3503. Carrascal further testified, credibly and persuasively, that as soon as she received notice that Petitioner believed that Account No. XX3503 did not comply with the law, she closed the account and ceased doing business with Intermex and U.S. Bank. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondents did not attempt to conceal any information or mislead Petitioner regarding Account No. XX3503. Carrascal credibly and persuasively testified that she had intended to fully comply with the law. She had received training in order to serve as Moctezuma Envios' compliance officer, and Moctezuma Envios has a legal compliance manual in place to help ensure that it complies with applicable laws. The evidence establishes that Moctezuma Envios has been disciplined twice for previous violations of applicable laws. Specifically, some time prior to December 2008, Moctezuma Envios failed to file currency transaction reports concerning cash received from another chapter 560 licensee and failed to timely file at least two quarterly reports, as required by statute and rule. In 2011, Moctezuma Envios failed to timely file a required quarterly report. Both violations were resolved pursuant to Stipulation and Consent Agreement between Petitioner and Moctezuma Envios, under which Moctezuma Envios paid fines and agreed to comply with the law in the future. Carrascal acknowledged that the violations had occurred, but testified, credibly, that in both instances, Respondents had not intended to violate the law, and that Respondents had cooperated with Petitioner to rectify the circumstances that had resulted in noncompliance. Petitioner has adopted rule 69V-560.1000, which codifies a penalty matrix that authorizes and enables Petitioner to impose a fine for a specific statutory or rule violation, based on the level of fine adopted in rule 69V-560.1000(150) and the number of times a licensee has violated that particular statute or rule. Rule 69V-560.1000(150) establishes a range of $1,000 to $3,500 for a Level A fine; $3,500 to $7,500 for a Level B fine; and $7,500 to $10,000 for a Level C fine. Here, Respondents are charged with having violated section 560.309(3) for the first time. Pursuant to rule 69V-560.1000(85), Respondents are subject to a Level B fine, which ranges from $3,500 to $7,500. Rule 69V-560.1000(148) sets forth the factors, which Petitioner characterizes as "aggravating" or "mitigating," that must be considered in determining the specific amount of the fine within the ranges established in rule 69V-560.1000(150). 29. Rule 69V-560.1000(148) states: In accordance with Sections 560.1141(2) and (3), F.S., the Office shall consider the following circumstances in determining an appropriate penalty within the range of penalties prescribed in this rule for each violation as based upon the citation number. The Office also shall consider these circumstances in determining a penalty that deviates from the range of penalties prescribed for each violation and citation number as a result of such circumstances: Whether the violation rate is less than 5% when compared to the overall sample size reviewed; The degree of harm to the customers or the public; The disciplinary history of the licensee; Whether the licensee detected and voluntarily instituted corrective responses or measures to avoid the recurrence of a violation prior to detection and intervention by the Office; Whether the licensee’s violation was the result of willful misconduct or recklessness; Whether at the time of the violation, the licensee had developed and implemented reasonable supervisory, operational or technical procedures, or controls to avoid the violation; Where the violation is attributable to an individual officer, director, responsible person, or authorized vendor, whether the licensee removed or otherwise disciplined the individual prior to detection and intervention by the Office; Whether the licensee attempted to conceal the violation or mislead or deceive the Office; The length of time over which the licensee engaged in the violations; Whether the licensee engaged in numerous violations or a pattern of misconduct; The number, size and character of the transactions in question; Whether the licensee provided substantial assistance to the Office in its examination or investigation of the underlying misconduct; Other relevant, case-specific circumstances. Andrew Grosmaire, Chief for Petitioner's Bureau of Enforcement, testified that Petitioner proposes to impose a $7,500 fine on Respondents, and explained the basis for that amount. Grosmaire testified that Petitioner did not have any information regarding several of the factors listed in rule 69V-560.1000, so did not "use" those factors in determining the fine to be imposed on Moctezuma Envios.6/ Specifically, Petitioner did not use the factors in subsections (a), (b), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (l), and (m) in determining the fine. Petitioner did consider subsection (c), regarding the licensee's disciplinary history, in determining the fine. As discussed above, Petitioner presented evidence showing that Moctezuma Envios had been disciplined twice for violations of provisions of chapter 560 and implementing rules, albeit not for the same violation that is the subject of this proceeding.7/ Grosmaire noted that it was "unusual" for a licensee to have two previous violations. Petitioner thus considered Moctezuma Envios' disciplinary history an aggravating factor in determining the applicable fine. Petitioner also considered subsection (k), which addresses the number, size, and character of the transactions in question. According to Grosmaire, "100 percent of the checks were deposited into this account during the period in question," so Petitioner considered this an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate fine. As noted above, pursuant to rules 69V-560.1000(85), (147), and (148), Petitioner proposes to fine Respondents $7,500. Findings of Ultimate Fact Regarding Alleged Violation Florida case law holds that the determination of whether alleged conduct violates a statute or rule is a question of ultimate fact. Gross v. Dep't of Health, 819. So. 2d 997, 2002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Langston v. Jamerson, 653 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1st SCA 1995). For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondents did not own Account No. XX3503, into which payment instruments from Moctezuma Envios' check-cashing business were deposited. Although Respondents were able to deposit payment instruments into Account No. XX3503, they were not signatories on the account so could not withdraw funds from that account. Further, Respondents were not signatories to, and therefore did not have access to funds in, Account No. XX7788, into which Intermex swept the funds from the deposited instruments in Account No. XX3503 on a routine basis. On this basis, it is determined that Petitioner demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Moctezuma Envios and Liliana Carrascal, by virtue of being an affiliated party pursuant to section 560.103(1), violated section 560.309(3) by failing to maintain and deposit payment instruments into their own commercial account at a federally- insured financial institution. As discussed above, Petitioner proposes to fine Respondents $7,500, the maximum amount that can be imposed for a Level B fine. Petitioner reached this amount taking into account the factors set forth in rules 69V-560.1000(148)(c) and (k), which it considered to be aggravating factors that militated imposition of a higher fine within the Level B range. As discussed above, Carrascal presented evidence regarding several of the factors in rule 69V-560.1000(148) considered in determining the appropriate fine. Specifically, Carrascal testified, persuasively, that no harm to her customers or the public resulted from Respondents' violation of section 560.309(3); that Respondents' violation of the statute was inadvertent and was the result of misrepresentation by Intermex, so that the violation was not the result of Respondents' willful conduct or recklessness; that Moctezuma Envios has in place a professionally-prepared compliance manual to help Respondents avoid future violations, including the type of violation at issue in this proceeding; that once Carrascal became aware that Petitioner believed Account No. XX3503 was noncompliant with section 560.309(3), she cooperated fully with Petitioner's investigation and did not attempt to conceal, mislead, or deceive Petitioner; that as soon as Carrascal became aware of the noncompliance issues with Account No. XX3503, she closed the account and Respondents terminated all business dealings with U.S. Bank and Intermex, the latter with which Respondents had a business relationship that predated the matters giving rise to this proceeding; and that the deposits into Account No. XX3503 constituted only approximately ten percent of the total deposits Respondents made during the timeframe pertinent to this proceeding, with the other 90 percent being deposited in other accounts at other financial institutions. As discussed above, the undersigned found Respondents' evidence of mitigation regarding the factors set forth in rules 69V-560.1000(148)(b), (e), (f), (h), (k), and (l) credible and persuasive. Further, the undersigned considers relevant that in this case, Respondents affirmatively were misled into violating the law by Intermex.8/ Petitioners did not present persuasive countervailing evidence rebutting the evidence of mitigation presented by Respondents with respect to the amount of the fine. As noted above, Grosmaire testified that Petitioner considered subsections (c) and (k) as aggravating factors in determining that Respondents should be fined $7,500. Rule 69V- 560.1000(148) does not specifically address how much weight each factor should be assigned in determining the specific fine within the authorized range, and Grosmaire did not explain how the factors Petitioner "used" were weighed in arriving at the $7,500 fine. Considering the "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors on which the parties presented evidence, the undersigned determines that a $4,500 fine should be imposed on Respondents in this proceeding.9/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order finding that Respondents, Moctezuma Envios, Inc., and Liliana Carrascal, violated section 560.309(3), Florida Statutes, and imposing a fine of $4,250. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 2016.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent violated section 489.129(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), by being convicted or found guilty of, or entering a plea of nolo contendere to, regardless of adjudication, a crime directly related to the practice or the ability to practice contracting. If so, it must also be determined what penalty should be imposed for the violation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the licensing and regulation of contractors pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. Respondent holds an active license as a certified general contractor, having been issued license number CGC 1515398 on April 30, 2008. He is also the qualifier for Pro Group Construction, Inc. Respondent's license expires August 31, 2014. On or about October 15, 2009, Respondent was charged by the United States Government in a one-count Information with conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. On April 5, 2011, Respondent pled guilty to Count I of the Information, and was adjudicated guilty. On March 20, 2012, Respondent was sentenced to incarceration for one year and one day, supervised release for a period of three years upon completion of his prison sentence, and payment of restitution in the amount of $182,294.83 to Wells Fargo Bank. Included in the terms of supervision, are the following: The Defendant shall provide the probation officer access to any requested financial information. The defendant shall be prohibited from incurring new credit charges, opening additional lines of credit, acquisitions or obligating himself for any major purchases without approval of the probation officer. The defendant shall be prohibited from engaging in any employment related to the buying and selling of real estate. The scheme to which Respondent pled guilty involved fraudulent statements to a lending institution, i.e., Wells Fargo Bank, to induce the lender to believe that buyers had the funds to make down payments on foreclosed properties in order to qualify for loans when in fact the buyers did not have those funds. The conduct from which the criminal charges arose occurred prior to Respondent's licensure as a certified general contractor. The guilty plea and the judgment and sentencing all occurred while Respondent held his contractor's license. Respondent admitted at hearing that his actions, which resulted in the criminal proceedings, were wrong, and he takes responsibility for his wrongdoing. He asserts, however, that because he was not licensed at the time of the conduct, it has nothing to do with his license as a certified general contractor. He was, instead, licensed as a mortgage broker. However, contractors routinely interact with customers, deal with contracts for the building of or improvement of buildings, handle money and checks, and have direct involvement with lending institutions. Respondent admitted that, if he had an employee with a conviction for a crime such as the crime for which he pleaded guilty, that employee would not be permitted to handle money on behalf of his company.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 489.129(1)(j) and (m), Florida Statutes (2004),1/ and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a certified general contractor, having been issued License No. CGC 1506043 by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board ("Board" or "Construction Industry Licensing Board") and was the primary qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation. The Board is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of contracting in the State of Florida pursuant to Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant, Rankor Corporation was a contractor-qualified business in the State of Florida, having been issued License No. QB 26667. The officers of the Rankor Corporation were as follows: Tina M. Despin, president; Stephen Despin, Sr., executive vice president; Jerold S. Bakelman, vice president and treasurer; and Eldora Bakelman, secretary. The directors of the Rankor Corporation were Respondent, Mr. Bakelman and Mr. Despin. Jerold Bakelman was licensed as a financially responsible officer by the Board from August 27, 2003, to January 7, 2005. Mr. Bakelman's license number was FRO 711. Transactions Related to Longoria Property In December 2004, Antonia Longoria met with Tina Despin and Stephen Despin, Sr., about replacing the roof and performing other repairs at a house owned by Ms. Longoria located at 4716 Nottingham Drive, Ft. Myers, Florida ("Nottingham Drive house" or "Nottingham Drive property").2/ On or about December 7, 2004, Ms. Longoria entered into a contract with Rankor Corporation to remove and replace the roof and to make the other repairs at the Nottingham Drive house (hereinafter referred to as "Contract No. 1" or "December 7, 2004, Contract"). The cost for the scope of work in Contract No. 1, including the cost of obtaining permits was $32,690.00. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, one-third of the contract amount, $10,896.67, was due when the contract was signed; one-third of the contract amount was due when the trusses were delivered; $8,396.67 was due when the job was completed; and $2,500.00 was due after the final inspection of the job was completed. The December 7, 2004, Contract was signed by Tina Despin on behalf of Rankor Corporation and by Ms. Longoria. On or about December 7, 2004, Ms. Longoria paid Rankor Corporation, by personal check, a payment in the amount of $10,896.67 for the work to be done pursuant to Contract No. 1. Ms. Longoria made the check out to Rankor Corporation and gave it to Ms. Despin. On or about December 17, 2004, about ten days after Contract No. 1 was executed, Ms. Longoria entered into a second contract with Rankor Corporation to do additional work at the Nottingham Drive house (hereinafter referred to as "Contract No. 2" or "December 17, 2004, Contract"). Under the terms of the December 17, 2004, Contract, Rankor Corporation was required to relocate the entrance to the house from the side to the front of the house. The cost for the scope of work under this contract was $10,770.00, with payments to be made in three installments. Pursuant to the terms of Contract No. 2, one-third of the contract amount, $3,590.00, was due when the contract was signed; one-third was due when the trusses were delivered; and the remaining one-third was due upon completion of the project. Contract No. 2 was signed by Tina Despin on behalf of Rankor Corporation and by Ms. Longoria on or about December 17, 2004. Two days later, on or about December 19, 2004, Ms. Longoria paid Mr. Despin, Sr., by personal check, a payment in the amount of $3,590.00 for the project under this contract. The check was made out to "Stephen E. Despin" and not to Rankor Corporation. Ms. Longoria paid the $3,590.00 to Mr. Despin, Sr., as a representative of Rankor Corporation. The scope of work under both Contract No. 1 and Contract No. 2 required permits from the City of Ft. Myers Building Department before work could commence. However, after the two contracts were executed, Rankor Corporation never applied for the permits necessary to commence work under those contracts. At or near the end of January 2005, Ms. Longoria began calling Mr. Despin, Sr., to find out when he would begin the project at the Nottingham Drive house. After several unsuccessful attempts by Ms. Longoria to reach Mr. Despin, Sr., he returned her call in February or March, but Rankor Corporation never performed any of the work required under Contract No. 1 and Contract No. 2. No one from Rankor Corporation ever performed any work on Ms. Longoria's Nottingham Drive house. Notwithstanding its failure to perform any of the work required under the December 7, 2004, Contract and the December 17, 2004, Contract, Rankor Corporation did not return Ms. Longoria's two payments made pursuant to the terms of those contracts. The total of these two payments was $14,486.67. In or about March 2005, the City of Ft. Myers Code Enforcement unit posted a notice on the Nottingham Drive property advising Ms. Longoria that the subject property was in violation of the city code. The notice gave Ms. Longoria, as owner of the property, 30 days to have the repairs done to bring the house into compliance with the code. The violations cited in the notice were related to damages the Nottingham Drive house sustained from Hurricane Charlie. On or about April 19, 2005, Ms. Longoria entered into a contract with Roofmaster of South Florida, Inc. ("Roofmaster") to repair the roof at the Nottingham Drive house in order for the roof to be in compliance with the City of Ft. Myers code. The scope of work under the contract with Roofmaster was smaller than the scope of work under the December 7, 2004, Contract between Ms. Longoria and Rankor Corporation. The contact price for the project with Roofmaster was $9,500.00. In or about May 2005, Roofmaster commenced and completed work under its contract with Ms. Longoria. For this work, Ms. Longoria paid Roofmaster the contract price of $9,500.00. At no point in time until May 2005, the time at which Roofmaster commenced work under the contract with Ms. Longoria, did Ms. Longoria prevent Rankor Corporation from commencing and completing the work projects under the December 7, 2004, Contract and the December 17, 2004, Contract. Respondent's Attempts to be Removed as Qualifying Agent On January 5, 2005, Respondent wrote a letter to Mr. Bakelman memorializing Respondent's and Bakelman's conversation concerning Mr. Bakelman's decision to no longer serve as the financially responsible officer for Rankor Corporation. In the letter, Respondent recounted that during that conversation, he (Respondent) had "executed documents supplied by you [Bakelman] from the State of Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board releasing you [Bakelman] from said position with immediate effect." By letter dated January 5, 2005, Respondent forwarded a copy of his January 5, 2005 letter to Mr. Bakelman to the secretary of the Construction Industry Licensing Board in Tallahassee, Florida. Respondent requested that the letter be recorded and filed with pertinent information maintained by that office for "the business qualified by me [Respondent], known as Rankor Corporation. Apparently concerned about Mr. Bakelman's stepping down as Rankor Corporation's financially responsible officer, Respondent contacted the Department's Customer Service section on January 5, 2005, about the situation. At that time, a person in that section told Respondent that he should inform the company officers that they had an obligation to secure a new financially responsible officer, and if they did not, he was obligated either to act in that position or to terminate his position as qualifying representative. On January 7, 2005, Bakelman was properly removed as the financially responsible officer for Rankor Corporation and, thereby, ceased being the financially responsible officer for Rankor Corporation. Upon Mr. Bakelman's being properly removed as the financially responsible officer, Respondent, as the qualifying agent, became responsible for the duties and obligations related to Rankor Corporation's financial matters. By letter dated February 7, 2005, Respondent advised Stephen and Tina Despin (Stephen and Tina) that he was terminating his position as the primary qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation. In this letter, Respondent recounted a January 5, 2005, letter to the Despins in which he indicated that in light of Mr. Bakelman's resignation, he (Respondent) was requiring them to secure a financially responsible officer within two weeks. According to the letter, the reason Respondent was terminating his position with the company was that the Despins had failed to do so. In addition to advising the Despins that he was terminating his position as qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation, Respondent's letter provided the following: Pursuant to guidelines of CILB [Construction Industry Licensing Board], it is required that no new contracts or construction endeavors requiring the use of my license be undertaken, this includes, but is not limited to, the "pulling" of permits. Furthermore, my license number is to be removed form any signage or advertising immediately, which would serve to give the impression that Rankor is acting as a certified general contractor. The only work you are permitted to perform is to conclude projects already underway, and I was advised by the board [Construction Industry Licensing Board] that you should secure another qualifier as soon as possible. I will advise the local building departments of the change of status as well. Respondent sent the February 7, 2005, letter to the Despins by certified mail. According to the return receipt, Tina Despin signed for and received the letter on February 8, 2005. Respondent also sent a copy of his February 7, 2005, letter to the Despins to the Construction Industry Licensing Board. On February 7, 2005, Respondent sent a letter to the Board informing the Board of Respondent's termination as the primary qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation and requesting the appropriate documents to be removed as the primary qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation. The letter provided, in relevant part, the following: Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Fl [sic] 32399 Re.: Termination of Acting as Qualifier for Rankor Corporation Dear Sirs or Mesdames: As per attached letter I with immediate effect remove myself as qualifier for Rankor Corporation, QB 26667[.] Please provide me with any forms required to effect completion of the same, this should not be considered in any manner a renunciation or modification of my termination as qualifier. This act is irrevocable and immediate. I am a certified General Contractor, [sic] [M]y license number is CGC 1506043. The "attached letter" referred to in Respondent's letter to the Board, quoted in paragraph 30, is Respondent's February 7, 2005, letter to the Despins. Larissa Vaughn has been the administrative assistant for the executive director of the Board since February 2005. As an administrative assistant, Ms. Vaughn is familiar with the licensure process for construction contractors. Ms. Vaughn testified that the Board never received Respondent's February 7, 2005, letter to the Board, which informed the Board of Respondent's termination as the primary qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation and requested that he be sent appropriate documents to be removed as the primary qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation. The reason the Board never received the letter is not clear. However, Ms. Vaughn testified that a letter, such as Respondent's February 7, 2005, letter to the Board, would not have necessarily been received. According to Ms. Vaughn, "[a] lot of letters like this are received and [when] there is a request for forms, it goes to our customer contact center." Ms. Vaughn testified that even if the Board had received Respondent's February 7, 2005, letter, that correspondence would not have been sufficient in itself to remove Respondent as the primary qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation. According to Ms. Vaughn, the Department requires that to be removed as the primary qualifying agent for a contractor-qualified business in the State of Florida, a licensed contractor must submit to the Board a properly completed change of status application. Ms. Vaughn testified that a change of status application can be requested and received from the Department by phone, e-mail, or internet.3/ On September 13, 2005, Respondent submitted a change of status application to the Board. Almost two years later, Respondent's change of status application remains open and has not been approved by the Board. Respondent's efforts to terminate his status as the qualifying agent for Rankor Corporation were unsuccessful for the reasons stated above. In this case, even if Respondent's February 7, 2005, letter had effectively terminated his status as qualifying agent, the fact remains that he was the qualifying agent in December 2004 when Rankor Corporation entered into the two contracts with Mrs. Longoria. Moreover, Respondent became responsible for Rankor Corporation's financial matters after Mr. Bakelman was properly released as the company's financially responsible officer. There is no evidence that Respondent has been previously cited for violations under Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. The total investigative costs of this case to Petitioner, excluding costs associated with any attorney's time, for Department Case No. 2005-028129 was $408.37 (four hundred eight dollars and thirty seven cents).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulations, Construction Industry Licensing Board, enter a final order: (1) finding that Respondent, Joseph D. Sloboda, violated Subsections 489.129(1)(j) and (m), Florida Statutes; (2) imposing a $1,000 fine for each violation; (3) requiring Respondent to make restitution to Antonia Longoria in the amount of $14,486.67; and (4) requiring Respondent to pay investigative costs associated with this case of $408.37. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 2007.
